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Emissions Gap Report 2022

The Closing Window

Climate crisis calls for rapid transformation

of societies

ISBN: 978-92-807-3979-4

Job number: DEW/2477/NA

This publication may be reproduced in whole or in part and in any form for educational or non-prot services without

special permission from the copyright holder, provided acknowledgement of the source is made. The United Nations

Environment Programme would appreciate receiving a copy of any publication that uses this publication as a source.

No use of this publication may be made for resale or any other commercial purpose whatsoever without prior permission

in writing from the United Nations Environment Programme. Applications for such permission, with a statement of the

purpose and extent of the reproduction, should be addressed to the Director, Communication Division, United Nations

Environment Programme, P.O. Box 30552, Nairobi 00100, Kenya.

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The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any

opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country,

territory or city or its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

Some illustrations or graphics appearing in this publication may have been adapted from content published by third

parties. This may have been done to illustrate and communicate the authors’ own interpretations of the key messages

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The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reect the views of the United

Nations Environment Programme. We regret any errors or omissions that may have been unwittingly made.

Suggested citation

United Nations Environment Programme (2022). Emissions Gap Report 2022: The Closing Window — Climate crisis calls

for rapid transformation of societies. Nairobi. https://www.unep.org/emissions-gap-report-2022

Co-produced with:

UNEP Copenhagen Climate Centre (UNEP-CCC) and CONCITO – Denmark’s green think tank.

Supported by:

