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2023-04-18
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March 2022

OXFORD ENERGY COMMENT

Michal Meidan

The Russian invasion of Ukraine and

China’s energy markets

The contents of this paper are the author’s sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent the views

of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, energy markets are in turmoil. Oil and gas

prices are rising and exhibiting high volatility as the markets grapple with the impact of sanctions and

the prospect of reduced flows from Russia

. China is heavily exposed to Russian commodity exports

and to global markets. The invasion and its aftermath have a profound impact on China’s short term

energy supplies, its policy priorities for the coming year and long term energy policies.

In the near term, China will suffer from higher energy costs and commodity prices

much like other

energy importing countries. The economic and geopolitical fallout pose challenges for China in this

critical year of a domestic leadership transition, a time when it is seeking stability. But in the longer-

term, China could benefit from higher volumes of yuan-denominated trading (should Russian sellers

chose to rely on it) and greater use of China’s payment settlement system. Russia’s growing

international isolation could also lead it to offer attractively priced gas pipeline deals to China and open

up new investment opportunities for Chinese firms in Russia’s energy sector. This comment offers some

preliminary analysis of these issues.

Russian energy supplies to China

Russia is China’s second largest oil supplier and its third largest gas provider (pipeline gas and LNG

combined). In 2021, it delivered 1.6 mb/d of crude to China, accounting for 17 per cent of China’s oil

supplies (Figure 1) and 16.8 bcm of gas, representing 15 per cent of imported gas. Russia is also

China’s second largest supplier of coal, accounting for around 17 per cent of total inflows (Figure 2).

Much of the increase in coal supplies took place in 2021, as China introduced an informal ban on

Australian supplies and domestic production growth slowed.

Figure 1: China’s oil imports, select sources, mb/d

Source: China Customs, OIES

For more on the implications for oil markets see Bassam Fattouh, Andreas Economou, Ahmed Mehdi, “Russia-Ukraine crisis:

Implications for global oil markets”, OIES Comment, March 2022, https://www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/russia-ukraine-

crisis-implications-for-global-oil-markets/ and gas markets Mike Fulwood, Jack Sharples, James Henderson, “Ukraine Invasion:

What This Means for the European Gas Market”, OIES Comment, March 2022,

https://www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/ukraine-invasion-what-this-means-for-the-european-gas-markets/

China also imports wheat, potash, aluminium and nickel from Russia

The contents of this paper are the author’s sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent the views

of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members.

Figure 2: China’s coal imports by source, Mt

Source: China Customs, OIES

Russia-China political relations are also strong, as highlighted by a joint statement issued on 4 February

2022, just before the opening of the Winter Olympics in Beijing

“On the afternoon of 4 February, President Xi Jinping held talks with Russian President Vladimir

Putin […] In a warm and friendly atmosphere, the two Presidents had an in-depth and thorough

exchange of views on China-Russia relations and a series of major issues that concern

international strategic security and stability

.”

At the side-lines of this summit, Rosneft and CNPC signed a 10-year supply deal for supplies of an

additional 100 million mt (0.20 mb/d of crude oil) which is effectively the renewal of an existing

agreement which expires at the end of 2023 and includes crude delivered from Russia to China via

Kazakhstan along the 0.40 mb/d Kazakhstan’s Atasu-Alashankou (KKT) pipeline

. Gazprom and CNPC

signed a 10 bcma gas supply deal, expanding on the existing 38 bcma Power of Siberia (PoS) project.

The two deals signed in early February were testament to the deepening energy ties between the two

countries, with the denomination of the gas supply contract in euros a strong signal of both countries’

desire to move away from dollar-denominated trade

. Less than one month later, following the Russian

invasion into Ukraine, and in light of the sanctions imposed on Russia by the EU and the US as well as

other countries, a key question is whether China will increase its imports of Russian commodities

shunned by other buyers.

The full text of the joint statement can be found here

https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Translations/2022-02-

04%20China%20Russia%20joint%20statement%20International%20Relations%20Entering%20a%20New%20Era.pdf

“President Xi Jinping Held Talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin”, China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 February 2022,

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202202/t20220204_10638923.html

Rosneft extends China supply deal through Kazakhstan”, 25 Feb 22, Argus,

https://direct.argusmedia.com/newsandanalysis/article/2305905. In 2021, flows through Kazakhstan (according to Chinese

customs data) averaged 0.10 mb/d, suggesting that there is room for higher supplies through the Kazakh route.

Although it is noteworthy that they did not designate the yuan or roubles or the settlement.

