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首页文档碳中和资料研究报告世界能源展望2022：全球宏观经济和能源市场前景（英）-equinor

世界能源展望2022：全球宏观经济和能源市场前景（英）-equinorVIP专享VIP免费

2022
nergy
Perspectives
Global macroeconomic and energy market outlook
2 | Energy Perspectives 2022
WE BUILD
TOO MANY
WALLS
AND
NOT ENOUGH
BRIDGES
Sir Isaac Newton
Energy Perspectives 2022 | 3
Welcome to Equinor’s
Energy Perspectives 2022
Meeting global climate goals through an energy
transition is an immense challenge that requires
commitment from governments, industry and
individuals alike. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
earlier this year has not only tragically impacted
the lives and livelihoods of those directly aected,
but the associated geopolitical tensions have
also further deteriorated global cooperation and
trade and supply flows on which a sustainable
energy transition is completely dependent.
Security of energy supply has come to the
forefront of the energy policy agenda, with rising
energy prices and unprecedented overall cost of
living, keeping energy aordability firmly on the
agenda as well.
In order to bring the world on track to address
long-term sustainability challenges in a balanced
manner, trust, cooperation, and burden-sharing
must be established. This will take time and is by
no means guaranteed. As long as short-termism
and local priorities dominate policy making, the
necessary global changes in the direction of
sustainable development will be delayed.
Energy Perspectives presents two distinct
scenarios for the future world economy,
international energy markets and energy-related
greenhouse gas emissions. The scenarios are not
predictions, but possible contrasting pathways,
providing a platform for debate and decision
making.
The two scenarios, Walls and Bridges, illustrate
very dierent future pathways driven by a variety
of factors, ranging from economic growth and
technological development to climate policy
and geopolitics. The scenarios aim to highlight
the immense challenges that must be overcome
to make the move from the slow, incremental
changes that characterise the energy transition
today (Walls), to the radical changes needed to
move the world onto a path aligned with the 1.5°C
ambition of the Paris Agreement (Bridges).
We are committed to being a leader
in the energy transition. Energy
Perspectives provides me and my
colleagues with crucial insight about the
outcome space within which we have to
balance our strategic priorities.
Anders Opedal
President and CEO
Walls divide and bridges connect. Our
new scenarios paint a large outcome
space for what the long-term energy
future might look like based on choices
made today and going forward.
Eirik Wærness
Senior vice
president and
Chief economist
/56
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2022EnergyPerspectivesGlobalmacroeconomicandenergymarketoutlook2EnergyPerspectives2022WEBUILD​TOOMANY​WALLSAND​NOTENOUGH​BRIDGESSirIsaacNewtonEnergyPerspectives20223WelcometoEquinor’sEnergyPerspectives2022Meetingglobalclimategoalsthroughanenergytransitionisanimmensechallengethatrequirescommitmentfromgovernments,industryandindividualsalike.Russia’sinvasionofUkraineearlierthisyearhasnotonlytragicallyimpactedthelivesandlivelihoodsofthosedirectlyaffected,buttheassociatedgeopoliticaltensionshavealsofurtherdeterioratedglobalcooperationandtradeandsupplyflowsonwhichasustainableenergytransitioniscompletelydependent.Securityofenergysupplyhascometotheforefrontoftheenergypolicyagenda,withrisingenergypricesandunprecedentedoverallcostofliving,keepingenergyaffordabilityfirmlyontheagendaaswell.​Inordertobringtheworldontracktoaddresslong-termsustainabilitychallengesinabalancedmanner,trust,cooperation,andburden-sharingmustbeestablished.Thiswilltaketimeandisbynomeansguaranteed.Aslongasshort-termismandlocalprioritiesdominatepolicymaking,thenecessaryglobalchangesinthedirectionofsustainabledevelopmentwillbedelayed.​EnergyPerspectivespresentstwodistinctscenariosforthefutureworldeconomy,internationalenergymarketsandenergy-relatedgreenhousegasemissions.Thescenariosarenotpredictions,butpossiblecontrastingpathways,providingaplatformfordebateanddecisionmaking.​Thetwoscenarios,WallsandBridges,illustrateverydifferentfuturepathwaysdrivenbyavarietyoffactors,rangingfromeconomicgrowthandtechnologicaldevelopmenttoclimatepolicyandgeopolitics.Thescenariosaimtohighlighttheimmensechallengesthatmustbeovercometomakethemovefromtheslow,incrementalchangesthatcharacterisetheenergytransitiontoday(Walls),totheradicalchangesneededtomovetheworldontoapathalignedwiththe1.5°CambitionoftheParisAgreement(Bridges).Wearecommittedtobeingaleaderintheenergytransition.EnergyPerspectivesprovidesmeandmycolleagueswithcrucialinsightabouttheoutcomespacewithinwhichwehavetobalanceourstrategicpriorities.AndersOpedalPresidentandCEOWallsdivideandbridgesconnect.Ournewscenariospaintalargeoutcomespaceforwhatthelong-termenergyfuturemightlooklikebasedonchoicesmadetodayandgoingforward.EirikWærnessSeniorvicepresidentandChiefeconomist4EnergyPerspectives2022EnergyPerspectives2022presentstwoscenariosforeconomicandenergymarketdevelopment,WallsandBridges​.Wallsbuildsoncurrentenergymarkettrendsandenergyandclimatepolicies,assumingclimateactiontoprogressataslowlyacceleratingpaceinthefuture.​Bridgesisanormativeback-castcomplyingwiththe1.5°Ccarbonbudget,demonstratingtheenormousandsustainedeffortsrequiredtoreachthistarget.DecarbonisationAffordabilitySecurityExtremeweatherWarinEuropeCostoflivingcrisisSustainableenergypolicy0246810121420102020203020402050WallsBridgesHistoryGlobalfossilfueldemandGtoeIEA(history),Equinor(projections)KeyinsightsfromEnergyPerspectives2022Policy-makers’focushasshiftedrepeatedlyoverthelast18months​Thisisduetothecost-of-livingcrisis,theRussianinvasionofUkraine,andextremeweatherevents.​Sustainableenergypolicyrequiresmaintainingbetweenthesecompetingprioritiestobemaintained.Peakdemandforfossilfuelsarrivesbefore2030​InWalls,thepeakoccursin2026,followedbyagentledownwardtrajectory.​InBridges,fossilfueldemanddeclinesatarapidpaceafter2025.By2050,allremainingfossilfueluseiseitherfullyabatedorcompensatedbycarbonremoval.WALLSBRIDGESGasdemandwillcontinuetogrowinWalls,butdeclinessharplyinBridges​InWalls,gasdemandpeaksin2041andisaround10%higherthantoday’slevelin2050.​InBridges,gasdemandpeaksin2025andfallstoaroundaquarteroftoday’slevelin2050.​Energyconsumptionshiftstowardselectricity​InWalls,electrificationacceleratessteadilytowards2050,increasingitssharebyhalf.​InBridges,amassiveaccelerationhappensbefore2030.By2050,theshareexceeds50%,twoandahalftimesaslargeastoday.​Thegrowthofwind&solarphotovoltaics(PV)capacityoutrunsallprevioustrends​InWalls,windcapacityissixtimesgreater,andsolarPVcapacity12timesgreaterin2050comparedwithtoday.​InBridges,windcapacityis12timesgreater,andsolarPVcapacity27timesgreaterin2050comparedwithtoday.​01234520102020203020402050WallsBridgesHistory0510152025WallsBridgesWallsBridgesSolarPVWind201920302050Globalgasdemand​ThousandBcm​Wind&solarPVcapacity​​ThousandGW​010203040506020102020203020402050WallsBridgesHistoryElectricityshareofenergyconsumption​%EnergyPerspectives20225IEA(history),Equinor(projections)IEA(history),Equinor(projections)IEA(history),Equinor(projections)Electrificationandhydrogen-basedfuelswillcontributetothedecarbonisationoftransport​Inbothscenarios,electricvehiclesreplaceinternalcombustionenginesinroadtransport.​InBridges,furtherdecarbonisationisachievedbyincreasingtheuseofhydrogen-basedfuelsinmarineandairtransport.Carboncapture,utilisationandstorage(CCUS)willplayanessentialroleinthedecarbonisationofthepowerandindustrysectors​InWalls,CCUSonbothcoalandgasstartstoaccelerateafter2030.​InBridges,thereismassivegrowthinCCUSevenbefore2030,andnounabatedfossilfueluseremainsin2050.​01234567WallsBridgesWallsBridgesCoalOilGasNBSDACBECCS201920302050-1001020304020152020202520302035204020452050WallsBridgesHistory01234WallsBridgesWallsBridgesMillionsOilGasBiomassHydrogenElectricity201920302050Carboncapturedandstoredannually​GtCO₂Globalenergy-relatedCO₂emissions,​aftercarbonremoval​​GtCO₂Transportfuelmix​GtoeSource:IEA(history)Equinor(projections)Source:IEA(history)Equinor(projections)NBS/DAC/BECCS–definitionsareonpage9​Currentnetzerocommitmentsarenotenoughtoavoidglobalwarmingabove1.5°C​InWalls,the1.5°Cbudgetisexhaustedby2032.InBridges,currentcommitmentsaremet,andfurthercommitmentsaremadethatenableemissionstoremainwithinthe1.5°Ccarbonbudgetwiththehelpofcarbonremovaltechnologies.​6EnergyPerspectives2022Source:IEA(history)Equinor(projections)TableofcontentsWelcometoEquinor’sEnergyPerspectives2022​................................................................................................................................................................3​KeyinsightsfromEnergyPerspectives2022...........................................................................................................................................................................4​Tableofcontents​................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................7Introduction​............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................8​Theenergytransition​...........................................................................................................................................................................................................................9Netzeroand1.5°Ctargets​............................................................................................................................................................................................................10​Theenergytrilemma​..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................12Energyintensity​......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................14Short-termoutlook​........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................16​Geopoliticaldrivers​..............................................................................................................................................................................................................................17​Globaleconomy​.....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................18Outlookto2025​.....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................19​Commodities​...........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................20Thescenarios​.....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................22​Thescenarios​..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................23Walls​...............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................25Bridges​..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................27​Long-termoutlook​........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................30Theenergyworld:Twoscenarios​.............................................................................................................................................................................................31Globalenergydemand​....................................................................................................................................................................................................................32Globalenergyconsumption:Fuelmix​...................................................................................................................................................................................33​Globalenergyconsumption:Regionalperspectives​...............................................................................................................................................34Theenergyworldin2030and2050​..................................................................................................................................................................................35Globaleconomy​....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................36​Elevatedinflation​...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................37Globaloilmarket​..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................38Challengesforthefutureofrefining​.....................................................................................................................................................................................39​Decarbonisingtheaviationindustry​.....................................................................................................................................................................................40Globalgasmarket​...............................................................................................................................................................................................................................41​RussiangassupplytoEurope​....................................................................................................................................................................................................42Globalelectricitymarket​...............................................................................................................................................................................................................43​Iscurrentmarketdesignfitforpurpose?