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China’s Energy Security and Relations

with Petrostates

This book examines the development of bilateral energy relations between China

and the two oil-rich countries, Kazakhstan and Russia.

Challenging conventional assumptions about energy politics and China’s

global quest for oil, this book examines the interplay of politics and sociocultural

contexts. It shows how energy resources become ideas and how these ideas are

mobilized in the realm of international relations. China’s relations with Kazakhstan

and Russia are simultaneously enabled and constrained by the discursive politics

of oil. It is argued that to build collaborative and constructive energy relations

with China, its partners in Kazakhstan, Russia, and elsewhere must consider not

only the material realities of China’s energy industry and the institutional settings

of China’s energy policy but also the multiple symbolic meanings that energy

resources and, particularly, oil acquire in China.

China’s Energy Security and Relations with Petrostates oers a nuanced

understanding of China’s bilateral energy relations with Kazakhstan and Russia,

raising essential questions about the social logic of international energy politics.

It will appeal to students and scholars of international relations, energy security,

Chinese and post-Soviet studies, along with researchers working in the elds of

energy policy and environmental sustainability.

Dr. Anna Kuteleva is a postdoctoral research fellow at the School of International

Regional Studies at the National Research University Higher School of Economics,

Russia. Anna holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Alberta,

Canada, and an MA in World Politics from Shandong University, China. Over

the past ten years, she has worked extensively in the realm of political science

and Chinese studies. Her research is located in a broad constructivist tradition

of IR and focuses on the nexus between politics and sociocultural contexts in

international relations, with particular interests in energy politics, Russia, and

China.