UNEP promotes

environmentally sound

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The Closing Window

Climate crisis calls for rapid

transformation of societies

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EmissionsGapReport2022TheClosingWindowClimatecrisiscallsforrapidtransformationofsocieties©2022UnitedNationsEnvironmentProgrammeISBN:978-92-807-3979-4Jobnumber:DEW/2477/NAThispublicationmaybereproducedinwholeorinpartandinanyformforeducationalornon-profitserviceswithoutspecialpermissionfromthecopyrightholder,providedacknowledgementofthesourceismade.TheUnitedNationsEnvironmentProgrammewouldappreciatereceivingacopyofanypublicationthatusesthispublicationasasource.NouseofthispublicationmaybemadeforresaleoranyothercommercialpurposewhatsoeverwithoutpriorpermissioninwritingfromtheUnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme.Applicationsforsuchpermission,withastatementofthepurposeandextentofthereproduction,shouldbeaddressedtotheDirector,CommunicationDivision,UnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme,P.O.Box30552,Nairobi00100,Kenya.DisclaimersThedesignationsemployedandthepresentationofthematerialinthispublicationdonotimplytheexpressionofanyopinionwhatsoeveronthepartoftheSecretariatoftheUnitedNationsconcerningthelegalstatusofanycountry,territoryorcityoritsauthorities,orconcerningthedelimitationofitsfrontiersorboundaries.Someillustrationsorgraphicsappearinginthispublicationmayhavebeenadaptedfromcontentpublishedbythirdparties.Thismayhavebeendonetoillustrateandcommunicatetheauthors’owninterpretationsofthekeymessagesemergingfromillustrationsorgraphicsproducedbythirdparties.Insuchcases,thematerialinthispublicationdoesnotimplytheexpressionofanyopinionwhatsoeveronthepartoftheUnitedNationsEnvironmentProgrammeconcerningthesourcematerialsusedasabasisforsuchgraphicsorillustrations.MentionofacommercialcompanyorproductinthisdocumentdoesnotimplyendorsementbytheUnitedNationsEnvironmentProgrammeortheauthors.Theuseofinformationfromthisdocumentforpublicityoradvertisingisnotpermitted.Trademarknamesandsymbolsareusedinaneditorialfashionwithnointentiononinfringementoftrademarkorcopyrightlaws.TheviewsexpressedinthispublicationarethoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsoftheUnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme.Weregretanyerrorsoromissionsthatmayhavebeenunwittinglymade.©Maps,photosandillustrationsasspecifiedSuggestedcitationUnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme(2022).EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindow—Climatecrisiscallsforrapidtransformationofsocieties.Nairobi.https://www.unep.org/emissions-gap-report-2022Co-producedwith:UNEPCopenhagenClimateCentre(UNEP-CCC)andCONCITO–Denmark’sgreenthinktank.Supportedby:UNEPpromotesenvironmentallysoundpracticesgloballyandinitsownactivities.OurdistributionpolicyaimstoreduceUNEP'scarbonfootprint.TheClosingWindowClimatecrisiscallsforrapidtransformationofsocietiesEmissionsGapReport2022VEmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowAcknowledgementsAcknowledgementsTheUnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme(UNEP)wouldliketothankthemembersofthesteeringcommittee,theleadandcontributingauthors,thereviewers,andtheSecretariatfortheircontributiontothepreparationofthisassessmentreport.Authorsandreviewershavecontributedtothereportintheirindividualcapacities.Theiraffiliationsareonlymentionedforidentificationpurposes.SteeringcommitteeJulianeBerger(GermanEnvironmentAgency),JohnChristensen(CONCITO–Denmark’sgreenthinktank),NavrozK.Dubash(CentreforPolicyResearch,India),SamuelKarslake(DepartmentforBusiness,EnergyandIndustrialStrategy,UnitedKingdom),WaelFaragBasyounyKeshk(MinistryofEnvironment,Egypt),JianLiu(UNEP),GerdLeipold(ClimateTransparency),SimonMaxwell(independent),SurabiMenon(ClimateWorksFoundation),DirkNemitz(UnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange[UNFCCC]),HenryNeufeldt(UNEPCopenhagenClimateCentre[UNEP-CCC]),KatiaSimeonova(independent),YoubaSokona(IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange[IPCC]),OksanaTarasova(WorldMeteorologicalOrganization)AuthorsChapter1Authors:AnneOlhoff(CONCITO–Denmark'sgreenthinktank),JohnChristensen(CONCITO–Denmark’sgreenthinktank)Chapter2Leadauthors:WilliamF.Lamb(MercatorResearchInstituteonGlobalCommonsandClimateChangeandPriestleyInternationalCentreforClimate,SchoolofEarthandEnvironment,UniversityofLeeds,UnitedKingdom),GiacomoGrassi(EuropeanCommission,JointResearchCentre[JRC],Italy)Contributingauthors:LucasChancel(WorldInequalityLab,ParisSchoolofEconomics,France),MonicaCrippa(EuropeanCommission,JRC,Italy),DiegoGuizzardi(EuropeanCommission,JRC,Italy),MarilenaMuntean(EuropeanCommission,JRC,Italy),JosOlivier(PBLNetherlandsEnvironmentalAssessmentAgency,theNetherlands),GlenPeters(CICEROCenterforInternationalClimateResearch,Norway),JuliaPongratz(Ludwig-MaximiliansUniversityMunich,MaxPlanckInstituteforMeteorology,Germany)Chapter3Leadauthors:TakeshiKuramochi(NewClimateInstitute,Germany),MicheldenElzen(PBLNetherlandsEnvironmentalAssessmentAgency,InstituteforEnvironmentalStudies,VrijeUniversiteitAmsterdam,theNetherlands),TarynFransen(WorldResourcesInstitute,UnitedStatesofAmerica)Contributingauthors:CaitlingBergh(EnergySystemsResearchGroup,UniversityofCapeTown,SouthAfrica),AnnaChapman(ClimateAnalytics,Australia),NandiniDas(ClimateAnalytics,Australia),KimCoetzee(ClimateTransparency,Germany),NeilGrant(ClimateAnalytics,Germany),MarianaGutiérrez(HUMBOLDT-VIADRINAGovernancePlatform,Mexico),GaheeHan(SolutionsforOurClimate,RepublicofKorea),FredericHans(NewClimateInstitute,Germany),CamillaHyslop(NetZeroTrackerandUniversityofOxford,UnitedKingdom),JiangKejun(EnergyResearchInstitute,China),JoojinKim(SolutionsforOurClimate,RepublicofKorea),BenKing(RhodiumGroup,UnitedStatesofAmerica),AmanMajid(ClimateAnalytics,Germany),AndrewMarquard(EnergySystemsResearchGroup,UniversityofCapeTown,SouthAfrica),BryceMcCall(EnergySystemsResearchGroup,UniversityofCapeTown,SouthAfrica),MalteMeinshausen(UniversityofMelbourne,Australia),MiaMoisio(NewClimateInstitute,Germany),SilkeMooldijk(NewClimateInstitute,Germany),LeonardoNascimento(NewClimateInstitute,Germany),NataliePelekh(NewClimateInstitute,Germany),AnneOlhoff(CONCITO–Denmark’sgreenthinktank)JazmínRoccoPredassi(FundaciónAmbienteyRecursosNaturales,Argentina),AnaluzPresbítero(IniciativaClimáticadeMéxico,Mexico),MartinBirkRasmussen(CONCITO–Denmark’sgreenthinktank),CarleyReynolds(ClimateAnalytics,Germany),JoeriRogelj(GranthamInstitute,ImperialCollegeLondon,UnitedKingdom;InternationalInstituteforAppliedSystemsAnalysis[IIASA],Austria),ÜmitŞahin(IstanbulPolicyCenter,SabancıUniversityandStiftungMercator,Türkiye),CleaSchumer(WorldResourcesInstitute,UnitedStatesofAmerica),KentaroTamura(InstituteforGlobalEnvironmentalStrategies,Japan),FabbyTumiwa(InstituteforEssentialServicesReform,Indonesia),FarahVianda(InstituteforEssentialServicesReform,Indonesia),JorgeVillarreal(IniciativaClimáticadeMéxico,Mexico),ClaireStokwell(ClimateAnalytics,Germany),SarithaSudharmmaVishwanathan(IndianInstituteofManagement,Ahmedabad[IIMA],India),LisaWijayani(InstituteforEssentialServicesReform,Indonesia),WilliamWills(FederalUniversityofRiodeJaneiro,Brazil)Chapter4Leadauthors:JoeriRogelj(ImperialCollegeLondon,UnitedKingdom;InternationalInstituteforAppliedSystemsAnalysis[IIASA],Austria),MicheldenElzen(PBLNetherlandsEnvironmentalAssessmentAgency,theNetherlands),JoanaPortugal-Pereira(GraduateSchoolofEngineering[COPPE],UniversidadeFederaldoRiodeJaneiro,Brazil)Contributingauthors:TarynFransen(WorldResourcesInstitute,UnitedStatesofAmerica),GauravGanti(ClimateVIEmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowAnalytics,Germany),JarmoKikstra(ImperialCollegeLondon,UnitedKingdom),AlexKöberle(ImperialCollegeLondon,UnitedKingdom),RobinLamboll(ImperialCollegeLondon,UnitedKingdom),ShivikaMittal(ImperialCollegeLondon,UnitedKingdom),Carl-FriedrichSchleussner(ClimateAnalytics,Germany),CleaSchumer(WorldResourcesInstitute,UnitedStatesofAmerica)Chapter5Leadauthors:NiklasHöhne(NewClimateInstitute,Germany),KellyLevin(BezosEarthFund,UnitedStatesofAmerica),JoyashreeRoy(AsianInstituteofTechnology,Thailand,andJadavpurUniversity,India)Contributingauthors:StephenNaimoli(WorldResourcesInstitute,UnitedStatesofAmerica),LouiseJeffery(NewClimateInstitute,Germany),JuditHecke(NewClimateInstitute,Germany),JoshuaMiller(InternationalCouncilonCleanTransportation,UnitedStatesofAmerica)Chapter6Leadauthors:AlineMosnier(SustainableDevelopmentSolutionsNetwork,France),MarcoSpringmann(UniversityofOxford,UnitedKingdom),ShenggenFan(ChinaAgriculturalUniversity,China)Contributingauthors:BruceCampbell(Clim-EATandUniversityofCopenhagen,Denmark),HelenHarwatt(ChathamHouse,UnitedKingdom),JuliaRochaRomero(UNEP-CCC,Denmark),WeiZhang(CGIARandInternationalFoodPolicyResearchInstitute[IFPRI],UnitedStatesofAmerica)Chapter7Leadauthors:PieterPauw(EindhovenUniversityofTechnology,theNetherlands),DipakDasgupta(TheEnergyandResourcesInstitute–TERI,India),HeleendeConinck(EindhovenUniversityofTechnology,theNetherlands)Contributingauthors:LiliaCouto(UniversityCollegeLondonInstituteforSustainableResourcesandChathamHouse,UnitedKingdom),MichaelKönig(theFrankfurtSchool–UNEPCentreforClimateandSustainableEnergyFinance,Germany),GeorgeMarbuah(StockholmEnvironmentInstitute,Sweden),LuisZamarioli(theFrankfurtSchool–UNEPCentreforClimateandSustainableEnergyFinance,Germany)ReviewersNadiaAmeli(UniversityCollegeLondon)JesicaAndrews(UNEPFinanceInitiative),MarciRoseBaranski(UNEP),StefanoBattiston(UniversityofZurich),JulianeBerger(GermanEnvironmentAgency),MarinaBortoletti(UNEP),RuciMafiBotei(UNEP),DavidCarlin(UNEPFinanceInitiative),PieroCarlodosReis(Directorate-GeneralforClimateAction(DG-CLIMA]),HuguesChenet(UniversityCollegeLondon),JohnChristensen(CONCITO–Denmark’sgreenthinktank),IanCochran(UniversityofEdinburghBusinessSchool),ReneColditz(DG-CLIMA),PeterCooleman(DepartmentforBusiness,EnergyandIndustrialStrategy),AnnetteCowie(UniversityofNewEngland),MonicaCrippa(JRC),KrystalCrumpler(FoodandAgricultureOrganizationoftheUnitedNations[FAO]),RobDellink(OECD),PaulDowling(DG-CLIMA),NavrozDubash(CentreforPolicyResearch),FlorianEgli(EnergyandTechnologyPolicyGroup),JamesFoster(DepartmentforBusiness,EnergyandIndustrialStrategy),ChadFrischmann(ProjectDrawdown),OliverGeden(GermanInstituteforInternationalandSecurityAffairs),BernatGoni-Ros(DG-CLIMA),NiklasHagelberg(UNEP),ThomasHale(UniversityofOxford),AndreaHinwood(UNEP),ClaireHoolohan(UniversityofManchester),JasonJabbour(UNEP),NarcisJeler(DG-CLIMA),YasukoKameyama(NationalInstituteforEnvironmentalStudies),MaartenKappelle(UNEP),SamuelKarslake(DepartmentforBusiness,EnergyandIndustrialStrategy),WaelFaragBasyounyKeshk(MinistryofEnvironment,EgyptianEnvironmentalAffairsAgency),ThaddeusIdiKiplimo(UNEP),JohannesKlumpers(DG-CLIMA),BorisLeMontagner(UNEPEconomyDivision),GerdLeipold(ClimateTransparency),KaiLesmann(PotsdamInstituteforClimateImpactResearch),JianLiu(UNEP),JamesLomax(UNEP),PhillipLugmayr(DG-CLIMA),MarkLundy(ConsultativeGroupforInternationalAgriculturalResearch),DominicMacCormack(UNEP),MariaSocorroManguiat(UNEP),JadeMaron(UNEP),SimonMaxwell(independent),SurabiMenon(ClimateWorksFoundation),BertMetz(independent),IreneMonasterolo(ÉcoledesHautesEtudesCommercialesduNord),JongwoonMoon(YonseiUniversity),KanakoMorita(ForestryandForestProductsResearchInstitute),SusanMutebi-Richards(UNEP),DirkNemitz(UNFCCC),HenryNeufeldt(UNEP-CCC)ClementineO’Connor(UNEP),RowanPalmer(UNEP),FrederikPischke(GermanEnvironmentAgency),VickyPollard(DG-CLIMA),FriedemannPolzin(UtrechtUniversity),KatePower(HotorCoolCoalition),ClaraRabeloCaiafaPereira(EindhovenUniversityofTechnology),RaoniRajão(UniversidadeFederaldeMinasGerais),ElisabethResch(UNEP-CCC),CorneliusRhein(DG-CLIMA),YannRobiouduPontRobiouduPont(ClimateEnergyCollege),JohannaSchiele(DG-CLIMA),Laure-SophieSchiettecatte(FAO),JohannesSchuler(DG-CLIMA),XavierSeront(DG-CLIMA),HimanshuSharma(UNEP),KatiaSimeonova(independent),PaulSmith(UNEPFinanceInitiative),YoubaSokona(IPCC),ShreyaSome(AsianInstituteofTechnology),SandhyaSrinivasan(WorldBank),JamalSrouji(WorldResourcesInstitute),RichardSwannell(WRAP),KentaroTamura(InstituteforGlobalEnvironmentalStudies),OksanaTarasova(WorldMeteorologicalOrganization),SvenTeske(InstituteforSustainableFutures,UniversityofTechnology,Sydney),SimoneWestiHøjte(CONCITO–Denmark’sgreenthinktank),FrancescoTubiello(FAO),Jensvan‘tKlooster(UniversityofAmsterdam),MelvinvanVelthoven(DG-CLIMA),LouisVerchot(ConsultativeGroupforInternationalAgriculturalResearch),CleoVerkujl(StockholmEnvironmentInstitute),DanielWetzel(InternationalEnergyAgency),CharlieWilson(UniversityofOxford),ZhaoXiusheng(TshinguaUniversity),MajaZ.Ulezic(DG-CLIMA),EdoardoZandri(UNEP),CarolineZimm(IIASA)VIIEmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowChiefscientificeditorsAnneOlhoff(CONCITO–Denmark’sgreenthinktank),JohnChristensen(CONCITO–Denmark’sgreenthinktank),SimonMaxwell(independent)EditorialsupportJuliaRochaRomero(UNEP-CCC)Secretariat,productionandcoordinationAnneOlhoff(CONCITO–Denmark'sgreenthinktank),JuliaRochaRomero(UNEP-CCC),KaisaUusimaa(UNEP),MaartenKappelle(UNEP),EdoardoZandri(UNEP)MediaandlaunchsupportUNEP:DanielCooney,KatieElles,MariaVittoriaGalassi,MirandaGrant,NancyGroves,RuneKier,MichaelLogan,BeverleyMcDonald,DuncanMoore,PoojaMunshi,KeishamazaRukikaire,NicolienSchoneveld-deLange,JoyceSang,ReaganSirengo,NehaSudandseveralothermembersoftheUNEPCommunicationDivisionUNEP-CCC:MetteAnnelieRasmussen,LasseHemmingsen,MonnaHammershøyBlegvadDesignandlayoutCarenWeeksConcept&Design(figuresandtables),StrategicAgenda(layout),BeverleyMcDonald,UNEP(coverdesign)TranslationsoftheexecutivesummaryandlanguageeditingStrategicAgendaThanksalsoto:LarsChristiansen(UNEP-CCC),AngelineDjampou(UNEP),NathanBorgford-Parnell(UNEP),AmitGarg(IIMA),DanyGhafari(UNEP),LeonaHarting(UNEP-CCC),AmalieJensenius(CONCITO–Denmark’sgreenthinktank),ThomasLaursen(UNEP-CCC),PazLópez-Rey(UNEP),BertMetz(independent),JaneMuriithi(UNEP),LouPerpes(UNEP),EkaterinaPoleshchuk(UNEP),AlexanderPopp(PotsdamInstituteforClimateImpactResearch),PinyaSarasas(UNEP),DrewShindell(DukeUniversity),NanditaSurendran(UNEP),YingWang(UNEP)UNEPwouldliketothanktheClimateWorksFoundation,theDanishMinistryofForeignAffairs,theMinistryofEconomicAffairsandClimatePolicyoftheNetherlands,theGermanGovernmentanditsInternationalClimateInitiative(IKI),andtheSwedishInternationalDevelopmentAuthority(SIDA),aswellastheIKEAFoundationandLaudesFoundationfortheirsupporttotheworkoftheEmissionsGapReport2022.VIIIEmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowIXEmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowContentsAcknowledgementsVGlossaryXIForewordXVExecutivesummaryXVIChapter1Introduction11.1ContextandframingoftheEmissionsGapReport202211.2Approachandstructureofthereport2Chapter2Globalemissionstrends32.1Introduction32.2Globalemissionstrends52.3Emissionstrendsofmajoremitters7Chapter3Nationallydeterminedcontributionsandlong-termpledges:ThegloballandscapeandG20memberprogress113.1Introduction113.2Globaldevelopmentsinmitigationpledgesfor2030andbeyond123.3ImpactsofnewandupdatedNDCsonglobalGHGemissionsin2030133.4ProgressofG20memberstowardstheirNDCtargets153.5DetailsonG20members’net-zeropledges23Chapter4Theemissionsgap264.1Introduction264.2Scenariosconsideredforthe2030emissionsgapassessment274.3Theemissionsgap324.4Temperatureimplicationsoftheemissionsgap35Chapter5TransformationsneededtoachievetheParisAgreementinelectricitysupply,industry,buildingsandtransportation385.1Introduction385.2Initiating,acceleratingandaccomplishingthetransformationtowardszeroemissions385.3Electricitysupply405.4Industry435.5Transportation465.6Buildings49Chapter6Transformingfoodsystems526.1Introduction526.2Transformationneedsandpotential546.3Signsofprogressandoptionsforfurtheraction566.4Howcantransformationbeaccelerated?61Chapter7TransformingthefinancesystemtoenabletheachievementoftheParisAgreement657.1Introduction:Theneedforatransformationofthefinancialsystem657.2Aligningfinancialsystemactorswithclimatechange687.3Transformingthefinancialsystem:Sixapproachestopublicpolicy72References78XEmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowXIEmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowGlossaryGlossaryThisglossaryiscompiledaccordingtotheleadauthorsofthereport,drawingonglossariesandotherresourcesavailableonthewebsitesofthefollowingorganizations,networksandprojects:theIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange,UnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme,UnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange,andWorldResourcesInstitute.Anthropogenicmethane:Methaneemissionsderivedfromhumanactivities.Anthropogenicemissionssourcesincludecoalmining,agriculturalpractices,wastewatertreatment,certainindustrialprocesses,andoilandgassystems,amongothers.Baseline/reference:Thestateagainstwhichchangeismeasured.Inthecontextofclimatechangetransformationpathways,theterm‘baselinescenarios’referstoscenariosbasedontheassumptionthatnomitigationpoliciesormeasureswillbeimplementedbeyondthosealreadyinforceand/orlegislatedorplannedtobeadopted.Baselinescenariosarenotintendedtobepredictionsofthefuture,butrathercounterfactualconstructionsthatcanservetohighlightthelevelofemissionsthatwouldoccurwithoutfurtherpolicyefforts.Typically,baselinescenariosarecomparedtomitigationscenariosthatareconstructedtomeetdifferentgoalsforgreenhousegas(GHG)emissions,atmosphericconcentrationsortemperaturechange.Theterm‘baselinescenario’isusedinterchangeablywith‘referencescenario’and‘no-policyscenario’.Carbonborderadjustmentmechanisms:Mechanismsthatacttoequalizethepriceofcarbonbetweendomesticproductsandimports,toeliminatefinancialincentivestorelocateproductionoutsideregionswithstrongclimatecontrols.Carbondioxideemissionbudget(orcarbonbudget):Foragiventemperatureriselimit,forexamplea1.5°Cor2°Clong-termlimit,thecorrespondingcarbonbudgetreflectsthetotalamountofcarbonemissionsthatcanbeemittedfortemperaturestostaybelowthatlimit.Stateddifferently,acarbonbudgetistheareaunderacarbondioxide(CO2)emissiontrajectorythatsatisfiesassumptionsaboutlimitsoncumulativeemissionsestimatedtoavoidacertainlevelofglobalmeansurfacetemperaturerise.Carbondioxideequivalent(CO2e):Awaytoplaceemissionsofvariousradiativeforcingagentsonacommonfootingbyaccountingfortheireffectontheclimate.Itdescribes,foragivenmixtureandamountGHGs,theamountofCO2thatwouldhavethesameglobalwarmingability,whenmeasuredoveraspecifiedtimeperiod.Forthepurposeofthisreport,GHGemissions(unlessotherwisespecified)arethesumofthebasketofGHGslistedinAnnexAtotheKyotoProtocol,expressedasCO2eassuminga100-yearglobalwarmingpotential.Carbonmarkets:AtermforacarbontradingsystemthroughwhichcountriesmaybuyorsellunitsofGHGemissionsinanefforttomeettheirnationallimitsonemissions,eitherundertheKyotoProtocolorunderotheragreements,suchasthatamongmemberStatesoftheEuropeanUnion.ThetermcomesfromthefactthatcarbondioxideisthepredominantGHG,andothergasesaremeasuredinunitscalledcarbondioxideequivalents.Carbonneutrality:Isachievedwhenanactor’snetcontributiontoglobalCO2emissionsiszero.AnyCO2emissionsattributabletoanactor’sactivitiesarefullycompensatedbyCO2reductionsorremovalsexclusivelyclaimedbytheactor,irrespectiveofthetimeperiodortherelativemagnitudeofemissionsandremovalsinvolved.Carbonoffset:SeeOffset.Carbonprice:ThepriceforavoidedorreleasedCO2orCO2eemissions.Thismayrefertotherateofacarbontax,orthepriceofemissionpermits.Inmanymodelsusedtoassesstheeconomiccostsofmitigation,carbonpricesareusedasaproxytorepresentthelevelofeffortinmitigationpolicies.Conditionalnationallydeterminedcontribution:Aconditionalnationallydeterminedcontribution(NDC–seebelow)proposedbysomecountriesthatiscontingentonarangeofpossibleconditions,suchastheabilityofnationallegislaturestoenactthenecessarylaws,ambitiousactionfromothercountries,realizationoffinanceandtechnicalsupport,orotherfactors.ConferenceoftheParties(COP):ThesupremebodyoftheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC).ItcurrentlymeetsonceayeartoreviewtheUNFCCC’sprogress.XIIEmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowDoublecounting:Doublecountinginvolvestwocountriestakingcreditforthesameemissionsreductions,therebygivingtheimpressionthattheworldhasreducedemissionsmorethanitactuallyhas.Forexample,emissionsreductioncreditsfromacountrymightbesoldtoanothercountry,whilethosereductionsarestillcountedtowardsachievementoftheNDCinthecountrywherethecreditsoriginated.Emissionpathway:ThetrajectoryofannualGHGemissionsovertime.Emissionstrading:Amarket-basedinstrumentusedtolimitemissions.Theenvironmentalobjectiveorsumoftotalallowedemissionsisexpressedasanemissionscap.Thecapisdividedintradableemissionpermitsthatareallocated–eitherbyauctioningorhandingoutforfree–toentitieswithinthejurisdictionofthetradingscheme.Entitiesneedtosurrenderemissionpermitsequaltotheamountoftheiremissions(e.g.tonsofCO2).Anentitymaysellexcesspermits.Tradingschemesmayoccurattheintra-company,domesticorinternationallevel,andmayapplytoCO2,otherGHGs,orothersubstances.EmissionstradingisalsooneofthemechanismsspecifiedundertheKyotoProtocol.Financialsystem:Afinancialsystemisasetofglobal,regionalorfirm-specificinstitutionsandpracticesusedtofacilitatetheexchangeoffunds.Financialsystemscanbeorganizedusingmarketprinciples,centralplanning,orahybridofboth.Institutionswithinafinancialsystemincludeeverythingfrombanks,tostockexchanges,togovernmenttreasuries.Foodsecurity:Asituationthatexistswhenallpeople,atalltimes,havephysical,socialandeconomicaccesstosufficient,safeandnutritiousfoodthatmeetstheirdietaryneedsandfoodpreferencesforanactiveandhealthylife.Foodsystems:Foodsystemsarethepublicpolicydecisions,thenationalandglobalsystems(includingproduction,farming,processingandglobalsupplychains),andtheindividualsandgroups(publicandprivate),thatinfluencethequantityandqualityoffoodavailableforall.Globalwarmingpotential:AnindexrepresentingthecombinedeffectofthedifferingtimesGHGsremainintheatmosphereandtheirrelativeeffectivenessinabsorbingoutgoinginfraredradiation.Greenhousegases(GHGs):Theatmosphericgasesresponsibleforcausingglobalwarmingandclimaticchange.ThemajorGHGsarecarbondioxide(CO2),methane(CH4)andnitrousoxide(N2O).Lessprevalent,butverypowerful,GHGsincludehydrofluorocarbons(HFCs),perfluorocarbons(PFCs)andsulphurhexafluoride(SF6).Greenhousegasremoval:WithdrawalofaGHGand/oraprecursorfromtheatmospherebyasink.Industrialprocessesandproductsuse(IPPU):Theindustrialprocessesandproductuse(IPPU)sectorcoversGHGemissionsresultingfromvariousindustrialactivitiesthatproduceemissions,thatarenotthedirectresultofenergyconsumedduringthemanufacturingprocessandtheuseofman-madeGHGsinproducts.Integratedassessmentmodels:Modelsthatseektocombineknowledgefrommultipledisciplinesintheformofequationsand/oralgorithms,inordertoexplorecomplexenvironmentalproblems.Assuch,theydescribethefullchainofclimatechange,fromproductionofGHGstoatmosphericresponses.Thisnecessarilyincludesrelevantlinksandfeedbacksbetweensocioeconomicandbiophysicalprocesses.Intendednationallydeterminedcontribution:IntendedNDCsaresubmissionsfromcountriesdescribingthenationalactionsthattheyintendtotaketoreachtheParisAgreement’slong-termtemperaturegoaloflimitingwarmingtowellbelow2°C.OnceacountryhasratifiedtheParisAgreement,itsintendedNDCisautomaticallyconvertedtoitsNDC,unlessitchoosestofurtherupdateit.KyotoProtocol:Aninternationalagreementsignedin1997andwhichcameintoforcein2005,standingonitsown,andrequiringseparateratificationbygovernments,butlinkedtotheUNFCCC.TheKyotoProtocol,amongotherthings,setsbindingtargetsforthereductionofGHGemissionsbyindustrializedcountriesLanduse,land-usechangeandforestry(LULUCF):AGHGinventorysectorthatcoversemissionsandremovalsofGHGsresultingfromdirecthuman-inducedlanduse,land-usechangeandforestryactivities.Least-costpathway:Least-costpathwayscenariosidentifytheleastexpensivecombinationofmitigationoptionstofulfilaspecificclimatetarget.Aleast-costscenarioisbasedonthepremisethat,ifanoverarchingclimateobjectiveisset,societywantstoachievethisatthelowestpossiblecostovertime.Italsoassumesthatglobalactionsstartatthebaseyearofmodelsimulations(usuallyclosetothecurrentyear)andareimplementedfollowingacost-optimal(cost-efficient)sharingofthemitigationburdenbetweencurrentandfuturegenerations,dependingonthesocialdiscountrate.Likelychance:Alikelihoodgreaterthan66percentchance.Usedinthisassessmenttoconveytheprobabilitiesofmeetingtemperaturelimits.XIIIEmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowMitigation:Inthecontextofclimatechange,mitigationrelatestoahumaninterventiontoreducethesourcesorenhancethesinksofGHGs.Examplesincludeusingfossilfuelsmoreefficientlyforindustrialprocessesorelectricitygeneration,switchingtosolarenergyorwindpower,improvingtheinsulationofbuildings,andexpandingforestsandother‘sinks’toremovegreateramountsofCO2fromtheatmosphere.Nationallydeterminedcontribution(NDC):SubmissionsbycountriesthathaveratifiedtheParisAgreementwhichpresentstheirnationaleffortstoreachtheParisAgreement’slong-termtemperaturegoaloflimitingwarmingtowellbelow2°C.NeworupdatedNDCsaretobesubmittedin2020andeveryfiveyearsthereafter.NDCsthusrepresentacountry’scurrentambitionortargetforreducingemissionsnationally.Offset:Inclimatepolicy,aunitofCO2eemissionsthatisreduced,avoidedorsequesteredtocompensateforemissionsoccurringelsewhere.Purchasingpowerparity:Ameasurementthateconomistsusetocomparethespendingpowerbetweentwoormorenations.Scenario:Adescriptionofhowthefuturemayunfoldbasedon‘if-then’propositions.Scenariostypicallyincludeaninitialsocioeconomicsituationandadescriptionofthekeydrivingforcesandfuturechangesinemissions,temperatures,orotherclimatechange-relatedvariables.S-curve:AdoptionofnewtechnologiesoftenfollowsanS-curvetrajectory.UnderanS-curve,growthfollowsanon-linearpatterninwhichthecurveinitiallyincreasesslowly,beforeacceleratingrapidlytoafasterlineargrowthrate.Asthevariableapproachesanewsaturationpoint,thegrowthratedeceleratesuntilasteadystateisreached.Source:Anyprocess,activityormechanismthatreleasesaGHG,anaerosoloraprecursorofaGHGoraerosolintotheatmosphere.XVEmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowForewordForewordEveryyear,thenegativeimpactsofclimatechangebecomemoreintense.Everyyear,theybringmoremiseryandpaintohundredsofmillionsofpeopleacrosstheglobe.Everyyear,theybecomemoreaproblemofthehereandnow,aswellasawarningoftougherconsequencestocome.Weareinaclimateemergency.Andstill,asUNEP’sEmissionsGapReport2022shows,nationsprocrastinate.SinceCOP26inGlasgowin2021,newandupdatednationallydeterminedcontributions(NDCs)havebarelyimpactedthetemperatureswecanexpecttoseeattheendofthiscentury.Thisyear’sreporttellsusthatunconditionalNDCspointtoa2.6°Cincreaseintemperaturesby2100,farbeyondthegoalsoftheParisAgreement.Existingpoliciespointtoa2.8°Cincrease,highlightingagapbetweennationalcommitmentsandtheeffortstoenactthosecommitments.Inthebest-casescenario,fullimplementationofconditionalNDCs,plusadditionalnetzerocommitments,pointtoa1.8°Crise.However,thisscenarioiscurrentlynotcredible.Togetontracktolimitingglobalwarmingto1.5°C,wewouldneedtocut45percentoffcurrentgreenhousegasemissionsby2030.For2°C,wewouldneedtocut30percent.Astepwiseapproachisnolongeranoption.Weneedsystem-widetransformation.Thisreporttellsushowtogoaboutsuchatransformation.Itlooksin-depthatthechangesneededinelectricitysupply,industry,transport,buildingsandfoodsystems.Itlooksathowtoreformfinancialsystemssothattheseurgenttransformationscanbeadequatelyfinanced.Isitatallordertotransformoursystemsinjusteightyears?Yes.Canwereducegreenhousegasemissionsbysomuchinthattimeframe?Perhapsnot.Butwemusttry.Everyfractionofadegreematters:tovulnerablecommunities,tospeciesandecosystems,andtoeveryoneofus.Mostimportantly,wewillstillbesettingupacarbon-neutralfuture:onethatwillallowustobringdowntemperatureovershootsanddeliverotherbenefits,likecleanair.Theworldisfacingothercrises.Wemustdealwiththem.Butletusrememberthattheyalsoofferopportunitiestoreformourglobaleconomy.Wehavemissedtheopportunitytoinvestinalow-carbonrecoveryfromtheCOVID-19pandemic.Now,weareindangerofmissingtheopportunitytoboostcleanandefficientenergyasaresponsetotheenergycrisis.Insteadofmissingsuchopportunities,wemustcapitalizeonthemwithconfidence.Iurgeeverynationandeverycommunitytoporeoverthesolutionsofferedinthisreport,buildthemintotheirNDCsandimplementthem.Iurgeeveryoneintheprivatesectortostartreworkingtheirpractices.Iurgeeveryinvestortoputtheircapitaltowardsanet-zeroworld.Thetransformationbeginsnow.IngerAndersenExecutiveDirectorUnitedNationsEnvironmentProgrammeXVIEmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowExecutivesummary1.TestimonytoinadequateactionontheclimatecrisisandtheneedfortransformationThisthirteentheditionoftheEmissionsGapReportistestimonytoinadequateactionontheglobalclimatecrisis,andisacallfortherapidtransformationofsocieties.Sincethetwenty-sixthUnitedNationsClimateChangeConferenceoftheParties(COP26),therehasbeenverylimitedprogressinreducingtheimmenseemissionsgapfor2030,thegapbetweentheemissionsreductionspromisedandtheemissionsreductionsneededtoachievethetemperaturegoaloftheParisAgreement,illustratedinthefollowing:▶Countries’newandupdatednationallydeterminedcontributions(NDCs)submittedsinceCOP26reduceprojectedglobalgreenhousegas(GHG)emissionsin2030byonly0.5gigatonsofCO2equivalent(GtCO2e),comparedwithemissionsprojectionsbasedonmitigationpledgesatthetimeofCOP26.▶CountriesareofftracktoachieveeventhegloballyhighlyinsufficientNDCs.GlobalGHGemissionsin2030basedoncurrentpoliciesareestimatedat58GtCO2e.Theimplementationgapin2030betweenthisnumberandNDCsisabout3GtCO2efortheunconditionalNDCs,and6GtCO2efortheconditionalNDCs.▶Theemissionsgapin2030is15GtCO2eannuallyfora2°Cpathwayand23GtCO2efora1.5°Cpathway.ThisassumesfullimplementationoftheunconditionalNDCs,andisfora66percentchanceofstayingbelowthestatedtemperaturelimit.If,inaddition,theconditionalNDCsarefullyimplemented,eachofthesegapsisreducedbyabout3GtCO2e.▶Policiescurrentlyinplacewithnoadditionalactionareprojectedtoresultinglobalwarmingof2.8°Coverthetwenty-firstcentury.ImplementationofunconditionalandconditionalNDCscenariosreducethisto2.6°Cand2.4°Crespectively.