​.........................................................................................................................................................................44Globalhydrogenmarket​................................................................................................................................................................................................................45Keysectorinsights:Industry​........................................................................................................................................................................................................46​Keysectorinsights:Buildings​.......................................................................................................................................................................................................47Keysectorinsights:Transport​....................................................................................................................................................................................................48Emissions​................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................50​Energy-relatedgreenhousegasemissions​.....................................................................................................................................................................51Energy-relatedCO₂emissions​..................................................................................................................................................................................................52Keyfigures​............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................53​Units,definitionsandphotocredits​...............................................................................................................................................................................................54Acknowledgementsanddisclaimer​...............................................................................................................................................................................................55​EnergyPerspectives20227INTRODUCTION8EnergyPerspectives2022«PreviousBacktotableofcontentsNext»EnergyPerspectives20229TheenergytransitionTheenergytransitionisdefinedbyanongoingprocessofrestructuringtheenergysystemthroughenergyefficiencyandsubstitutingawayfromfossilfuelstowardssustainablelow-carbonenergysources,inordertodeliversufficientenergy,reduceCO₂emissionsandlimitglobalwarming.​Asthethreatsposedbyglobalwarminghavebecomeprogressivelymoreevident,theconceptofenergytransitionhasbecomecoupledwiththeambitiontoreducenetgreenhousegasemissionstozerobythemiddleofthecentury,andpreferablycapglobalwarmingat1.5°Cabovepre-industriallevels.Massivetransformativemeasuresandstructuralchangesintheglobalenergysystemareneededtosupporttheenergytransition.Thekeyenablerstothistransitioncanbecategorisedasfollows:Rapidgrowthinthesharesofwindandsolarphotovoltaic(PV)generationinthepowersector,andelectricvehicle(EV)sales,demonstratethattheenergytransitionisunderwayinsomesectors.​However,whilepowergenerationaccountsforsome40%ofglobalCO₂emissions,andpassengercaruseforanother9%,completedecarbonisationofthesetwosectorswould,allelsebeingequal,leavetheworldwithemissionsatabouthalfoftoday’slevel.Thiswouldreduceglobalwarmingbutnotcomeclosetodeliveringonthe1.5°Ctarget.Furthermore,emissionsremaininginothersectorsareprovingmorechallengingtoeliminate,forexamplehigh-temperatureindustrialprocessheatingandnon-roadtransportation.​​Theenergytransitionneedstoconsiderthegrowthaspirationsofpoorercountriesand,moregenerally,theaffordabilityofelectricityandfuelstoconsumers.Climbingoutofpovertymaycomeintoatleasttemporaryconflictwithemissionreductiontargets,suggestingdifficulttrade-offs.Inaddition,theenergytransition,ashighlightedbyeventsthiswinter,needstobealignedwiththerequirementforsupplysecurity.​Facilitatinganenergytransitionthatdeliversonthe1.5°Ctargetisanenormouschallenge.Meetingthe1.5°Ctargetinajustandsustainablemannerforalladdsadditionallevelsofcomplexity.ENERGYINTENSITY​Decouplingeconomicactivityandenergyuse​•Structuralchangestotheeconomy​•Technologicalimprovements​•Behaviouralchanges​CARBONINTENSITY​Decarbonisingenergyuse​•Fuel-switching,includingelectrification​•Renewableenergysources​•Carboncapture,utilisationandstorageCARBONREMOVAL​Removingcarbonfromtheatmosphere​•Nature-basedsolutions(NBS)​•Bioenergywithcarboncaptureandstorage(BECCS)​•Directaircapture(DAC)10EnergyPerspectives2022Netzeroand1.5°Ctargets​AroundseventycountrieshavealreadycommittedtoreducingtheirCO₂emissionstonetzerobythemiddleofthe21stcentury,comprisingaroundthree-quartersofcurrentglobalemissions.Manycorporationshavealsoannouncednetzerotargetsandputforwardstrategiestoachievetheseambitions.​Itisacommonmisperceptionthatachievingnetzerowilldeliveronthe1.5°Ccaponglobalwarming.​Cappingglobalwarmingat1.5°Cabovepre-industriallevelswasagreeduponasanambitioninParisin2015attheUnitedNationsClimateChangeConference.ItbecamethedominanttargetaftertheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)publishedareportonglobalwarmingof1.5°Cin2018.The1.5°Ctargetcorrespondstoaspecificremainingcarbonemissionsbudget.TheIPCCAR6reportof2021estimatedthisbudgettobe500GtCO₂fortheperiod2020-50,whichcoversemissionsintheenergysystemaswellasotheruses.Thisimpliesthattheworldhaslessthantenyearsatcurrentemissionslevelsbeforethebudgetisexhausted.Netzero,sometimescalledcarbonneutrality,referstotheequilibriumbetweenthenumberofanthropogenicgreenhousegasesreleasedintotheatmosphereandtheamountremovedandstoredbycarbonsinks.Acommitmenttonetzeroentailsacommitmenttoachievingthisequilibriumataspecificfuturepointintimeandsustainingthisbalanceindefinitely.​Inshort,the1.5°Ctargetrequirescumulativenetcarbonemissionstoremainunderafinitelevel,whilstnetzerorequiresonlythatemissionsarebalancedbyanequivalentamountofcarbonremovalaftersomespecificpointinthefuture.​Itfollowsthatthe1.5°Ctargetisthemoreonerousconstraint:ofthemanypathwaysthatleadtonetzerobymid-century,thevastmajoritywillnotmeetthe1.5°Ctarget.Countrieswithnetzerotargetsseteitherinlaw,policydocumentsorpledges2035204020452050205320602070TheIPCC’s6thAssessmentReportputstheCO₂budgetforthe2020-50periodat500Gt.Thisbudgetistobesharedbetweenemissionsinenergy,industrialuseslikecement,andagriculture.Inthisanalysisabudgetof445Gtisallocatedtoemissionsforenergypurposes.​Source:Energy&ClimateIntelligenceUnit,MapChartEnergyPerspectives202211The1.5°Ctargetcanbeachievedonlythrougharadicalandunprecedentedreductioninemissionsasaresultofanacceleratedphase-outoffossilfuelsintheshort-to-mediumterm,asdemonstratedinBridges,ascenariowhichnotonlyachievesnetzeroby2050butalsocomplieswiththerequiredcarbonbudget.​Postponingthephase-outoffossilfuelsandmaintaining,orincreasing,emissionsintheshort-to-mediumtermwillonlyexacerbatethechallengeandwillrequireevenmoreradicalandchallengingemissionreductionsinlateryears.​Totrytoputintocontexttheunprecedentedemissionsreductionsrequiredtoachievethe1.5°Ctarget,considerthetwofollowingpossiblefutures,illustratedinthechartsbelow:​•Lineardecline:Alineardeclineinemissionsofapproximately1.1Gtperyear,reachingnetzeroin2050,whichwillovershoottheemissionsbudgetintheyear2038.​•Coviddecline:Anannualreductioninemissionsof5.8%peryearuntil2050,asimilarlevelofdeclinetothatobservedin2020inresponsetoreducedactivitylevelsduringtheCovid-19lockdowns,whichwillovershoottheemissionsbudgetintheyear2043.​Neitheroftheseextremealternativesavoidsovershootingtheemissionbudgetcompatiblewitha1.5°Ctemperatureincrease,meaningthatinbothcasesnegativeemissionsatafuturedatewouldberequiredtoreducetheaggregatecarbonemissionsandcomplywiththebudget.20152020202520302035204020452050LineardeclineCoviddeclineTarget0100200300400500600Cumulativeenergy-relatedemissions​GtCO₂​051015202530354020152020202520302035204020452050LineardeclineCoviddeclineHistoryAnnualenergy-relatedemissions​GtCO₂​Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections)​Source:Equinor​12EnergyPerspectives2022Theenergytrilemma​Thepurposeofenergypolicymakingistousethetoolsofgovernmentincludingnationallegislation,internationaltreaties,investmentincentives,taxationandotherpublicpolicyelements,tofindanacceptableandsustainablecompromisebetweenamyriadofcompetingpriorities.Thiscompromiseiscommonlysimplifiedandreferredtoasthe‘EnergyTrilemma’,atrade-offbetweenthreecriteria:​•Energyaffordability:thatconsumers’needsforheating,coolingandotherenergyservicescanbemetwithoutcompromisingtheirabilitytomeetotherbasicneeds​•Energysecurity:thatenergysupplyisalwaysavailableinadequateamounts,robustagainstgeopoliticalinstabilityand/ornaturaldisasters​•Energydecarbonisation:thatenergyservicesareprovidedandconsumedinwaysthatdonotendangerfuturesupplyornegativelyimpacttheclimate,disadvantagingfuturegenerations​Policymakers’concernsaboutindividualcriteriahaveebbedandflowed,andpolicyprioritieshaveshiftedaccordingly.Thediagrambelowisasimplifiedillustrationofthechangingfocusofglobalenergypolicyoverthepastdecade,withthelasteighteenmonthsexhibitingaparticularlyerratictrajectory.​PriortotheParisAgreement,energypolicywaspredominantlyefficiency-drivenanddirectedmainlyatsecuringenergysupplyascheaplyaspossible,althoughtherewereremindersinperiodsofoilmarketturbulencethatenergyaffordabilitydependedverymuchonenergysupplysecurity.Localpollutionwasafactorinenergypolicymaking,butwiderenvironmentalissues,withthenotableexceptionoftheholeintheozonelayer,receivedlimitedattention.​TheParisAgreementbroughtclimatechangetotheforefrontofenergypolicy,andsubsequentIPCCreportsandConferencesoftheParties(COPs)havereinforcedthisprioritisation.Althoughthecostsofpursuingdecarbonisationtargetswerenotaltogetherignored,energyaffordabilitywasoftenrelegatedtoasecondaryconcern,andpotentialsupplysecuritychallengesweretypicallydiscounted.​AlthoughtheeconomicrecoveryfromCovid-19droveasharpreboundinfossilfueldemandandmadeenergyaffordabilityahigh-profileissueinthesummerof2021,COP26inGlasgowinlate2021seemedtohavemaintainedthefocusondecarbonisation.However,theinvasionofUkrainebyRussianforcesinFebruaryofthisyearbroughttheissueofsecuritybacktotheforefrontofenergypolicy.Furtherrisesinenergypricesandtheoverallcostoflivingkeptenergyaffordabilityatthetopoftheagendainmanycountries.DecarbonisationAffordabilitySecurityPre-ParisPost-ParisSustainableenergypolicyLockdownreboundCOP26PresentRussia’sinvasionofUkraineAschematicillustrationofthechangingfocusofglobalenergypolicysincetheParisAgreementwasnegotiatedandadoptedin2015Source:Equinor​EnergyPerspectives202213Itishighlyuncertainnowwherethefocusofenergypolicywillmovenext.​•Willdecarbonisationregainitsmomentumanditspositiononthepoliticalagenda?Willtheincreasingfrequencyofextremeweathereventsimpactingnaturalhabitats,destroyingpeople’shomes,anddisruptinginfrastructure,provokepolicymakerstofocusmoreonclimatechangemitigationoradaptation?​•Willthecost-of-livingcrisisleadtoincreasedenergypovertyandfoodshortages?WilltheongoingsituationinUkraineexacerbatethecrisis,andfoodsecuritybecomeaglobalissue?​•Asemergingeconomiesstrivetoraisethelivingstandardsoftheirpopulationsandinevitablyconsumemoreenergy,willthatenergybesuppliedsustainably?Shouldtheeconomicriseoftheseregionsbelimitedbytheemissionlegacyoftheindustrialisedregions?​•Willbottlenecksinthesupplyofmineralscriticaltotheenergytransition,includinglithiumandcobalt(forbatteries),silicon(forsolarpanels),rareearthelements(forpermanentmagnets)andsteel,copper,aluminiumandnickel(forpracticallyeverything),imposelimitstotherateofelectrificationofroadtransportanddecarbonisationofregionalpowersystems?Willtherelianceonasmallnumberofcountriesformanyoftheseminerals,andrelianceonChinaforrefinement,givefurtherreasonsforconcern?WilltheexclusionofRussiafromglobaltradeexacerbatecriticalbottlenecks?​Theenergysupplysecurityandenergydecarbonisationcriteriacallformanyofthesamelong-termsolutions,namelytheprioritisationofenergyefficiencymeasuresandanacceleratedshiftfromimportedfossilfuelstoindigenousrenewableenergysources,meaninginmostcaseswindandsolarpower.​Moreover,climatechangewilllikelyprovideasteadystreamofremindersofitsexistence,asithasthissummer,withheatwaves,forestfires,floodsanddroughtsaffectinglargepartsofEurope,NorthAmericaandAsia.​Atthesametime,theissueofenergyaffordabilityisnotexpectedtodiminishinimportanceintheshortterm.Theseconflictingdemandsshouldensurethatthefocusofactualpolicymakingwillbenearthesweetspotwheretheconflictingdemandsofenergysecurity,affordabilityanddecarbonisationareadequatelybalanced.​Theaimofenergypolicymakersistofindapathwaytothesweetspot.Anysuchpathwaywillmeetbarriers,andthetestwillbeinhowefficientlyobstructionscanbesurmounted,circumventedordismantled.14EnergyPerspectives2022Energyintensity​Theenergyintensityofaneconomy,beittheworld,aregion,acountryoranindustry,denotestheamountofenergyrequiredtoproduceaunitoftheeconomy’soutput.Changesinthisamountarenotonlydrivenbychangesinenergyefficiency,butbymanyotherfactorsaswell.Energyintensityisthusawiderconceptthanenergyefficiency.​Energyintensityisausefulmetricforenergyscenariobuildersbecauseitispossibletoseetrendsinpastchanges,indicatingthescopeforfuturechanges.Energyintensityprojectionstogetherwitheconomicoutputprojectionsenableanalyststodevelopenergydemandoutlookswhichareessentialcomponentsofenergyscenarioanalysis.​Technologicalchangesarethemaindriverofenergyintensityimprovements,encompassingthedevelopmentoftechnologycapableofdeliveringthesameamountsofoutputwithlessenergyinputalongwiththedeploymentofthistechnologyviatheturnoverofcapitalstock,andthesubsequentchangestotheenergymixthatresultfromthis.Themostprominentexampleofthelatteriselectrification.Electricengineswastelessenergythancombustionengines,andthustheongoinggradualreplacementofconventionalcarswithEVslowerstheenergyintensityofroadtransport.​Normally,theprofitmotivewouldstimulateprogressinthedevelopmentanddeploymentofmoreenergy-efficienttechnologyinordertoreduceinputcosts.​Itmaybe,however,thatthemarketdoesnotdeliverimprovementsatthepacerequiredbyenvironmentalorsupplysecurityconcerns.Ifso,policymakersmayintervenewithtargetsandincentivestoaccelerateprogress.​Theseconddriverofenergyintensityimprovementsisstructuralchangestotheeconomy,i.e.changesinthesectorcompositionofitsoutput.Economiestypicallyevolveinstages,withthefirststagecharacterisedbyagrarianproduction,thesecondbyindustrialisationandthethirdbyrapidgrowthintheprovisionofservices.Arecurrentpatternisthatthemigrationofresourcesbetweensectorsfirstleadstoanincreaseandthentoadeclineinenergyintensity.