Routledge Contemporary China Series

Modern Art for a Modern China

Yiyan Wang

Ethnic Minorities, Media and Participation in Hong Kong

Creative and Tactical Belonging

Lisa Y.M. Leung

The Politics of Waste Management in Greater China

Environmental Governance and Public Participation in Transition

Natalie Wai Man Wong

Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics

From the Tributary System to the Belt and Road Initiative

Asim Dogan

Homeownership in Hong Kong

House Buying as Hope Mechanism

Chung-kin Tsang

Local Clan Communities in Rural China

Revolution and Urbanisation since the Late Qing Dynasty

Zongli Tang

China’s Energy Security and Relations With Petrostates

Oil as an Idea

Anna Kuteleva

Ethnic Identity of the Kam People in Contemporary China

Government versus Local Perspectives

Wei Wang and Lisong Jiang

For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge.com/

Routledge-Contemporary-China-Series/book-series/SE0768

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China’sEnergySecurityandRelationswithPetrostatesThisbookexaminesthedevelopmentofbilateralenergyrelationsbetweenChinaandthetwooil-richcountries,KazakhstanandRussia.ChallengingconventionalassumptionsaboutenergypoliticsandChina’sglobalquestforoil,thisbookexaminestheinterplayofpoliticsandsocioculturalcontexts.Itshowshowenergyresourcesbecomeideasandhowtheseideasaremobilizedintherealmofinternationalrelations.China’srelationswithKazakhstanandRussiaaresimultaneouslyenabledandconstrainedbythediscursivepoliticsofoil.ItisarguedthattobuildcollaborativeandconstructiveenergyrelationswithChina,itspartnersinKazakhstan,Russia,andelsewheremustconsidernotonlythematerialrealitiesofChina’senergyindustryandtheinstitutionalsettingsofChina’senergypolicybutalsothemultiplesymbolicmeaningsthatenergyresourcesand,particularly,oilacquireinChina.China’sEnergySecurityandRelationswithPetrostatesoffersanuancedunderstandingofChina’sbilateralenergyrelationswithKazakhstanandRussia,raisingessentialquestionsaboutthesociallogicofinternationalenergypolitics.Itwillappealtostudentsandscholarsofinternationalrelations,energysecurity,Chineseandpost-Sovietstudies,alongwithresearchersworkinginthefieldsofenergypolicyandenvironmentalsustainability.Dr.AnnaKutelevaisapostdoctoralresearchfellowattheSchoolofInternationalRegionalStudiesattheNationalResearchUniversityHigherSchoolofEconomics,Russia.AnnaholdsaPhDinPoliticalSciencefromtheUniversityofAlberta,Canada,andanMAinWorldPoliticsfromShandongUniversity,China.Overthepasttenyears,shehasworkedextensivelyintherealmofpoliticalscienceandChinesestudies.HerresearchislocatedinabroadconstructivisttraditionofIRandfocusesonthenexusbetweenpoliticsandsocioculturalcontextsininternationalrelations,withparticularinterestsinenergypolitics,Russia,andChina.RoutledgeContemporaryChinaSeriesModernArtforaModernChinaYiyanWangEthnicMinorities,MediaandParticipationinHongKongCreativeandTacticalBelongingLisaY.M.LeungThePoliticsofWasteManagementinGreaterChinaEnvironmentalGovernanceandPublicParticipationinTransitionNatalieWaiManWongHegemonywithChineseCharacteristicsFromtheTributarySystemtotheBeltandRoadInitiativeAsimDoganHomeownershipinHongKongHouseBuyingasHopeMechanismChung-kinTsangLocalClanCommunitiesinRuralChinaRevolutionandUrbanisationsincetheLateQingDynastyZongliTangChina’sEnergySecurityandRelationsWithPetrostatesOilasanIdeaAnnaKutelevaEthnicIdentityoftheKamPeopleinContemporaryChinaGovernmentversusLocalPerspectivesWeiWangandLisongJiangFormoreinformationaboutthisseries,pleasevisit:https://www.routledge.com/Routledge-Contemporary-China-Series/book-series/SE0768China’sEnergySecurityandRelationswithPetrostatesOilasanIdeaAnnaKutelevaFirstpublished2022byRoutledge2ParkSquare,MiltonPark,Abingdon,OxonOX144RNandbyRoutledge605ThirdAvenue,NewYork,NY10158RoutledgeisanimprintoftheTaylor&FrancisGroup,aninformabusiness©2022AnnaKutelevaTherightofAnnaKutelevatobeidentifiedasauthorofthisworkhasbeenassertedbyherinaccordancewithsections77and78oftheCopyright,DesignsandPatentsAct1988.Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthisbookmaybereprintedorreproducedorutilisedinanyformorbyanyelectronic,mechanical,orothermeans,nowknownorhereafterinvented,includingphotocopyingandrecording,orinanyinformationstorageorretrievalsystem,withoutpermissioninwritingfromthepublishers.Trademarknotice:Productorcorporatenamesmaybetrademarksorregisteredtrademarks,andareusedonlyforidentificationandexplanationwithoutintenttoinfringe.BritishLibraryCataloguing-in-PublicationDataAcataloguerecordforthisbookisavailablefromtheBritishLibraryLibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationDataNames:Kuteleva,Anna,author.Title:China’senergysecurityandrelationswithpetrostates:oilasanidea/AnnaKuteleva.Description:NewYork:Routledge,2021.Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.Identifiers:LCCN2021001426ISBN9780367651329(hardback)ISBN9780367651466(paperback)ISBN9781000406313(adobepdf)ISBN9781000406320(epub)Subjects:LCSH:Energypolicy--China.Energyindustries--China--Internationalcooperation.China--Commerce--Russia(Federation)Russia(Federation)--Commerce--China.China--Commerce--Kazakhstan.Kazakhstan--Commerce--China.Environmentalpolicy--Internationalcooperation.Classification:LCCHD9502.C62K882021DDC333.8/2320951--dc23LCrecordavailableathttps://lccn.loc.gov/2021001426ISBN:978-0-367-65132-9(hbk)ISBN:978-0-367-65146-6(pbk)ISBN:978-1-003-12804-5(ebk)TypesetinTimesNewRomanbyDeantaGlobalPublishingServices,Chennai,IndiaIdedicatemyworktomygrandfather,VadimFilippov,andthememoryofmygrandmother,AntoninaFilippova.Ultimatelynothingcouldhavebeenpossiblewithouttheunwaveringsupportofmymother,OlgaKuteleva.ContentsListofillustrationsixListoftablesxiPrefacexiiAcknowledgmentsxiiiAbbreviationsxv1Whatdoyouimaginewhenyouthinkaboutoil?12Discursivepoliticsofenergyandenergyparadigms:Theoreticalframeworkandmethodology8Realismvs.liberalism:Thedichotomyofconflictandcooperationinthestudyofinternationalenergypolitics8Analternative:Criticalconstructivism11Discourseanalysisandtexts:“Frompoststructuralistislandstothefarawayshoresofconstructivism”173China’senergysecurityanddiscursivepoliticsofenergy24EvolutionofChina’senergystrategyfromthe1950stothe2000s:“Self-reliance,”“goingout,”and“scientificdevelopment”27China’sdiscursivepoliticsofenergy38China’senergyparadigm:ChasingDaqing504China–Russiaenergyrelations61Russia’sdiscursivepoliticsofenergy62Russia’senergyparadigm:Adiscursivebipolardisorder74China–Russiaenergyrelations75Xi’s“Chinadream”andPutin’s“energysuperpower”84viiiContents5China–Kazakhstanenergyrelations96Kazakhstan’sdiscursivepoliticsofoil97ConstructingKazakhstanasapetrostate:Oilrentand“We”and“they”inKazakhstan’sdiscursivepoliticsofEnergycooperationbetweenXiJinping’sChinaandtheKazakhstan’soil:Ablessingandathreat99Nazarbayevism103energy113Kazakhstan’senergyparadigm:Nazarbayev’spetrostate116China–Kazakhstanenergydialogue116post-NazarbayevKazakhstan1276Conclusions:Examiningoilasadiscourse139Energy(in)securitiesanddiscursivepoliticsofoil139China’squestforoil140Limitationsanddirectionsforfutureresearch142Index145Illustrations3.1DaqingIronManWangJinxiMemorial.Daqing,China,November2016313.2TheMuseumofDaqingOilfield,November2016.Anoilworkerstudiesthe“twotheories”ofChairmanMaoafterashift323.3TheMuseumofDaqingOilfield,November2016.ZhengZhenhe(1977).TheIronManWangJinxistudiesthe“twotheories”ofChairmanMao323.4TheMuseumofDaqingOilfield,November2016.YuDaokai(1989).ThebirthofDaqing:GreetingtheNationalDaywithnewandoutstandingsuccess334.1MultimediaartinstallationEnergyoftheGreatVictory.May2015.GorkyCentralParkofCultureandLeisure,Moscow,Russia644.2OutlineofthemultimediaartinstallationEnergyoftheGreatVictory.©Museon.ru.CourtesyofMuseon.ru644.3Molodkin,A.(2013).Democracy[mixedmediainstallation,crudeoil,neon].©AndreiMolodkin.CourtesyofGregoryR.Staley,AmericanUniversityMuseumattheKatzenArtsCenter684.4VasyaLozhkin(2012).ThePaganDeities[acryliconpaper].©VasyaLozhkin.Courtesyoftheartist.Inscriptionsonthepainting:“Father-Gas”(left)and“Mother-Oil”(right)684.5VasyaLozhkin(2012).TheBlackVodka[acryliconpaper].©VasyaLozhkin.Courtesyoftheartist695.1TheheadquartersofKMGinNur-Sultan.©PeterKorolev.Courtesyofthephotographer1075.2MapofNur-Sultan.ThemainurbanaxisofNur-Sultan:theKhanShatyrEntertainmentCenter(1),theKMG’sheadquartersandtheRoundSquare(2),theBayterekTower(3),andtheAkOrdaPresidentialPalace(4)1075.3TheheadquartersofKMG,theviewontheBaiterekTowerfromtheRoundSquare(North).©PeterKorolev.Courtesyofthephotographer1085.4TheBaiterekTowerandtheAkOrdaPresidentialPalace.©PeterKorolev.Courtesyofthephotographer108xIllustrations5.5TheAkOrdaPresidentialPalace,theviewfromtheBaiterekTower.©PeterKorolev.Courtesyofthephotographer1095.6TheheadquartersofKMG,theviewontheentertainmentcenterKhanShatyrfromtheRoundSquare(South).©PeterKorolev.Courtesyofthephotographer1095.7TheentertainmentcenterKhanShatyr.©PeterKorolev.Courtesyofthephotographer110Tables2.1IntertextualResearchModels183.1China’sOilProduction,Consumption,andTrade:1993–2016345.1Kazakhstan’sLargestOilProducingCompanies(WithMoreThan1,000Employees,April2017)120PrefaceAttheheartofthisbookistheinterplaybetweenpoliticsandsocioculturalcon-textsininternationalenergypolitics.IexplorethisinterplaybyexaminingthedevelopmentofbilateralenergyrelationsbetweenChinaandtwooil-richcoun-tries,KazakhstanandRussia,from2005to2017.Thegoalistochallengeconven-tionalassumptionsaboutenergypoliticsand,particularly,aboutChina’sglobalquestforoilbyshowinghowenergyresourcesbecomeideasandhowtheseideasaremobilizedintherealmofinternationalrelations.Buildingmyanalysisonconstructivistandpoststructuralistinsights,Idemon-stratethatChina’senergyrelationswithKazakhstanandRussiaaresimultane-ouslyenabledandconstrainedbythediscursivepoliticsofenergy.IalsorevealthatChina’sexternalenergystrategyiscruciallydependentonitsdomesticdiscur-sivepoliticsofenergy.Hence,tobuildcollaborativeandconstructiveenergyrela-tionswithChina,itspartnersinKazakhstan,Russia,andelsewheremustconsidernotonlythematerialrealitiesofChina’senergyindustry(e.g.,energyresourcesavailableinChina,itsmining,refining,andstoragecapacity,andtheexistingandplannedtransportationroutes)andtheinstitutionalsettingsofChina’senergypolicy(e.g.,China’slegalframeworksandthestructureofChina’senergygov-ernment)butalsothemultiplesymbolicmeaningsthatenergyresourcesacquireinChina.Overall,thisbooknotonlyprovidesanuancedunderstandingofChina’sbilat-eralenergyrelationswithKazakhstanandRussiabutalsoraisesandbringstotheforequestionsaboutthesociallogicofinternationalenergypoliticsingen-eral.Thus,itoffersanimportantadditiontotheliteraturecriticalofmainstreamapproachestointernationalrelationsandhelpingtopromotediscourseanalysiswithinthedisciplinefurther.AcknowledgmentsThisbookistheresultofasix-year-longresearchadventure.ItisbasedonthePhDthesiswhichIpreparedanddefendedattheUniversityofAlbertainCanada.Inthecourseofthisresearchproject,Ihavebeenfortunateenoughtoreceivesup-portandadvicefrommanypeople.Firstofall,IoweinfinitethankstomysupervisorIanUrquhart.Thisresearchprojectwouldnotbethesamewithoutyourconstructivefeedback,gentleguid-ance,andencouragement.Fromourfirstmeeting,youtookme,mywriting,andmyideasseriously.Ineverfeltlonelybutalwaysfeltsupportedandvalued.YouarethebestmentorIcouldaskfor.Thankyouforyourinsightfuldiscussionsandforalwaysbeingthereforme.Thankyouforyourhumor,kindness,andpatience.Thankyouverymuchtomysupervisorycommitteemembers,RogerEppandGordonHoulden,fortheenthusiasticguidanceofmyresearch.Roger,thankyouforassistingmeineachsteptocompletemyPhDprogram.Yourthought-stimu-latingquestionsnotonlyencouragedmetocriticallyevaluatemyresearchprac-ticesandscholarlyanalysisbutalsoinstilledconfidenceinmeandempoweredmeasanindependentthinker.Gordon,thankyouforbeinggenerouswithyourtimeandadvice.ThankyouforwelcomingmeintotheChinaInstituteandforgivingmetheopportunitytobeapartofatop-notchresearchteam.IwouldliketothankRobAitkenandJeremyPaltielforreadingmyworksothoughtfullyandofferinginsightfulcomments.ThankyoutoMalindaSmith,SiobhanByrne,GregAnderson,PatrickvonMaravic,YasmeenAbu-Laban,JudyGarber,andMojtabaMahdaviforadvice,feedback,challengingquestions,guidance,andencouragementatvariousstagesofmyworkattheUniversityofAlberta.ThankyoutoStephenKuntz,associatedirectoroftheAcademicSuccessCentreattheUniversityofAlberta,forhelpingmetobuildmyconfidenceinwriting.Ialsowouldliketothankmyfriendsandcolleagues,TheodorTudoroiu,ValeriySemikashev,JustinLeifso,ChadCowie,RenéeBeausoleil,andJenniferBoivin,whoreadmyearlydrafts,tookthetimetodiscussmyworkandgavemanyhelpfulsuggestionsforitsimprovements.AndthankyoutoallmyintervieweesinChina,Kazakhstan,andRussiafortakingthetimetosharetheirknowledgewithme.MyPhD“gang,”JustinLeifso,ChadCowie,MichaelBurton,andEmrahKeskin,Iamincrediblyluckytosharethisjourneywithyou.ThankyouforsharingxivAcknowledgmentsideas,experiences,books,contacts,aswellashopes,victories,fears,tears,andlaughs.Justin,Chad,andMikethankyouforbeingexcellentambassadorsforCanadaandwelcomingmetoyourcountrywithopenarms.IamgratefulforeverythingIlearnedfromyou(exceptforthenonsenseaboutthose1972hockeygames).Thankyoutomyfriendsandpeers,DanyelEvseev,AlexanderBajev,SamreenAhmed,PrachiMishra,OwurakuKusi-Ampofo,SevanBeukian,NicoleLugosi,HajarAmidian,MiaTulli,DaxD’Orazio,MeganAiken,IsaacOdoom,GeoffSalomons,andAlexandraSavchenko.Iamdeeplygratefulforyoursupport,inspiration,friendship,andshouldertoleanon.Finally,thankyoutoMariamGeorgisandNishaNathforbecominginspira-tionalacademicrolemodelsforme.MariamandNisha,pleaseknowthatIcannotimaginehavingdonethiswithoutyou.Youhavehadaprofoundinfluenceonmyattitudestowardmyresearchandscholarlyfocus.Iamabetterscholarhavingworkedalongsideyou.AbbreviationsBPBritishPetroleumBRIBeltandRoadInitiativeCEOChiefExecutiveOfficerCNOOCChinaNationalOffshoreOilCorporationCNPCChinaNationalPetroleumCorporationCPCCommunistPartyofChinaEIAEnergyInformationAdministrationESPOEasternSiberia–PacificOceanEUEuropeanUnionGDPGrossDomesticProductIWEPACSSInstituteWorldEconomicsandPoliticsChineseAcademyofSocialSciencesKMGKazMunayGasKCPLLPKazakhstan-ChinaPipelineLimitedliabilitypartnershipsNBSCNationalBureauofStatisticsofChinaNFRKNationalFundoftheRepublicofKazakhstanNOCNationaloilcompanyMFAofthePRCMinistryofForeignAffairsofthePeoples’RepublicofChinaMtoeMillionTonsofOilEquivalentPLAPeople’sLiberationArmyofChinaPRCPeople’sRepublicofChinaSCOShanghaiCooperationOrganizationUNUnitedNationsUSUnitedStatesUSSRUnionofSovietSocialistRepublics1Whatdoyouimaginewhenyouthinkaboutoil?Oil.Whatdoyouimaginewhenyouthinkaboutoil?Whatisthefirstthingthatcomestoyourmind?Doyouimaginehighwaysfulloffastcars?DoyouthinkaboutclimatechangeandimaginepipelineprotestsinNorthDakota?DoyouthinkaboutasmalltoyfactoryinChina’sGuangdong?Maybe,youthinkaboutthe2003invasionofIraq?Iwasbornandraisedinpost-SovietRussia,andwhenIthinkaboutoil,thefirstthingthatcomestomymindiscorruption.WhenIthinkaboutoil,IimagineVladimirPutinbeingthepresidentofmycountryforyetanotherdecade.Sincetheearly20thcentury,wehavelivedin“theworldofoil”(e.g.,Yeomans2004;Heinberg2003;Shiva2008;Yergin2011a;BridgeandLeBillon2012).Withtherapiddevelopmentofthenaturalgasindustry,electricity,biofuels,andnon-traditionalenergysourcesoverthepastdecades,oilhasbeenlosingground.Inthepastdecades,oilalsohasbeenpushedpoliticallytodefensivepositionsinmanypartsoftheworldbyenvironmentalactivistsandtheinternationalpoliticsofclimatechangemitigation.However,westilllargelydependonoil,andinthenearfutureitwillstayentrenchedinliterallyallsystemsofoursocieties.Oilistheenergyofourcivilization.Crudeoilisaformofbitumencomposedprincipallyofhydrocarbons.Itisextractedfromnaturalreservoirsandtransportedthroughpipelinestoarefineryortoaport,whereitisloadedintoatankerandcontinuesitsjourneytoarefinerybywater.Morethanhalfofallthecrudeoilusedintheworldcrossesaninternationalborder,whichmakesoiloneofthemostinternationallytradedcommoditiesintheworld(Yergin2011a).Oilpowersover90percentoftheworld’stransportationthatunderpinsmod-erneconomiesandlifestyles.Ourindustrialfoodsupplysystemsalsoconsumealotofoil.Petrochemicalsfromoilareusedtomakeeverythingfromclothestomobilephonestoperfumestovitamins.Nothingmoveswithoutoilinthemodernworld.Thismakesoilagloballysought-aftercommodity(Wenar2016;Yergin2011b).Nonetheless,oilisconcentratedonlyinafewgeographicareas,andconcernsaboutitsscarcityarewidespreadandstrong.Thetemporalaspectand2Whatdoyouimaginewhenyouthinkaboutoil?decliningavailabilityofoilthatreflecttechnologicalandgeologicalconstraintsofoilextractionaddanotherdimensiontoitsscarcity.Fromeconomic,geological,andtechnologicalperspectives,oilisaconcreteandrealthing,yetitanimatessuchabstractideasasfreedom,mobility,andinde-pendence.Whenwethinkaboutoil,wethinknotonlyaboutpumpjacks,pipelines,tankers,pricecharts,andlongsupplychainsbutalsoaboutcapitalism,security,development,environment,democracy,andmodernity.Importantly,bothmate-rialandimaginedconstructionsofoilaresociallyandculturallyspecific.Inotherwords,whileweallliveintheworldofoil,weallthinkaboutoilandimagineitdifferently.Theseideashaveinspiredthecentralquestionofthisbook:Howdodiffer-entstatesunderstandoil,andhowdotheseunderstandingsinfluencerelationsbetweenthem?Atitsheartisageneralinterestinthenexusbetweenpoliticsandsocioculturalcontextsininternationalenergypolitics,andthebookexploresthisnexusbydrawingontheanalysisofthedevelopmentofbilateralenergyrelationsbetweenChinaandtwooil-richcountries–KazakhstanandRussia.ThebookcentersonChinabecauseitscaseisunique.Inthelate19thandtheearly20thcenturies,economicallydilapidatedandpoliticallyunstable,Chinaposedapotentialthreattosomestatesandservedasaspaceforgeopoliticalinvasionforothers.Despitethat,bythebeginningofthe21stcentury,Chinahassuccessfullyliftedarecordnumberofpeopleoutofpovertyandachievedarapidincreaseinlivingstandards,andreachedasustainedlevelofeconomicgrowth,gainingstatureandinfluenceinworldaffairs.ToquoteGiovanniArrighi(2007,95),attheendofthe20thcenturyChinapioneered“thesocialandeco-nomicempowermentofthepeoplesoftheglobalSouth.”GivenChina’ssizeandscale,itisevidentthatitsrapidandpowerfulriseisbringingaboutanewageineconomicandpoliticalhistory(e.g.,Arrighi2007;Jacques2009;Harvey2005).China’sextremetransformationfromenergyself-sufficienttoenergy-dependentdevelopmentoverthepastthreedecadesisoneofthedrivingfactorsofthesechanges.Sincetheearly1990s,Chinahasemergedas“theworld’sfactoryfloor.”AroundhalfofallenergyconsumedinChinaisabsorbedbytheindustrialsec-torandcanbeattributedtointernationaltrade(DuandLin2015).TheincreasedoutputofChina’sindustrialsectordrivesthehighdemandforelectricity,refinedpetroleumproducts,andmaterialsthatareenergy-intensivetoproduce,suchaschemicals,steel,andaluminum(Maetal.2009;Fuetal.2014;DuandLin2015).Theindustryhasalsocontributedtothetotalenergydemandbyboostingenergyconsumptioninthetransportsector(Leung2010;Meidanetal.2015).Socioeconomicchanges,suchasthemarketizationoftheeconomy,rapidurbani-zation,andrisingincomes,haveaddedadditionalpressuretoChina’sdemandforenergy.ThedynamicconsumercultureemerginginChinapromoteslifestylesthatarefundamentallydependentonecologicallydestructiveandnon-renewablesourcesofenergy.Highfossil-fueluseandcarbon-intensivebehaviorarenowthemajorconsumerpatternsofChina’shouseholds(Liuetal.2009;Fengetal.2011;Daietal.2012).Whatdoyouimaginewhenyouthinkaboutoil?3Asaresultofthesedeepandrapidchanges,inthefirstdecadeofthe21stcentury,thefluctuationsinChineseenergyconsumptiondeviatedconsidera-blyfromglobaltrends.Whileprimaryenergyconsumptionhasonlyrisenby13percentinOECDcountriesandby30percentforthewholeworld,Chinaincreaseditsprimaryenergyconsumptionby70percent.RisingdemandforenergyhasturnedChinafromanetenergyexportertoanetenergyimporter.China’senergyproductionwas11.6percentmorethanconsumptioninthemid-1980s;since2005itsconsumptionhassurpassedoutputbyapproximately10percent.Chinabecameacoalimporterin2002andanaturalgasimporterin2007.However,theswitchisparticularlymarkedforpetroleumproducts:inthe1980sChina’soilproductionwas35percentmorethanitsconsumption,butsince2003overone-halfofthetotaloilconsumptionhasbeenimported.Importantly,thereisstrongevidencetosuggestthattheexpansionindemandforenergywillcontinueforaboutanothertwodecades,inasmuchasChina’seconomyisstillintheprocessof“take-off”inindustrializationandsocioeco-nomictransformation(EIA2015).Overthepastdecade,theproductivityofChina’soilfieldshasworsened,andthequalityofdomesticproductionhasdeclinedsteadilybecauseofresourcedepletion.Whileinthe1960sthedevelopmentofinternalenergycapacitywastheprincipalsolutiontoChina’senergysecuritychallenges,inthefuturesub-stantialnewfossil-fuelreserveswillnotlikelybediscovered.Inotherwords,almostallradicaloptionsforthedevelopmentofdomesticenergycapacityhavealreadybeenexhausted;intheneartomediumterm,Chinawillbeunabletoovercomeitsforeignenergydependenceonfossilfuels.Currently,Chinesestate-ownedenterprisesareprospectingforandextractingcrudeoilin42states(EIA2015,9).Three-fourthsofChina’scrudeoilimportscomefromtheMiddleEast(52percent)andAfrica(23percent)1(EIA2015,10).Evenso,thereisampleevi-dencetosuggestthatChinaaimstobroadenthegeographicalscopeofitsforeignenergyquest.ItisimportanttorecognizeandanalyzeChina’semergenceasanewinflu-entialactorininternationalenergypolitics.Fromthestandpointofenlightenedself-interest,mutualvulnerabilitieswithintheglobalenergysystemshouldbeasufficientpragmaticreasonforstudyingthewayChinaunderstandsenergyandconstructsitsrelationswithenergyexportersindifferentpartsoftheworld.Itisalsoimportanttoinquirewhat,onarelativebasis,makesChinaanattractivepart-nerforvariousenergyexportersandhowtheirinteractionswithChinatransformthewaytheyviewtheirownenergywealth.ToexplainhowChina’squestforenergysecuritytransformstheglobalattitudestowardoil,thisbookexaminesChina’srelationswithRussiaandKazakhstan.TheChina–Russiacaseissignificantbecausebothstatesplaymajorrolesinshapingglobaltrendsinenergypolitics.Incontrast,newsfromKazakhstanrarelyhitinter-nationalheadlines,yetKazakhstanisasignificantoilproducerandhasbecomeanincreasinglyimportantsuppliertoChinaoverthepast20years.Importantly,theChina–KazakhstancaseprovidesnovelinsightsintoChina’sapproachtoSouth–SouthcooperationanditsstrategyinCentralAsia.4Whatdoyouimaginewhenyouthinkaboutoil?ByexaminingChina’srelationswithKazakhstanandRussia,thisbooknotonlyprovidesanuancedunderstandingofenergyrelationsbetweentheseindividualstatesbutalsoraisesandbringstotheforequestionsaboutthesociallogicofinter-nationalenergypoliticsingeneral.Specifically,itdemonstratesthatthematerialanddiscursivestructuresofenergypoliticsarecomplexlyinterwovenandinterde-pendentthroughdiversesocial,cultural,economic,andpoliticalencounterswithenergy,andthus,energyrelationsaredeterminednotonlybymaterialrealitiesbutalsobydiscursivepoliticsofenergy.Inthissense,theanalyticalfocusofthisbookisnotonwhyaparticularoutcomewasobtainedinChina–KazakhstanandChina–Russiaenergyrelationsbutratheronhowandwithwhateffectdiversediscursivestructuresofenergypoliticsaresociallyconstructedinthecourseoftheserelations.Twokeytheoreticalpropositionsanchormyanalysis.First,therealitiesofenergyproductionandconsumption(e.g.,volumeanddestinationsofoilexports,domesticoildemand)aretreatedasmaterialreferentsofidentitiesthatarecon-structedbystatesininternationalenergypolitics.Second,thematerialrealitiesofenergyacquiretheirmeaningsandsignificanceonlyintheprocessofnarrative-makinganddiscursivesymbolization.Hence,ifwewanttounderstandhowanagentconstructsitsidentityandtheidentitiesofitscounterpartsininternationalenergypolitics,weneedtoknowwhatmeaningsthisagentattributestoenergyresources.AstructuredandsystematicintertextualdiscourseanalysisbasedonLeneHansen’smethodology(2006)ofaheterogeneouscollectionoftextsallowsmetoachievetwoprimaryanalyticalgoals:··torevealthediscoursesthatdominateChina’senergyrelationswithKazakhstanandRussia;and··toexaminehowthesedominantdiscoursessupportandsustainspecificinter-pretationsofChina’senergyrelationswithKazakhstanandRussiawhileexcludingorrenderingmarginalothers.TomapandelucidatethedevelopmentofdiscursivepoliticsofenergyinChina,Kazakhstan,andRussia,Iusetextualdocumentsanddiverseculturalartifacts(e.g.,worksoffiction,popularsonglyrics,paintings,photographs,films,museumexhibits,andarchitecture).Myresearchisbilingual,withtextualdocumentsinChineseandRussianbeingthemajorsourcesofdata.Itakelanguageseriouslyandexploreitspowertoconstructsocialreality.Moreover,Ishowthatdiversecompetingdiscoursesaboutextraction,production,andconsumptionofenergyandredistributionofenergyrevenuesemergeanddisseminatethemselvesthroughdifferentformsofvisualart,popularentertainment,architectureandcityplanning,museums,culturalspaces,andothersocioculturalstructuresandpractices.Thisallowsmenotonlytoadvancetheunderstandingofofficialenergydiscoursesbutalsotounravelcriticaldiscoursesabouttheeconomic,environmental,social,andpoliticalimpactsassociatedwiththeexpansionoftheenergyindustryandtheincreaseofenergyexports.Therestofthebookproceedsinfivechapters.InChapter2,IexplainwherethebookislocatedwithinthemajortheoreticaldebatesthatprovidethebasisforWhatdoyouimaginewhenyouthinkaboutoil?5thestudyofenergypoliticsintherealmofInternationalRelations.Istartwithabroadanddiversebutnotoverlydetailedreviewoftheexistingmainstreamrealistandliberalscholarshipthatisheavilypreoccupiedwiththedichotomyofconflictandcooperationandexplainsinternationalenergyrelationsthroughtheprismofenergysecurity.Problematizingtheconceptofenergysecurity,Ipresentcon-structivismasanalternativethatcanleadtovaluableinsights.Inthelastpartofthischapter,Idefinemajorconceptsanddevelopaconstructivistmethodologyforstudyinginternationalenergyrelationsasaproductofcomplex,dynamic,andinterdependentsocialprocesses.Chapter3focusesonChina.IstartwithChina’squestfor“self-reliance”inthe1950sandthestoryoftheDaqingoilfield.Further,Idiscussthelegacyof“self-reliance”andtransitiontothe“goingglobal”energystrategyintheeraof“reformandopening-up”inthe1990sandtheearly2000s.Inthesecondpartofthischapter,IexaminetheevolutionofChina’sdiscursivepoliticsofenergyinthemid-2000sandtheearly2010s.Iidentifythedominantdiscursiveconstruc-tionsinChina’senergypoliticsandtracehowtheyshiftedandchangedoverthepasttenyears.Finally,IdeterminehowthesediscursiveconstructionssupportandsustainspecificinterpretationsofChina’senergystrategywhileexcludingothersorrenderingthemmarginal.Thisallowsmetodefinenorms,meanings,andideasthatconstituteChina’senergyparadigm.Chapters4and5focusonChina’srelationswithRussianandKazakhstan,respectively.Istarteachcasestudywithananalysisofnationalenergypara-digmsofChina’scounterpartsandthenexaminewhatimpactChina’semergenceasakeyenergyconsumerhasonthem.ThesechaptersshowthatwhileChinaisredefiningglobalenergypoliticsandconventionalapproachestoenergysecu-rity,itsunderstandingofoilhasnotchangedmuchsincethemid-1950s.Hence,China’squestforenergysecuritystrengthenstheaffirmationthatthereisnoalternativeforoil.Atthesametime,thetwopetrostatesseeChinaasstrivingtocontroltheirenergysectorand,subsequently,asathreattotheirsovereigntyintherealmofinternationalenergypolitics,whichiskeytotheirsenseofidentity.Overall,Russia’sandKazakhstan’senergycooperationwithChinasimultane-ouslyexposescontradictionswithintheirenergyparadigmsandactsasaconduitthroughwhichperceptionsofChinaasathreatfindastrongervoice.Finally,Chapter6emphasizestheneedtotaketheconstitutivepoweroflan-guageseriouslyandreflectonhowthelanguageweuseinfluencesthewaywestudyandpracticeenergypolitics.ItstressesthattheexternalenergystrategiesofChinaanditsenergy-richcounterpartsarecruciallydependentontheirdiscursivepoliticsofenergy.Hence,theworkofbuildingcollaborativeandconstructiveenergyrelationswithChina,itspartnersinKazakhstan,Russia,andelsewheremustconsidernotonlymaterialrealitiesofChina’senergyindustry(e.g.,energyresourcesavailableinChina,itsmining,refining,andstoragecapacity,andtheexistingandplannedtransportationroutes)andinstitutionalsettingsofChina’senergypolicy(e.g.,China’slegalframeworksandthestructureofChina’senergygovernment),butalsomultiplesymbolicmeaningsthatenergyresourcesacquireinChina.6Whatdoyouimaginewhenyouthinkaboutoil?MovingbeyondChina’srelationswithpetrostates,thechapterreturnstotheconceptofenergysecurity.AttheheartofChina’senergyparadigmisanunhealthyobsessionwithenergyself-sufficiency,anditsnotionofsecuritycent-ersonavoidingsuddenchangesintheavailabilityofenergyrelativetodemandinthenameofnationalsecurityandongoingeconomicgrowth.China’squestforoilempowerspetrostates,likeRussiaandKazakhstan,andreinforcestheunderstand-ingofoilasacriticalsought-afterenergysource.Weindeedliveinthe“worldofourmaking,”andthisworld,toalargeextent,istalkedintobeing.Hence,toredefineourunderstandingsofenergysecurity,weneedtostarttakingtheworldofwordsandideasasseriouslyastheworldofpumpjacks,pipelines,tankers,pricecharts,andextendedsupplychains.Thebookendsbyemphasizingthatifwearetoimaginetheworldwith-outoil,weneedtorethinkourrelationswithit.Oncewestartviewingoilasathreatratherthananopportunityforourdevelopmentandprogress,wewillbeabletodevelopanewlanguagethatdenaturalizesthedominantnotionsofenergy(in)securityandcooperatetoproducesustainableinternationalenergysolutions.Note1China’soilimportscomefromSaudiArabia,Iraq,Iran,Oman,Angola,andRussia.In2015,RussiatemporarilyovertookSaudiArabiaasthebiggestcrudeexportertoChinafourtimes.Whilefluctuationsinimportnumbersover2015indicatethatRussiaisgainingmomentuminChina’smarket,itistooearlytodrawconclusions.Asfor2018,SaudiArabiaisstillChina’smajorsupplier.BibliographyArrighi,G.(2007).AdamSmithinBeijing:lineagesofthetwenty-firstcentury.London;NewYork:Verso.Bridge,G.,andLeBillon,P.(2012).Oil.Cambridge:PolityPress.Dai,H.,Masuib,T.,Matsuokac,Y.,andFujimor,S.(2012).TheimpactsofChina’shouseholdconsumptionexpenditurepatternsonenergydemandandcarbonemissionstowards2050.EnergyPolicy,50(1),336–350.Du,K.,andLin,B.(2015).UnderstandingtherapidgrowthofChina’senergyconsumption:acomprehensivedecompositionframework.Energy,90(1),570–577.EnergyInformationAdministration[EIA](2015).China.Internationalenergydataandanalysis[PDFfile]Retrieved27June2016fromhttps://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/China/china.pdf.Feng,Z.,Zou,L.,andWei,M.(2011).TheimpactofhouseholdconsumptiononenergyuseandCO2emissionsinChina.Energy,36(1),656–670.Fu,F.,Ma,L.,Li,Z.,andPolenske,K.R.(2014).TheimplicationsofChina’sinvestment-driveneconomyonitsenergyconsumptionandcarbonemissions.EnergyConversionManagement,85,573–580.Hansen,L.(2006).Securityaspractice:discourseanalysisandtheBosnianWar.London:Routledge.Harvey,D.(2005).Abriefhistoryofneoliberalism.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.Whatdoyouimaginewhenyouthinkaboutoil?7Heinberg,R.(2003).TheParty’sover:oil,warandthefateofindustrial.GabriolaIsland:NewSocietyPublishers.Jacques,M.(2009).WhenChinarulestheworld:theriseofthemiddlekingdomandtheendofthewesternworld.NewYork:AllenLane.Leung,G.C.K.(2010).China’soiluse,1990–2008.EnergyPolicy,38(2),932–944.Liu,H.,Guo,J.,Dong,Q.,andXi,Y.(2009).ComprehensiveevaluationofhouseholdindirectenergyconsumptionandimpactsofalternativeenergypoliciesinChinabyinput-outputanalysis.EnergyPolicy,37(8),3194–3204.Ma,H.,OxleyL.,andGibsonJ.(2009).SubstitutionpossibilitiesanddeterminantsofenergyintensityforChina.EnergyPolicy,37(5),1793–1804.Meidan,M.,Sen,A.,andCampbell,R.(2015).China:the“newnormal.”TheOxfordInstituteofEnergyStudies.[PDFfile]Retrieved12June2016fromhttps://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/China-the-new-normal.pdf.Shiva,V.(2008).Soilnotoil:climatechange,peakoilandfoodinsecurity.London:ZedBooks.Wenar,L.(2016).Bloodoil:tyranny,resources,andtherulesthatruntheworld.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.Yeomans,M.(2004).Oil:anatomyofanindustry.NewYork:NewPress.Yergin,D.(2011a).ThePrize:theepicquestforoil,moneyandpower.NewYork:SimonandSchuster.Yergin,D.(2011b).TheQuest:energy,security,andtheremakingofthemodernworld.London:Penguin.2DiscursivepoliticsofenergyandenergyparadigmsTheoreticalframeworkandmethodologyBuildingmyanalysisonconstructivistandpoststructuralistinsights,Iseektoofferanuancedperspectiveofenergypoliticsthatcapturessuchvariablesassocialcontext,intersubjectivemeanings,andidentities.Myresearchisdividedintotwoparts.Thefirstareathatwillbeexaminedisthediscursivepoliticsofenergythatincludesidentitiesandhistoricalnarrativesaboutenergyresourcesthatareconstructedbystatestorepresentthemselvesandeachotherinenergyrelations.Thesecondareaofresearchinvolvesdevelopingabetterunderstandingofhowtheseidentitiesandhistoricalnarrativesaboutenergyresourcesarerepro-ducedinenergyparadigms.Thischapterintroducesthetheoreticalframeworkthatinformsthisanalysis.Itstartswithacritiqueofthemainstreamapproachestoenergypoliticsandthenproceedstodevelopaconstructivistmethodologyforstudyinginternationalenergyrelationsasaproductofsocialprocesses.Realismvs.liberalism:ThedichotomyofconflictandcooperationinthestudyofinternationalenergypoliticsThemajordivisionswithinthescholarshiponinternationalenergyrelationsarebuiltondifferentapproachestointernationalorderandthenatureofthestateinprovidingandregulatingthisorder.TheliteratureonenergypoliticsthatseekstoincorporateInternationalRelations(IR)theoreticalperspectivesmostoftenreferstorealistandliberaltheoriesas“major,”“dominant,”or“traditional”schoolsofIR(theissuehighlightedbyHancockandVivoda2014andStoddard2013).Despitesomenotableexceptions(BouzarovskiandBassin2011;Mitchell2011;DeBardeleben2012;Casier2011,2013;KratochvílandTichý,2013;Campion2016),theroleofotherIRtraditionsintheresearchoninternationalenergyrela-tionsislimitedtotheextenttowhichtheorizingisreducedtoadialoguebetweenrealismandliberalism.Realismassumesthattheinternationalsystemischaracterizedbyanarchy,inasmuchasnoauthorityiscapableofregulatinginteractionsofthe“sovereign”stateswithinit.Thismeansthatinsteadoffollowingtheprescriptionsofahigherauthority,stateshavetobuildrelationswitheachotherontheirown.Statesareviewedasrationalagentsthatalwayspursuetheirinterestsinthesystemofself-help,andthusthecrucialgoalofastateistoensureitssurvival.InthequestforDiscursivepoliticsofenergy9security,statestrytoaccumulateresources,andtherelativelevelsofmilitaryandeconomicpowerofstatesdeterminetherelationsbetweenthem.ThemajorityofmainstreamrealistsusethefixedandnarrowconceptofpowerofferedbyKennethWaltz(1979,131),accordingtowhichthepowerofastateininternationalrela-tionsismeasuredintermsofthe“sizeofpopulationandterritory,resourceendow-ment,economiccapability,militarystrength,politicalstability,andcompetence.”Thismaterialisticapproachtopowerisoneofthemajorappealsofmainstreamrealismbecauseitallowsitsadvocatesto“justifybothaccommodationandthebuildingupofarmamentsinthenameofabalanceofpower”(HollisandSmith1990,28).Italsooffersthoseadvocates“theingredientsneededtoexplaintheresilienceofthemoderninternationalsystemofstates”(Little2007,3).Whenitcomestoenergy,proponentsoftherealistapproachholdthatenergyrelations,likeanyotherfieldofinternationalrelations,arestrictlydeterminedbythenationalinterestsofstatesinwhichconcernsofsurvivalandpowerarehighlyprioritized.Followingtherealisttradition,scholarsfocusoncategoriessuchasresourcecompetition(e.g.,Klare2008;ZweigandBi2005;ZweigandHao2015),energydependence(e.g.,Bilgin2011;BosseandSchmidt-Felzmann2011;OrttungandOverland,2011),andresourcenationalism.Fromthisperspec-tive,Chinaisa“hungrydragon”thatneedstofightforenergyresources–andpar-ticularlyfossilfuels–topoweritsrapidlydevelopingeconomy(e.g.,Klare2008;ZweigandBi2005;ZweigandHao2015);Russiahasan“energyweapon”andistryingtouseittobuildanew“energyimperialism”(e.g.,Baev2008;Goldman2008;Kropatcheva2014;Mankoff2009;Orban2008);andKazakhstanmattersonlyasaspaceofgeopoliticalexpansionforvariousgreatpowers(e.g.,AhmadandRubab2015;Weitz2006).Insum,proponentsoftherealistapproachtointernationalenergyrelationsexamineaworldofstatesthatfacesanongoingbattleoverresources.Theyemphasizegeostrategicaspectsofenergyrelationsandmostoftenrathernarrowlyfocusonthebalanceofpowerbetweenenergyexportersandimport-dependentstates,portrayingenergyrelationsasazero-sumgame.This,asadvocatesoftheliberaltraditionpointout,leadsrealistanalysistomanyshortcomingssinceitdisregardsimportantinstitutionaldeterminantsofenergyrelations.Inthepopularimaginationandwideforeignpolicydiscourse,liberalismisportrayedasbeingpeace-orientatedandmoreethicalwhencomparedtoreal-ism.Discussionofenergyrelationsisnotanexception(e.g.,CurrierandDorraj2011;StokesandRaphael2010).Onthecontrary,however,theprincipalcon-cernofliberalscholarshipisnottheattainmentofpeaceorpeacefulrelationsamongindividualsandstates.Infact,similartorealistscholars,themajorityofcontemporaryproponentsofliberalisminIRofferpronouncedutilitarianandrationalistictheories.Atthesametime,theyallarestillbasedonthebeliefin“aslowbutinexorablejourneyawayfromtheanarchicworldtherealistsenvision,astradeandfinanceforgetiesbetweennations,anddemocraticnormsspread”(Snyder2004,56).Evenwhenliberaltheorizingisdetachedfromitshistorical,ideologicalinclinations–suchasthecelebrationofprogressandmodernity,thebalanceofpluralityandunity,theequalityofopportunities,andthepromotion10Discursivepoliticsofenergyofwell-being–itisstilllogicallycognatewithateleologicaldefinitionofinter-nationalrelationsasunfoldinginthepursuitofmutuallyadvantageouscoopera-tion(e.g.,Moravcsik1997).Liberaltheorizingclaimsthatifitispossibletoidentifyinstigatorsofacon-flict,thenitshouldbepossibletoformacoalitionoflaw-abidingstatesthatwilljointlystandagainstaggressors(e.g.,Claude1964;KupchanandKupchan1995).Aglobalsystemofinternationalorganizationsoughttofulfilllegislative,execu-tive,and,importantly,judicialfunctionsandresponsibilities,ensuringatthesametimethateachstatewouldbeabletoretainitssovereignty,freedom,andinde-pendence(e.g.,Smith1992;KingsburyandRobert1993).Importantly,liberalismpresupposesthatitisgovernmentsthatmakewars,notpeople.Hence,accordingtothelogicofreason,thebesthopeforpeaceisademocracybecauseitrepresentsthewillofthepeoplewhorejectconflictinfavorofcooperation(e.g.,Owen1994;Doyle1997;OnealandRussett1997).Consequently,variousversionsofliberal-ism,regardlessoftheirtheoreticalorientations,manifesttheintentandrestraintthatannouncesthepossibilityofpeaceamongthestatesthatareboundbyrationalliberalnorms.Liberalscholarshiponenergyrelationsperfectlyillustratesthispoint.Theunderlyingassumptionthatguidestheliberalapproachtointernationalenergypoliticsisthatenergyrelationsaregovernedbydiverseinstitutions,organ-izations,andregimesandthusinvolvebothstateandnon-stateagents.Liberalscholarshiponenergyrelationsfocusesmainlyoncomplexinstitutionalarrange-mentsthatprovideframeworksforcooperationbetweenenergyexportersandenergyimporters(GoldthauandWitte2010).Whileliberalscholarshiponinter-nationalenergypoliticsisdiverse,allliberalcontributionstothestudyofinterna-tionalenergypoliticsareunitedbythe“faithinthefunctioningofmarketsandthepotentialforinstitutionalinternationalcooperationtoachievemutuallybeneficialsolutionsbetweenbotheconomicactorsandstates”(Stoddard2013,445).Advocatesoftheliberalapproachareinterestedinstrategiesthattransformenergyrelationsintoapositive-sumgameandensuregreatereconomicefficiencyofcooperationbetweenenergyexportersandenergyimporters.Examiningenergyrelationsasapositive-sumgame,scholarsturntoenvironmentalaspectsofenergycooperationandemphasizeissuesoflong-termdepletionoffossil-fuelreserves,efficientenergyuse,environmentalprotection,aswellasthedevelopmentofrenewableenergysources.Thesethemesarearticulatedparticularlyclearlyintheliteratureonglobalenergygovernancethatasksthequestions:Whoshouldgov-ernglobalenergyrelations,andhowshouldthoserelationsbegoverned?(FloriniandSovacool2009;VictorandYueh2010;Ghosh2011)Andwhatshouldbegovernedinenergy?(Cherpetal.2011;Araújo2014;Bazilianetal.2014).Somescholarsfocusonthepotentialofexistingorganizations,suchastheG8,G20,ortheInternationalEnergyAgency(e.g.,KirtonandKokotsis2015;Downie2015;Keohane1978;VandeGraaf2012),togovernglobalenergyrelations,whileothersproposeestablishmentofneworganizations(VictorandYueh2010).Asregardstheareasofenergygovernance,thevastmajorityofliberalscholarsagreethatemphasisneedstobeputonthesecurityofenergysupply,environmentalDiscursivepoliticsofenergy11sustainability,andenergypoverty–ineachcase,tooffsetpresumedcausesofinternationalconflict.Whetherenergyrelationsareperceivedasazero-sumgame(realism)orasapositive-sumgame(liberalism),theirlogicisexplainedthroughincentivespro-videdbyenergysecurity.AsLynneChester(2010,891)pointsout,theveryterm“energysecurity”evidentlypromisesthatthereis“aconcept(anabstractidea)withsomeformofstrategicintent”behindit.Atthesametime,theconceptofenergysecurityisvague:itcoversarangeofthreatsthatvaryinnature,time,andmagnitude,andincludes“themultiplicityofmeaningsthatcanbeattributedtoitestablishesthattherecanbeno‘one-size-fits-all’solution”(893).Theonlyideathatunitesdiverseinterpretationsofenergysecurityisanemphasisonavoidingsuddenchangesintheavailabilityofenergyrelativetodemand.Inotherwords,energysecurityisalwaysaboutthedeficitofenergyandthisdeficitistobeaddressedmainlybyincreasingsupply.Bothrealistandliberalanalysesofenergyrelationsdisregardtheirsociallogic,whichcreatesafewblindspots.Asthecaseinpoint,issuesrelatedtotheextrac-tion,production,andconsumptionofenergyandtheredistributionofenergyrentsbecomemattersofsecurityonlywhenapowerfulagentframesandrespondstothemassuch.Hence,theverynotionof“security”inenergyrelationsshouldbeproblematizedandconceptualizedinwaysthatallowforanunderstandingofhowvariousenergyissuesbecomemattersofsecurity.Whatarethedifferentideasthatthenotionofsecurityembodiesinenergypolitics?Howdoparticularresponsestothechallengesofextraction,production,consumption,anddistributionofenergyemergeasappropriateandrational?Howdomultipleanddiverseunderstandingsofenergyshapetheidentitiesofstatesininternationalrelations?Howaredifferentnationalnarrativesaboutenergyresourcesconnectedattheinternationallevel?Constructivismandpoststructural-ismoffercluestothesequestions.Analternative:CriticalconstructivismOneofthecoreinsightsofconstructivismwasformulatedbyNicholasOnuf(1989):thesubjectofIRtheoryisa“worldofourmaking.”Socialrealitiesarethen,followingOnuf’sargument,asinfluentialasmaterialrealitiesindeter-miningstates’actionsintheinternationalarena.Forinstance,inthewordsofAlexanderWendt(1995),“socialstructuresincludematerialresourceslikegoldandtanks”because“materialresourcesonlyacquiremeaningforhumanactionthroughthestructureofsharedknowledgeinwhichtheyareembedded”(73).Accordingly,primaryunitsofanalysisarediversesocialconstructsthatare“realandobjective,not‘justtalk’…[but]thisobjectivitydependsonsharedknowl-edge”(Wendt1995,74).Importantly,socialconstructsexist“notinactors’headsnorinmaterialcapabilities,butinpractices”(Wendt1995,74).Thismeansthatsocialconstructsemergethroughtheprocessesofcomplexsocialinterac-tionsbetweenagentsandtheexistenceofthesesocialconstructsisreinforcedbypractice.12DiscursivepoliticsofenergyAsBrigitLocherandElizabethPrügl(2001)argue,“diverseconstructivisms”embracethe“ontologyofbecoming”inasmuchasallofthem“aredescribingtheworldnotasonethatis,butasonethatisintheprocessofbecoming”(114).Particularly,theontologyofbecomingallowsconstructiviststoexamine“thecon-stitutionofinternationalagents”andrevealhistoricallycontingentsetsofagreedknowledgetoexplaintransformationsofstrategiesanddevelopacomprehen-siveunderstandingofsocialchange(LocherandPrügl2001,114–115).Thetwooverarchingconstructivistapproachesarelabeledas“conventional”(or“thin”)and“critical”(or“thick”)(e.g.,Adler1997;PriceandReus-Smit1998;Zehfuss2001).Bothapproachesassumethatthematerialandsocialrealitiesofinterna-tionalrelationsarecomplexlyinterwovenandinterdependent,yetconventionalconstructivismputsatthecenterofanalysismaterialfactors,whereascriticalcon-structivismprioritizesdiscursivestructures.Strivingtobridgeepistemologicalrelativismandepistemologicalrationalism,conventionalconstructivistsperceivetheinternationalsystem“asanobjectivesocialfact”(Wendt1999,75).Incon-trast,criticalconstructivistsfocuson“howtheworldis‘talkedintoexistence’”(Adler2013,122).Forthem,socialfactsemergethroughthestructuresoflan-guage,whichpresupposesthat“consciousnesscanbestudiedonlyasmediatedbylanguage”(Adler2013,97).Consequently,criticalconstructivistscholarstakerelationsbetweensymbolization,language,andpowermoreseriouslythancon-ventionalconstructivists,whichbringsthemclosetopoststructuralism.JamesDerDerian(2009)definespoststructuralismas“asemio-criticalactivityeversearchingforandseekingtodismantletheempirico-rationalpositionswherepowerfixesmeaning”(296).Heoffersafour-dimensionalresearchagendaofpoststructuralisttheorizing:tointerrogatepresentknowledgeofinternationalrelationsthroughpastprac-tices,tosearchoutthemarginsofpoliticaltheory,tolistenforthecriticalvoicesdrownedoutbyofficialdiscourses,andtoconductaninquiryintotheencounterofthegiventextwithreactingtext.