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March2022OXFORDENERGYCOMMENTMichalMeidanTheRussianinvasionofUkraineandChina’senergymarketsThecontentsofthispaperaretheauthor’ssoleresponsibility.TheydonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheOxfordInstituteforEnergyStudiesoranyofitsMembers.2FollowingRussia’sinvasionofUkraineon24February2022,energymarketsareinturmoil.OilandgaspricesarerisingandexhibitinghighvolatilityasthemarketsgrapplewiththeimpactofsanctionsandtheprospectofreducedflowsfromRussia1.ChinaisheavilyexposedtoRussiancommodityexportsandtoglobalmarkets.TheinvasionanditsaftermathhaveaprofoundimpactonChina’sshorttermenergysupplies,itspolicyprioritiesforthecomingyearandlongtermenergypolicies.Inthenearterm,Chinawillsufferfromhigherenergycostsandcommodityprices2muchlikeotherenergyimportingcountries.TheeconomicandgeopoliticalfalloutposechallengesforChinainthiscriticalyearofadomesticleadershiptransition,atimewhenitisseekingstability.Butinthelonger-term,Chinacouldbenefitfromhighervolumesofyuan-denominatedtrading(shouldRussiansellerschosetorelyonit)andgreateruseofChina’spaymentsettlementsystem.Russia’sgrowinginternationalisolationcouldalsoleadittoofferattractivelypricedgaspipelinedealstoChinaandopenupnewinvestmentopportunitiesforChinesefirmsinRussia’senergysector.Thiscommentofferssomepreliminaryanalysisoftheseissues.RussianenergysuppliestoChinaRussiaisChina’ssecondlargestoilsupplieranditsthirdlargestgasprovider(pipelinegasandLNGcombined).In2021,itdelivered1.6mb/dofcrudetoChina,accountingfor17percentofChina’soilsupplies(Figure1)and16.8bcmofgas,representing15percentofimportedgas.RussiaisalsoChina’ssecondlargestsupplierofcoal,accountingforaround17percentoftotalinflows(Figure2).Muchoftheincreaseincoalsuppliestookplacein2021,asChinaintroducedaninformalbanonAustraliansuppliesanddomesticproductiongrowthslowed.Figure1:China’soilimports,selectsources,mb/dSource:ChinaCustoms,OIES1FormoreontheimplicationsforoilmarketsseeBassamFattouh,AndreasEconomou,AhmedMehdi,“Russia-Ukrainecrisis:Implicationsforglobaloilmarkets”,OIESComment,March2022,https://www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/russia-ukraine-crisis-implications-for-global-oil-markets/andgasmarketsMikeFulwood,JackSharples,JamesHenderson,“UkraineInvasion:WhatThisMeansfortheEuropeanGasMarket”,OIESComment,March2022,https://www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/ukraine-invasion-what-this-means-for-the-european-gas-markets/2Chinaalsoimportswheat,potash,aluminiumandnickelfromRussia3Thecontentsofthispaperaretheauthor’ssoleresponsibility.TheydonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheOxfordInstituteforEnergyStudiesoranyofitsMembers.Figure2:China’scoalimportsbysource,MtSource:ChinaCustoms,OIESRussia-Chinapoliticalrelationsarealsostrong,ashighlightedbyajointstatementissuedon4February2022,justbeforetheopeningoftheWinterOlympicsinBeijing3:“Ontheafternoonof4February,PresidentXiJinpingheldtalkswithRussianPresidentVladimirPutin[…]Inawarmandfriendlyatmosphere,thetwoPresidentshadanin-depthandthoroughexchangeofviewsonChina-Russiarelationsandaseriesofmajorissuesthatconcerninternationalstrategicsecurityandstability4.”Attheside-linesofthissummit,RosneftandCNPCsigneda10-yearsupplydealforsuppliesofanadditional100millionmt(0.20mb/dofcrudeoil)whichiseffectivelytherenewalofanexistingagreementwhichexpiresattheendof2023andincludescrudedeliveredfromRussiatoChinaviaKazakhstanalongthe0.40mb/dKazakhstan’sAtasu-Alashankou(KKT)pipeline5.GazpromandCNPCsigneda10bcmagassupplydeal,expandingontheexisting38bcmaPowerofSiberia(PoS)project.ThetwodealssignedinearlyFebruaryweretestamenttothedeepeningenergytiesbetweenthetwocountries,withthedenominationofthegassupplycontractineurosastrongsignalofbothcountries’desiretomoveawayfromdollar-denominatedtrade6