​Thethirddriverischangesinbehaviour.Givenincentives,peoplemaybewillingtomakedowithsmalleramountsofenergyservices.Theymayaccepttotravelless,turndowntheirradiatorsandevenadjusttheireatinghabitstowardsfoodproducedwithasmallerenergyandemissionfootprint.Thishashappenedbefore,atleastovershortperiods,andmayhappenagain.​Annualchangesinenergyintensitiesfluctuateastheweatherplaysapart.Whilecoldwintersandhotsummerspushupthedemandforheatingandcooling,mildwintersandsummersdotheopposite,withsharpdeviationsfromthetrendasaresult.However,cleartrendsexist,andtheyaremostlydown.Between1990and2019,theenergyintensitiesofNorthAmerica,theEU27area,ChinaandIndiadeclinedbyaveragesof1.8%,1.8%,3.9%and1.9%peryearrespectively,accordingtoIEAdata.Globally,therewasalevellingoutintheearly2000sreflectingChina’srapidindustrialisationandbuild-outofinfrastructure,butsincearound2010thedownwardtrendhasreasserteditself.1990199520002005201020152020ChinaIndiaIndustrialisedOtheremerging0200400600800EnergyintensitytoepermillionUSD​Source:IEA©OxfordEconomicsLimited2022EnergyintensityTechnologicalchangesStructuralchangesBehaviouralchangesMarketsignalsEnergypolicyDriversofenergyintensitySource:EquinorEnergyPerspectives202215SHORT-TERMOUTLOOK​16EnergyPerspectives2022«PreviousBacktotableofcontentsNext»EnergyPerspectives202217Geopoliticaldrivers​Russia’sinvasionofUkrainewilldrivebroadglobalchange.Thecoreconflictwillnotberesolvedintheshort-to-mediumterm,andthewarwillcontinuetolastformonthsifnotyears.TheliberalworldorderwillremainunderpressurefromRussia’schallenge,andtheoutcomeinUkrainewillreverberatearoundtheworld.NatowillspendmoreondefenceandtensioninEuropewillgrow.Russiawillmuddlethrougheconomicallydespitesanctions,increasinglyrelyingonawareconomyapproach.Thewarwillimpacttheglobaleconomynegativelyfarbeyondoriginalexpectations,whichmayinturnleadtoincreasedpoliticalvolatility.​Withenergyweaponised,energysecuritywillbeakeypolicypriority.Thereislittletosuggestareturntonormalcyanytimesoon.TheEUhascommittedtoshuttingoutRussianhydrocarbons.BeforeRussiangasbecomesobsolete,MoscowwilldowhatitcantomakesuregasshortagesmakethenextcoupleofwintersinEuropeeconomicallyandpoliticallychallenging.TheEUwillnotabandontheirenergytransitionandclimategoals,buttheywillbemorepainfulthananticipatedtoachieve.Opec+willseektocontinuetowielditsmarketpowerandsustainhighoilprices.Cooperationandunityonaddressingclimatechangecouldbeinjeopardy.​Thedividebetweendevelopedandemergingeconomieswilldeepen.First,thepost-pandemiceconomicdownturnwillaffectpoorcountriesandpoorpeopledisproportionately.Second,theaftermathoftheCovid-19pandemicandtheperceivedunfairnessinvaccinedistributionwilllinger.Third,climatepolicyandtheenergytransitionwillincreasinglybeseenbytheglobalSouthasaNorth-westernresponsibility,andtherewillbefearthatclimatepoliciescanentrenchdeveloped-economydominance.Allofthiswillreducetheworld’sabilitytotacklemainissuestogether.​Reglobalisationisglobalisationthatrecognisestheimportanceofnationalsecurity,supplychainresilience,andclimatechange,whichinturnaddsnewrisks.After30yearsofglobalisationwithvastgainsforbusinessandconsumers,Chinese-USrivalryandRussia’sinvasionofUkrainearechangingtheglobaleconomy.Commodities,logistics,technology,andfinancewillbethemostvulnerablesectors,andsupplychainscouldbeselectivelydecoupledforpoliticalpurposes.Inaworldwithlesstrust,autarkyandprotectionismwillbepoliticallyfashionable.Businesseswillhavedifferentriskstoconsider.However,thiswillnotbetheendofglobaltradeandsupplychains;ratherglobalisationwithanewruleset:reglobalisation.WILDCARD:EvenwiththepositivemomentumoftheInflationReductionAct,theelectionofaUSrepublicanpresidentin2024couldfastoverturnBiden’spoliciesonclimate,energy,trade,andsecurity(Nato).Intheshortterm,USgloballeadershipwillalsobehamperedbyinternaldivisionsandisolationistimpulses.18EnergyPerspectives2022GlobaleconomyIn2021,theglobaleconomyreboundedfollowingtheCovid-19pandemiceconomicdownturn.Globaleconomicgrowthin2021was5.9%comparedtothe3.4%contractionin2020.Growthwasstrongamongmosteconomies.TheEurozoneeconomyexpandedby5.3%,theUSeconomyby5.7%,andtheChineseeconomyby8.1%.Globally,GDPrecoveredtothepre-pandemiclevelinthefirstquarterof2021.​AsRussiainvadedUkraineinFebruary2022globalgrowthexpectationsfortheyearweresignificantlyreduced.RussiaandUkraineaccountforarelativelysmallpartoftheglobaleconomy,buttheyareimportantsuppliersofenergy,foodcommodities,fertilisers,andcertainmetals.ThewarhasledtothedestructionofUkrainianproductioncapacity,disruptionofsupplychainsandeconomicsanctionsonRussia.Thesedevelopmentshavecontributedtosupplyshortagesandincreasedpricelevelsforthegoodsmentionedabove.Asaconsequence,theglobaleconomyhasslowedduringthefirsthalfof2022.​EuropeistheregionmostsignificantlyhitbythewarinUkraine.Priortothewar,RussiawastheEU’smainenergyprovider,supplyingalmost40%ofgasandsignificantamountsofoilandcoal.WhiletheEUisworkingtowardsreducingitsdependenceonRussianenergy,anyshortageswillhavemajoreconomicconsequencesfortheregion.Governmentsareexpectedtoseektoshieldhouseholds,inwhichcaseshortagescouldmeansignificantcontractionsinindustry.Germany,ItalyandothercentralEuropeancountriesaremostatrisk.​Highglobalfoodpriceswillhitemergingmarketsthehardest.Asglobalfoodpriceincreasesareexacerbatedbythewar,emergingmarketsareparticularlyvulnerabletofoodpriceinflationorpotentialfoodshortages.SeveralAfricanandMiddleEastcountriesaredependentonwheatimportsfromRussiaandUkraine.Followingaperiodofsignificantexportdisruptions,grainexportsbyshiphavetentativelystartedagain.Highcostsoffertiliserscouldalsocausedisruptionofdomesticfoodproductioninmanycountries,includinginadvancedeconomies.WhileLatinAmericaandAsiaarelessdependentonRussianandUkrainianfoodcommodities,highglobalfoodandfertilizerpricescouldputsignificantstrainsontheseregions.​China’sCovid-19restrictionscontinuetobeakeyriskfactorintheglobaleconomy.ThelockdowninShanghaiandotherChinesecitiesduringthesecondquarterof2022exacerbatedexistingglobalsupplychaindisruptionsfollowingthepandemicasitdisruptsChinesegoodsmanufacturingandexport.WhileitisexpectedthatpotentialfuturelockdownswillbelesssevereasChinahasmovedtowards“societalzero-Covid”,anymajorlockdownwillhavenegativeconsequencesfortheglobaleconomy.​TheUSeconomyhasshownresilienceandisexpectedtogaineconomicallyfromthewarintheshortterm.USenergyexportswillbekeyforEuropeasitreducesrelianceonRussianfossilfuels.However,surgingUSinflationfollowedbymonetarytighteningwillrestraingrowth.TwoconsecutivequarterlydeclinesinGDPduringspring/summer2022raisedrecessionfears.Inflationissettoremainhighinthenearterm,beforeeasing.Atightlabourmarketandhighconsumerspendinghavecausedconcernsaboutaprice-wageupwardspiralfuellinginflation.​-30030609020172019202120232025AgriculturerawmaterialsNon-fuelFertilisersFoodProjectionWorldcommodityprices​%changey/y​Source:©OxfordEconomicsLimited2022EnergyPerspectives202219Outlookto2025​Twoextraordinaryevents,theCovid-19pandemicandRussia’sinvasionofUkraine,havedominatedtheheadlinesinthepastcoupleofyearsandhavelefttheirmarkonenergymarketsandtheshort-termcommoditydemandforecast.​Covid-19hadashockeffectonenergydemandin2020withtheoilmarketbeinghardesthit.Oildemandfellduetoasignificantdropinthetransportsector,aspeoplerefrainedfromtravellingtoworkandusingairtransportforholidaysandbusinessappointments.GasdemandprovedresilienttotheimpactofCovid-19inthewesternworldbutsufferedinAsiaduetodampenedindustrialactivity.Electricitydemandintheresidentialsectorincreasedduringthepeakofthepandemicaspeoplewereforcedtospendmoretimeathome,butthiswasbyfaroutweighedbythedeclineindemandfromthecommercialandindustrialsectorsduringthesameperiod.​WhilstCovid-19isstillverymuchpresent,theimplicationsforenergymarketshaveproventobeshort-lived.Allmarketsmadeastrongrecoveryduring2021and2022asactivityreturnedtopre-Covidlevels.Thelessseverehealthimplicationsofthemorerecentvariants,combinedwithimpressivevaccinerolloutsinlargepartsoftheworld,meanthattheCovid-19virushasbecomepartofanewnormalwayoflife.​WithCovid-19posinglessofathreatthefocushasshifted,andtheneedforsustainedeconomicgrowthnowoutweighstheriskposedbythevirus.Recentwhole-citylockdownsinChinabearwitnesstoamoredrawn-outreturntonormalinAsia,leadingtosomelingeringimpactsonenergydemandreboundandcontinueddisruptionstoglobalsupplychains.​Russia’sinvasionofUkrainewillhaveasignificantimpactonenergymarketsinthenextdecade.Geopoliticaltensionsandtheweaponisationofcommoditieswillforceachangeintheenergymixandtradeflows.OutsideRussia,theimpactofthewarwillbemostseverelyfeltinEurope,asdeclining,ifnotnon-existent,gasflowsfromRussiaarereplacedbyotherenergysourcesandenergyefficienciesinadditiontoLNG(Liquefiednaturalgas)andalternativepipelineimports.BuildoutofrenewablecapacitywillbeacceleratedaspartoftheREPowerEUambition,withlifetimeextensionsofcoalandnuclearpowerplantshelpingtofillthesupplygapintheshortterm.RussianoilandgaswillfindotheroutletsthanEurope,withincreasedsupplyavailabletothedomesticmarketsandexporttoAsia.​Demanddestructionmaybeseenacrossallcommoditiesandregionsasaresultoflimitedorlackofsupplyandhighprices.GlobalLNGsupplyislikelytoproveinsufficienttomeetdemand,asRussianflowsarereducedandpotentiallyswitchedoffaltogether,withthesupplydeficitandhigherpricesleadingtodemanddestruction.Russianoilsupplyisunlikelytoreturntopre-warlevels.​8590951001051101151202019202020212022202320242025CoalOilGasElectricity-8-4048122016201920222025ChinaCISEUNorthAmericaWorldProjectionCoal,oil,gasandelectricitydemand​Indexed2019=100​GDPgrowth​%changey/y​Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections)​Source:©OxfordEconomicsLimited2022(history),Equinor(forecastfromJune2022)​Commodities​OilOilmarketsremainvolatile,drivenbysupplyanddemanduncertainty.​SanctionsonRussianoilfollowingtheinvasionofUkraine,Opec+failingtodeliverontheiragreedproductionaswellassupplydisruptionsinotherregions,haveledtofearsofsupplyshortages.Adownwardrevisionofglobaleconomicgrowth,continuedlockdownsinChinaandhighpricesleadtodecreaseddemand.Marketvolatilityisexpectedtoremainhighintheshortterm,withconsiderableupsideanddownsiderisk,dependentonhoweventsunfold.Power​Powerpriceswillremainstretchedbetweentheneedforsecurityofsupplyandthevolatilityofunderlyingcommodities.​Bothwillbedependentuponpoliticalchangesemergingfromtheongoingcrisisandweatherpatternsuntil2025.Acombinationofheightenedpoliticaltension,ahighershareofintermittentgenerationandlackofinvestmentindispatchablecapacityoverthepastdecadehasresultedinthedelayofaround10GWofcoalcapacityretirementsinEuropeandashifttowardsnuclearforreliability.Russia’sinvasionofUkrainehastakenEuropefrombeingthemarketoflastresortforLNGandcoaltoaprimelocation.Thisinturnhassubstantiallyincreasedthefuelcostforpowergenerationacrosstheworld.Powerpriceswillbestronglyaffectedbyaworldwidesurgeinfuelpricesandthecurrentmarketdesign.Thesectorisexpectedtoleanheavilytowardsmarketreformstoprovidecorrectivemeasuresandacceleratetheenergytransition.​Hydrogen​Hydrogendemandintheenergysectorislookingtogrow.​Currentgeopoliticalandenergymarketturmoilencumbersthedevelopmentofahydrogenmarket.Inanuncertaincontext,governmentscoulddelaytheirdecarbonisationstrategies,makingitharderforcompaniestojustifyinvestmentsinemerginglow-carbontechnologies.Whilehydrogenisarelevantpartofthedecarbonisationnarrative,short-termmarketeffectswilllikelypostponeitsuptake.​Gas​Short-termoutlooksofferlittlerespitetostressedglobalgasmarkets.​TheNordStream2gaspipelinebetweenRussiaandGermanywouldhaveprovidedsomesupplyrelief,buttheprojecthasbeenhaltedindefinitely.Thishasbeenreplacedbyincreasedtightnessandreducedflexibility,asrisinghostilitiesbetweentheEastandtheWestdisruptgasflowswithglobalconsequences.Withverylimitedoptionstoincreaseshort-termgassupply,globalgasmarketsarevolatileandhighlysensitivetodisruptionsinsupplyandseasonalvariationsindemand.USliquefiednaturalgascanbufferbutnotcureshort-termglobaltightness,andinfrastructurebottlenecks,policiesandregulationspreventfurtherloosening.Theshort-termfocusisthereforeonefficienciesandalternativestoeasetheburdenoftightbalances.Thisreportdoesnotconsidergreyhydrogen,i.e.hydrogenproducedbyreformingnaturalgaswithoutcarboncaptureandstoragesincehydrogenproducedinthiswayisnotusedforenergy-relatedpurposes.20EnergyPerspectives2022EnergyPerspectives20222122EnergyPerspectives2022THESCENARIOS​«PreviousBacktotableofcontentsNext»EnergyPerspectives202223Thescenarios​EnergyPerspectives2022breakswithtraditionandpresentstwoscenariosforglobaldevelopmentandfutureglobalenergymarkets:WallsandBridges.​Twoscenariosarepresented,notbecausetheworldhasbecomesimpler,quitetheopposite.Asharpdichotomyisemergingbetweentheslow,incrementalchangethatcharacterisestheenergytransitionseentoday,andtheaccelerationnecessarytoachievetheradicalchangesrequiredtomovetheworldontoatrulysustainablepath.Thetwoscenariosencapsulatethisdichotomy.​Thefutureofenergymarketsisdifficulttopredict.Recenteventshaveshownitisnotonlythelong-termdevelopmentofmacroeconomicsandenergymarketsthatareuncertain.Covid-19hasonlyashort-termimpactinbothscenarios,withnosignificantlastingimpactexpectedinthemediumandlongterm.However,theRussianinvasionofUkraineandtheassociatedgeopoliticaltensionshavegivenrisetothereappearanceofobstaclestocooperationandexistingtradeandsupplyflowswhichmayhavelong-lastingeffectsoneconomicdevelopment,governmentpolicyandcorporatedecision-makinginsomeregions.Thescenariosconsiderthesekeyuncertainties.​Thescenariosstartfromtheworldasitistoday,wheretheenergytransitionhasbegunbuthasyettoacceleratetothespeedrequiredtoachievethegoalsoftheParisAgreement.Theysharenear-identicalpathsupuntil2025,atwhichpointtheystarttodiverge.Wallsshowsapathwayofwheretheworldcouldgoifitcontinuestobroadlyfollowcurrenttrends,whilstBridgesillustratesapathwaytheworldwouldneedtofollowtoreachthe1.5°Ctarget.