(DerDerianandShapiro1989,6)Subsequently,asOnuf(1989)accuratelypointsout,poststructuralismtakesthemajorontologicalandepistemologicalassumptionsofconstructivisttheorizing“asadialecticalnecessity”andextendsthemto“aradicaldegree”(45–46).Poststructuralisttheorizingexplicitlyquestionstheveryexistenceofindepend-entandobjectiveknowledgeandexplores“howthediscursivedistributionofpowernormalizesparticularsubjectpositions,regulatesspaceandtime,andsur-veilstoensureconformity”(McKenna2004,22).Followingthislogic,poststruc-turalistscholarsseecausalepistemologyas“aparticulardiscourseofknowledge,whichcannotsustainitsprivilegeoutsideofitsownhistoricalandpoliticalloca-tion”(Hansen2006,9).Criticalconstructivistsborrowfreelyandapplyconceptualapparatusandmeth-odologicaltoolsdevelopedbypoststructuralistIRscholars.Nonetheless,evenwhencriticalconstructivistsposeconstitutivequestions–“howisitpossible?”(seeDiscursivepoliticsofenergy13Doty1993)–theydonotdivergefromthepositionofmildpositivismandarenotwillingtoabandoncompletelycausalepistemology(e.g.,PriceandReus-Smit1998,282andJackson2016,105–108).Operatingwithinconstitutiveandintersub-jectiveframeworksofsocialfacts,theydeliberatelyuseexistingmeta-structuresofinternationalrelations(e.g.,state,sovereignty)todefineandlimittheirtheorizing.Importantly,asEmanuelAdler(1997,333–334)argues,criticalconstructivistsare“interestedneitherinemancipationperse,norexclusivelyinuncoveringthepowerstructuresthataffectthemarginalizedinhistorybutinprovidingbetterexplanationsofsocialreality.”Inthisregard,criticalconstructivismisstilla“rebelson”ofmain-streamIRtraditions,realism,andliberalism(AgathangelouandLing2004,28–29).Insum,constructivismremainsadiversescholarshipthatisbestdescribedasa“heterogamous”researchprogram(Hopf1998,196)ora“meta-theory”(Wæver1997,25).Hence,itsengagementwithandlearningfrompoststructuralismisnaturalandappropriate.Buildingmyresearchonconstructivistandpoststruc-turalistinsights,Iseektodemonstratethatidentitiesofagentsmatterininter-nationalenergypoliticsandexaminetheseidentitiessystematicallythroughtheadoptionofadiscourseanalysisapproach.Indoingso,Imovebeyondtheconceptofenergysecurityandfocusonasetofresearchquestionsthatemphasizetheconstitutivesignificanceofrepresentationsofidentityinformulatinganddebatingdiversestrategiesintherealmofinternationalenergypolitics.Whilemystudyisinspiredbybothconstructivistandpoststructuralistscholarship,itstillfirmlyfitsintoanoverarchingconstructivistresearchagendabecauseitisfocusedon“whatis”ratherthan“whatoughttobe”or“whatcouldpossiblybe.”BeyondenergysecurityAlthoughthetheoryofsecuritizationintegratesclassicalrealistunderstandingsofinternationalrelations,itisgroundedinconstructivistontologicalandepiste-mologicalassumptions.Inthiscase,asStefanoGuzzini(2011,331)putsit,“theconstructivisthorsehasbeenputbeforethegeopoliticalcart.”Securitizationis“asetofinterrelatedpractices,andtheprocessesoftheirproduction,diffusion,andreception/translationthatbringthreatsintobeing”(Balzacq2010,xiii).Thequintessenceoftheconceptofsecuritizationisthat“itisbylabelingsomethingasecurityissuethatitbecomesone”(Wæver2004,13).Thismeansthatsecurityisasocialconstruct,andthusitdoesnothaveanypre-existentmeaningbutcanbeanythingasecuritizingagentclaimsitis.AsBarryBuzan,OleWæver,andJaapdeWilde(1998,26)elaborate:[T]hetaskisnottoassesssomeobjectivethreatsthat“really”endangersomeobjecttobedefendedorsecured;rather,itistounderstandtheprocessofcon-structingasharedunderstandingofwhatistobeconsideredandcollectivelyrespondedtoasathreat.Consequently,theconceptofsecuritizationrepresentstheessenceofwhatBuzan(2010)elsewherereferstoasthe“socialside”ofsecurityanalysisandopensupa14Discursivepoliticsofenergywaytodenaturalizetheframingofcertainevents,issues,things,orpeopleaspos-ingexistentialthreatstostatesandsocieties.Thereverseprocess–politicization(desecuritization)–isunderstoodas“theshiftingofissuesoutoftheemergencymodeandintothenormalbargainingprocessofthepoliticalsphere”(Buzan,Wæver,anddeWilde1998,4).Whenappliedtothestudyofenergyrelations,thetheoryofsecuritizationoffersinsightsintohowanenergydeficitbecomesrepresentedaseitheranexistentialthreattonationalsovereigntyandinternationalstabilityorapoliticalmatter.Importantly,byidentifyingenergyissuesassecurityorpoliticalmatters,agentssimultaneouslydeterminetheneedforrespectivestrategies.Consequently,thethe-oryofsecuritizationhelpstoexplaintheconceptualfoundationsofthedichotomybetweenconflictandcooperationthatisatthecenteroftheradicalriftbetweenrealistandliberalviewsofenergyrelations.Forexample,AndrewPhillips(2013,34)examinesenergysecurityas“theproductofinterlockingperceptionsrelat-ingtoquestionsofsupplyadequacy,theefficiency,flexibility,adaptabilityandresilienceofallocativeinstitutions,andthestabilityandbenignityofthestrategicorderinwhichenergymarketsareanchored.”Accordingtohim,securitizationofenergyisaresultofChina’sandIndia’sriseas“import-dependentenergysuper-consumers”(2013,17).Alongsimilarlines,re-examiningSino-Japaneseenergyandenvironmentalrelations,ElizabethWishnick(2009)concludesthatdiversesocialandculturalfactorspreventthetwocountriesfromformingaregionalsecu-ritycommunity,eventhoughtheyhavesharedrisks.Insum,bothPhillips’andWishnick’sanalysesshowthatthefailureofliberaltheoriesdoesnotmeanthesuccessoftherealistapproachtoenergypolitics.Instead,theybothdemonstratethattheconceptofenergysecuritythatliesatthecenterofbothliberalandreal-istapproachestoenergypoliticsexplainsnothingandhastobeexplaineditself.Otherscholarsusetheconceptofsecuritizationtocallintoquestionthegiven-nessofthedifferentialcategoriesofsecurityandinsecurityintherealmofenergypolitics.Asacaseinpoint,JonnaNyman(2018)arguesthatsecurityisapractice,“somethingthatpeopledo”(24)andthushasneitheraninherentmeaningnoranintrinsicvaluebutisneverneutral.Asaresult,Nymanapproachessecurityas“apowerfultoolforchange”(32)anddistinguishes“negative”and“positive”energysecurity.ApplyingthistheoreticalframeworktoadetailedcasestudyofChina’senergysecuritypractices,Nyman(2018,7)identifiesasecurityparadox:“stateenergysecuritypracticesresultinlesssecurityforstates,humanbeings,andtheenvironment”(seealsoNymanandZeng2016).Toraiseandbringtotheforequestionsaboutthesociallogicofenergyrela-tions,aconstructivistanalysisshouldmovebeyondtheconceptofenergysecurityandfocusontheroleofidentityininternationalenergypolitics.Hence,prob-lematizingtheideaofsecurityinenergyrelationsisnotenough.Thesecondstepistoaskhowparticularresponsestothechallengesofextraction,production,consumption,anddistributionofenergyemergeasappropriateandrational.Todoso,thisbookgoesbeyondtheanalysisofpolicydiscoursesandintroducesamethodologicalframeworkthatincludesbroaderculturalartifactsandsocietaldiscourses.Discursivepoliticsofenergy15IdentityandthelogicofappropriatenessIdentityisacomplicatedconcept:it“tendstomeantoomuch(whenunderstoodinastrongsense),toolittle(whenunderstoodinaweaksense),ornothingatall(becauseofitssheerambiguity)”(BrubakerandCooper2000,1).Inthetheo-reticalframeworkofferedbyconstructivistscholars,identityisperceivedasa“relativelystablesystemofmeaningswithawell-consolidatedcontextinwhichtoact”(Tsygankov2010,16)andislocated“atthecoreofnationalandtransna-tionalinterests”(Adler2013,102).Thisdoesnotimply,however,thateachagentofinternationalrelationsholdsonlyoneidentityorthatagentshaveapre-socialessence.Onthecontrary,identityiscontinuallytransformingintheprocessofsocialinteraction.AsTedHopf(1998,175)pointsout,anagent“understandsothersaccordingtotheidentityitattributestothem,whilesimultaneouslyrepro-ducingitsownidentitythroughdailysocialpractices.”Thecentralconceptualpremisebehindthisassumptionisthreefold.First,agents’identitiesareshapedbythesocialstructuresoftheenvironmentsinwhichtheyoperate(Hansen2006;Tannenwald2007;Jackson2016).Second,identitiesareconstructedthroughtheprocessofdifferentiationandlinking(Wæver2002;Hansen2006).Third,identi-tiesarenegotiatedinadiscursivecompetitionbetweendifferentsocialgroupsthatrepresentagents(Tsygankov2010).Consequently,heremyversionofcon-structivismdeviatessignificantlyfromtheconventionalconstructivisttheorizingassociatedwiththeworksofWendt(1999).Intheconstructivistconceptualframeworkthatcapturesvariousidentitiesconstructedbyagentstorepresentthemselvesandeachotherininternationalenergypolitics,energyrelationsappearasaproductofcomplex,dynamic,andinterdependentsocialprocesses.Inthisframework,identityhascharacteristicsofacausalvariablebecauseitgivesrisetoandexplainsthelogicofappropriate-nessinenergyrelations.Thelogicofappropriatenessisastructureofmeaningthatjustifiesactionsthatareacceptedbyanagent(MarchandOlsen1989,2006,2009).Agentsevaluatecoursesofactionaccordingtothelogicofappropriate-nessthatcorrespondsbestwiththeiridentities.Thismeansthatactionalwaysimplies“evokinganidentityorroleandmatchingtheobligationsofthatidentityorroletoaspecificsituation”(MarchandOlsen1989,951).Inthislight,thebroadconstructivistquestionaboutinternationalenergypoliticscanbeputasfollows:howdoesthewayagentsidentify/labelthemselvesandothersshapethestrategicchoicestheymake?DiscursivepoliticsofenergyAstheprecedinganalysisshows,realistscholarssecuritizethedeficitsofenergyresourcesandperceivethemasastrategiccommodity,controloverwhichdeter-minesthepowerandinfluenceofastate.Liberalscholars,ontheotherhand,politicizethedeficitsofenergyresources,seeingthemasanormaleconomiccommoditythatshouldbeallocatedbymarketsandregulatedbyinternationalinstitutions.Thesetwoapproachespresentthreeidiosyncraticnarrativesaboutenergyresourcesyetignoretheprocessthroughwhichthesenarrativesare16Discursivepoliticsofenergysociallyconstructed.Energy,asE.F.Schumacher(1982,1–2)highlights,“isnotjustanothercommodity,butthepreconditionofallcommodities,abasicfactorequalwithair,water,andearth.”Diversesocial,cultural,economic,andpoliticalencounterswithenergyresourcesgivethemmultiplesymbolicmeanings.IntheframeworkthatIpropose,therealitiesofenergyproductionandcon-sumption(e.g.,volumeanddestinationsofoilexports,domesticoildemand)aretreatedasmaterialreferentsofidentitiesthatareconstructedbystatesininter-nationalenergypolitics.However,narrativesaboutenergyresourcesdefinethemeaningofthesematerialreferents.Forexample,whenRussianpoliticalleadersidentifyRussiaasan“energysuperpower,”theyrefertooil,naturalgas,coal,andotherenergyresourcesthatarelocatedwithinRussia’sbordersandoftenusethevolumeofRussia’senergyimportsasamaterialreferent.Inthiscase,thenarra-tiveaboutenergyresourcesportraysthemasasourceofextraordinarynationalpower.Nevertheless,thematerialrealitiesofenergyacquiretheirmeaningsandsignificanceonlyintheprocessofnarrative-makinganddiscursivesymboliza-tion.Theverysamematerialrealitiesofenergyproductionandimportsaresuc-cessfullyusedasareferentbythosewhoclaimthatRussia’senergywealthisthesourceoftremendousnationalvulnerabilityandidentifyRussiaasan“energyappendageofthedevelopedworld.”Consequently,amaterialreferentqualifiesasapartofthe“reality”ofinterna-tionalenergypoliticsnotbecauseitexistsbutbecauseitisvaluedbyagents.Thereality,ingeneral,isthoughtofasaqualitythatagentsattributetophenomenaintheprocessofnarrative-makingbynoticingthem,talkingaboutthemwithothers,andactingasifthesephenomenaareimportant.Followingthislogic,ifwewanttounderstandhowanagentconstructsitsidentityandtheidentitiesofitscounter-partsininternationalenergypolitics,weneedtoknowwhatmeaningthisagentattributestoenergyresources.Thelogicofappropriatenessinenergyrelations:EnergyparadigmsDiversecontestationsofidentityandnarrativesaboutenergyresourcesarepro-motedbyvariousactorsinbothpublicandprivatespaces.Thesecontestationscouldbeespeciallyintenseuntiloneoftheavailablevisionsofidentityandaspecificnarrativeaboutenergyresourcesacquiresadominantstatus.Morespe-cifically,thepersuasionpartoftheprocessiscompletewhenthestateappropri-atesanidentityvisionandanarrativeaboutenergyresourcesasafoundationofitsenergyparadigm.Iusetheterm“paradigm”inThomasKuhn’sbroadsenseasstandingfor“theentireconstellationofbeliefs,values,techniques,andsoon,sharedbythemem-bersofagivencommunity”(2012,175).Energyparadigmsarediscursivelycon-structedpreciselyinawaytoappeartobeobjectiverepresentationsofrealityandprovideaconsolidatedinstitutionalcontextinwhichstatesoperateintherealmofinternationalenergypolitics.Energyparadigmsrepresentthelogicofappropriatenessininternationalenergyrelationsand,likeanyotherexpressionofthelogicofappropriateness,theyarerootedin“structuresofresourcesthatmakeDiscursivepoliticsofenergy17actionpossible”and“structuresofmeaningthatexplainandjustifybehavior”(MarchandOlsen2006,691).Energyparadigmsaremyconstructivistroadmapstoenergyrelations:theyrepresentrelativelystablesystemsofnorms,meanings,andideasthatshapethewaystatesactinthefieldofenergyrelations.Discourseanalysisandtexts:“Frompoststructuralistislandstothefarawayshoresofconstructivism”Thechapterhasthusfaraimedtodevelopacriticalconstructivistresearchdesignforthestudyofinternationalenergypolitics.Inthissection,Ifurtherelaborateonthemethodologyofthisprojectbyfocusingonthemethodsofcollecting,gener-ating,andanalyzingthedata.IbrieflyoutlinethelogicofdiscourseanalysisinIRandthenfocusonthespecificframeworkofdiscourseanalysisthatIutilize.1Ialsodescribehowthedatawascollectedandgeneratedanddiscusssomeparticu-larpatternsinthedatacollection.DiscourseasaconceptanddiscourseanalysisasamethodologyintherealmofIRhadinitiallybelongedtopoststructuralistscholarshipthatenteredthefieldinthelate1980s,andtheearly1990sasacriticalattitudeandnewapproachtointellectualinquiryfocusedmainlyontheontologicalandepistemologicalshort-comingsofconventionalIRtheorizing(e.g.,DerDerian2009;Walker1993).However,asAnnaHolzscheiter(2014,43)pointsout,overthepasttwodecadesthestudyofdiscourse“hasgraduallytraveledfrompoststructuralistislandstoeventhefarawayshoresofconstructivismthatworkshardtoreconcileconstruc-tivistontologyandpositivistepistemology.”IborrowheavilyfromthepoststructuralistdiscourseanalysismethodologyofferedbyLeneHansen(2006),whointurndrawsonJuliaKristeva’s(1986,37)theoryofintertextualgenerationofmeaningthatimpliesthattextsare“con-structedasamosaicofquotations;anytextistheabsorptionandtransformationofanother.”Hence,Hansen’sintertextualdiscourseanalysisexaminestextsas“simultaneouslyuniqueandunited,”meaningthateachtext“makesitsownpar-ticularconstructionofidentity,weavesaseriesofdifferentiationsandjuxtaposi-tions,andcouplesthemtoaspatially,temporally,andethicallysituatedforeignpolicy”(Hansen2006,55).Shedevelopsasetof“intertextualresearchmodels,”eachofwhichhasitsownanalyticalfocus,anobjectofanalysis,andagoalofanalysis(57).Usingtheseintertextualresearchmodels,Iorganizeallmytextsintolargergroupstostructureandsystematizemyanalysis(Table2.1).Mainly,IfocusonModel1whichcapturesdiscoursesproducedby“politicalleaderswithofficialauthoritytosanctiontheforeignpoliciespursuedaswellasthosewithcentralrolesinexecutingthesepolicies”(Hansen2006,53).Theanalysisofculturalrepresentation(Model2A)andmarginaldiscourses(Model2B)helpstodemonstratehowandwithwhateffectofficialdiscoursesemergeanddisseminatethemselvesbeyondtherealmofforeignpolicy.Thesetwomodelsarespecificallycrucialincaseswhereofficialdiscoursesachieveahegemonicstatus(thediscursivepoweroftextsinModel1isextreme)andthespaceforabroaderpoliticaldiscussionislimited.18DiscursivepoliticsofenergyTable2.1IntertextualResearchModelsModel1Model2AModel2BSourcesoftextsNationalleaders,HighandpopularNGOs,media,andgovernments,seniorcultureacademicscivilservants,anddiplomatsObjectofanalysisCoreofficialFilms,fiction,Books,pamphlets,texts:officialphotography,andreportsstatementsandmusic,poetry,producedbyspeeches,reportspaintings,nationalandofgovernmentalarchitecture,internationalinstitutionsandmuseumexhibitsNGOspolicy-makingAcademicanalysisagencies,andNewspaperstrategicpolicyeditorialsdocumentsGoalofanalysisThestabilizationofThesupportThesupportofficialdiscoursesandcritiqueandcritiquethroughintertextualofofficialofofficiallinksdiscoursesdiscoursesTheresponseofofficialThebroaderdiscoursestocriticalhistorical,discoursescultural,andsocialcontextsofthestudyNumberoftextsChina23424212Russia16547121Kazakhstan772168ResearchquestionandanalyticalquestionsDiscursivepoliticsofenergy:WhatidentitiesandhistoricalnarrativesaboutenergyresourcesdoChina,Canada,Kazakhstan,andRussiaconstructtorepresentthemselvesandeachotherinenergyrelations?•·Whatisenergy?Whatisoil?•·Whoare“we”inrelationtoenergy/oil?•·Whoare“they”inrelationtoenergy/oil?Energyparadigms:Howareidentitiesandhistoricalnarrativesaboutenergyresourcesconstructed,manifested,andenactedinbilateralenergyrelationsbetweenChinaandCanada,Kazakhstan,andRussia?•·Whatare“we”goingtodowithenergy?•·Whatare“they”goingtodowithenergy?Discursivepoliticsofenergy19Inpreparingmyanalysis,Iformulatedanoverarchinganalyticalquestion:WhatidentitiesandhistoricalnarrativesaboutenergyresourcesdoChina,Russia,andKazakhstanconstructtorepresentthemselvesandothersinenergyrelations?Thisquestionwasfurtherdividedintothreeoperationalquestionsto“interrogate”alltextsinthedatasetwhenIreadandcodedeachofthemtoidentifyrecurringpatterns,themes,concepts,andrelationsbetweenthem:··Definitionofthesubject:Whatisenergy?Whatisoil?··Definitionofactors(Self):Whoare“we”inrelationtoenergy/oil?··Definitionofactors(Other):Whoare“they”inrelationtoenergy/oil?··Definitionofaction:Whatare“we”goingtodowithenergy/oil?ItreatalltextsincludedinModel1asprimarysources,whereasModel2Bcontainsbothprimaryandsecondarysources.Intheframeworkofintertextualdiscourseanalysis,textsthatareconventionallyconsideredsecondarysources(HalperinandHeath2012,180–181and255–256)mightbetreatedasaprimarysource.Forexample,ifascholarlyarticlefromModel2Bisrepeatedlyquotedinofficialdiscourseorwiderpublicdebate,itcouldbetreatedasaprimarysourceinsomecasesandasasecondarysourceinothers.Inthiscase,asHansen(2006,75)emphasizes,“theuseofsecondarysourcesdoesnotpreventonefromsubjectingthemtodiscourseanalysisatalaterstageoftheresearchprocess.”Iselectedandexamined969textsdatingfrom2005to2017.Alltextualsourceswerecollectedfromofficialwebsitesofindividualinstitutionsorthroughdatabases.Someofthetextswereidentifiedusing“snowballing.”Forexample,asignificantphotographoranotablesocialmediaposting(Model2A)surfacedintheanalysisofnewspapereditorialsorexpertreports(Model2B).Finally,someofthesourceswerecollectedinthecourseoffieldwork.Model2Aincludesinter-viewsandobservationsmadeinChina,Kazakhstan,andRussiabetween2015and2018.Specifically,Model2Bincludes11semi-structuredinterviewsinChina,Kazakhstan,andRussiawithleadingexpertsandacademicsconductedbetweenMay2016andMay2017.Respondentswerechosenbasedontheirpracticaloracademicexperiencewithinternationalenergycooperationandforeignaffairs.Alltheinterviewsweretranscribedintheoriginallanguage.Insum,theanalysisinthisbookisbasedonacomprehensivecorpusoftextsthatareasrepresentativeaspossibleofvariousdiscursivelayersineachstate.Drawingonthenotionofintertextuality,Icanrevealhowmultipleandoftencon-tradictorydiscourses–circulatingacrossdifferenttime-scales,levels,andlayers–arelinkedtooneanotherandhowthesediscoursescometogethertoconstituteenergyparadigmsthatshapethewayChinainteractswithRussiaandKazakhstaninthefieldofenergypoliticsandthewaythethreecountriesconstructandrecon-structoilinthisprocess.Note1ThismethodologicalframeworkwasalsousedtoexamineCanadiandiscursivepoliticsofoilonprovincial,federal,andinternationallevels(KutelevaandLeifso2020)andRussia’senergyrelationswiththeEuropeanUnion(Kuteleva2020).20DiscursivepoliticsofenergyReferencesAdler,E.(1997).Seizingthemiddleground:constructivisminworldpolitics.EuropeanJournalofInternationalRelations,3(3),319–363.Adler,E.(2013).Constructivismininternationalrelations:sources,contributions,anddebates.InW.Carlsnaes,T.Risse,andB.A.Simmons(Eds.)Handbookofinternationalrelations(pp.112–144).London:SAGEPublications.Agathangelou,A.M.,andLing,L.H.(2004).ThehouseofIR:fromfamilypowerpoliticstothepoisiesofworldism.InternationalStudiesReview,6(4),21–49.Ahmad,M.,andRubab,M.(2015).GreatgameofgreatpowersinCentralAsia:acomparativeanalysis.DefenceJournal,18(11),31.Araújo,K.(2014).Theemergingfieldofenergytransitions:progress,challenges,andopportunities.EnergyResearchandSocialScience,1,112–121.Baev,P.K.(2008).Russiansuper-giantinitsliar:Gazprom’sroleindomesticaffairs.InS.E.Cornell,andN.Nilsson(Eds.)Europe’senergysecurity:Gazprom’sdominanceandCaspiansupplyalternatives(pp.59–70).Washington,DC;Stockholm:CentralAsia–CaucasusInstitute,SilkRoadStudiesProgramme.Balzacq,T.(2010).Understandingsecuritisationtheory:howsecurityproblemsemergeanddissolve.London;NewYork:Routledge.Bazilian,M.,Nakhooda,S.,andvandeGraaf,T.(2014).Energygovernanceandpoverty.EnergyResearchandSocialScience,1,217–225.Bilgin,M.(2011).EnergysecurityandRussia’sgasstrategy:thesymbioticrelationshipbetweenthestateandfirms.CommunistandPost-CommunistStudies,44(2),119–127.Bosse,G.,andSchmidt-Felzmann,A.(2011).Thegeopoliticsofenergysupplyinthe“WiderEurope.”Geopolitics,16(3),479–485.Bouzarovski,S.,andBassin,M.(2011).Energyandidentity:imaginingRussiaasahydrocarbonsuperpower.AnnalsoftheAssociationofAmericanGeographers,101(4),783–794.Brubaker,R.,andCooper,F.(2000).Beyond“identity.”TheoryandSociety,29(1),1–47.Buzan,B.,Wæver,O.,anddeWilde,J.(1998).Security:anewframeworkforanalysis.London;Boulder:LynneRienner.Campion,A.S.(2016).Thegeopoliticsofredoil:constructingtheChinathreatthroughenergysecurity.London:Routledge.Casier,T.(2011).Russia’senergyleverageovertheEU:mythorreality?PerspectivesonEuropeanPoliticsandSociety,12(4),493–508.Casier,T.(2013).TheEU–Russiastrategicpartnership:challengingthenormativeargument.Europe-AsiaStudies,65(7),1377–1395.Cherp,A.,Jewell,J.,andGoldthau,A.(2011).Governingglobalenergy:systems,tran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zhuyi).InthefourdecadesafterChina’sgovernmentofficiallyinitiatedthe“reformandopen-ingup”policiesin1978,Chinahassuccessfullyliftedarecordnumberofpeopleoutofpoverty,achievedarapidincreaseinlivingstandards,reachedasustainedlevelofeconomicgrowth,andemergedasanactiveparticipantinglobaltrade,gainingstatureandinfluenceinworldaffairsandbecomingaplayerofconse-quenceontheinternationalstage.MartinJacques(2009,185)enthusiasticallysummarizesChina’sdevelopmentalexperienceinthe21stcentury:TheemergentChinesemodelbearswitnesstoanewkindofcapitalismwherethestateishyperactiveandomnipresentinarangeofdifferentwaysandforms:inprovidingassistancetoprivatefirms,inagalaxyofstate-ownedenterprises,inmanagingtheprocessbywhichtherenminbislowlyevolvesChina’senergysecurityanddiscursivepoliticsofenergy25towardsfullyconvertiblestatusand,aboveall,inbeingthearchitectofaneconomicstrategywhichhasdrivenChina’seconomictransformation.China’ssuccesssuggeststhattheChinesemodelofthestateisdestinedtoexerciseapowerfulglobalinfluence,especiallyinthedevelopingworld,andtherebytransformthetermsoffutureeconomicdebate.Despitesuchpositiveassessments,thereareplentyoffarlessfavorableaspectsofChina’sextraordinarytransformation.China’sdevelopmentsofarhasbeenextremelyresource-intensive,anditscurrentsuccesscannotbedivorcedfromthevariousdomesticchallengesrelatedtotheenvironmentalandresourcesustain-abilityofitsgrowthtrajectory.China’senergyproblemsarevast,complex,andincreaseexponentiallyasChinacontinuesitsdevelopment.SincetheestablishmentofthePeople’sRepublicofChinain1949,energyresourceshavebeenperceivedinChinaasamatterofnationalsecurityandasourceofchronicvulnerability.Afterstrugglingtoachieveenergyself-sufficiencythroughoutthe1950s,Chinaenjoyeditforalmostthreedecades.EnergyexportswerethemajorsourceofforeignexchangeandplayedavitalroleinChina’smodernizationinthelate1970sandthemid-1980s.Intheearly1990s,Chinabegantransitioningrapidlyfromself-sufficienttoimport-dependentdevelopment.Chinabecameacoalimporterin2002andanaturalgasimporterin2007.However,theshiftisspecificallynoticeableforoil:inthe1980sChina’soilproductionwas35percentmorethanitsconsumption,butsince2003overone-halfoftheoilconsumedinChinahasbeenimported(BP2017).Betweenthe2000sandthe2010s,China’sindustrialsectoraccountedfor70percentoffinalenergyconsumption.Contrarytopopularassumptions,therapidandextensivedevelopmentofindustryisnotdirectlycorrelatedtotheaccel-eratedgrowthofoildemand.Oildemandincreasedby567percentinindustry,butinothersectorsithasbeengrowingfaster(e.g.,Leung2010;LinandXie2013;Panetal.2020).Infact,theindustrialsector’sshareoftotaloilconsump-tionevendecreasedfrom59percentin1990to41percentin2014.Industryhasbeencontributingtothetotaloilconsumptionbydrivingoildemandinthetrans-portsectorthatwentupby2,097percentbetween1980and2012.Whiletheshareofoilinthetotalindustrialenergyfuelmixdidnotchangesincetheearly1990s,fluctuatingaround15–16percent,theshareofoilinthetransportationsectorfuelmixjumpedto90percentinthemid-2000s(Leung2010,937).Specifically,theaccelerateduseofdieselforroadtransportationcloselycorrelatestothedevel-opmentofheavyindustriesthatboomedthroughoutthe1990sand2000s,forexample,construction,coal,shipbuilding,steel,andcement(Meidanetal.2015,4).Formorethanadecadeafter2000,thedemandfordieselgrewwith8percentannualaveragerates.Eventhoughitstartedslowingdownin2011anddeclinedin2013forthefirsttimeinthepastfourdecades,IWEPACSS(2016,132)predictsthatdomesticconsumptionandfurtherdevelopmentofthetransportsectorwilllikelycontinuetoprecipitateamodestgrowthofdieselconsumptioninthefuture.Socioeconomicchangesofthe2000shavealsoaddedadditionalpressuretooilconsumption.China’surbanpopulationgrewfrom35.4percentin2000to26China’senergysecurityanddiscursivepoliticsofenergy57.35percentin2016(NBSC2017).Atthesametime,thedisposableincomepercapitaofurbanresidentsskyrocketed,showinga10percentincreaseannu-ally(NBSC2017).China’snewdynamicconsumerculturepromotesalifestylethatisecologicallydestructiveandfundamentallydependentonnon-renewablesourcesofenergy.Highfossilfueluseandcarbon-intensivebehaviorarenowthemajorconsumerpatternsofChina’shouseholds(Daietal.2012;Fengetal.2011;Liuetal.2009).Thespreadof“carculture”thatgoeshandinhandwithurbanizationandtheexpansionoftheurbanmiddleclassisoneofthemostvividexamplesoftherelationshipsbetweensocioeconomicchangesandoilconsumption.Inthe2000s,Chinesecitiesbecamelesspedestrianandcyclist-friendly,thedailytraveldistanceofurbanresidentssignificantlyincreased,andtheuseofpublictrans-portescalatedconsiderablyattheexpenseofnon-motorizedtransportmodes(Panetal.2009;Wangetal.2011).Atthesametime,owningacarbecameanessentialbadgeofmiddle-classsocialstatusfortheurbanChinese(Gerth2010;Marks2012).Theoverallnumberofcivilianvehiclesontheroadsincreasedfrom15.45millionin2006to108.7millionin2016,whilethenumberofprivatepassengercarsgrewfrom11.49millionto101.5million(NBSC2017).Gasolineisthesecond-largestconsumedoilproductinChina,withanestimated23percentshareand,duetothegrowthinthenumberofvehicles,itsconsumptionroseto17,812Mtoein2015(IWEPACSS2016,132).Besides,themassiveboomincarownershipandrapiddevelopmentofthetransportsector,ingeneral,spurredenergy-hungrydomesticautoproduction.ChinasurpassedtheUS,Japan,Germany,andSouthKoreaandbecamethelargestautomanufacturerin2012(OICA2017).In2016,China’spro-ductionofpassengercarsreached24.420millionunits(OICA2017)andcontinuestogrow.ToputChina’scarcultureintheglobalperspective,theshareofcarown-ersinChinaisonly17percent,whereas88percentofAmericanshaveacar,JapanandSouthKoreatrailcloselybehindtheUSwith81percentand83percentofcarownersrespectively,andthemediannationalshareofcarownersintheEuropeanUnionis79percent(PewResearchCenter2015).China’sshareofcarownersissignificantlybelowtheinternationalaverageof35percentandislessthantheshareofcarownersincountriessuchasElSalvador(19percent),Nigeria(18percent),andSouthAfrica(31percent)(PewResearchCenter2015).GivenChina’slownumbers,itisreasonabletoexpectthattheexpansionofcarcultureinChinawillpushtheconsumptionofoilforquitesometime.WhydoesChina’soilconsumptionmatter?ManyinterdependencesbetweenChinaandtheworldareeconomic–mostnotableexamplesincludetraderela-tionsandfinancialflows–whileother,nolessimportant,formsofmutualinter-dependenciesconcernglobalenvironmentaldegradationandnaturalresourceshortage.Consequently,inasmuchasChinanowoccupiesacentralplaceinanincreasinglyinterdependentworld,thesustainabilityofChina’sdevelopmentisnot“their”but“our”problem.BothinsideandoutsideChina,theconsensusisthatthecountry’sresource-intensivemodelofdevelopmentisunsustainableintheshortandlongterms.ButhowwillChinaaddresstheresourceshortage?IfChina’senergysecurityanddiscursivepoliticsofenergy27China’smodernhistoryisaguide,Chinawillchangeswiftlyanddeliberately,solvingtheproblemsthatitcurrentlyfacesandmovingontothenextsetofprob-lemsthatitwillcreateintheinterim.ThatiswhyitisparticularlyimportanttounderstandhowChinadefinesitsdevelopmentinthecontextofenergydeficit,aswellashowChinaimaginesthefutureandpreparesforit.HowdoesmodernChinadefineandcommunicateitsidentityininternationalenergyrelationsandhowdoesChinamakeitsenergychoices?Thisisthecen-tralquestionthatIaddressinthischapter.ThefirstpartofthechapterdiscussestheevolutionofChina’senergystrategyfromthemid-1950stotheearly2000s.IttellsthestoryofChina’soilthatstartswiththediscoveryofoilinDaqingin1959andgoesallthewaytoChina’scommitmentto“peacefulrise”and“worldharmony”intheearly2000s.ThesecondsectionfocusesonChina’sdiscursiveenergypoliticsbetween2005and2016.First,itexaminestheevolutionanddiver-sificationofChina’sapproachtoenergysecurityandexplainstherecentchangesinChina’sframingofoil.Further,thechapterturnstocontextualizedactualiza-tionsofcollectiveidentities:Whoare“we”andwhoare“they”inChina’senergypolitics?ItexplainshowandwithwhateffectChinadefinesitselfaswellasitsalliesandadversariesininternationalenergypolitics.ThefinalsectionofthechaptermapsChina’senergyparadigmbyidentifyingdiscursiveconstructionsthatareinstitutionalizedasChina’senergystrategy.EvolutionofChina’senergystrategyfromthe1950stothe2000s:“Self-reliance,”“goingout,”and“scientificdevelopment”Daqing:The“bigcelebration”inthehistoryofChina’soilRightafterthePeople’sRepublicofChinawasestablished,Chinajoinedthe“bat-tleforoil”(石油大会战,Shiyoudahuizhan).Duringthefirstdecadeofthisbattle,SoviettechnicaladvisersandspecialistscontrolledthedevelopmentofChina’spetroleumindustry.ChinaalsowasdependentontheSovietUnionforapproxi-mately80percentofdrillingequipmentandmachineryandimportedSovietcrudeoilandrefinedoilproducts(Cheng1976,128).Asaresult,theSino-Sovietsplitofthemid-1950screatedanacuteshortageofoilthatforcedChina’sgovernmenttoaccelerateeffortstoincreasedomesticextractionandproductioncapacity.SoonDaqing,locatedinthenortheasternpartofthecountryinHeilongjiangProvince,becamethefrontlineofChina’s“battleforoil”andtheaxialsymbolofChina’seconomicandpoliticalindependence.DaqingisthelargestoilfieldinChina.OfficialnarrativeslinkitsdiscoverydirectlytothecoreofChina’snation-buildingprojectbyconnectingittothe10thanniversaryofthefoundationofthePRC.Daqing’shistoryformallystartedfourdaysbeforetheNationalDaycelebrationson26September1959,when,accordingtoofficialChinesesources,oilflowedfromSongjiNo.3wellinSongliaoBasin.In1960,Daqing’sprovedoilreserveswereestimatedtobe400milliontons(Fengetal.2012,6).Productionmultipliedand,bytheendof1963,46.3percentofalloilproducedinChinacamefromDaqing(Lim2010,19).28China’senergysecurityanddiscursivepoliticsofenergyTheveryname“Daqing”emphasizesitssymbolicimportanceandideologicalunderpinningasitisderivedfromacombinationoftwowords:“big”(大,da)and“celebration”(庆,qing).AllspheresoftheproductionprocessanddailylifeinDaqingwereideologizedandfromtheoutsetframedasanever-endingstrug-gle.Daqingwasfrequentlyreferredtoasa“battleground”(战区,zhanqu)ora“greatbattle”(大清会战,daqinghuizhan).1ThePoliticalDepartmentofDaqingOilfieldestablishedapoliticalsupervisorystructuresimilartotheoneofthePeople’sLiberationArmy(Hama1980,190–191)andpublishedweeklyideologi-calupdatesinanewsletterentitledBattleReportofDaqing(大庆战报,Daqingzhanbao).2AsChu-yuanCheng(1976,11)pointsout,Daqingwasdeliberatelydesigned“soasnottoreplicatethetypicaloil-boomcityoftheWest.”YuQiuli,3whowasresponsiblefortheearlydevelopmentofChina’soilindustry,institutedinDaqingapolicyofself-sufficiencyandfrugalityforoilfieldworkersandtheirdependentsthatsubsequentlyhasevolvedintoacultofself-imposedasceticismandideologicalvigor.DuringtheCulturalRevolution(1966–1976),DaqingplayedadistinctroleintheMaoistideology,whenChina’sauthoritiesturnedoilworkersintothenational“labormodel”(模式or典型,moshiordianxing)intheindustrialsec-tor.4WangJinxi,theheadofadrillingcrew,becamethefocusofthe“IndustryLearnfromDaqing”(工业学大庆,GongyeXueDaqing)nationalideologicalcampaignandgraduallyearnedthestatusofanationalhero.5Hewasrenownedforwhatlatercametobeknownasthe“ironmanspirit”(铁人精神,tierenjingshen)or“Daqingspirit”(大庆精神,Daqingjingshen):selflessness,uncon-ditionalloyaltytotheparty-state,andexceptionalcouragetoworkinhostileandharshconditionsforthesakeofnationalprosperity.Featuredonnumerouspropagandapostersandinnewspaperarticles,WangJinxiliterallybecamethefaceofChina’sindustrializationinthe1960sand1970s.AfterWangJinxidiedin1970,China’sauthoritiescarefullypreservedhislegacy.Between1971and1978,thePeople’sDailymentionedWangJingxiin361editorials(RenminRibaoTuwenShujuku2017).WangJinxialsobecameacharacterofmanychil-dren’sbooksandin1973hisbiographywaspublishedin150thousandcopies.TocommemorateWangJinxi’scontributiontothedevelopmentofthenationaloilindustry,China’sauthoritieserectedelaboratemonumentsallaroundChina,includingamassiveIronManMemorialinDaqing(openedin1971,subse-quentlyexpanded).Onabroaderscale,DaqingandtheoilindustryepitomizedthesuccessandleadershipoftheCommunistPartyofChina.InthewordsofZhouEnlai,Daqingsymbolized“theredflagthatwaserectedbyChairmanMaohimself”(RenminRibao1967a).Accordingtotheofficialnarratives,the“redflagofDaqing”(大庆红旗,Daqinghongqi)made“Americanimperialists”and“Sovietrevision-ists”shiverinfearandadmiration(RenminRibaoTuwenShujuku2017).Attheendof1963,ZhouEnlaiattestedthat“Chinadoesnotneedtoimportoilanymoreandcanbeprimarilyself-sufficient”(RenminRibao1963).Soonafter,theideaofself-reliance6becameaguidingprinciplefortheenergyindustryChina’senergysecurityanddiscursivepoliticsofenergy29development,strikingdeeprootsintotheofficialenergydiscoursesandabroaderdiscourseofnationaldevelopment.IntheChinesecontext,theideaofself-relianceisrelatedtothelocusofcon-troloverthetrajectoryofnationaldevelopment.Firstandforemost,itimpliesanorientationonthemaximumpossibleindependenceandautonomyindecision-making.Followingthislogic,energyself-sufficiencybecomesanultimatepro-grammaticandpolicygoalandisacorollaryofself-reliance.Startingfromthelate1950s,theideaofself-reliance,botheconomicallyandpolitically,wastakentoitsextremeascompletenon-involvementininternationalrelationsandisola-tion.Duringthistime,self-relianceinthedevelopmentoftheenergysectorwasframednotasarationalanddeliberatedevelopmentalchoicebutasamatterofsurvival.GettingusedtothenewenergysecurityimperativesBetweentheearly1960sandthemid-1970s,China’senthusiasmandgreatopti-mismaboutthefutureofDaqingandthedevelopmentoftheoilindustry,ingen-eral,weretakenupbytheWest.WesternimaginationofChina’ssuccessranwildasaresultofstatementsmadebyChina’sauthorities(Bartke1977,21;Yeh1962,1–2)andwasfurtherignitedbyreportsofChina-friendlyforeignjournalists,suchasAnnaLouiseStrong(e.g.,1963)andWilfredBurchett(e.g.,1974).However,asLimTaiWei(2010,10–11)indicates,theexactlocationandsizeofDaqingwereunknownoutsideChinaforalmostadecadeandupuntilthemid-1970smostoftheavailableinformationaboutDaqingintheWestcamefromareportprovidedbyananonymousmainlandChinaimmigranttoTaiwan.In1974,thechairmanoftheJapan-ChinaOilImportCouncil,RyutaroHasegawa,visitedDaqingandannouncedonhisreturntoJapanthatsoonChinawillbecomeJapan’smajoroilsupplier(Smil2004,8).AsVaclavSmil(2004,9)accuratelyputsit,Japanese“wishfulthinkingwasmistakenforagenuinecriticalforecasting”bymanyinternationalobservers.SomerenownedAsiaexpertsintheUSconcludedthatbythe1980sChina’soilproductionwouldhaveacon-siderableimpactontheinternationalenergymarket.SeligS.Harrison(1975,4),forexample,brandedChinaas“thenextoilgiant,”claimingthat“theneteffectofexpandedChineseoilexportswouldbetoreduceglobaldependenceontheMiddleEastandthePersianGulf.”Inasimilarvein,ParkChoon-hoandJeromeAlanCohen(1975)certifiedthat“theoil-poorChinaofthepast”wouldsoon“emergeasanoilpowerofthefuture”(28)andwarnedthat“enormousquantitiesof[China’soil]maybeamixedblessing”fortheUS(49).ArthurJayKlinghoffer(1976,540)believedthatoilfromDaqingtransformedChina“intoaregionaloilpowerinEastAsia”and“asuccessfulrivaloftheSovietUnioninthegameofAsianoilpolitics.”Fortheirpart,SovietexpertsdidnotrecognizeChinaasapotentialcompetitor,yetstillwereworriedthatChinawasbecomingincreas-inglyindependentandassertive(e.g.,Kulpin1975;Kapitsa1979).Nonetheless,whileChina’soilproductionhadindeedskyrocketedfrom11.31Mtoein1965to30China’senergysecurityanddiscursivepoliticsofenergy106.15Mtoein1979(BP2017),ChinawasnotdestinedtobecomeanewKuwaitoranewSaudiArabia.Inthe1980s,Chinabecametheworld’sfourth-largestoilproduceroutsidetheMiddleEastandstartedtosellitsoilontheinternationalmarket,signingcontractswithJapan,Thailand,Philippines,Romania,andHongKong(Zha2005a,16).However,China’scareerasanoilexporterwassoontoend.Aftertheintroductionofthe“reformsandopeningup”policiesandtheturnfromMaoZedong’s“per-manentrevolution”toDengXiaoping’s“socialismwithChinesecharacteristics”in1978,Chinaemergedas“theworld’sfactoryfloor”andrapideconomicdevel-opmentaccelerateddomesticoildemand.Asearlyas1993,Chinaturnedfromanetoilexporterintoanetoilimporter.Meanwhile,theproductivityofChina’soil-fieldsworsened,andthequalityofdomesticproductiondeclinedsteadilybecauseofresourcedepletion.Bythemid-1990s,allradicaloptionsforthedevelopmentofdomesticenergycapacityhadalreadybeenexhaustedanditbecameclearthatintheneartomediumtermChinawouldbeunabletoovercomeitsforeignenergydependenceonfossilfuels(Zha2005b,28).China’sfirstoil-boomtown,Yumen,locatedinthenorthwestofGansuProvince,hadturnedintoa“ghosttown”bythemid-2000swhenthedepositsoftheLaojunmiaooilfieldwereexhausted.Daqinghasalsoexperiencedaneco-nomicdownturn,yetitavoidedthefaithofYumenbecauseofitscelebritysta-tus.Thecentralandprovincialgovernmentscloselymonitoredthepost-industrialtransitionandeconomicdevelopmentofDaqinginthe2000s(Wangetal.2014).WhenIvisitedDaqinginNovember2016,thecitywasbearingallthetypicalsignsofdecayunderacommandeconomy.Ahigh-speedtrainfromHarbin,thecapitalofHeilongjiangProvince,broughtmetoanewlybuiltmodernrailwaystationthatwasobviouslytoobigforacitythesizeofDaqing.Severalhundredsofpumpjacksscatteredaroundthecitywerenoddingrhythmicallynearclosedshoppingmallsandnewresidentialareasunclaimedbytenants.Newlyrenovatedroadswereempty.WhileDaqing’spopulationisaginganddeclining,thecentralandprovincialauthoritiesarepouringinvestmentsnotonlyintoDaqing’sinfrastructurebutalsointoitsheroicheritage.IronManMemorial(Figure3.1)openedin1971wassubsequentlyexpandedin1991and2004.In2006,thenewmemorialcomplexwasbuilttocelebratethe47thanniversaryofthediscoveryofDaqingoilfield.Itoccupies21squarekilometersandincludesaparkwitha30-meter-tallgranitestatueofWangJinxiandamuseumwithabout2,000exhibits.InadditiontotheIronManMemorial,Daqing,likeanyothermajoroilcityintheworld,hasamuseumthattellsthestoryofitsoil.ThemainexhibitionattheMuseumofDaqingOilfieldfundedbyCNPCisdividedintothreeparts:TheSurprisingDiscoveryofDaqing;ADifficultStartoftheGreatHistory;andThePeopleofDaqingOilfieldAreItsBackbone.Alargepartoftheexhibitionconsistsoflifelikespecimensandpracticalartifacts,includingpersonalitemsofDaqing’soilworkersandmanagement(e.g.,Figure3.2).ItalsofeaturesworksofartdedicatedtotheoilworkersofDaqing(e.g.,Figures3.3and3.4).Consequently,theMuseumofDaqingOilfieldisnotanindustrialmuseumbutChina’senergysecurityanddiscursivepoliticsofenergy31aheritagecenter:itisdevotedalmostentirelytothestoriesofthepeoplewhobuiltChina’soilindustryratherthantothehistoryoftheindustryitself.Atthesametime,thesestoriesarecarefullyboundtotheofficialnarrativeofChina’sdevelopmentsincetheestablishmentofthePRC.Inthissense,theMuseumofDaqingOilfieldisamuseumofChina’spoliticalhistoryand–morethanany-thingelse–showcasestheideologicalrolethattheoilindustryhasbeenplayinginChinasincethe1950s.In2003,toavoidthedepletionoftheoilfieldandtocutcapitalspending,CNPC(ChinaNationalPetroleumCorporation)decidedtobringtheproduc-tiondownto803.289kbdstrategically.Daqingbecamea“centurialoilfield,”meaningthatitiswilloperateforacenturyandissupposedtobeChina’smajordomesticoilproductionbaseuntil2060(CNPC2017).7AccordingtoXiJingping(2009),thegoalofDaqinginthecomingdecadesistwo-fold:“tomaintainforaslongaspossiblehighandstableproductiontoeasethetensionofdomesticoildemandandtoprotectthenationalenergysecurity,”and“topromotetheeconomicdevelopmentofHeilongjiangprovinceandrevitalizationoftheoldindustrialbasesofthenortheasternregioningeneraltosupportthesteadygrowthofthenationaleconomy.”Consequently,eventhoughDaqingisnotanactivecenterofthrivingindustrialdevelopmentanymore,itisstillasym-bolofthisdevelopment.Importantly,itstillplaysavitalroleinChina’squestforthemaximumpossibleself-reliance.Figure3.1DaqingIronManWangJinxiMemorial.Daqing,China,November2016.32China’senergysecurityanddiscursivepoliticsofenergyFigure3.2TheMuseumofDaqingOilfield,November2016.Anoilworkerstudiesthe“twotheories”ofChairmanMaoafterashift.Figure3.3TheMuseumofDaqingOilfield,November2016.ZhengZhenhe(1977).TheIronManWangJinxistudiesthe“twotheories”ofChairmanMao.China’senergysecurityanddiscursivepoliticsofenergy33Figure3.4TheMuseumofDaqingOilfield,November2016.YuDaokai(1989).ThebirthofDaqing:GreetingtheNationalDaywithnewandoutstandingsuccess.The“goingglobal”strategyandChina’sNOCsinthe2000sandthe2010sInthe1980s,China’soilconsumptionincreasedannuallybyanaverageof5.4percent.In1993,China’soilconsumptionsurpasseditsoilproduction,andasaresult,Chinabecameanetimporterofoil.In2002,whilestillholdingthetitleoftheworld’sfourth-largestoilproduceroutsidetheMiddleEast,Chinabecametheworld’ssecond-largestoilconsumer.Between1993and2015,itsnetoilimportdependency8climbedfrom8percentto59percent(seeTable3.1),and,sofar,oilistheonlysourceofenergyforwhichChinameetsthedemandbysuchmassivenetimports.In1997,apolicypaperauthoredbyPrimeMinisterLiPengacknowledgedthatdomesticoilproduction“cannotkeepupwiththeneedsofeconomicTable3.1China’sOilProduction,Consumption,andTrade:1993–2016Production(Mtoe)Consumption(Mtoe)Imports(Mtoe)Exports(Mtoe)Netimports(Mtoe)Netimportdependency(%)1980105.9586.668.27−18.06−9.79−111985124.9089.759.00−36.30−27.