.Lessthanonemonthlater,followingtheRussianinvasionintoUkraine,andinlightofthesanctionsimposedonRussiabytheEUandtheUSaswellasothercountries,akeyquestioniswhetherChinawillincreaseitsimportsofRussiancommoditiesshunnedbyotherbuyers.3Thefulltextofthejointstatementcanbefoundherehttps://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Translations/2022-02-04%20China%20Russia%20joint%20statement%20International%20Relations%20Entering%20a%20New%20Era.pdf4“PresidentXiJinpingHeldTalkswithRussianPresidentVladimirPutin”,ChinaMinistryofForeignAffairs,4February2022,https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202202/t20220204_10638923.html5RosneftextendsChinasupplydealthroughKazakhstan”,25Feb22,Argus,https://direct.argusmedia.com/newsandanalysis/article/2305905.In2021,flowsthroughKazakhstan(accordingtoChinesecustomsdata)averaged0.10mb/d,suggestingthatthereisroomforhighersuppliesthroughtheKazakhroute.6Althoughitisnoteworthythattheydidnotdesignatetheyuanorroublesorthesettlement.4Thecontentsofthispaperaretheauthor’ssoleresponsibility.TheydonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheOxfordInstituteforEnergyStudiesoranyofitsMembers.ASWIFTresponseBeijing’sofficialpositionremainsthat:“Chinafirmlyopposesallillegalunilateralsanctions,andbelievesthatsanctionsareneverfundamentallyeffectivemeanstosolveproblems.Theywillonlycreateseriousdifficultiestotheeconomyandlivelihoodofrelevantcountriesandfurtherintensifydivisionandconfrontation[…]ChinaandRussiawillcontinuetoconductnormaltradecooperationinthespiritofmutualrespect,equalityandmutualbenefit”7.Inprinciple,then,ChinawillnotcutitselfofffromRussiansupplies.Thereality,however,ismorecomplicatedgiventhatmosttransactionsarestillsettledinUSdollars.SanctionsontheSWIFTpaymentsystemhavereportedlyledChinesebankstorestrictlettersofcredits(LCs)forRussianoilandcoalpurchases8.TradingcouldshifttotheChinesecurrency,theRenminbi(RMBoryuan),usingChina'scross-borderinterbankpaymentsystem(CIPS).ChinabegandevelopingCIPSasayuan-denominatedalternativetoSWIFTin2015,butfewoilmarketparticipantsarefamiliarwithitandclearingvolumesaresmall.UsingCIPSwilltaketimetosetupanditremainsuncleartowhatextentRussiansellersarewillingtomovewholesaletotheyuan.Moreover,eventhoughtheChinesegovernmenthasbeenkeentodevelopCIPSandyuan-denominatedtrading,BeijingwillwanttoavoidactivelydefyingsanctionsinawaythatcouldendupexposingChinesefirmstosecondarysanctions.Beijingwouldwantthereforetomaintainimports,withoutthoseflowsimpedingChinesecompanies’accesstoWesternmarkets.SometransactionswithRussiaarereportedlyalreadysettledinyuan,includingchemicalssoldbySiburtoSinopec9aswellasGazpromNeftpaymentsforrefuellingaircraftflyingtoandfromChina10.AccordingtoChinesepress,theRMBaccountedforover17percentoftradesettlementsbetweenChinaandRussiain202111.MoscowcouldthereforeuseitsforeignreservesinChinatofinanceimportsfromthecountryorusecurrencyswaps.China’sCentralBank,thePBOChasacurrencyswapof150billionyuanversus$1,750billioninroubleswithRussia’scentralbank,allowingthetwonationstoprovideliquiditytobusinessestocontinuetrading.Inaddition,anestimated13percentofRussia’sreserves,or$77billion,wereinChineseassetsasofJune202112.OilsuppliestocontinuebutalargerampupunlikelyOilsuppliestoChinawillcontinue,evenifvolumesfallintheneartermduetopaymentissues.0.60mb/dofcrudeflowstoPetroChinarefineriesinNortheastChinathroughtheESPOpipelineareunderapre-financedlong-termloansandwillthereforenotbeimpactedbySWIFTrestrictions.ButadditionalESPOvolumes,whichareloadedthroughtheKozminoterminalinRussia’sfareast,aresoldbySurgutneftegaztolargetradingfirmsthroughspottenders,forwhichLCsarerequired.China’slargeststate-ownedrefiners,PetroChinaandSinopecarenotusuallyrequiredtoopenLCs,whilemajortradinghousesandrefinerswithstrongcreditcanusetelegraphictransferstofinancedeals13