​Bothscenariosconsiderthesamesetofdrivers,rangingfromeconomicgrowthandtechnologicaldevelopmenttoclimatepolicyandgeopolitics,andbothscenariosrecognisetheprofoundsystemicchangerequiredtoputtheenergysystemonamoresustainabletrack.Thedifferencebetweenthetwoscenariosistherelativeforceofthesedriversandtheextenttowhichtheyinfluencethefuturepathoftheglobalenergysystemafter2025.Inshort,Wallsfailstomakethistransitiontoasustainablepathway,whilstBridgessucceeds.​EnergyPerspectivesdoesnottrytopredictthefuturebutshowspossiblefuturepathsfortheglobalenergysystembasedonthechoicestheworldmakes,providingaplatformfordebateandinformeddecision-making.​24EnergyPerspectives2022Walls​Wallssignifytheabundanceofbarriersblockingfundamentalandacceleratedchangeintheglobalenergysystem.​Throughouthumanhistory,wallshavebeenbuilttoprotectusfromthethingsthatwefear:intruders,plagues,viruses,theweather,andwildanimals.Inadvertently,wallsexcludeus,cutoffoptionsandplaceobstaclesinourpath.Wallsshieldus,butalsoformbarrierstotransitionandmovement.​Wallsprotect,buttheyalsodivide.​TheWallsscenariobuildsoncurrenttrendsinmarket,technologyandpolicy,assumingthemtocontinuedevelopingataslowlyacceleratingpaceinthefuture.Economicgrowthremainsthekeydriverforgrowingenergydemand,andnationalgovernmentscontinuetoprioritiseshort-termeconomicgrowthoverlong-termclimategoals.GeopoliticaltensionsinthewakeoftheRussianinvasionofUkraineleadtolong-lastingeffectsoneconomicdevelopmentandgovernmentpolicy,especiallyintheCommonwealthofIndependentStates(CIS),theEUandChina.​Theenergytransitionishamperedbyalackofcooperationandtrust,andalthoughclimatepoliciescontinuetotighten,withmomentum-drivenmainlybytheindustrialisedregions,thescenariodoesnotmeetallstatedtargetsanddoesnotmovefastenoughtosatisfythegoalsoftheParisAgreement.Changeissimplynothappeningfastenough.​Wallsisastoryaboutanenergytransitionthatisslowlyaccelerating,butthatdoesnotreachclimatetargets.However,itisimportanttonotethatthechangestotheglobalenergysystemoutlinedinWallsarenotagiven.Theywillstillrequireenormouschangestothefoundationsoftheglobalenergysystem,butthiswillnotbesufficient.​Bridges​IfWallssignifythebarrierstochange,Bridgesrepresenttheovercomingofthesebarriersandtheimpetustowardsacceleratedchange.​Bridgeshelpustoconnect,allowingpeopletoreachplacestheywouldnototherwisehavebeenabletoreachandachievethingstheywouldnototherwisehavebeenabletoachieve.Bridgesareopen-endedandfacilitatetransition,movement,tradeandcommunication.​Bridgesconnectandenable.​TheBridgesscenarioisanormativeback-castconstrainedbyanenergy-relatedCO₂emissionsbudgetof445GtCO₂compliantwitha50%probabilityofnomorethana1.5°Ctemperaturerise.​Abenigngeopoliticallandscapeisre-established,supportingrenewedcooperationandfriendlycompetitionamongnations.Energymarketsbecomemoreintegratedandtechnologicaladvancementsaresharedmorereadily.Climateactionremainsthekeydriver,andallregionsareunderpressuretorapidlyphaseoutfossilfuels,buildrenewablecapacity,improveenergyefficiencyandmakedrasticbehaviouralchanges.Theacceleratedtransitionbringssignificantchangestotheenergysystemevenbefore2030.​Thisambitiousscenarioservestoillustratetheenormouschallengetheworldisfacedwith.Itistechnicallywithinreach,butwhetheritisalsopracticallyandeconomicallyachievable,andsaleabletovotersoncealltheimplicationsareclear,isopentodebate.Thescenarioisnotanchoredindetailedanalyticalconvictionsbutratheraimstostimulatediscussionsaroundthefeasibilityofthechangesrequiredtolimitglobalwarmingto1.5°Cbytheendofthecentury.​Seefootnoteonpage10EnergyPerspectives202225Walls​TheWallsscenariobuildsoncurrenttrendsinenergymarkets,technologyandpolicy.​Energyintensity​InWalls,theenergyintensityoftheglobaleconomyimprovesby2%peryearbetween2020and2050.Thepaceofimprovementissignificantlyhigherthantheaverageof1.2%peryearforthe1990-2019period,drivenbyastrongfocusonenergyefficiency.Someregionsaccomplishevenmoreimpressiveimprovementsthantheaverage:theEuropeanUnionandpartsofAsiadroptheirenergyintensitiesbybetween2.5%and3%peryear.​ThoughWallsisnotasustainablescenariofromaclimateperspective,peoplebecomemorekeenlyawareoftheglobalwarmingthreatanditslinktoenergyconsumption,andalargeshareofthelow-hangingfruitisharvested.Energyintensitydeclineratesaresignificantlyimprovedasaresultoftheelectrificationofroadtransportand,tolesserdegrees,theindustryandthebuildingssectors.However,asarule,high-emittingindustrialassetsarenotretiredaheadoftheirnormaleconomiclifetimes,constrainingtheturnoverofcapitalstockandthedeploymentofthemostefficienttechnologies.Decarbonisation​Decarbonisationoccursinboththeenergyend-useandtransformationsectorsataslowlyacceleratingpacecomparedwithrecenthistory.Fossilfuelsdoremainapartofthefuelmixwherealternativesresultinsignificantlyhighercosts,andwhereabatementviaCCUSoffersaneconomicoptionfordecarbonisation.​Theshareoffossilfuelsintotalprimaryenergyisaround80%todayandhasbeensoforthelastthirtyyearsatleast.InWalls,thissharesteadilydecreasesto62%in2050.Fossilfueluseonlybeginstofallinthe2030sandis20%lowerin2050comparedwith2019.Coalseesthebiggestreduction,halvingovertheperiodto2050.Thetransportsectorcontinuestoseeincreasingelectrification,contributingtoareductionintheoilshareoftotalprimaryenergyfromaround30%todayto25%in2050.Gasmaintainsashareofaroundaquarteroftotalprimaryenergydemandthroughouttheprojection(2019-2050)period.​Fossilfuelscomprisearoundtwo-thirdsofend-useenergyconsumptiontoday,andthishasbeenthecaseforthelastthirtyyearsatleast.InWalls,thissharesteadilydecreasestoaroundhalfin2050.Inaddition,CCUSintheindustrialsectorcontributesaround0.2GtCO₂ofdirectabatementin2050.​Electrification​Electrification,measuredbyboththeamountofelectricityusedandtheshareofelectricityinenergyconsumption,hasincreasedsteadilyoverthelastthirtyyears.Consumptionincreasedatarateof2.9%peryearacrosstheperiod1990-2019,andtheelectricityshareincreasedfrom13%in1990to20%in2019.​ThisincreaseismainlytheresultofmassiveelectrificationinChinasincetheturnofthemillennium,contributingtoanincreaseintotalelectricitydemandof130%between1990andtoday.However,China’sgrowthratecannotbemaintainedindefinitely,andthiswillleadtoadeclineintheglobalgrowthrateoverthenextthreedecades.​InWalls,electricitydemandgrowsbytwo-thirdsovertheprojectionperiod,withanannualaveragegrowthrateof1.6%.Theshareofelectricityinfinalconsumptionincreasesfrom20%todaytoaround30%in2050.​02004006008001990200020102020203020402050WorldIndustrialisedChinaIndiaOtheremergingHistoryWalls–EnergyintensitytoepermillionUSD​Source:IEA,©OxfordEconomicsInternational2022(history),Equinor(projections)​26EnergyPerspectives20221990200020102020203020402050CoalGasHistory0246810122020203020402050TransportIndustryPower&heatOther050100150200250Walls–Globalcoalandgaspowergeneration​ThousandTWh​Walls–Globalhydrogendemand​Mtoe​Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections)​Source:Equinor​Powergenerationfromcoalgrewbyanaverageof2.8%peryearovertheperiod1990-2019.InWalls,thisgrowthendsimmediately,andpowerfromcoaldecreasesby2.2%peryearacrosstheprojectionperiod,adropof50%by2050.​Gaspowergenerationgrewbyanaverageof2.4%peryearovertheperiod1990-2019.InWalls,thisgrowthcontinuesinthe2020s,andreachesaplateausoonafter2030.Gaspowergrowsbyanannualaverageof0.6%peryearacrosstheprojectionperiod,anincreaseof20%overall.Coalpowerpeaksin2024,andgasovertakescoalin2039.Gas-to-powerachievesapeakin2041.​InWalls,CCUSonfossilfueluseinthepowersectorcontributesaround0.3GtCO₂ofabatementin2050.​Windpowercapacitygrowsatanannualrateof5.6%overtheprojectionperiod,makingwindgenerationroughlyfivetimesgreaterin2050thanitistoday.Evenmoreimpressively,solarpowercapacitygrowsatanannualrateofover8%overthesameperiod,makingsolargenerationin2050around16timesgreaterthantoday.Together,windandsolarconstitute45%oftheglobalpowergenerationmixin2050,upfrom8%today.By2050,windandsolarpowerbothexceedgas,andhydropowerisgreaterthancoal.​Nuclearpowercapacitygrowsatarateof1%peryearacrosstheprojectionperiod,comparedwiththe1990-2019rateof0.7%,makingnucleargeneration50%higherin2050thantoday’slevel.Theshareoftotalzero-carbongenerationintheglobalpowermixincreasesfromaround40%todaytonearlythree-quartersin2050.Potentialbottlenecks,suchasinsufficientelectricitygridsorlandspacefornewrenewables,areaddressedandadequatelysolved,withsuitableregulatoryframeworksandmarketdesignstructuresimplementedtoharnesstheefficiencyofmarketforceswherepossible.​Hydrogen-basedfuels​InWalls,bothblueandgreenhydrogenareintroducedintotheenergymixfrom2025onwardsandscaledupinthe2030s.Hydrogen,anditsderivatives,suchasammoniaandothere-fuels,areslowlyintroducedinsectorsthatcannoteasilyelectrify,suchasheavyindustry,marinetransportandaviation.However,thereremainsverylimitedpenetrationinallsectors,withcostsremainingtoohighcomparedwithcompetingdecarbonisationtechnologiesandcarbonemissionallowances.CCUSrequiredforbluehydrogenproductionisapproximately0.6GtCO₂in2050.​Carbonremoval​Althoughresearchanddevelopmentintocarbonremovaltechnologiesproceeds,thereremainsverylimitedpenetration,andinWalls,negligiblecarbonisremovedfromtheatmospherein2050viacarbonremovalmethods.​EnergyPerspectives202227Bridges​InBridges,changesbeyond2025needtohappenatanastonishingrate,supportedanddrivenbypolicythroughout.​EnergyIntensity​InBridges,theenergyintensityoftheglobaleconomyimprovesbyanaverageof3.1%peryearbetween2020and2050,withallregionsmakingsignificantcontributions.Thepaceofchangeismuchhigherthanthe2%peryearimprovementinWalls,relyingonenergyefficiencyincreasesfarbeyondanythingexperiencedinrecenthistory.Technologiesthatmakethispossibleareconceivablebutwouldrequiresignificantandsustainedpolicysupportandfinancingtomakethemareality,andinBridgesthisisforthcoming.​After2025,anabsolutedecouplingofeconomicgrowthfromenergydemandoccursatagloballevel,somethingneverseenbeforeinmodernhistory,enablingglobaleconomicgrowthtocontinuewhilsttotalprimaryenergydemandpeaksandthendeclines.Thisdeclineinprimaryenergydemandispresenttoagreaterorlesserextentinalmostallregions,Indiabeingtheprominentexception,whereprimaryenergydemandcontinuestogrowtowards2050byafurther20%comparedtothe2025level.​However,India’spercapitaenergyuse,althoughrisingacrosstheperiod,remainslowerthanallbuttheverypoorestregionsofAsiaandAfrica.​Decarbonisation​InBridges,theimpetustowardsdecarbonisationisimmediateandunrelenting.Fossilfuelusedecreasesbymorethan5%peryearacrosstheperiodto2050,comparedtolessthan1%inWalls,andsignificantchangeisalreadyobservableby2030.​Bridgesseestheshareoffossilfuelsintotalprimaryenergyfallto67%in2030(comparedto76%inWalls)andto22%in2050(62%inWalls).Fossilfuelusein2050isafifthofitscurrentlevel.Coalisbyfarthehardesthit,withitsshareofprimaryenergydemandshrinkingfromaquartertodaytoaround3%.Oilandgasfarealittlebetter,theirsharesbeingreducedbyapproximatelytwo-thirdsby2050.​Inaddition,CCUSonindustrialfossilfuelusecontributesaround0.4GtCO₂ofdirectabatementin2050.​Electrification​InBridges,electrificationhappenseverywherepossible,andithappensfast.Electricitycurrentlysuppliesaroundafifthofthetotalend-useenergydemand.By2030,thisshareincreasestonearly30%,andby2050electricitymakesupthelargestshareoftotalfinalconsumption.​Electricitydemandincreases2%peryearacrosstheprojectionperiod,whichlooksreasonablecomparedtogrowthobservedinthelasttwodecades,whichwasdrivenbyChina’selectrification.However,thismasksthefactthattheincreaseto2030is3.1%peryear,fallingto2.3%inthefollowingdecadeto2040,andonly0.5%inthedecadeafterthat.ItisthespeedofelectrificationintheearlypartoftheprojectionperiodthatiskeytodifferentiatingBridgesfromWalls.​Theroadtransportsectorundergoesthelargesttransformation,withnearlythree-quartersofglobaldemandsuppliedbyelectricityin2050,comparedtoaroundafifthinWalls.Electricitydemandintheroadtransportsectorin2050isaround35timestheleveltoday.1990200020102020203020402050WorldIndustrialisedChinaIndiaOtheremergingHistory0200400600800Bridges–Energyintensity​toepermillionUSD​Source:IEA,©OxfordEconomicsInternational2022(history),Equinor(projections)​28EnergyPerspectives2022InBridges,electricitydemandintheindustrialsectorgrowsatarateof1.3%peryear,withanincreaseofnearly50%in2050comparedwithtoday.Residentialelectricitydemandincreasesby2.2%peryear,andby2050isalmostdoubletoday’slevelandathirdlargerthanthatinWalls,drivenbyacceleratingdemandforelectricalheating,particularlyinthedecadeafter2025.​​Windandsolarpowerbearmostoftheburden,supportedbyvaryingamountsofdispatchablerenewablessuchashydroandbiomassdependingonregionalconditionsandpoliticalfeasibility.Windcapacitygrowsataround7%peryearovertheperiod,resultinginwindgenerationeleventimeshigherin2050thantoday.Solarcapacitygrowsatnearly10%peryear,resultinginsolargeneration25timeshigherin2050thantoday.​Nuclearpowercapacityincreasesatnearly2%peryearovertheperiod,resultinginnucleargeneration50%higherin2050thantoday.​Alreadyby2030,nearly60%ofelectricitycomesfromzero-carbonsources(comparedto47%inWalls),withhalfofthisprovidedbyintermittentgeneration.Zero-carbonpowergenerationaccountsfor96%ofallelectricitysupplyin2050,withtwo-thirdsofthispowercomingfromintermittentsources.Thisrequiresextensiveupgradesandextensionstoexistingpowergrids,andthewidespreaddeploymentofelectricitystoragetechnologiesacrossalltimescales.​Hydrogen-basedfuels​InBridges,hydrogenisintroducedintotheenergymixfrom2025onwardsandscaleduprapidly.Demandforhydrogenin2050isapproximately466Mt,approximatelyseventimesthelevelseeninWalls.​1990200020102020203020402050CoalGasHistory02468101205001000150020002020203020402050TransportIndustryPower&heatOtherBridges–Coalandgaspowergeneration​ThousandTWh​Bridges–Globalhydrogendemand​Mtoe​Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections)​Source:Equinor​InBridges,theutilisationofexistingcoalandgaspowerplantsisreducedasquicklyaspossible,withemissionsfromremainingplantscapturedandstored.Thisrequiresaround1GtCO₂ofabatementin2050splitevenlybetweencoalandgas.