30−301990138.31112,867.56−31.10−23.55−211993144.03145.7936.20−25.1011.1081994146.08148.1229.00−23.805.2041995149.02160.2036.73−24.5512.1981996158.52175.6745.40−27.0018.40101997160.13192.1567.90−28.2039.70211998160.18197.0857.40−23.3034.10171999160.22209.3364.80−16.4048.40232000162.62224.2297.49−21.7275.76342001164.83229.0991.20−20.5070.70312002166.87248.10102.70−21.4081.30332003169.59276.94131.90−25.40106.50382004174.05323.41172.90−22.40150.50472005181.35328.93171.16−28.88142.28432006184.77353.15194.50−26.30168.20482007186.32370.66211.40−26.60184.80502008190.44378.06230.16−29.40200.76532009189.49392.81256.42−3.92252.51642010203.01448.49294.37−4.08290.29652011202.88465.11315.94−4.12311.82672012207.48487.07330.89−3.88327.00672013209.96508.14281.74−1.62280.13552014211.43527.96361.80−4.21357.58682015214.56561.84335.48−2.87332.62592016199.69587.66––––34China’senergysecurityanddiscursivepoliticsofenergySource:BPEnergyChartingToolandNBSC.China’senergysecurityanddiscursivepoliticsofenergy35development”andstatedthat,whileChinaisstilldeterminedtoexpandanddiver-sifydomesticoilproduction,itwillalsohaveto“goonthegloballevel”and“investintothedevelopmentofmultifacetedcooperationwithforeigncountries”(ChinaInternetInformationCenter2012).9Thispapersignifiedtheofficialshiftfrom“self-reliance”to“goingglobal”(走出去,zouchuqu)inChina’senergystrategy.Thethreelargestate-ownedcompanies–ChinaNationalOffshoreOilCorporation(CNOOC),ChinaPetrochemicalGroupCorporation(Sinopec),andChinaNationalPetroleumGroupCorporation(CNPC)–becameinstrumentsintheimplementationofthisstrategy.Intheprocessofreorganizationoftheministriesresponsiblefortheenergysector,thesethreenationaloilcompanies(NOCs)werecreatedinthe1980s.Theministrieswererepeatedlyreshuffled,andeventually,ministerialauthor-itywasforwardedtothreestate-ownedenterprises.CNOOCwascreatedin1982fromtheoffshoreassetsoftheMinistryofPetroleumIndustryandiscur-rentlyresponsiblefortheoveralloffshoreworkincooperationwithforeignenterprises.In1983,SinopecwascreatedfromthedownstreamassetsoftheMinistryofPetroleumIndustryandtheMinistryofChemicalIndustry.Sinopecreceivedfullcontroloverdownstreamproductionandtooktheresponsibilitiesforalloilrefining,marketing,andpetrochemicalmanufacturing.Finally,in1988,theCNPCwasestablishedtotakecontrolovertheremainingonshoreupstreamoilandgasproductionactivities.China’sauthoritiesstimulatedthedevelopmentandgrowthofCNOOC,Sinopec,andCNPCthroughpricelib-eralizationandtheintroductionofmanagementincentivesandinternalmarketcompetition(Houser2008).Attheendofthe1990s,China’sNOCswerereadyandhadamarketincentiveto“goglobal”evenintheabsenceofamandatebyChina’sauthorities(Downs2006,2007;Zhang,Z.2012).Infact,theNOCsstartedtoinvestindevelopingnewoilresourcesoutsideChinayearsbeforethegovernmentincluded“goingglobal”intothenationalenergystrategy(Zhang,C.2015,280).However,China’sNOCsbecamevisibleontheinternationalenergymarketandtheleveloftheiroverseasinvestmentstartedproliferatingonlyafterthegovernmentgrantedthemofficialapproval.Inthe1990s,NOCsdirectedtheirinvestmentsinfieldswithprovenreservesandfocusedonbringingtheiroverseasproductionhome(Alonetal.2015,298).However,bythemid-2000s,China’sdomesticrefinerycapacityexpanded,andtheNOCscoulddiversifytheirinvest-mentportfoliobyengagingintheproductionandexplorationofdifferenttypesofcrudeoil(Zha2005b,28).Atthesametime,theNOCsbecamemoreambitiousbytargetingexplorationareaswithunprovenreservesandexpandingthegeographicscopeoftheirbusinessactivities.Mostoften,theNOCsadvancedtheirtradingoperationstomaximizeprofitsregardlessoftheoil’sfinaldestination.Between2005and2006,whenoverseasmergersandacquisitionsofChina’sNOCspeaked,93percentoftheirforeignproductionwassoldonlocalmarkets,whereasequityoil10madeuponly15percentofChina’soilimports(Chen2011,607,seealsoHouser2008,155).Consequently,throughoverseasequityinvestments,China’sNOCsweretryingtosecurecontrolovertheupstreamtoincreasetheirprofits,36China’senergysecurityanddiscursivepoliticsofenergyratherthantoadvanceChina’snationalenergysecurity.China’sgoalsbecameevenmoreapparentintheperiodafter2008whenChina’sNOCsexpandedtheiroverseasactivitiesintheaftermathoftheglobalfinancialcrisis(Alonetal.2015).Chinaexpertsreportthat,eventhoughChina’sgovernmentdoesnotdic-tatetotheNOCswhere,how,andwhentoinvest,alloverseasprojectsinitiatedbytheNOCshavetobeauthorizedbytheNationalDevelopmentandReformCommission(NDRC)11andtheMinistryofForeignAffairsbeforebeingimple-mented(Downs2006,2008;Andrews-Speed2012;Zhang,C.2015).Inotherwords,China’sparty-statemonitorsandsupportsbutdoesnotruntheoverseasactivitiesoftheNOCs.ThedynamicsofChina’sdomesticpoliticalandeconomicdevelopmentinthe2000sledtoahighdegreeofconvergencebetweentheinter-estsofthestateandthatoftheNOCs.WhileitisunclearwhetherChina’sNOCsconsidernationalinterestsandsecurityintheirbusinessactivitiesabroad,theycomplywithandactivelysupporttheofficialenergysecuritydiscourse(Zhang,C.2015,280–281).China’s“goingglobal”energystrategyisnotlimitedtothesupportoftheoutwardinvestmentofNOCs.Italsoincludesmergingenergysecurityobjec-tiveswithforeignpolicyanddiplomaticefforts.AsChenShaofeng(2008,93),apoliticalscientistfromPekingUniversity,pointsout,“securingenergyresourcesabroadanddiversifyingimportsourceshavedefactobeenincorporatedintoChina’sforeignstrategy.”Inthe2000s,Chinaadvanceditsbilateralrelation-shipswithoil-richcountries,suchasIran,Sudan,Libya,Myanmar,Russia,andKazakhstan.TheinvolvementoftheMinistryofForeignAffairsinenergydealsmakesitaninfluentialstakeholderinChina’senergystrategydevelopment.ApoliticaleconomistofPekingUniversity,ZhaDaojiong(2005b,28),notesthat,betweenthe1950sandthe1970s,Chinahad“20yearsofself-relianceinatenseinternationalenvironment,”but,upuntiltheearly1990s,itdidnothavetoworryaboutitsenergysecurity.Intheearly2000s,accordingtoZha(2005b,29),itbecameevidentthat“theeraofenergyself-sufficiencyhaspassed”andnowChinahas“noalternativebuttolearnhowtosurviveintheinterdepend-entworld.”Nevertheless,thelegacyofself-relianceanditsinfluenceonChina’senergysecurityisstillstrong.Atthedawnofthe“goingout”strategy,Chinawasstillfocusedonmaintainingitsfreedomfromoutsidecontrolandminimizingout-sideinfluence.Inthissense,the“goingout”strategyshouldbeseennotasasub-stituteforChina’senergyself-reliancestrategybutasitsextensionandevolution.NewvariablesinChina’senergydevelopment:SustainabilityandenvironmentEnergyresources,andoilspecifically,fromtheoutset,wereideologizedandsecu-ritizedissuesinChina.Asaresult,upuntilthemid-2000s,China’senergysecu-ritywaslimitedtothesupplyside.China’sstatedidnotpaysignificantattentiontocontroloverdomesticenergyconsumptionandtheadvancementofadomesticcleanenergyagenda.China’senergysecuritystrategyfocusedonkeepinghighChina’senergysecurityanddiscursivepoliticsofenergy37economicgrowth,andenergyresources,inthisframework,wereviewedasstra-tegiccommoditiesratherthanstandardcommercialcommoditiestobeallocatedbythefreemarket.TheinitialpanicoverChina’senergydependencystartedtosubsidegraduallybothinsideandoutsideChinainthemid-2000s.China’sstatereconciledwiththefactthatsubstantialoilimportswereChina’snewnormalandacknowledgedthatgrowingdependencyonimportedenergywasnotChina’sonlyenergyproblem.China’shighfossil-fueluseandcarbon-intensivedevelopmentalsoaggra-vatedenvironmentaldegradation.Bythemid-2000s,thicksmogcoveredBeijing,Chongqing,Tianjin,Shanghai,Harbin,Ürümqi,andmanyothermajorChinesecities,cuttingvisibilityandcausingchiefdisruptionsintransportationanddailyactivities.Thecarbondioxide(CO2)footprintofChina’senergyconsumptionwasfarhigherthanthatofanyothersinglecountry.CoalismostlytoblameforthedegradationofairqualityandtheincreaseofCO2emissions:itcontributesabout70percentofChina’stotaldust,nitrogenoxideemissions,andCO2emissions,andupto90percentofChina’stotalsulfurdioxide(SO2).However,thegrow-ingconsumptionofoilbytransportandindustrialsectorsaddstheirfairsharetoChina’senvironmentaldegradation(Heetal.2005;AlamandParamati2015).EnvironmentaldestructionstartedtothreatenChina’seconomicgrowth,whereasrisingincomesandrapidurbanizationincreasedthedemandforenvironmentalamenitiesandthuspoliticalpressureforenvironmentalprotection.Inthemid-2000s,China’sstateshiftedthefocusfromeconomicdevelopmentmeasuredinthegrowthofitsGDPtoimprovingthenationalenvironmentalland-scapeandsocialsustainability.The“fourthgenerationofleaders”headedbyHuJintaopromisedtoevaluateChina’sdevelopmentalsuccessbasedon“thesatis-factionofthepeople”(CentralCommitteeoftheCPC2003).China’snewaspira-tionwas“harmony”(和谐,hexie),aconceptwithConfucianovertones(e.g.,Ge2006,30–42).Onthedomesticlevel,“harmony”wasdefinedas“thedevelopmentoftheentiresocietyinasustainableandbalancedmanner”and“puttingpeoplefirst.”TheChinesegovernmentoperationalizeditasfiveoverarchingandinter-dependentdevelopmentaltargets(knownasthe“fiveharmonies”):(1)harmonyinthedevelopmentofurbanandruralareas(emphasizingruraldevelopment);(2)harmonyinregionaldevelopment(emphasizingthegapbetweenthecoastalprov-incesandtherestofthecountry);(3)harmonyinthebalancebetweeneconomicandsocialdevelopment(withemphasisoncreatingmorejobsandprovidingbet-tersocialservices);(4)harmonyinrelationsbetweenpeopleandnature(stressingresourceconservationandenvironmentalprotection);(5)harmonyinthebalancebetweennationaldevelopmentandopennesstotheinternationalmarkets(CentralCommitteeoftheCPC2003).“Harmony”becamethecentralthemeofthe17thNationalCongressoftheCPCheldin2007,andChina’sdomesticdevelopmentofficiallybecameencap-sulatedintheconceptofa“harmonioussociety”(和谐社会,hexieshehui).AftertheCongress,“harmony”spilledalloverChina:universityadministrationsurgedstudentsto“makethecampuslifeharmonious,”taxicompaniesencouraged38China’senergysecurityanddiscursivepoliticsofenergypassengerstomaintain“harmoniousrelationswiththedriver,”andevenlocalfarmers’marketsstartedtopromote“harmonioustrade.”12After2007,theaspira-tionforharmonywasomnipresent:onecouldfinditeverywhere,fromthe“har-monious”high-speedtrains(和谐号,HexieHao)tothe“harmoniousfamily”salespromotion(和谐家庭,HexieJiating)oftheAmericanfast-foodchainKFC.“Harmony”alsobecamethenewmodeandtheultimategoalofChina’sinter-actionswiththeinternationalcommunity.In2007,HuJintaohighlightedthatChinamaintains“thatthepeopleofallcountriesshouldjoinhandsandstrivetobuildtheharmoniousworldoflastingpeaceandcommonprosperity”(和谐世界,hexieshijie).Hu(2007)alsopromisedtoensurethatChina’srisewillbepeaceful(和平发展,hepingfazhan),callingtheaspirationforpeacea“strategicchoicethatthegovernmentandpeopleofChinahavemadeinlightofthedevelopmenttrendofthetimesandtheirfundamentalinterests”(seealsoHu2005).Anothersignificantcontributionofthe“fourthgeneration”toChina’sideologywastheconceptofa“scientificoutlookondevelopment”(科学发展观,kexuefazhanguan)13thatcorrespondedwiththequestforharmonyonthedomesticandinternationallevels(Wu,X.2009).“Scientificoutlook”isnotaboutsciencepersebutaboutthequalityofdevelopment,asitpromotesaconceptionofbalancedandinclusivegrowth.Ontheinternationallevel,China’sleaderswerelinking“sci-entificoutlook”totheinternational“sustainability”discourse(可持续,kechixuwithafocusonclimatechange).Incontrast,onthedomesticleveltheemphasiswasontheuseofinnovations,technology,andexpertiseinsolvingChina’ssocialandecologicalproblems.Overall,thetwoconcepts–“harmonioussociety/world”and“scientificout-lookondevelopment”–definedanewdevelopmentalobjectiveforChina.In2005,China’sleadersincludedenergyconservationandenvironmentalprotectioninthenationaleconomicdevelopmentframeworkasapartofthe11thFive-YearPlan.14TheoverarchinggoalwastoreduceenergyuseperunitofGDPby20percentandcutnationalSO2emissionsby10percentintheperiodbetween2006and2010.China’sdiscursivepoliticsofenergyWhatdoesoilmeanforChina?Asthefirstpartofthischapterdemonstrated,theavailabilityofoilfromtheoutsetwasideologizedandframedasasecurityissueinmodernChina.Fromtheearly1950stotheearly2000s,China’sunderstandingofenergysecuritywaslimitedtothesupplysideandwasfocusedonoil.WiththerapidgrowthofChina’soilimportsandevenmoresowiththenewfocusonsustainabledevelopmentinthemid-2000s,energydeficithasceasedtobeaninternalissueforChina,andtheconceptofenergysecurityhasstartedtointernationalizeandexpand.Between2006and2016,Chinesepoliticiansoftenplaceenergyonanexten-sivelistofnewnon-traditionalsecuritythreats.Theymentionitasoneofthemostcurrentglobaldevelopmentalchallenges,includingterrorism,transnationalChina’senergysecurityanddiscursivepoliticsofenergy39cybercrimes,foodinsecurity,infectiondisease,naturaldisasters,andclimatechange(e.g.,Yang2009,2011;Hu2012;Xi2015b,2016).China’sofficialenergydiscoursealsoemphasizedthecomplexinterconnectionswithintheinternationalsystemthatmakebalancedandequalenergydevelopmentofallstateswithinitauniversalvalue(e.g.,StateCouncilofthePRC2012;Li,K.2012;Yang2012b).Inparallelwithinternationalization,theconceptofenergysecurityalsostartedtoincorporatenewdimensionsofenergydevelopment.Inthe21stcentury,accordingtoChina’sauthorities,China’senergyresourcesoughttobestableandsecure,aswellaseconomicallyefficientandclean.Inthissense,“China’senergydevelopmentnotonlyguaranteesdomesticeconomicandsocialdevelopmentbutalsomakessignificantcontributionstoglobalenergysecurity”(StateCouncilofthePRC2012).Energysecuritynowgoesbeyondthesupplysecurityoffossilfuels.Overthepastdecade,Chinahasemergedasboththeworld’slargestproducerandcon-sumerofrenewableenergytechnologies.TheRenewableEnergyLawof2005(amendedin2009)andtheEnergyConservationLawof2007areofficialbench-marksforChina’s“green”and“sustainable”energydevelopment(绿色发展and可持续发展,lusefazhanandkechixufazhan).TheRenewableEnergyLawspeci-fiesmeasuresandgoalsrelatingtomandatorygridconnection,pricemanage-mentregulation,specialfunds,andtaxreliefs(StateCouncilofthePRC2009).Importantly,thislawsetsthegoaltoincreasetheshareofrenewableresourcesinChina’stotalenergymixupto15percentby2020.TheEnergyConservationLaw(StateCouncilofthePRC2007)intendstostrengthenenergyconservationonthenationallevel,specifically,forkeyenergy-usingentities.Italsopromotesefficientuseofenergy,theadoptionofenergyconservationtechnologies,andtheapplicationofrenewableenergyinvariousareas.Between2009and2010,renew-ableenergyresourcesandtechnologicaldevelopmentmovedtotheverycenterofChina’sdiscursivepoliticsofenergy.AsZhangGuobao(2009,43)summa-rizes,China’sgovernmentrealizedthat“ifChinaneglectstherenewableenergyindustrynow,inthenexttenyearsitwillsuddenlyfinditselffallingbehindothercountriesonceagain.”Asaresultofthisshiftinthinking,“scienceandtechnol-ogy”becameanewmantraofChina’senergydevelopment(e.g.,Jiang2008;Hu2012;Li,K.2012;Liu2012c;Wu,X.2014a).Theshifttoabroaderconceptofenergysecurityiscloselyassociatedwithandfollowsthelogicof“harmonioussociety/world”and“China’speacefulrise.”Forinstance,reframingthenotionof“harmonioussociety/world,”theauthorsofthe2007China’sEnergyDevelopmentReportfocuson“development”and“peace.”Inthemanifesto-likeintroduction,theydescribetheavailabilityofenergyresourcesasapreconditionof“development”andapotentialobstacleto“peace,”emphasizingthattheglobalquestforenergyresourcesleadstofiercecompetitionbetweendifferentgroupsofstates,aggravatesmistrust,andincreasespossibleconflictbetweengreatpowers.Theauthorsofthereportstronglyargueinfavorof“peacefulinternationalcooperation”intherealmofenergydevelopment.Intheiropinion,shiftingthefocusfromgeopoliticstointegrated,sustainable,andefficientdevelopmentistheonlysolutionfortheglobalenergychallengesinthe40China’senergysecurityanddiscursivepoliticsofenergy21stcentury.Theyalsosuggestthatchangingtheapproachtoenergysecurityontheinternationallevelwillbringanoticeablechange.ByswitchingtoamoreinclusiveandcooperativemodeofinternationalenergyrelationsthecountriesoftheGlobalNorthwillunderstandthattheirenergysecurityisnotaffectedbythesurgeinenergydemandinChina,India,andotherdevelopingcountries.China’sofficialsconstructthescarcityofenergyresourcesasproducinginternationalinequalityandreinforcingthebackloginthedevelopmentoftheGlobalSouthinthe21stcentury.Theyseetheavailabilityofenergyresourcesasadevelopmentalrightofallnations.Inthissense,theyputhumandevelop-mentaboveenvironmentalconcerns.RepresentativesofChinadonotdenythenegativeimpactsofclimatechangeanditsconnectiontotherisingproductionandconsumptionoffossilfuels.Yet,theylabeltheattemptstoimposeuniversalconsumptionlimitsundertheumbrellaofclimatechangeasactionsthathindereconomicgrowthandpovertyreductionintheGlobalSouth(e.g.,Wen2007b;Zhang,G.2008c;Li,K.2012).Giventheiremphasisonglobalizationandinterdependence,China’sofficialsfindthesolutiontothecontradictoryenergyproblemsintherealmofinternationalpolitics.Firstofall,thecountriesoftheGlobalNorthmustrecognizetheir“his-toricalresponsibilities”towardtheGlobalSouthandactaccordingly,generatingthepoliticalwilltoensureafairerandmoreequitableglobalenergydevelop-ment(StateCouncilofthePRC2005;Wen2007b).ItistheGlobalSouth’sturntorealizeitsfullpotentialanditmusthaveanopportunitytoallocateasmanyenergyresourcesasitneedsforitseconomicgrowth.However,Chinanowtreatseconomicgrowthasameansratherthananend.Followingthelogicofa“har-monioussociety/world,”ChinaurgesthecountriesoftheGlobalSouthtonotonlyprioritizetheireconomicsuccessbutalsotogeneratethepoliticalwillforafundamentalchangeinthemodeofenergyconsumption.TheprimaryrationalehereisthatpatternsofenergyconsumptiondevelopedbytheGlobalNorthinthe19thand20thcenturiesareunhealthyandunsustainableforthesharedfutureofboththeNorthandtheSouth(Li,K.2012).Despiteageneralacknowledgmentofenvironmentalconsequencesofrisingenergyconsumptionoffossilfuelsandtherapidexpansionofsolar,geothermal,wind,biofuels,andothernon-traditionalenergysourcesinthelate2000sandthe2010s,oilhaskeptitsstatusasthevitalenergyresourceforChina.TheleadingroleofoilinChinesethinkingaboutenergyresourcesresultsinfrequenttermi-nologysubstitutionbetween“energy”and“oil”inscholarlyresearchonenergysecurity.ManyChineseacademicseitherexplicitlyorimplicitlydefineenergysecurityasthesecurityofoilsupply(e.g.Zhao2006;Wu,L.2009;Lin2014;ZhangandZhang2015).Similarly,energyself-sufficiencyisoftenunderstoodasanabilitytomeetoilconsumptionneedsfromdomesticsupplies(e.g.,WeiandLiu2006;Wu,L.2013;Zha2012;Yan2016).TheoverwhelmingmajorityofacademicarticlespublishedinChinesepeer-reviewjournalsbetween2005and2016examineChina’senergydevelopmentthroughtheprismofdefinitionsofenergysecurityofferedbyAmericanscholars.Thesedefinitionsemphasizerela-tivegainsconcerns,prioritizeshort-andmedium-termsecuritychallenges,andChina’senergysecurityanddiscursivepoliticsofenergy41mainlyfocusontheacquisitionofoil.Inparticular,themostfrequentlycitedunresolvedissueofChina’senergystrategyisthereliabilityoftheMalaccaStraitasarouteforChina’soilimportsfromtheMiddleEastandAngola,theso-called“China’sMalaccadilemma”(马六甲困境,Maliujiakunjing).ThescholarlyapproachmirrorstheofficialenergydiscoursethatunivocallydescribesthescarcityofoilasasecuritythreatandafundamentalpredicamentforChina’snationaldevelopment.Moreover,theofficialenergydiscoursealsooftendefinesenergysecurityasthereliabilityandavailabilityofoilsupplies.China’slatestwhitepaperonenergypolicy(StateCouncilofthePRC2012)highlights“resourcerestraints,”“lowenergyefficiency,”and“increasingenvironmentalpressure”as“toughchallenges”ofenergydevelopment.Italsodefines“gravechallenges”tonationalenergysecurityinconnectiontooilasfollows:Thecountry’sdependenceonforeignenergysourceshasbeenincreasinginrecentyears.Inparticular,thepercentageofimportedpetroleumintotalpetroleumconsumptionhasrisenfrom32percentatthebeginningofthe21stcenturytothepresent57percent.Marinetransportationofpetroleumandcross-borderpipelinetransmissionofoilandgasfaceever-greatersecurityrisks.Pricefluctuationsintheinternationalenergymarketmakeitmoredif-ficulttoguaranteethedomesticenergysupply.ItwillnotbeeasyforChinatomaintainitsenergysecuritysinceitsenergyreservesaresmallanditsemergencyresponsecapabilityisweak.Thecentralroleofoilinthedefinitionofenergysecuritypresupposessecuritiza-tionofenergydevelopmentingeneral,implyingthatgovernanceandmanage-mentofenergyresourcesisastrategictaskforastate.Consequently,whileenergydevelopment,ingeneral,isframedasaglobal/internationalchallengethatshouldbeapproachedasamatterofinternationalpoliticsratherthanasapurelyeco-nomicmatterorasecuritythreat,China’sapproachtooilisdrasticallydifferent.China’soil:ReproducingDaqingspiritunderthe“socialistmarketeconomy”DaqingcontinuestoepitomizeChina’saspirationsforoilandinspiresChina’soilpoliticsonbothnationalandinternationallevels,asitdidsixdecadesago.XiJinping(2009)affirmsthattheDaqingspiritisstillacrucialpartofChinesecul-tureandDaqing,asa“modernoilcity,”playsavitalroleintheimplementationofthestrategyofcleandevelopmentandscientificdevelopment.ThecoverarticlesauthoredbyLiuTienanandZhangGuobao,publishedbythePeople’sDailyin2012,offerparticularlyclear-cutexamplesoftheroleofDaqinginChina’scon-temporaryoildiscourse.Liu’sarticle(2012a)arguesthatoverthepasttenyearsChina“hasbeencarefullystudyingtheglobalsituation,engaginginenergydiplo-macy,andactivelyimplementingthe‘goingglobal’strategy.”Accordingtohim,asaresult,Chinawasableto“buildanoverseasDaqing”(建成了“海外大庆,”jianchengle“haiwaiDaqing”)bysecuringthefourstrategictransportation42China’senergysecurityanddiscursivepoliticsofenergychannelsforitsoilimports(North-West,North-East,South-West,andmaritimeroutes).Inasimilarvein,Zhang(2012a)givesapositiveassessmentofthedevel-opmentofChina’soilindustryand,highlightingthesuccessofChina’soffshoreoilproduction,concludesthatintheearly2000sChina“hasrecreatedaDaqingonthesea”(再造了一个海上大庆,zaizaoleyigehaishangDaqing).China’sauthoritiesmakesurethatthepopulationwillbeabletoreadthosemetaphorscorrectly.Aswasalreadymentionedinthischapter,thecentralandprovincialgovernmentssupportthefadingeconomyofDaqingandinvestinitsmuseuminfrastructure,makingDaqinganattractivedestinationfordomestictourists.Socialscientistsandbusinessmanagementresearchersstudytheevo-lutionoftheDaqingspirit(e.g.,Li,JX.2012;Ma2009;SongandWang2013;Wang,K.2009).North-EastPetroleumUniversity(Daqing,Heilongjiang)andNortheastNormalUniversity(Changchun,Jilin)bothhaveResearchCentersfortheDaqingSpiritthatfocusonbuildingthenarrativeofDaqingintothecurriculumsofprovincialandsub-provincialPartyschools.Moreover,withthesupportofthegovernment,Daqingspirit–rebrandedas“patriotism,entrepre-neurship,realism,anddedication”–isvisualizedinfilms,documentaries,andTV-shows.AnexcellentexampleisthefilmIronMen(铁人,Tieren)thatwasreleasedamidstthecelebrationsofthe60thanniversaryofthefoundingofthePRCin2009.Theleadingactor,WuGang,“feltblessedtohavetheopportunitytorepresenttheheroismthattouchedthewholecountry”(RenmingRibao2009).However,theprimarygoalofthefilmisnottoremindthenewgenerationofChineseaboutthegloryofindustrializationandfearlessnessofChina’soilworkersofthe1960sbuttohelpittoformalinkbetweentheheritageofMaoistChinaandthepresentChinathatisbuildinga“socialistmarketeconomy.”TheplotofIronMenalternatesbetweenthestoryofagroupofDaqingoilworkersledbyWangJinxiandapresent-daystoryfocusedonafictionalcharac-ter,LiuSicheng,thesonofoneofWangJinxi’scomrades-in-arms.LiuSichengcontinuestheworkofhisfather:heistheheadofadrillingcrewthatstrugglestofindoilinthemiddleofanunknowndesertintheearly2000s.HecollectsitemsrelatedtoWangJinxiandisfascinatedbytheearlyhistoryofDaqing.TheaudiencelearnsabouttheDaqingspiritthroughLiuSicheng’srecollectionsofconversationshehadwithhisfather.Inthecourseofaspiritualandprofessionalstruggle,theyoungmanendsupembracingtheDaqingspiritandfindsabalancebetweenhisdeepfeelingofpatriotismandseekingcommercialsuccessforthecompanythatherepresents.This50-million-yuan(approximatelyUS$7.5millionin2009)15filmwasfundedbytheStateAdministrationofPress,Publication,Radio,FilmandTelevision,anexecutivebranchundertheStateCouncil.ThePeople’sDailyreviewedIronMenasa“bigpieceofbarnstormingwidescreenentertainment”(Ren2009),yetthefilmstilldidnottopthechartsanddidnotachievesuccessintermsoftheboxofficeresults.Daqing’sironmenandtheirspiritualdescend-antshadtocompetefortheheartsoftheaudiencewithTonyStark,thefamousAmericanIronMan,16andlostthebattle.WhatmakesIronMenandothersimilarChina’senergysecurityanddiscursivepoliticsofenergy43films(e.g.,TheFoundingofaRepublic,2009,andAftershock,2010)interesting,however,isnottheircommercialorartisticvaluebuttheirpoliticalbackgroundandagenda.IronMenisapartoftheeffortofChina’sauthoritiestokeepDaqing’sbrandandideologicalheritagealive.LiketheexpositionattheMuseumofDaqingOilfield,IronMenisyetanothermediumthatcommunicatesawholesetofoffi-cialdiscourses,includingtheoildiscourse.ThediscoursethatshowcasesDaqingasthemodelforChina’soilindustryisreinforcednotonlybythegovernmentbutalsothroughthenarrativesproducedbyChina’sNOCs.Forexample,theofficialwebsiteofCNPChasapagededi-catedtothe“Daqingspirit,”summarizedas“dynamic,loyal,honest,andcom-mitted.”Linkingitscorporatehistorytothe“miracleofChina’sindustry,”CNPCfeaturesthestoriesof“representativepioneers”:WangJinxi,theoldoilindustryhero,andWangQimin,thenewoilindustryhero.WangQimin“consciouslyfollowedtheexampleofoldIronManWangJinxi”sincehestartedtoworkfortheExplorationandDevelopmentResearchInstituteofDaqingPetroleumAdministration.Inspiredbythelegendary“ironman,”WangQiminadvancedasetofmethodsforoilfielddevelopmentthathelped“Daqingoilfieldtoaccomplishthegoalofmaintainingahighandstableannualoutputof50milliontonsfor27consecutiveyears.”CNPChonorsWangQiminasthe“IronManoftheNewEra”forcontributingtothe“scientificresearchspiritofconstantinnovationandimprovement.”Byemphasizingthecontinuityofoilworkers’generations,thenarrativetoldbytheCNPCalsoreinforcestheideaofcontinuityinthedevelop-mentoftheindustry.Insum,inthe21stcentury,China’soilandChina’sideologyareascloselyinterconnectedastheywereintheearly1950s.Theabilityoftheparty-statelead-ershiptoensureadequateandreliablesuppliesofoilremainsoneofthesymbolsoftheenduringsuccessoftheCommunistPartyofChina.ArebrandedDaqingspirithelpstolegitimizetheparty’songoingrulethroughhistoricalcontinuity.EventhoughChina’smajorstrategicgoalsinenergydevelopmenthavechanged,whenitcomestooil,China’saimisstillself-relianceandmaximumpossibleself-sufficiency.Between2005and2016,Chinawasconsistentlyidentifyingitselfasadevel-opingcountrythatisfacinga“complicated”and“grim”situationintherealmofenergysecurity(e.g.,Wen2006;Hu2008;Liu2012a;Wu,X.2014d).TosupportChina’sstatusasadevelopingcountryintherealmofinternationalenergyrela-tions,China’sofficialsoftenrefertoBRICS,highlightingcommonalities,sharedinterests,andchallenges(Hu2012b;Xi2013a).TheoverarchingideaisthatthedevelopmentofChinaandotherBRICSstatesonthetrajectoryfromapre-industrializedstatetoamodernaffluentindustrializedstateisunfinished.Hence,China’seconomicsuccessisrelative,ontheonehand,tothecontextinwhichitoccursandtothelivingstandardsinthedevelopedWesterncountries.ViceForeignMinisterFuYing(2010)vividlyarticulatesthisideainthekey-noteaddressattheDinneroftheThirdWorldPolicyConference.FuYingunivo-callydefinesChinaasadevelopingcountry,facingthechallengesthatgobeyondmereeconomicgrowth:44China’senergysecurityanddiscursivepoliticsofenergyChinaisnotjustasymboloraGDPfigure.Itisacountrythatprovidesfor1.3billionpeople,with140millionstudentsinschoolsanduniversities,over20millionnewjob-seekerseveryyear,including6millionuniversitygraduates.[…]Chinaisquicklyurbanizing,andyethalfofitspopulationisstillrural.Further,FuYingrearticulatesChina’sdefinitionofenergydevelopmentasadevelopmentalright:Measurestomitigatetheeffectsofclimatechangehaveahumandimension.Peoplelivinginpoorregionsneedtosecuretheirrighttoproperindoor-heating.Grandmasinurbancommunitiesaredebatingaboutafairerwaytopayelectricitybills.Themigrantlaborersdemandbetterpayandbetterwork-ingconditions.Workersarelaid-offwhenfactoriescloseduetopoorenergyefficiencyandneedtobere-employed.ForChina,alltheserankhighonthegovernment’sagendatoaddresshumanrightsconcerns.Consequently,contrastingChinatothedevelopedWesterncountries,China’sofficialshighlightthatChina’sconsumptionpercapitaisstilllowandmanyChinesestillexperienceenergypoverty.Inthissense,China’sofficialdiscourseonenergycontraposesChinatodevelopedWesterncountriesthatmust“facetheirhistoricalresponsibilities”(Wen2007b,999)andmakeacoordinatedeffortto“toachieveuniversal,coordinated,andbalanceddevelopment”(StateCouncilofthePRC2005).Inthissense,China’senergyidentityisfirmlycontextualizedarounditsongoingdevelopmentalproject.Asacaseinpoint,China’sEnergyPolicystatesthat“asthelargestdevelopingcountryintheworld,Chinaisfacedwiththedauntingtasksofdevelopingitseconomy,improvingitspeople’slivelihood,andbuildingamoderatelyprosperoussociety”(StateCouncilofthePRC2012).ThequantityofChina’senergyconsumptionisasimportantasthequalityofChina’senergydevelopmentforthediscursiveconstructionofChina’senergyidentity.ZhangGuobao(2012b)arguesthat“Chinawillnotfollowthedevel-opmentpathoftheWesterncountries.”AccordingtoZhang,itplacesgreateremphasison“scientificdevelopment,economicrestructuring,andmodernizationofitsenergystructure”and“vigorouslypromotesenergyconservationandemis-sionreduction,aswellasthedevelopmentofrenewableenergysuchaswindpower,hydropower,andsolarenergy.”Elsewhere,Zhang(2008a)pointsoutthat,atthepeakoftheirmodernization,developedWesterncountriesaccountedforonly15percentofthetotalworldpopulationyetwereconsumingmorethan60percentoftheworld’senergyresources.Incontrast,China,accordingtohim,“hassupportedtherapiddevelopmentofitsnationaleconomywitharelativelylowrateofenergygrowth,”andChina’senergydevelopmentis“healthy”whencom-paredtotheenergydevelopmentofitsWesterncounterparts(Zhang2008a,15).WuXingxiong(2014a,5)madesimilardeclarations,promisingthat,eventhoughChina’seconomicgrowthwillcontinueinthefuture,“Chinawillnotrepeatthetraditionalpathofdevelopedcountrieswhoproduceduncontrolledemissionofgreenhousegasesduringtheirindustrialization.”China’senergysecurityanddiscursivepoliticsofenergy45Atthesametime,ChinastronglyidentifiesitselfwiththeGlobalEast,asapartof“globalizedAsia”(Xi2014a)anda“memberofAsia-Pacificfamily”(Hu2006a).ThisidentityreinforcesChina’sdivergencefromWesterndevelopedcountries.ItsimultaneouslyalliesChinanotonlywithdevelopingbutalsowithdevelopedAsiancountries.Chinaismakingaconsciousidentitychoicebycon-fidentlysituatingitselfintheEast(understoodasEastAsiaandAsia-Pacific)ortheGlobalSouthanddistancingitselffromtheWestortheGlobalNorth.Suchself-representationallowsChinatoclaimthestatusofanexceptionaldevelopingcountry,aninfluentialindependentplayer,andaprospectiveleaderofthedevel-opingworld.Forinstance,YangJiechi(2012a)affirmsthatChinaisuniquelyequippedtorepresenttheGlobalSouthandpromoteitsinterestsontheinterna-tionalstage.HefurtheraddsthatChinaisalsocapableto“initiateaninternationalreform”(促改革,Cugaige)ofglobalgovernance,withequitableenergydevelop-mentasoneoftheprimarytargets.ThisidentityintersectswithanotherdimensionofChina’sofficialenergydiscoursethataddressesrepresentationsofChinaasbothconsumerandproducer.Chinaasaconsumerandasaproducer:TheguarantorofglobalenergysecurityPointingoutthatChinanotonlytopstheworld’schartsofthelargestenergycon-sumersbutalsoleadstheworldintheproductionofallsortsofenergyresources,ZhangGuobao(2008aand2012b)identifiesChinaasan“energygreatpower”(世界能源大国,shijienengyuandaguo).ZhangconstructsChinaasaguarantorofglobalenergysecurity,pointingoutthatChina’snationalenergysecurityis(andalwayshasbeen)aprincipalissueforglobalenergydevelopmentratherthanjustasourceofChina’sdomesticconcerns.Forexample,hearguesthatacting“asaresponsiblegreatpower,”China“foralongtimehasbeentryingitsbesttoensureglobalenergysecuritybysolvingitsenergysecurityproblemsthroughmaintainingself-sufficiency”(Zhang,G.2008a,17).Followingthislogic,nowitistimefortheinternationalcommunitytorecognizeChina’sheroicefforts.Importantly,theseefforts,accordingtoZhang(2008a),shouldearnChinanotjustinternationalrecognitionbutalsotherighttotakepartininternationalenergygovernance.TheideaofChinabeingaguarantorofglobalenergysecuritycor-respondswellwiththeinternationalramificationsoftheconceptoftheChinaDream(中国梦,Zhongguomeng),activelypromotedbyXiJinpingafter2013.17AtthecoreofthenotionoftheChinaDreamisanegotiationofcollectiveidentityandindividualaspirations.AlldiversegoalsoftheindividualChinesepeoplearerepresentedintheChinaDreamasshapedbyasharedhistoryandcol-lectivewilltomakeChina“arichandpowerfulcountry,”“revitalizethenation,”and“enhancethewell-beingofthepeople’”(Xi2014a).AnessentialpartoftheChinaDreamistheconfidenceoverChina’sdevelopmentalachievementsduringthepastdecadeandthesuperiorityofChina’sdevelopment,comparedwithboththedevelopedworldandothercountriesinthedevelopingworld.Thisgrowingconfidencehasbeentransferredtointernationalrelations.46China’senergysecurityanddiscursivepoliticsofenergyXiJinping’spredecessor,HuJintao,wasrisk-averseandmainlyfocusedhisattentionon“harmony,”initiatingatransitiontosustainabilityandmaintainingeconomicgrowth.WhileHuwaspracticingastrategyof“hidecapabilitiesandkeepalowprofile”(韬光养晦,taoguangyanghui)inforeignaffairs,XiquicklyreframedChina’sforeignpolicyas“strivingforachievement”(奋发有为,fenfayouwei)(Qian2013).18Intheworkreportpresentedatthe19thNationalCongressoftheCPC,XiJinpinghighlightedthatChinahadentereda“newera”(新时代,XinShidai).TheconceptisalsofeaturedinthewordytitleofXi’sreport:SecureaDecisiveVictoryinBuildingaModeratelyProsperousSocietyinAllRespectsandStrivefortheGreatSuccessofSocialismwithChineseCharacteristicsforaNewEra.Hespecifiedthat“itwillbeanerathatseesChinamovingclosertocenterstage”andheldoutChinaasamodelforotherdevelopingnations,emphasizingthatChinahaddevelopeditseconomywithoutimitatingWesternvalues.AccordingtoXi,“thepath,thetheory,thesystem,andthecultureofsocialismwithChinesechar-acteristics”provides“anewtrailforotherdevelopingcountriestoachievemoderni-zation”andoffers“anewoption”forthosedevelopingnations“whowanttospeeduptheirdevelopmentwhilepreservingtheirindependence.”Overall,Xidemon-stratedextremeconfidenceinChina’sgrowingnationalpowerandconfirmedinter-nationaltrendsworkinginfavorofthedevelopmentalmodelchosenbyChina.Bythemiddleofthe21stcentury,Xiasserted,Chinawillhavebecome“agloballeaderintermsofcomprehensivenationalpowerandinternationalinfluence.”Amongtheotherthings,XiJinping(2017)madetwocommitmentsrelatedtoChina’senergyfuture.First,hepromisedthatChinawouldactivelytakepartintheinternationalpolicyresponsetoclimatechange:“takingadrivingseatininter-nationalcooperationtorespondtoclimatechange,Chinahasbecomeanimpor-tantparticipant,contributor,andtorchbearerintheglobalendeavorforecologicalcivilization.”Further,XiJinpingpromisedthatChina“willpromotearevolutioninenergyproductionandconsumption,andbuildanenergysectorthatisclean,low-carbon,safe,andefficient.”Consequently,inthe“newera”announcedbyXi,Chinaisnotonlyaguarantorofinternationalenergysecuritybutalsoapotentialmodelforenergydevelop-ment.AsChinaisoptimistically“dreaming”aboutabetterworldinwhichtheinternationalcommunitywillrightfullyacknowledgeitasafrontrunner,XiisgettingreadytotaketheleadinbalancingcommongoalsoftheworldcommunityandChina’snationalinterests.China’salliesandadversariesininternationalenergypoliticsSince2013,Chinahasfocusedonthe“correctviewofmoralityandbenefits”(正确义利观,zhengqueyiliguan),tryingtoimproverelationswithitsneigh-borsanddevelopingcountriesatlarge(MFAofthePRC2014a).ThisdiplomaticstrategyiscloselyassociatedwithXiJinping’sleadership,asitissupposedtobecome“asolidfoundationforthesmoothstartofChina’sdiplomacyinthenewera”(WangY.2013).Chinaportraysitsrelationswiththedevelopingworldascloseandconstructive:a“friendlycooperation”withtheASEANcountries,aChina’senergysecurityanddiscursivepoliticsofenergy47“mutuallybeneficialpartnership”withCentralAsia,“people’sfriendship”withLatinAmerica,andtheCaribbean,anda“brotherhood”withAfrica.AccordingtoWangYi(2013),“AfricanleadersandpeoplefromallwalksoflifespeakhighlyofChina’sAfricapolicyandappreciatedChinaforitsself-lessnessinhelpingtoAfricaforalongtimeandsolemnlyrefutethefallacyofChina’sso-called‘neocolonialism’inAfrica.”WangYi(2013)alsoconfirmedXiJinping’spromiseto“offertheaidtoAfricawithoutanypoliticalconditionsattached,”helpingAfricancountriesto“transformtheirresourceadvantages”into“diversified,independent,andsustainabledevelopment.”Similarly,WangYi’spredecessor,YangJiechi(2010)arguedthatcooperationwithChinahelpsthepeopleofAfricatoconverttheircountries’energyresourcesinto“therealdevelopmentaladvantages.”RespondingtothequestionaboutWesterndisapprovalandvocalconcernsaboutChina’sinvestmentinAfricanoil,YangJiechi(2010)repliedthathehasnoticedthat“somepeopleintheworlddonotwanttoseethedevelopmentofChina-AfricanrelationsandoftenuseChina-Africanenergycooperationto‘makespeculations.’”Hepointedoutthat“theUSandEurope”exportmoreoilfromAfricathanChina.Inhisopinion,sinceChinafullysupportstheeffortsofothercountriestodevelopcooperationwithAfricaintheenergyfield,theyalsohavenoreasontoopposeChina’sattemptstobuildapartnershipwithAfrica.Finally,YangJiechialsohighlightedthat“AfricabelongstotheAfricanpeopleandtheAfricanpeoplearetheownersofAfrica,whereastherestarejustguests,”andthusWesterncountries“shouldrespectthehost’srighttochoosepartnersandfriends.”Alongthesamelines,ChinaarticulatesitspoliticalandeconomicambitionsinCentralAsia.China’sofficialshighlightthat“Shanghaispirit”(上海精神,ShanghaiJingshen)isanessentialattributeoftheSCOthatmakesanorgani-zationof“anewtype”:peace-oriented,cooperative,open,andstrivingtowardharmony(e.g.,Yang2008;Xi2013c).ChinaendorsesitsstatusasthefounderofSCO,aswellasitsmajorinspirerandideologist,andoffersCentralAsiaapartnershipbasedonforeignpolicypluralism,cosmopolitism,mutualbenefits,commondevelopmentalgoals,andequality.Energyresourcesarelistedasoneofmanyoptionsfor“pragmaticcooperation,”alongwithsocio-culturalexchangesandajointstruggleagainstthe“threeevilsforces”(三股势力,sangushili)thataredrug-trafficking,transnationalcrimes,andcybercrimes(Xi2014b,2015a).Insum,ChinapromotesitselfasasenioryetstillanequalpartnerinCentralAsiaandstressesthatitwilloffer“nostringsattached”relations.Consequently,Chinaismostlysurroundedby“friends,”“brothers,”and“friendlyneighbors”intheGlobalSouth.Inthe2000sandthe2010s,“win-win”(合作共赢,hezuogongying)isthemostfrequentlyrepeatedepithetof“coop-eration”inChina’sdiscourseonSouth–Southenergyrelations(e.g.,Wen2007a;Zhang,G.2008b;Yang2012a;Xi2015c).AccordingtoChina’sofficials,allChinawantsintheGlobalSouthis“toreducetheglobalimbalance,sothatpeopleofallcountriessharethefruitsofworldeconomicgrowth”(Xi2016).Incontrast,whenitcomestothediscursivepoliticsofenergy,China’srelationswiththeGlobalNorthappeartobewaymorecomplicated.48China’senergysecurityanddiscursivepoliticsofenergyChina’sofficialsdescribetheEuropeanUnion(EU)asneithera“brother”nora“friend”butasan“importantroleintheinternationalpoliticalarena.”Atthesametime,theystilloffertheEUmember-statestheopportunitytobecomeChina’s“comprehensivestrategicpartners”(e.g.,Song2012)andinvitethem“tointen-sifycoordinationandcooperation”withChina(e.g.,Xi2014a).OnthenarrowerlevelofChina’senergydiscourse,however,theEUishomogenizedandtreatedasasinglehostileentity.Itbecomesoneof“thosecountries”thatseeChinaasathreat,labelingitscooperationwithotherdevelopingcountriesasneocolonialismandquestioningthepossibilityofitspeacefulrise(e.g.,Yang2010;Ying2010).Asoneof“thosecountries,”theEUalsoistryingtorestrictChina’saccesstoenergyresourcesandthuspreventChinafrombridgingtheNorth-SouthgapandstrengtheningSouth–Southcooperation.TogetherwiththehomogenizedEU,“thosecountries”alsoincludetheUS.ViceForeignMinisterFuYing(2010),inthespeechthatwasalreadycitedinthischapter,urgestherepresentativesofthedevelopingworldto“takeChinaas[their]partner.”ReferringtoanunspecifiedpublicationintheNewYorkTimes,FuYingencouragesthemtodisregardtheopinionof“thosecountries,”whichtreatChinaas“thescapegoatforallproblemsonearth.”ShehighlightsthatChinais“averyconvenientscapegoat”because“despitethesacredprincipleoffreedomofspeech,thereislittleinterestamongthemediainthosecountriesininformingtheirpublictheviewsfromwithinChina”(Fu,2010).BuildinganewDaqingoverseasAthisretirement,JiangZemin(2008)19proposedthe“newapproachtoenergydevelopmentwithChinesecharacteristics”(中国特色的新型能源发展道路,Zhongguotesedexinxingnengyuanfazhandaolu)basedonsixpillars:conserva-tionofenergy,energyefficiency,diversifiedenergydevelopment,environmen-talprotection,technologicalprogress,andinternationalcooperation.Hewarnedhissuccessorsthat“thenextfewdecadeswillbethecrucialperiodforChina’scomprehensivesocio-economicdevelopmentandwillmarkthegreatrejuvena-tionoftheChinesenationand,[inthisregard,]thetaskofenergydevelopmentisverysignificant”(Jiang2008,351).Whilethetermdidnottakeroot,theenergystrategyformulatedunderHuJintaoandfurtherdevelopedwiththearrivalofXiJinpingfitsintotheframeworkdevelopedbyJiangZemin.ThisevolutionindicatesthatthereisageneralagreementamongthethreelatestgenerationsofChina’sleadersastohowChina’senergystrategyshouldlook.Sincethemid-2000s,theoverallaimofChina’senergydevelopmenthasbeensustainableeconomicgrowthandsocialstability.Chinaconsistentlychoosesan“all-of-the-above”energystrategy:itplanstosecureastablesupplyoffossilfuelsandsimultaneouslyinitiatesatransitionto“greener”fuelsandlaunchesacompre-hensiveresourceconservationprogram.AtthesymposiumonChina’sPeacefulDevelopment(2011),YangJiechilinkedgrowingenergyconsumptiontoenvironmentaldegradationandidentifiedChina’senergysecurityanddiscursivepoliticsofenergy49thesetwoissuesastheprimary“bottlenecks”ofChina’sdevelopment.HefurtherattestedthatSelf-relianceisthefootholdfordevelopment.Inthefinalanalysis,acountrymustrelyonitsstrengthtoensureitsdevelopment.Commonprosperityisthegoalofdevelopment.Acountrycantrulyachievesustainabledevelopmentonlywhenitintegratesitsdevelopmentwiththecommondevelopmentofthewholeworld.Consequently,YangJiechiexplicitlyconnectsChina’senergystrategytothenotionsof“harmonioussociety/world”and“China’speacefulrise.”Moreover,heconfirmsthatChinafirmlybelievesinthepossibilityofmutuallybeneficialenergycooperationandisgoingtofocusonavoidingcompetitionintherealmofenergydevelopment.Alongsimilarlines,LiuTienan(2012b,24)arguesthat,byconducting“all-aroundinternationalcooperation”andactivelyimplement-ingits“goingglobal”strategy,Chinaisactingasaresponsibleparticipantininternationalenergyrelations.Accordingtohim,China’sactionswillbalanceratherthandestabilizeglobalenergymarkets.Thewhitepaperofenergypolicy(StateCouncilofthePRC2012)convertstheseideasintothestrategicaimofChina’senergydevelopmentandconceptualizesthemas“amodernenergyindustry”thatwill“provideasolidguaranteeforbuildingamoderatelypros-peroussocietyinallrespectsandmakegreatercontributionstotheworld’seconomicdevelopment.”Chinaquicklytransitionedfromthepromiseto“modernize”and“reform”itsenergysystem(e.g.,Hu2006b,2008;Wen2007a)toa“revolutioninenergyproductionandconsumption”(能源生产和消费改革,nengyuanshengchanhexiaofeigaige)(e.g.,Zhang,G.2012b;Wu,X.2014c).Accordingtothewhitepaperonenergypolicy(StateCouncilofthePRC2012),China“isexploringandpracticinganewwayinthehistoryofenergydevelopmenttoensureitssus-tainableenergydevelopment.”In2014,XiJinpingsummarizedChina’senergystrategyas“fourrevolutionsandonecooperation”(四个革命、一个合作,sigegeming,yigehezuo):(1)the“revolutioninenergyconsumption”thatfocusesonrestrainingunreasonableenergyuse;(2)the“energysupplyrevolution”thatimpliesdevelopingadiversifiedsupplysystem;(3)the“technologicalrevolu-tion”thatwillpromotemodernizationofenergyindustry;(4)the“energysystemrevolution”thatwillopenafastlaneforenergydevelopment(seeXi2015b).Inadditiontothesefour“revolutions”inChina’sdomesticenergydevelopment,XialsohighlightedtheneedtostrengtheninternationalcooperationandmakeenergysecurityapartofChina’soverall“openingup”strategy.AsWuXingxiong(2014c,2014b)explainsXiJinping’splans,thisfinaldimensionoftheenergystrategyis“anextension”ofChina’snewforeignpolicystrategyand,specifically,theBeltandRoadInitiative(BRI).Asof2016,CNOOC,Sinopec,andCNPCcontributedtoacombined92per-centofthetotaloilindustryrevenueinChina(IWEPACSS2016).Theyoper-ateinmorethan30countriesandhaveequityproductioninatleast20ofthese50China’senergysecurityanddiscursivepoliticsofenergycountries.Chinamaintainedtheprincipleof“Chinafirst”and“focusondomes-ticresourcesbystrengtheningdomesticenergysupplycapacitiesandcontinu-ouslyimprovingitsabilitytocontrolthedependenceonexternalsourcesofoil”(Wu,X.2014c,4).Consequently,supportingNOCsandexpandingthescopeofenergydiplomacy,China’sgovernmentremainsprimarilyconcernedwiththeavailabilityofoilanddoesnotplantorevolutionizeitsapproachtosupplysecu-rity.Followingthelogicofself-reliance,Chinais“buildinganoverseasDaqing”(Liu2012a).Inthissense,whilethedreamofbringingChinaintoaleadershippositioninworldaffairsbeginstoloomovertheconcernsaboutmaintainingitseconomicgrowthandmakingitmoresustainable,inChina’senergypoliticsingeneral,andpreciselywhenitcomestooil,self-reliancestillplaysamoreprominentroleinstructuringpoliciesanddevelopingrelationswithresource-richcountries.China’senergyparadigm:ChasingDaqingOntheinternationallevel,China’sofficialenergydiscoursestressesthefunda-mentalandpersistentinequalityofthecurrentworldorderand,usingitasastart-ingpoint,callsforreducingthegapbetweentheGlobalNorthandtheGlobalSouth.Inthiscontext,thetwoforemostdimensionsofChina’senergyparadigmarethefollowing:··Availabilityofenergyresources,andspecificallyfossilfuels,isaprerequisitefordevelopment;and··Globaldistributionofenergyresourcesisneitherapurelyeconomicissuenorasecurityissuebut,firstandforemost,amatterofinternationalpoliticsbecauseenergydevelopmentisarightofeverynation.Inthisparadigm,thefocusofenergysecurityisdevelopment.Coherently,thedef-initionofenergysecuritycorrespondswiththeconceptofdevelopmentthatinthemid-2000swasencapsulatedintheaspirationfora“harmonioussociety/world”and“China’speacefulrise.”Followingthenewdevelopmentstrategy,China’senergyparadigmbroadenedandnowincludessustainableandenvironmentallyconsciousdevelopmentasapartoftheconceptofenergysecurity.Inadditiontoit,thenotionofenergysecuritystartedtointernationalize,and,asaresult,theenergydeficitbecamemorepoliticized.Thepoliticizationofenergydeficitpresupposesthatbindinginternationalrulesandregulationsshouldregulatethedistributionofenergyresources.Italsoimpliesthatinternationalenergyrelationscanandshouldbeapositive-sumgame.Onthedomestic/nationallevel,however,theenergydeficitisassociatedmainlywiththereliabilityoftheoilsupplyandremainssecuritized.Aswasthecase60yearsago,Chinatreatsthedeficitofoilasanexistentialthreattoitsnationaldevelopmentandasourceofdangerousvulnerabilities.Asaresult,whenitcomestooil,China’senergystrategyisdefinedasthequestforanewDaqing.China’senergysecurityanddiscursivepoliticsofenergy51Insum,thereisabifurcationinChina’senergyparadigm:whileontheglobal/internationalleveltheenergydeficitisnowpoliticized,onthedomestic/nationallevelitremainslargelysecuritized.Chinaactivelypromotesacooperativemodeofenergydevelopmentontheinternationallevelanddoesnotcallforurgentandexceptionalmeasurestodealwiththeenergydeficit.Nonetheless,whenitcomestooil,Chinastilldoesnotrushtotradeitsself-relianceforinterdependency.AnessentialpartofChina’senergyparadigmisChina’senergyidentities.Ontheonehand,brandingitselfasadevelopingcountry,Chinadefendsitsrighttoobtainenergyresourcesforitsgrowth.Chinaalsoalliesitselfwithresource-richdevelopingcountries,framingitsglobalquestforenergyresourcesintermsof“win-win”South–Southcooperation.Here,Chinapresentsitselfasanin-groupmember,proposingequalpartnershipand“nostringsattached”relationsthatChina’srepresentativesframeasadvantageouslydifferentthanrelationshipswiththeGlobalNorth.AccordingtoChina’sofficialenergydiscourse,thepeopleoftheGlobalSouthreadilyembracetheopportunitiesfor“win-win”cooperationwithChina,whereas“thosecountries”intheGlobalNortharestillsuspiciousanddistrustfulofChina’speacefulrise.Ontheotherhand,Chinadefinesitselfasadistinctcaseamongdevelopingcountries.WiththearrivalofXiJinping,thisdiscursivetrendhasintensified.Theidentityofanenergyproducerbuildsonthenarrativeofheroicoilexplo-rationandproductioninDaqinginthe1950s.Whileonthedomesticlevelthisnarrativeisperceptible,ontheinternationallevelChina’sidentityasanenergyproducerissupportedmainlybythereferencestoitsreliableandconsistentrecordofenergyself-sufficiency.Asfortheidentityofaconsumer,ChinadescribesitsenergyconsumptionasresponsibleandmodestrelativetotheGlobalNorthandshowcasesitsrecentachievementsin“green”and“clean”energydevelopment.China’sofficialenergydiscoursetranslatesthepastrecordsandcurrentaccom-plishmentsintofuturepromises.China’sidentityasthelargestconsumerandpro-ducerofenergymergeswiththeidentityofadevelopingcountry.Asaresult,notonlydoesChinabecomethefirst-choicepartnerforresource-richdevelop-ingcountriesbutitcanalsolegitimizeitsattemptstorepresenttheinterestsoftheGlobalSouthintheinternationalenergypolitic.Also,bybringingthesetwoidentitiestogether,ChinaunderminesthelegitimacyoftheGlobalNorth’sleader-shipininternationalenergypoliticsand,mainly,therightoftheGlobalNorthtocriticizeChina’senergychoice,bethatregulationsofdomesticenergyconsump-tionsoritsenergycooperationwithdevelopingcountries.TheoverarchingideaisthatChinaisaguarantorofglobalenergysecurity,andthesuccessofitsenergydevelopmentoffersbenefitstootherparticipantsofenergyrelationsinboththeGlobalSouthandtheGlobalNorth.China’sofficialenergydiscoursedetailsandcarefullyrevisesthestoryofChina’s“green”and“clean”energyfuture.Itexplicitlyconfirmsthattheulti-mategoalofChina’senergydevelopmentisself-relianceandassertsthatitsnewproactiveroleinglobalenergypoliticsbringsbenefitstoallotheractors.Notably,Chineserepresentativespromiseresource-richcountriesto“trans-formtheirresourceadvantagesintodevelopmentadvantages”andstimulate52China’senergysecurityanddiscursivepoliticsofenergytheir“diversified,independent,andsustainabledevelopment”(Wang,Y.2013).Thestate’sfinancinganddiplomaticbackinghaveopenedmanydoorsforChina’sNOCsandhelpedthemtobringmanybarrelsofoverseasproducedoilhome.Nevertheless,China’sexperiencesinthedifferentcountriesoftheGlobalNorthandtheGlobalSouthhavevariedwidely.ItisfairtosaythatallotheractorshavenotwarmlywelcomedChina’semergenceininternationalenergypolitics.ThesubsequentchaptersexamineChina’srelationswithtwolargeoil-produc-ers,RussiaandKazakhstan.LookingatthebilateralenergyrelationsbetweenChinaandthesetwopetrostates,Ifocusontwointerconnectedgoals.First,Icon-tinuetodefineanddeconstructChina’senergyparadigm,focusingonhowitismanifestedandenactedinbilateralenergyrelationswithKazakhstanandRussia.Secondly,IaddressthesecondkeyquestionthatthisbookputstotheforebyexamininghowChina’semergenceasasignificantenergyconsumerinfluencestheenergyparadigmsofitsoil-richcounterparts,aswellashowtheirperceptionsofChinahaveevolved.Notes1Theuseoftheterm“greatbattle”(大会战,dahuizhan)isspecificallynoteworthybecausethistermwasalsousedtodescribetheguerillawarfareduringtheSecondSino-JapaneseWar(1937–1945).2BattleReportofDaqingmaturedintoalocaldailynewspaper,renamedin1982asDaqingDaily.3YuQiuli(余秋里)belongstotheso-calledfirstgenerationleadersoftheCommunistPartyofChina.Hejoinedthepartyin1931andtookpartintheLongMarchof1934asasoldierofthePLA.After1949,hebecametheheadoftheMilitaryAcademyofChinaandthereafterheldvariouspostsinthecentralmilitarycommand.In1958,YuQiuliwasappointedasMinisterofPetroleumIndustrybyMaoZedong.Heoccupiedthispostuntil1964,whenhebecameadeputychiefoftheStatePlanningCommission.From1977untilhisretirementin1987,hewasamembertheCentralPolitburooftheCPC.4Forabriefperiodbetween1966and1970atthepeakoftheCultureRevolution,DaqingseveraltimescameunderattackfromtheleadersoftheGangofFour;however,itscelebritystatusofthe“model”wasquicklyrestored(seeLim2010,79–106).5WangJinxiisthemostfamousof“fiveredflags”(五面红旗,wumianhongqi),thegroupofmodelcelebrityoilworkersthatalsoincludedDuanXingzhi,MaDeren,XueGuobao,andZhuHongcha.6Theconceptofself-relianceisrepresentedintheofficialdiscoursebytwoterms:“onone’sownstrength(自力更生,ziligengsheng)and“self-reliance”(自给,zigei).7Inthe2000s,ChinanotonlytookcareofDaqingoilfieldbutalsostartedtobuildasystemofstrategicpetroleumreserves.ThecurrentcapacityofChina’sstrategicpetro-leumreservesis36.9Mtoe,whichisequivalenttoapproximately30daysofoilimportsin2016.8Netimportdependencystandsforthepercentageoftheamountofnetoilimportsovertheamountoftotaloilconsumption.9Originallypublishedin1997asChina’sPolicyonEnergyResourcesbyXinhuaNewsAgency.In2012,ChinaInternetInformationCenterreprintedthedocumentasLiPeng:China’sEnergyPolicy.China’senergysecurityanddiscursivepoliticsofenergy5310Equityoilisthatproportionofproductionthataconcessionownerhasthelegalandcontractualrighttoretain.11NDRCisasuccessortotheStateDevelopmentPlanningCommission.12TheauthormadethoseobservationsinDecember2007andMarch–July2008inBeijingandXian’.13Theterm“scientificdevelopment”wasintroducedrightafterHuJintaotookofficeasthechairmanofCPCinthelate2002;however,itwasfullydevelopedintoacoherentconceptonlybythe17thCongressoftheCPC.14In2005,thenameofChina’snationaldevelopmentalprogramwaschangedfrom“plan”(计划,jihua)to“guideline”or“blueprint”(规划,guihua).Accordingtotheofficialstatements,thedifferenceisnotonlylinguisticbutalsoconceptual.Whileold“five-yearplans”weresettingmandatorygrowthtargetsforoutput,thenew“five-yearblueprints”issuesguidingdevelopmentaltargets.15Forcomparison,historicaldramaTheFoundingofaRepublic(2009)thatmarkedthe60thanniversaryofthePRCcostUS$8.4million.ItwasalsocommissionedbyChina’sfilmregulatorandmadebythestate-ownedfilmstudio.ActionmovieMulan:RiseofaWarrior(2009)wasproducedwithoutdirectgovernmentalgrantsandcostUS$7.4million.16TonyStark,theIronMan,isafictionalsuperheroportrayedbyRobertDowneyJr.intheactionfilmtrilogyIronMan(2008,2010,2013)basedoncomicbookspublishedbyMarvelComics.Foranothercomparison,thefirstfilmofthetrilogy(2008)costedUS$140million.17XiJinpingdidnotinventtheideaof“ChineseDream.”Itwasarticulatedfirstin2006byLiJunru,thentheheadoftheCentralPartySchool,andfurtherhadalifeofitsown,graduallyachievingawidercurrencyinChinesesociety(Ferdinand2016).18ChineseofficialsandscholarsalsouseotherChineseproverbstohighlighttheturntoamoreproactiveforeignpolicystrategy:“takeinitiative”(主动进取,zhudongjinqu,e.g.,Xi2013b),“activelygoingin”(积极进取,jijijinqu,e.g.,MFAofthePRC2014b),and“activelyaccomplish”(积极作为,jijizuowei,e.g.,Xi2015d).19LaterJiangZemin’sarticlewasexpandedintoResearchonEnergyIssuesinChina.ReferencesAdelman,I.,andSunding,D.(1987).EconomicpolicyandincomedistributioninChina.JournalofComparativeEconomics,11(3),444–461.Alam,M.S.,andParamati,S.R.(2015).Dooilconsumptionandeconomicgrowthintensifyenvironmentaldegradation?evidencefromdevelopingeconomies.AppliedEconomics,47(48),5186–5203.Alon,I.,Leung,G.C.K.,andSimpson,T.J.(2015).OutwardforeigndirectinvestmentbyChinesenationaloilcompanies.JournalofEast-WestBusiness,21(4),292–312.Andrews-Speed,P.(2012).ThegovernanceofenergyinChina:transitiontoalow-carboneconomy.Basingstoke:PalgraveMacmillan.Bartke,W.(1977).OilinthePeople’sRepublicofChina:industrystructure,production,exports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tlyassert-ingitselfasagreatpowerand“geopoliticalsubject”(Putin2012)andbehavingaccordingly.“Greatpowerness”(великодержавность,velikoderzhavnost’)isperceivedasaninheritedpropertythatbelongstoRussiabyvirtueofitsenormoussize,resources,culture,andhistory(Laruelle2007;Urnov2014).Constructedasaproperty,this“greatpowerness”becomesRussia’sconcomitantcharacteristicandfundamentalqualityratherthanapositionoraconditionthatissubjecttochange.Inotherwords,inthisframework,Russia’sgreatpowerstatusisamatteroffact.ThereisabroadagreementamongpoliticalelitesthatRussia’s“greatpow-erness”mustbereaffirmedontheinternationallevel.However,onlywhenPutinupdatedtheunderlyingfoundationsofRussia’sclaimforthestatusofgreatpowerwithanewfocusoncontroloverenergyresourcesduringtheoilpricesurgeofthemid-2000sthatitbecameclearhowRussiamightaccomplishthisgoal.1InDecember2005,atameetingoftheSecurityCounciloftheRussianFederation,PutinproclaimedthatRussiawouldbecomeoneoftheleadersand“trendsetters”oftheglobalenergysector.Accordingtohim,inthe21stcentury,energyresourcewealthisRussia’s“naturalcompetitiveadvantage”thatwillnotonlybea“locomotive”thatpullsRussia’seconomyforwardbutalsohelpRussiatoimproveitspositionintheinternationalarena(Putin2005a).VladislavSurkov(2006),thedeputychiefofPutin’sadministrationatthattime,wasevenmoredirectaboutRussia’sfuture:“Ifyouhavestronglegs,youshouldbedoingtheChina–Russiaenergyrelations63longjumpratherthanplayingchess.”Putinhimselfemphaticallyavoidedusingtheterm“superpower”(e.g.,Putin2006c).Incontrast,Surkov(2006)explainedthatwhile“adherentsoftheliberalobscurantism”thinkthatmarketliberalizationisthedrivingforceofRussia’seconomicdevelopment,Putinoffersa“realis-ticmodel”whichis“theconceptofRussiaastheenergysuperpower.”InJuly2006,duringtheG8summitinSaint-Petersburg,PutinpresentedtheconceptofRussia’senergyleadershiptotheinternationalpublicthroughthediscussionofglobalenergysecurity(Putin2006aand2006b).Bytheendofhissecondtermaspresident(2004–2008),Putinsuccessfullyregainedfullstatecontroloverthenationalenergycomplexand“discoveredthevalueof‘securitizing’theenergybusiness,”activelyandexplicitlyusingenergyresourcesasatoolorlevertopro-moteRussia’sforeignpolicies(Baev2012,178).Asaresult,inthemid-2000sforRussiatobeagreatpowermeanttobetheenergysuperpower.Overthefollowingdecade,Russia’sdomesticpoliticswasfullofinternalcontradictions,yetadhocopportunismisanendogenousvariableratherthananinvariablefeatureofRussianpolitics(Orttung2009,OrttungandOverland2011).AsRobertW.Orttungexplains,Russia’spoliticaldevelopmentinthemid-2000swasnotdrivenbygrowingenergyrentsalone.Instead,itechoedPutin’saware-nessofthe1990sandrepresentedhisendeavorto“correctwhatheconsideredtobesomeofthemistakesofthatera”(Orttung2009,54).2Inthissense,whilethenewRussianauthoritarianismandPutin’sprojectofrestoringRussia’simperialprerogative3lostoverthe1990sbenefitedsignificantlyfromthedramaticriseofoilrents,theywerenotcausedbyit.Importantly,asAnneApplebaum(2012,4)argues,theideasthatareassociatedwithPutin’spoliticalleadershipconstitute“acarefullyworkedoutsystem,withcarefullydesignedinstitutions,”andthusshouldbeapproachedasanideology.ConstructingRussiaasanenergysuper-powerisoneofthecentralthemesofthisideology.Inthemid-2000s,introducingthediscourseofenergysuperpowerintothenarrativeofRussia’s“greatpowerness,”Putin’sregimewasmakingaconsciousidentitychoice.Thediscourseofenergysuperpowercontinuestoinfluencethedevelopmentofthehierarchyofdomesticandforeignpolicyobjectives,eventhoughafter2011Putin’sregimeshiftedthegravityofidentity-buildingprojectonto“religion,patrioticvalues,militaryachievements,anddefendingtherightsofethnicRussians”(Rutland2015,84).Oneillustrativeexampleoftheideologicalvalueofthediscourseofenergysuperpowerinthemid-2010sistheattempttomergeitwiththenarrativeofRussia’svictoryinWorldWarII.Asacaseinpoint,duringthe2015annualcelebrationofthevictoryoftheSovietUnionoverNaziGermanyintheGreatPatrioticWar(VictoryDay),thesquareinfrontoftheGorkyCentralParkofCultureandLeisureinMoscowwasdecoratedwithamassivemultimediaartinstallationentitledEnergyoftheGreatVictory.Theinstallationfeaturedsym-bolsofgas,electrical,andoilenergy:agasdrillingrig,atransmissiontower,andanoilhorse(seeFigures4.1and4.2).AccordingtotheParkadministration’spressrelease,theinstallationwascommemorating“theroleoftheenergysectorinthedevelopmentofthenationaleconomyinthewartimeandheroicdeedsofthe64China–RussiaenergyrelationsFigure4.1MultimediaartinstallationEnergyoftheGreatVictory.May2015.GorkyCentralParkofCultureandLeisure,Moscow,Russia.Figure4.2OutlineofthemultimediaartinstallationEnergyoftheGreatVictory.©Museon.ru.CourtesyofMuseon.ru.Sovietpowerengineers,whotogetherwithallotherSovietpeoplewerevictoriousoverfascism.”Adocumentarywithanidenticaltitlethatwasbroadcastedbythestate-ownedtelevisionchannelRussia-1(TernerandYevsyukov2015)alsopre-sentsampleenergysuppliesoftheSovietUnionasoneofthemajorcausesofitsvictoryoverfascism.ThecentralideaofthedocumentaryisthattheSovietenergyChina–Russiaenergyrelations65sectornotonlyhelpedtosavethecountryfromfascismbutalsokick-starteditseconomicdevelopmentafterthehardshipyearsofthewarandeventuallymadeitoneoftheworld’stwosuperpowers.Intherealmofinternationalrelations,Russia’sauthoritiesconstructenergywealthasoneofRussia’skeycompetitiveadvantages.Dominantofficialdis-coursesdefineenergycooperationbetweenRussiaandthemajorenergycon-sumersasa“dialogue.”Specifically,Russia’srepresentativesusetheconcept“energydialogue”(энергодиалог,energodialog)todescribeRussia’srelationswiththeEuropeanUnionandChina.Theyhighlightmutualvulnerabilitiestoportraytheserelationsasbeingbasedonasetofsymmetricalinterdependencies(e.g.,Medvedev2010a,Lavrov2007a)anddescribethemas“cooperative”(Putin2005b,Lavrov2007b,Novak2013a),“pragmatic”and“mutuallybeneficial”(Medvedev2010b),“dynamic”(Shmatko2010),“partnership-based”(Novak2014b),“stable”(Novak2015a),and“positive”(Denisov2016).Araw-materialsappendageandavictimofaresourcecurseTheRussianpublicacceptsthebroaddiscourseof“greatpowerness”asitres-onateswellwithpopularperceptionsofRussia.AsthemostrecentsurveysofLevadaCenter4(2016,31–34)show,64percentofRussiansbelievethatRussiaisa“greatpower”and76percentthinkthatitmustmaintainthisroleinthefuture.Moreover,43percentexpressednostalgiafortheSovietUnionbecauseof“thelostsenseofbelongingtoagreatpower”(LevadaCenter2016,257).However,only17percentofRussiansthinkthatpossessingvastnaturalresourcesquali-fiesacountryasagreatpower(LevadaCenter2016,35–36)andonly18per-centbelievethatRussia’sinternationalrespectisbasedonitsresourcewealth.Consequently,RussianswantRussiatobeagreatpower,yettheydonotassociatethe“greatpowerness”withnaturalresourcesanddonotseeagreatpowerasanenergysuperpower.ThesurveyconductedasapartoftheNEORUSproject(2013)5addsanotherlayertothefindingsofLevadaCenter.Thissurveyrevealsthat64percentofrespondentsagreethatRussiaisanenergysuperpower.Atthesametime,however,thesurveyalsoshowsthattheRussianpublicnotonlyapprovesofthediscourseofenergysuperpowerbutalsoismarkedlyinfluencedbyaconflictingdiscoursethatidentifiesRussiaasa“raw-materialsappendage”(сырьевойпридаток,syr’yevoypridatok).Specifically,thesurveyfoundthat63percentofrespondentsthinkthat“Russiashouldnotbearaw-materialappendage”(NEORUS2013).Themetaphorof“appendage”andthediscoursethatgoeswithithavealonghistoryinRussianpolitics,goingbacktotheearlyyearsoftheSovietUnion.In1925,JosephStalin(1952,297)encouragedthebuildingoftheSovieteconomy“insuchawayastopreventourcountryfrombecominganappendageoftheworldcapitalistsystem”and“notasasubsidiaryenterpriseofworldcapitalism,butasanindependenteconomicunit.”LaterSovietauthoritiesusedthemetaphorof“appendage”todescribethepositionofthedecolonizedcountriesoftheThirdWorldintheglobalcapitalistsystem.Intheearly1990s,opponentsofeconomic66China–RussiaenergyrelationsandpoliticalliberalizationclaimedthatMichaelGorbachev’sreformsweretrans-formingRussiaintoa“raw-materialappendageoftheWest”(сырьевойпридатокЗапада,syr'yevoypridatokZapada)(e.g.,Andreyeva1990;Kol’ev1995).Sincethen,thediscourseofraw-materialappendagehasbecomemorecomplexanddevelopedthreeinterrelatedexpressions.Inthe2000s,atthecoreofitistheideathatextractionandexportofresourcesareprimitiveandunsustainableeconomicactivities,appropriateonlyforunderdevelopedandweakcountries.Secondly,followingtheupdateoftheraw-materialappendagediscourse,dependenceonresourceexportsconstrainsRussia’seconomicdevelopmentandinevitablycon-signsittoalowplaceintheinternationalhierarchy.Finally,onlyacorruptedandtraitorousgovernmentcancondemnRussiatosuchahumiliatingandmiserableposition.Initsoriginalversion,thediscourseofraw-materialappendagefocusedontheWestasRussia’snegativeOther,yetoverthepastdecadeithasexpandedtoincludeChinaasthesecondnegativeOther(e.g.,Khramchikhin2013;Grek2015;Pestsov2015).Insum,thediscourseofraw-materialappendagepresentsRussia’svastenergyresourcesnotasafoundationofextraordinarynationalpowerbutasasourceoftremendousvulnerability.Inthissense,thepopularityofthisdiscourseindicatesthatanenergysuperpowerinthepopularimaginationhasadefinitionbycontra-diction:beinganenergysuperpowermeansnotbeingaraw-materialappendage.Thepowerofthediscourseofraw-materialappendageisparticularlyevidentintheexperts’debatesontheroleofenergyresourcesinRussia’sdevelopment.OnlyafewRussianexpertsspeakwithenthusiasmofusingenergyresourcesasthefoundationofRussia’seconomicgrowthandriseintheinternationalarena(e.g.,Simonov2006,2007;Inozemtsev2015).Inawidelydiscussedbookwitharevealingtitle,EnergySuperpower(2006,7),KonstantinSimonovarguesthat“creatingasovereignsystemforextractingandsellingenergyresources,whichwillallowRussiatodetermineindependentlythedirectionsofitsexportflows,isnotamatterofimperialambitionsbutamatterofthecountry’ssurvival.”However,despitehispassionatesupportoftheconceptofanenergysuperpower,SimonovisnotsatisfiedwithhowPutinutilizesRussia’senergywealth.OtherexpertsopenlycallPutin’sattemptstoturnRussiaintoanenergysuper-powerastrategicfailure(e.g.,DenisovandGrivach2008;Evstafiev2014;Trenin2016).Inthiscritique,thediscourseofraw-materialappendagecoincideswiththebroaderdiscourseofresourcecursethatholdsthatresourcewealthmightimpactnegativelyeconomicgrowthandcauseso-calledDutchDisease(e.g.,Roland2006;Tabata2006,2009;GaddyandIckes2010,2013).FyodorLukyanov(2016),forexample,claimsthatinthemid-2000sthediscourseofenergysuper-powerwasperceivedbyRussia’spoliticalelitesasastrategyof“smartdownshift-ing.”TheinitialgoalwasnottorestonthelaurelsofanenergysuperpowerbuttouseenergyresourcesasatooltoencourageRussia’seconomicdevelopmentandstrengthenitsinternationalpoliticalties.However,inLukyanov’sopinion,inthe2010sthisstrategyhasprovenitselfunsuccessfulandevenharmfulbecauseitsloweddowntheevolutionofpost-Sovieteconomicandpoliticalsystems.Fortheirpart,VladimirMau(e.g.,2008),AlekseyKudrin(e.g.,2015),GermanGreffChina–Russiaenergyrelations67(e.g.,2016),andotherRussianliberaleconomistscompareRussia’sdependenceonenergyexportswithheavydrugaddictionandfrequentlyusethemetaphorof“sittingontheoilneedle”(сидетьнаигле,sidet’naigle)todescribeRussia’seconomicdevelopment.Theoverlapsbetweenthebroaderdiscourseofresourcecurseandthedis-courseofraw-materialappendage,however,arelimitedtotheeconomicrationali-ties.TheconceptofthepoliticalresourcecursethatsuggeststhatresourcewealthweakensthequalityofinstitutionsanderodesdemocracyandisoftenappliedtoRussiabyWesternpoliticalscientists(e.g.,Fish2005;Ross2001,2012),isdismissedbymostRussianscholars.Theyclaimthatthisconceptisideologi-callybiased(e.g.,Popova2015)orconsideritonlya“partlyjustifiedopinion”(Mezhuyev2010,19,seealsoKuyan,2016).Overall,Russianacademicsandthink-tankexpertsnotonlyrarelyexplicitlylinkRussia’sauthoritarianismwithresourcerevenuesbutalsogenerallyavoidanopendiscussionofcorruptionandpoliticalbriberyinthestate-runoilandgascompanies.Journalisticinvestiga-tions(e.g.,Konstantinov2006;Mukhin2006;PanyushkinandMikhail2008)andreportsofoppositionalNGOs,suchasAlexeyNavalny’sAnti-CorruptionFoundation(e.g.,Kulachenkov2015),fillthisgap.However,themostvividandunapologeticexpressionsofallspectrumofideasthatconstitutethediscourseofraw-materialappendagearefoundoutsideofconventionalpoliticalforums.ContestingPutin’senergysuperpowerRussiancontemporaryartandliteraturebecamealocusofcritiquesofRussia’soil-drivendevelopment.Similarly,Russia’spopularcultureisavehiclenotonlyforlegitimatingPutin’sideologybutalsoaconduitthroughwhichcounter-dis-coursesfindavoice.TheofficialconstructionsofenergyresourcesasRussia’sprimarycompetitiveadvantageareconfrontedbycriticaldiscoursesthatevolvearoundthestrugglesovervaluesandoverwhoisincontroloverthevitalnationalassets.Thecurrentauthoritarianregimeconstrainsthedisseminationofthesedis-coursesinthedomainofpublicpolitics,butartists,musicians,andwriterscanunsilenceandactivatethem.AndreiMolodkinliterallyfillsdemocracywithcrudeoil(Figure4.3).Hisinstallationconsistsofnineseparatethree-dimensionallettersarrangedtoformtheword“DEMOCRACY”thatarefilledwithcrudeoilthroughasystemofinterconnectedpipes.AccordingtoMolodkin,hewantedtoshowthatdemoc-racyis“notanidea”anymorebut“justasouvenir,”andthusitisonlyusefulas“anemptycanister”tocarryoil(MoscowHouseofPhotography2008).VasyaLozhkin,arenownedrepresentativeofRussian“punktrash”art,turnstheoilintolife-givingwaterandvodka.Onhisstylizedicons,agrimMother-oil(матушка-нефть,matushkaneft')isnursingamandressedinthegreysuit,auniformofanofficialinRussia(Figure4.4).Lozhkin’sotherpainting–TheBlackVodka–pre-sentsagroupofidenticalgrey-suitedmenfeastingonoilthatiscomingfromapipeline(Figure4.5).Inasimilarveinbutwithdifferentvisualimages,emergingartistAlexandraZheleznova(Poletaeva)depictsrelationsbetweenstatesmenand68China–RussiaenergyrelationsFigure4.3Molodkin,A.(2013).Democracy[mixedmediainstallation,crudeoil,neon].©AndreiMolodkin.CourtesyofGregoryR.Staley,AmericanUniversityMuseumattheKatzenArtsCenter.Figure4.4VasyaLozhkin(2012).ThePaganDeities[acryliconpaper].©VasyaLozhkin.Courtesyoftheartist.Inscriptionsonthepainting:“Father-Gas”(left)and“Mother-Oil”(right).China–Russiaenergyrelations69Figure4.5VasyaLozhkin(2012).TheBlackVodka[acryliconpaper].©VasyaLozhkin.Courtesyoftheartist.oilasadestructiveloveaffair.Inherpictures,oilisnotamotherbutadominatrix“madameOil.”Thisfemmefatalewearsarevealingdress,andhermakeupisevocativeanddramatic.Sheisinsidious,greedy,andseductive.Shecorruptsandunmanstop-energyofficials,subordinatingthemtoherevilwill.Themessageoftheseworksisratherstraightforward:Russia’srelationswithoilarenothealthy,astheytakeaformofdestructiveandviolentaddictionandtherebysustaincor-ruption,malpractice,andabuseofpower.Apopularsong,“ILoveOil,”focusesonanotheraspectofRussia’soil-drivenmodernity,ridiculingtheprosperitygeneratedbyoilrevenues.Aspouseofanoilmansings:“IfthereisoilinRussia,IaminMilan.”Themusicvideopresentsthemostessentialsymbolsoftheso-called“well-fed2000s”(сытыенулевые,sytyyenulevyye):lavishparties,luxuryshoppinginEurope,expensivecars,andskyscrapersofMoscow’sbusinessdistrict.Thevideoalsofeatureswomeninfolkcostumesdancingagainstthebackdropofoilrigs.Eventually,themaincharac-ter’sloveforoilandgastransformsintoloveforRussia.Broughttogether,thelyricsandimagesconstructoilasapartofRussia’snationalidentityandlinkoiltothetimelyandtimelessRussianness.70China–RussiaenergyrelationsAmorestrikingandstraightforwardexampleofthecritiqueofRussia’sdependencyonoilrevenuesinpopularcultureisSemyonSlepakov’s“SongaboutOil”thatappearedonsocialmediain2015,amidstanewupsurgeoftheeconomiccrisis.ThecomedianSlepakovspeaksonbehalfof“asimpleworkerofatractorfactory,”whogrumblesthatherecentlystartedtonoticethathe“doesnothaveenoughmoneytolivehisbadlife.”Inanironicandsatiricalmonologue,the“sim-pleworker”commentsontheTVnewsreportsthatexplainthecurrenteconomicdownfallbyblamingtheUSandpromisethat“soonthepricesonthemother-oilwillgoupagain.”Complainingthathemightnotsurvivewhilewaitingfortheoilpricestogoup,heblamestheauthorities:DearallwhoareatthehelmofOurimmenseoilship,Idon’tgetit.Howdiditallgolikethis?Yousaidit’sgoingtobeallright!Youhavebeenpumpingtheoilalltheseyears,Youdidknowlimits,grief,andsorrows.Youworkeddayandnight,servingyourfatherland.Andyouearnedenoughmoneyfortenthousandlives.ButhowamIsupposedtolive[throughthis],guys?I’masimpleworker.Myonlysavingsaremykidneystones[and]Verylittlefleshonthesurfaceofmybones.Imightnotlivetoseetheoilpricesgoingup!Inasimilarhumorousfashion,YuryShevchuk,arenownedrockmusician,poet,andardentcriticofPutin’sregime,linksoilandpoliticalpowerinatenderbutgrimromance.SpeakingdirectlytoRussia,Shevchukpromisesherthat“whenoilrunsout,ourpresidentwilldie”and“theworldwillbeabitfreer.”Thelastversesofhissonggo:Wewilllearnonceagaintoloveandtobewise,Therewillbenohandoutsandeternalarguments,Allmermaidsandfairieswillprayforus,Oncewewilldrinkalltheoil,oncewewillsmokeallthegas.EventhoughShevchuk’ssongwascensoredonTV(Vinogradov2009)andhasneverbeenplayedontheradiosinceitsreleasein2007,itinstantlybecamepopu-larandregaineditspopularityagainduringthepoliticalprotestsof2012and2013.Nolessstrikingandvividactualizationsofthediscourseofraw-materialappendageemergeinRussianfictionwriting.Inthe2000sandthe2010s,anentirecorpusofRussian“petro-fiction”hasevolved,includingtravelogues(e.g.,Golovanov2014),detectivenovels(e.g.,Yudenich2007),anddystopias(e.g.,China–Russiaenergyrelations71Sorokin2006,2008,2013;Pelevin2003,2006;Bykov2006;Khazin2017).Summarizingthemaintrendsinthisliterature,IlyaKalinin(2015,143)arguesthatoilis“transformedintoasystematicmotifofcontemporaryRussianlitera-ture(andofcultureasawhole)”and“actsasoneofthecentralsymbolicfiguresthroughwhichthepost-Sovietunconsciousfindsalanguage.”Indeed,Russianauthorsutilizethislanguagetocriticizetheoil-drivencapitalismofpost-SovietRussia,aswellasthenationalisticideologyandnewconsumerculturethatarisearoundit.Inadditiontoit,theyconstructthemoral,intellectual,cultural,andsocialprogressasafunctionofRussia’soil-dependentdevelopment.TheearlywritingsofVictorPelevin(2003,124)exemplifythisidea:Ourwholecultureisjustamoldonthepipethatexistsonlybecausetheoilinthepipeisheated.Andtheoilisheatednottoblossomthemoldbutbecauseitisjustfastertopump.ThepresenceofoilinRussia’scontemporaryhighandpopularculturevividlydemonstratesthatthediscursivepoliticsofenergyspillsintoandontoallareasoflifeinRussia.Artists,musicians,comedians,andwritersbecomeincreas-inglyboldintheirpoliticalprotest.TheycondemnoilasasourceofPutin’sregimeresilience,chroniclesocioeconomicinequality,andpoliticalcorruption.RepresentationsofRussia’soil-drivenmodernityinVasyaLozhkin’sgrotesquepaintingsandVladimirPelevin’sdystopiannovelsareasaggressiveandvividasinYuryShevchuk’srockballadsandSemyonSlepakov’scomedy.Thesevariationsoftheraw-materialappendagediscourseexplicitlychallengePutin’sideology,aswellasthelegitimacyandcredibilityofPutin’sregime.Beingobsessedwithpoliticalcorruption,thesediverseexpressionsoftheraw-materialappendagediscoursedonotcaptureenvironmentalconcernsassociatedwithdirectandmeasurablenegativeconsequencesoftheoilindustryexpansion.Theyalsodonotintersectwithdiscoursesthataimatconstructinganunderstand-ingofenergysecuritywithclimateasanintegralconsideration.Inthissense,Russia’scriticaloildiscoursesarenot“anti-oil”but“anti-Putin.”“We”and“they”inRussia’sdiscursivepoliticsofenergyTheanalysisofRussia’sdiscursivepoliticsofenergymakesapparenttwoover-archingconstructionsofRussia:theenergysuperpowerandaraw-materialappendage.Italsouncoversoneprominentdiscursivesilence.Beingobsessedwithitsenergywealth,Russiadoesnotidentifyitselfasapetrostate(foradetailedanalysisseeRutland2008,2015).Bothofficialandcriticaldiscoursesavoidcom-parisonsofRussiawithotherenergy-richstates.RussianrepresentativesnevermeasureRussia’seconomicsuccessesandfailuresagainsttheexperienceofIraq,Kuwait,SaudiArabia,Kazakhstan,Venezuela,Nigeria,Norway,andotherprom-inentpetrostates.ThediscourseofenergysuperpowerconstructsRussiaasaone-of-a-kindactorofinternationalenergypolitics.ItframesRussiaasanindispensableand72China–RussiaenergyrelationsirreplaceableenergyexporterandemphasizesRussia’sexceptionalroleinglobalenergysecurity,implyingthatenergyimportersneedRussiaasmuchas,ifnotmorethan,Russianeedsthem.Defending,reinforcing,andjustifyingtheclaimforRussia’sspecialstatusininternationalenergyrelations,Putin’sregimerespondstotheraw-materialappendagediscoursethatportraysRussiaasaddictedtotherevenuesgeneratedbyenergyexportsandthusweakandvulnerable.Whilebeingthemirroroppositeofeachother,thetwodiscoursesconstructtheWest(mainly,theEuropeanUnion)andtheEast(mainly,China)asRussia’smostimportantOthers.WhileRussiabelongstoabroaderEuropeanintellectualandculturalhistory,itneveridentifieditselfandwasneverrecognizedbyothersasaWesterncoun-trywithoutastipulationforsomeuniquelyRussianqualities.Thiscomplexandcontradictoryidentitycreatesagapofalteritybetweenpost-SovietRussiaandthecountriesthataretraditionallydesignatedastheWest.TheWesternversionofmodernityissimultaneouslyperceivedas“adevelopmentalorcivilizationalmodeltoemulate”and“asadegenerateanddehumanizedfoilforwhatRussiashouldneverbecome”(Clunan2009,79;seealsoMalinova2012).Thediscourseofraw-materialappendageidentifiesRussiaasapotentialoractualvictimofWesternexpansionism.Inthisdiscursiveframework,Russia’senergycooperation,aswellasgeneraleconomicandpoliticalrapprochementwiththeWest,isperceivedasathreat.Incontrast,thediscourseofenergysuperpowerpresentsRussiaasanequalamongequalsinrelationswiththeWest.Inthisregard,thediscourseofenergysuperpowerforcesRussia’srep-resentativestoseekfromtheWesttherecognitionofRussia’suniquestatusininternationalenergyrelations.Morespecifically,Russia’sroleinEuropeanenergysecuritybecomesacornerstoneofRussia’sclaimforenergysuperpowerstatus(Kuteleva2020).Atthesametime,theconceptof“theWestversustheRest”(Huntington1996)assistsPutin’sregimeinpromotingtheideaofRussianculturalaversiontothe“Western”notionofdemocracyandcategoriesrelatedtoit.Russia’s“sovereigndemocracy”(сувереннаядемократия,suverennayademokratiya)isbasedonsupposedlyuniqueRussianculturalvaluesandthusisimmunetointernationalcriticism.EkaterinaShulman(2010)describesthisasa“reversecargocult”:6eventhoughdejureRussiaisbuildingaWestern-typeliberaldemocracy,RussianelitesrefusetoadopttheWesternnormsandfollowrecommendationsofinternationalorganizationsbecausetheWestallegedlydeviatesfromitsproclaimedprinciplesordoesnotadequatelyfollowitsownadvice.AcaseinpointisRussia’senergyrelationswiththeEU.Identifyingitselfasanenergysuperpower,Russiaclaimsthe“rightforanindependentviewpoint”(Shmatko,2008).Itrejectsasymmetricaldefinitionsofenergyrelations,whichrecognizesthe“normativepower”(Manners2002)oftheEU,aswellasitsgeneralpoliticalsuperiority.ThesearticulationsofRussia’snormativesovereigntyareparticularlyevidentintheevolutionofRussia’spri-marystrategicenergypolicydocument.ThefirstEnergystrategy(2003)containsreferencesto“Europeannorms”andexpressesacommitmenttoadopt“EuropeanChina–Russiaenergyrelations73regulations.”Incontrast,itsnewestadditions(2009and2015)appealto“interna-tionalnorms”and“internationalregulations.”ByreaffirmingRussia’spoliticalautonomyandnormativeindependencefromtheEUandtheWestmoregenerally,RussianpoliticianselevateRussia’sroleininternationalenergysecurityandconstructRussiaasasovereignandpowerfulactorofinternationalenergypolitics.Inadditiontothis,Russia’srejectionofEuropeannormsintherealmofenergypoliticsisanexpressionofthe“cargocult.”Forexample,inthemid-2000s,RussianrepresentativesstartedtoaccusetheirEuropeancounterpartsofestablishingadoublestandardapproachinrela-tionswithRussia:Certainly,wecangiveaccesstoourpartners[toourresourceextractionandtransportationinfrastructure].However,wehaveaquestion:willtheygiveusaccesstoanything?[…]Wedonotmindworkingontheprinciplesof[theEuropeanEnergyCharter].Butweneedtounderstandwhatwewillreceiveinexchange.(Putin2006b)Followingthislogic,theprincipalregulationsoftheEU’sThirdEnergyPackagewerelabeledbyRussianpoliticiansas“unwise”(Lavrov2012),“indiscreet”(Lavrov2013),“short-sighted”(Novak2014b;Putin2013a),“ineffective”(Novak2015b),and“unfair”(Putin2013b).InPutin’sMunichspeechof2007,thiscriti-cismisparticularlytangible,whenPutinclaimsthattheEuropeanEnergyCharter“isnotsoacceptable”forRussiabecauseneitherRussianortheEUmember-stateswanttofollowit(Putin2007).Byandlarge,inthemid-2000sRussiaadoptedadefensivepositioninrela-tionstotheWest.Notably,Russia’srepresentativeswantedtheEUmember-statestorespectRussia’sinterestsininternationalenergypoliticsandacceptRussianclaimsforthestatusofanenergysuperpower.Instead,Russia’sEuropeancoun-terpartsallegedly“followtheoldhabit,treatingRussiaastheSovietUnion”(Khristenko2006a)andhave“complexes”thatdonotallowthemto“reconcilethemselvestotheirdependenceonexternalsourcesofenergy”(Lavrov2007b).FollowingthelogicofRussia’sdefensivediscursivestrategy,RussiacanbeareliablepartnerfortheEUmember-states,butonlyiftheytreatitasanenergysuperpower.SimilartrendsareapparentinRussia’sconstructionoftheEast.InthecontextofRussianenergypolitics,theEastisunderstoodasAsia.Russia’srepresenta-tivesdescribeAsiaas“promising,”“dynamic,”and“energetic”yetpaintitwithawidebrush.Forexample,discussingthenewtrendsininternationaldevelopment,Lavrov(2006)notesthatglobalizationhas“anAsianface”butdoesnotspecifytowhompreciselythisfacebelongs.Mostoften,Russia’srepresentativesdesignateJapan,SouthKorea,China,andIndiaasAsia.AccordingtoLavrov(2006),thesecountriesare“interestedinaprosperousRussia”becausewithoutRussia’senergyresourcestheywillnotbeabletoachieve“thegoalsofeconomicgrowth.”Inasimilarvein,otherRussia’srepresentativesclaimthatAsiancountriesrecognize74China–Russiaenergyrelationsitasa“naturalpartner”(Khristenko2006b)andan“infallibleguarantorofenergysecurity”(Shmatko2009).ConflictswiththemajorWesternpowers,ontheotherhand,evertRussia’sidentityandaccentuateitsnon-Westernself-representationsthatElizabethWishnick(2017)hastermedthe“Asianstate”identity.However,whileAsiaisincreasinglymoreimportantinRussia’senergypolitics,thehistorical,cultural,andpoliticalgulfseparatingRussiafromtheEastisconsiderablymoreprofoundthanthatseparatingitfromtheWest.Russiaconstructsothernon-Westernsocie-tiesaspremodernorevenanti-modernandthusinferiorrelativelytoitself(Bassin1991;Clunan2009).BothrealandperceiveddifferencesbetweenRussiaanditsnon-WesternOthers,specificallythoseinAsia,reinforceRussia’sunderstandingofselfasapartoftheWest(Curanović2012;Morozov2015).Atthesametime,inaquantitativesense,post-SovietRussiaiscurrentlya“normaldevelopingcountry”(SchleiferandTreisman2005).Intermsofincomeinequalities,macroeconomicinstability,corruption,crime,andothertypicalprob-lemsofthedevelopingworldRussiaisfarfromtheworst(betterthanNigeria)butstillnotatthetop(worsethanChina).TheapparentriseofEastAsianandSoutheastAsiannationsattheendofthe20thcenturyandtheirnewlyfoundeconomiccloutcontradictstraditionalperceptionsoftheEastaslowerinsta-tusandsubordinateinrelationtoRussia.Specifically,itisincreasinglydifficultforPutin’sregimetoconstructRussiaasanenergysuperpowervis-à-visrisingChina,and,asaresult,itsrapprochementwithChinatriggerstheraw-materialappendagediscourse(e.g.,Grek2015;Pestsov2015).Insum,thediscourseofenergysuperpowerpresentsRussiaasanequalamongequalsinrelationswiththeWestandassuperiorinrelationswiththenon-West-ernpowers.Atthesametime,however,thediscourseofraw-materialappendageidentifiesRussiaasapotentialoractualvictimofWesternandChineseexpan-sionism.Inthisdiscursiveframework,Russia’senergycooperation,aswellasgeneraleconomicandpoliticalrapprochementwiththeWestandChina,isper-ceivedasathreat.ThediscourseofenergysuperpowerforcesRussia’srepresent-ativestoseekfromtheWestandChinatherecognitionofRussia’suniquestatusininternationalenergyrelations.Morespecifically,Russia’sroleinEurasianenergysecuritybecomesacornerstoneofRussia’sclaimforenergysuperpowerstatus.ThisdiscursiveframeworksustainstheconstructionofRussiaaslocatedinthemidstofaninfinitedialoguebetweentheEastandtheWest.Consequently,Putin’sregimecarvedforRussiaadistinctiveandprominentyetlonelypositionininternationalenergypolitics.InasmuchasRussia’s“We”iswithneithertheWestnortheEast,Putin’sregimeisdoomedtoprotectitsenergysector–inPutin’sownwords(2006c),“theholyofholiesofRussia’seconomy”–fromeveryone.Russia’senergyparadigm:AdiscursivebipolardisorderInthemid-2000s,controloverenergyresourcesbecametheendsandmeansofpoliticalpoweratthedomesticlevelandacenterofgravityinPutin’sprojectofrestoringRussia’sinternationalstatusthatwaslostduringthe1990s.AsoilChina–Russiaenergyrelations75pricesrose,themultifacetedandcontradictoryambitionsofRussia’spoliticalelitesforthenationalfutureintheinternationalarenabecameencapsulatedinthediscourseofenergysuperpower.Inthisdiscursiveframework,thepossessionofabundantenergyresourcesandcontroloverenergystreamsautomaticallymakeRussiaaplayerofconsequenceontheinternationalstage.Accordingly,Russianrepresentativessociallyinstrumentalizeenergyresourcesasoneoftheprimarysourcesofnationaleconomicgrowth,pride,power,andindependence,aswellasasustainablefoundationformutuallybeneficialrelationswithitspartnersinbothEuropeandAsia.IntroducingthediscourseofenergysuperpowerintothenarrativeofRussia’s“greatpowerness,”Putin’sregimemadealong-termidentitychoice.Thediscourseofenergysuperpowerhasoutlivedtheoilpriceboomofthemid-2000sandoccu-piesaprominentplaceinPutin’sideologyinthe2010s.Thediscourseofenergysuperpower,beingoneoftheintegralpartsofPutin’sideology,isproducedandreproducedbyRussia’sauthorities.ThisdiscoursewasreplicatedevenunderthepresidencyofDmitryMedvedev(2008–2012)whowaspromotingpoliticalandeconomicmodernization,openlyurgingRussiaawayfrom“humiliatingdepend-enceonraw-materials”(Medvedev2009).Thepresenceandthestronginfluenceofthecriticaldiscourseofraw-materialappendagereinforcetheproductionandreproductionofthediscourseofenergysuperpower.Thiscounter-discourserecognizesRussia’senergywealthasafunc-tionofmultiplevulnerabilities.Inthissense,thediscourseofraw-materialsappendagechallengesPutin’sideology,aswellasthelegitimacyandcredibil-ityofPutin’srule.Inthissense,thediscoursesofenergysuperpowerandraw-materialappendagearemutuallyconstitutive,meaningthatthetwodiscoursessimultaneouslyexcludeandreinforceoneanother.Thediscourseofraw-materialappendageforcesPutin’sregimetosustainthediscourseofenergysuperpowerbyreplicatingitonbothnationalandinternationallevels.Inotherwords,Putin’sregimemustpresentRussiaasanenergysuperpowerandframeitsinteractionswithotherinternationalactorsaccordinglybecauserejectingthediscourseofenergysuperpowerwillentailacceptingitsantithesis,thediscourseofraw-mate-rialappendage.Asaresult,Russia’senergydiplomacybecomesahostageoftheconflictbetweenthediscourseofenergysuperpowerandthediscourseofraw-materialappendage.China–RussiaenergyrelationsLoans-for-oilandnewpipelinesSinceVladimirPutinrosetopowerin1999,oneofhisprimarygoalshasbeentoreestablishfullstatecontrolovertheenergysector.TheculminationofPutin’seffortswasthenationalizationoftherebelliousYukos.7In2003,oneofthemostvaluableassetsofYukos–Yuganskneftegaz–wassoldbyacontroversialclosed-roomauction(Sixsmith2010)andwaseventuallyacquiredbyRosneftforUS$9.3billion.Rosneftwasnotabletoraisethefullamountofcashfromdomes-ticsources.Westernbanksrefusedtoofferitaloanbecauseofthecontroversies76China–RussiaenergyrelationsthatsurroundedtheYukosaffair.CNPC,onthecontrary,agreedtolendRosneftUS$6billionasanadvancepaymentforfive-yeardeliveriesofoil,passingthecreditthroughChina’sExport-ImportBankofChina(EximBank).EventhoughRussia’sexportstoChinaincreased,RussianauthoritiesagainsuspendedplanstobuildadirectpipelinefromEasternSiberiatoNorthernChina.In2006,againstthebackgroundofsharplydeterioratingrelationsbetweenRussiaandEuropeanconsumersofitsenergy,Putinannouncedthatinthenear-estdecadeRussiawouldincreaseitsoilexportstoAsiatenfold,from3percentto30percent.Transneft,thestate-ownedoperatoroftheoilpipelinenetworks,initiatedtheconstructionofanewpipelinesystemtotransportoilfromEasternSiberiatothePacificcoastatNakhodka.However,thenewprojectdidnotincludeadirectbranchtoChina.Between2006and2008,morethan60percentofRussianoilwasdeliveredtoChinabytheEastSiberianrailway,whereastherestwasdeliveredthroughKazakhstanviatheAtasu-AlashankoupipelineandbytankersfromSakhalin(Ederetal.2009,229–231).Thebreakthroughinpipelinenegotiationshappenedonlyafterthe2008globaleconomiccriseshittheRussianeconomyhard.AsoilpriceswerecollapsingfromtheJuly2008highofUS$147totheDecember2008lowofUS$32,Russia’sNOCswereeagertosignnewdealswiththeChinese.InFebruary2009,ChineseandRussianofficialsannouncedtheChinaDevelopmentBank(CDB)wouldlendRosneftandTransneftUS$15bil-lionandUS$10billion,respectively,withaninterestrateof5.69percent.Chinahadalreadyusedloan‐for‐oilandloan‐for‐gasdealstosecurelong‐termsuppliesbeforeandamidsttheeconomiccrisesin2009itofferedgenerousloanstomanyenergy-richstatesbutnotatthisscaleandinsuchquantity.8ChineseandRussiangovernmentsplayedanactiveroleinfacilitatingthesedeals.RussiangovernmentandRosneftinitiatedthenegotiationsbyapproachingChina’sgovernmentin2008(Goncharov,interview,November2016,Beijing).Asaresult,Russia’sNOCscoveredtheholesintheirbudget,whereasCNPCwassupposedtoget15Mtoeofcrudeoilyearlyatmarketpriceoverthenext20years.TheloanswerealsocontingentupontheconstructionofaspurfromRussia’snewlylaunchedESPOpipelinetoChina.In2011,the1,030-kilometer‐longpipelinelinkedtheESPOtotheDaqingrefinerycomplexviaSkovorodino.Transneftbuiltthe65-kilometer-longsectionofthispipelineonRussianterritoryusingCDB’sloan,whereastheCNPCcompletedthe965kilometerslocatedinsideChina.In2010,RussiabecameoneofthetopfiveoilsupplierstoChinaanditsexportstoChinahavegrownsteadilysincethen.EventhoughasignificantpricedisputequicklyarosebetweenRosneftandCNPC,9in2013Russia’sandChina’sNOCssignednewmultipleenergydeals.Notably,Rosneftsigneda25-yearoildealworthUS$270billionwithCNPCandanotherten-yearoildealworthUS$85bil-lionwithSinopec.Asaresult,Rosneft’sexportdealswithChinajumpedtoover25Mtoeperyear.Also,CNPCandRosneftsignedamemorandumofunderstand-ingtoformajointventuretodevelopRusskoyeandYurubcheno-TokhomskoyeoilfieldsinEasternSiberiathatwillsupplylocaldemand,aswellasChineseandotherAsianmarkets.China–Russiaenergyrelations77Attheendof2014,TransneftaddedthreemoreoilpumpingstationstotheESPOSystem,increasingtheoilpumpingcapacityofthestationsbuiltin2011.Ayearlater,theinitialpipelinewasjoinedbyaparallelone.OnceChina’sspuroftheESPOexpandeditscapacity,Chinareceivedmorethan50MtoefromRussia,whichconstituted14percentofthetotalChina’simportsand18percentofRussia’stotalexports.In2016,thisallowedRussiatocompetewithSaudiArabiaforthestatusofChina’ssecond‐largestsupplierofoil,whereasChinasurpassedGermanyasthetopbuyerofRussianoil.TheexistingChina–Russiacontractsanticipateafurtherincreaseinexportsofoilovertheremainderofthe2010sandwellintothe2020s.DiscursivepoliticsofenergyinRussia’sChinapolicyFramingtherelationswithChinaasan“energydialogue,”Russia’srepresentativesclaimthatthisdialogueismotivatedandsustainedbymarketincentivesratherthanadesiretoformanewpoliticalcoalitionagainsttheWest.Theydescribeitas“pragmatic”(Denisov2014a)and“clearlydefined”alongthelinesofeco-nomicdevelopment(Lavrov2012).TheframeofmarketrationalismhighlightsRussia’sextraordinaryandenduringcapacitytosatisfyChina’sgrowingenergydemand.ItalsoconnotesthatRussiaisinterestedinChinaasamarketanddesirestostrengthenitsrelationswithit.Importantly,byusingthisframe,Russia’soffi-cialsdiscursivelyinstrumentalizeRussia’sampleresourcewealthasasignificantcompetitiveadvantageratherthanacurseorasourceofvulnerabilities.Russia’senergyexportstoChinahavebecomenotaconsequenceofanunhealthyaddic-tiontoresourcerevenuesandanecessitytodiversifyenergyexportsinthefaceofdeterioratingrelationswiththeWestbutarationaleconomicchoicestipulatedbythedevelopmentoftheglobalenergymarket.AnotherpartoftheofficialdiscourseonChina–Russiaenergyrelationsistheframeofregionalism.ItforegroundsgeographicproximityasafoundationforChina–Russiamutuallybeneficialenergycooperation.Thisframe,however,hasseveralseriouslimitations.AsthediscussionofRussia’sconstructionsof“we”and“they”intheprevioussectionpointsout,RussiadoesnotperceiveitselfasanAsianstate.AsRussia’scurrentambassadortoChinaAndreyDenisov(2014a)putsit,ChinaandRussia“areneighbors,but[they]aredifferent.”Inotherwords,RussiaisinAsiabutRussiaisnotAsia.HencethereferencestosharedpastandculturalaffinitywithChinasupporttheframeofregionalism.Moreover,whereasinthecaseofRussia’srelationswiththeEU,officialdiscoursestemporallyharkenbacktothepast(e.g.,WorldWarII,ColdWar),thediscursiveconstructionofChina–Russiaenergyrelationsisframedintermsofthefuture(e.g.,expectedfutureeconomicgrowth).Forexample,framingRussia’srelationswiththeEU,VictorKhristenko(2006a)arguesthat“RussiahadnevercutoffsuppliestoEurope–neitherdur-ingtheColdWarnorduringthefinancialcrisesof1998–because[Russia]his-toricallyseesitselfasapartofEurope”(alsoLavrov2012;Novak2014b).Incontrast,discussingRussia’senergycooperationwithAsia,Khristenko(2006b)focusesongeoeconomicratherthangeopoliticalorgeoculturallinks:78China–RussiaenergyrelationsWeviewtheeasterndirectionasastrategicone,sincehere–ontheoutercontour–RussiahassuchcountriesasJapanandKorea,theleadersoftheworldeconomy,ChinaandIndia,withtheirhugemarketsandindustrializa-tionpotentials,anddynamicandambitiousSoutheastAsianstates.Theinter-nalcontourisEastSiberiaandtheFarEast.[…]ThereisasituationwhenthereisarealopportunitytorealizeMikhailLomonosov’sfamouspredictionthat“thepowerofRussiashallbeincreasedbySiberia.”Consequently,theframeofregionalismdoesnotcreateanotherdimensionwithintheconstructionofChina–Russiaenergycooperationbutreinforcesitsreadingasarationalchoicebasedpurelyonthematchingeconomicinterestsofthetwocountries.AlexanderGabuev,aChinaexpertandaseniorassociateattheCarnegieMoscowCenter,arguesthat,despitetherecentprogressinChina–Russiaenergyrelations,Chinaisstillnot“aprioritypartnerforRussia”(interview,October2016,Moscow).AccordingtoGabuev,theRussianeliteidentifiesitselfas“Europeans”andseesitsfuture“inEurope”:Russianbusinessandhigh-rankingofficials–everyone–wanttoreturntobusinesswiththeWest.NooneeverwantedanyseriouspartnershipwithAsia.[TheRussians]arealittleculturallylimited,racists,oftennotwellinformed[aboutAsia],andnotpragmatic,andthusapartnershipwithChinaisstillaculturalchoice.IfyousellmoreoiltotheWest,thenyouareaEuropeancoun-try,youarestrivingforcapitalism,amarketdemocracy,andhighWesternstandardsofconsumption.IfyousellmoreoiltoChina,thenyoubecomeamoreauthoritariancountry,inwhichhumanrightsareviolated,andsoon.(Interview,October2016,Moscow)Indeed,discussingthediversificationofenergyexportstowardtheEast,RussianrepresentativesstressthatChinaisnotgoingtoreplaceEuropeinRussia’senergydiplomacy.Forexample,Putin(2006d)declaresconfidentlythateventhoughRussiawantstohave“accesstothedevelopingAsianmarkets,”itsEuropeanpartners“neednotfear”thatRussiawillreducetheirenergysupplies.Similarly,inallhispublicstatements,especiallythoseaimedattheWesternaudience,AlexandrNovakinsistentlyrejectsthenotionthatenhancedcooperationbetweenRussiaandthecountriesoftheAsia-Pacificregionmarksaturnto“theEast”inRussia’senergypolitics(e.g.Novak2015a,2015c).Besides,Novak,onmultipleoccasions,emphasizesthatRussiawillnotfavortheinterestsofitsnewpartnersoverthoseofcurrentones.Consequently,Russia’srapprochementwithChinaandotherAsiannationsisconstructednotasaredirectionofRussia’senergypoliticsbutasitsglobalization.AstheFirstDeputyMinisterofEnergyAlexeyTexler(2015)putsit,inthe2010sRussialikea“double-headedeaglelooksinbothdirections.”Nevertheless,inthemid-2000sandevenmoresoafterPutin’sregimeoffi-ciallyadmittedits“turntotheEast”(разворотнаВосток,razvorotnaVostok)China–Russiaenergyrelations79in2014,Chinastartedtorepresentthemajor(ifnotonly)counterbalancetotheWestinRussia’senergydiplomacy.Onthediscursivelevel,Putin’sregimeusesenergyrelationswithChinatomaintainRussia’sstatusastheuniqueproviderofcontinentalenergysecurityandreinforcethediscourseofenergysuperpower.Inthiscontext,theframeofstrategicpartnershipbecomescriticalfortheconstruc-tionofChina–Russiaenergyrelations.Thisthirdframeisbasedonthenotionofnationalinterests(e.g.,Denisov2014a,2016;Putin2012,2013b).Denisov(2014b)describesRussia–Chinaenergycooperationas“aproductofthepoliticalwilloftheleadersofthetwocountries.”Similarly,Lavrov(2012)arguesthat“themainsecret”ofsteadydevelopmentoftheChina–Russiarelationsis“asystemicapproach”thatincludesyearlymeetingsatthehighestleveland“setsthenecessarypoliticaltoneforpracticalprojects.”Inaddition,China–Russiaenergycooperationisele-vatedtothegloballevel,anditsdevelopmentispresentednotonlyasapartofthebilateralrelationsbutalsoasanessentialfactorinthedevelopmentofinter-nationalenergypolitics.Forexample,inanarticleforPeople’sDaily(2012),PutinarguesthatTheenergy-sectordialoguebetweenourtwocountrieshasastrategicdimen-sion.Ourjointprojectshaveabigimpactonshapingtheglobalenergymar-ket’sentireconfiguration.TheyofferChinamorereliableanddiversifiedenergysuppliesforitsdomesticneedsandofferRussiathechancetoopenupnewexportroutestothefast-growingAsia-Pacificregion.WhilePutin(2014)recognizesthat“Chinesefriendsdriveahardbargainasnegotiators,”themoreaggressiveexpressionsofthediscourseofenergysuper-power(seeKuteleva2020,86-87)areabsentinRussia’sofficialdiscourseaboutChina–Russiaenergyrelations.Thereisevidence,however,tosuggestthattheassertivenessoftheenergysuperpowermarksRussia’srelationswithChinaonanunofficiallevel.SergeyGoncharov,theformerdirectoroftheRepresentativeOfficeofRosneftinChina(2006–2013),characterizesRussia’sseniorofficialsresponsiblefornegotiationswithChinaas“mobsters”with“thementalityofdrugdealers”(interview,November2016,Beijing).Accordingtohim,ininternalcommunications,theyformulatedthegoalofChina–Russianegotiationsoveroilexportsinthelate2000sas“toputChinaontheneedle”(посадитьнаиглу,posadit'naiglu)therebycomparingRussia’soiltoheroin.AcurrentemployeeofRosneftinChinaalsoconfirmedthathissupervisorsbelievedthattheESPOpipe-linewould“fastentheChinesetoRussia”and,subsequently,Chinawillaccepttheoil-linkedgaspricingmechanismofferedbyRussia(interview,November2016,Beijing).ThefactthatRussia’srepresentativesnevermadestatementsliketheseinpublicindicatesthattheenergysuperpowerdiscoursehasavindictiveandprotectivenature.Intherealmofenergydiplomacy,Russia’srepresentativesevokeitsaggressiveexpressionsonlywhentheyconsiderthattheirforeigncoun-terpartsthreatenRussiawithoutduerespectandquestionitsuniquestatusininter-nationalenergyrelations.80China–RussiaenergyrelationsThediscourseofraw-materialappendageandChina–RussiarelationsGenerally,RussianslikeChinabutarehesitantabouttheChinese.In2016,36percentofRussiansbelievedthatChinaisRussia’sfriend(LevadaCenter2017,194and205).Adecadeago,only12percentofRussianthoughtso.Publicopin-ionaboutChinaissteadilyimproving.However,manyRussiansstillbelievethatthereisadangerof“Chineseexpansion”whichwillbecausedbyChina’sover-populationand,accordingly,willleadtothelossofeasternRussianterritories(foradetailedanalysisofRussianfearsabout“Chineseexpansion”seeLarin2009;Yankov2010;Curanović2012).Accordingtothesurveys,46percentin2005and24percentin2016agreedthattheauthoritiesneedtolimittheresidenceoftheChineseontheterritoryofRussia(LevadaCenter2017,174).Asitwasalreadypointedoutthroughthischapter,thediscourseofraw-mate-rialappendageinitiallyfocusedontheWestasRussia’snegativeOtherandhasexpandedtoincludeChinaasthesecondnegativeOtheronlyrelativelyrecently(e.g.,Khramchikhin2013;Yanitskiy2010).However,thecontradictoryattitudestowardChinaandtheChinesedonottransformintoacoherentChinathreatdis-courseintherealmofenergypolitics.AlexanderGabuevnotesthatRussiaisoftenportrayedasChina’sraw-materialappendagebecauseoftheunbalancedtradeturnoverbetweenthetwocountriesandframesthisopinionasa“widespreadliberaldiscourse”(interview,October2016,Moscow).Accordingtohim,theformula“ourrawmaterialsinexchangeforyourcarsandconsumergoods”isaproductofRussia’seconomicstructureratherthanaresultofChina’sattemptstoconquerRussia.ThisopinioniswidelysharedbymostofRussia’sChinaexperts.KseniaKushkina,aprojectspecialistattheEnergySystemsCenteroftheSkolkovoInstituteofScienceandTechnology,pointsoutthatChinaisoftenperceivedasan“Orientalmystery”anda“‘blackbox’inwhichsomethingentersbutwhatcomesoutofisnotclear”(interview,October2016).Accordingtoher,theChineseare“quitepragmaticandtruth-ful”because“theyalwayshonestlydefinetheirlong-termgoals,albeitinvaguephrases.”LikeGabuev,shedescribesthecritiqueofChina–Russiaenergycoop-erationandtheperceptionsofChinaasathreatasanopinionofthe“radicallib-erals.”SheattributesittotheignoranceofChinaanditsintentions.Importantly,Russia’sChinaexpertsbelievethatasabuyerofenergyresourcesChinaistheultimatechoiceforRussia.AsRaisaEpikhinaofMoscowStateUniversityputsit,“Chinahasnoequals”because“Chinaisahugemarket,and,fromthispointofview,Chinawillalwaysbeattractiveforeveryone”(interview,October2016).TheopiniondescribedbyChinaexpertsas“liberal”indeedisoftenheldbyadherentcriticsofPutin’sregimewhostandupforliberaleconomicreformsandcomprehensivepoliticalreforms.Forexample,YuliaLatinina,awell-knownjournalist,publicintellectual,andtoacertainextentasymbolofRussianliberal-ism,criticizesChina–RussiaenergydealsasunprofitableforRussia(e.g.,2014a,2014b).However,hercriticismtargetscorruptioninRussia’senergysectorratherthanperpetuatestheperceptionsofChinaasathreat.SimilarrepresentationsofChina–Russiarelationsappearinfictionwriting(e.g.,Sorokin2006;ChizhovaChina–Russiaenergyrelations812017),whereChinatakesadvantageofthegreedofcorruptRussianofficialstogaincontroloverRussianenergyresources.Insum,theraw-materialappendagediscourselabelsasathreatnotChinabutRussia’sunhealthyaddictiontotheenergyrentingeneral.Inthissense,SinophobiathatexistsinRussiansocietyisnotachallengeforthedevelopmentofChina–Russiaenergyrelationsbecauseitexistsinanotherdiscursivespace.Thediscourseofraw-materialappendage,however,forcesPutin’sregimetorepro-ducethediscursivelogicofenergysuperpowerinitsconstructionsofChina–Russiaenergyrelations.Consequently,theexpressionsoftheenergysuperpowerdiscourseinRussia’sdiscursivepoliticsofChina–Russiaenergycooperationcanbeattributedtotwofactors.First,itisapartofthediscursivestructurethatlegiti-mizesPutin’sregime.Second,itsustainsthediscursiveconstructionofRussiaasaninfluentialactorininternationalenergypolitics.China’sconstructionofRussiaasapartnerinenergyrelationsChina’sleadersandseniorofficialsattheendofthe2000sandtheearly2010sdescribedChina–Russiarelationsas“healthy”and“dynamic”(Hu2012a),prais-ingRussiaasatrustedpartnerandagoodneighbor(Liu2005;Li2016a).EnergycooperationwasalwaysapriorityfortheChineseside.AtthedawnofChina–Russiaenergyrelations,LiuGuchang(2005),China’sambassadortoRussiaatthattime(2003–2009),bluntlyformulatedtheChineseapproachtotheenergydialoguewithRussia:“Chinaneedsoilandgas,Russianeedsamarket,andtheChinesemarketisthemostconvenientandstable.”HealsonotedthatsuccessfulenergycooperationwouldelevateChina–Russiarelationstoanewlevel.The2007China’sEnergyDevelopmentReportarguesthatinthemid-2000s“thehighlypoliticizednature”ofinternationalenergyrelationsexposesRussiato“enormouspressure.”Accordingtoit,thedecisionofRussia’sauthoritiestoincreaseoilexportstoAsiain2006isalogicalstepincreatinga“multipolar”energystrategy.Importantly,theauthorsofthereportuniteRussiaandChinabyportrayingthembothasvictimsofunfoundedcriticismoftheWest.Theircon-cludingremarksareworthquotinginlength:Sincethebeginningof2006,Russiahasswitchedtoadiversifiedstrategyofenergyexports.ThisstrategyturnedtheinternationalpublicopinionagainstRussia:somearguedthatRussia“usesenergyresourcesasaforeignpolicytool,”“managesgeopoliticsthroughenergyexports,”and“triestomanipu-latetheWestwithenergyresources.”Ontheotherhand,theenergyneedsofsomemajorenergyconsumerswerealsocriticized.Forexample,China’sandIndia’srapideconomicdevelopmentcausedarapidincreaseinenergydemand.Thecountrieswerelabeledas“theworld’senergyblackholes,”“energy-hungrydragons,”andevenasthechiefculpritsoftheoilpricesrise.Asaresult,China’sandIndia’scontributiontoglobaleconomicdevelopmentwasdiluted,whereastheirenergydemandwasplacedunderthespotlightand82China–Russiaenergyrelationsexaminedwithamagnifyingglass.Inthisframework,theUnitedStatesandWesternEuropeancountriesemergedas“threatened”becausetheirenergysecurityisjeopardizedbyRussia’sintentionstoexploreAsianmarkets,andtheirenergysupplyisaffectedbythesurgeindemandinChina,India,andotherdevelopingcountries.Inthisdiscursiveframework,RussiaisexplicitlyconstructedasanantipodetotheWestandthusasChina’spotentialally,eventhoughitdoesnotappearasapartofChina’s“we”(becausethe“we”is“developingcountries”).Otherexpertsofstate-affiliatedthinktanksandresearchinstitutionssketchasimilarportraitofRussia.LiZhonghai(2009,5–6)oftheChineseAcademyofSocialSciencesdefinesRussiaasan“independentenergyproducer”andclaimsthat“China’sgovernment,business,andpeoplehavealwayshadhighhopestomeetChina’sgrowingenergydemandthroughthedevelopmentofChina-Russiarelations.”Alongsimilarlines,ZhangHongxia(2007,38),alsoaresearcherattheChineseAcademyofSocialSciences,claimsthattheenergywealthbecame“the‘goldenkey’toRussia’seconomicdevelopmentandthe‘tool’fortheriseofRussiaasagreatpower”inthe2000s.SomeChinesescholarspointoutthatRussia’seco-nomicoverdependenceontheenergysectorisnotsustainableinthelongrun(e.g.,Zhang2007;Wu2006).However,overalltherichbodyofliteratureonRussia’senergystrategyandenergydiplomacythatemergedinChinabetween2006and2009presentsRussiaasapromisingenergysupplierandprovidesapositiveoutlookforthedevelopmentofChina–Russiacooperation(e.g.,Wang2006;Li,ZH.2009).China’sofficials,onthecontrary,between2006and2009bypassedthetopicofChina–Russiaenergycooperationinsilence.Againstthebackgroundofthe2005loan-for-oil,China’srepresentativeshadhighhopesforthepipelineproject(Liu2005;MFAofthePRC2005).WhenRussianauthoritiessuspendedtheplanstobuildadirectpipelinefromEasternSiberiatoNorthernChina,theirChinesecounterpartsremovedthedevelopmentofenergycooperationwithRussiafromtheiragenda.ThelanguageofthepublicstatementsmadebyChina’sofficialsdur-ingthisperiodisvague,anditseemsthattheystruggletofindpracticalexamplestoillustratethe“strategic”natureofChina–Russiarelations.Forinstance,calling2006and2007“extraordinaryyearsinthehistoryofChina-Russiarelations,”LiuGuchang(2007)describesthestrategiccomponentoftheserelationsasfollows:ChinaandRussiaexchangetheiropinionsinatimelymannerandmaintainclosecooperationonthemajorglobalandregionalissues,whichcontributestostrengtheningtheinfluenceandeffectivenessofthetwocountriesintheinternationalarenaandcontributestothepeacefuldevelopmentoftheplanet.China’sofficialsstarttotalkaboutstrengtheningenergyrelationswithRussiaagainonlyafter2009.TheirconstructionofChina–RussiaenergyrelationsisstructurallysimilartotheRussianone,buttheemphasisfallsdifferently.China–Russiaenergyrelations83LiketheirRussiancounterparts,China’srepresentativesdefineChina–Russiaenergyrelationsasa“dialogue”basedon“theprincipleofmutualbenefitandcomplementingeachotherwithadvantages”(MFAofthePRC2010).Theframeofmarketrationalismoccupiesacentralplace;however,whiletheideaofinter-dependenceplaysacrucialroleinRussiandiscourse,China’srepresentativesputtheaccentontheabsenceofgeopoliticsandlinkChina–Russiarelationswiththeconceptsof“peacefulrise”and“harmoniousworld.”TheyframeChina–Russiaenergycooperationintermsofthedesireofthetwocountriestousetheirdevelop-mentpotentialandensuredynamiceconomicgrowthratherthantoformananti-Westerncoalition.Reinforcingthelogicofthe“peacefulrise,”HuJintao(2012b)arguedthat“thewholeworld”willbenefitfromacloserinteractionbetweenChinaandRussia.China’srepresentativesoftendescribeChina–Russiaenergyrelationsas“businesscooperation”(e.g.,Hu2012a;Li2012b).TheframeofregionalismisalsopresentinChina’sconstructionofChina–Russiaenergyrelations.AcommonmetaphorforChina–RussiarelationsevokedbybothChina’sofficialsandforeignpolicyexpertsisapopularproverb“acloseneighborisbetterthanadistantrelative”(远亲不如近邻,yuanqinburujinlin)(e.g.,Liu2008;Ma2008;WangH.2009).UnliketheirRussianpart-ners,China’srepresentativespresentChina–Russiaenergycooperationnotasanoveltybutasanopportunitytorevitalizethehistoricaleconomic,social,andculturalnetworksconnectingthetwocountries.Asacaseinpoint,XiJinping(2013)comparedoilandnaturalgaspipelinestotheThousands-milesTeaRoute(万里茶道,wanlichadao).10Accordingtohim,thenewpipelineswillbecome“arteries”thatconnectChinaandRussiainthe21stcentury,liketherouteoverwhichtradersexchangedChineseteaforRussianfurstwocenturiesago.Reinforcingthenarrativeof“win-win”cooperation,XiJinpingarguedthatinthecaseofChinaandRussia“oneplusoneismorethantwo”becauseoftheircomplementaryinterests.Finally,China’sofficialdiscourseofChina–Russiarelationsalsoframesenergycooperationbetweenthetwocountriesasapartofthestrategicpartner-ship.However,China’sofficialsemphasizethe“comprehensiveness”ofChina–Russiadiplomaticrapprochementandbroadenthecontentofenergycooperation.WhereasfortheRussiansideenergycooperationmeansfirstandforemostexportsoffossilfuelsandtheconstructionofthetransportationinfrastructuretofacilitatetheseexports,ChineserepresentativesfocusonexpandingtheportfolioofChina–Russiaenergyrelationsandmovingbeyond“traditionaloilandgas”(e.g.,MFAofthePRC2010;Li,H.2012a,2012b).TheconstructionoftheenergycooperationasapartofChina–Russia’s“com-prehensivestrategicpartnership”didnotchangeonceXiJinpingreplacedHuJintao.Startingfrom2014,however,XiandotherChina’sseniorofficialshigh-lightthatenergyrelationsarebasedon“practicalcooperation”(e.g.,MFAofthePRC2014;Xi2015;Li,H.2016a,2016b).By2017,“practical”(务实,wushihezuo)becamethemostrecurringepithetforChina–RussiarelationsinChina’sofficialdiscourse.Accordingly,China’srepresentativesfeatureenergyintheir84China–Russiaenergyrelationsrecentpublicstatementsnotasacentralstrategicprioritybutjustasanotheriteminthelonglistofitemsonthecooperationagenda(e.g.,Xi2017;Li,H.2017).Notably,thediscussionofthefurtherexpansionofenergyinfrastructurewasincorporatedintothediscourseofBRIandframedasoneofthe“connectiv-ity”issues(e.g.,Xi2015;HuangpuandWang2015).ThisshiftmeansthattheChinesesidewantstoincludethenegotiationsonfuturepipelinesinthebroaderthemeofregionalintegration,aswellaspotentially“linkingup”theEurasianEconomicUnionandBRI.11Inthisframework,thepipelinesarenotamatterofbilateralrelationsbutapartoftheintegrationpackage.Xi’s“Chinadream”andPutin’s“energysuperpower”DespitetheundeniablelogicfortherapprochementbetweenRussiaandChina,their“energydialogue”hasbeencomplicated.DespitethesteadilyrisinggrowthofdemandforandofimportsofoilonChina’spart,Russiahesitatedtoenterlong-termagreementswithChinauntiltheendofthe2000s.Inthelate2000s,somescholarsarguedthataconvergenceofoutlookbetweenRussiaandChinainregardtotheirpreferencesforthestatecontrollingthevitalsectorsoftheecon-omywillcreateastrongerfoundationforthecooperation(e.g.,Ferdinand2007;Williams2009).However,thedirectpipelinetoChinawasnotcompleteduntil2011andrelativelystableenergycooperationbetweenRussianandChinastartedtoemergeonlyafter2013.WhileRussiaseparatesitselffromtheWest,thehistorical,cultural,andpoliticalgulfseparatingitfromChinaissubstantiallydeeper.ThepatternofChina–Russiaenergyrelationsbetween2005and2017indicatesthatRussiaturnstotheEastonlywhenitfaceschallengesintheWest:theneedtofindthecashtofinancethecontroversialnationalizationofYukos’assetsin2005,thedeclineinWesterndemandforRussianoilfollowingthe2008globalfinancialcrises,and,finally,therecentalienationbetweentheWestandRussiafollowingtheUkrainiancrisesinthemid-2010s.Russia’senergyidentitiesanddiscursivepoliticsofenergyappeartobedrivingitawayfromChina.Putin’sregimemustpresentRussiaasanenergysuperpowerandframeitsinteractionswithChinaaccordinglybecauserejectingthediscourseofenergysuperpowerwillentailacceptingitsantithesis,thediscourseofraw-materialappendage.Asaresult,Russia’senergydiplomacytowardChinabecomesahostageoftheconflictbetweenthediscourseofenergysuperpowerandthediscourseofraw-materialappendage.WhiletheSovietUnionwasChina’s“bigbrother”(老大哥,laodage),modernRussiaisnotamemberofChina’sfamilybutmerelyabusinesspartner.Inthe2010s,ChinacanbuyasmuchRussianoilasitseconomicdevelopmentrequiresandrecognizesthatRussianeedsChina’smoneymuchasChinaneedsRussia’senergyresources.FortheChineseside,apartnershipwithRussiaisamatterofconvenienceandarationalchoicedeterminedbyitscurrenteconomicinterests.XiJinping’sChinaDreamdoesnotincludeageopoliticalcoalitionwithPutin’sChina–Russiaenergyrelations85energysuperpower.Russiaislosing(oralreadyhaslost)itscompetitiveadvan-tagesinrelationswithChinabecauseinthe2010soilsuppliescanbuyChina’sfriendshipbutcannotturnitintoageopoliticalally.Notes1SeeBouzarovskiandBassin(2011)andRutland(2015)forageneraldiscussionoftheroleofenergyresourcesindebatesoverRussiannationalidentity.2AsThaneGustafson(2012,101)putsit,intheenergysector“themarketreformswentirretrievablywrong.”Marketliberalizationofoilindustrywasachildofthe1990s,aperiodthatiscommonlyreferredtoinRussiaas“therecklessandevil1990s”(лихиедевяностые)or“thetimeofconfusion”(смутноевремя).OnprivatizationofRussia’soilindustryinthe1990sseeFreeland(2000),Dixon(2008),Gustafson(2012),andSakwa(2014).3ImperialprerogativeisaconceptdevelopedbyParthaChatterjee(2005,2012).Itisunderstoodasaself-claimedrightofanempiretodeclarethecolonialexceptionwithinitsspheresofinfluence,suchasproclaimingotherpoliticalentitiesasinneedofinter-ventionbecausetheyareunabletomanagetheirownaffairs.4LevadaCenterisaRussianindependentnon-governmentalpollingandsociologicalresearchorganization.5ThesurveywasconductedbythefirmRussianPublicOpinionandMarketResearch(ROMIR)asapartoftheNEORUS(Nation-buildingandnationalismintoday’sRussia)projectoftheDepartmentofLiterature,AreaStudiesandEuropeanLanguagesattheUniversityofOslo.6Initially,theterm“cargocult”chiefly,butnotsolely,referredtodiverseMelanesianreligiouspracticescharacterizedbythebeliefthatmaterialwealthcouldbeobtainedthroughritualworship.Later,thetermwasusedmetaphoricallytodescribeattemptstoachievesuccessfuloutcomesbyreplicatingasetofconditionsassociatedwiththoseoutcomes,althoughthoseconditionsareeithernotrelatedtothecausesoftheoutcomesornotsufficientenoughtoreproducethembythemselves(e.g.,“cargocultscience”or“cargocultprogramming”).AccordingtoShulman(2010),inRussia’scase“allformsofsocialorganizationandpublicadministrationarealmostentirelyborrowedandimplantedwithmoreorlessviolence,inthecourseofrepetitive[…]wavesofwest-ernization,”yet“manyoftheseformshaveapurelydecorativecharacterofwindowdressing”becausethereisabeliefthatthisstateofaffairsisthesameintheWestbut“theyarejustbetterthanweareatpretending.”7ForadetailedanalysisoftheYukosaffairseeSixsmith,2010.8In2009,ChinasignedsimilardealswithBolivia,Brazil,Ecuador,Venezuela,andTurkmenistan,butnoneoftheseloansexceededUS$10billion.Bytheendof2010thetotalvalueofloansextendedbyChinatoenergy-richcountriesisestimatedtobeaboutUS$77billion(JiangandSinton,2011);however,notalltheseloansweredirectlybackedbyenergysupplycontracts(e.g.,theUS$10loantoKazakhstanin2009andUS$13billionloantoGhanain2010).9In2012,followingthedisagreementoverthetermsofthecontractrelatedtopipe-linefees,CNPCreduceditspaymentsforRussianoil.Thedisputesettledwithacompromise.10ThishistoricrouteconnectedEuropeanRussiatoChinathroughSiberiainthe18thandthe19thcenturies.ItisbetterknownastheSiberianRoute(Сибирскийтракт,Sibirskytrakt).11Theenergycooperation,nevertheless,wasnotmentionedintheJointDeclarationontheConnectionoftheSilkRoadEconomicBeltandtheEurasianEconomicUnionsignedin2015byPutinandXi(JointDeclaration2015).86China–RussiaenergyrelationsReferencesAndreyeva,N.(1990).Ostanovit'spolzaniyekkatastrofe!Kotvetulikvidatorovimogil'shchikovnashegosotsialisticheskogoOtechestva![Stoptheslippingtothedisaster!CalltoaccountthegravediggersofoursocialistMotherland!].InA.Byelicki(Ed.),KratkiyKursIstoriiPerestroyki[Ashorthistoryofperestroika](pp.66–76).Leningrad:KrasnyOctyabr.Applebaum,A.(2012).Putinism:theideology.TheLondonSchoolofEconomicsandPoliticalScience.Strategicupdate13.2.[PDFfile]Retrievedfromhttp://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/updates/LSE-IDEAS-Putinism-The-Ideology.pdf[Accessed12Jan.2017].Baev,P.K.(2012).FromEuropeantoEurasianenergysecurity:Russianeedsandenergyperestroika.JournalofEurasianStudies3,177–184.Bassin,M.(1991).RussiabetweenEuropeandAsia:theideologicalconstructionofgeographicalspace.SlavicReview,50(1),1–17.Bouzarovski,S.,andBassin,M.(2011).Energyandidentity:imaginingRussiaasahydrocarbonsuperpower.AnnalsoftheAssociationofAmericanGeographers,101(4),783–7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oftheregionandespeciallyinthedevelopmentofresourcesectors.Inexchange,theregionwasassignedtheroleofacommoditysupplier.For70yearsitseconomywassubordinatedtotheneedsoftheEuropeanpartoftheSovietUnion(Loring2014).AfterthecollapseoftheSovietUnionin1991,Kazakhstanbecameaninde-pendentstateandfounditselfholding3.2percentoftheworld’stotalprovenoilreserves.NursultanNazarbayev–thefirstanduntilMarch2019theonlypresi-dentofKazakhstan–turnedtheextractionofenergyresourcesintothefounda-tionofKazakhstan’snationalprosperity.In1997,Kazakhstanbecametheproudleaderamongthepost-Sovietstatesinpercapitaforeigndirectinvestment,andin1999,itregisteredthefirstbudgetsurplus.Throughoutthe2000s,Kazakhstan’sgrowthperformanceaveragedalmost8percentannuallyinrealterms(WorldBank2018).Since2006,ridinglargelyonhighoilprices,Kazakhstanhastran-sitionedfromlower-middle-incometoupper-middle-incomestatus.TothecreditofNazarbayevandhisallies,Kazakhstan’sgovernmentinvestedgener-ouslyandconsistentlynotonlyinthepovertyeradicationbutalsointhenewmiddleclass,andasaresult,Kazakhstanbecameoneofthemostsociallyandpoliticallystablepost-Sovietstates(KalyuzhnovaandPatterson2016;AzamandAhmed,2015).Nazarbayev’sregimealsohadambitiousplanstodiversifytheeconomyawayfromnaturalresourceextraction,butlittleprogresswasmadeinthisdirectioninthe2000sandthe2010s.In2017,themanufacturingsectoraccountedfor11percentofGDP,whiletheagriculturalsectorconstitutedonly5percent.Bothsec-torsareinefficientandfailtocompetesuccessfullywithforeignproducers(WorldBank2018).Incontrast,rentsderiveddirectlyandindirectlyfromthesaleofenergyresourcesconstituteabout25percentofKazakhstan’sGDP(WorldBank2018).Consequently,afterindependence,Kazakhstanbecameaclassicrentierstate(Ostrowski2011;Frankeetal.2009),anditsfragileeconomyisextremelyvulnerabletodownwardglobaloildemandandpriceshocks.98China–KazakhstanenergyrelationsNazarbayevhassteadilycentralizedthepowerinhisownhands.The1995referendumextendedNazarbayev’sterminofficeto2000.However,intheafter-mathofthe1998Rublecrisis,Nazarbayevcalledforelectionsaheadofsched-uleandwasre-electedaspresidentin1999.In2005,hegot91.2percentofthevoteandwonanotherseven-yearterm.In2007,aconstitutionalamendmentexemptedNazarbayevpersonallyfromthetwo-termlimitonthepresidency.In2010,theparliamentofKazakhstanawardedNazarbayevanhonorarytitleoftheLeaderofNation(Елбасы,Elbasi),whichuniquelyempoweredNazarbayevtosecurealifetimeroleindomesticandforeignpolicydecision-making.DarkhanKaletayev,thefirstdeputychairmanoftherulingpro‐presidentialpartyNurOtan(2008–2009),providesthemostprecisesummaryofthedominantvisionofNazarbayev’sleadership:NazarbayevisnotjustthepresidentofKazakhstanbutistheleaderofthenation,likeAtatürkfortheTurks,MahathirfortheMalayans,LeeKuanYewfortheSingaporeans,andRooseveltfortheAmericans.Heisakindofper-sonalitythatcomespreciselyintheperiodofthedemandandneedforseriousprogressinthedevelopmentandgrowthofthenation.Supportersandoppo-nentsofNazarbayevareunitedinonething:withouthim,therewouldbenopresent‐dayRepublicofKazakhstaninthemodernstatesystem.(Suleev2009)Nazarbayev’sdecisiontoretireinMarch2019tookmanyobserversbysur-prise.Overthepastdecades,anincreasingamountofscholarshipisdedi-catedtounderstandingthediscursivemechanismsemployedbyNazarbayev’sregimetolegitimizeandstrengthenitspowerinKazakhstan.MarleneLaruelle(2014)arguesthat“Nazarbayevism”iscloselyboundtothecivicnationalism(Kazakhtanness)andethnicnationalism(Kazakhness)2andintimatelyconnectedtotransnationalism,thatistheideaofKazakhstanasamodernnation-stateinte-gratedintotheworldcommunityandbenefitingfromeconomicglobalization.RicoIsaacs(2010,448)demonstratesthatdiscoursesthatconstructNazarbayevas“thefatherofindependence”andthesinglepersoncapableofresolvingthechallengesofpost‐Sovietnation‐buildingarenotonly“projectedfromaboveattheelitelevel”butalsosharedandacceptedbymostofthecitizens.Similarly,MariyaY.Omelicheva(2016),exploringthelegitimacydiscoursesproducedbyNazarbayev’sregimeandevaluatingtheeffectivenessofthesediscourses,basedondatafromthe2011WorldValuesSurvey,concludesthattheNazarbayev’sdiscursivepoliticsechothebeliefsaboutsocioeconomicandpoliticaldevelop-mentwidelyheldinKazakhstanisociety.Elsewhere,Omelicheva(2013,84–85)arguesthattheconceptofapresidentialdemocracybecamepopularamongtheKazakhstanibecauseitresonateswellwiththewidelysharedideaofastrongvisionaryleaderresponsibleforthenationalsuccess.Otherscholars(e.g.,Kudaibergenova2015;Alff2015;Sullivan2017)pointoutthatNazarbayev’sregimealsomonopolizesdiscoursesofdevelopmentandusesthemtolegitimizeNazarbayev’severlastingrule.China–Kazakhstanenergyrelations99Insum,Nazarbayevestablishedhimselfasanauthoritarianrulerandanauthoritariandiscourse-makerthatenjoysbroadpopularsupport.EventhoughthediscursivepoliticsofNazarbayev’sregimeiscontestedinsomerealms(e.g.,Kudaibergenova2016),itsdiscursivedominancehasremainedunchallengedforthepastthreedecades.Nazarbayevhassuccessfullymonopolizedallformaldiscursivedomains,includingpubliccommunicationofKazakhstaniofficials,academicdiscussions,andmedia.Hisspeechesandarticlesarecompiledintoeditedvolumes,includingfourcollectionsofquotations.Besides,Nazarbayevisaprolificwriter,authoring22booksbetween1985and2017onthepoliticalandsocioeconomicdevelopmentandhistoryofKazakhstan.GivenNazarbayev’sdiscursivehegemony,myanalysisofKazakhstan’sdis-cursivepoliticsofenergylargelyfocusesonthetextsproducedbyNazarbayev.Kazakhstan’sofficialdiscourses(Model1)arerepresentedbyasetof77texts,includingkeypolicyandprogrammaticdocumentsandpublicstate-mentsofKazakhstaniofficials;33outof77textsareauthoredbyNazarbayev.InKazakhstan’scase,culturalrepresentations(Model3A)andmarginalpoliti-caldiscoursesthatareproducedbyNGOs,academics,andpublicintellectuals(Model3B)oftenreplicate,entrench,andevenintensifytheofficialdiscourses.Notably,mysurveyofKazakhstaniacademicliteratureonenergypoliticsrevealedthatanoverwhelmingmajorityofscholarlyworkscontainatleastonequotationfromNazarbayev’streatises.3Nazarbayev’sdiscursivedominanceisreinforcedthroughthecreationofnumeroussymbolicreferencesthatconstructhimasapro-tectorandencouragerofthedevelopmentofscienceandeducationinKazakhstan.AlmostallmajorinitiativesofthelastdecaderelatedtoenhancingKazakhstan’sintellectualandresearchpotential–newschools,universities,researchcenters,museums,libraries,scholarships,andspecialbursaries–havebeennamedafterNazarbayev.Nazarbayevdominateseventhephysicaldiscursivespaces.InNur-SultanandAlmaty,Nazarbayev’squotationscanbefoundeverywhere:facadesandentrancesofpublicbuildings,billboards,freewayoverpasses,benches,andpublicart.Consequently,thepositionofthehighlycentralizedandpersoni-fiedregimeofNazarbayevenjoysafullpoliticalanddiscursivehegemonyinKazakhstan.Withonlysporadicandisolatedexceptions,widerpoliticaldebatesinKazakhstanareshrunktothepointofbeingbarelysignificantfortheanaly-sisofKazakhstan’sdominantenergyparadigmandChina–Kazakhstanrelations.FollowingNazarbayev’sresignationinMarch2019,theSenatespeakerKassym-JomartTokayevtookofficeasthepresident.Intheinterim,Tokayevmadeagen-erousgifttoNazarbayevbypushingthroughtheparliamentalawrenamingthecapitalofKazakhstaninhishonortoNur-Sultan.ThissymbolicmoveindicatesthatNazarbayev’slegacywillendureandtheleadershiptransitionisnotgoingtobringsignificantideologicalchangesinthenearestfuture.Kazakhstan’soil:AblessingandathreatControlovernationaloilresourcesoccupiesadistinctplaceinKazakhstan’sofficialnarrativeofnationalindependenceandsovereignty.Narratingthemodernhistory100China–KazakhstanenergyrelationsofKazakhstan,Nazarbayev(2006,107)emphasizesthat,beingapartoftheSovietUnion,Kazakhstanneverfeltlikea“realmaster”of“thegreattreasureshiddeninitsbowels.”Onlyasasovereignstate,Kazakhstanwasabletouseoilasthe“foundationof[its]economicindependence”(108).NazarbayevstartsthestoryofKazakhstan’ssovereigntybycallingoil“thebloodoftheKazakhstanieconomy”and“theblackgoldofKazakhstanilands”thathelpedthegovernmenttokick-startthegrowthintheearly1990s(99).Developingthisstoryfurther,hearguesthatthevastresourcewealthis“anobjectofenvyandclaims[ofotherstates]becauseofwhichKazakhstancouldindeedloseitsindependence”(100).According,inthemiddleoftheverysameparagraph,oiltransformsfromKazakhstan’s“blood”and“blackgold”intoa“beast”thatNazarbayevandhisteam“managedtotame,”while“alwaysrememberingthatforaminutewecannotrelaxanddeceiveourselvesbythefactthatwecontrolit”(100).Consequently,therearetwocompetingnarrativesaboutoilintheofficialenergydiscourse:oilasablessingandoilasathreat.LikeRussia,Kazakhstanstruggleswiththeidentityofthevictimoftheresourcecurseandseekstorepositionitself.However,whilePutin’sRussiareframesitselfasanenergysuperpower,Nazarbayev’sKazakhstanconsistentlyandemphati-callydeclaresthe“economyfirst”principle.Besides,Nazarbayev’sregimehasdevelopedacomplexconstructionthatrationalizesandreframesKazakhstan’sdependenceonenergyrevenuesasatransitionalphaseinitsdevelopment,neu-tralizingthenegativeconnotationsoftheresourcecursediscourses.PortrayingKazakhstanasasovereignownerofitsenergyresourcesandasamodernstatethatisaspiringtojointhe“internationalenergyresourcesclub”(130),Nazarbayev(2006)claimsthatthefocusontheoilsectorandthequestforforeigninvestmentswastheonlyrationaldevelopmentalchoiceforKazakhstanafteritbecameindependent:Eachcountryenterstheprocessof[internationaleconomic]integrationwithluggage.Thisluggageisdifferentforeachcountry:intellectandlabor,indus-trialandtechnological,cultural,andresourcepotentialsoracombinationofthesepotentials.And,basedonthecapabilitiesofacountry,theworldmarketsetsconditionsforthiscountry’sintegrationintoit.Eachcountrymustpayakindof“membershipfee,”offeringtheworldmarketwhateveritcancontrib-utetotheintegratedeconomyatthemoment.(128)Kazakhstan,accordingtoNazarbayev,paidits“membershipfee”inthelate1990sbygivingaccesstoitsnaturalresourcestolargeinternationalcompanies.Foreigninvestmentsintheoilsectormust“smoothenthedifficultiesofthetransitionperiod”duringthefirstdecadesofindependenceandhelpKazakhstanbecomeapartoftheglobaleconomy;however,thisdevelopmentalchoicedoesnotdetermineKazakhstan’slong-termfutureandits“fate”ininternationalpolitics(Nazarbayev2006,128–129).Consequently,NazarbayevconstructsKazakhstan’sdependenceonoilrevenuesasaconsciouschoiceandaninevitablesideeffectofitssuccessfulintegrationintotheglobaleconomy.AsaKazakhstaniexpertsummarizedit,“theChina–Kazakhstanenergyrelations101presidentexplainedtousthatweneedtosellouroil,ifwanttobecomeKuwait”(interview,February2017,Almaty).Nazarbayevalsohighlightsthatbybringinghomeforeigninvestmentandinvit-inginternationalcompaniestodevelopoilreserves,Kazakhstandidnotsurrenderitsnewfoundindependencebut,onthecontrary,wasabletostrengthenitssov-ereigntybyrevitalizingtheeconomy(Nazarbayev2009,2010a).Also,accordingtotheofficialdiscourse,Kazakhstanwilleventuallyoutgrowitspetrostatestatusandobtaintherecognitionoftheinternationalcommunityintherealmoftechno-logicalinnovations,particularlybydeveloping“green”sectors.WhenaddressingKazakhstanicitizensbetween2005and2016,Nazarbayevyearlyrepeatedlikeamantrathatthegovernmentisdeterminedtodevelopthenon-primarysectorsoftheeconomyandwilluseoilrevenuestocreatethe“neweconomyofthefuture”(новаяэкономикабудущего,novayaekonomikabudushchego).Consequently,whileRussia’senergydiscoursesconstructthedependencyonoilrevenuesasahumiliating“downshifting,”Nazarbayev’sregimepresentsKazakhstanasaproudpetrostatethatperceivesoilasapurelyeconomiccommodityanddoesnottakeitsoil-basedprosperityforgranted.AcaseinpointisNazarbayev’s(2017,221)framingoftheoil-boostofthemid-2000sasaunique“respite”thatallowedthegovernmentto“takeacomprehensivelookattheemergingmodelofthenationaleconomy.”Healsostressesthatevenintheearly1990she“clearlyrealized”thatKazakhstanneeded“amodelofbalanced,sustainabledevelopment”(221)andwasdeterminedtodiversifyKazakhstan’seconomyawayfromoil.KazakhstaniexpertsandscholarsreproduceNazarbayev’sofficialdiscourse,solidifyingitslegitimacy.TheydiagnoseKazakhstanwithcertainsymptomsoftheDutchDiseaseandaddresstherisksrelatedtoitsdependenceonvolatilecommoditymarkets(e.g.,Nurmaganbyetov2011;Karyenov2014;Ondash2012,2013;Yelyubayev2016).Withonlyrareexceptions(Temirkhanov2014a,2014b,2015),expertsagreethatthestateistheonlyactorthatcanprotectKazakhstanfromtheresourcecurseandpresentNazarbayev’sdevelopmentalprogramsaseffectivepreventivemeasuresformitigatingit.Themetaphorofraw-materialappendageappearsinthepopulardiscoursebutisabsentinexperts’vocabulary.Overall,thegeneralattitudeoftheexpertcommunitytowardtheeconomicconse-quencesofKazakhstan’sdependenceonoilincomeismostvividlysummarizedbyMuratTemirkhanov(2014a),theHeadofResearchattheinvestmentbankHalykFinance:“Theresourcecurseistheevil,butitmakeshappyboththeordi-naryKazakhstanisandtheofficials.”LiketheirRussiancolleagues,Kazakhstaniexpertsrarelydiscussthepoliti-calsideoftheresourcecurseandavoidreferencestothestudiesthatfocusonpossibleantidemocraticeffectsofresourcewealth.Quitenotably,noneoftheKazakhstaniexpertscitesquasi-canonicalworksofMichaelRoss(e.g.,2001,2012)ormentionthepopular“notaxation,norepresentation”axiomthatinspiredmanystudiesoftheresourcecurse.Onthecontrary,someofthemreframethepoliticalimplicationsoftheresourcecurseasanexternalsovereigntythreat,ech-oingNazarbayev’sconcernsaboutKazakhstan’soilcausingtheenvyofothernations.Forinstance,JumageldiYelyubayevoftheAl-FarabiKazakhNational102China–KazakhstanenergyrelationsUniversity(2016,83)arguesthatoneofthemajorexpressionsoftheresourcecurseis“theincreasingpressureonthenationalgovernmentsfromtransnationalenergycorporationsandcountrieswhere[thesecorporations]areregistered”that“underminesthebasisofthestatesovereignty.”Thisbringsustothebroaderenergydiscoursethatconstructsoilasaheavilysought-afterresourceandfollowsNazarbayev’salarmingnarrativeofenergyandenvironmentalcrises.Whenwritingaboutsustainabledevelopmentandthefutureofhumancivili-zations,Nazarbayevisratherpessimisticabouttheroleofoilinsocial,political,andeconomicprogress.InRadicalRenewalofGlobalSocietyandPartnershipofCivilizations(2010b,6),Nazarbayevidentifiestheenergyandenvironmentalcri-sisasoneofthethree“mosturgentandtopicalproblemsforallmankind,”alongwithfoodshortagesandincomeinequality.Hecharacterizestheseasacontradictionbetweenenergysecurityandenvironmentalprotection.Accordingtohim,thecrisesareprovokedbythedepletionofworldoilreservesandarefurtherdeterioratedwiththeexpansivegrowthofChina,India,andotherdevelopingcountries.Asthepricesforoilandcostsofitstransportationaregrowing,oilbecomesa“geopoliticalfactor”:Whetherwelikeitornot,oilbecomesageopoliticalfactorandaneffectiveleverofpoliticalpressure.Wearenowforcedtotalkaboutenergyblackmail,energythreat,andenergyterrorism.Sourcesandsupplyroutesofenergybecamepotentialandveryvulnerabletargetsforattacksbyinternationalter-rorists.Wehavecrossedthelinefromthecivilizationthatcontrolsoiltothecivilizationthatiscontrolledbyoil!Wearereadytopayforitmoreandmoreliterallyandfiguratively.(Nazarbayev2010b,43,emphasisadded)Consequently,accordingtoNazarbayev,oilistheenergyresourceofthe21stcen-tury.Hisconceptofenergysecurityisfocusedontheavailabilityofoilsupplies.Atitscoreistheideaofoilscarcityandglobaloildependence.Inthiscontext,oilbecomesextremelysecuritizedandappearsonthe“panicpolitics”agenda.Tocompletethepicture,Nazarbayevpresentstheenvironmentalsideofthecrisisasanunfolding“ecologicalcatastrophe”(Nazarbayev2010b,44).Withoutgoingintodetails,hearguesthatitisaresultof“ecologicalviolence”and“irrationaluseofhydrocarbonsasanenergycarrier”(43).4FollowingNazarbayev’slogic,Kazakhstan’svastoilreservesexposeittopotential(butunspecified)geopoliticalthreatsinthepresent,whereastheinevita-bledepletionofthesereservesinthefutureisconstructedasastructuralproblemforitslong-termdevelopment.Nazarbayev(2010b,49)concludesthat“onethingisclear”:Weneedtotakeurgentmeasurestoimplementtheglobalenergyimperativeandecologicalimperative,whichcommandsustoactively–thatisdaily–engageininnovativedevelopmentofexistingenergytechnologies:optimiz-ingconsumption,conservingnaturalresources,energy-saving,developingrenewableenergy,andpromotingalternativeenergy.China–Kazakhstanenergyrelations103Insum,thedominantenergydiscoursesconstructthevastoilreservessimultane-ouslyasablessingandasasourceofmultiplevulnerabilities.OilisthefoundationofKazakhstan’sindependenceandthegreatestthreattoitssovereigntyafterthecollapseoftheSovietUnion.Kazakhstan’sdependenceonoilincomesisframedasatemporaryphaseinitseconomicdevelopment.Accordingly,Kazakhstanisportrayedasamodernanddynamicpetrostatethatwillnotlieonitsoarsbutwilluseitsoilmoneytotransitiontonewmodernityandelevateitselfontoanewdevelopmentlevel.Inthisframework,Nazarbayev’sregimesecuresforitselftheroleoftheonlyguarantorofthepost-oilbrightfuture.ConstructingKazakhstanasapetrostate:OilrentandNazarbayevismIntheearly2000s,Kazakhstanreshapedtherelationshipbetweenthepoliticalauthoritiesandtheeconomy,buildingastructuresimilartoPutin’s“powerverti-cal”inRussia.AsWojciechOstrowski’sresearch(2010)reveals,thesecurityoftheNazarbayevregime’scontrolovertheoilsectorisfoundedonmanagingandrotatingcadresaccordingtovariousconsiderations,theforemostofwhichisloyaltytoNazarbayev.Successfullysecuringcontrolovertherentfromthecoun-try’soilresources,NazarbayevgainedaccesstoenoughpoliticalandeconomicresourcestoimposeandmaintainaregimethatOstrowskidefinesas“quasi-corpo-ratist”(Ostrowski2010,139).OneofthemajorfeaturesofNazarbayev’sdomes-ticenergypoliticsintheearly2000swas“Kazakhization”oftheoilindustryanditssub-contractors:acompanyis“onlygrantedaccesstotheoilindustrybecauseitisatleastpartlyownedbytheregime’sclient,whoisalsoanethnicKazakh”(Ostrowski2009,36).Inaddition,Nazarbayev’sregimestaffedKazMunayGaswithethnicKazakhs,creatingbarriersforothernon-Kazakhspecialiststojoinit.ThispolicyelevatedthestatusofethnicKazakhoilmenand,asaresult,they“notonlyowetheirpatronNazarbayevthehighpositionstheyarehandedbutarealsoindebtedtohimfortheirspecial,privilegedpositionsinpost-SovietKazakhstanthatgobeyondmeasurablebenefits”(Ostrowski2009,36).Consequently,theKazakhizationoftheoilsectorallowedNazarbayevtobuildcomplex,modern,andmediatedpatron–clienttiesthatdeterminerelationshipsofloyaltyovereth-nicityorclanaffiliation.Onthediscursivelevel,however,oilisinstrumentalizedbyNazarbayev’sregimenotasasourceofthepoliticalpowerofethnicKazakhsbutasasourceofcollectiveprosperityofallpeopleofKazakhstan.Nazarbayev’sgovernmentencouragesamongthepopulationasenseofnationalprideinvaluingoilasanationalassetand,asaresult,therisingnationalconsciousnessofthepopulationistightlyboundtoKazakhstan’sresourcewealth.Inotherwords,thesovereigncontroloverthenationalnaturalresourcesand,specifically,oilbecameoneofthecornerstonesoftheself-determinationofthemulti-ethnicKazakhstanination.Itisimportanttohighlightonesignificantcontradictionhere.Whiletheofficialnation-buildingdiscoursesareconcentratedaroundtheideaoftheKazakhstaniasthesymbolicownersoftheirownhouse,thepeopleofKazakhstanwerenever104China–Kazakhstanenergyrelationsdesignatedastheholdersofnaturalresources.Allofficialtexts,startingwiththe1995Constitution(Article3,Section6),emphasizethatthestateownsnaturalresources.The2010LawonSubsoilandSubsoilUseexplicatesthisconstitutionalnormfurther,definingstateownershipofnaturalresourcesas“oneoftheconstitu-entbasicelementsofstatesovereigntyoftheRepublicofKazakhstan”(Chapter10,Article1).WhileNazarbayevcanbefairlycalledthemostsecularpresidentinthepost-Sovietspace,heturnstoreligion,rationalizingthestateownershipofnaturalresourcesenshrinedintheConstitutionandotherlawsofthecountry:Thesubsoil,water,flora,andfaunaremainedexclusivelyinthestateowner-ship.Noteveryonewhoparticipatedindraftingthe[1995]Constitutionsup-portedthisview.Theenthusiasticproponentsofprivatepropertyofferedtoallowthepossibilityofprivateownershipforeverything.Atthesametime,mostofthemembersoftheworkinggroupconsidereditunsubstantiatedtoallowprivateownershipforwhatwasnotcreatedbyhumanlabor.ThewealthofourlandwasgiventousbyGodandwaspreservedbyourancestors,thisiswhatexistedbeforeus,andwillexistafter,andthereforebelongsnotonlytousbutalsotoourfuturegenerations.(Nazarbayev2006,80,emphasisadded)Inthisdiscursiveframework,thestateispresentedasthesole,authentic,andonlylegitimateownerofnaturalresources.SincetheregimeandthestateinKazakhstanarepurposefullyconflated,Nazarbayev,actingasthe“guarantoroftheinviolabilityofKazakhstan’sspecialpathofdevelopment”(Suleev2009),takespersonalresponsibilityforgoverningthenaturalresourcesandredistribut-ingresourcerevenues.ThisdiscursiveconstructionisreinforcedfurtherbyreferencestotheabilityofNazarbayev’sregimetosatisfycitizens’socioeconomicneeds.Namely,Nazarbayevonmultipleoccasionspraisedhimselfforspendingtheoilmoneywiselyduringtheperiodofhighcommoditypricesbyredirectingsubstantialportionsofitintothemainsovereignwealthfund,theNationalFundoftheRepublicofKazakhstan(NFRK).In2006,NazarbayevwarnedhisnationthatifKazakhstanboostedthesocialwelfareandincomesofitscitizenswiththe“easyoilmoney,”itwillonly“gethockedup”tooilrevenue(Nazarbayev2006,139).Instead,heproposedtosavethismoney“forarainyday”(139)ortodirectitto“supportinganddevelopingtheprioritythingsforthecountry”(261).While“theprioritythings”remainhiddenintheblackboxofNazarbayev’sregime,the“rainyday”camewithabroad-basedeconomicslowdowntwice,in2008and2014.Inthe2014addresstothenation,NazarbayevpointedoutthatbecausehedidnotlettheKazakhstanipeople“spendtheoilmoneyontheirdailyneeds”5whenoilpriceswereontherisebut“savedandmultipliedit,”nowKazakhstanhasthereservesthatwillhelpitspeopleto“over-comegrimtimesandtostimulatethegrowthofthenationaleconomy.”AnotherdiscursiveconstructionthatlegitimizestheNazarbayevregime’snewstrategyofresourcenationalismanditsmodelofstatecapitalismisthenarra-tivethatproblematizestheprivatizationoftheearly1990s.Inthemid-2000s,China–Kazakhstanenergyrelations105Nazarbayev(2006,183)calledprivatization“themostcontroversialpageinthehistoryofKazakhstan.”Hefurtherdescribeditasbeingvitaltoeconomicprogressyetalsoachaoticanddisorderlyprocess,whichnourishedaclassofbusinesselitewithnothingbutcontemptfornationalinterests.Later,healsofre-quentlyemphasizedthestarkcontrastbetweentheKazakhstanoftheearly1990sandtheKazakhstanofthemid-2000s(e.g.,Nazarbayev2010c,2011a,2013).Inthisframework,reestablishingstatecontroloverthestrategicoilsectorbecomesanothernation-buildingexercise,whereasNazarbayev’sregimebecomestheonlypowerthatcanensurethefairnessandrightfulnessofthisprocess.ManydiscoursesproducedbyNazarbayev’sregimearematerializedintheliteralsenseinNur-Sultan,thefirstcapitalofindependentKazakhstan.6Asmanystudiespointout,Nur-Sultan’snewcityscapeispurposefullydesignedtostimulatefeelingsofnationalprideandtosupportaparticularconstructionofnationalidentity(e.g.,Anacker2004;Dave2007;Schatz2010;Koch2010).Thecitybecameafocalpointoftheomnipresentnationalistpropagandaandplaysanimportantroleinthenation-buildingprojectofNazarbayev’sregime.Itissym-bolicthatevenNur-Sultan’surbangeographyreflectstheintimaterelationshipbetweenoilandthestateinKazakhstan:inthebureaucraticdistrict(knownastheLeftBank)thegrandioseheadquartersofKazMunayGas(KMG)neighborstheAkOrdaPresidentialPalace,theSupremeCourt,andvariousstateministries.TheheadquartersofKMG(Figure5.1)isapartofNur-Sultan’sRoundSquare,a70.000-square-meterarchitecturalcomposition.ThebuildingthatholdsKMG’sheadquartersisamassiveconstructionservingasthemainentranceofRoundSquare.Thebuildingreflectsmultipleinspirationsinitsarchitecturalstructure.Withanarchwaylocatedbetweentwohightowersandslightlylowerrectangularbuildings,theKMG’sheadquartersisreminiscentofatriumphalarch.The18-sto-reybuildingisalmostentirelymadefromgolden-pinkglasswindowsseparatedbywhiteandgreyconcreteribsthatemphasizetheverticallinesonthefacadeimitatingGreekcolumns.Withitsmultiplereferencestoworldarchitecture,theKMG’sheadquartersreflectsboththetraditional(e.g.,triumphalarches)andthemodern(glassandconcrete).ToaccesstheRoundSquare,apedestrianwalksontheesplanadethatpassesunderthearchofKMG’sheadquarters.ThispathwayformsoneofthemainaxesofNur-Sultanbecauseitconnectsthebuildingwiththreeotherkeylandmarks:theKhanShatyrEntertainmentCenter,theBayterekTower,andtheAkOrdaPresidentialPalace(Figure5.2).ClimbingthestairstoentertheRoundSquarefromthenorth,apedestrianobservestheshapeoftheBayterekTowerlocatedoutsideit(seeFigures5.3and5.4).ThetowerisapopularobservatoryandasymbolofKazakhstan(e.g.,the10.000KazakhstanitengenotefeaturestheimageoftheBayterekTower).LiketheKMG’sheadquarters,theBayterekTowermergeslinearandcircularshapes.Itconstitutesthemainsteelbasethatslowlyopensinsee-throughmetalpointslikeflowerpetals.Amassivegoldenballislocatedatthecenterofthesesteelpetals.TheBaiterekTowerismeanttoembodyaKazakhfolktaleaboutamythicaltreeoflifeandamagicbirdofhappiness,and,inthissense,itlinksthenewKazakhstanimodernitytotheKazakhtraditions.Theobservationdeckis97metersabove106China–Kazakhstanenergyrelationsgroundlevel,correspondingtotheyear1997whenNur-Sultan(backthencalledAstana)officiallybecamethecapitalofKazakhstan.Insidethetopleveloftheobservatory,onecanfindagildedhandprintoftherighthandofNazarbayevmountedonanornatepedestal.Aplaqueinvitesthevisitorstoplacetheirhandintheimprintandmakeawish.VisitorsoftheBayterekTower’sobservatoryseetheAkOrdaPresidentialPalace,wheretheKMG’sheadquarters’pathwayalsoleads.TheAkOrdaPresidentialPalace(seeFigure5.5)istheofficialworkplaceofthepresidentofKazakhstanandhasbeenNazarbayev’sresidencesince2004.LiketheotherbuildingsIdescribedearlier,thePalaceisofmixedinspiration.Itsfacadehasasemi-circularporticosupportedbymassivepillarsthatwereinspiredbytheWhiteHouse,theofficialresidenceandworkplaceofthepresidentoftheUS.ThePalace’sgeneralstructureisrectangularandsupportsasky-blueandgolddome(nationalcolorsofKazakhstan)thatistoppedwithagoldspirewithagoldensphereatitsapex.ThePalaceremainsconnectedtotheothertwobuildings–theKMG’sheadquartersandtheBayterekTower–bythepedestrianesplanadethatleadsfromonebuildingtoanother.Finally,thesameesplanadealsoleadstotheKhanShatyr(RoyalMarquee)EntertainmentCenter.ClimbingthestairstothesouthtoexittheRoundSquarethroughtheKMG’sheadquarters’arch,onecanseetheshapeoftheKhanShatyrslowlyemerginginthespaceofthearch(seeFigures5.6and5.7).Designedin2006byBritishtechno-architectNormanFoster,theKhanShatyrisaneo-futuristbuild-ingandoneofthekeyarchitecturelandmarksofNur-Sultan.Itisametallicsee-throughleaningstructureshapedlikeapointedtentonanellipticalbase.Fromthebirds-eyeview,thebuildinglookslikethetraditionalKazakhdwelling,theyurt.TheKhanShatyrisoneoftheelitebuildingsinNur-SultanandisconsistentlyframedintheofficialdiscoursesasasymbolofthenewKazakhmodernityandprosperity(formoreontheKhanShatyr’sroleinthenation-andcity-buildingseeKoch2013).Overall,thefourlandmarksdescribedaboveconstituteanurbancomposi-tionthatpurposefullylinkssymbolsofthepersonifiedstatepower(theAkOrdaPresidentialPalace),theindependenceandnation-buildingnarratives(theBayterekTower),oilincomes(theheadquartersofKMG),andthenewKazakhmodernity(theentertainmentcenterKhanShatyr).Theyallplaywithshapesandmaterialstomixtheideaoftraditionsandinnovationsintoasingleauthoritativeideologicalmessageofpower.Overall,thewholecityisalarge-scalecommemorationofKazakhstan’soil-drivenmodernity.Accordingtoitscitizens,Nur-Sultanisnourishedbytheoilcompaniesthatgenerouslyandsupposedlyvoluntarilydonatefundsforvariousinfrastructureprojects(interview,Jan.2017,Nur-Sultan).EdwardSchatz(2005,126)alsohighlightsthispopularnarrative,addingthat“foreignstateswhoseextractiveindustriessoughtafootholdinthelucrativeKazakhstanimarketfoundthemselves‘donating’totheconstructionofthecapitalcity,inaclearbidforpreferentialallocationofcontracts.”Inthisframework,oilbecomesanultimateblessingforKazakhstanandasourceofnationalpride,whereasNazarbayevyetagainisportrayedastheonlyguarantorofthefairredistributionofoilincomesinthebestinterestsofthepeopleofKazakhstan.China–Kazakhstanenergyrelations107Figure5.1TheheadquartersofKMGinNur-Sultan.©PeterKorolev.Courtesyofthephotographer.Figure5.2MapofNur-Sultan.ThemainurbanaxisofNur-Sultan:theKhanShatyrEntertainmentCenter(1),theKMG’sheadquartersandtheRoundSquare(2),theBayterekTower(3),andtheAkOrdaPresidentialPalace(4).108China–KazakhstanenergyrelationsFigure5.3TheheadquartersofKMG,theviewontheBaiterekTowerfromtheRoundSquare(North).©PeterKorolev.Courtesyofthephotographer.Figure5.4TheBaiterekTowerandtheAkOrdaPresidentialPalace.©PeterKorolev.Courtesyofthephotographer.China–Kazakhstanenergyrelations109Figure5.5TheAkOrdaPresidentialPalace,theviewfromtheBaiterekTower.©PeterKorolev.Courtesyofthephotographer.Figure5.6TheheadquartersofKMG,theviewontheentertainmentcenterKhanShatyrfromtheRoundSquare(South).©PeterKorolev.Courtesyofthephotographer.110China–KazakhstanenergyrelationsFigure5.7TheentertainmentcenterKhanShatyr.©PeterKorolev.Courtesyofthephotographer.Petro-multiculturalismandinternationalismIntheearly1990s,Kazakhstan’sdeeppolitical,economic,andsocialcrisiswascoupledwiththeideologicalandideationalvacuumproducedbythecollapseoftheSovietideology.TheKazakhstanipeoplehadtoreinventnotonlytheirstate-hoodbutalsothemselves.Afterindependence,manyMuslimsinKazakhstanfeltgreatreverenceforthereligionoftheirforefathers(Jessa2006;Khalid2014;Yemelianova2014).However,Nazarbayev’sregimehasfailedtotranslateIslamintoasourceofpoliticallegitimacyandthushasstartedtoframeIslamasathreattonationalunityandpoliticalstability.Accordingtotheofficialnation-buildingdiscoursesofNazarbayev’sregime,themajorpoliticalprojectforKazakhstanistocreatetheKazakhstanination,perceivednotasanethniccategorybutasoneofcivilcollectivesolidarity(Isaacs2010;Laruelle2014;Omelicheva2015).Inthisframework,Islambecomesoneofmanysymbolsofthelocalculture,whereasNazarbayev’spetrostatewantsverystronglytoremainsecular.AsGalinaM.Yemelianova(2014,9–10)argues,Kazakhstan’spoliticalelitesremain“extraordinarilyignorantaboutIslaminanyform”and,asaresult,viewIslamasfanaticalandanti-progressive.Sincethemid-1990s,Nazarbayev’sregimehasimposedauthoritarianandrepressivesec-ularismfromthetopdown.Itisvigilantinitsdeterminationtokeep“Islamicfanaticism”and“Islamicextremism”fromtakingrootinthecountryandinitiatesChina–Kazakhstanenergyrelations111all-outcampaignsagainstanyMuslimpoliticalactivities.Publicmanifestationsofreligiositybecamesecuritized.7Accordingtotheofficialdiscourses,Kazakhstan’sinternalunityandopen-nesstoWesternmodernityaresupposedtostrengthenitsinternationalprestigeand,therefore,secureasteadyinflowofforeigninvestment.ThislogicallowsNazarbayev’sregimetoputsecularismattheserviceofprotectingitsinterestsintheenergysector,constructingtheconsolidationofIslamicsentimentnotonlyasathreattopoliticalstabilitybutalsoasanimminentthreattothecountry’soilincomes.Thesamediscoursesareenactedontheinternationallevel.AsBahvaDave(2007,136)putsit,Nazarbayev’sregimehas“skillfullylearnedtocul-tivateandexploit”animageof“aMuslim-dominatedoil-richstate,whichispoliticallystable,devoidofethnicorreligiousconflictorathreatof‘terror-ism,’understrongleadershipwithapro-Westernoutlook”toattractWesternandAsianinvestors.Atbothdomesticandinternationallevels,NazarbayevactivelypublicizestheideaofnationalunitybasedonKazakhstan’sdistinctivebrandofsecularmulti-culturalismthatispresentedastheutmostvalueandaprerequisiteforsustainableeconomicdevelopment.Nazarbayev’sTheWayofKazakhstan(2006,5)openswiththefollowingclaim:IfwetalkabouttheKazakhstanway,ofcourse,thiswayisnotlimitedonlytothechoiceofaneconomicmodel.Thisisalsoapoliticalmodel,whichincludesnotonlygeneralconstitutionalprovisionsbutalsothepoliticalregimeandinter-confessionalrelations.Thisistherichestarray,andinthisregard,Kazakhstanemergedasamodelstateinthemodernworld.Thisrealm[ofKazakhstan’sdevelopment]receivedahighinternationalanddomesticrecognition.ThepreservationoftheethnicandreligiousconsensusinsuchafragileregionoftheplanetforadecadeandahalflargelydeterminestheKazakhstanway.Alongthesameline,inhislatestbookaboutKazakhstan’shistory,TheEraofIndependence(2017,155),NazarbayevconcludesthatKazakhstan“foundtheoptimalgoldenmeanintherelationshipbetweenthestateandreligion,whichallowedthestateandreligiousdenominationstofruitfullyworktogethertostrengthenthenationalaccord.”Securitizingculturalandreligiousdifferences,Kazakhstan2050Strategyreleasedin2012defines“theclashofcivilizations”asoneofthetenkeychallengesforKazakhstaninthe21stcenturyandoutlinesthefollowingasaresponsetoit:Wemustlearntoliveintheco-existenceofculturesandreligions.Wemustbecommittedtoadialoguebetweenculturesandcivilizations.Onlyindialoguewithothernationsourcountrywillbeabletosucceedandgaininfluenceinthefuture.Inthe21stcentury,Kazakhstanmuststrengthenitspositionasa112China–KazakhstanenergyrelationsregionalleaderandbecomethebridgefordialogueandinteractionbetweenEastandWest.(Nazarbayev2012)ThesecularmulticulturalismdiscourseintersectsandoverlapswithNazarbayev’saspirationstomakeKazakhstanapartoftheinternationalcommunityasanequalandcontributingmember.Inthiscontext,bothKazakhstan’smulticulturalismandsecularismarecelebratednotinthenameofliberaltoleranceanduniversalhumanity,beyondcultural,national,andreligiousdifferences,butasasignofKazakhstan’sopennesstoglobalizationandreadinesstocooperatewithwhoeveriswillingtoinvestinitseconomy.Finally,thesecondpillarofNazarbayev’sconstructionofKazakhstanasamodernpetrostateisinternationalismthatbecomesthefoundationofapronounc-edlynon-confrontationalandmulti-vectorforeignpolicy.LocatingKazakhstan“attheheartofEurasia,”Nazarbayev(e.g.,2005,2006,2017)presentsitasanindispensableandnaturalallyofRussia,China,theEuropeanUnion,Turkey,Iran,India,Japan,SouthKorea,andsoon.Ineverypresidentialaddress,NazarbayevremindstheKazakhstanipeopleabouttheimportanceofinternationaleconomicintegration.Hewantsthemto“thinkglobally”(2011b)andbereadyto“takepartintheglobaldecision-making,”contributingto“theformationofanewarchitec-tureofinternationalrelations”(2010c).Atthesametime,Nazarbayev(2010b)highlightsthatKazakhstanneedstoacceptthelogicofglobalizationandlearntoactaccordingtoit:Theglobaleconomicsystemisawell-builtandwell-functioningmechanismthatoperatesaccordingtoitsownrules.Andwemustworkbytheserules.Wearenotexpectedattheworldmarkets,butweneedtomakeourselvesindemandthereandgainafoothold.Thisideaofinternationalismisfirmlytiedtothediscoursesofmulticulturalismandsecularism.FollowingNazarbayev’slogic,onlymulticulturalandsecularKazakhstanwillbeacceptedbytheinternationalcommunityandonlymulticul-turalandsecularKazakhstancanattractforeigninvestors.Insum,thesecularmulticulturalismandinternationalismdiscourseshavetwofunctions.First,onthedomesticlevel,theydevelopasdovetailingpartsofthedis-cursivesystemthatprotectsandlegitimizesNazarbayev’sruleinKazakhstanand,subsequently,hiscontrolovernationaloilresources.Secondly,thesediscoursesareatthecoreoftheself-representationofKazakhstanontheinternationallevel.TheyareapartofKazakhstan’sinternationalbranding.Nazarbayev’sdiscursiveconstructionofKazakhstanissupposednotonlytodistinguishitfromotherpet-rostatesbutalsotoopen-upforitasmanycooperationopportunitiesaspossible.OnewaytothinkaboutinterconnectionsbetweenKazakhstan’sstate-ledsecu-larmulticulturalismandpronouncedinternationalismononesideanditsenergypoliticsontheothersideistheconceptofpetro-Islam.Petro-IslamisdefinedbySyedManzarAbbasZaidi(2010,145)asaspecifictypeofIslam,thefirstandChina–Kazakhstanenergyrelations113foremostobjectiveofwhichis“toprotectoilwealth,or,moreappropriately,thetypeofsocialrelationsunderlyingthosetribalsocietiesthatpossessthelion’sshareofthiswealth.”NazihN.Ayubi(1996,233)notesthatinSaudiArabiaandmostofthesmallercountriesofthePersianGulf“domestically‘petro-Islam’emphasizesaninterpretationofreligionthatisexcessivelyritualisticinstyleandconservativeinsocio-economiccontent.”Consequently,inthecaseofthePersianGulfstates,aconservativetop-downversionofIslamservedasalegitimacystruc-tureforstatecontrolovertheoilsectorandredistributionofoilrevenues.WhilethereadingsofIslambyNazarbayev’sregimearetheexactopposite,thediscur-sivemechanismsthatlinkoilandreligionarethesame.AsRichardU.Moench(1988,188)sharplysummarizestheessenceofpetro-Islamasanideology,it“maybetheologicallyvague,butitissociologicallyclear.”Indeed,essential-izingandmythologizingreligionandpromotingtop-downrepressivesecularism,Nazarbayev’sregimeinstrumentalizesIslamasathreattoKazakhstan’soil-drivenprosperity.Nazarbayev’sregimeusesreligionpolicyandmulticultural-ismastoolsinconstructingKazakhstanasapetrostate,andthusitsapproachtoIslamandmulticulturalismcanbefunctionallydefinedaspetro-secularismorpetro-multiculturalism.“We”and“they”inKazakhstan’sdiscursivepoliticsofenergyNazarbayevrepeatedlyemphasizesthatRussiahasneverbeentheSovietUnionitself(2006,2010a,2017).EventhoughNazarbayevadmitsthatbeingapartoftheSovietUnion,Kazakhstanwasconstrainedbythedecisionpowerofthe“center,”heconstructsKazakhstanasanequalagentofSovietmodernityratherthanapowerlesscolonialsubjectofRussia(e.g.,2006).Inthisframework,the“center”isresponsibleforthefiascooftheSovietUnionand,asthesuccessoroftheSovietUnion,Russiarepresentsthefailuretoprovideaviablealternativetotheneolib-eraldevelopmentmodelandthefailuretoreformthesocialistsysteminthelate1980s.Importantly,suchframingoftheSovietpastallowsNazarbayevtodetachKazakhstanfromthecollapseofthehegemonicsocialistproject.HealsodoesnotincludeRussiainthecategoryofdevelopingcountries.LabelingKazakhstanasadevelopingcountryandexcludingRussiafromthisgroup,Nazarbayevdiffer-entiatesKazakhstan’sandRussia’sexperienceafterthedissolutionoftheSovietUnion.Asaresult,theSovietUnionis“we,”butRussiais“they.”Nazarbayev(2017,17)stressesthat,unlikemanyotherformermemberrepub-licsoftheSovietUnion,Kazakhstan“madetherightchoice”intheearly1990sandcontinuestofollow“therightpath”inthe2010s:Injustaquarterofacentury,aformerSovietrepublicthatintheUSSRwasunjustlyrankedamongthelaggardsturnedintoamoderncountrywithanationalstatehood,aneffectivemarketeconomy,ademocraticsocialsystem,andahighinternationalauthority.AllthisisacomplexanddynamicprocessofmodernizationofKazakhstan–breakingtheoldandobsolete,carryingoutboldreformsandinnovations,andcreatingthenewandmodern.114China–KazakhstanenergyrelationsInthissense,theprocessofdevelopmentturnsintoacompetition.NazarbayevconstructsKazakhstanasanexceptionalpost-Sovietstate,accentuatingthatinmanyrealmsKazakhstanbecame“theonly”or“thefirst”post-Sovietstate.HecontrastsKazakhstantootherpost-Sovietstatesthat,accordingtohim,failedtoembracemodernizationandglobalization.Unlikethem,Kazakhstanisopentotheworldandactivelylearnsfromdevelopedcountries.TherecurringexampleisthedecisiontoestablishNFRKin2000that,asstressedintheofficialenergydiscourses,wasinspiredbyNorwegianexperience(e.g.,Nazarbayev2017,218).WhileofficialdiscoursesemphasizetheadvantagesofcloserelationswithRussiaandotherformerSovietstates,theyconstructKazakhstanasapartofthebroaderinternationalcommunityratherthantheso-called“post-Sovietspace”(постсоветскоепространство,postsovetskoyeprostranstvo).Withintheinter-nationalstratificationsystem,Kazakhstanplacesitselfamongthedevelopingcoun-tries.Inthiscategory,however,KazakhstanissetoffagainstdevelopingcountriesofAfricaandLatinAmerica.Specifically,suchpetrostatesasNigeria,Venezuela,andArgentinaarepresentedasfailuresandoftenserveasexamplesforwhatKazakhstanshouldneverbecome.Incontrast,Singapore,Malaysia,SouthKorea,andChinaarecommonlypointedoutassuitablerolemodelsforKazakhstan(e.g.,Nazarbayev2006,2017;Suleev2009).Atthesametime,Nazarbayev’sregimedoesnotpresentKazakhstanasanAsiancountry.Instead,Nazarbayev(2006,2010a,2017)introducedanddevelopedhisvisionofEuarasianismthathehasbeenpropagatingconsistentlyoverthepasttwodecades.Nazarbayev(2010)locatesKazakhstanbothsymbolicallyandgeographically“attheheartofEurasia.”InNazarbayev’sconception,beingEurasianmeansbeingdifferentfrombothAsia(East)andEurope(West).Asiaisassociatedwithasetofnegativestereotypes,includingunderdevelopment,illiteracy,radicalism,fundamentalism,andviolence,whereasEuropedesignatesamodernandsuperioryetculturallyandsociallyforeignmodelofdevelopment.Besides,theEuropeanpastrepresentscolonialoppressionandimperialism.FollowingthelogicoftheEast–Westdichotomy,beingaEurasiancountry,KazakhstanismorecivilizedandmodernthanitsneighborsintheEastbutstillisnotanentirelyWesterncoun-tryandthusisentitledtoitsuniquepathofdevelopmentthatdeviatesconsider-ablyfromthehegemonicneoliberalmodel.ThelogicofNazarbayev’sEurasianismintersectswithKazakhstan’sbrandofpost-colonialismthatdistinguishesitfromtheformerThirdWorld.Officialpost-colonialdiscoursesfocusonfurtherdelinkingKazakhstanfromitsSovietpastandstrengtheningtheconstructionofKazakhstanasanindependentactorofinternationalrelationsvis-à-visRussia.Kazakhstanconsidersitselfonlysemi-colonizedanddoesnotidentifyitselfasavictimofimperialism(BeissingerandYoung,2002).DiscussingherconversationswithKazakhstaniacademicsintheearly1990s,BahvnaDave(2007,2)describestheirunderstandingofcolonialismas“quiteperfunctory”becausetheydidnotdisapproveofcolonialdominationpersebutexpressed“afeelingofdisappointmentbythefailureoftheSovietstatetofullydeliveritspromisedgoals.”DianaT.Kudaibergenova(2016)accentu-atessimilartrendsinKazakhstan’spost-colonialdiscourseinthe2000sandtheChina–Kazakhstanenergyrelations1152010s.ShepointsoutthatKazakhstan’spost-colonialdiscourseis“asfragileandinsecureasthelocalprocessofnation-building”(Kudaibergenova2016,924).ShehighlightsthatherrespondentsinKazakhstanwere“ambiguousinpointingfingerstotheactiveactorsofthepastcolonization”andavoided“radicalanti-colonialand,thus,anti-Russianmessages.”Colonialism,ingeneral,isassociatedwithhumiliationandshame,whileapost-colonialstatussignifiesitsinferiority.Avoidingassociationswiththisstatus,dominantdiscoursesseparateKazakhstanfromthevictimsofcolonialism,representedbyageneralizedandhomogenizedThirdWorld.Insum,Kazakhstan’s“we”stillbelongstotheSovietUnion,whereasthedevelopingcountriesare“they.”ConstructingitselfasapartoftheformerSecondWorld,KazakhstanalsodelinksitselffromthepoliticallegaciesoftheThirdWorld.Finally,KazakhstanispresentingitselfasacarrieroftheuniqueEurasianidentity.Thesecomplexandcontradictoryidentityconstructionstransformintoanevenmorecomplexandmorecontradictoryenergyidentity.Accordingtothedominantdiscourses,whileKazakhstanaspirestobecome“theKuwaitofCentralAsia”inthenearfuture,itisnotgoingtobeapetrostateforever.NazarbayevpromisesthatKazakhstanwillhaveitsowndistinctiveandoriginalpathofdevelopmentand,despiteallodds,willnotrepeattheexperienceofNigeria,Norway,Venezuela,SaudiArabia,andotherpetrostatesthatallowedthemselvesto“drowninpetrodollars”(Nazarbayev2006,110).Inthiscontext,Kazakhstan’sconstructionofRussiaasan“other”isparticularlyrevealing.SomeKazakhstanischolarscompareRussiaandKazakhstanascountriesthatfacesimilareconomicchallengesrelatedtothedependenceonresourcerents(e.g.,Yelyubayev2016).Others,onthecontrary,avoidsuchparallelsanddistinguishKazakhstanfromRussia,usingthemetaphoroftheraw-materialappendagetodescribeRussia’sdevelopmentafterthecollapseoftheSovietUnion(e.g.Bisenbayev2011).ThediscursiveconstructionofRussiaasaraw-materialappendageisparticularlyinteresting.Forexample,MuratAbdirovoftheGumilyovEurasianNationalUniversity(2017,704–705)arguesthatinthe2000sRussia“turnedintoaraw-materialappendageofthedevelopedcountries,suchasEurope,andChina”andthusitwilleventuallyloseboth“itsvastterritoryandsplendidnaturalresources.”Abdirovpredictsthatby2030“notonlyChinabutalsotheinternationalcommunity”willtrytogaincontroloverRussia’s“immenseandunpopulatedlandsfullofnaturalresources”(706).Particularly,accordingtohim,RussianauthoritiesrisklosingSiberiaandtheFarEast:thesetworegionswillturninto“SiberianAfrica”whereChinaextractsresourcestosupportitsaspi-rationsforglobalhegemony(622).InthepicturesovividlypresentedbyAbdilov,Russia’soverrelianceonenergyresourcesnotonlysubscribesittoalowstatusintheinternationalpowerhierarchybutalsojeopardizesitssovereigntyandter-ritorialintegrity.Hewarnsthat,ifKazakhstanfollowsRussia’ssteps,ittoocan“unwittinglybecomeChina’sresourcecolony”(754).Inessence,Kazakhstan’sdominantenergydiscoursespurposefullyandcon-sistentlyconstructotherpetrostatesas“they.”Sincethe1990s,KazakhstanhasnotfoundaplaceforitselfinthedevelopedFirstWorldorthedevelopingThird116China–KazakhstanenergyrelationsWorld.Stayinginbetweenthetwoworldsasapetrostate,Kazakhstanisexposedtogeopoliticalthreatsandrisks.Hence,thekeygoalforKazakhstanbecomestransitioningintothecategoryofadevelopedcountryandagradualabandonmentofitsdependenceonresourceincomes.Kazakhstan’senergyparadigm:Nazarbayev’spetrostateThedominantenergydiscoursesidentifyoilwealthasthefoundationofKazakhstan’sindependenceandprosperityafterthecollapseoftheSovietUnion.Atthesametime,however,officialdiscoursesconstructKazakhstanintheoppo-sitiontootherpetrostates.ItiswidelyrecognizedinKazakhstanthatthedepend-enceonresourceexportsconstrainsKazakhstan’seconomicdevelopmentandinevitablyconsignsittoalowplaceintheinternationalhierarchy.AtthecenterofKazakhstan’senergyparadigmisthereadingofitsoil-driveneconomicpros-perityasatemporaryphaseinnationaldevelopment.InthediscursiveframeworkdevelopedbyNazarbayev’sregime,Kazakhstanisapetrostatebydestinybutwillbecomeamoderninnovation-driveneconomybychoice.AnotherimportantpartofKazakhstan’senergyparadigmisthesecuritizationofoilasagloballysought-aftercommodity.Kazakhstan’sofficialdiscoursescon-structitsoilwealthasatastymorselfortheavidgreatpowers.Followingthislogic,oilbecomesasourceofvariousthreatstoKazakhstan’sindependenceandsovereignty.Kazakhstan’sdiscursivepoliticsofoilisintimatelyconnectedtothediscoursesthatlegitimizeandsupporttheNazarbayevregime,andhenceNazarbayevismplaysaninstrumentalroleinKazakhstan’sconstructionofoil.Nazarbayevisportrayedasthesingleguarantorofthefairredistributionofoilincomesinthebestinter-estsoftheKazakhstanipeople.Nazarbayev’sregimealsopromisestoensurethatKazakhstanwillsmoothlytransitiontothepost-oilfuture.DefiningKazakhstaninrelationtooil,Nazarbayev’sregimeproducesandreproducestwobroaddiscursiveconstructions:internationalismandpetro-multiculturalism.Nazarbayev’sregimeusesreligionpolicyandmulticulturalismastoolsinconstructingKazakhstanasanexceptionalpetrostate.Accordingtotheofficialdiscourses,Kazakhstan’sinternalunityandopennesstoWesternmodernitystrengthenitsinternationalprestigeand,therefore,secureasteadyinflowofforeigninvestment.Insum,oilisconstructedinKazakhstanasasourceofdevelopmentandasourceofmultiplevulnerabilities,whereasNazarbayev’sregimerepresentsitselfastheonlypowerthatcanturnoilintoablessingforKazakhstan.Inthissense,Kazakhstan’senergyparadigmissubordinatedtothediscursivepoliticsthatsus-tainsandlegitimizesNazarbayev’sauthoritarianrule.China–KazakhstanenergydialogueChina’sNOCsinKazakhstan:Therealityvs.perceptionsChina’sNOCsfirstpurchasedequityoilstakesinKazakhstaninthelate1990s,yetuntilthemid-2000sChinawasnotavisibleactorintheoilsector.In2005,China–Kazakhstanenergyrelations117China–KazakhstanenergyrelationsmadenewswhenCNPCannouncedthatithadstruckanagreementtobuyPetroKazakhstan,aCanada-basedcompany,forUS$4.2billion.ThenewsaboutthisdealcamethreeweeksafterCNOOChadtodropitsbidforUnocalamidoppositionfromUSpoliticians.Kazakhstanianalysts(interview,February2017,Nur-Sultan)arguethatCanadianinvestors“slammedthedoor”inthemid-2000sbecausetheydidnotwant“toshare”byinvestingininfrastructureandsocialprojectsinKazakhstan.China’sNOCs,onthecontrary,tooka“morecooperativestance”andthuswerewarmlywelcomedbyNazarbayev’sregime.Laterthesameyear,CNOOCsignedamemorandumofunderstandingwithKMGtojointlyexploretheDarkhanfieldontheshelfoftheCaspianSeathathasbeenestimatedtoholdabout11billionbarrelsofoil.InFebruary2006,KazakhstanimediareportedthatCanada’sNationsEnergyCompanywasinterestedinsellingtoChina’sCITICGroup96.4percentofsharesinKarazhanbasMunai,whichheld20-yearexploitationrightsfortheoilfieldsnorthofAktauinMangystauregion.8RepresentativesofNationsEnergyCompanyatfirstdeniedthattheywerenegotiatingwithChineseinvestors;how-ever,inNovember2006,thecompanyannouncedthatitreachedanagreementwithCITICGrouptosellitsshareinKarazhanbasMunaiforUS$1.91billion.Afterthedealwasannounced,allkeyKazakhstanipressagencies,newspa-pers,andnewswebsitesreprintedquotationsfromthestatementsmadebyValeryKotovich,VictorEgorov,andAlikhanBaimenov,membersoftheMazhilis(thelowerhouseoftheparliament),whoexpressedconcernswith“Chineseexpan-sion”(e.g.,KazakhstanToday2006).KotovichdescribedtheactionsofChina’sNOCsas“persistentandevenstraightforward.”Accordingtohim,theacquisitionofKarazhanbasMunaiwouldhaveallowedChinatocontrolmorethan40per-centofKazakhstan’soilproduction.YegorovandBaimenovwarnedthatChina’sassertiveexpansionmightthreatenthenationalinterestsofKazakhstan.Theanxi-etyvoicedbythethreeMazhilismembersprovokedaheatedpublicdiscussionaboutthenatureandconsequencesofChina’sgrowingpresenceinKazakhstan’senergysector.VariouscommentatorssharedthebeliefthatKazakhstanwasa“tastymorsel”forenergy-hungryChinaandagreedthatNazarbayev’sregimeneededtobemorecautiousinrelationswithit(e.g.,Adilov2006;Amrekulov2006;Morzabayeva2006).Twoyearslater,Kotovichexplainedthathe“readontheInternetaboutChina’sexpansioninKazakhstan”and“becamealerted”bythisinformation(Zakon.kz2008).Inretrospect,hecallsthepublicstatementsthathemadeinNovember2006“acertainmessagetothegovernmentsothatitponderedanddevelopedanapproachtominimizethreatsforthenationalsecurity.”KonstantinSyroezhkin(2010,287–288)andsomeotherKazakhstaniChinaexperts(interview,February2017,Almaty),however,speculatethatconcernsofKotovichandhiscolleaguesarelinkedtotheinterestsofunspecifiedWesternandRussianenergycompanies.WhatevermotivatedmembersoftheMazhilistocriticizeChina’sNOCs,theircon-cernsresonatedwiththepublic.Thegovernmenttooktheir“message”andpublicdebatesprovokedbyitseriously.Afterareview,itapprovedthedealwiththecon-ditionthatCITICGroupwillresell50percentofitssharesinKarazhanbasMunai118China–KazakhstanenergyrelationstoKMG.InOctober2007,theparliamentapprovedtheamendmentstothe1996LawofSubsoilandSubsoilUsethatenabledthegovernmenttoalterorcancelcon-tractswithforeigncompaniesiftheiractionsposeathreattothenationalsecuritybysubstantialimpairmentoftheeconomicinterests(Law2-IV,24October2007).Whilethislegislativechangecontinuedtheprocessofinstitutionaliza-tionofresourcenationalisminitiatedafterthedisputeoverTengizin2002,9Kazakhstan’sauthoritiespresenteditasadirectresponsetothepublicconcernsaboutChina’snewestacquisitions.OfficialdiscourseemphasizedthatKazakhstanneedsChinesemoneyasmuchasChinaneedsKazakhstanioilandthustoughen-ingcontrolovertheIOCsoperatinginKazakhstanwouldnotscareoffChineseinvestors(Nazarbayev2006,2017).Importantly,Nazarbayev’sregimewasabletodiscursivelyreinforceitspositionastheonlyguarantorofKazakhstan’ssover-eigntyovernaturalresources.DespitedeterioratingphobiasandprejudicesagainstChinaandtheChineseinKazakhstan,China’sNOCscontinuedtheirexpansioninKazakhstan’senergysector.Duringtheoilpricesurgeattheendofthe2000s,Nazarbayev’sregimewelcomedChineseinvestmentandeffectivelyusedChinesemoneytorenation-alizetheoilsector.ThecaseinpointisthetakeoverofMangistauMunaiGasbyKMGandCNPCin2009.CentralAsiaPetroleumLtdofIndonesiahadcontrolledMangistauMunaiGassince1997andby2007itsstakeinthecompanyhadrisento99percent.Varioussources,however,connectMangistauMunaiGastoamemberofNazarbayev’sfamily,RakharAliyev.Whilebeingmarriedtothepresident’solderdaughterDarigaNazarbayeva,AliyevmadeasuccessfulcareerinKazakhstan’sNationalSecurityCommitteeandinvestedinvariousassets,includingtheoilsector(Peyrouse2012).In2007,AliyevfellfromgraceafterhedivorcedNazarbayev’sdaughter.ExpertsconnectthedecisionofCentralAsiaPetroleumLtdtosellitsstakeinMangistauMunaiGastoAliyev’sdownfall(SilkRoadIntelligencer2007;interview,February2017,Nur-Sultan).Nazarbayev’sregimewasdeterminedtoregaincontroloverMangistauMunaiGas,but,becauseoftheongoingeconomicdownfall,KMGdidnothaveenoughmoneytoclosethedealwithCentralAsiaPetroleumLtd.In2009,NazarbayevvisitedChinaandafterameetingwithHuJintaosecuredforKazakhstanagenerousUS$10billionloan.Whilethemediaoftendescribethedealasa“loan-for-oil,”thetwolinesofcreditextendedtoKazakhstanwerenotbackedbyasupplycontract.China’sExport-ImportBankofChina(EximBank)lentthestate-ownedDevelopmentBankofKazakhstanUS$5billion,whereasCNPCextendedaUS$5billionloantoitsKazakhstanipeerKMG.ThetwoNOCsalsosignedaseparatedealagreeingforjointpurchaseofthemajoritystakeinMangistauMunaiGas.TheMangistauMunaiGastakeoverwasfinalizedattheendof2009whenCentralAsiaPetroleumLtddivideditsassetsbetweenKMG(51percent)andCNPC(49percent)forUS$2.6billion,lessthantheUS$3.3billionoriginallyannouncedin2007.Since2010,controversialreportsthatChinawillsooncontrolmostofKazakhstan’soilsectorappearregularlyinthenationalmedia.AsacaseinChina–Kazakhstanenergyrelations119point,inAugust2013,thekeyKazakhstaninewswebsitesreportedthat“China’sshareinKazakhstanioilisgreaterthanthatofKazakhstanitselfandgreaterthanthatofanyoneelseinthecountry,”citingan“analystwishingtoremainanon-ymous”(e.g.,TengriNews.kz2013;Forbes.kz2013).Eventhoughsuchinfor-mationwasusuallyfollowedbyrefutationsandquestionsaboutitscredibility,manyofKazakhstan’sChinaexpertsperpetuateitasafact,arguingthatafterthe2009MangistauMunaiGastakeoverChina’sNOCscontrolaround40percentofKazakhstanioil(e.g.,Syroezhkin2010,292;Sadovskaya2015,22).Onthecontrary,China’sNOCsdidnothaveassetsinKazakhstan’soff-shoreprojectsthatproduce“bigoil”foralongtime.Onlyin2013,CNPCwasabletobuyashareintheKashganoilfieldintheCaspianSeawaters.10ThisacquisitioncostCNPCUS$8billion:US$5billionforConocoPhillips’8.33percentshareintheNorthCaspianOperatingCompanyandUS$3bil-liontofinancethesecondphaseoftheKashganoilproject.Asinthecaseofthe2009MangistauMunaiGastakeover,thetwogovernmentswereinvolvedinsettlingthedeal.CNPCandtheNorthCaspianOperatingCompanysignedthefinalagreementafterXiJinpingvisitedKazakhstaninSeptember2013.InXi’swords(2013a),Nazarbayevandheboth“hailedandsupported”CNPCpartici-patingintheKashaganproject.Inparallelwiththepracticeofobtainingequityoilstakes,ChinawasalsoactivelyinvestinginthedevelopmentofunfracturedpipelineinKazakhstan.Theconstructionofthe2,798-kilometer-longKazakhstan–ChinaoilpipelinewasfinancedbyKMGandCNPCandisoperatedasajointventure.TheAtasu-Alashankousectionofthepipeline(987kilometers)wascompletedinjusttenmonthsandinJuly2006thepipelinebegantopumpoilfromthefieldslocatednearAtasuinnorthernKazakhstantotheDushanzirefinerylocatedinXinjiang.Thecurrentcapacityofthepipelineis14milliontonsofcrudeoilperyear,whereasitsnominalcapacityis20milliontons(KCPLLP2018).TheKazakhstan–ChinapipelineisnotoverlysignificantinaddressingChina’srapidlygrowingenergyneeds(EIA2017).Likewise,eventhoughthepipelineoffersKazakhstanadirectconnectiontotherapidlygrowingChinesemarket,theamountofcrudeoilthatcomestoChinathroughthepipelineissmallincomparisontothatshippedtoRussia(EIA2017).However,becauseitisChina’sfirsttransnationalpipelineandKazakhstan’sfirstpost-Soviettrans-nationalpipelineand,importantly,Kazakhstan’sfirstpipelinethatbypassesRussia,manyexpertsconsideritsconstructionanimportantsignofgeopoliticalchanges(e.g.Huoetal.2013;Yang,C.2014;Zhao2014;YueandYang2016).Inthisframework,theKazakhstan–ChinapipelinebecomesasymbolofthenewerainwhichRussia’sdominationinCentralAsiaisdeclining,whereasChina’sinfluenceisrising.WhileChina’sachievementsinKazakhstanareindeedimpressive,China’sNOCsstilldonotparticipateinthedevelopmentoftheTengizandKarachaganakfieldswherearound55percentofKazakhstan’soilisproduced(seeTable5.1).Byinvestinginsmallerprojects,Chinaobtainedaccesstoatotalofaround24per-centoftheoilproducedinKazakhstan.However,China’sNOCsdonotshiptheir120China–KazakhstanenergyrelationsTable5.1Kazakhstan’sLargestOilProducingCompanies(WithMoreThan1,000Employees,April2017)NameoftheCompanyRegionOwnershipOzenmunaygazMangystauRegionKMG(Kazakhstan),100%MangistauMunaiGasMangystauRegionKMG(Kazakhstan),51%CNPC(China),49%KarazhanbasMunaiMangystauRegionKMG(Kazakhstan),50%CNPC(China),50%PetroKazakhstanKumkolKyzylordaRegionKMG(Kazakhstan),33%ResourcesCNPC(China),67%KarachaganakPetroleumWestKazakhstanRoyalDutchShell(UK,OperatingB.V.KazakhstanRegionNetherlands),29.25%Eni(Italy),29.25%Chevron(США),18%Lukoil(Russia),13.5%KMG(Kazakhstan),10%NostrumOilandGas(formerWestKazakhstanTheNetherlands,100%Zhaikmunai)RegionTengizchevroilAtyrauRegionChevron(США),50%KMG(Kazakhstan),20%ExxonMobi(USA),25%LukArco(Russia,France),5%NorthCaspianOperatingAtyrauRegionKMG(Kazakhstan),16.8%CompanyN.V.