andcanthenselltoindependentrefiners,whichusuallyrequireLCs.Butheretoo,SinopecandPetrochinawillbecarefulnottoengageinactivitiesthatcouldimpacttheirglobaltradingactivities.7“ForeignMinistrySpokespersonWangWenbin’sRegularPressConferenceonMarch2”,2022https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202203/t20220302_10647299.html8“ChinesebankscutaccesstofinancingforRussiacrude”,28February2022,Argus,https://direct.argusmedia.com/newsandanalysis/article/2306346;MuyuXu,ChenAizhu,“China'sRussiancoalpurchasesstallasbuyersstruggletosecurefinancing”,1March2022,9“SanctionstodrivemoreRussianpolymerstoChina”,Argus,28February2022,https://direct.argusmedia.com/newsandanalysis/article/2306380?keywords=sibur%20sinopec10ThepressreporthoweverstatesGazpromNeftislookingtoswitchfromUSdollarstoyuanandroubles“China,RussiaexpandtradesettlementsinlocalcurrenciestocounterUSdollarhegemony”,GlobalTimes,5September202111“Yuanincreasinglypreferredamidde-dollarizationofChina-Russiatrade”,GlobalTimes,25February202212“Russia-ChinaTradeStifledbyYuan’sSurgeAgainstRuble”,BloombergQuint,3March2022,https://www.bloombergquint.com/china/russia-china-trade-seen-handicapped-by-yuan-s-surge-versus-ruble13ChinesebuyerseyeUralscargoeswarily,Argus,28February2022,https://direct.argusmedia.com/newsandanalysis/article/23066395Thecontentsofthispaperaretheauthor’ssoleresponsibility.TheydonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheOxfordInstituteforEnergyStudiesoranyofitsMembers.BeyondPetroChina,theShandongmarketisthelargestconsumerofRussianoil,importinganaverage0.55mb/dofRussiancrudein2021,accordingtoKplerdata,withflowsfromKozminoaccountingforanaverage0.49mb/d.SalesintoShandongcouldfallonpaymentrestrictions—unlesslargetradersactasmiddlemen.Buttodate,theShandongmarkethasseenlowercrudedemandasrunshavebeencurtailedbytheWinterOlympicsandongoingtaxinspections.Stocklevels,accordingtoKpler,haveriseninQ122intheprovinceandsanctionedIranianbarrelscanalsobewithdrawnfromstorage.Shandongrefinersmaythereforestruggletoabsorbmoresourcrudeinthenearterm.Chinesebuyerswill,however,belookingtoimportmorecrudeanddiscountedbarrelswillfindahomeinChina,butthereislittleurgencytodosoaspricessoar.RefiningmarginsimprovedonhigherdomesticdemandduringtheLunarNewYearwhilecrudestockshavebeendrawndownfromtheir2020-2021highs.Agovernmentmandatetokeepbarrelsathomeinabidtostabilisedomesticpriceswillalsosupportpurchases.Butevenwiththelargedrawdownsofcrudefromstorage,overallstocklevelsarestillwellabove2019levels,offeringChinaabufferandlimitingtheurgencytoimportatveryhighcosts.Whatismore,whenglobaloilpricestradeatabove$130perbarrel,thedomesticpricingmechanismisnolongeradjustedupwardssorefinersstarttolosemoneyandconsumersbegintolimitroadfuelconsumption.Overallthen,ChineseimportsfromRussiaareunlikelytofallbelow0.8mb/dfromthe1.82mb/drecordedinDecember2021(includingbarrelsthroughKazakhstan).Oncebuyersandsellersfindawaytosettletransactions,flowswilllikelyrecoverto2021averagelevelsof1.6mb/dunlesstheyarediscountedwidely,eitherforrefineryprocessingortogointostorage.FlowswillhavetobeseaborneorthroughKazakhstan,asthereislikelylimitedupsideontheESPOline.TakingthelongviewongasChinesebuyerswillalsocontinuetoimportRussiangas.PipelineflowsthroughthePoSaresettorisebyanother4bcmin2022to14-15bcm.IntermsofLNG,CNPChasa3MtpaSPAwithYamalLNG(ofwhichCNPCisalsoastakeholder)and4.6Mtpaofnewsuppliesstartingupin2023fromArcticLNG2,inwhichChinesecompaniesarealsoshareholders.Currently,mostLNGflowsfromRussiaarefromYamalLNGwithsomevolumesfromSakhalinLNG,accordingtoKpler.Inthenear-term,anypotentialstrandedLNGcargoesthatcannotbedeliveredtoEurope(becauseoffinancialsanctionsoraRussiandecisiontocurbsupplies)couldgotoAsia,butthiswouldlikelyincurapremiumonshippingandredirectioncosts,inadditiontothealreadyrecordhighspotprices.Goingforward,however,additionalLNGvolumescouldgostraighttoChinaviatheNorthernSeaRoute,especiallyiftheyareofferedatadiscount.Figure3:ChineseLNGimports,bcmSource:ChinaCustoms,OIES6Thecontentsofthispaperaretheauthor’ssoleresponsibility.TheydonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheOxfordInstituteforEnergyStudiesoranyofitsMembers.ChinawillbecomeanincreasinglyimportantexportmarketforRussia.Pipelineflowscannotrampupquickly(beyondtheagreed38bcmaonPoS1)inthenearterm,andthe10bcmagassupplyagreementsignedbetweenGazpromandCNPCon4Februaryisunlikelytostartupbefore2024.ButasEuropelookstoreduceitsenergydependenceonRussia,PowerofSiberia2willbeapriorityforGazprom.ShouldRussiabeinapositiontooffersignificantpricediscountstoChinaonPoS2,BeijingmaywellconcludeanotherpipelinesupplydealwithRussiasoonerratherthanlater14,whilealsocontinuingtoseeknewLNGcontractswithRussiaandwithotherexporters.Thatsaid,evenaswiftagreementonPoSwouldnotresultinflowsbeforethelate2020satbestorearly2030smorerealistically.Figure4:China’spipelineimports,bcmSource:ChinaCustoms,OIESChineseinvestorscouldalsofurtherincreasetheirinvestmentsinRussianprojects.Alreadysince2014,whenRussiancompanies’accesstoWesternfinancingwasrestrictedduetosanctions,Chinesecompaniessteppedin.CNPCbought20percentsharesinYamalLNGin2013,andin2015theSilkRoadFundtooka9.9percentstakeintheproject.In2016ChinesebanksalsoagreedtolendNovatek$12billionfortheproject.ChineseinvestorsarealsoheavilyinvolvedinNovatek’sArcticLNG2,whichiscurrentlyunderdevelopment.CNOOCandCNPCeachholda10percentstakeintheproject.NovatekhassincesignedsupplycontractswithChinesecompaniesincludingShenergyGroupandZheijangEnergy.Meanwhile,ChineseservicecompaniescouldalsobenefitfromsanctionsifandasWesterncompaniespullout.Longtermgain,shorttermheadacheWhileChinastandstobenefitfromRussia’sneedtopivotEast,intheshortterm,soaringpricesofallcommoditieswillplaceconsiderablepressureontheChineseeconomyandcouldbecomeadistractioninthispoliticallyimportantyear.Withaleadershiptransitionattheendoftheyear,inwhichXiJinpingwillbesworninforanunprecedentedthirdterminoffice,Beijingwouldhavelikelypreferredtoavoidtheinflationarypressurerelatedtohighercommoditypricesandthegeopoliticalchallengesassociatedwiththecrisis.Moreover,thesurgeinoil-indexedgasandLNGpricessurgewillweighonChina’simporters(andtoalesserdegreeonend-usersgivendomesticpricecontrols)whilepowerplantswillseektoswitchbacktocoalwherepossible.AndgivenChina’sinformalbanonAustraliancoalalongsideIndonesia’scoalexportban,domesticproductionwilllikelyincrease,complicatingChina’s14FormoredetailsonthegassupplydealseeVitalyYermakov,MichalMeidan,“RussiaandChinaExpandTheirGasDeal:KeyImplications”,OIESComment,forthcoming7Thecontentsofthispaperaretheauthor’ssoleresponsibility.TheydonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheOxfordInstituteforEnergyStudiesoranyofitsMembers.environmentalpledges,offeringareminderofthechallengingtrade-offbetweenshorttermsupplysecurityandsustainability15.Geopolitically,theRussianinvasionputsBeijinginabind.WhileChinaiscloselyalignedwithRussiastrategicallyanddiplomatically,itwillwanttoprotectitseconomicinteractionswithglobalmarkets.AndwhileBeijingmayhavedeterminedthattheWestisindecline,itstillconsidersthattheUSisseekingtocontainChina’srise.Thus,Chinawillwanttoavoidbecomingthetargetofsecondarysanctions.ThesanctionsimposedfollowingtheRussianinvasionofUkrainewillprovideinvaluableinsightsforBeijingontheeffectivenessofsanctionsregimes,andlessonsastohowBeijingcouldprotectitselffromanypotentialsanctionstheUSortheWestcouldseektoimpose.15See“KeyThemesfortheGlobalEnergyEconomyin2022”,OIESSpecialReport,January2022https://www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/key-themes-for-the-global-energy-economy-in-2022/

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