​Powergenerationfromcoalpeaksin2022andthereaftershrinksatanaveragerateofmorethan10%peryearuntil2045.Powergenerationfromgasgrowsuntil2030,peaksandthendeclinesatasimilarratetocoal.By2050,nounabatedcoalorgaspowergenerationcapacityremains.CoalandgaswithCCUScontributeapproximately1,250GWofdispatchable,zero-carbonpowergenerationcapacityin2050.​Zero-carbonpower​RapidlyincreasingelectricitydemandinBridgesmakesitimperativethatelectricitysupplyisdecarbonisedquicklyandcompletely.EnergyPerspectives202229TheindustrialandtransportsectorsseesignificantincreasescomparedtoWalls,butitistheenergytransformationsectorsthatreallydifferentiatethescenarios,withdemandinthepower&heatsectornearly20timesgreaterin2050inBridgesthaninWalls,drivenbythecriticalnecessitytodriveoutremainingemissionsfromgaspowergeneration.​ThevastmajorityoftheadditionalhydrogeninBridgesisgreenhydrogen.CCUSrequiredforbluehydrogenproductionisaround0.8GtCO₂in2050,anincreaseofapproximatelyathirdcomparedwithWalls.​Carbonremoval​InBridges,carbonremovaltechnologiesmakeacriticalcontributiontoachievingthegoalofremainingwithinthecarbonbudgetrequiredfor1.5°C.​In2050,nature-basedsolutionsforcarbonremoval,whichincludeforestry,wetland,agriculturalandocean-basedpractices,areresponsibleforremoving2.3GtCO₂fromtheatmosphere.Bioenergywithcarboncaptureandstorage,anddirectaircapture,areresponsibleforremovingafurther1.4GtCO₂and0.6GtCO₂,respectively.​Policy&behaviour​Toensurethatthesystemicchangesandtechnologicalimprovementsoutlinedaboveactuallyachievetheirpotential,afirmandtargetedenergypolicyisrequired.​AsignificantshiftinhumanbehaviourandexpectationsisabsolutelycriticaltosuccessinBridges,incentivisingconsumerstochoosemoreecologicalgoodsandservices,andinvestorstoprovidefinanceforresearch,developmentanddeploymentoflowcarbontechnologies.Changesinhomeheating,travelanddietaryhabitswillalsoplayanimportantrole.​Ahighercarbonpriceisessential,sincecarbonpricingisaproven,cost-effectivewaytoincentiviseareductioninCO₂emissions.Thiswillencourageconsumersandcompaniestofindsolutionswithloweremissions.​Thereiscurrentlylimitedevidencetosupporttheideathatvotersindemocraciesareinclinedtodelegatepersonalinvestment,dietaryandotherlifestylechoicestotheauthorities.Raisingthelevelofacceptancefortheenergytransition,andtheenormouslifestylechangesthatitrequires,willbeessentialtoitssuccess,andinBridges,itisassumedthatthisisacceptedandpromptlyestablished.​2015202520352045DirectaircaptureBioenergywithcarboncaptureandstorageNature-basedsolutions012345Bridges-AnnualcarbonremovalGtCO₂​Source:Equinor​LONG-TERMOUTLOOK​30EnergyPerspectives2022«PreviousBacktotableofcontentsNext»EnergyPerspectives202231Theenergyworld:Twoscenarios​199020002010202020302040205002468101214161990200020102020203020402050024681012141619902000201020202030204020500246810121990200020102020203020402050024681012201520202025203020352040204520500102030405060201520202025203020352040204520500102030405060Walls–Totalprimaryenergydemand​Gtoe​Bridges–Totalprimaryenergydemand​Gtoe​Walls–Totalfinalenergyconsumption​Gtoe​Bridges–Totalfinalenergyconsumption​Gtoe​Walls–Powergeneration​ThousandTWh​Bridges–Powergeneration​ThousandTWh​Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections)​Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections)​Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections)​Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections)​Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections)​Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections)​CoalOilGasBiomassHydroNuclearNewrenewablesCoalOilGasBiomassNewrenewablesElectricityHeatHydrogenCoalOilGasBiomassHydroNuclearWindSolarHydrogenGeothermalOther32EnergyPerspectives2022Globalenergydemand​Totalprimaryenergydemand​Totalprimaryenergydemand(TPED)isthesumofdemandforcoal,oil,gas,nuclearenergy,hydroenergy,wind,solarandotherrenewableenergysources.Itincludestheenergylostintransmission,transportationandconversionofenergy.Electricityandheatarenotincludedintheprimaryenergydefinition,buttheenergyinputsusedtogenerateelectricityandheatare.​InWalls,totalprimaryenergydemandpeaksinthelate2030sasrapidlydecliningdemandinindustrialisedregionsoutweighsacontinuedincreaseindemandinmostemergingregions.DespitegrowthintheglobalpopulationandGDP,thedemandin2050isonly5%higherthanthatseenin2019.Curtailmentisaidedbyelectrification,efficiencygainsandadegreeofbehaviouralchangesaspoliticians,investorsandconsumersalllooktosupportamoresustainablefuture.​TotalprimaryenergydemandinBridgespeaksmuchsoonerthaninWalls,in2025,beforegoingintoasharpdeclineandendingupataglobaldemandlevelin2050thatis25%lowerthanthatobservedin2019.Fossilfuelsinprimaryenergydemand​InWalls,coaldemandpeakedin2018.FollowingadropduringtheCovid-19pandemic,coaldemandrecoversto2019levelsin2022beforegoingintoasteadydeclinetowards2050.Oildemandalsoseesarapidreturntopre-Covidlevelsandstartstodropafter2028.Gasfulfilstheroleofatransitionfuelandcontinuestogrowuntil2040,withdemandincreasingby14%relativetothe2019level,beforegentlydecreasingtowards2050.Despiteadropintheshareoffossilfuelsinthetotalprimaryenergydemandfroma2019levelof81%,theshareoffossilfuelsinWallsremainshighat62%in2050.​InBridges,gasisnotgiventheopportunitytoactasatransitionfuelwithallfossilfuelsdecliningrapidlyfrom2025onwards.By2050theshareoffossilfuelsinthetotalprimaryenergydemandis22%.AsinWalls,coaldemandpeakedin2018anddeclinesfrom2022followingashort-liveddemandreboundpostCovid-19.Oilandgasdemandhastodeclinerapidlytoalignwithclimatetargetswithoildecliningfrom2019andgasfrom2025.​0246810121416199020002010202020302040205002468101214161990200020102020203020402050Walls–Totalprimaryenergydemand​Gtoe​Bridges–Totalprimaryenergydemand​Gtoe​Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections)​Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections)​CoalOilGasBiomassHydroNuclearNewrenewablesEnergyPerspectives202233Globalenergyconsumption:Fuelmix​Totalfinalconsumption(TFC)istheamountofenergyusedintheend-usesectors.​TheglobalfuelmixintotalfinalconsumptionwillchangesignificantlyoverthenextdecadesasenergyefficiencyimprovementbringsTFCdownandelectrificationissettoaccelerateandreducetherelianceonfossilfuels.However,thefuelmixandtheroleoffossilfuelsinBridgesisradicallydifferenttothatrepresentedinWalls.InBridges,totalelectricitydemandisonlyslightlyhigherin2050comparedtoWalls,buttheincreaseinelectricitydemandstartsearlierandthebuild-upisfaster.Totalfinalconsumptionissignificantlylowerin2050inBridges,duetothemassive,assumedefficiencygains.This,combinedwithonlyaslightlyhigherelectricitydemand,resultsinahigherelectricityshareofthetotalfinalconsumption.TheelectricityshareinTFCis31%inWallsand51%inBridgesin2050.Forcomparison,the2019shareis20%.​InWalls,thedemandforelectricityisincreasinginlinewiththehistorictrendandmakesupjustoverhalfofglobalconsumptionin2050.In2019,oilhadthelargestshareofenergyconsumptionat40%,drivenbythetransportsector.Assectorsincreasinglyelectrify,especiallytransport,oillosessomemarketshare,butremainsanimportantpartofthefuelmix,withelectricityandoilhavingequalsharesatjustover30%in2050.Gasconsumptionmaintainsaconstantshareofthefuelmixtowards2050.Aslightdeclineisseenbeyond2040,drivenbysolarandwindreplacinggasinthepowersector,andnewrenewablesandhydrogengainingmarketshareintheindustrysector.​Drivenbyclimateambitions,electricityconsumptionincreasesrapidlyinBridges,replacingfossilfuels.Fossilfuelconsumptionisreducedto23%ofthefuelmixin2050andallremainingemissionsfromfossilfuelsareremovedbyCCUSorcompensatedforbycarbonremovaltechnologies.Oilconsumptiondrops75%fromitspeakin2019to2050,withelectricityconsumptionnearlydoublingoverthesameperiod.Electricityconsumptionsurpassesoilasthemainfuelintheearly2030s,asthetransportsectorundergoesaradicaltransformation.Hydrogenalsoseesarapiduptakeinmarketshareasexpandingrenewablecapacitypavesthewayforhydrogenintheindustryandtransportsectors.​01234519902000201020202030204020501990200020102020203020402050012345GasCoalOilBiomassHeatElectricityNewrenewablesHydrogen024681012WallsBridges31%51%Walls–Totalfinalenergyconsumptionbyfueltype​Gtoe​Bridges–Totalfinalenergyconsumptionbyfueltype​Gtoe​Totalfinalenergyconsumptionin2050​Gtoe​Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections)​Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections)​Source:Equinor​Includeswind.solarPV,concentratedsolarpower,tidal,geothermalIncludesbiomass,newrenewableandheatGasCoalOilElectricityOtherHydrogenHistory34EnergyPerspectives2022Globalenergyconsumption:Regionalperspectives​Totalenergyconsumptionwillpeaklaterinemergingthaninindustrialisedregions.Globalenergyconsumptionpeaksin2039and2025inWallsandBridges,respectively.InWalls,theindustrialisedeconomiessawpeakconsumptionin2018,whilsttheemergingeconomiescontinuetoincreasetheirenergyconsumptiontowards2050.InBridges,theemergingeconomiesdonotincreasetheirconsumptionbeyond2025.​Emergingregionswillclaimanincreasingshareofglobalenergyconsumptionfrom60%todayto72%in2050.Thedelayedpeakandincreasingshareinconsumptionintheemergingregionsarebeingdrivenbygrowingpopulations,urbanisationandtheexpandingmiddleclass,demandingmoregoodsandservices.ThisgrowthisledbyChina,IndiaandAfrica.​ChinaisthelargestenergyconsumergloballytodayandremainssothroughoutthescenarioperiodinbothWallsandBridges.InWalls,China’sconsumptiongrowsby1.3%peryearuntil2038beforeexperiencingaverygentledeclinetowards2050.Theconsumptionisdrivenbytheindustrialsector,whichremainssteadilyabove40%ofconsumptionuntil2050.​NorthAmerica,followedbyIndustrialAsiaPacific,exhibitsthehighestpercapitaenergyconsumption,currentlyconsuminguptotentimesmoreenergypercapitathanemergingregionssuchasIndia,AfricaandOtherAsiaPacific.Percapita,energydemanddoesnotincreasesignificantlyinmostemergingregionsineitherscenarioasthedemandincreasefromeconomicandpopulationgrowtharecounteredbyelectrificationandefficiencydevelopments.​Percapitaenergyconsumptionisdownintheindustrialisedregions,withelectrificationboostingenergyefficiencyinthetransportandresidentialsectors.InBridges,theseeffectsaresignificantlyamplifiedbytougherefficiencystandards,taxation,subsidies,andchangesinbehaviourandconsumptionhabits,resultinginapercapitaenergyconsumptionintheindustrialisedregionoflessthanhalfoftoday’slevelin2050.​01020304050601990200020102020203020402050WallsBridgesHistoryRichestthreeregionsPoorestthreeregions0123451990200020102020203020402050IndustrialisedChinaEmergingHistoryIndustralisedEmerginginc.China205040%60%28%72%2019GDPpercapitaintherichestandpoorestregionsRealthousandUSDatmarketexchangerates​Energydemandpercapita​toepercapitaWalls–Totalfinalenergyconsumption​Source:©OxfordEconomicsInternational2022(history),Equinor(projections),UN(population)​Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections),UN(population)​Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections)​IndustralisedEmerginginc.China205040%60%28%72%2019IndustralisedEmerginginc.China205040%60%28%72%2019EnergyPerspectives202235Theenergyworldin2030and2050​Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections).​105869982302019203020503445273851201920302050499527755439377552820192030205040%60%4324437939773873118720192030205072021133201920302050WallsHistoryBridgesGlobalOilDemand​mbdGlobalGasDemand​Bcm​GlobalCoalDemand​Btce​GlobalElectricityDemand​PWh​GlobalWind&SolarElectricitySupply​PWh​36EnergyPerspectives2022Globaleconomy​Globaleconomicgrowthcontinuesthroughoutthescenarioperiod,drivenbyemergingeconomies,butatalowerratethanobservedhistorically.Adeclininggrowthinthelabourforce,coupledwithanageingpopulationisassumedinbothscenarios.GlobalgrowthinWallsislowerthanthehistoricalgrowthrateof2.9%since1990.Thisiscausedbyadecreasingcatch-uppotentialforemergingcountrieswhenreplicatingtechnologiesandproductionmethods,comparedtohistory.Increasingcarbonlevelsintheatmosphereleadtoamoderatelynegativeclimateimpactoneconomies.Theglobaleconomywillgrowonaverageby2.1%peryearfrom2026-2050,headedbyemergingcountries.InBridges,consumersprimarilyinindustrialisedcountriesfaceasignificantlyhighercarboncosttocurbtheuseoffossilfuelsandtofinancetherapidenergytransition.Investmentsandtransferoftechnologyandknowledgearedirectedtowardsemergingeconomies.Theglobaleconomygrowsonaverageby2.2%peryearduringtheperiod.​Followinginitialcurtailedgrowth,BridgesassumesthattheenergytransitionoffersasmallglobalGDPbenefitby2050.Bridges,comparedtoWalls,seesinitiallylowergrowthasconsumersinindustrialisedeconomiesarehitbyreducedpurchasingpower.Overtime,climateimpactsinBridgesarereducedandhigherconsumptiongrowthfiltersthroughascarbontaxationpressureeases.​Bridgessufferssomeefficiencyloss,forexampleashareofthefossilfuelinfrastructurewillbereplacedbeforetheendofworkinglife,butstilloutpacesWalls’growthratefromaroundthemid-2030sonwards.​Russia’sinvasionofUkraineanditsimpactonthegeopoliticallandscapewillhavelong-lastingconsequencesfortheglobaleconomy.DuetotheinvasionofUkraineandintensifiedrivalrybetweentheUSandChina,geopoliticalconsiderationsandpoliticsaremorelikelytotrumpdecisionsbasedonpurecommercialandmarketmotives.Inaddition,globaltradebecomesmoreregionalised,leadingtomorefracturedsupplychains.​Thefutureoftheglobaleconomyisuncertain.Duetohighdebtlevelsandimbalancesineconomies,theabilityofgovernmentstoreducespendingandforcentralbankstotightenmonetarypolicyareuncertaintiesinaworldthathasbecomeusedtostrongpolicystimulus.Futureproductivitydevelopmentisalsoakeyunknown,affectingbothscenarios.Gainsliketechnologicalbreakthroughs,moreefficientuseoflabourandtechnology,andsmarterregulationsandreformsmaybesignificantgrowthcontributorsoutintime,withthespeedofimplementationandsuccessinfluencingthefuturepathway.​100150200250300350201520252035204510015020025030035020152025203520451001502002503003502015202520352045Industrialisedeconomies​GDPindexedto2015​Emergingeconomies​GDPindexedto2015​Globaleconomy​GDPindexedto2015​Source:©OxfordEconomicsLimited2022(history),Equinor(projections)​WallsBridgesHistoryElevatedinflation​EnergyPerspectives202237Inflationiselevatedandstickyacrosseconomies,potentiallyimpactingtheenergytransition.