(NCOC)Eni(Italy),16.8%Total(France),16.8%ExxonMobil(USA),16.8%RoyalDutchShell(UK,Netherlands),16.8%CNPC(China),8.3%INPEX(Japan)7.5%EmbaMunaiGasAtyrauRegionKMG(Kazakhstan),100%CNPCAktobeMunaiGasAktobeRegionCNPC(China),94.5%KMG(Kazakhstan),5.5%equityoilbackhomeviathenewlybuiltpipeline,asmanyobserverspredicted.Between2005and2017,Kazakhstan’soilexportstoChinahavenotexceeded6percentofitstotaloilexports(MinistryofNationalEconomyoftheRK2017).Accordingtothecustoms,Kazakhstanexportsitscrudeoilto35countries.ThekeyconsumersofKazakhstan’soilareintheWest.TheEUmembersreceivemorethan75percentofKazakhstan’soil,withmostoftheexportsgoingtoItaly(32percent),Netherlands(15percent),Switzerland(11percent),andFrance(11percent).SinophobiaandoilSinophobiaisbecominganincreasinglyprominentphenomenoninCentralAsia,andChinaisperceivedasyetanothergreatpowerthatthreatensthepoliticalandChina–Kazakhstanenergyrelations121economicsovereigntyofCentralAsianstates.WhileCentralAsianstates’politi-calleadersallpraiseChinainunisonforitsreliableandtrustworthypartnership,CentralAsiansocietiesaredividedoverChina’srise(Peyrouse2016;LaruelleandPeyrouse2012).Kazakhstanisnotanexception.KazakhstaniexpertsseeChinaasanecessarycounterweighttobothRussiaandtheUSnotonlyforKazakhstanbutforthewholeCentralAsia(e.g.,BasenovandKhafizova2007;AbdrakhmanovandKaukenov2007;Tokayev2008;Syroezhkin2010;Bisenbayev2011).ManyofthembelievethatculturalandeducationalexchangesbetweenChinaandKazakhstanimprovethewaythatyoungpeopleseeChinesedevelopment.Forexample,thedirectoroftheChineseStudiesCenterinAlmatyAdilKaukenov(interview,11February2017,Almaty)maintainsthatuniversitystudentsalreadyseeChinaasanopportunityratherthanathreat.AnotherprominentKazakhstaniChinascholar,RuslanIzimov,arguesthatinthe2010sChinastartedtoinvestmoreinits“softpower”andithadapositiveeffectontheimageofChinainKazakhstan(Omarov2017).Despitethat,theexpertsagreethatSinophobiaisaproblem.AsKaukenov(interview,11February2017,Almaty)emphasizes,Sinophobia“comesinwaves”andits“outbreaks”parallelwiththeemergenceofsocialdiscontentwitheconomicdevelopmentandthegov-ernment’sdecisions.Inthesecases,ChinaandtheChinesebecomeascapegoat.InregardtoChina–Kazakhstanenergyrelations,the2010and2011laborprotestsintheoil-richMangistauregionprovideavividexamplethatevengossipcantrig-gerSinophobicsentiments.In2010,inthecityofZhanaozen6,000employeesofOzenMunaiGas,ownedbyKMG,wentonstriketodemandunpaiddangermoney,higherwages,andbetterworkingconditions.Aftertwoweeksofnegotiations,theoilwork-ersendedthestrikeasthecompanyagreedtosatisfyalmostalltheirdemands.InMay2011,asimilarlaborconflictbetweenthemanagementandemployeesofKarazhanbasMunailedtoamassstrike.ActivistscalledforageneralstrikeacrosstheMangistauregionandsoonprotestsbrokeoutinKurykandAktau(Salmon2011).Thethreecompaniesinvolvedinthedisputeswithoilworkers–KarazhanbasMunai,ErsaiCaspianContractor,andOzenMunaiGas–refusedtonegotiatewithindependentlaborunionsandeventuallydismissedtheemployeeswhoactivelyparticipatedinthestrikes.Localauthoritiestookthesideofoilcom-paniesintheconflict,whichonlyaggravatedthetension,turningthelabordisputeintoagrandbattlebetweentheworkforceononesideandtheoilcompaniesandauthoritiesontheother.Themovementalsoacquiredapoliticaldimension,whenmanystrikersinZhanaozencollectivelyresignedfromKazakhstan’srulingpoliti-calpartyNurOtan.On16December2011,thedaywhenKazakhstancelebratedits20yearsofindependence,oilworkerslaidoffbyOzenMunaiGasdisruptedfestivitiesinZhanaozen.Protestsofoilworkersquicklytransformedintomassriots.Riotersburneddownseveraladministrativebuildings,includingthemayor’sofficeandtheofficesofOzenMunaiGaz,aswellasprivatehousesofthecompany’stop-managers.Policerespondedbyshootingattherioters,killing14andinjuringover90ofthem(GeneralProsecutor’sOfficeofRK2012;seealsoSalmon2012).122China–KazakhstanenergyrelationsThedayfollowingtheclashbetweenpoliceandprotestors,NazarbayevdeliveredaspeechatameetingoftheSecurityCouncil,identifyingtheeventsas“criminalactionsofagroupofindividuals”that“resultedinmassdisorders”(Akorda2011).Heemphasizedthat“labordisputesofoil-workersshouldnotbeassociatedwiththedeedsofhooliganswhowantedtousethesituationfortheircriminalintentions”andambiguouslywarnedthe“masterminds”oftheriotsthattheauthoritieswouldsoonidentifythem.Whileofficialdiscoursesattrib-utedtheviolencetotheactionsofunspecifiedevilOthers,blogosphere,socialmedia,andoppositionnewswebsitesproducedinformationandopinionscriti-calofNazarbayev’sregime,creatingseveralcontradictoryversionsoftheeventsinZhanaozen.AlongwithIslamicfundamentalists,theOralmans,11theWest,andtheRussians,commentatorsalsoblamedChineseNOCsfortheoilworkers’strikesandriots.ChineseinvestorsonlyparticipatedinthenegotiationswithoilworkersofKarazhanbasMunaiinAktau,whereasOzenMunaiGasiswhollyownedbyKMGandErsaiCaspianContractorisaKazakhstani–Italianventure.Nevertheless,somecommentatorsspeculatedthatitwastheunfairlaborpoliciesandpracticesintroducedbyChina’sNOCsthatcontributedtosocialdiscontentandpushedKazakhstanioilworkerstogoonstrike(e.g.,Kurmanov2011;Rumer2011;Torguzbayev2013).EventhesourcesthatdidnotfocusontheroleofChineseinvestorsintheconflictemphasizedthatitwasaChinesemanagerwhofiledasuitonbehalfofKarazhanbasMunaiagainstthelawyerofthestrikingoilworkersNataliaSokolova12(e.g.,Torguzbayev2011).TheoilworkersstrikesandtheZhanaozentragedyunderminedNazarbayev’slong-standingeffortstopresentKazakhstanasademocraticandpoliticallystablestate,damagingitsinternationalimage.Onthelevelofdomesticdiscursivepoli-tics,theseeventscauseda“discursivedislocation”(Torfing1999,301)becauseofficialconstructionsthatportrayNazarbayev’sregimeasasourceofeconomicprosperityandsecuritywerenotabletodomesticateandexplaintheeventsinZhanaozen(foradetailedanalysisseeLewis2016).Inthissense,itisquiteindic-ativethatnotonlyNazarbayev’sregimebutalsoitscriticsattributedtheescala-tionoftheconflicttotheactionsofambiguousevilOthers.Thediscursivepoliticsaroundtheoilworkers’strikesandtheZhanaozentragedyalsorevealshoweasilyKazakhstanilatentSinophobiaturnsChinaintooneoftheOthers.China’sKazakhstanpolicyinthemid-2000sandChina’sconstructionofKazakhstanInanattempttobuildafoundationformutualdiscoveryandcreatenewsocio-economicandpoliticallinks,sincethemid-1990sChinahaspromoteditselfinCentralAsiaunderthebrandoftheShanghaiCooperationOrganization(SCO).AccordingtoChina’sofficials,anessentialandnovelattributeoftheSCOisthe“Shanghaispirit”(上海精神,Shanghaijingshen),asetofsharedvalues,suchaspeace,cooperation,openness,andstrivingtowardharmony(e.g.,Yang,J.2008;Xi2013b).ChinaalsoemphasizesitsstatusastheSCOfounder,aswellasitsChina–Kazakhstanenergyrelations123majorinspirerandideologist,andoffersCentralAsiaapartnershipbasedonfor-eignpolicypluralism,cosmopolitism,mutualbenefits,commondevelopmentalgoals,andequality.Energyresourcesarelistedasoneofmanypossibleareasfor“pragmaticcooperation,”alongwithsocioculturalexchangesandajointstruggleagainstthe“threeevilsforces”(三股势力,sangushili)thataredrug-trafficking,transnationalcrimes,andcybercrimes(Xi2014,2015).Insum,Chinapromotesitselfasasenior,yetstillanequalpartner,inCentralAsiaandstressesthatitwilloffer“nostringsattached”relations.Inthemid-2000s,China’srepresentativesframedChina’sbilateralrelation-shipwithKazakhstanandthefourotherCentralAsianstatesasalogicalexten-sionofmultilateraldialoguewiththeSCO.13However,despitetheloftyrhetoricandChina’srepeatedattemptstoimprovetheSCO’scompetency,theorgani-zationfailedtobecomeaneffectiveplatformformultilateralcooperationandisoftenaccusedof“talkingtoomuchanddoingtoolittle”(e.g.Lukin2007;Germanovich2008;Kaukenov2013).Inotherwords,theSCObecameagatewayforChinatoCentralAsiabutwaslargelyineffectiveininstitutionalizingpoliticalandeconomictiesbetweenChinaandtheCentralAsianstates.Importantly,ChinaapproachedCentralAsiaasasinglecountry.Forexample,China’srepresentativesoftenhighlightthat“CentralAsiaisrichwithhydrocarbonresources,”whereasonlyKazakhstanandTurkmenistancouldbeconsideredoil-andgas-rich.14AsimilartrendisevidentintheacademicliteratureonChina’srelationswithCentralAsianstates,whereallfivestatesareportrayedashavingidenticalpopulations,cultures,developmentpotential,challenges,andsociopoliticalsystems(e.g.WeiandLiu2006;Wang2008;YueandYang2016).SomeChinesescholarsendupwithadiscussionof“China’soilcooperationwithCentralAsia”thatis“mainlyconcentratedinKazakhstan”(Yang,C.2014,89).Kazakhstanbecomes“thetreasure-houseofCentralAsia”(Huoetal.2013,15),and,asaresult,itispresentednotasanindependentandsovereignentitybutasapartoftheregion.Inthisframework,Kazakhstan’senergycooperationwithChinahasbecomeapartofChina’srelationswithCentralAsia.China–KazakhstanenergyrelationsandChina’snewdiplomacyInthemid-2010s,XiJinpingdesignatedCentralAsiaasChina’s“inlandgateway”toEuropeandtheMiddleEastintheframeworkoftheBeltandRoadInitiative(BRI).TheconceptoftheSilkRoadEconomicBeltwasfirstofficiallyannouncedinSeptember2013,atNazarbayevUniversity,duringXiJinping’sofficialstatevisittoKazakhstan(Xi2013a).ThefactthatthisinitiativewasfirstofficiallypresentedinKazakhstanunderlinesCentralAsia’ssignificantsymbolicstatusforthedevelopmentofBRI.ItalsosignalsthatChinaoffersKazakhstanoneofthecentralrolesinbuildingthenewSilkRoad,respondingtoNazarbayev’sambi-tionsforregionalleadership.IntroducingtheSilkRoadEconomicBelt,XiJinping(2013a)remarksthathe“couldalmosthearthecamelbellsechoinginthemountainsandseethewispof124China–Kazakhstanenergyrelationssmokerisingfromthedesert”andthattheseimages“havebrought[him]closer”toCentralAsia.Eventually,camelsbecameoneofthemajorsymbolsoftheBeltandRoadproject.CamelstraversingthedesertincaravansregularlyappearnotonlyonofficialwebsitesandnewspaperarticlesbutalsointhespeechesofChina’sofficials.Forexample,LiZhaoxing(2015)arguedthatcamels“haveepitomizedthetradeandculturalexchangesacrosstheEurasiacontinentandbeyondintothevastoceans.”China’sofficialsalsofrequentlyrefertothelegacyofZhangQian,aChineseexploreroftheHanDynastywhoiscreditedwith“discovering”CentralAsia(e.g.,Xi2013a,2016a,2017a,2017b).MythologizingandromanticizingthehistoryoftheancientSilkRoad(SidawayandWoon2017),China’sofficialdiscourseslinkBRItothepastthatCentralAsiashareswithChina.Indoingso,theypresentBRInotasanoveltybutasanopportunitytorevitalizethehistoricaleconomic,social,andculturalnetworksthatconnectedChinaandCentralAsiaforcenturies.Underthisframework,theChineseandCentralAsian“communityofdestiny”(命运共同体,mingyungongtongti)becomestimelessandtimely,whilethenarrativeofthemutuallybeneficialrelationshipbetweenChinaanditsimme-diateneighborsmovestothecenterofdiscursivepoliticsofBRI.DefiningCentralAsiainthecontextofBRI,China’srepresentativesoftenusesuchwordsas“bridge,”“crossroad,”“corridor,”“hub,”and“strategiclocation.”Underthebrandofthe“belt,”ChinaoffersKazakhstanandotherCentralAsianstatesan“all-of-the-above”cooperationstrategy.AsaPeople’sDailyeditorialsum-marizesit,theSilkRoadEconomicBeltisastrategythatwillimprovequalitativelythedevelopmentofChina’srelationshipwithCentralAsianstates:“Bystrengthen-ingpolicycommunication,roadconnectivity,tradelinks,currencycirculation,andconnectionsamongtheirpeoples,thecountriesinvolvedcantightentheireconomiclinks,deepencooperationamongthem,andexpandthespacefordevelopment”(ZhongSheng,2014).Importantly,ChinapromisestorespectCentralAsianstates’politicalindependenceand,specifically,topreservethestatusquovis-à-visRussia:Chinaiscommittedtothepathofpeacefuldevelopmentandtheindepend-entforeignpolicyofpeace.Werespectthedevelopmentpathsanddomesticandforeignpolicieschosenindependentlybythepeopleofeverycountry.WewillinnocircumstancesinterfereintheinternalaffairsofCentralAsiancountries.Wedonotseektodominateregionalaffairsorestablishanysphereofinfluence.WestandreadytoenhancecommunicationandcoordinationwithRussiaandallCentralAsiancountriestostrivetobuildaregionofharmony.(Xi2013a;seealsoXi2016b,2017a,2017b)Inthisdiscursiveframework,allfiveCentralAsianstateshaveaspacefortheirdiscursivemodelsofcooperationwithChinaandcanframetheirparticipationinBRIasstemmingfromtheirindependentchoice.Importantly,CentralAsianstatesarenotforcedtorespondtoChina’sinitiativeasanintegratedunitbutcanjoinitasautonomousentities.Inthissense,underthebrandofBRI,ChinaChina–Kazakhstanenergyrelations125consolidatestheexistingbilateraltiesratherthanbuildanewmultilateralnetworkinCentralAsia.Nazarbayev’sambitionsforKazakhstannotonlytobeCentralAsia’sregionalleaderbutalsotoplayagreaterroleininternationalpoliticsshapehisregime’sresponsestoBRI.Firstandforemost,NazarbayevseekstouseChina’sinterestinCentralAsiatohissovereignadvantage,kick-startingthedevelopmentofnon-resourcesectorsandreinforcinghispoliticalcontrolathomeandintheregion.Attheendof2014,Nazarbayev’sgovernmentannouncedanewdevelopmentprogramcalledBrightPath(Нұрлыжол,NurlyZhol).Thisprogramisdesignedasananti-crisisplanandanextensionofKazakhstan-2050,thelong-termdevel-opmentstrategypresentedin2012(Akorda2015).However,itisbestdescribedasasmallercustomizedversionofRussia’s“linkingup”proposal(KutelevaandVasiliev2020).Attheendof2015,China’sSilkRoadEconomicBeltandKazakhstan’sBrightPathweremergedbytheleadersofthetwostates.Thejointplanfocusesonthreepriorities:transportationinfrastructure,trade,andmanufacturingindustries.ThisstrategicandhighlyideologicallychargedmergerallowsNazarbayevtopositionKazakhstanasanactorwithindependentdecision-makingpowerintheframe-workofBRI.Simultaneously,themergersupportstheofficialChinesediscoursesthatpresentBRIasacollaborativeeffortandabasisforwin-wincooperation,reinforcingtheideathatBRIisnotChina’s“solo”enterprisebuta“chorusofnations.”Asacaseinpoint,theofficialglossaryofChina.org(2017)definesKazakhstan’sBrightPathprogramandBRIas“complementaryandmutuallyreinforcing”projects.Inthisframework,KazakhstanisawillfulinternationalagentratherthanaloyalpowerlesssubjectofChina’snewgeopoliticalambitions.Onthediscursivelevel,securityandenergycooperationceasestobethekeyprioritiesinChina–Kazakhstanrelations,givingwaytothe“multi-vectorcoop-eration”thatincludesfiveareas:(1)strengtheningpolicycommunicationandcoordination,(2)developmentoftransportinfrastructure,(3)creationofnewtraderoutesandimprovementofthebusinessenvironment,(4)enhancementofcurrencycirculationandcreationofnewfinancialnetworks,(5)andthe“people-to-peoplebond[sic]”thatwillensurethepublicsupportforBRI(StateCouncilofthePRC2015).Consequently,inthediscursiveframeworkofBRIenergyrela-tionsbetweenChinaandKazakhstanarefadingintothebackground.ThisnewlogicofcooperationcorrespondswellwiththediscursivepoliticsofNazarbayev’sregimethattendstoobscuretheroleofenergyresourcesinKazakhstan’sdevel-opmentandforeignaffairs.Ontheotherhand,ithelpsChinatorepairitsimageinKazakhstan.InadditiontorebrandingrelationswithKazakhstanalongthelinesofBRI,China’srepresentativesstartedtoopenlyaddresstheissueofSinophobiainKazakhstan,rebuttingthepopularmythsaboutChina’sexpansionandresourcegrabbing.ZhouLi(2012),China’sambassadortoKazakhstan(2010–2013),forexample,complainedaboutthelackofconfidenceinChina’speacefulrisearoundtheworld:126China–KazakhstanenergyrelationsTheUSworriesthatChinacanclaimworldleadership.Indiaandthecoun-triesofSouth-EastAsiaareafraidthatChinawilluseitsgrowingmilitarypowertoresolveterritorialdisputes.TokyoisconcernedaboutthethreattoitssecurityandthereductionofitsinfluenceintheregioninconnectiontotheriseofBeijing.InRussia,someCentralAsiancountries,andeveninfar-awayAfricaonecanhearaboutthe“threatofChinesemigration”or“China’sresourcegrabbing.”AccordingtoZhou,thosefearsaregroundless.HeclaimedthatChinadoesnotposeathreattoKazakhstanandtherestofCentralAsiabecause“ChinaisnottheSovietUnion”andChina’sriseisnotgoingtounleashanewColdWar.HealsohighlightsthatChinaneedsKazakhstan’s“understandingandsupport”asafellowdevelopingcountry.HissuccessorLeYucheng(2013a)usedtheidiom“aclosenearneighborisbetterthanafar-offrelative”(远亲不如近邻,yuanqinburujinlin)todescribeChina–Kazakhstanrelations,implyingthatbothcoun-triesareequallyattractedtoeachotherandthusneedto“investinthemutualtrust.”Elsewhere(2013b),LearguesthattheChinaDreamiscompatiblewithKazakhstan’sdevelopmentaspirationsandhenceChina’songoingtransforma-tionintoa“powerfulandprosperousstate”bringsKazakhstan(aswellasallothercountriesintheworld)onlybenefits(seealsoLe2013c).China’sreactiontoKazakhstanidiscoursesthatportrayitasathreatgrad-uallybecamemoreforceful.InAugust2013,China’sresponsetoSinophobiainKazakhstanhittheheadlinesofthemajornationalnewspapers,whenZhangHanhui,atthattimethedirector-generaloftheMFA’sDepartmentofEuropeanandCentralAsianAffairs,15abruptlycriticizedpronouncedlyanti-ChineseremarksbyMuratAuezov,thefirstambassadorofKazakhstantoChina(1992–1995)andrenownedKazakhstanisinologist(Burdin2013).InaninterviewwithapopularKazakhstaniweeklynewspaper,Auezovarguedthat“todayChinaneedsKazakhstanioilandgas,”whereasinthenearestfutureChinawilloccupyitster-ritoryto“solveitsproblemofoverpopulation”(BatsiyevandOmelchenko2013).AuezovalsotoldthejournaliststhatherepeatedlyraisedtheissueofChina’sexpansionandpossibleaggressionwithKazakhstan’sleadershipbutneverreceivedaproperresponse.Zhangrepliedtotheretireddiplomat,accusinghimofspreading“falseinformation”aboutChinaandcallinghima“lunatic”16(Burdin2013).ZhangblamedtheKazakhstanimediafornotcoveringthe“Americanthreat,”eventhough“NATOgainedafootholdontheterritoryofKazakhstan”andconductedmilitaryexercisesneartheChineseborder.HealsoboldlypointedoutthattheKazakhstanisaremoreinterestedinChinathantheChineseareinter-estedinKazakhstan:Some[Kazakhstani]mediareportthatamillionillegalChineseimmigrantsfreelyliveinKazakhstan.Othersclaimthattherearespecialsettlements–threemillionpeople–inXinjiangontheborderwithKazakhstanthatcouldbeturnedintoanarmyinawinkandoccupyKazakhstaninthreedays.Canyouimaginethis!ButtheKazakhstanipeoplebelievethatChinacanattackChina–Kazakhstanenergyrelations127them.However,Iamtellingyouthat[in2012]only180thousandChinesecitizensvisitedKazakhstan.Thisistheexactstatistics.Incontrast,halfamil-lionKazakhstaniswenttoChina,andthisnumberisgrowing.So,whowilloccupywho?(Burdin2013)Zhang’sappointmentasChina’sambassadortoKazakhstanin2014indicatesthattheMFAapprovedhistoughstanceonChina’scritiques.Zhang’sunam-biguouslyassertiveandstraightforwardresponsetoAuezovandotheroppo-nentsofKazakhstanrapprochementwithChinahighlightsthenewtrendinChina’sKazakhstanpolicyand,morebroadly,aturntowardharder-edged“WolfWarrior”diplomacy(Gill2020).FramingChina–Kazakhstanrelationsasmutu-allybeneficialandsynergetic,China’srepresentativespresentSinophobiaasacommonproblem.Accordingly,KazakhstanshouldbeinterestedinadecreaseofSinophobianolessthanChinabecauseKazakhstanneedsChina.Consequently,ChinawantstoberecognizedandrespectedasavaluedpartnernotonlybyKazakhstan’sauthoritiesbutalsobyKazakhstan’ssociety.Atthesametime,Chinarecognizesitsimageofa“resourcegrabber”inKazakhstanasaproblemandseekstoreframeChina–Kazakhstanrelations,creatinganewdiscursivecon-structionwithinwhichitsinterestinKazakhstanioilandotherresourcesislessobvious.EnergycooperationbetweenXiJinping’sChinaandthepost-NazarbayevKazakhstanInthemid-2000sandthe2010s,withthestrongfinancialandpoliticalbackingofthestate,China’sNOCswereabletomakegooddealswithKazakhstan’sKMG.EventhoughChina’sNOCswereabletoinvestonlyin“leftover”assets,by2017theygainedcontroloveratotalofaround24percentoftheoilpro-ducedinKazakhstan.Theirinvestmentsbroughtthefinancialresourcesmuch-neededbyNazarbayev’sregimeinthewakeoftheglobalfinancialcrisisbutdidnottransformKazakhstanintoChina’s“resourcecolony”asmanyKazakhstaniobserversfeared.Despitetheincreaseinequityproductionvolumeandtherapiddevelopmentofthepipelineinfrastructure,China’sNOCsdonotsendsubstantialamountsofKazakhstan’soilbackhome,andhencethedynamicsofregionalenergysupplypatternsdidnotchange.Inthissense,China’sNOCsbuildan“overseasDaqing”inKazakhstanratherthansolveChina’s“Malaccadilemma.”Atthesametime,eventhoughenergyrelationsbetweenChinaandKazakhstanhavesofarbeenmutuallybeneficialandcorrespondedtotheinterestsofbothstates,China’sexpansioninKazakhstan’soilsectorpromotesaSinophobicback-lashandincreasingneo-colonialconcernsinKazakhstanisociety.Kazakhstan’senergyparadigmsecuritizesoilasagloballysought-aftercommodity,and,asaresult,China’sinterestinKazakhstanioilisconstructedasapotentialthreattoKazakhstan’sindependenceandsovereignty.128China–KazakhstanenergyrelationsThesecuritizationofoilisaresultofKazakhstan’senergyparadigmbeingsubordinatedtothediscoursesthatlegitimizeandsupportNazarbayev’sregime.Kazakhstanipublic,critiquesofNazarbayev’sregime,andlocalexpertsseeChina’sgrowingpresenceinKazakhstan’soilsectorasasignoftheweaknessofthestateanditsinabilitytoprotectKazakhstan’snationalinterests.Inthissense,Sinophobiabecomesabyproductofoilsecuritization,andhenceitnotonlycreatesrisksforChina’sNOCsbutalsoposesalegitimacychallengeforNazarbayev’sregime.Toresolvethisparadox,Nazarbayev’sregimeistryingtorepositionKazakhstanasanactorwithindependentdecision-makingpowervis-à-visChinaandreframeChina–KazakhstanrelationsinaccordwiththebroaderconstructionofKazakhstan’sdevelopment,accordingtowhichthecountryismovingawayfromitsdependenceonresourceincomes.TheturbulencesinSino-Russianrelations,aswellasthegrowinganimos-itybetweenChinaandtheUS,willinmeaningfulwaysshapeKazakhstan’sfutureandaddextrapressureonthepoliticalregime.China’srepresentativesconsistentlyframeChina–Kazakhstanenergyrelationsasanexampleofwin-wincooperation.Inthemid-2010s,the“Shanghaispirit”gavewaytothenewnarrativethatfitsChina’srelationswithKazakhstanintotheframeworkofBRI,withinwhichChinastillpositionsitselfasapeerofKazakhstan.TheframeofsharedregionalhistoryisbridgedwiththeframeofmarketrationalismthroughtheemphasisonChina’sreputationasareliablepartnerthathasbeenbuiltoverdecadesofcooperation.Atthesametime,inthe2010s,Chinabecamesensitivetotheallegationsofneocolonialismandstartedtoemployassertivepublicdiplomacytacticstorespondtothosewhodoubtthewin–winnatureofChina–Kazakhstanrelations.China’srepresentativesaggressivelydeniedthatChinamightusetheinvestmentofNOCsinKazakhstanasgeopoliticalleverageandrejectedtheallegationsofneocolonialism.ThenewpresidentofKazakhstan,Kassym-JomartTokayev,inheritedprofoundlycomplexchal-lenges.AsChinaisbecomingincreasinglymoreassertiveinitsinternationaldealingsandcommunication,TokayevwillhavetobalancethedemandsofKazakhstan’sresource-curseddevelopmentandattemptstopreservethestatusquovis-à-visChina’srise.Notes1WestTurkestan,alsoknownasRussianTurkestan,isaregioncolonizedbytheRussianEmpire.ItcomprisedthevastterritorytothesouthoftheKazakhSteppe.IntheSovietera,theregionwasknownasMiddleAsia(СредняяАзия,SrednyayaAziya)andwasdividedbetweenKazakhstaninthenorth,Uzbekistanacrossthecenter,Kyrgyzstanintheeast,TajikistaninthesoutheastandTurkmenistaninthesouthwest.2RussianandKazakhlanguagesdistinguish“Kazakhasnationality/ethnicity”from“Kazakhascitizenship/territorialaffiliation.”Theterm“Kazakh”(казах,kazakh)isonlyusedforthenationalityandforethnicity.“Kazakhstani”(казахстанец,kazakhs-tanets)isdesignatedforthestateandterritorialbelongingandthusincludesmanyotherethnicitiesandnationalities(e.g.,RussianKazakhstani,UzbekKazakhstani,KoreanChina–Kazakhstanenergyrelations129Kazakhstani).Thelaterterm–Kazakhstani–wasintroducedintheearly1990safterthecollapseoftheSovietUnion.3Iretrieved68academicworkspublishedinRussianbetween2006and2016fromthesocialsciencedatabasesoftheNationalAcademicLibraryoftheRepublicofKazakhstan(Nur-Sultan)on12February2017.Thesearchwasbasedonthekeywords:“нефть”(oil),“ресурсы”(resources),“развитие”(development),and“Казахстан”(Kazakhstan).Theresultsincludedacademicarticlespublishedinthenationalpeer-reviewedjournals(43),graduatedissertations(17),andmonographs(8).In52outof68works,theauthorsquotedNazarbayevasanauthorityondiversetopics(e.g.,eco-nomicdevelopment,foreignpolicy,energysecurity,environmentalpolicies,tonamejustfew),with19worksusinghisquotesasepigraphs.4TheideaofenergyandenvironmentalcrisesisfurtherdevelopedinGlobalEnergyandEcologicalStrategyofSustainableDevelopmentinthe21stCentury(2011).Accordingtothelibraryabstract,thisbooksummarizesNazarbayev’s“theoreticalandmethodo-logicalresearchontheproblemsofbuildingaglobalenergysecurityandenvironmen-tallysustainabledevelopmentoftheworldandtheEurasianEconomicCommunity.”ThebookisalsodescribedasNazarbayev’s“message”tothedevelopingworldanditspublicationwastimedwiththe2012UnitedNationsConferenceonSustainableDevelopment.5Nazarbayevusedheretheexpression“проестьденьги”(proyest’den’gi),whichliter-allymeans“eatthemoney.”6UponthecollapseoftheSovietUnionin1991,Tselinograd(alsoknownasAqmola)wasaremoteindustrialtowninthemiddleoftheKazakhsteppe.Intheearlyyearsofindependence,Nazarbayevdecidedtotransformthissmalltownintothecapitalofhisnewlysovereignstate,givingitanewname,Astana(means“capital”inKazakh).ThecapitalwasformallymovedtoAstanain1997.Backin2006,theauthoritiesmovedtheCapitalCityDayfrom10Juneto6July,whichcoincideswithNazarbayev’sbirthday.Theofficialexplanationclaimsthatthenewdatereferencesthe6July1994,andcom-memoratesthedecisionoftheKazakhstanSupremeCounciltodesignatethecityasthenewcapital.In2019,theparliamentrenamedthecapitalNur-SultaninhonorofNazarbayev.7Themostrecentexampleincludesgirlsbeingbannedfromschoolwearingheadscarfs.On1September2018,inthevillageofFirdausinTurkestanprovince32teenagegirlattemptedtoentertheschoolbuildingbutwerestoppedbytheadministration.Inthepublicstatement,theMinisterofEducationandScienceYerlanSagadiyevpromisedtomakesurethat“nopupilinaheadscarfwillentertheschoolbuilding”(Zakon.kz,2008).Anotherofficialemphasizedthatbecause“thePresident[Nazarbayev]saysthatwearecivilizedsecularstate,wemustraise[thechildren]assecularpeople”(Informburo.kz,2018).8RenamedasCITICCanadaPetroleumLimitedin2007.9AdisputearoseinNovember2002whentheWesterncompaniesthatcontrolledTengizchevroilsoughttofinanceaUS$3.5billionexpansionoftheTengizoilfieldusingoilrevenues.Kazakhstan’sgovernmentprotested,astheplanwoulderodeitstaxreceipts.In2004,theamendmentstothe1996LawonSubsoilandSubsoilUsegrantedthegovernmenttoclaimprioritypurchaserightsinallenergyprojects(Law2-III,1Dec.2004).In2005,thegovermenttougheneditscontractterms(Law79-III,14October2005).10Kashaganisthelargestsupergiantoilfielddiscoveredinthepastthreedecades.EventhoughKashaganhassufferedfromeight-yeardelaysandcostincreasesince2005,manyexpertsstillconsideritanoilmarketgame-changerinthemaking.TheKashaganoilprojectisoperatedbyNorthCaspianOperatingCompanyownedbyEni,KazMunayGas,RoyalDutchShell,Total,ExxonMobil,CNPCandINPEX.ProductionstartedinSeptember2013,someeightyearsaftertheoriginalschedule,butwashalted130China–Kazakhstanenergyrelationsinjustafewweeksbecauseofgasleaksinitspipelines.ProductionwasrestartedinOctober2016andthefieldreachedactualproductionlevelsofover200.000barrelsperdaybymid-2017.11OralmansareKazakhrepatriates.MostofthemimmigratedtoKazakhstanfromUzbekistan,Turkmenistan,Mongolia,andChina.12NataliaSokolovaactedastheofficialrepresentativeoftheindependenttradeunionofoilworkersofKarazhanbasMunaiintheconflict.InAugust2011,thecourtfoundSokolovaguiltyofviolatingtwoarticlesoftheCriminalCodeofKazakhstan,byincit-ingsocial,national,tribal,andracialirreligiousenmity(Article164)andviolatingtheregulationsoforganizingandholdingmeetings,rallies,pickets,marchesanddemon-strations(article334).Thelaborlawyerwassentencedtosixyearsofimprisonment.InMarch2012,Sokolovapleadedguiltyonallchargesandherpenaltywasreducedtothreeyearsofprobation.13Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan,andUzbekistanaremembersoftheSCO,withTurkmenistanattendingmostofthesummitmeetingsinastatusofaspecialguest.14Uzbekistanisoftendescribedasresourcerich;however,itdoesnotbelongonthesameplaneasTurkmenistanwithgasandKazakhstanwithoil.Uzbekistan’soilproductionhasseensteadydeclineoverthepastdecade.Thesituationwithnaturalgasisslightlybetter.In2015,UzbekistanwasthethirdlargestnaturalgasproducerinEurasia,fol-lowingRussiaandTurkmenistan.However,existinggasfieldsaredepletingfasterthannewdiscoveriesarecomingonline,spurringtheneedforfurtherinvestmentandmod-ernizationofthegassector.KyrgyzstanandTajikistandonothavesubstantialdepositsofoilandgas.Bothcountrieshavepotentialforhydroelectricityandwindenergypro-ductionbutfailtomakethemostoftheirendowments,usingonlyabout5percentoftheavailablereserves.15In2014,ZhangHanhuibecamethenewChina’sambassadortoKazakhstan.In2018,ZhangleftKazakhstantobecometheassistantforeignminister.16ZhangHanhuiisafluentRussianspeaker,andtheinterviewwasconductedinRussiawithoutatranslator.CriticizingAuezov,ZhangusedacolloquialRussianexpression“fallfromtheMoon”(какслунысвалился,kakslunysvalilsya).ThisexpressionisquitestrongandimpliesthatAuezov’scommentsareinappropriateandrevealhisigno-ranceaboutthesubject.ReferencesAbdirov,M.Z.(2017).OtkrytiyedrugoyAmeriki,Kitaya,RossiiiKazakhstana:Nauchno-populyarnoyeissledovaniyeblagonamerennogoavtora[ThediscoveryofanotherAmerica,China,RussiaandKazakhstan:apopularsciencestudybyawell-meaningauthor].Astana:Qazaquniversiteti.Abdrakhmanov,A.,andKaukenov,A.(2007).OtnosheniyaKitayaistranTsentral'noyAziiglazamikazakhstanskikhekspertov[RelationsbetweenChinaandCentralAsiancountriesthroughtheeyesofKazakhstaniexperts].Kazakhstanvglobal'nykhprotsessakh,3,119.Adilov,M.(2006).Vpolitikenebyvayetdruzeyivragov,ayest'tol'kointeresy[Thereisnofriendsinpoliticsbutonlyinterests].Respublika-Delovoyeobozreniye,3Nov.Retrievedfromh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ptofenergysecurityandthedichotomyofconflictandcoopera-tionreproducedthroughthedialoguebetweenrealistandliberalIRapproaches.Myanalysisfocusesondiscoursesandtheirconstitutiveroleinthedevelop-mentofrelationsbetweenstates.Idevelopaconstructivistconceptualframe-workandadoptthepoststructuralistdiscourseanalysismethodologyinspiredbyLeneHansen’swork.Discourseanalysisispreoccupiedwithwhatpeopleknowaboutdiversematerialandsocialrealitiesandhowtheyarticulatethisknowledgebecauseitsaimistouncoverhowtheserealitiesareconstructed,negotiated,andinterpretedthroughtheprocessesofsocialinteraction.Astructured,systematic,andfocusedintertextualdiscourseanalysisofaheterogeneouscollectionoftexts140Conclusionsallowsmetoshowhowthematerialrealitiesofenergyacquiretheirmeaningsintheprocessofnarrative-makinganddiscursivesymbolization.Socialcontext,intersubjectivemeanings,andidentitiesacquirecharacteristicsofexplanatoryvariables.Theconceptoftheenergyparadigmlinksnationaldiscursivepoliticsofenergytothepracticeofinternationalrelationsandhencebecomesaconstructiv-istroadmaptorelationsbetweenexportersandimporters.Whileconstructivistandpoststructuralistanalysisofenergypoliticstendstofocusonpolicydiscourse,thisbookgoesmuchfurther.Itbringstextualdocu-mentsanddiverseculturalartifacts(e.g.,worksoffiction,popularsonglyrics,paintings,photographs,films,museumexhibits,andarchitecture)tomapandelu-cidatesocietaldiscoursesofenergy.Myresearchismultilingual,withtextualdoc-umentsinChineseandRussianbeingthemajorsourcesofdata.Itakelanguageseriouslyandexploreitspowertoconstructsocialreality.Moreover,Ishowthatdiversecompetingdiscoursesaboutextraction,production,andconsumptionofenergyandredistributionofenergyrevenuesemergeanddisseminatethemselvesthroughdifferentformsofvisualart,popularentertainment,architectureandcityplanning,museums,culturalspaces,andothersocioculturalstructuresandprac-tices.Thisallowsmenotonlytoadvancethenuancedunderstandingofenergypolicy-makinganddiplomacybutalsotounravelcriticaldiscoursesabouteco-nomic,environmental,social,andpoliticalimpactsassociatedwiththeexpansionoftheenergyindustryandtheincreaseofenergyexportsthatdefineabroaderunderstandingofenergyinoursocieties.China’squestforoilAtthecoreofChina’senergyparadigmisthenotionofdevelopment.Theavail-abilityofenergyresources,andspecificallyfossilfuels,isinstrumentalizedasaprerequisitefordevelopment.Importantly,China’senergyparadigmdefinesenergydevelopmentasarightofeverynation.Hence,theglobaldistributionofenergyresourcesisneitherapurelyeconomicissuenorasecurityissuebutfirstandforemostamatterofinternationalpolitics.China’sofficialenergydiscoursesemphasizethefundamentalandpersistentinequalityofthecurrentworldorderand,usingitasastartingpoint,callforreducingthegapbetweentheGlobalNorthandtheGlobalSouth.Accordingly,thefocusofChina’sconceptofenergysecurityisdevelopment,andthusitsdefinitioncorrespondswiththeconceptofdevelopmentthatinthemid-2000swasencapsulatedintheaspirationfor“harmonioussociety/world”and“China’speacefulrise.”Followingthenewdevelopmentstrategy,China’senergyparadigmbroadened,andnowtheconceptofenergysecurityincludessustain-ableandenvironmentallyconsciousdevelopment.Inadditiontoit,theconceptofenergysecuritybegantointernationalize,and,asaresult,theenergydeficitbecamemorepoliticized.Thede-securitizationofenergydeficitpresupposesthatthedistributionofenergyresourcesshouldberegulatedbybindinginternationalrulesandregulations.Italsoimpliesthatinternationalenergyrelationscanandshouldbeapositive-sumgame.Conclusions141Onthedomesticlevel,however,China’sofficialdiscoursesassociatethedefi-citofenergywiththereliabilityofoilsupply,andthusoilisstillasecuritizedobject.Aswasthecase60yearsago,Chinatreatsthedeficitofoilasanexistentialthreattoitsnationaldevelopmentandasourceofdangeroussecurityvulnerabili-ties.Therefore,China’soilstrategyonthedomesticlevelisdefinedasthequestforanewDaqing.Insum,China’senergyparadigmisbifurcated:whileontheglobal/interna-tionalleveltheenergydeficitisnowpoliticized,onthedomestic/nationallevelitremainslargelysecuritized.Chinaactivelypromotesacooperativemodeofenergydevelopmentontheinternationallevelanddoesnotcallforurgentandexceptionalmeasurestodealwiththeenergydeficit,yet,whenitcomestooil,Chinastilldoesnotrushtotradeitsself-relianceforinterdependency.Throughoutthe2000sand2010s,“win-win”isthemostfrequentlyrepeatedepithetfor“cooperation”inChina’senergydiscourse.ChinaframesitsrelationswithRussiaandKazakhstanasmutuallybeneficialandbasedoncommondevel-opmentalgoals.ThebalanceofinterdependenceintherelationsbetweenChinaandtheseoil-richcountriesisassumedtobecreatedandsustainedbymarketincentivesthattranscendpoliticalandideologicaldifferences.BuildingrelationswithRussiaandKazakhstan,Chinaaspirestobecomeastrategicbusinesspartnerandtrustedfriendforthem.ThetwocasesdemonstratethatChinaisdeterminedtodesecuritizeenergyandseparateitscooperationwithoil-richcountriesfromgeopolitics.Atthesametime,Chinaisbecomingmoreassertiveandsensitivetothealle-gationsofneocolonialismaswellastothedoubtsaboutitspeacefulintentions.WhenXiJinpingbecamethegeneralsecretaryoftheChineseCommunistPartyin2012,heannouncedthatChinaisdreamingaboutthe“greatrejuvenationoftheChinesenation.”Bythemiddleofthe21stcentury,Xiasserts,Chinawillbecome“agloballeaderintermsofcomprehensivenationalpowerandinternationalinflu-ence.”XioffersChinaasamodelforotherdevelopingnations,demonstratingextremeconfidenceinChina’sachievementsduringthepasttwodecadesandinthesuperiorityofChina’sdevelopment,comparedtoboththeGlobalNorthandtheGlobalSouth.ThisgrowingconfidencetransfersintoChina’senergypolicy-makingontheinternationallevel.UnderXi’sleadership,weseeChinaseekingnotonlytobuildan“overseasDaqing”butalsostrivingtoberecognizedasanewtrendsetterandaglobalplayerofconsequenceininternationalenergypolitics.TheanalysisofChina’sbilateralenergyrelationswithRussiaandKazakhstanalsorevealsalotaboutthewaysdiscursivepoliticsofenergyinfluencesforeignpolicyandinternationalstrategiesofpetrostates.Russiaisaformerempirerecov-eringafteracollapseandseekingrevenge.Kazakhstan,onthecontrary,isayoungpost-colonialstate.Whileitsgeopoliticalpositionintheinternationalsystemisuncertain,KazakhstancanbesafelyidentifiedasapartoftheGlobalSouth.Asmuchasthesetwostatesseemtobedifferentfromeachother,theyaresignifi-cantnetoilexportersandsharetheidentityofanoil-richcountry.Astheanaly-sisoftheirdiscursivepoliticsofenergydemonstrates,theybothinstrumentalizeoilasasourceofliveliness,nationaldevelopment,sovereignty,independence,142Conclusionsandpower.Atthesametime,notwithstandingtheirobsessionwithoil,theydonotconsiderthemselvespetrostates.BothRussiaandKazakhstansecuritizetheenergysector,andtheirenergydiplomacyisheavilyaffectedbythedominantdichotomiesof“we”and“they.”Chinais“they”forRussiaandKazakhstan.BothcountriesseeChinaasstrivingtocontroltheirenergysectorand,subsequently,asathreattotheirsovereigntyintherealmofinternationalenergypolitics,whichiskeytotheirsenseofidentity.Asaresult,RussiaandKazakhstandonotconsiderChinaasaprioritypartner.Overall,Russia’sandKazakhstan’senergycooperationwithChinasimultaneouslyexposescontradictionswithintheirenergyparadigmsandactsasaconduitthroughwhichperceptionsofChinaasathreatfindastrongervoice.Insum,mystudyshowsthattheexternalenergystrategiesofChinaanditsoil-richcounterpartsarecruciallydependentontheirdiscursivepoliticsofenergy.Hence,buildingcollaborativeandconstructiveenergyrelationswithChina,itspartnersinRussia,Kazakhstan,andelsewheremustconsidernotonlymaterialrealitiesofChina’senergyindustry(e.g.,theamountofenergyresourcesavail-ableinChina,itsmining,refining,andstoragecapacity,andtheexistingandplannedtransportationroutes)andinstitutionalsettingsofChina’senergypolicy(e.g.,China’slegalframeworksandthestructureofChina’senergygovernment)butalsomultiplesymbolicmeaningsthatenergyresourcesacquireinChina.Likewise,mybestadvicetoChina’srepresentativesistobeconsciousaboutthewayChinaisperceivedinotherstatesandtaketheworldofwordsandideasasseriouslyastheworldofpumpjacks,pipelines,tankers,pricecharts,andlongsupplychains.LimitationsanddirectionsforfutureresearchFourdirectionsforfutureresearcharemostapparent.Firstly,mystudyconcernsitselfwiththeunderexaminedtopicofoil,andthusitonlysuperficiallycovereddiscoursesrelatedtodecarbonizationandenergytransition.Astudyofdiscur-sivepoliticsofenergywithafocusonrenewableresources(e.g.,biomass,hydro-power,geothermal,wind,andsolar)wouldofferimportantandvaluableinsightsintothecurrentstateofinternationalenergypoliticsandlikelywouldalsoallowusaglimpseintoitsfuture.Moreover,theanalyticalscopeofmystudyisdefinedbyitsemphasisonthestate.Accordingly,thenextlogicalstepistohaveacloserlookattheenergydiscoursesproducedbyvariousactorswithinthestate(fromNOCstotheCEOsofprivaterefineries)anddiversetransnationalactors.Secondly,whileChina’senergyrelationswithRussiaandKazakhstanareafertilesourcefortheanalysisofChina’sdiscursivepoliticsofenergy,thesecasesallowcoveringonlyonesideofit.AnexaminationoftherecentexamplesofChina’sengagementwithinternationalinstitutionsonenergy-relatedissues,therefore,wouldhelptoshowhowChina’senergydiscoursesevolvetorepresentthelatestshiftsinChina’sforeignpolicystrategy(e.g.,China’sforeignpolicy-makingonclimatechange)andpowerrealignmentsintheinternationalenergyConclusions143politicsingeneral(e.g.,theUSwithdrawalfromtheParisAgreementandXiJinping’sdeterminationto“striveforachievement”ininternationalaffairs).Thethirddirectioninvolvesastudyofthecomplexissuesrelatedtopoliticallegitimacyandnationalbranding.MyanalysisofRussia’senergypoliticsrevealsthediscursiveconstructionsthatareessentialtothewayPutin’sregimehasbeenactivelypositioningRussiaasanantagonisttotheWestonbothdomesticandinternationallevels.ThecaseofKazakhstandemonstratesthatKazakhstan’senergyparadigmissubordinatedtothediscursivepoliticsthatsustainsandlegiti-mizesNazarbayev’sauthoritarianrule.Inthissense,acriticalexaminationoftheevolution,transformation,andlimitsofRussia’sandKazakhstan’sofficialdiscursivepoliticsofenergywouldbefruitfulforamorenuancedunderstand-ingofdomesticpracticesandstrategiesofnationbrandingadoptedbytherulingregimes.Importantly,theconflictbetweendifferentdiscursiverepresentationsofoilexposesfracturesinPutin’sandNazarbayev’sideologies,pointingouttonewpossibilitiesfortheemergenceofstrongcounter-hegemonicdiscoursesthatwillchallengethelegitimacyoftheirregimes.Finally,asaconstructivistandsomewhatcriticalstudentofinternationalrela-tions,Iwasstruckbythefactthatthediscursivepoliticsofenergyreinscribesthewidevarietiesofmasculinisthierarchies.InChina,theofficialdiscussionofenergypovertyandthequestforenergyefficiencyneverconsidersgenderedenergyusage.InRussia,theaggressiveexpressionsoftheenergysuperpowerdiscourseinRussia’sdiplomacyarelinkedtoPutin’smasculinitycult.DoingfieldworkinKazakhstan,Iwitnessedmanyexamplesofstructuralandinstitution-alizedgenderdiscriminationthatleftmewonderingwhetherthedisempowermentofKazakhstaniwomenisconnectedtooraffectedbythedominanceoftheenergysectorinKazakhstan’seconomy.Lastly,inallthethreecountriesthatIstudied,women’sexperienceswereabsentinthedominantnarrativesoftheoilindustrydevelopment.Onillustrationstonewspaperarticlesaboutoil,atoilmuseums,andinthedocumentariesaboutoil,Isawmendigging,drilling,andsqueezingoutoil,aswellasmensmilingandshakinghandsoverthesignedinternationalcontracts.Icanhardlyfindadozentextsinmydatasetthatareproducedbywomen.Inotherwords,itseemsthattheworldofoilbelongstomen.WhileIamnotsurehowexactlyweshouldstudythewomen–oilnexusintherealmofinternationalenergyrelations,Iamconfidentthatthisnexusdeservesmoreattentionfromscholarsinthefieldsofpolitics,internationalrelations,andpoliticaleconomy.Thisresearchprojectwaschallengingandextremelyrewarding.Theexperi-enceandnewknowledgethatIgainedaffectedmyviewoftheaimsandmethodsofthedisciplineofpoliticalscience.Asawayofconcluding,Iwanttosumma-rizethemajorlessonsthatIhavelearnedasapoliticalscientistthroughoutthisresearchproject.First,diversityisbeautifulandexciting.Thediversityofideasaboutenergyinspiredmetopursuethisstudy,andfurtherthisdiversitybecameanessentialsourceofcreativityandestablishedanexigencyforcriticalthinking.Weshouldcelebratedifferencesratherthantrytoneutralizethem.Inaworldsufferingfrommultiplesocialbreakdownsanddividedbypoliticalpolarity,anappreciationfordiversitywillchallengeustosearchfornewpathstowardcompromiseand144Conclusionscooperation.Second,travelingacrossdifferentlanguages,cultures,andcountries,Iencounteredagreatvarietyofpolitics,practices,types,andmodesofknowledgeproduction.Ibelievethatbycreating,reproducing,preserving,sharing,andcel-ebratingknowledgewecanembracediversityandhelpotherpeopletodosoaswell.Thisistheonlywayhowwecanlearnandteachotherstoacceptandrespectpoliticalandsocioculturalnormsdistinctfromourown.Finally,weindeedliveinthe“worldofourmaking,”and,toalargeextent,wetalkthisworldintobeing.Wemustacknowledgethatourlanguageispoliticalandrecognizeitspowertoshapeourlivesandthelivesofothers.Ihopemyworkwillinspirebothscholarsandpractitionerstotaketheconstitutivepoweroflanguageseriouslyandreflectonhowthelanguagetheychoosetouseinfluencesthewaytheystudyandpracticepolitics.IndexAfrica47,114,116,126Aktau117,121,122Aliyev,R.118Asia73–74,75,76,77–79,114;Central47,96,115,118,119,121,122–126;East29,45,74;Southeast74,78Auezov,M.126–127BeltandRoadInitiative(BRI)49,84,96,123–125BrightPath,Kazakhstan125Buzan,B.13carculture,China26CaspianSea97,117centuryofhumiliation,China24ChinaNationalOffshoreOilCorporation(CNOOC)35,49,117ChinaNationalPetroleumCorporation(CNPC)30,31,35,43,49,76,96,117,118,119,120ChinaPetrochemicalGroupCorporation(Sinopec)35,49,76climatechange38,39,40,44,46,142coal16,25,37ColdWar77,126constructivism(IRtheory)11–13;andcritical12–13,17CulturalRevolution24,28Daqing:thecityof27–28,30;Museum30–33;oilfield27–33,41–46,48,50,51,127,141;thespiritof28,41,42–43Deng,Xiaoping24,30Denisov,A.77,79DerDerian,J.12discourseanalysis17–19,139discursivepoliticsof,theconceptof15–16energy:conservation38–39,44;consumption25,37,40,44,49,51;deficit14,27,38,50–51,140–141;green39,49,51,52,101;paradigm,theconceptof16–17,140–143;andChina50–52;andRussia74–75;andKazakhstan116–117,128;renewable10,26,39,44,103,142;security,conceptof11,13–14;superpower14,62–63,65–66,67,71–74,75,79,81,84,100,143;sustainabledevelopment39,40,47,48,50,82Eurasia61,112,115,124;andenergysecurity74;EconomicUnion84EuropeanEnergyCharter73EuropeanUnion48,65,72–73,77,112,120Export-ImportBankofChina(EximBank)76,118Foster,N.109Fu,Ying44,48Gabuev,A.78,80goingglobal,China33–36,42,49Gorbachev,M.66greatpowerness,Russia’s62–63;65,75GreatLeapForward,China24Hansen,L.12,17,19,139harmony,conceptof27,36–39,46,123HeilongjiangProvince27,30,32,42Hu,Jintao37–38,46,48,83,118India14,40,73,78,81–82,102,112,126Indonesia118intertextuality(intertextualgenerationofmeaning)17,18,129Iran36,112146IndexIraq6n1,71ironman30,42–43;andMemorial30;andmovie42–43Japan24,26,29,30,73,78,112,120,130n12Jiang,Zemin48KarazhanbasMunai117–118,120,121,122Kazakhization103KazMunayGas(KMG)105–110,117,118–119,120,121,127Khristenko,V.77Korea26,73,78,112,114Kuwait29,71,101,115Kyrgyzstan96liberalism(IRtheory)9–11Libya36Liu,Tienan41–42,49logicofappropriateness15,16–17Lozhkin,Vasya67,68–69,71Malaysia98,114MangistauMunaiGas118–119,120Mao,Zedong24,30Medvedev,D.75Molodkin,A.67,68Myanmar36Nazarbayev,N.:aboutRussia113–114;discursivehegemony99;Nazarbayevism98,116;patron–clientties103;nation-building103–104,110–113;regime97–99NEORUSproject65Nigeria26,71,114,115Norway71,114,115Novak,A.78Nur-Sultan(Astana)99,105–109Nyman,J.14oil:DaqingoilfieldseeDaqing;Laojunmiaofield30;inart67–69;inpopularculture70;loans-for-oil75–77,82,118;fieldsinKazakhstan117,118,119,120,129n9;petro-fiction70–71;price62,70,75,76,81,97,105,118;production25,29,32,33–34,42,117;refining27,35,76,96,119,142Onuf,N.11–12Ostrowski,W.103OzenMunaiGas121–122peacefulrise,China27,39,48,49,50,51,83,126,140Pelevin,V.71PetroKazakhstan117,120petrostate52,71,101,103,111,112,113,114–116,141petro-Islam113petro-multiculturalism(petro-seculitarism)113Phillips,A.14pipeline(oil):Atasu-Alashankou76,96,119;Kazakhstan-China76,96,119,120,127;EasternSiberia–PacificOcean(ESPO)76–77,79;Russia-China62,76–77,79,82–83,84poststructuralism(IRtheory)12,17Putin,V.62–65,66;ideology63,71,75;legitimacy66–67realism(IRtheory)8–9,11resourcecurse66–67,77,100–102,128Rosneft75–76,79SaudiArabia6n1,29,71,77,113,115Securitization,conceptof13–14ShanghaiCooperationorganization(SCO)47,122–123;Spirit47,123,128Shevchuk,Yu.70Shulman,E.72Siberia76,78,82,115Singapore114,98SinopecseeChinaPetrochemicalGroupCorporationSinophobia81,121–122,125–128Slepakov,S.70,71SovietUnion28,63,65,84,100,126;collapseof61,96,97,103,110,113,115,116;andpost-Soviet66,71,72,73,98,103,104,114,119;SovietaidtoChina24;Sino-Sovietsplit27,29Stalin,J.65Sudan36Syroezhkin,K.117Tajikistan96Texler,A.78ThirdWorld44,65,114,115,116Transneft76–77Turkmenistan96,123,130n14UnitedStates(US)26,29,47,48,61,70,82,98,108,121,128,143Uzbekistan96,130n14Venezuela71,85n8,114,115Index147Wang,Jinxi28,30,42–43,52n5Wang,Yi47Wendt,A.11,15Wishnick,E.14WorldWarII63,77;andVictoryDay63–65Xi,Jinping41,45–46,48,49,51,83,96,119,123–124,141Yang,Jiechi45,47,49Yukos75–76,84Yumen,thecityof30Zha,Daojiong36Zhanaozen,thecityof121–122Zhang,Hanhui126–127,130n16Zhang,Guobao39,41–42,44,45Zhou,Enlai28

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