​Globaleconomiesareexperiencingaworldwidesurgeininflation.Inflationisanticipatedtoremainhigherforlonger,however,theshort-termoutlookisuncertain.Thekeydriversofthecurrentinflationsurgearesupply-chainbottlenecks,ashiftindemandtowardgoodsandawayfromservices,lackoflaboursupply,andasupplyshocktoenergyandfoodduetotheinvasionofUkraine.Increasingandvolatileinflationmakesitmoredifficultforhouseholdsandfirmstoplanforsavingsandinvestments,andcentralbanks’credibilitymayerodeashighinflationpersists.Thereisaworrythattheglobaleconomymightenteraphaseofstagflation,meaningsloweconomicgrowthandrelativelyhighunemployment,accompaniedbyincreasingfoodandenergyprices.Thesehighpricesarefosteringsocialunrestacrosseconomies,particularlyinemergingmarkets.​Majorcentralbankshaverespondedtotherisinginflationbyaggressivelyhikinginterestratesandbyothertighteningmeasures.Thesuccessofmonetarypolicytightening,dampeninginflationwithoutchokinggrowth,iscrucialtobringingdowninflation.Thecostanddurationofinflationwilldependontheinterplaybetweenthepersistenceoflabourmarkettightness,supply-sidedisruptionsandthecentralbanks’response.Inaddition,thedurationofthewarinUkraineanditsimpactonenergyprices,foodpricesandgrowthareofkeyimportance.Thelonger-termpathforinflationwilldependonwhetherdisinflationaryforcesseenoverthepastdecadeswillfadeorgraduallyre-emerge.​Thereareseveralpossibleeffectsofhighinflationontheoilandgasindustry.Higheroilandgaspricesprovideanaturaloffsetagainstinflation,whilealsoincreasingthecompetitivenessofrenewables.However,thereislikelytobeacost-pushinsupplychains,andtightlabourmarketscausewagecoststoincreases.Forcapital-intensiveprojects,suchaswindandsolarPV,higherinterestratesandfinancingcostsarelikelytoimprovetherelativecompetitivenessoffirmswithstrongbalancesheets.​Thethreatofinflationandrisinginterestratescancreateachallengingenvironmentforindustriesandtheenergytransition.Inflationdampenseconomicgrowthifindustriesandhouseholdscannotsubstituteawayfromcarbon-intensiveenergytogreenerandcheaperalternatives.Higherinflationandinterestratescouldalsolimittheprivatesector’sabilitytofundthetransitionandpointthepublicsectortowardsshort-termpovertyalleviationratherthanlong-termclimateriskmitigation.Bothmonetaryandfiscalpolicyhavearoletoplayintheenergytransition.Monetarypolicyshouldrecognisethatinvestinginamoresustainableeconomycouldposearisktomedium-terminflationandmaycallforadeviationfrominflationtargets.Onthefiscalside,governmentsarefacingabalancingactneedingtopushtheenergytransitionforwardwhilstatthesametimeprotectingthevulnerablefromenergypoverty.Energyshortage,securityofsupplyconcernsandrisingenergypricesmayslowtheenergytransitionintheshort-to-mediumterm.Inthelongerterm,inflation,interestratesandeconomicgrowthwillimpactinvestmentdecisionsandwaysoffundingthetransition.​​38EnergyPerspectives2022Oildemanddeclinesastheenergytransitioncontinuestogainmomentum.However,severalyearsofunderinvestmentinupstreamprojectshaveraisedconcernsoversupplyshortagesandfearsthatsupplymaydeclinefasterthandemand.Energysecurityremainsakeyfactorintheenergytrilemmaandrenewedupstreaminvestmentinthemediumtermmaybeseen.​InWalls,oildemandpeaksinthelate2020s,followedbyadecreaseof18%(19mbd)by2050,astheenergytransitiondrivesdemanddown.​TheindustrialisedregionsandChinaaredrivingthedemanddecline,leadingtoacombineddecreaseof37%(24mbd)between2025and2050.ThischangeistheresultofshiftsderivedfromcarbonneutralitypledgesandchangesinroadtransportwhereefficiencygainsandaswitchtoEVsreducedemand.​Keyemergingregions,suchasAfrica,IndiaandtheMiddleEast,continuetoseeincreasingoildemand,up27%between2025and2050.Thesectorsdrivingthisincreaseareresidential,industryandpetrochemicalastheregionscontinuetodevelopandindustrialise.​Russianproductionlevelsareunlikelytoreturntopre-invasionlevelsduetoalong-termlackofinternationalinvestmentinRussianprojectsgoingforward.Anyshortfallsinthemediumtermareexpectedtobecoveredbyotherregions,mostnotablystrongergrowthinUSshale,withareconfigurationoftradeflowsbeingthelargestchangeasaresultoftheconflict.TheprojectionforoilinBridgesisgovernedbytheenergytransitionwithpolicies,technologyandbehaviouralchangesdrivingtotaldemanddown70%(69mbd)from2025to2050.Demandpeaksin2019inBridges.​TheroadtransportsectoraccountsforthemajorityofthereductioninoildemandasLDVinternalcombustionenginesarereplacedbyelectricvehicles,anddieselenginetrucksarereplacedpredominantlybyelectricandhybridvehicles,buthydrogenvehiclesarealsointroduced.​Overalldemandfromthenon-energysectorpeaksinearly2030butcontinuestoincreasetowards2050inregionssuchastheMiddleEast,ChinaandCIS,reflectingasurplusofindigenoussupplyasexternaldemandiscurtailed.​Gasoilandgasolineseethebiggestdeclineindemandastheroadtransportsectoristransformed,whilenaphthaistheonlyproductthatcontinuestoincreasetowards2050duetodemandfromthepetrochemicalsector.​Globaloilmarket​0204060801002019TransportPowerBuildingsIndustryFeedstockuse20500204060801002019TransportPowerBuildingsIndustryFeedstockuse2050Walls–Changeinoildemand​mbd​Bridges–Changeinoildemand​mbd​Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections)​Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections)​Thedemandtrendforrefinedproductsandpressuretoeithercloseorbuildnewrefiningcapacitiesiscloselylinkedtoregionalvariationsinsocio-economicdevelopment.Inindustrialisedcountries,economiesaremorematureandtendtogrowataslowerpace,withpeoplebecomingmoreconsciousoftheeffectofcarbonemissionsleadingtostrongerdemandforcleanenergy.Asaresult,refinersinNorthAmerica,EuropeandIndustrialisedAsiaPacifichavehadtoshutinpartoftheirproduction.Conversely,demandforcheapenergycontinuestogrowintheemergingregionsoftheworldwherepeoplehavelessmoneytospendonnon-fossilfuels.Demandforrefinedproductscontinuestogrow.​Thelong-termtrendisthatincreasingdemandforalternativefuelswilloutweighthatforrefinedproducts,butnotallrefineryproductswillbeaffectedequally.Dieselandgasolinedemandislikelytodecreaseasroadtransportiselectrified,whilstproductssuchasnaphtha,LPGandjetfuelwillbelessaffected.Thefirsttwoduearetoincreaseduseinpetrochemicalindustriesandthelatterduetothedifficultyofreplacingitwithmoresustainableoptions.Twochallengesarisefromthis:thecurrentrefineryset-upisnotequippedforthefuture,anddemandforcrudefeedwillchangeovertime.Toaddressthisrefinerieswillhavetoinvestinnewequipment,andthedemandforcrudeoilwillshifttowardsthoserefineriesthatyieldhigherquantitiesofproductsthatareindemand.​Refiningcompanieshaveoverthepastthreeyearsstartedtosetindividualtargetsforreducingcarbonemissions,addingfurtherincentivetocloserefineriesamidsteconomicpressures.RefineriesemitlargeamountsofCO₂andshuttingarefinerycangoalongwaytowardscompaniesachievingamorecarbonneutralstatus.Thisweighedheavilyintherecentdecisionstoclosetworefineries:LyondellBasell’sHoustonrefineryintheUSandIdemitsu’sYamaguchirefineryinJapanandislikelytoplayanincreasingroleincompanydecisionsgoingforward.​Thegrowthofalternativefuelsisunlikelytomakecrudeoilrefiningredundantintheforeseeablefuture,butadaptationswillbeneededforindividualrefineriestosurvive.Goingforwardtherewillbeasharpcompetitionwithwinnersandlosersalike.Futurecompetitiverefineriesarelikelytobethosethatcanadapttothechangingenvironmentandmeetthefollowingcriteria:​•Low-cost​•Flexibilitytohandlechangingcrudeslateslinkedtochangesindemandforaspecificproduct​•Flexibilitytoswitchtorenewablesproduction​•Tightintegrationwiththepetrochemicalindustry,whichisexpectedtoseefuturegrowthindemandStrongcompetitionandlowprofitmarginshaveforcedmanyrefinerstomakedifficultdecisionsoverthepastthreeyears;shutdownproduction,converttoprocessingofrenewablefeedstock,orcontinueproductionandwaitforbettertimes.Theworldeconomyandglobalpopulationaregrowing,peoplearebecomingricher,demandingmoregoodsandtravellingtheworld.Thedemandforenergyappearstobeboundless,sohowcanrefineriescopeinsuchanenvironment?​ChallengesforthefutureofrefiningEnergyPerspectives202239Around3.8billionpeopleflyeveryyear,63millionpeopleareemployedintheindustryandairtransportmakesup35%ofglobaltrade.Today,aviationaccountsforaround2%ofglobalgreenhousegasemissions.Thisissettoincreaseasthedemandforairtransportwillgrowalongwiththeglobaleconomy,reaching3%by2050.Decarbonisingtheaviationindustry​40EnergyPerspectives2022Aviationisoneofthehardestsectorstodecarbonise.TheEUiscurrentlyworkingonaproposaltoextendthedefinitionofsustainableandadvancedfeedstocksandincreasetargetsfortheirshareinaviationfuel.Thisproposalwantsa2%shareby2025,37%by2040,and80%by2050.Theprevioustargetswere32%by2040,and63%by2050.Thereareeffortstobuildplanesusingbatteriesandelectricmotors,butthiswillonlyfindaroleinshorter-distanceaviation.Theenergydensityofbatteriesdoesnotcomparewellwiththatofjetfuel,whichhas30timesmoreenergyperkilogramthanlithium-ionbatteries.ThismeansthatanAirbusA380,whichcantravel15,000kminasingleflightusingconventionalfuel,wouldonlybeabletocoveralittleover1,000kmwithanelectricengine.​Moreuseofbiofuelsandothersustainableaviationfuels(SAF)willbenecessaryinordertodecarbonisetheaviationindustry.SAFhavethesamepropertiesasconventionalfuels.Theyaredrop-infuels,whichmeanstheycanbeblendedwithconventionaljetfuelsandtransportedusingtheexistinginfrastructure.Itiscurrentlypossibletoblend50%biofuelwithtraditionaljetfuelwithouthavingtomakeanychangestoexistingmachineryorinfrastructure.Around400thousandflightspoweredbyabiofuelblendhavesofarbeencarriedout.​TherearethreemainpathwaysfortheproductionofSAF:Fats-to-fuelreliesontheesterificationoffatsfrombiomasssuchasusedcookingoil;Waste-to-fuelisbasedonupgradingofcarbohydratesderivedfromwaste;andAir-to-fuel,basedonadirectcombinationofcapturedandsequesteredcarbondioxideandgreenhydrogenandisbysomeseenastheholygrailoffutureaviationfuels.​Sustainableaviationfuelscanhelpreduceemissions,buttherearesignificantchallenges.Fats-to-fuelhasthepotentialtoreduceemissionsby85%comparedwithconventionalfossilfuels.Itiswellestablished,anditdoesnothavetheIndirectlandusechange(ILUC)problemthatvegetableoil-basedfuelshave.However,securingsufficientfeedstockforproductionisachallenge.Theuseofoilsfromalgaecouldprovideasolution,butsofarthissourcehasprovidedmixedresults.DuetofeedstockconstraintstheAirtransportactiongroup(ATAG)expectsthatfuelfromthispathwaywillonlybeabletoprovideupto8%ofthesustainableaviationfuelneededfornetzeroemissionsby2050.UsingWaste-to-fuelitispossibletoreduceemissionsby95%.Residuefromagricultureandforestrycanbeusedasfeedstock,buttherearesignificantchallenges.Duetolowenergydensity,upto10timestheamountoffeedstockistypicallyneededcomparedwithconventionalfuelandthiscreateslogisticalbottlenecks.Productionplantswillhavetobecollocatedwithfeedstocksourcesandtheplantsizewillbesmallcomparedwitharefinery.Forthisreason,ATAGestimatesthatfuelfromthistypeofproductioncancontributeupto45%ofSAFby2050.WithAir-to-fuelitwillactuallybepossibletoreduceemissionsbymorethan100%.IfCO₂isabundantlyavailablethroughcarboncaptureandstorage,thisproductionmethodhasnofeedstockconstraint.However,whatwillbeneeded,andwhatposesaconstraint,isrenewableenergytoproducegreenhydrogen.TheinvestmentbankBarclaysestimatesthataround7to9timesthecurrentsolarandwindcapacityintheUSwillberequiredtoproduce50%ofthesustainableaviationfuelneededfornetzeroby2050.​Significantinvestmentsareneededtoreplaceconventionalaviationfuelwithsustainablealternativesinanindustrythatislargeandgrowing.BarclaysstipulatesthatoverUSD1trillionincapitalwillbenecessarytoovercomeallhurdles.If,orwhen,challengesareovercome,sustainableaviationfuelcouldmakeitpossibletopracticallyeliminatetheindustry’sgreenhousegasemissions.​EnergyPerspectives202241InWalls,gasdemandgrowsby11%(435Bcm)from2025toitspeakdemandin2040asitreceivessupportfrompoliciesandregulationsandaidsgrowthanddevelopment.Italsofacilitatestheglobalenergytransitionbyphasingoutmorepollutingformsofenergyandbalancingelectricitysystemswithgrowingsharesofintermittentrenewables.After2040however,demandisultimatelydampenedasdecarbonisationintensifies.​Asiaisthekeydriverbehinddemandgrowth,drivenbyindustrialandpowersectorsandincreasedcoaltogasswitchinginresponsetocleanairconcernsandannouncedcarbonneutralitypledges.​WaningindigenousproductionandsubsequentimportdependenciescontinuetoexposeEuropetoglobalgasmarketfundamentals.ReducedRussianflowstoEuropedrivemoresignificantadjustmentsintheregionalsupplymixandthereforeimpactcosts,prices,tradedflowsandvolatility.Gasmarketsaretighter,morevolatileandlessflexiblefollowingthereducedRussiansupply.InBridges,theglobalgasdemanddeclinesby71%(2914Bcm)between2025and2050duetoarapidshifttowardsrenewables,supportedbybatteriesandpoliciesconstrainingfossilfuels.Theuptakeofrenewablesandhencethephase-outoffossilfuelsoccurssoquicklythattheroleofgasasatransitionfuelislimited.Thechangeingasdemandismostsignificantintheindustrialisedregionsthatseean81%droponaveragefrom2025-50.​Gasdemandpeaksin2025,withChina’sdemandpeakingslightlylater,in2027.Thedemandreductionacceleratesafter2030,affectingallflowsandtrade(pipe,LNGanddomestic)plusallinvestmentsingasexploration,production,infrastructureandusage.​Hydrogenproductionandthechemicalandpetrochemicalsectorsaretheonlyareastoseegasdemandgrowthbeyond2025.Gasdemandinhydrogenproductionpeaksin2040beforeslightlydecliningtowards2050,asenoughcapacityisbuiltinrenewablestomakegreenhydrogenthemorefeasibleandsustainablechoice.​Globalgasmarket​InWalls,gasdemandremainsavitalpartofthefuelmixinthemedium-to-longterm.However,inBridges,gasisnotperceivedasatransitionfuelanddeclinesrapidlyafter2025.Pre-warEuropeannaturalgasimportsin2021​Bcm/yr-bysourceandtype​Source:Kpler,Equinor,MapChart​USLNGNorwayPipeRussia~90%Pipe,10%LNG​MiddleEastPipeandLNG​AfricaPipeandLNGLatinAmericaLNGRUShareofRussianGasinEuropeanImports202118066303142021unusualyear,typically95%pipeand5%LNG113RussiangassupplytoEurope​OneconsequenceofRussia’sinvasionofUkraineisasignificantreductioninRussiangasexportstoEurope.Growinguncertaintyshroudsexistinglong-termcontractsandfutureRussianflowstothecontinent,withglobalramifications.SincegasmarketsareconnectedgloballybyLNG,thelossofRussianexportvolumestoEuropeisfeltgloballyasEuropecallsongreaterLNGvolumestofillthesupplygap.Importingregions,likeEuropeandAsia,aremostexposedtosupplychanges.ExportingregionslikeNorthAmericaaremoreshelteredfromsupplydisruptions.​Intheshortterm,furtherreductionsinRussianflowswillcausedemanddestruction,asimportingnationscompeteforsupplyandendusersreduceorsubstitutetheirdemandinresponsetothetightmarkets,highpricesandincreasedvolatility.Inthemedium-to-longterm,LNGvolumesfromUSandQatarareexpectedtostepupandhelpfillthesupplygap.However,additionalvolumesarelimitedbyinfrastructureandriskappetite,particularlywithoutlong-termcontractsaccompanyinginvestments.Futuregasmarketsaresusceptibletoinflexibilityaswellastightnessupto2030,withadditionalLNGvolumesonlymadeaccessiblebyoutbiddingotherregionsorsectors.​FurthercutstoflowsfromRussiatoEuropewillhavepronouncedeffectsongasdemand,economicgrowthandclimateambitions,asthereisnotenoughalternativegassupplyintheworldtocovertheimmediatesupplygapleftbyRussia.SuchcutswouldpotentiallyaffectRussia’sLNGexportsector,anditisnotinconceivablethatgasflowsfromRussiatoEuropewillcompletelycease.Increaseddisruptionsalsoendangertheconnectivityandoptimisationoftoday’sgasmarkets,sinceRussianflowstoEuropelackalternativeroutesandarelostwithoutinvestmentinnewpipelinestoAsia.However,risksofoversupplyremain,duetogeopoliticalchanges,economicrecession,andexportingnationsrespondingstronglytocurrentmarketfundamentals.​Regardlessofthefuturesupplysituation,riskstogasmarketshaveunquestionablybeenexacerbatedbygrowinghostilitiesandabreakdowninglobalcollaboration.​42EnergyPerspectives2022EnergyPerspectives202243InWalls,electricitydemandgrowsby47%globally.A65%growthinelectricitydemandisseenintheemergingregions,drivenbyeconomicdevelopment,increasedstandardsoflivingandambitionstodecarbonise.​Electricitydemandinthetransportsectorseesthelargestgrowth,increasingbynearly600%overtheprojectionperiod,owingtothesurgeinthedeploymentofelectricvehicles.Decarbonisationofemission-intensiveprocessesintheindustrysectordrivesa46%increaseinelectricitydemand,whilsta32%increaseisseeninbuildings,duetoelectrificationofheatingandincreasedcoolingneeds.​Energyefficiencyimprovementsintheresidentialsector,willdampenlong-termelectricityconsumption,especiallyintheindustrialisedregions.​Thepowergenerationfuelmixchangessignificantlyacrossthe2025-50period.Fossilfuelsdeclineby29%,drivenbynetzeroambitions,whilstsolarandwindgrowby562%and260%,respectively.After2025coalwillreduceitsshareinthegenerationmix.In2050fossilfuelswillform28%ofthepowergenerationfuelmix,with45%ofthesharebeingsolarandwind.InBridges,electricitydemandgrowsby61%between2025-50.Allregionselectrifyfastinthemid-termtodriveoutfossilfuels.​Thelargestelectricityconsumerstoday,ChinaandNorthAmerica,seepeakpowerdemandinthe2040s,astotalfinalenergyconsumptionfallsduetoefficiencygains.However,theregionsstillaccountfor38%ofdemandin2050​.​Industryandresidentialarethehighestelectricitydemandsectorsgloballybeyond2028,withdemandinindustrybeingdominatedbyChinathroughouttheperiod.TheresidentialsectorseespersistenthighdemandinChinaandNorthAmerica,withdemandintheIndiaandAfricaincreasingmostrapidlytowards2050.​​​Thetransportsectorseesthemostsignificantgrowthinelectricitydemand,growingalmost450%overtheprojectionperiod.​Thepowersectorseesaradicalshiftawayfromfossilfuelstowardsrenewables,especiallysolarandwind,froma57%shareoffossilfuelsin2025to4%in2050.Solarandwindmakeup65%ofthepowergenerationfuelmixin2050.Globalelectricitymarket​Clearpoliticalvisionssupportedbyappropriateregulationandmarketreformsencouraginginvestments,arerequiredtobuildadecarbonisedandreliablepowersystemglobally.Suchsystemsarekeytoachievingglobalclimatetargetsandhelpimproveenergysecurityforregionsrelyingheavilyonfossilfuelimports.​010203040506020152020202520302035204020452050010203040506020152020202520302035204020452050Walls–Fuelmixinpowergeneration​ThousandTWh​Bridges–Fuelmixinpowergeneration​ThousandTWh​Source,IEA(history),Equinor(projections)​Source,IEA(history),Equinor(projections)​CoalOilGasBiomassHydroNuclearWindSolarHydrogenGeothermalOtherIsthecurrentpowermarketdesignfitforpurpose?​Duetotheenergycrisisandskyrocketingprices,manyEuropeanpoliticiansandcommentatorsarguethat“themarketisbroken”andthatthere’saneedtomakechangestothecurrentelectricitymarketdesign.Thecurrentdesignischaracterisedbythemostexpensiveunitofgenerationneededtomatchdemandsettingthepriceforallproducers.Withextremelyhighgaspricesthisisweighingheavilyonallconsumersasthepriceofgassetsthemarketpriceofallelectricitygeneratedincertainmarkets,despitegasholdingarelativelysmallshareintheelectricitygenerationmix.​Argumentsformarketreformshavebeenofferedearlieraswellbuthavebeenrelatedtoanincreasingshareofrenewablesaspartofmeetingclimatetargets.Beingtechnologieswithclosetozeroproductioncosttheyareprojectedtopushoutthehighestcostgenerationtechnologiesandtherebydrivedownthemarketprice.Thismakesitchallengingtoattractenoughinvestmentsintonewgenerationcapacitytokeepupwithdemandgrowthaslowerpriceswillreducethereturnoninvestments.​Thehighmarketpriceindicatesthatsupplyislimitedwithregardtokeepingupwithademandthatisinelasticand/orhasfewsubstitutionalternatives.Thecurrentsituationisseriousasthereisarealunder-supplyofgastoEuropeandthathasadirecteffectonconsumerelectricityprices,aswellasputsaneconomicstrainonindustry,businessesandhouseholdsusinggasasaninputfactororforheating.​WholesalepricesarenotthishighduetoRussia’sinvasionofUkraineorthestrugglesofFrenchnuclearelectricity.Itisthemarketdesignthatiscausingthespikesandthemarkethasreactedexactlythewayitwassetuptodo–givingapricesignaltostimulateinvestmentinmoreproductioncapacity,althoughtheshort-termconsequenceswouldalsobeareductionindemandoruseofalternativegenerationcapacitythatmightbeevenmoreexpensiveandlesssustainable.Theresultingchallengeisthatthecurrentdesignprovidesneitheranaffordable,securenordecarbonisedpowersystem.Whilethecaseforafundamentalchangetopowermarketpricemechanismswasacontroversialissueonlysixmonthsago,callsforare-designarenowheardbothfromEuropeancountriesaswellasEuropeaninstitutionsthathaveacknowledgedthatafundamentalchangeisnecessary.​Tofacilitatethetremendousinvestmentsnowrequiredtorebalanceanddecarbonisetheelectricitymarket,oneofthemostimportantchallengesare-designwillhavetoaddressistherequirementsforlong-termrevenuevisibility.Withthecombinationofthecurrentmarketdesignprinciples,thedecarbonisationobjectives,andthecurrentmarketsituation,suchvisibilityislow.Deliveringonthethreeobjectivesofaffordability,securityanddecarbonisationwillinsteadmostlikelyrequirebettercentralcoordinationandinterventiontodrivetherequiredinvestments,butalsocompetition,innovation,andrisksharing.​Giventheconsequencesofthecurrentmarketdesign,thequestionnowappearstobenotifsuchinterventionisnecessary,butratherbywhatentityandmechanisms,andwhereinthevaluechainsuchcoordinationandinterventionshouldbeplaced.44EnergyPerspectives2022EnergyPerspectives202245InWalls,theroll-outofhydrogenstartstoaccelerateinthe2030saslargenewprojectsarebeingdevelopedinparallelwithhydrogeninfrastructure.​Intheoverallenergymix,hydrogendemandremainssmallatlessthan2%ofthetotalenergydemandby2050,withgreenhydrogenmakingup40%.Europe,Asia,andtheUSformthemainhydrogendemandregions.China,EU,India,andIndustrialAsiaPacificallrelyonimportstomeettheirdemand.Hydrogendemandtakesoffintheindustrysector,replacingsomegreyhydrogen,aswellasthetransportsector,inparticularinshippingwhereitmeets18%ofdemandin2050throughconversiontoammonia.​InBridgestheshareofhydrogenintheenergymixrapidlyincreases,reaching9.8%in2050,drivenbyaneedtoreplacetheremainingemissionsfromgaspowergeneration.​Chinaseesthefastestgrowthindemandintheshortterm,reaching53%oftheglobaltotalin2030.Itremainsthebiggestconsumerin2050,butitsshareshrinksto30%by2050.90%ofdemandin2050comesfromtransportandindustry.Theshareofgreenhydrogenproductionincreasesrapidlyandbythemid-2030sismorethanhalfofproduction.Itexceeds80%by2050.​Obstaclestotheroll-outofhydrogen​Theintroductionofcleanhydrogenisnotwithoutpolitical,technologicalandfinancialchallenges.Short-termmarketissuescloudthefutureofdevelopinganewmarketplaceforhydrogenasanenergycarrier.​Areducedpoliticalappetitetodeployhydrogenintheshorttermcouldimpedethedevelopmentofahydrogeneconomyinthemid-to-longterm.Thefirstprojectswillneedstronggovernmentsupporttoberealised.HydrogendevelopmentinEuropeiskey,includingforthegrowthexpectationsofpotentialexportregionssuchasAfrica,theMiddleEast,andNorthAmerica.​Deploymentofhydrogencouldbedelayedoverconcernsaboutnaturalgasandelectricity/renewablesscarcity,whicharenecessarytoproducehydrogen.Areductioningreenhydrogentechnologycostsisdependentonmoreprojectsbeingdeveloped.Theenergyefficiencyofhydrogenisalsoanissue.​Fewsectorsarereadytousehydrogen,andeventhosewhereitisalreadyanintegratedpartoftheproductionprocess(e.g.,refineries,fertiliser,andmethanolproduction)couldfacedifficultiesinswitchingtolow-carbonhydrogen.Globalhydrogenmarket​ThepotentialofcleanhydrogenasasubstituteforCO₂-emittingfossilfuels,includinginthosesectorsthatarehardtoelectrify,meansthatitisreceivingeverincreasinginterest.01002003004005006007008002020202520302035204020452050RestofworldCISIndiaChinaIndustrialAsiaPacificEuropeNorthAmerica01002003004005006007008002020202520302035204020452050RestofworldCISIndiaChinaIndustrialAsiaPacificEuropeNorthAmericaWalls–Hydrogendemand​Mtoe​Bridges–Hydrogendemand​Mtoe​Source:Equinor​Source:Equinor​46EnergyPerspectives2022Transformingtheindustrialsectorwillbedifficultasprocessessuchascementandsteelrelyonveryhightemperaturesthatarebestachievedthroughtheburningoffossilfuels.Sincetheturnofthecenturyenergyconsumptioninindustryhasincreasedbymorethan55%,andindustrialemissionsin2019accountedfor16%oftotalemissions.Theindustryfuelmixhasremainedfairlyconstantsince1990,withfossilfuelsmakingupapproximately60%annually.However,theshareoffossilfuelshasstartedtodeclinewithelectricityincreasingitssharebyfourpercentagepointssince2000,accountingforjustlessthan30%ofthetotalmixin2019.​EnergyconsumptioninindustrycontinuestoincreaseinWallstowards2050butdecreasesinBridgesfrom2025onwards.Electricityconsumptionincreasesgraduallyinlinewiththehistorictrendfrom2000andbyequalamountsinWallsandBridges.Itcoversanincreasinglygreatershareoftotalconsumptioninbothscenarios.However,duetogreaterefficiencygainsinBridgestheshareofelectricityisconsiderablyhigherthaninWallsby2050,accountingfor55%inBridgesasopposedto42%inWalls.HydrogenbecomesanimportantpartoftheindustryfuelmixinBridges,accountingfor16%oftotalconsumption,butcoversalowershareofthefuelmixinWalls.​EnergyintensityintheindustrialsectorisdecliningandcontinuestodosoinbothWallsandBridges.Thedeclineisbeingfacilitatedbyashiftawayfromtheenergy-intensiveheavyindustriestowardsmoreservice-basedindustriesinmanyregions.Technologicaladvances,theuseofelectricarcfurnacesandagreaterlevelofsteelrecyclingaresomeofthekeydevelopmentsthatwillhelpfurtherdrivedowndemandandimproveefficiency.​Keysectorinsights:Industry​01234WallsBridgesWallsBridges201920302050GasCoalOilHeatBiomassNewrenewablesElectricityHydrogen01234WallsBridgesWallsBridges201920302050GasCoalOilHeatBiomassNewrenewablesElectricityHydrogenIndustrialdemand​Gtoe​Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections)​EnergyPerspectives202247Energydemandforbuildingsusedforresidentialandcommercialpurposeshasseenasteadyincrease.Growingeconomiesandpopulations,aswellasincreasedurbanisationandashifttowardsservice-basedeconomies,havefacilitatedthedemandformorebuildingsandhouseholdappliances.Between2000-19theenergydemandfrombuildingsincreasedbynearly30%,withthedemandfromcommercialbuildingsaloneincreasingbymorethan50%.Buildingsmadeupathirdofthetotalenergyconsumptionin2019andaccountedfor10%ofglobalemissions.Therelativelylowshareofemissionscomparedtoconsumptionreflectsafuelmixthathistoricallyhasbeenlessreliantonfossilfuelsthanothersectors.In2019thebuildingsectorhadlessthan40%shareoffossilfuels.​Biomassandelectricityhaveaccountedforapproximatelyhalfofannualconsumptionthroughoutthe1990-2019period,fuellingwoodstovesandelectricalappliances.Thedemandgrowthhasmainlybeencoveredbyanincreaseinelectricityconsumption,whichhasrisenmorethan80%sincetheturnofthecentury.​Electrificationcontinuestotransformthesector,accountingforanincreasingshareofthefuelmixasit,alongwithnewrenewables,continuestoreplacefossilfuelsinbothscenarios.InWalls,theenergydemandfrombuildingscontinuestoincreaseuntilthemid-2030sbeforedeclininggentlytowards2050.InBridges,thechangecomessooner,andefficiencygainshelpdrivedowndemandbynearlyaquarterby2050.Thedemandleveliscomparabletotheearly2000sby2050.Electricitymakesup46%ofconsumptioninWallsand72%inBridgesin2050.​Technologicaladvances,policiesandbehaviouralchangesarealreadyhavinganimpactthatwillhelpsecureamoresustainablefutureforthebuildingssector.TheintroductionofLEDbulbs,smartmetersandthermostatsiswellunderwayand,inmanyinstances,incentivised.Thedemandforcoolingunitsisincreasingduetorisingtemperaturesandurbanisationandoverallwealthpushingupthewantforcomfort.Alotwillbegainedfromtechnologicaladvancesimprovingtheefficiencyoftheseunitsandotherhouseholdappliances,suchasfridgesandfreezers.Severalcountriesareputtinginplacepoliciesandincentivestopromoteheatpumpsandphaseouttraditionalgasboilers.​Growingpopulationsandurbanisationwillleadtoasignificantincreaseinfloorspacedemandgoingforward.Stricterregulationsare,andwillcontinuetobe,putinplacetoreducethecarbonfootprintofnewbuildingprojects.Carbonneutral,andevencarbonnegative,housingistechnologicallyattainable,butprovidingefficientandsustainablehousinggloballyandatscale,nottomentionmakingitaffordable,remainsasignificantchallenge.Inaddition,therewillundoubtedlybealagintransformingtheoverallhousingstockeveniffuturenewbuildsmeetcarbon-neutralstandards,asitisinconceivablethatallexistinginefficientbuildingswillbedemolishedearly.Hence,themovetowardscarbon-neutralbuildingsislikelytoaccelerateoverthecomingdecade,butafullturnoverofbuildingstockandtransitiontoglobalcarbon-neutralhousingwilltaketime.​Behaviouralchangeswillalsoberequiredtodrivedemanddownwithrecommendationsforwaterandspaceheatingandcoolingtemperatures,morerecyclingofclothesandplastics,aswellasdietarychangesallhavingaroletoplay.​Keysectorinsights:Buildings​01234WallsBridgesWallsBridges201920302050GasCoalOilHeatBiomassNewrenewablesElectricityHydrogen01234WallsBridgesWallsBridges201920302050GasCoalOilHeatBiomassNewrenewablesElectricityHydrogenBuildingsdemand​Gtoe​Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections)​48EnergyPerspectives2022Historically,growthinGDPandpopulationhastranslatedintoagrowingnumberofvehiclesontheroads,whilstalsogreatlyincreasingthedemandforoilandpushingupgreenhousegasemissions.Since1990,oildemandfromtransporthasgrownby86%,reachingnearly58mbdin2019.Themajorityofthisdemandincreasecomesfromroadtransportsuchascars,buses,trucksandtwo-wheelers.Thetransportsectorisresponsibleforaquarterofglobalenergy-relatedgreenhousegasemissions,andoverthepastdecade,therehasbeenasignificantglobaldrivetowardsloweringemissionsfromtransportingeneralandroadtransportinparticular.​Thetransitionofthetransportsectorhasalreadybegunandtheshareoffossilfuelsinthefuelmixhasdecreasedby3%between2000and2019.Whilstthismaynotseemlikeasignificantchangeitshouldbeseeninrelationtoanoverallsectorialdemandincreaseofnearly50%andthefactthattheshareofnon-fossilfuelshasmorethantripledoverthesameperiodfrom1.5%to5%.Therateofphase-downoffossilfuelsissettoaccelerate,withefficiencyimprovements,electrification,biofuelsandhydrogentransformingthesector.Thefuelmixchangesinasimilarmannerinbothscenarios,butchangeoccursmuchmorerapidlyandtoagreaterextentinBridgesthaninWalls,especiallyinthecurrentdecade.​Theimmensechangesneededtoensureasustainablepathaheadforthetransportsectorwillrequirecontinuedgovernmentincentivesandlegislativemeasures.Suchmeasureswillreducethenumberofheavilypollutingvehicles,promotegreateruseofcollectivepassengertransport,andreplaceflightswithalternativemeansoftransport,amongstotherthings.Initiativestopromotethesepathwaysarealreadybeingputinplacebygovernmentswith,forexample,theUKintroducingabanonthesaleofnewKeysectorinsights:Transport​20192030205001234WallsBridgesWallsBridgesHydrogenOilElectricityGasBiofuels20192030205001234WallsBridgesWallsBridgesHydrogenOilElectricityGasBiofuels20192030205001234WallsBridgesWallsBridgesHydrogenOilElectricityGasBiofuelsTransportdemand​Gtoe​Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections)​pureinternalcombustionenginecarsfrom2030andFranceprohibitingselectflightswhereatrainorbusalternativeoftwoandahalfhoursorlessexists.However,theenergyuseandfuelmixinBridgesin2050,comparedtotoday’ssituation,isavividillustrationofthechallengesahead.​EnergyPerspectives202249EMISSIONS​50EnergyPerspectives2022«PreviousBacktotableofcontentsNext»EnergyPerspectives202251Sourcesandsinks​Carbonsourcesreleasemorecarbonthantheyabsorb,whilecarbonsinksabsorbmorecarbonthantheyrelease.​FossilfuelcombustionisthegreatestcontributortoglobalCO₂emissions.Ofthetotalman-madeCO₂emissions,fossilfuelusehasrecentlyaccountedforapproximately85%,withlandusechangescontributingsome9%,cementandothermanufacturingprocessescloseto4%andflaringtheremainder.GlobalCO₂emissionsfromfossilfuelcombustionandcementmanufacturingincreasedby1.7%peryearbetween1990and2019,tosome36.7Gt,whilstemissionsfromlandusechangesweredownby0.4%peryear,accordingtotheGlobalcarbonproject.​LandandoceansinksarecurrentlyabsorbingapproximatelyhalfoftheglobalCO₂emissions.CO₂absorptionintooceansandvegetationfluctuatesannuallybutwasupby1.2%ayearbetween1990and2019.Therateofabsorptionbysinksisnotsufficienttokeepupwiththerateofemissionsfromsources.Asaresult,thenetCO₂additionstotheatmosphereincreasedfrom9.3Gtin1990to19.8Gtin2019.Thepaceofincreaseacrosstheperiodwasunevenreflectingupsanddownsonthesinksidemorethanfluctuationsinemissions.​Methane​Methaneisashort-livedbutpotentglobalwarmingdriver.Anestimated30%ofthe1.1°Cwarmingthathasoccurredsincetheindustrialrevolutionisduetomethaneemissions.Approximately20-25%ofmethaneemissionsareduetooilandgasactivities,withagricultureresponsiblefor40-50%andcoalminingfor10-15%.​Globalmethaneemissionslevelledoutintheearly2000sbuthaverecentlystartedtoriseagain.Thereasonforthisrecentriseisuncertain,butevidencesuggeststhatagricultureandlandusechangesmayberesponsible.Theoilandgassectoremissionscanbemoreeasilymanagedandcanbereducedbychangingwellcompletionpracticesandfixingleakyinfrastructure.Suchimprovementsareessentialfortheindustry’slicencetooperateandcorrespondinglyhighonitsto-dolist.​Energy-relatedgreenhousegasemissions​AglobalmethanepledgewasannouncedatCOP26inGlasgowinNovember2021.Itaspirestoreduceglobalmethaneemissionsby30%by2030.Thepledgehasbeenendorsedbymorethan100countriesrepresenting45%ofglobalmethaneemissions.Globalwarmingimplications​Globalwarmingreflectsthetotalamountofgreenhousegasesintheatmosphere,andrelativetothisamount,fluctuationsinemissionsfromoneyeartothenextmakelittledifference.Thedeclinesinemissionsin2009duetothefinancialcrisis,andin2020duetotheCovid-19pandemic,werefollowedbysharpreboundsin2010and2021andprovidedonlyabriefrespite.Inthemselvestheywarrantednochangesinthewarmingprojectionsdevelopedintheprecedingyears.-40-200204060199119962001200620112016CementcarbonationsinkLandsinkOceansinkEmissionsfromlanduseEmissionsfromfossilfuelcombustionandcementmanufacturingNetadditionstoatmosphereGlobalCO₂emissionsourcesandsinks​Gt​​Budgetimbalancenumbernettedout​Source:Globalcarbonproject​52EnergyPerspectives2022GlobalCO₂emissionsfromfossilfuelcombustiondeclineinbothscenarios,buckingthehistorictrend.InWalls,emissionspeakin2025andseeanoverallreductionbyone-thirdbetween2019and2050.ThisillustratesthatWallsisanythingbutalong-termtrendextrapolationexercise,butascenariothatpicksuponthecurrentsignsofdecarbonisationofpowergenerationandroadtransport,inparticular.​ThedeclineismostsignificantinBridgeswhereCO₂emissionsfromfossilfuelusearesettodeclinebyaround1.7Gtperyearinthelate2020sandearly2030s.Exceptfor2020,whichsawanextraordinarydropinemissionsofseveralgigatonnesduetotheCovid-19lockdowns,noyearsince1990hasseenemissionreductionsatthescalerequiredinordertoreachthe1.5°CtargetmodelledinBridges.Thefinancialcrisisin2009,forinstance,ledtoadeclineofonlyaroundhalfofonegigatonne.​ReducingglobalCO₂emissionsfromfossilfuelcombustionthroughenergyefficiencyimprovements,switchingtolowercarbonfuels,andcountinginCCUSonfossilfuels,isnotsufficienttodelivercumulativeemissionsinlinewiththe1.5°Ctarget.CCUShasbeenappliedtoindustry,powergenerationandbluehydrogenproductioninbothWallsandBridges.ThetotalCCUSonfossilfueluseinBridgesincreasesto2.2Gtperyearby2050,whichisapproximatelydoubletheamountassumedinWalls.​Inordertomeetthe1.5°CemissionsbudgetthatdefinesBridges,afurtherassumptionhasbeenmaderegardingcarbonremovalthroughBECCS,DACandnature-basedsolutions.Carbonremovalthroughthesemeasuresequatestoaround1.3Gtperyearin2030and4.3Gtperyearin2050.InBridgestheworldbecomesnetzerointhemid-2040s,withmoredevelopedregionshavingtogonetnegativeintheearly2040stoallowother,lessdevelopedregionsmoretimetoreachthetarget.Volumesarelowtoday,buttherearesignificanteffortstorampupcarbonremovalmarketsincludingfromgovernmentssuchastheUSandUK,aswellastheEU.​Energy-relatedCO₂emissions​0102030401990200020102020203020402050CoalOilGas-1001020304020152020202520302035204020452050ThousandsWallsBridgesBridgeswithoutcHistory0102030401990200020102020203020402050CoalOilGasWalls–CO₂emissionsbeforecarbonremoval​Gt​CO₂emissionsbeforeandaftercarbonremoval​Gt​Bridges–CO₂emissionsbeforecarbonremoval​Gt​Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections)​Source:IEA(history),Equinor(projections)​-1001020304020152020202520302035204020452050ThousandsWallsBridgesBridgeswithoutcarbHistory-1001020304020152020202520302035204020452050ThousandsWallsBridgesBridgeswithoutcarbonremovalHistoryEnergyPerspectives202253Keyfigures​UnitsWalls​Bridges​Walls​BridgesGlobalGDP2015-USDtrillion84.1​162.7​164.2​2.1​2.2​NorthAmerica,Europe,IndustrialAsiaPacific​2015-USDtrillion51.3​78.8​77.9​1.4​1.4​China​2015-USDtrillion14.6​38.1​38.7​3.2​3.2​RestofWorld​2015-USDtrillion18.3​45.8​47.6​3.0​3.1​Globalenergyintensity-indexedto2019​100​54.1​38.0​-2.0​-3.1​Globalpopulationbillion7.71​9.73​9.73​0.8​0.8​GlobalenergydemandGtoe14.37​15.02​10.64​0.1​-1.0​Coal​Gtoe3.81​1.94​0.37​-2.1​-7.2​Oil​Gtoe4.48​3.72​1.02​-0.6​-4.7​Gas​Gtoe3.30​3.64​0.98​0.3​-3.8​Nuclear​Gtoe0.73​1.01​1.14​1.3​1.4​Newrenewables​Gtoe0.33​2.63​5.40​6.9​9.4​Oilexclbiofuels​mbd96.8​81.5​24.1​-0.6​-4.4​GasBcm3,977​4,379​1,187​0.3​-3.8​Globalenergy-relatedCO₂emissions(Gt)​Gt33.4​22.3​1.2​-1.3​-10.2​NorthAmerica​Gt5.9​2.8​0.2​-2.3​-10.8​Europe​Gt3.8​1.2​0.0​-3.6​-15.4​China​Gt10.1​5.1​0.1​-2.1​-14.3​India​Gt2.3​3.0​0.1​0.9​-8.6​WorldCO₂emissionsfromfossilfueluseremovedbyCCUSMt14​1,144​2,211​15.2​17.6​WorldCO₂emissionsremovedfromatmosphereMt0​0​4,300​-​-​Globallightdutyvehicles(LDVs)fleetmillion1,345​1,561​1,382​0.5​0.1​LDVSoildemandMtoe1,147​543​29​-2.4​-11.2​LDVsbiofueldemandMtoe72​46​1​-1.4​-13.9​LDVselectricitydemandMtoe2​166​270​16.1​17.9​201920502019-2050growthperyear(%),CAGR«PreviousBacktotableofcontentsNext»Definitions​Energydemandandconsumption​History:1990-2019​Projection:2019-2050Short-termoutlook:2019-2025Long-termoutlook:2025-2050​Regions​Thereare12regionsmodelled.​Industralised:EuropeanUnion,IndustralisedAsiaPacific,NorthAmerica,OtherEurope.​Emerging:Africa,China,CIS(CommonwealthofIndependentStates),India,MiddleEast,OtherAmericas,OtherAsiaPacific,SoutheastAsia​Sectors​Thereare8sectorsmodelled.​Industry,residential,otherstationary,transport,non-energy,power&heat,hydrogen,othertransformationPhotocredits​Page8SethReese,Unsplash​Page9VictorSánchezBerruezo,Unsplash​Page11YosefFutsum,UnsplashPage13JoshAppel,UnsplashPage13CaseyHorner,UnsplashPage13JasonDent,UnsplashPage15FréSonneveld,UnsplashPage16ØivindHaug,EquinorPage17PolinaRytova,Unsplash​Page21NateWatson,Unsplash​Page22Valdemaras,UnsplashPage23FabioComparelli,UnsplashPage23MarcusLoke,UnsplashOnlyunitsusedinthereportarelistedUnitsCoal​Btce​billiontonnesofcoalequivalent​Oil​mbd​millionbarrelsperday​Gas​Bcm​billioncubicmetre​​Power​TWh​terawatt-hour​PWh​petawatt-hour​GW​gigawatt(1wattx109)​Energy​Mt​milliontonnes(1tonnex106)​Gt​gigatonnes(1tonnex109)​toetonneofoilequivalentktoe​thousandtonnesofoilequivalent​Mtoe​milliontonnesofoilequivalent​Gtoe​gigatonnesofoilequivalent​Carbon​GtC0₂​gigatonnesofcarbondioxide​Monetary​USD​1USdollar​Page29CourtneyHill,UnsplashPage30FrederikLower,UnsplashPage32AppolinaryKalashnikova,UnsplashPage37SanderWeeteling,UnsplashPage39KhamkeoVilaysing,UnsplashPage40IwanShimko,Unsplash​Page42HaraldPettersen,EquinorPage44SebAtkinson,UnsplashPage46LennyKuhne,UnsplashPage49JackAnstey,UnsplashPage48TomasAntonEscobar,UnsplashPage50WesleyTingey,UnsplashPage55OleJørgenBratland,Equinor54EnergyPerspectives2022«PreviousBacktotableofcontentsNext»Acknowledgementsanddisclaimer​Acknowledgements​Theanalyticalbasisforthisoutlookislong-termresearchonmacroeconomicsandenergymarketsundertakenbytheEquinororganisationduringthefirsthalfof2022.TheresearchprocesshasbeencoordinatedbyEquinor’sunitforMacroeconomicsandEnergyMarketAnalysis,withcrucialanalyticalinput,supportandcommentsfromotherpartsofthecompany.Jointeffortsandclosecooperationinthecompanyhavebeencriticalforthepreparationofanintegratedandconsistentoutlookfortotalenergydemandandtheprojectionsofthefutureenergymixindifferentscenarios.Weherebyextendourgratitudetoeverybodyinvolved.​Theeditorialprocessconcludedon13thSeptember2022.​Disclaimer​ThisreportispreparedbyavarietyofEquinoranalystpersons,topresentmattersfordiscussionandanalysis,notconclusionsordecisions.Findings,views,andconclusionsrepresentfirstandforemosttheviewsoftheanalystpersonscontributingtothisreportandcannotbeassumedtoreflecttheofficialpositionofpoliciesofEquinor.Furthermore,thisreportcontainscertainstatementsthatinvolvesignificantrisksanduncertainties,especiallyassuchstatementsoftenrelatetofutureeventsandcircumstancesbeyondthecontroloftheanalystpersonsandEquinor.Thisreportcontainsseveralforward-lookingstatementsthatinvolverisksanduncertainties.Insomecases,weusewordssuchas”ambition”,”believe”,”continue”,”could”,”estimate”,”expect”,”intend”,”likely”,”may”,”objective”,”outlook”,”plan”,”propose”,”should”,”will”andsimilarexpressionstoidentifyforward-lookingstatements.Theseforward-lookingstatementsreflectcurrentviewsconcerningfutureeventsandare,bytheirnature,subjecttosignificantrisksanduncertaintiesbecausetheyrelatetoeventsanddependoncircumstancesthatwilloccurinthefuture.Severalfactorscouldcauseactualresultsanddevelopmentstodiffermateriallyfromthoseexpressedorimpliedbytheseforward-lookingstatements.​Hence,neithertheanalystpersonsnorEquinorassumeanyresponsibilityforstatementsgiveninthisreport.EnergyPerspectives202255«PreviousBacktotableofcontents©EquinorASAThisreport,includingthecontentsandarrangementofthecontentsofeachindividualpageorthecollectionofthepages,isownedbyEquinor.Copyrighttoallmaterialincluding,butnotlimitedto,writtenmaterial,photographs,drawings,images,tablesanddataremainsthepropertyofEquinor.Allrightsreserved.Anyotheruse,reproduction,translation,adaption,arrangement,alteration,distributionorstorageofthispresentation,inwholeorinpart,withoutthepriorwrittenpermissionofEquinorisprohibited.Theinformationcontainedinthispresentationmaynotbeaccurate,uptodateorapplicabletothecircumstancesofanyparticularcase,despiteourefforts.Equinorcannotacceptanyliabilityforanyinaccuraciesoromissions.EnergyPerspectives2022
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