▶Togetontrackforlimitingglobalwarmingto1.5°C,globalannualGHGemissionsmustbereducedby45percentcomparedwithemissionsprojectionsunderpoliciescurrentlyinplaceinjusteightyears,andtheymustcontinuetodeclinerapidlyafter2030,toavoidexhaustingthelimitedremainingatmosphericcarbonbudget.Astheseheadlinefindingsillustrate,incrementalchangeisnolongeranoption:broad-basedeconomy-widetransformationsarerequiredtoavoidclosingthewindowofopportunitytolimitglobalwarmingtowellbelow2°C,preferably1.5°C.Everyfractionofadegreematters.AtCOP26lastyear,thisdiresituationwasrecognized,andcountrieswerecalleduponto“revisitandstrengthen”their2030targetsbytheendof2022.Consequently,akeyquestionforthiseditionoftheEmissionsGapReportis,whatprogresshasbeenmadeinambitionandactionsinceCOP26,andhowcanthenecessarytransformationsbeinitiatedandaccelerated?Thereportconsiderstransformationsrequiredinthesectorsofelectricitysupply,industry,transportandbuildings.Itfurthermoreinvestigatescross-cuttingsystemictransformationsoffoodsystemsandthefinancialsystem,illustratingthatthereisimmensepotentialtoreduceemissionsbeyondcurrentmitigationpledges.Theclimatecrisisispartofthetripleplanetarycrisisofclimatechange,pollutionandbiodiversityloss.Thisyear,theworldiswitnessingcompoundingenergy,foodandcostoflivingcrises,exacerbatedbythewarinUkraine,allofwhicharecausingimmensehumansuffering.Severalmethodologicalimprovementsandupdateshavebeenmadethisyeartoimprovetheestimatesandensureconsistencyacrossthechaptersofthisreport.Thesechanges,alongwiththeirimplicationsfortheinterpretationofthereportresults,aredescribedindetailinthereportchaptersandonlineappendices.However,itisimportanttonotethattheseimprovementsimplythattheestimatespresentedarenotdirectlycomparabletothoseofpreviousreports.2.GlobalGHGemissionscouldsetanewrecordin2021Estimatesoflanduse,land-usechangeandforestry(LULUCF)arecurrentlyonlyavailableupto2020,limitingouranalysisoftotalglobalGHGemissionsfor2021.However,globalGHGemissionsfor2021,excludingLULUCF,arepreliminarilyestimatedat52.8GtCO2e,aslightincreasecomparedto2019,suggestingthattotalglobalGHGemissionsin2021willbesimilartoorevenbreaktherecord2019levels(figureES.1).ThisconfirmsearlierfindingsthattheglobalresponsetotheCOVID-19pandemicledtoanunprecedentedbutshort-livedreductioninglobalemissions.TotalglobalGHGemissionsdropped4.7percentfrom2019to2020.ThisdeclinewasdrivenbyasharpdeclineinCO2emissionsfromfossilfuelsandindustryof5.6percentin2020.However,CO2emissionsreboundedto2019levelsin2021,withglobalcoalemissionsexceeding2019levels.Methaneandnitrousoxideemissionsremainedsteadyfrom2019to2021,andfluorinatedgasescontinuedtosurge.XVIIEmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowGlobalGHGemissionshavecontinuedtogrowinthepast10years,buttherateofgrowthhasslowedcomparedtothepreviousdecade.Between2010and2019,averageannualgrowthwas1.1percentperyear,comparedto2.6percentperyearbetween2000and2009.Thirty-fivecountriesaccountingforabout10percentofglobalemissionshavepeakedinCO2andotherGHGemissions,buttheirreductionshavebeenoutweighedbyglobalemissionsgrowthelsewhere.EstimatesofLULUCFemissionsandsinksaresubstantial,butalsodeeplyuncertain.Basedonnationalinventories,theLULUCFsectorwasanetsinkin17oftheG20memberStatesin2020,includinginChina,theUnitedStatesofAmerica,India,theEU27andtheRussianFederation.GHGemissionsexcludingLULUCFinthesecountriesarethereforehigher,byasmuchas33percentintheRussianFederation,17percentintheUnitedStatesofAmerica,9percentinIndia,andabout8percentinChinaandintheEU27.Bycontrast,theLULUCFsectorisanetemitterinIndonesiaandBrazil,accountingfor44percentand22percentoftheiremissionsrespectively.3.GHGemissionsarehighlyunevenacrossregions,countriesandhouseholdsThetopsevenemitters(China,theEU27,India,Indonesia,Brazil,theRussianFederationandtheUnitedStatesofAmerica)plusinternationaltransportaccountedfor55percentofglobalGHGemissionsin2020(figureES.1).Collectively,G20membersareresponsiblefor75percentofglobalGHGemissions.Percapitaemissionsvarygreatlyacrosscountries(figureES.1).WorldaveragepercapitaGHGemissions(includingLULUCF)were6.3tonsofCO2equivalent(tCO2e)in2020.TheUnitedStatesofAmericaremainsfarabovethislevelat14tCO2e,followedby13tCO2eintheRussianFederation,9.7tCO2einChina,about7.5tCO2einBrazilandIndonesia,and7.2tCO2eintheEuropeanUnion.Indiaremainsfarbelowtheworldaverageat2.4tCO2e.Onaverage,leastdevelopedcountriesemit2.3tCO2epercapitaannually.FigureES.1TotalandpercapitaGHGemissionsofmajoremittersin2020,includinginventory-basedLULUCF03691215IndiaWorldEU27IndonesiaBrazilChinaRussianFederationUSA03691215InternationaltransportBrazilRussianFederationIndonesiaEU27IndiaUSAChinaPercapitaGHGemissions0-3TotalGHGemissionsGtCO2etCO2e/capitaLULUCFCO2FossilCO2FFI,CH4,N2O,F−gasesXVIIIEmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowFigureES.2ImpactonglobalGHGemissionsin2030ofnewandupdatedunconditionalNDCsrelativetoinitialNDCsConsumption-basedemissionsarealsohighlyunequalbetweenandwithincountries.Whenemissionsassociatedwithbothhouseholdconsumptionandpublicandprivateinvestmentsareallocatedtohouseholds,andhouseholdsarerankedbyGHGemissions(excludingLULUCF),thebottom50percentemitonaverage1.6tCO2e/capitaandcontribute12percentoftheglobaltotal,whereasthetop1percentemitonaverage110tCO2e/capitaandcontribute17percentofthetotal.High-emittinghouseholdsarepresentacrossallmajoreconomies,andlargeinequalitiesnowexistbothwithinandbetweencountries.4.Despitethecallforcountriesto“revisitandstrengthen”their2030targets,progresssinceCOP26ishighlyinadequateAspartoftheParisAgreement’sfive-yearambition-raisingcycle,countrieswererequestedtosubmitneworupdatedNDCsintimeforCOP26.TheGlasgowClimatePact,adoptedin2021atCOP26,furtherrequestedcountriestorevisitandstrengthentheir2030mitigationtargetstoalignwiththetemperaturegoaloftheParisAgreement.Between1January2020and23September2022(thecut-offdateusedforthisreport),166partiesrepresentingaround91percentofglobalGHGemissionshadsubmittedneworupdatedNDCs,upfrom152partiesasofCOP26.AstheEuropeanUnionandits27memberStatessubmitasingleNDC,139neworupdatedNDCshavebeensubmitted.RelativetoinitialNDCs,alargershareincludesGHGemissiontargets,coverageofsectorsandgasesisgenerallygreater,andmoreincludeunconditionalelements.Intotalandiffullyimplemented,theneworupdatedunconditionalNDCsareestimatedtoresultinanannualadditionalreductionof4.8GtCO2eby2030relativetotheinitialNDCs.ProgresssinceCOP26amountstoabout0.5GtCO2e,mainlyresultingfromneworupdatedNDCsfromAustralia,Brazil,IndonesiaandtheRepublicofKorea(figureES.2).ImpactofnewandupdatedNDCs(decreaseinemissions)ImpactofnewandupdatedNDCs(increaseinemissions)Zeroimpact,noneworupdatedNDCTotalimpactImpactsinceCOP26RussianFederationNon-G20OtherfactorsOtherfactorsTotalTotalMexicoSaudiArabiaIndonesiaChinaArgentinaSouthAfricaAustraliaTürkiyeBrazilCanadaJapanEU27IndiaUnitedKingdomUnitedStatesofAmericaRepublicofKorea0-4,000-3,000-2,000-1,000-500-4,500-5,000-3,500-2,500-1,500MtCO2eXIXEmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindow5.G20membersarefarbehindindeliveringontheirmitigationcommitmentsfor2030,causinganimplementationgapMostoftheG20membersthathavesubmittedstrongerNDCtargetssince2020havejuststartedtheimplementationofpoliciesandactionstomeettheirnewtargets.ThosethatarecurrentlyprojectedtomeettheirNDCtargetsarecountriesthathaveeithernotupdatedtheiroriginalNDCs,ordidnotstrengthenoronlymoderatelystrengthenedtheirtargetlevelsintheirupdatedNDCs.AllotherG20memberswillneedadditionalpoliciestoachievetheirNDCs.ThecentralestimateofaggregateemissionsprojectionsforG20membersin2030undercurrentpoliciesdecreasedby1.3GtCO2ecomparedwiththe2021assessment,mainlyduetotheprojectedemissionreductionsfromtheInflationReductionActintheUnitedStatesofAmerica(about1GtCO2e).Collectively,theG20membersarenotontracktoachievetheirneworupdatedNDCs.Basedoncurrentpoliciesscenarioprojectionsinindependentstudies,thereisanimplementationgap,definedasthedifferencebetweenprojectedemissionsundercurrentpoliciesandprojectedemissionsunderfullimplementationoftheNDCs.Thisimplementationgapis1.8GtCO2eannuallyby2030fortheG20members.FortwoG20members,theRussianFederationandTürkiye,theprojectedemissionsundertheirNDCshaveconsistentlybeensignificantlyabovecurrentpoliciesprojections,therebyloweringtheimplementationgapcomparedtowhatcanreasonablybeexpected.IfNDCprojectionsaresubstitutedbycurrentpoliciesscenarioprojectionsforthesetwomembers,theG20memberswouldcollectivelyfallshortofachievingtheirNDCsby2.6GtCO2eannuallyby2030.BeyondG20members,theglobalimplementationgapfor2030isestimatedtobearound3GtCO2efortheunconditionalNDCsand6GtCO2efortheconditionalNDCs.6.Globally,theNDCsarehighlyinsufficient,andtheemissionsgapremainshighTheemissionsgapfor2030isdefinedasthedifferencebetweentheestimatedtotalglobalGHGemissionsresultingfromthefullimplementationoftheNDCs,andthetotalglobalGHGemissionsfromleast-costscenariosthatkeepglobalwarmingto2°C,1.8°Cor1.5°C,withvaryinglevelsoflikelihood.CurrentcommitmentsbycountriesasexpressedintheirunconditionalandconditionalNDCsfor2030areestimatedtoreduceglobalemissionsby5and10percentrespectively,comparedwithcurrentpoliciesandassumingthattheyarefullyimplemented.Togetontrackforlimitingglobalwarmingtobelow2.0°Cand1.5°C,globalGHGemissionsmustbereducedby30and45percentrespectively,comparedwithcurrentpolicyprojections.FullimplementationofunconditionalNDCsisestimatedtoresultinagapwiththe1.5°Cscenarioof23GtCO2e(range:19–25GtCO2e)(tableES.1,tableES.2andfigureES.3).Thisestimateisabout5GtCO2esmallerthaninthe2021editionoftheEmissionsGapReport.However,thisdifferenceisalmostentirelyduetomethodologicalupdatesandupdatestothe1.5°Cscenarios.Theemissionsin2030arehigherundertheupdated1.5°Cscenarios,becausetheystarttheirreductionsfromthemostup-to-datehistoricalemissions,whichhaveincreasedoverthepast5years.Thisdoesnotcomewithoutconsequences,asonaveragethesescenarioshavealowerchanceofeffectivelykeepingwarmingto1.5°C.IftheconditionalNDCsarealsofullyimplemented,the1.5°Cemissionsgapisreducedto20GtCO2e(range:16–22GtCO2e).TheemissionsgapbetweenunconditionalNDCsandbelow2°Cpathwaysisabout15GtCO2e(range:11–17GtCO2e),whichisabout2GtCO2elargerthanthatwhichwasreportedlastyear.Themainreasonforthisincreaseisthatthisyear’sreportcorrectsfordiscrepanciesinhistoricalemissionsthroughharmonization.IftheconditionalNDCsarealsofullyimplemented,thebelow2°Cemissionsgapisreducedto12GtCO2e(range:8–14GtCO2e).Emissionsundercurrentpoliciesareprojectedtoreach58GtCO2ein2030.Thisis3GtCO2ehigherthantheestimateoflastyear’sreport.Abouthalfoftheincreaseisduetotheharmonization,aboutonequartertothechangeofglobalwarmingpotentials(GWPs),andtheremaindertothemethodologicalchoiceofonlyselectingmodelstudiesthatexplicitlyaccountforthemostrecentcurrentpolicesandNDCestimates.XXEmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowFigureES.3GlobalGHGemissionsunderdifferentscenariosandtheemissionsgapin2030(medianestimateandtenthtoninetiethpercentilerange)TableES.1GlobaltotalGHGemissionsin2030andtheestimatedemissionsgapunderdifferentscenariosGHGemissionsin2030(GtCO2e)MedianandrangeEstimatedemissionsgapin2030(GtCO2e)Below2.0°CBelow1.8°CBelow1.5°CYear2010policies66(64–68)---Currentpolicies58(52–60)17(11–19)23(17–25)25(19–27)UnconditionalNDCs55(52–57)15(12–16)21(17–22)23(20–24)ConditionalNDCs52(49–54)12(8–14)18(14–20)20(16–22)Note:Thegapnumbersandrangesarecalculatedbasedontheoriginalnumbers(withoutrounding),andthesemaydifferfromtheroundednumbersinthetable.NumbersareroundedtofullGtCO2e.GHGemissionshavebeenaggregatedwithglobalwarmingpotentialover100years(GWP100)valuesoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChangeSixthAssessmentReport(IPCCAR6).2°Crange1.8°Crange1.5°CrangeBlueareashowspathwayslimitingglobaltemperatureincreasetobelow2°Cwithabout66%chanceGreenareashowspathwayslimitingglobaltemperatureincreasetobelow1.5°Cwitha66%chanceby2100andminimum33%chanceoverthecourseofthecenturyCurrentpoliciesscenarioConditionalNDCcaseUnconditionalNDCcaseConditionalNDCcaseUnconditionalNDCcaseRemaininggaptostaywithin2°ClimitRemaininggaptostaywithin2°ClimitConditionalNDCscenarioUnconditionalNDCscenario15GtCO2e23GtCO2e20GtCO2eMedianestimateoflevelconsistentwith2°C:41GtCO2e(range:37–46)Medianestimateoflevelconsistentwith1.5°C:33GtCO2e(range:26–34)2010policiesscenarioGtCO2e12GtCO2e2030405060702015202020252030XXIEmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindow7.Withoutadditionalaction,currentpoliciesleadtoglobalwarmingof2.8°Coverthiscentury.ImplementationofunconditionalandconditionalNDCscenariosreducethisto2.6°Cand2.4°CrespectivelyAcontinuationofthelevelofclimatechangemitigationeffortimpliedbycurrentunconditionalNDCsisestimatedtolimitwarmingoverthetwenty-firstcenturytoabout2.6°C(range:1.9–3.1°C)witha66percentchance,andwarmingisexpectedtoincreasefurtherafter2100asCO2emissionsarenotyetprojectedtoreachnet-zerolevels.ContinuingtheeffortsofconditionalNDCslowerstheseprojectionsbyaround0.2°Cto2.4°C(range:1.8–3.0°C)witha66percentchance.AscurrentpoliciesareinsufficienttomeeteventheunconditionalofNDCs,acontinuationofcurrentpolicieswouldresultinabout0.2°Chigherestimatesof2.8°C(range:1.9–3.3°C)witha66percentchance.GlobalwarminglevelsonlygetclosetotheParisAgreementtemperaturegoaliffullimplementationofthehighlyuncertainnet-zeropledgesisassumed.Achievingnet-zerotargetsinadditiontounconditionalNDCsresultsinkeepingprojectedglobalwarmingto1.8°C(range:1.8–2.1°C)witha66percentchance.AssumingthatconditionalNDCsandpledgesareachievedandfollowedbynet-zerotargets,globalwarmingissimilarlyprojectedtobekeptto1.8°C(range:1.7–1.9°C)witha66percentchance.However,inmostcases,neithercurrentpoliciesnorNDCscurrentlytraceacrediblepathfrom2030towardstheachievementofnationalnet-zerotargets.8.Thecredibilityandfeasibilityofthenet-zeroemissionpledgesremainsveryuncertainGlobally,88partiescoveringapproximately79percentofglobalGHGemissionshavenowadoptednet-zerotargets,TableES.2GlobaltotalGHGemissionsin2030andglobalwarmingcharacteristicsofdifferentscenariosconsistentwithlimitingglobalwarmingtospecifictemperaturelimitsScenarioNumberofscenariosGlobaltotalGHGemissions(GtCO2e)EstimatedtemperatureoutcomeClosestapproximateIn2030In205050%chance66%chance90%chanceIPCCAR6WorkingGroup(WG)IIIscenarioclassBelow2.0°C(66%chance)19541(37–46)20(16–24)Peak:1.7–1.8°CIn2100:1.4–1.7°CPeak:1.8–1.9°CIn2100:1.6–1.9°CPeak:2.2–2.4°CIn2100:2.0-2.4°CC3aBelow1.8°C(66%chance)13935(28–40)12(8–16)Peak:1.5–1.7°CIn2100:1.3–1.6°CPeak:1.6–1.8°CIn2100:1.4–1.7°CPeak:1.9–2.2°CIn2100:1.8–2.2°CN/ABelow1.5°C(66%in2100withnoorlimitedovershoot)5033(26–34)8(5–13)Peak:1.5–1.6°CIn2100:1.1–1.3°CPeak:1.6–1.7°CIn2100:1.2–1.5°CPeak:1.9–2.1°CIn2100:1.6–1.9°CC1aValuesrepresentthemedianandtenthtoninetiethpercentilerangeacrossscenarios.Percentagechancereferstopeakwarmingatanytimeduringthetwenty-firstcenturyforthebelow1.8°Candbelow2.0°Cscenarios.Whenachievingnet-negativeCO2emissionsinthesecondhalfofthecentury,globalwarmingcanbefurtherreducedfromthesepeakwarmingcharacteristics,asillustratedbythe“Estimatedtemperatureoutcome”columns.Forthebelow1.5°Cscenario,thechanceappliestotheglobalwarmingintheyear2100,whilethe“noorlimitedovershoot”characteristiciscapturedbyensuringprojectionsdonotexceed1.5°Cwithmorethan67percentchanceoverthecourseofthetwenty-firstcenturyor,inotherwords,thatthelowestchanceofwarmingbeinglimitedto1.5°Cthroughouttheentiretwenty-firstcenturyisneverlessthan33percent.ThisdefinitionisidenticaltotheC1categorydefinitionusedbytheIPCCAR6WGIIIreport.ComparedtoIPCC(2022),theEmissionsGapReportanalysisalsoselectsscenariosbasedonwhetherornottheyassumeimmediateaction.Note:GHGemissionsinthistablehavebeenaggregatedwithGWP100valuesofIPCCAR6.XXIIEmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindoweitherinlaw(21),inapolicydocumentsuchasanNDCoralong-termstrategy(47),orinanannouncementbyahigh-levelgovernmentofficial(20).Thisisupfrom74partiesatCOP26.Anadditionaleightpartiescoveringanadditional2percentofglobalGHGemissionshaveanother(non-net-zero)GHGmitigationtargetaspartoftheirlong-termstrategies.FocusingontheG20members,19membershavecommittedtoachievingnet-zeroemissions,upfrom17atCOP26.Thesetargetsvaryinanumberofimportantrespects,includingtheirlegalstatus;timeframe;explicitconsiderationoffairnessandequity;whichsources,sectorsandgasestheycover;whethertheywillallowtheuseofinternationaloffsetstocounttowardstheirachievement;thelevelofdetailtheyprovideontheroleofCO2removal;andthenatureofplanning,reviewofandreportingontargetimplementation.FigureES.4visualizesthenecessarydirectionforcountriestomovefromtheircurrentemissionlevelstotheirNDCtargetsfor2030,andindicatesthenet-zerotargetsforeachG20memberthathasanet-zerotarget(notingthatFrance,GermanyandItalyareonlyassessedaspartoftheEuropeanUnion).ThoseG20memberswhoseemissionshavealreadypeakedwillneedtofurtheracceleratetheiremissiondeclinestotheirnet-zerotargetyear,whilememberswhoseemissionswillcontinuetoincreasethrough2030undertheNDCswillrequirefurtherpolicyshiftsandinvestments–includingadequatesupporttodevelopingcountries,whereapplicable–toachievetheemissionsreductionsimpliedbytheirnationalnet-zerotargets.ThisillustrationdoesnotconsidertherelativemeritsintermsofequityorfairnessofthechoicescountriesmakeregardingtheirNDCsortheirnationallydeterminedpathwaystonet-zero.However,itbringstotheforethediscrepanciesbetweenshort-termpolicyimplementation,midtermtargetsandlong-termtargets.Italsoservesasanimportantreminderthatcurrentevidencedoesnotprovideconfidencethatthenationallydeterminednet-zerotargetswillbeachieved.9.Wide-ranging,large-scale,rapidandsystemictransformationisnowessentialtoachievethetemperaturegoaloftheParisAgreementThetaskfacingtheworldisimmense:notjusttosetmoreambitioustargets,butalsotodeliveronallcommitmentsmade.Thiswillrequirenotjustincrementalsector-by-sectorchange,butwide-ranging,large-scale,rapidandsystemictransformation.Thiswillnotbeeasy,giventhemanyotherpressuresonpolicymakersatalllevels.ClimateactionisimperativeinallcountriesbutmustbeachievedsimultaneouslywithotherUnitedNationsSustainableDevelopmentGoals.ThetransformationtowardszeroGHGemissionsinthesectorsofelectricitysupply,industry,transportationandbuildingsisunderway.However,increasedandacceleratedactionisneededifthesearetohappenatthepaceandscalerequiredtolimitglobalwarmingtowellbelow2°C,preferably1.5°C.Ofthesefoursectors,electricitysupplyisthemostadvanced,asthecostsofrenewableelectricityhavereduceddramatically.Still,majorobstaclescontinuetoexist,includingensuringthattransformationsarejustanddeliverenergyaccessforpeoplewhoarecurrentlynotserved.Furthermore,theimpactsoncommunitiesandnations,andexistingfossilenergycompaniesandsupplychains,mustbehandled,andgridintegrationoflargesharesofrenewableenergymustbeprepared.Forbuildingoperationsandroadtransport,themostefficienttechnologiescurrentlyavailableneedtobeapplied,whileforindustry,andshippingandaviation,zero-emissionstechnologiesneedtobefurtherdevelopedanddeployed.Thefollowingbroadportfolioofkeyactionstoinitiateandadvancethetransformationmustbeundertaken,tailoredtothespecificcontextofeachofthefoursectors:▶avoidinglock-inofnewfossilfuelintensiveinfrastructure▶enablingthetransitionbyfurtheradvancingzero-carbontechnologies,marketstructuresandplansforajusttransformation▶applyingzero-emissionstechnologiesandpromotingbehaviouralchangetosustainanddeepenreductionstoreachzeroemissionsAllactorshaverolestoplayininitiatingandacceleratingthetransformation,includingintheremovalofbarriersthatstandinthewayofprogress(tableES.3).Whileanyindividualactionsmaynotamounttosignificantenoughchange,takentogethertheycanspurmorefar-reaching,durable,systemicchange.XXIIIEmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowFigureES.4EmissionstrajectoriesimpliedbyNDCandnet-zerotargetsofG20members.NationalemissionsinMtCO2e/yearovertime.SaudiArabiaArgentinaAustraliaBrazilCanadaSouthAfricaTürkiyeRussianFederationUnitedKingdomUSARepublicofKoreaEmissionstrenduntil2030impliedbyNDCtargetsLinearcontinuationoftheemissionstrendimpliedbyNDCtargetsNetzerowithunclearorCO2-onlycoverageNet-zeroCO2targetsNet-zeroGHGtargetsMexicoIndonesiaJapanIndiaChinaEU27Historicaldata04000600015000800015000035005000025000150008000800060001000060000250006002020204020602020204020602020204020602020204020600202020402060202020402060202020402060202020402060202020402060202020402060202020402060202020402060202020402060202020402060202020402060202020402060XXIVEmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowTableES.3Importantactionstoacceleratetransformationsinelectricitysupply,industry,transportationandbuildingsbydifferentactors1TableES1Importantactionstoacceleratetransformationsinelectricitysupply,industry,transportationandbuildingsbydifferentactorsELECTRICITYSUPPLYINDUSTRYTRANSPORTATIONBUILDINGSNationalgovernmentsRRemovefossilfuelsubsidiesinasociallyacceptablemannerRRemovebarrierstoexpansionofrenewablesRStopexpansionoffossilfuelinfrastructureRPlanforajustfossilfuelphase-outRAdaptmarketrulesofelectricitysystemforhighsharesofrenewablesRSupportzero-carbonindustrialprocessesRPromotecircularmaterialflowRPromoteelectrificationRSupportalternativecarbonpricingmechanismsRSupportresearchandinnovationRPromotelow-carbonproductsRPlanforajusttransformationRSetmandatestoswitchtozero-emissionsroadvehiclesbyspecificdatesRRegulateandincentivizezero-carbonfuelsforaviationRAdjusttaxation/pricingschemesRInvestinzero-emissionstransportinfrastructureRRegulatetowardszero-carbonbuildingstockRIncentivizezero-carbonbuildingstockRFacilitatezero-carbonbuildingstockInternationalcooperationRCooperateonajustcoalphase-outRSupportinitiativesonemissions-freeelectricity,powersystemflexibilityandinterconnectionsolutionsRCooperateonzero-carbonbasicmaterialsRCooperateonhydrogenRSharebestpracticeRCooperateonfinancingandpolicydevelopmentRCoordinateontargetsettingandstandardsRProvideaccessandfavourableconditionstofinanceRSupportskillsandknowledgegrowthSubnationalgovernmentsRSet100percentrenewabletargetsRPlanforajustfossilfuelphase-outREngageinregionalplanningandregulationsRCooperatewithvariousstakeholdersRPlaninfrastructureandsupportingpoliciesthatreducetraveldemandRAdjusttaxation/pricingschemesRImplementzero-emissionsbuildingstockplansRIntegratelow-emissionsrequire-mentsinurbanplanningRAddrequirementsthatgobeyondthenationallevelBusinessesRSupporta100percentrenewableelectricityfutureRPlanandimplementzero-emissionstransformationRDesignlong-livedproductsRCreatecircularsupplychainRWorktowardszero-emissionstransportationRReducetravelinoperationsRConstructionandbuildingmaterialcompaniesreviewbusinessmodelsRAchievezero-carbonownedorrentedbuildingstockInvestors,privateanddevelopmentbanksREngagewithordivestfromfossilfuelelectricityutilitycompaniesRDonotinvestinorinsurenewfossilfuelinfrastructureREngagewithordivestfromemissions-intensiveindustryRInvestinlow-carbonenergyandprocesstechnologiesRDriveawarenessofclimaterisksRInvestinzero-emissionstransportinfrastructureRSupportzero-emissionsvehicles,vesselsandplanesRAdjuststrategyandinvestmentcriteriaforzero-carbonbuildingstockRSupportbuildingrenovationCitizensRPurchase100percentrenewableelectricityRConsumesustainablyRLobbyRAdoptactivemobilitypracticesRUsepublictransportationRUsezero-emissionsvehiclesRAvoidlong-haulflightsRRetrofitforimprovedcarbonfootprintRTenantschallengelandlordsRAdoptenergy-savingbehaviourXXVEmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindow10.Thefoodsystemaccountsforonethirdofallemissions,andmustmakealargereductionFoodsystemsaremajorcontributorsnotonlytoclimatechange,butalsotoland-usechangeandbiodiversityloss,depletionoffreshwaterresources,andpollutionofaquaticandterrestrialecosystems.Adoptingafoodsystemslensimpliesacross-sectoralapproachthatexplicitlyconnectssupplyanddemandsides,andallactorsofthefoodsupplychain.Itfacilitatesidentifyingsynergiesandtrade-offsacrossinterconnectedenvironmental,healthandeconomicdimensions,buttheinclusionofseveralsectorsmakescomputationofemissionsmoredifficult,andincreasesrisksofdoublecounting.ThefoodsystemiscurrentlyresponsibleforaboutathirdoftotalGHGemissions,or18GtCO2e/year(range:14–22GtCO2e).Thelargestcontributionstemsfromagriculturalproduction(7.1GtCO2e,39percent)includingtheproductionofinputssuchasfertilizers,followedbychangesinlanduse(5.7GtCO2e,32percent),andsupplychainactivities(5.2GtCO2e,29percent).Thelatterincludesretail,transport,consumption,fuelproduction,wastemanagement,industrialprocessesandpackaging.Projectionsindicatethatfoodsystememissionscouldreachca30GtCO2e/yearby2050.TogetonanemissionspathwayalignedwiththeParisAgreementtemperaturegoal,foodsystemswillhavetoberapidlytransformedacrossmultipledomains.Requiredtransformationsincludeshiftingdiets,protectingnaturalecosystems,improvingfoodproductionanddecarbonizingthefoodvaluechain.Eachtransformationdomainincludesseveralmitigationmeasures.ThepotentialtoreduceGHGemissionsisupto24.7GtCO2e/yearin2050(figureES.5).Transformingfoodsystemsisnotonlyimportantforaddressingclimatechangeandenvironmentaldegradation,butalsoessentialforensuringhealthydietsandfoodsecurityforall.Actionsbyallmajorgroupsofactorsisrequiredtodrivetransformationsforwardandtoovercomebarriers.FigureES.5FoodsystemsemissionstrajectoryandmitigationpotentialsbytransformationdomainGHGemissions(GtCO2e)05201520302050Target2°C1015202530Demand-sidechangesProtectionofecosystemsFarm-levelimprovementsDecarbonizingsupplychainLesslossandwasteFlexitariandietsPescatariandietsVegetariandietsVegandietsReduceconversionofcoastalwetlandsReduceconversionofpeatlandsReduceconversionofgrasslandsReducedeforestationManuremanagementCropnutrientmanagementRicemanagementFeedcompositionSoilcarbonmanagementingrasslandSoilcarbonmanagementincroplandsDecarbonizesupplychainsXXVIEmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindow11.RealignmentofthefinancialsystemisacriticalenablerofthetransformationsneededArealignmentofthefinancialsystemisvitallyimportanttoenablethetransformationsneededaretobeachieved.Thefinancialsystemisanetworkofprivateandpublicinstitutionssuchasbanks,institutionalinvestorsandpublicinstitutionsthatregulatethesafetyandsoundnessofthesystem,butalsoco-lendorfinancedirectly.Aglobaltransformationfromaheavilyfossilfuel-andunsustainablelanduse-dependenteconomytoalow-carboneconomyisexpectedtorequireinvestmentsofatleastUS$4–6trillionayear,arelativelysmall(1.5–2percent)shareoftotalfinancialassetsmanaged,butsignificant(20–28percent)intermsoftheadditionalannualresourcestobeallocated.TheIPCCassessesthatglobalmitigationinvestmentsneedtoincreasebyafactorofthreetosix,andevenmorefordevelopingcountries(figureES.6).Financialsystemschangeisrequiredtoenablesuchaglobaltransformation.Todate,mostfinancialactorshaveshownlimitedactiononclimatechangemitigationbecauseofshort-terminterestsandconflictingobjectives,andbecauseclimaterisksarenotadequatelyrecognized.Sixapproachestobringingaboutafinancialsystemthatiscapableoftheshiftingoffinanceflowsneededforsystemictransformationareidentified:▶Increasetheefficiencyoffinancialmarkets.Keyinterventionsincludetheprovisionofbetterinformation,includingtaxonomiesandtransparency,onclimaterisks.Indevelopingcountrycontexts,prioritieswillincludecapacity-buildingandstrengtheninginstitutions.▶Introducecarbonpricing.Thiscanbedonethroughpolicyinstrumentssuchascarbontaxesorcap-and-tradesystems.Emissions-tradingschemesandcarbontaxesnowcover30percentofallglobalemissions,withaglobalaveragepriceofUS$6pertonofCO2.Boththecoverageandthepriceareinsufficientfortransformingthefinancialsystem:theInternationalMonetaryFundhassuggestedaglobalaveragepriceofUS$75asrequiredby2030.▶Nudgefinancialbehaviour.Climatefinancemarketsaresubjecttodeepinformationasymmetry,riskaversionandherdbehaviour,allofwhichresultininefficientchoices.Policy“nudges”canachievebetterresults,withstrongpublicpolicyinterventions,taxation,spendingandregulationspositivelyinfluencingbehaviour.▶Createmarkets.Publicpolicyactioncanremoveexistingmarketdistortionsandacceleratenewproductmarketsforlow-carbontechnology,pushinginnovationthroughpublicfinance,andreplacingolder,inefficientandfossilfuel-basedtechnology.Developmentbanks,includinggreenbanks,canplayamoreactiveroletostimulatefinancialmarketsasnewerproductmarketsarebeingaccelerated.Multilateraldevelopmentbankscansupportmarketcreationthroughshiftingfinancialflows,stimulatinginnovationandhelpingtosetstandards(e.g.forfossilfuelexclusionpolicies,GHGaccountingandclimateriskdisclosure).▶Mobilizecentralbanks.CentralBanksareincreasinglyaddressingtheclimatecrisis.InDecember2017,eightcentralbanksandsupervisorsestablishedtheNetworkforGreeningtheFinancialSystem,whichhasnowgrownto116membersand18observers.Mandatesofcentralbanksindevelopingcountriesareoftenbroaderthanthoseofcentralbanksindevelopedcountries;moreconcreteactiontowardsthisapproachcanthereforebeobserved.Forexample,theReserveBankofIndiarequiresthatcommercialbanksallocateacertainproportionoflendingtoalistof“prioritysectors”,includingrenewableenergy,andBangladeshBankhasintroducedaminimumcreditquotaof5percentthatfinancialinstitutionsmustallocatetogreensectors.▶Setupclimateclubsandcross-borderfinanceinitiatives.Thesecanincludejusttransitionpartnerships,andcanalterpolicynormsandchangethecourseoffinancethroughcrediblefinancialcommitmentdevicesoncross-borderfinancialflows,suchassovereignguarantees.Evidenceontheeffectivenessofthesixapproachesabovesuggeststhatthereisnosingle“silverbullet”.Instead,nestedandcoordinatedapproachesareneeded,tailoredtocontexts,andimplementedacrossmajorgroupsofcountries,withequityand“justtransition”withinandbetweencountries.Thesuccessofsuchcoordinatedandcooperativeaction,depend,ultimately,onpublicsupportandpressurestoavertthesignificantrisksofinaction,andthewillingnessofkeyfinancialsystemactorstotakeontheirroles.XXVIIEmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowFigureES.6Financeflowsandmitigationinvestmentneedspersector,typeofeconomyandregion(averageduntil2030)0Actualyearlyflowcomparedtoaverageannualneeds(billionUS$2015/year)Energyefficiency(IEA)TransportElectricityAgriculture,forestryandotherlanduse100015005002000Averageflows(2017–2020)Annualmitigationinvestmentneeds(averageduntil2030)lowlowhighhighMultiplicationfactorsValueGDPshareSectorx2x7x7x70Actualyearlyflowcomparedtoaverageannualneeds(billionUS$2015/year)DevelopingcountriesDevelopedcountries100020003000Typeofeconomyx4x74%9%2%4%x3x5x2x5x10x310Actualyearlyflowcomparedtoaverageannualneeds(billionUS$2015/year)EastAsiaNorthAmericaEuropeSouthAsiaLatinAmericaandCaribbeanJapan,AustraliaandNewZealandEasternEuropeandWest-CentralAsiaAfricaSouth-EastAsiaanddevelopingPacificMiddleEast6009003001200Regionx4x2x3x6x2x4x4x8x3x7x7x15x5x12x6x12x14x28x7x141EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowIntroductionLeadauthors:AnneOlhoff(CONCITO–Denmark’sgreenthinktank),JohnChristensen(CONCITO–Denmark’sgreenthinktank)11.1ContextandframingoftheEmissionsGapReport2022Since2010,theUnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme(UNEP)hasprovidedannualscience-basedassessmentsofthegapbetweencommitmentsmadebygovernmentstoreducegreenhousegas(GHG)emissionsandthoseneededtoachieveglobaltemperaturetargetsundertheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC).ThisthirteentheditionoftheEmissionsGapReportisatestimonytoinactionontheglobalclimatecrisis.Injusteightyears,globalGHGemissionsmustbereducedby30to45percentcomparedtowheretheyareheadedunderpoliciescurrentlyinplacetogetontracktolimitingglobalwarmingtowellbelow2.0°Cand1.5°Crespectively.Commitmentsbycountriesasexpressedintheirlatestunconditionalandconditionalnationallydeterminedcontributions(NDCs)for2030willonlyreduceglobalemissionsby5to10percent,assumingthattheyarefullyimplemented.Earlierthisyear,theIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)publishedtworeportsaspartofitsSixthAssessmentcycle,onImpacts,AdaptationandVulnerability(IPCC2022a)andMitigationofClimateChange(IPCC2022b).Thereportsrecordthevastimpactsofclimatechangethatwearealreadyexperiencing,andhowtheclimaterisksofthefutureareofamuchgreaterorderofmagnitude.Onceagain,thesereportsdocumentthatthescaleandrateofclimatechangeandassociatedrisksdependstronglyonnear-termmitigationandadaptationactions,findingthatprojectedadverseimpactsandrelatedlossesanddamagesescalatewitheveryincrementofglobalwarming.Thisyear,ashasrepeatedlybeenthecaseinrecentyears,manycountrieshaveexperiencedanunprecedentednumberofclimateevents,withextremeweatherleadingtoflooding,droughtandwildfires,andcausingfoodshortages,healthproblems,andmajordamagetoecosystemsandhumanhabitats,leadingtointernaldisplacementandmigrationaroundtheworld.InlinewiththeEmissionsGapReport,theIPCCreportssendareverberatingmessagethatthewindowofopportunitytolimitglobalwarmingtowellbelow2°C,preferably1.5°C,therebyavoidingsomeunmanageableclimaterisks,isclosingrapidly.Everyfractionofadegreematters.ConsistentwithpreviousEmissionsGapReports,theIPCCMitigationofClimateChangereportfindsthat“projectedglobalemissionsfromNDCsannouncedpriortoCOP26wouldmakeitlikelythatwarmingwillexceed1.5°Candalsomakeitharderafter2030tolimitwarmingtobelow2°C”(IPCC2022b).Specifically,thereportfindsthatGHGemissionslevelsby2030associatedwiththeimplementationofNDCs,implythatmitigationafter2030cannolongerestablishapathwaythatlimitsglobalwarmingto1.5°Cduringthetwenty-firstcenturywithoutsignificantovershoot,andthatreturningtobelow1.5°Cin2100isinfeasibleforsomescenarios(IPCC2022b).Unprecedentedscalingupofmitigationambitionsandimplementationisaprerequisitetobridgingtheemissionsgap,andisexpectedtobeoneofthefocusareasofthetwenty-seventhUnitedNationsClimateChangeConferenceoftheParties(COP27).FollowinguponthedecisionsmadeatCOP26,itwasdecidedtoestablishaworkprogrammeforurgentlyscalingupmitigationambitionandimplementation,thedetailsofwhichareexpectedtobeagreeduponatCOP27(UNFCCC2022a;UNFCCC2022b).Recognizingthesignificantemissionsgap,countrieswerefurthermoreencouragedtorevisitandstrengthentheir2030mitigationpledgesin2022,anditwasdecidedtoestablishannualhigh-levelministerialroundtablesonpre-2030ambitionalsostartingin2022.Consequently,akeyquestionforCOP27andforthisyear’sEmissionsGapReportis,whatprogresshasbeenmadesinceCOP26,andhowcanthetransformationnecessarytobridgetheemissionsgapbeinitiatedandaccelerated?Thereportlooksattransformationsrequiredinelectricitysupply,industry,transport,buildings,foodsystemsandthefinancialsystem.Itisimportanttoacknowledgethatfortransformationstobesuccessfultheyneedtobejustandsociallybalanced.Thereisnouniversalmodel,andtransformationswilllikelybeverydifferentbetweendevelopedanddevelopingcountries.2EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowInparallelwiththeclimatecrisisandotherplanetarycrises,theworldfacescompoundingenergy,foodandcostoflivingcrises.ThesecrisesareexacerbatedbythewarinUkraine,whichiscausingimmensehumansufferingandunderminestherecoveryoftheglobaleconomyfollowingtheCOVID-19pandemic.Thecrisesareawake-upcalltotheglobalcommunityformore,ratherthanless,climateaction.AspreviouseditionsoftheEmissionsGapReporthavedocumented,theunprecedentedlylargefiscalrescueandrecoverypackagesinresponsetotheCOVID-19crisisweretoalargeextentmissedasanopeningtoacceleratethegreentransition.Whilethecurrentcrisesarefundamentallydifferent,governmentsaroundtheworldfacelargelysimilarchoices:(1)tousethemasanopeningtoacceleratethetransitionawayfromfossilfuelsandtheexpansionofrenewableenergy,whileboostingenergyconservationandenergyefficiency,or(2)toallowthemtodivertattentionfromclimatechangeactionandcontinueinvestmentinfossilfuels,causinglock-inandjeopardizingtheParisAgreementtemperaturegoal.TheglobalimplicationsofthesecrisesforclimateactionandGHGemissionsarestillunclear,andtheyarelikelytodifferintheshorttermandthelongterm,buttheycouldbesignificant,dependingonhowgovernmentsrespondtothem.1.2ApproachandstructureofthereportTheEmissionsGapReportisanassessmentreport.Itprovidesanevaluationofcrediblescientificandtechnicalknowledgeonemissionstrends,progress,gapsandopportunities,basedonasynthesisofthelatestscientificliterature,models,anddataanalysisandinterpretation,andmodels,includingthatpublishedinthecontextoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC).Asinpreviousyears,thisEmissionsGapReporthasbeenpreparedbyaninternationalteam.Thisyear,UNEPconvened77leadingscientistsfrom41expertinstitutionsacross23countries.Theassessmentprocesshasbeenoverseenbyarespectedinternationalsteeringcommitteeandhasbeentransparentandparticipatory,whilealsotakingintoaccountgeographicaldiversityandgenderconcerns.Allchaptershaveundergoneexternalreview,andtheassessmentmethodologyandpreliminaryfindingsweremadeavailabletothegovernmentsofthecountriesspecificallymentionedinthereport,toprovidethemwiththeopportunitytocommentonthefindings.Thisyear,severalmethodologicalupdatesweremadetoimprovetheestimatesandensureconsistencyacrossthechaptersofthereport.TwoworkinggroupswereestablishedtoaddressrecurrentissuesintheEmissionsGapReports,relatedto(1)landuse,land-usechangeandforestrydatasources,notablyreconciliationofdifferencesbetweenglobalmodelestimatesandnationalreportingofforestCO2sinks(alsoseechapter2),and(2)harmonizationofglobalemissionsdatabasedonhistoricalemissionsandglobalmodels(seechapters3and4).Furthermore,thereportscenarioshavebeenupdatedbasedonIPCC’sSixthAssessmentReport,andthemostrecentvaluesofglobalwarmingpotentialover100yearsareused.Itisimportanttonotethattheseimprovementsalsoimplythattheestimatespresentedarenotdirectlycomparabletothoseofpreviousreports.Fulldetailscanbefoundinchapters2to4andrelatedappendices.Thereportisorganizedintosevenchapters,includingthisintroduction.Chapter2assessesthetrendsinglobalGHGemissions,includingtheeffectsofCOVID-19,andconsidersconsumption-basedemissionsandtheirdistributionbetweenandwithincountries.Chapter3providesanupdatedgloballandscapeofNDCsandlong-termnet-zeroemissionspledges,andassessestheprogressofG20memberstowardsachievingtheirNDCsandnet-zeroemissionspledges.Chapter4updatestheassessmentoftheemissionsgapby2030basedonthelatestNDCs,andconsiderstheimplicationsoftheemissionsgaponthefeasibilityofachievingthelong-termtemperaturegoaloftheParisAgreement.Chapter5providesthestatusofthetransformationtowardszeroGHGemissionsinthesectorsofelectricitysupply,industry,transportationandbuildings,andidentifiesactor-basedactionsthatcouldacceleratethetransformation.Chapter6providesanassessmentofthefoodsystemstransformationsneeded,whethertherearesignsthattheyarehappening,andhowtheycouldbeaccelerated.Finally,chapter7considersthetransformationsofthefinancesystemneededtoenabletheachievementoftheParisAgreement.3EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowGlobalemissionstrendsLeadauthors:WilliamF.Lamb(MercatorResearchInstituteonGlobalCommonsandClimateChangeandPriestleyInternationalCentreforClimate,SchoolofEarthandEnvironment,UniversityofLeeds,UnitedKingdom),GiacomoGrassi(EuropeanCommission,JointResearchCentre[JRC],Italy)Contributingauthors:LucasChancel(WorldInequalityLab,ParisSchoolofEconomics,France),MonicaCrippa(EuropeanCommission,JRC,Italy),DiegoGuizzardi(EuropeanCommission,JRC,Italy),MarilenaMuntean(EuropeanCommission,JRC,Italy),JosOlivier(PBLNetherlandsEnvironmentalAssessmentAgency,theNetherlands),GlenPeters(CICEROCenterforInternationalClimateResearch,Norway),JuliaPongratz(Ludwig-MaximiliansUniversityMunich,MaxPlanckInstituteforMeteorology,Germany)22.1IntroductionThischapterassessestrendsingreenhousegas(GHG)emissionsuptoandincluding2021.Itanalysesglobalemissionsbygas,country,householdandsector,providingthecurrentandhistoricalcontextforsubsequentchaptersoncountrypledgesandmitigationpathways.Therearebothshort-andlong-terminfluencesonGHGemissions.Intheshortterm,abruptgeopoliticalandeconomiceventssuchastheCOVID-19pandemicandthewarinUkrainecanleadtosignificantbuttemporarychangesinannualemissions.Inthelongterm,structuralshiftsintechnologies,productionandinvestmentdecisions,aswellaseconomicandclimatepolicies,playanimportantrole.Oneaimofthischapteristoprovidebothshort-andlong-termperspectivesontrendsinglobalGHGemissions.Anotherfocalareaofthechapterislanduse,land-usechangeandforestryemissions(LULUCF).TheLULUCFsectoriscomplexintermsofdefinitions,conceptsandquantification,duetothescientificchallengeofseparatinghumanfromnaturalinfluencesonGHGfluxes,andthefactthatitisbothasourceandsinkofCO2.Thisyear,theEmissionsGapReporthasadoptedanewapproachforLULUCFemissions,asdescribedinbox2.1.4EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowBox2.1MethodologicalupdatetoensureconsistencybetweenglobalandnationalLULUCFemissionestimatesRecentliteraturehashighlightedsignificantdifferencesinanthropogenicLULUCFestimatesbetweentheapproachundertakenbycountriesintheirreportingtotheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC)(‘nationalinventoryapproach’)andtheglobalmodellingapproach(‘bookkeepingapproach’)pioneeredinthescientificcommunityandusedintheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)AssessmentReports(Grassietal.2021;Grassi,Schwingshackletal.2022).Bothapproachesareapplicableintheirspecificcontexts,butarenotdirectlycomparableastheyusedifferentsystemboundaries.Themainconceptualdifferenceisthatbookkeepingmodelsconsiderasanthropogeniconlythefluxesthatareduetodirecthuman-inducedeffects,suchasland-usechange,shiftingcultivation,harvestandregrowth.Bycontrast,nationalinventoriesgenerallyconsiderasanthropogenicallthefluxesoccurringonalargerareaofmanagedforestthanthatusedbymodels,andincludemostindirecthuman-inducedeffectsonthisareathatmodelsconsidernatural(i.e.thenaturalresponsetohuman-inducedenvironmentalchangessuchasincreasedCO2atmosphericconcentrationandnitrogendeposition,whichenhancetreegrowth).OtherreasonsforthedifferencecanarisefromthelimitedrepresentationoflandmanagementinglobalmodelsandvaryinglevelsofaccuracyandcompletenessofestimatedLULUCFfluxesinnationalinventories.Thesedifferenceshampercomparabilitybetweennationalinventoriesandbookkeepingmodelsforthehistoricalperiod,andbetweennationallydeterminedcontributions(NDCs)(basedonthenationalinventoryapproach)andintegratedassessmentmodels(basedonthebookkeepingapproach)forprojections.Toreflectandaddressthis,themethodologicalapproachtoLULUCFemissionsdataisupdated:whendepictingcountryemissionstrends,nationalinventorydataisused.Inthischapterthisappliestohistoricalemissions(basedonGrassi,Concheddaetal.2022andgap-filledwhennecessary),andinchapter3itappliestocountryNDCemissions.WhenreportingglobaltotalGHGemissions,datafromglobalmodels,i.e.thebookkeepingapproach,isused.ThischapterusesbookkeepingmodelsthatonlycoverLULUCFemissions(basedonFriedlingsteinetal.2022),whilechapter4usesintegratedassessmentmodels.ThisapproachensuresthatcountryestimatesareconsistentwiththosereportedbycountriesthemselvestotheUNFCCC,andthatglobalestimatesareconsistentwiththecarboncycle,scenariosandclimatescienceliteratureusedintheIPCCAssessmentReports.Inaddition,aharmonizationprocedurehasbeenimplementedinchapter4toensurecomparabilitybetweengloballyaggregatedNDCestimatesandintegratedassessmentmodelemissionpathwaysconsistentwithdifferentwarminglevels.TheharmonizationprocedureadjustsglobalNDCscenariostotheoutputsfromintegratedassessmentmodelsforthehistoricalperiod.Forfurtherdetails,pleaseseeappendixA,whichisavailableonline.AllGHGemissionfiguresinthisreportareexpressedusingglobalwarmingpotentialover100years(GWP100)fromtheIPCCSixthAssessmentReport(Forsteretal.2021).Inlinewithpreviousreports,non-LULUCFemissionsinthischapterarebasedonasingleconsistentglobalsource,theEmissionsDatabaseforGlobalAtmosphericResearch(EDGAR),whichisavailableupto2021(Crippaetal.2022).1LULUCFemissions,basedonbothGrassi,Concheddaetal.(2022)andFriedlingsteinetal.(2022),arecurrentlyonlyavailableupto2020,limitingouranalysisoftotalglobalGHGemissionsto2020.Nonetheless,aninitialestimateoftotalglobalGHGemissionsin2021excludingLULUCFisprovided.1EDGARincludesallanthropogenicGHGemissionssourcesdefinedintheIPCCguidanceandreflectedinUNFCCCnationalinventories.Someadditionalsourceswithrelevantwarmingimpacts,suchaschlorofluorocarbons,hydrochlorofluorocarbonsandhydrogengasareexcluded(Minxetal.2021;Dhakaletal.2022).ItshouldbenotedthattheemissionsestimatespresenteddifferfromtheEmissionsGapReport2021(UnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme[UNEP]2021)duetotherevisionoftheLULUCFdataandtheswitchtoGWP100valuesfromtheSixthAssessmentReport.IftotalGHGestimatesexcludingLULUCFarerecalculatedbasedontheGWP100fromtheIPCCFourthAssessmentReport,theyshowstrongagreementwithpreviousreports.Furtherinformationonthedataused,estimationsofgrowthratesanduncertaintiesisprovidedinappendixA,availableonline.5EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindow2.2Globalemissionstrends2.2.1TherateofgrowthinGHGemissionshasslowedinthepastdecade,butglobalGHGemissionscouldsetanewrecordin2021WhiletherateofgrowthinGHGemissions(includingLULUCF)inthepastdecadehasslowedcomparedtothepreviousdecade,averageGHGemissionsinthelastdecadewerethehighestonrecord(figure2.1).Between2010and2019,averageannualgrowthwas1.1percentperyear,comparedto2.6percentperyearbetween2000and2009.Reasonsforthisdecadalslowdownincludeaglobalreductioninnewcoalcapacityadditions(particularlyinChina),thesteadysubstitutionofcoalbygasinthepowersectorsofdevelopedcountries,theincreasingpaceofrenewableenergydeploymentsworldwide(Lamb,Wiedmannetal.2021;Dhakaletal.2022;Friedlingsteinetal.2022;Jacksonetal.2022;)andareductioninLULUCFnetemissions,althoughtheseareveryuncertain(Friedlingsteinetal.2022).ThisraisesthequestionofwhetherglobalGHGemissionsarereachingaplateau,orwhetherslowerlevelsofgrowthwillcontinueinthecomingyears(seealsosection2.2.3).TotalglobalGHGemissionsaveraged54.4gigatonsofCO2equivalent(GtCO2e)between2010and2019,andreachedahighin2019(figure2.1,table2.1).EstimatesofLULUCFemissionsfor2021arenotyetavailable,preventingconclusionsregardingtotalglobalGHGemissionsin2021.However,theinitialestimateoftotalglobalGHGemissionsexcludingLULUCFfor2021exceedscomparablelevelsin2019by0.26GtCO2e,or0.2percent(table2.1),suggestingthattotalglobalGHGemissionsin2021willbesimilarto,orevensurpassing,2019levels.Figure2.1TotalGHGemissions1990–2021andcomparisonofLULUCFestimatesSources:Crippaetal.(2022);Friedlingsteinetal.(2022);Grassi,Concheddaetal.(2022)Note:TotalemissionsincludeCO2fromfossilfuelandindustry(fossilCO2),CO2emissionsfromLULUCF,methane(CH4),nitrousoxide(N2O),andfluorinatedgases(F-gases).LULUCFCO2emissionsaredepictedinthetoppanelupto2020asanetglobalsourceusingthebookkeepingapproachfromtheGlobalCarbonBudget(nodataisavailablefor2021).AcomparisonofthebookkeepingtothenationalGHGinventoryapproachisprovidedinthelowerpanelfortheyear2020.01990200020102020GHGemissions(excludingLULUCF)reboundedandwere52.8GtCO2ein2021,comparedto52.6GtCO2ein201910-1020304050600102030405060ComparisonofLULUCFestimatesin2020(GtCO2e)TotalGHGemissions1990–2021(GtCO2e/year)GHGemissions+bookkeepingLULUCF54GtCO2e49GtCO2eGHGemissions+inventoryLULUCFFossilCO2CH4N2OF−gasesLULUCFCO254GtCO2e51GtCO2e42GtCO2e38GtCO2e6EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowThisconfirmsthattheglobalresponsetotheCOVID-19pandemichadanunprecedentedbutshort-livedeffectonemissions(figure2.1,table2.1).TotalglobalGHGemissionsdropped4.7percentfrom2019to2020–thelargestsingle-yearabsolutedropinGHGemissionssince1970whenthedatasetstarts(Dhakaletal.2022).Nonetheless,dailyemissionsdatasuggeststhatCO2emissionsfromfossilfuelandindustry(hereafterreferredtoasfossilCO2forbrevity)hadalreadyreboundedbytheendof2020(LeQuéréetal.2020;Liuetal.2020;Davisetal.2022;Jacksonetal.2022).GlobalatmosphericCO2concentrationscontinuedtogrowfrom2019to2020,reachinganannualmeanof413partspermillion.Thiswasslightlyslowerthanduring2018to2019,butfasterthanthedecadalaveragerate,despiteCOVID-19restrictions(WorldMeteorologicalOrganization2022).Thelong-termimpactsofCOVID-19onglobalGHGemissionsarenotyetpossibletodiscern(Kikstraetal.2021;Shanetal.2021).Ontheonehand,theglobalresponsetoCOVID-19hasdisruptedsupplychainsandmayhaveledtounderlyingshiftsinenergysupplyanddemand;ontheotherhand,economicstimuluspackagesappeartohavefavouredfossilfuels,missinganopportunitytosupportrenewableenergyandlow-carboninvestments(Hepburnetal.2020;UNEP2020;Bertrametal.2021;LeQuéréetal.2021;UNEP2021).Emissionstrendsin2022andbeyondwillbefurtherinfluencedbythewarinUkraineandsubsequentdisruptionstoglobalenergysupplies,whicharedrivingarenewedpolicyfocusonenergysecurity.Earlyassessmentsprojectanincreaseinfossilfuelinvestmentsin2022,asmanycountrieshaveannouncedplanstoexpandnaturalgasinfrastructurestoshoreupdomesticsupplies(ClimateActionTracker2022;InternationalEnergyAgency2022).Table2.1Totalemissionsbysource,2019–2021YearGtCO2CH4,N2O,F-gases(GtCO2e)LULUCF(GtCO2)TotalGHGemissionsexcludingLULUCF(GtCO2e)TotalGHGemissions(GtCO2e)202137.9(±3)15(±3.6)N/A52.8N/A202036(±2.9)14.8(±3.6)3.2(±2.2)50.854201938(±3)14.6(±3.6)3.8(±2.2)52.656.42.2.2COVID-19responsesmainlyimpactedCO2emissionsfromfossilfuelsandindustry,whilemethaneandnitrousoxideremainedsteady,andF-gasescontinuedtosurgeFossilCO2emissionsdeclinedby5.6percentfrom2019to2020,butreboundedtolevelscomparableto2019levelsin2021(table2.1).Methane,nitrousoxideandF-gasemissionscontinuedtogrowduringandaftertheinitialCOVID-19pandemicresponse.Thesenon-CO2emissionssourcesaremainlylinkedtoagriculturalactivities(methaneandnitrousoxide),fossilfuelsupplychains(methane),andcoolingandindustrialprocesses(F-gases).Thattheyfollowedthelonger-termtrendofsteadygrowth(forF-gasemissions,rapidgrowth)indicatesthatthesesectorswerelessexposedtotheenergydemandreductiondynamicsoftheinitialCOVID-19pandemicresponse.Atasourcelevel,emissionsfromoilsawthesteepestdropin2020,followedbycoalandgas(Friedlingsteinetal.2022).Oilismainlyusedinlandtransportandaviationandshipping,whichweremostseverelyaffectedbythepandemic(LeQuéréetal.2020;Liuetal.2020).Emissionsfromoilhaveyettorebound,andremainedbelow2019levelsin2021(Jacksonetal.2022).Ontheotherhand,coalandgasreboundedstronglyin2021.In2021,globalcoalemissionsexceeded2019levels,mainlyduetoincreasedusageinChinaandIndia(Davisetal.2022;Jacksonetal.2022).Insomecountriestherehasbeenashiftfromcoaltogasinrecentdecades;whilethiscanreduceemissionsintheshortterm,ithascontributedthedevelopmentofnewgasinfrastructuresthathavelonglifetimesandcumulativeemissionsimpacts,includingviamethaneemissionsfromleakages(Alvarezetal.2018).2.2.3LULUCFemissionsremainsubstantial,butaredeeplyuncertainNetLULUCFCO2emissionsassessedusingthebookkeepingapproach(seebox2.1)experiencedasmalldeclinefrom2019to2020,largelyrelatedtoparticularlylargepeatandtropicaldeforestationanddegradationfiresin2019(Friedlingsteinetal.2022).WhilethenumberofdeforestationfiresintheAmazonremainedhighin2020,land-userelatedfireemissionsinIndonesiadecreasedastheunusuallydryconditionsof2019ceased.LULUCFemissionsfrombookkeepingmodelsarehighlyuncertaininbothmagnitudeandtrend,andvarysubstantiallybyglobalregions(Pongratzetal.2021).Averageemissionsbetween2011and2020were4.1±2.6GtCO2.ThedataindicatesadeclineinLULUCFemissionsoverthispastdecade(of4percent/year).However,theliteraturereportsaverylowconfidenceinthistrend,duetounderlyingdatalimitations(Dhakaletal.2022,Friedlingsteinetal.2022).Whereasremovalsmainlytakeplaceinregionswithapre-7EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowtwentieth-centurylegacyofdeforestation(i.e.EuropeandNorthAmerica),emissionsareconcentratedintropicalregionswithahighpresent-dayburdenofdeforestation(theAmazonbasin,SoutheastAsiaandsub-SaharanAfrica).Netemissionstrendsareprimarilydrivenbydeforestation,inplaceswherethemonitoringandquantificationofland-usetrendsischallenging.NetLULUCFemissionsfromnationalinventoriesremainedstablebetween2011and2020atadecadalaverageofaround-2GtCO2/year(appendixA,figureA.1),withtemperateandborealregionsreportingnetremovalsandtropicalregionsreportingclosetonet-zeroemissions(Grassi,Concheddaetal.2022).For2011–2020,thedifferenceinglobalnetLULUCFCO2fluxesbetweennationalinventoriesandbookkeepingmodelsisabout6.1GtCO2(5.1GtCO2fortheyear2020;figure2.1).Thislargedifferenceisexplainedbyavarietyoffactors,themostimportantbeinghowareasofmanagedlandandanthropogenicforestsinksaredefined(Grassietal.2021;alsoseeappendixA).2.2.4SectoremissionstrendsEmissionscanbedividedamongfiveglobaleconomicsectors:energysupply;industry;agriculture,forestryandotherland-usechange(AFOLU);2transport;anddirectenergyuseinbuildings.Since1990,mostgrowthinemissionshasbeenfromtheenergysupply,industryandtransportsectors(Lamb,Wiedmannetal.2021;Dhakaletal.2022).In2020,theenergysupplysectorcontributed20GtCO2e(37percentofthetotal),industrywas14GtCO2e(26percent),AFOLUwas9.5GtCO2e(18percent),transportwas7.6GtCO2e(14percent)andbuildingswas3.1GtCO2e(5.7percent).Reallocatingtheemissionsassociatedwithelectricityandheatproduction(e.g.intheenergysupplysector)tofinalconsumingsectorsincreasesthecontributionoftheindustryandbuildingssectorsto34percentand16percent,respectively(Dhakaletal.2022).Thereareanumberofparticularlyhigh-emittingsubsectorsthatdriveglobalemissionsgrowth.Theseincludeelectricityandheatproduction(14GtCO2ein2020,25percentofthetotal),roadtransportation(5.6GtCO2e,10percent),andthe2AFOLUincludesLULUCFCO2emissions,hereaccountedforusingglobalbookkeepingmodeldata,plusadditionalagriculturalemissionsfromEDGAR,suchasmethanefromlivestockandricecultivationandnitrousoxidefromfertilizerapplication.metalsindustry(3.2GtCO2e,6percent).Methaneemissionsfromentericfermentation(i.e.livestockrearing),landfillsites,andfugitivemethaneemissionsfromoil,gasandcoalsupplychains,arealsosignificantglobalsourceswithshort-termwarmingimpacts(Dhakaletal.2022).Asat2021,emissionshavereboundedrelativeto2019emissionsacrossmostsectorsandsubsectors,exceptfortransportation,oilandgasfugitiveemissions,andpetroleumrefining.2.3EmissionstrendsofmajoremittersEightmajoremitters–sevenG20membersandinternationaltransport–contributedmorethan55percentoftotalglobalGHGemissionsin2020:China,theUnitedStatesofAmerica,theEuropeanUnion(27),India,Indonesia,Brazil,theRussianFederation,andinternationaltransport(figure2.2).TheG20asawholecontributed75percentofthetotal.Collectively,theemissionsofthetopeightfellfrom32.8GtCO2ein2019to31.5GtCO2ein2020(achangeof-3.8percent).In2020,theLULUCFsectorbasedonthenationalinventories(gap-filledwhennecessary)wasanetsinkintheemissionsinventoriesofChina,theEuropeanUnion,India,theRussianFederationandtheUnitedStatesofAmerica,andin17G20membersoverall(figure2.2).IfLULUCFemissionsandremovalsareexcluded,totalGHGemissionsarehigherbyasmuchas33percentintheRussianFederation,17percentintheUnitedStatesofAmerica,9percentinIndia,andabout8percentinChinaandtheEuropeanUnion.Bycontrast,theLULUCFsectorisanetemitterinIndonesiaandBrazil,accountingfor44percentand22percentoftheirtotalemissions.Formostmajoremitters,includingChina,India,theRussianFederation,BrazilandIndonesia,GHGemissions(excludingLULUCF)reboundedin2021,exceedingpre-pandemic2019levels(Crippaetal.2022;Davisetal.2022;Jacksonetal.2022).Thehighestincreasesbetween2019and2021wereobservedinIndonesiaandChina,at6.8percentand5.9percentrespectively.Internationaltransportemissionsin2021remainfarbelow2019levels(-15.9percent)(figure2.2).8EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowFigure2.2TotalandpercapitaGHGemissions(includingLULUCF)ofmajoremittersin2020andsince1990,andestimatedGHGemissions(excludingLULUCF)in2021comparedto2019Sources:Crippaetal.(2022);Grassi,Concheddaetal.(2022)Note:Whereincluded,LULUCFemissionsarebasedonthenationalinventoryapproach,gap-filledwhennecessary.Percentagevaluesinthefinalpanelrefertotherelativeemissionschangebetween2019and2021.Insomecountries,mainlyduetodeforestation,theLULUCFsectorisanetsourceofemissions;inothercountriesitisanetsinkofemissions,mainlyduetoforestregrowthandafforestation.2020199020002010202019902000201005101520250369121503691215IndiaWorldEU27IndonesiaBrazilChinaRussianFederationUSA03691215InternationaltransportBrazilRussianFederationIndonesiaEU27IndiaUSAChinaPercapitaGHGemissionsin2020andtrendsince1990,includinginventory-basedLULUCF(tCO2e/capita)0-3GHGemissionsin2020andtrendsince1990,includinginventory-basedLULUCF(GtCO2e)LULUCFCO2FossilCO2,CH4,N2O,F−gases0Trend51015IndonesiaInternationaltransportBrazilRussianFederationEU27IndiaUSAChinaEstimateofGHGemissionsin2021comparedto2019,excludinginventory-basedLULUCF(GtCO2e)20192021+5.9%+3.2%+3.9%+4.9%+6.8%-6.7%-4.0%-15.9%9EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowPercapitaGHGemissionsoftheUnitedStatesofAmericaandtheEuropeanUnionhavecontinuedtodeclineoverthepastdecade,whilethoseofmostotherregionsgrew(figure2.2).WorldaveragepercapitaGHGemissions(includingLULUCF)were6.3tCO2ein2020.TheUnitedStatesofAmericaremainsfarabovethislevelat14tCO2e,followedby13tCO2eintheRussianFederation,9.7tCO2einChina,about7.5tCO2einBrazilandIndonesia,and7.2tCO2eintheEuropeanUnion.Indiaremainsfarbelowtheworldaverageat2.4tCO2e.Onaverage,leastdevelopedcountriesemit2.3tCO2epercapitaannually.AswithcurrentpercapitaGHGemissions,contributionstohistoricalcumulativeCO2emissions(excludingLULUCF)varygreatlybetweencountriesandglobalregions(Gütschowetal.2016;Matthews2016).WhereastheUnitedStatesofAmericaandEuropeanUnioncontributed25percentand17percentrespectivelytototalfossilCO2emissionsfrom1850to2019,Chinacontributed13percent,theRussianFederation7percent,India3percent,andIndonesiaandBrazil1percenteach.Leastdevelopedcountriescontributedonly0.5percenttohistoricalCO2fossilfuelandindustryemissionsbetween1850and2019(Dhakaletal.2022).2.3.2Consumption-basedemissionsarehighlyunequalbetweenandwithincountriesWhennationalfossilCO2emissionsareestimatedonaconsumption-basis(i.e.wherethesupply-chainemissionsareallocatedtoconsumers)ratherthanontheterritorial-basisconsideredsofar,emissionstendtobehigherinhigh-incomecountriessuchastheUnitedStatesofAmericaandEuropeanUnion(by6percentand14percentrespectively;Friedlingsteinetal.[2020]).Conversely,theyarelowerincountriessuchasIndiaandChina(by9percentand10percentrespectively),whicharenetexportersofgoods.Internationaltransfersofemissionsembodiedintradedproductspeakedin2006andhavesincestabilizedtobeaboutonequarterofglobalCO2emissions,orabout6.5GtCO2esince2014accordingtothelatestassessment(Woodetal.2020;Hubaceketal.2021;Dhakaletal.2022).Consumption-basedaccountingisalsorelevantforAFOLUemissions,astheproductionofhighlytradedagriculturalcommoditiessuchassoybeans,palmoil,grainsandmeatproductsareknowntodrivedeforestationandcreatemethaneandnitrousoxideemissions(Pendrilletal.2022).SimilartofossilCO2transfers,high-incomecountries(UnitedStatesofAmerica,EuropeanUnionandJapan)tendtobenetimportersofagriculturalproductsandhencehavehigherconsumption-basedAFOLUemissions.MajornetexportersofsuchcommoditiesandtheirembodiedAFOLUemissionsincludeBrazil,Indonesia,ArgentinaandAustralia.AccordingtoHongetal.(2022),inthepastdecadeChinahasbecomethelargestnetimporterofembodiedAFOLUemissions,supersedingEuropeandtheUnitedStatesofAmerica.Approximately22percentofagriculturallandworldwideisusedfortradedproducts,resultinginannualconsumption-basedAFOLUemissionsof4.5–5.8GtCO2easat2017,excludingsinks(Hongetal.2022).Consumption-basedemissionsalsodivergestarklyatahouseholdlevel,inlargepartduetoincomeandwealthdisparitiesbetweenandwithincountries(Capstick,KhoslaandWang2020).Whentheemissionsassociatedwithbothhouseholdconsumptionandpublicandprivateinvestmentsareallocatedtohouseholds(seeappendixA),andhouseholdsarerankedbyGHGemissions(excludingLULUCF),thebottom50percentemitonaverage1.6tCO2e/capitaandcontribute12percentoftheglobaltotal,whereasthetop1percentemitonaverage110tCO2e/capitaandcontribute17percentofthetotal(Chancel2022;Chanceletal.2022).Super-emittersinthetop0.1percent(average467tCO2e/capita)andthetop0.01percent(2,531tCO2e/capita)haveseenthefastestgrowthinpersonalcarbonfootprintssince1990.High-emittinghouseholdsarepresentacrossallmajoreconomies,andlargeinequalitiesnowexistbothwithinandbetweencountries(figure2.3)(Chanceletal.2022).10EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowFigure2.3Householdconsumption-basedemissions,excludingLULUCF,byemissionsgroupsSource:Chanceletal.(2022)Note:Percapitaemissionsincludeemissionsfromdomesticconsumption,publicandprivateinvestments,andimportsandexportsofcarbonembeddedintradewiththerestoftheworld.Householdsarerankedaccordingtototalemissionsanddividedaccordinglyintogroups(e.g.thebottom50percentreferstothe50percentofhouseholdswiththelowestemissionsinthatcountryorregion).2.3.3Somecountrieshavepeakedemissions,buttheirreductionshavebeenoutweighedbyemissionsgrowthelsewhereBy2019,35countriesaccountingforabout10percentofglobalemissionshadpeakedandreducednetGHGemissions,includingLULUCF,foratleast10years.Thesecountries,whicharemainlyinEuropeandalsoincludetheUnitedStatesofAmerica,thathavestartedfromahighbaseofpercapitaandhistoricalcumulativeemissions(Lamb,Grubbetal.2021;LeQuéréetal.2019).Mostofthemhavealsoachievedreductionsonaconsumptionbasis.Countrieswithsustainedemissionsreductionshavetendedtoreduceenergysystememissionsviaswitchingfromcoaltogas,lowornegativegrowthinenergydemand,and/orscalinguprenewableenergydeployments.Sofar,theyhavehadlimitedsuccessinreducingtransportoragriculturalemissions(Lamb,Grubbetal.2021;Lamb,Wiedmannetal.2021).However,totalreductionsintheannualemissionsofpeakingcountriestodatehavebeenmodest–3.2GtCO2efrompeakyearsto2018,accordingtooneestimate(Lamb,Grubbetal.2021)–andhavebeenoutweighedbyglobalemissionsgrowthelsewhere.Asat2019,themajorityofcountrieshadincreasedemissionsoverthepastdecade(74countries,65percentofglobalemissions),orremainedstable(39countries,25percentofglobalemissions).USARussianFederationChinaWorldEuropeBrazilIndonesiaIndia050100150200250HouseholdGHGemissionsin2019,excludingLULUCF(tCO2e/capita)Bottom50%Middle40%Next9%Top1%11EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowNationallydeterminedcontributionsandlong-termpledges:ThegloballandscapeandG20memberprogressLeadauthors:TakeshiKuramochi(NewClimateInstitute,Germany),MicheldenElzen(PBLNetherlandsEnvironmentalAssessmentAgency,InstituteforEnvironmentalStudies,VrijeUniversiteitAmsterdam,theNetherlands),TarynFransen(WorldResourcesInstitute,UnitedStatesofAmerica)Contributingauthors:CaitlingBergh(EnergySystemsResearchGroup,UniversityofCapeTown,SouthAfrica),AnnaChapman(ClimateAnalytics,Australia),NandiniDas(ClimateAnalytics,Australia),KimCoetzee(ClimateTransparency,Germany),NeilGrant(ClimateAnalytics,Germany),MarianaGutiérrez(HUMBOLDT-VIADRINAGovernancePlatform,Mexico),GaheeHan(SolutionsforOurClimate,RepublicofKorea),FredericHans(NewClimateInstitute,Germany),CamillaHyslop(NetZeroTrackerandUniversityofOxford,UnitedKingdom),JiangKejun(EnergyResearchInstitute,China),JoojinKim(SolutionsforOurClimate,RepublicofKorea),BenKing(RhodiumGroup,UnitedStatesofAmerica),AmanMajid(ClimateAnalytics,Germany),AndrewMarquard(EnergySystemsResearchGroup,UniversityofCapeTown,SouthAfrica),BryceMcCall(EnergySystemsResearchGroup,UniversityofCapeTown,SouthAfrica),MalteMeinshausen(UniversityofMelbourne,Australia),MiaMoisio(NewClimateInstitute,Germany),SilkeMooldijk(NewClimateInstitute,Germany),LeonardoNascimento(NewClimateInstitute,Germany),NataliePelekh(NewClimateInstitute,Germany),AnneOlhoff(CONCITO-Denmark'sgreenthinktank)JazmínRoccoPredassi(FundaciónAmbienteyRecursosNaturales,Argentina),AnaluzPresbítero(IniciativaClimáticadeMéxico,Mexico),MartinBirkRasmussen(CONCITO-Denmark'sgreenthinktank),CarleyReynolds(ClimateAnalytics,Germany),JoeriRogelj(GranthamInstitute,ImperialCollegeLondon,UnitedKingdom;InternationalInstituteforAppliedSystemsAnalysis[IIASA],Austria),ÜmitŞahin(IstanbulPolicyCenter,SabancıUniversityandStiftungMercator,Türkiye),CleaSchumer(WorldResourcesInstitute,UnitedStatesofAmerica),KentaroTamura(InstituteforGlobalEnvironmentalStrategies,Japan),FabbyTumiwa(InstituteforEssentialServicesReform,Indonesia),FarahVianda(InstituteforEssentialServicesReform,Indonesia),JorgeVillarreal(IniciativaClimáticadeMéxico,Mexico),ClaireStokwell(ClimateAnalytics,Germany),SarithaSudharmmaVishwanathan(IndianInstituteofManagement,Ahmedabad[IIMA],India),LisaWijayani(InstituteforEssentialServicesReform,Indonesia),WilliamWills(FederalUniversityofRiodeJaneiro,Brazil)33.1IntroductionThischapterprovidesanupdatedassessmentofprogressonnationallydeterminedcontributions(NDCs)andlong-termpledges,focusingonthreekeyquestions:1)Whatglobalprogresshasbeenmade—overallandsincethe2021UnitedNationsClimateChangeConferenceofthePartiesCOP26—bycountriesintheirsubmissionsofneworupdatedNDCsandlong-term,net-zeroemissionpledges(section3.2)?2)Whatistheestimatedimpactonglobalgreenhousegas(GHG)emissionsin2030ofthelatestNDCs,assumingtheyarefullyachieved,andwhatprogressismadebyG20membersindividuallyandcollectivelytowardsachievingtheirNDCs(section3.3)?3)Whatisthestatusofnet-zeroemissionpledgesbyG20membersandarecurrentpoliciesandNDCtargetsalignedwiththelong-termpledges(section3.4)?Section3.2adoptsaglobalperspective,whereassubsequentsectionsfocusonG20members.Currently,G20membersaccountforabout75percentofglobalGHGemissions(seechapter2),andtheirsuccessinimplementingandpotentiallyexceedingtheirNDCtargetswillcarryamajorimpacton2030emissionsandthepossibilityforbridgingtheemissionsgap.Thecut-offdatefortheassessmentis23September2022.AllGHGemissionfiguresareexpressedusingthe100-yearglobalwarmingpotentials(GWPs)fromtheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)SixthAssessmentReport(AR6).TheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC)inventoryreportsforhistoricalemissionsarereferredtowhencomparingthemtoindividualG20members’NDCtargets.ThemethodologyandpreliminaryfindingsofthischapterweremadeavailabletothegovernmentsoftheG20membersspecificallymentionedtoprovidethemwiththeopportunitytocommentonthefindings.FindingsrelatedtotheprogressofG20memberstowardstheirNDCandnet-zerotargetsshouldbereadwithtwoimportantcaveatsinmind.TheEmissionsGapReportdoesnotassessthelevelofambitionofNDCs.However,thelevelofambitionisoneofthefactorslikelytoinfluencewhethercountriesareontracktoachievingtheirNDCtargets.In12EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowotherwords,acountrycurrentlyontracktoachieveitsNDCsisnotnecessarilyundertakingmoremitigationactionthanacountrynotyetontrack.Secondly,theParisAgreementrecognizesthateachcountryfacesuniquenationalcircumstances.Factorssuchasdevelopmentstageandassociatedopportunitiesandbarriersmayaffectbothtargetambitionandtargetimplementation.3.2Globaldevelopmentsinmitigationpledgesfor2030andbeyond3.2.1NDCsTheambition-raisingcycleoftheParisAgreementbuildsonthesubmissionbypartiesofincreasinglyambitiousNDCseveryfiveyears.DuetotheCOVID-19pandemic,manypartiessubmittedneworupdatedNDCsbyCOP26in2021insteadofin2020.AsassessedbytheEmissionsGapReport2021,thenewandupdatedNDCsshowedsomeprogress,butgloballytheyremainedhighlyinsufficienttobridgethe2030emissionsgap.Reflectingthis,theGlasgowClimatePact,adoptedatCOP26,requestedthatparties“revisitandstrengthen”their2030targetsbytheendof2022.ThissectionprovidesanupdateonthegloballandscapeandthekeycharacteristicsofthenewandupdatedNDCs(thosethatreplacedaninitialNDCbetween1January2020and23September2022)aswellastheinitialNDCs(thoseineffectasof31December2019).1ProgresssinceCOP26ishighlighted.Asat23September2022,166outof194ParisAgreementparties,representingaround91percentof2019globalGHGemissions(ClimateWatch2022),havesubmittedneworupdatedNDCs,upfrom152partiesasatCOP26.SincetheEuropeanUnionandits27memberstatessubmitasingleNDC,thisamountsto139neworupdatedNDCshavingbeensubmitted.TheseNDCsreflectemergingtrendsrelatedtotheambition,form,coverageandconditionalityofGHGmitigationpledges.Effecton2030emissions:Ofthe139neworupdatedNDCs,justoverhalf(74NDCsfrompartiesrepresenting77percentofglobalGHGemissions)wouldresultinlower2030emissionsrelativetotheinitialNDCs(figure3.1).Thisisupfrom67NDCsrepresenting69percentofglobalGHGemissionsasatCOP26.Twenty-threeNDCs,frompartiesrepresenting9percentofglobalGHGemissions,hadcommunicatedaneworupdatedNDCthatwouldnotreduce2030emissionsrelativetothepreviousNDCs.Forty-twoNDCsfrompartiesrepresenting5percentofglobalemissionscouldnotbecomparedwiththepreviousNDCsintermsof2030emissions,typicallyduetoinsufficient1ExcludingupdatedfirstandsecondNDCs.informationinthepreviousNDCs,astransparencyhasimprovedinthecurrentNDCs.Pledgeform:Atotalof146NDCs,frompartiesrepresenting91percentofglobalGHGemissions,nowcontainGHGtargets.Thisisupfromupfrom128initialNDCs(89percentofglobalemissions)andupfrom143NDCsasatCOP26(90.5percentofglobalGHGemissions).TheseGHGtargetscompriseseveraldifferenttypes,includingbase-yeartargets(commitmentstoreduceorcontroltheincreaseinemissionsbyaspecifiedamountrelativetoabaseyear,containedin43NDCs)andbaselinescenariotargets(commitmentstoreduceemissionsbyaspecifiedamountrelativetoaprojectedemissionsbaselinescenario,containedin83NDCs),amongotherformulations(20NDCs).Base-yeartargetstypicallyresultinemissionsdecreasingovertimerelativetohistoricallevels,whereasbaselinescenariotargetsaretypicallyformulatedtoallowabsoluteemissionstocontinuetogrow.Atotalof43NDCs,frompartiesrepresenting36percentofglobalGHGemissions,nowcontainabase-yeartarget.Thisisupfrom34initialNDCsfrompartiesrepresenting34percentofglobalGHGemissions.Ofthe21countriesadoptingaGHGtargetforthefirsttimeintheirneworupdatedNDCs,16alsoadoptedabaselinescenariotarget.Sectorcoverage:GHGtargetscanbeformulatedtocoveracountry’sentireeconomyoronlyasubsetofit.Targetswitheconomy-widecoverageincludetheenergy,industrialprocessandproductuse,wasteandlandsectors.Thereare95currentNDCs,frompartiesrepresenting55percentofglobalGHGemissions,thatcoverallsectors.Thisisupsignificantlyfromthe54initialNDCs,frompartiesrepresenting46percentofglobalGHGemissions,thatdidso.Gascoverage:Likewise,GHGtargetscanbeformulatedtocoverallmajorGHGs—carbondioxide(CO2),methane(CH4),nitrousoxide(N2O),hydrofluorocarbons(HFCs),perfluorochemicals(PFCs),sulfurhexafluoride(SF6)andnitrogentrifluoride(NF3)—oronlyasubsetofthem.GHGcoverageofNDCshasremainedrelativelyconstantfromtheinitialtothecurrentNDCs,24ofwhich,frompartiesrepresenting30percentofglobalemissions,coverallgases.Conditionality:SomepartieshavesubmittedNDCsthatareentirelyorpartiallyconditionalonfactorssuchasinternationalsupport(e.g.,financeortechnologytransfer),whileothershavesubmittedNDCsthatarenotconditional.NDCsnowincludemoreunconditionalelementsthanpreviously.Onehundredandtwenty-sixcurrentNDCs,frompartiesrepresenting80percentofglobalemissions,nowincludeatleastsomeunconditionalelements.Thisisupfrom103initialNDCs,frompartiesrepresenting76percentofglobalemissions.13EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowFigure3.1EffectofneworupdatedNDCson2030GHGemissionsrelativetoinitialNDCs2Thisestimateincludesreductionsofaround0.3GtCO2eresultingfromotherfactors,includinglowerprojectionsofinternationalaviationandshippingemissions.3TheimpactofthenewandupdatedNDCsfromnon-G20memberssincethecut-offdateofthestudieswasnotincluded.3.2.2Long-termandnet-zeropledgesAsat23September2022,88partiescoveringapproximately79percentofglobalGHGemissionshaveadoptednet-zeropledgeseitherinlaw(21parties),inapolicydocumentsuchasanNDCoralong-termstrategy(47parties),orinanannouncementbyahigh-levelgovernmentofficial(20parties).Thisisupfrom74partiesasatCOP26.Anadditionaleightpartiescoveringanadditional2percentofglobalGHGemissionshaveanother(non-net-zero)GHGmitigationtargetaspartoftheirlong-termstrategy.Atotalof36percentofglobalGHGemissionsarecoveredbynet-zerotargetsfor2050orearlier,while43percentofglobalemissionsarecoveredbynet-zeropledgesforyearslaterthan2050.Currently,21percentofglobalemissionsarenotcoveredbynet-zeropledges.Atotalof53net-zerotargetscoverallsectors,while31donotspecifysectoralcoverage.Moreover,37coverallgases,eightcoverfewerthanallgasesand40donotspecify.Twocoverinternationalshippingandaviation,onecoversinternationalaviationbutnotshipping,12coverneitherand71donotspecify.Fivenet-zerotargetsruleouttheuseofinternationaloffsetstowardsthenet-zerotargets,19anticipatetheuseofinternationaloffsets,and61donotspecify.3.3ImpactsofnewandupdatedNDCsonglobalGHGemissionsin2030Thissectionestimatestheimpactonprojectedglobal2030emissionsofnewandupdatedNDCsasat23September2022(assumingtheyarefullyimplemented)comparedtoinitialNDCs.ThedatacomefromthreemodelgroupsthatincludeupdatedNDCswithcut-offdatesrangingfromNovember2021toSeptember2022(Keramidasetal.2021;denElzenetal.2022;Meinshausenetal.2022),andtwoopen-sourcetools(ClimateActionTracker2021;ClimateWatch2022).2ToenabletheinclusionoftheupdatedNDCsofG20membersthatweresubmittedafterthecut-offdatesofthefivedatasources(thatis,Australia,Brazil,India,Indonesia,RepublicofKoreaandtheUnitedKingdom),NDCemissionestimateswererecalculatedbasedonthehistoricalemissionsdatausedintherespectivestudies.3FullimplementationofallneworupdatedunconditionalNDCsisprojectedtoleadtoatotalreductioninglobalGHGemissionsfor2030ofabout4.8gigatons(Gt)ofCO2e(range:1.7–7.9GtCO2e)annually,comparedwithinitialpledges(figure3.2;seealsoappendixBandtableB.2).NewandupdatedNDCssubmittedsincetheEmissionsGapReport2021accountforabout0.7GtCO2eofthistotal,mainlyduetoadditionalreductionsfromtheupdatedNeworupdatedNDCnotcomparabletoinitialNDCNeworupdatedNDCwithequalorhigher2030emissionsrelativetoinitialNDCNeworupdatedNDCwithlower2030emissionsthaninitialNDCUpdatedNDCsinceCOP26NoneworupdatedNDCsubmitted14EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowNDCsofAustralia(10percentofthe0.7GtCO2e),Brazil(35percent),Indonesia(10percent),SaudiArabia(about25percent),4RepublicofKorea(5percent)andnon-G20members(15percent),whilesubmissionssinceCOP26accountfor0.5GtCO2eofthetotal(mainlyfromAustralia,Brazil,IndonesiaandRepublicofKorea).ForsomeG20members,theimpactonglobalGHGemissionsin2030isestimatedatzero.Thisappliestomembersthathavenot4Brazil’s2022NDCsubmissionreducedemissionsrelativetotheirprevioussubmission,whichexplainsthecontributiontothe0.7GtCO2ereduction.However,the2022NDCsubmissionstillimpliesemissionsthatarehigherthanthoseoftheinitialNDCofBrazil.5AccordingtotheIPCCguidelinesfornationalinventoriesforBrazil.submittedanupdatedNDC(Türkiye),thathavesubmittedNDCswithasimilartargetasinapreviousupdate(UnitedKingdom)orwheretheupdatedtargetisestimatedtoresultinhigheremissionsthanemissionsprojectedbasedoncurrentpoliciesforsomestudies(IndiaandtheRussianFederation).Brazil5andMexicoshowanincreaseintheemissionstargetscomparedtotheprevioustargets,duetoachangeinthereferenceemissions.Figure3.2ImpactofnewandupdatedunconditionalNDCson2030globalemissionscomparedwithinitialNDCsNotes:Theadditionalreductionresultingfromotherfactors,includinglowerprojectionsofinternationalaviationandshippingemissions,isincludedinthefigure.TheupdatedNDCofBrazillowerstheprojectedincreaseinemissionsin2030comparedwiththepreviousNDC.ImpactofnewandupdatedNDCs(decreaseinemissions)ImpactofnewandupdatedNDCs(increaseinemissions)Zeroimpact,noneworupdatedNDCTotalimpactImpactsinceCOP26RussianFederationNon-G20OtherfactorsOtherfactorsTotalTotalMexicoSaudiArabiaIndonesiaChinaArgentinaSouthAfricaAustraliaTürkiyeBrazilCanadaJapanEU27IndiaUnitedKingdomUnitedStatesofAmericaRepublicofKorea0-4,000-3,000-2,000-1,000-500-4,500-5,000-3,500-2,500-1,500MtCO2e15EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindow3.4ProgressofG20memberstowardstheirNDCtargetsAmbitioustargetsareimportantbutmatterlittleunlesstheygohandinhandwithambitiouspoliciesandacceleratedimplementation.ThissectionprovidesanupdatedassessmentoftheprogressofG20memberstowardstheirlatestNDCtargetsasat23September2022basedonasynthesisofrecentlypublishedstudiesofemissionsprojections.6ForeachG20member,GHGemissionsprojectionswerecompiledandreviewedtoassesstheemissionlevelsexpectedunderexistingpoliciesi.e.thecurrentpoliciesscenario.7Expectedemissionlevelsin2030undercurrentpolicieswerethencomparedtoprojectedemissionsundertheNDCtargettoassesswhethertheG20membersarelikelytomeettheirrespectiveemissionsreductiontargetsfor2030.Theassessmentisbasedon‘pointintime’emissionsprojectionsintheNDCtargetyear.EuropeanUnionmemberstatesarenotassessedindividually.3.4.1MethodsandlimitationsCurrentpoliciesscenarioprojectionsarecomparedtothelatestunconditionalNDCsortoconditionalNDCsforG20memberswhoseNDCsdonothaveunconditionalelements.TheassessmentofconditionalityofNDCsfollowstheWorldResourcesInstitute(ClimateWatch2022),whichconsidersIndonesiaandMexicotohavebothunconditionalandconditionalNDCs,andIndiaandSouthAfricatohaveonlyconditionalNDCs(seeappendixB,tableB.2,availableonline).Toenablearobustcomparisonofprojectionspublishedbyindependentresearchinstitutions,themethodologyofdenElzenetal.(2019)isfollowed.Officialassessmentspublishedbynationalgovernmentsarecomparedwithindependentassessments.AlldatasourcesarepresentedinappendixB(tableB.1),availableonline.Theassessmentisbasedonemissionsincludinglanduse,land-usechangeandforestry(LULUCF)(seeappendixBfordetailsonadjustmentsofemissionprojectionsexcludingLULUCF).HistoricalemissionsdataforenergyandindustrysectorsweretakenfromthelatestinventorysubmissionstotheUNFCCC,supplementedbythePotsdamReal-TimeIntegratedModelforprobabilisticAssessmentofemissionPaths(PRIMAP)databaseforintervalyearsandmostrecentyearsafterthelastinventorydatayear(Gütschow,GüntherandPflüger2021).ForhistoricalLULUCFemissions,harmonizeddatafromGrassi,Concheddaetal.(2022)andGrassi,Federicietal.(2022)areused.FortheemissiondatafromtheliteratureexpressedinGWPsotherthanthe100-yearGWPsfromthe6TheupdatedNDCsofIndiaandIndonesiasubmittedafterthecut-offdatewerenotconsideredinthissectionbecausenostudyreviewedinthissectionquantifiedandorexaminedthetargetlevelsasthereportwenttopress.7Currentpoliciesscenarioprojectionsassumethatnoadditionalmitigationactionistakenbeyondcurrentpolicies,evenifitresultsinNDCtargetsnotbeingachievedorbeingoverachieved(UnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme[UNEP]2015;denElzenetal.2019).Currentpolicyprojectionsreflectalladoptedandimplementedpolicies,whichforthepurposeofthisreportaredefinedaslegislativedecisions,executiveordersortheirequivalent.Thisimpliesthatofficiallyannouncedplansorstrategiesalonewouldnotqualify,whileindividualexecutiveorderstoimplementsuchplansorstrategieswouldqualify.8Exceptionsweremadeinafewcases,whereexternalreviewerssuggestednationalstudiespublishedbefore2020,thatwereassessedtoproviderelevantinformation.IPCC’sAR6,conversionfactorsusedinAR6wereapplied(Lecocqetal.2022).Theselectionofstudiesprojecting2030emissionsisbasedonfourmainconsiderations:1)whetherthestudiestakeintoaccountthemostrecentsocietal,economicandpolicydevelopments—accordingly,onlystudiespublishedin2020orlaterareincluded,82)thatpeer-reviewedstudiesareincludedtotheextentpossible,3)inclusionofstudiespublishedbynationalexpertsand4)thatallGHGsandsectorsarecovered.Policycut-offdatesrangedfrom2019tomid-2022acrossstudies,meaningthatrecentlyadoptedpolicies,includingmostofthosepresentedlaterinsection3.4.3,arefullyreflectedinsomeofthescenariostudiesreviewed.ManystudiestooklimitedaccountofthepotentialimpactoftheCOVID-19pandemiconfutureemissions.Chapter2showsthatlong-termimpactsofthepandemiconemissionsremainuncertain,thatglobalemissionsareexpectedtoreboundfullyin2021andthatimpactsshowlargevariationacrossG20membersandsectors.Therefore,studiesthatdonotexplicitlytaketheimpactofthepandemicintoaccountarealsoconsidered.Furthermore,noneoftheemissionsprojectionsconsiderthepotentialimplicationsofthewarinUkraine.OtherlimitationsaresimilartopreviousEmissionsGapReports(seeappendixB.3).ForthethreeG20membersthatrecentlysubmittedmoreambitiousNDCs(Australia,BrazilandRepublicofKorea),afewstudiescomparedtheircurrentpoliciesscenarioprojectionstoearlierNDCtargets.Whererequired,NDCemissionlevelsarerecalculatedbasedonthehistoricalemissionsdatausedinrespectivestudies.NorecalculationsweredonefortheNDCsofIndiaandIndonesia,bothofwhichwereupdatedtowardstheendofthedraftingprocess.3.4.2SynthesisofrecentlypublishedscenariostudiesTable3.1showstheprogressofG20memberstowardstheirlatestNDCtargets,organizedbythestatusandassessmentofwhetherthesetargetswillbemet,basedoncurrentpolicies.MostG20membersthatsubmittedstrongerNDCtargetsin2020and2021havejustbeguntheirimplementationeffortstomeettheirnewtargets.ThosethatareprojectedtomeettheirlatestNDCtargetbasedonpoliciescurrentlyinplaceareG20membersthathavenotsubmittedaneworupdatedNDC,didnotstrengthenoronlymoderatelystrengthenedtheirtargetlevelsintheirupdatedNDCs(table3.1).AllotherG20memberswillneedadditionalpoliciestoachievetheirNDCs.16EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowTable3.1AssessmentofprogresstowardsachievingthecurrentNDCtargets,2022(unconditional,unlessotherwisementioned)fortheG20undercurrentpolicies,basedonindependentstudiesmainlypublishedin2020orlaterProjectedprogresstowardsthelatestNDCtargetMeetthetargetwithexistingpolicies(Indicatedby+,ifoverachievedbymorethan15)MissthetargetwithexistingpoliciesUncertainStatusofneworupdatedNDCSubmittedstrongertargetChina(4/7),India(conditional:4/7),iSaudiArabia(2/2)Argentina(0/3),Australia(0/4)ii,Brazil(0/4,onewithinreach),Canada(0/4)EU27(0/3),ii,iiiJapan(0/3),RepublicofKorea(0/3)iv,SouthAfrica(conditional:0/3),UK(0/1),UnitedStatesofAmerica(0/4)Indonesia(0/3,onewithinreach)NonewtargetsubmittedTürkiye(3/3)SubmittedequivalentorweakertargetRussianFederation+(5/5)iiMexico(1/3)Notes:SeeappendixB.1forthelistofstudiesreviewed.ThenumberofindependentstudiesthatprojectacountrytomeetitspreviousorthefirstNDCtargetarecomparedtothetotalnumberofstudiesandindicatedinbrackets.“Withinreach”indicatesthatonlythelowerboundestimateofthecurrentpoliciesscenarioprojectionsiswithintheNDCtargetrange.iSubmittedupdatedNDCafter1August2022,whichhasnotbeenpossibletoconsiderinthisassessment.iiCurrentpoliciesscenarioprojectionsfromofficialpublicationswerealsoexamined.TheofficialpublicationsforthreeG20members(Canada,theEuropeanUnionandUnitedKingdom)showthattheydonotprojecttomeettheir‘pointintime’NDCtargetundertheircurrentpoliciesscenario.Australia’smostrecentofficialreportreporteditsprogresstowardstheirearlierNDC(Australia,DepartmentofIndustry,Science,EnergyandResources2021).iiiFortheEU27,werefertotheEuropeanUnionReferencescenario,whichassumesfullimplementationoftheNationalEnergyandClimatePlans(NECPs)fortheperiod2021–2030byEuropeanUnionmemberstatesandseesEuropeanUnionemissionsreducebyaround43percentbelow1990levelsby2030(EuropeanCommission2021a).IncludingnetremovalsfromLULUCF,thisincreasesto-45percent.ThisbaselinescenarioindicatesthatadditionaleffortwouldberequiredtomeettheEuropeanUnion’scurrent2030energyefficiencytargetwhileitscurrent2030renewableenergytargetwouldbemet.AdditionalmemberstatemeasureswillupdatetofullyimplementtheirNECPsfortheperiod2021–2030byJune2023(draft)andJune2024(finalplans)withadditionalmeasures,takingintoaccountrecentpolicyandgeopoliticaldevelopments(EuropeanCommission2020).ivTheRepublicofKorea’sEmissionsTradingScheme(K-ETS)isaninstrumenttofullyachievethecountry’sNDCtargetandcoversmorethan70percentofitsGHGemissions.Theimplementationphase3(2021–2025)hasnotbeenupdatedsincetheupdatedNDCwasannounced(InternationalCarbonActionPartnership2022).Collectively,theG20membersareprojectedtofallshortoftheirneworupdatedNDCsby1.8GtCO2e(centralestimate)annuallyby2030.Inotherwords,thereisanimplementationgap,definedasthedifferencebetweenprojectedemissionsin2030(assumingfullimplementationofNDC)andemissionsbasedoncurrentpoliciesscenarioprojections.FortwoG20members,theprojectedemissionsundertheNDChaveconsistentlybeenassessedtosignificantlyexceedcurrentpoliciesprojections(theRussianFederationandTürkiye)sincetheEmissionsGapReport2015(UNEP2015),therebyloweringtheimplementationgapcomparedtowhatcanbereasonablyexpected.IfNDCprojectionsforthesetwomembersaresubstitutedbycurrentpoliciesscenarioprojections,theG20memberswouldcollectivelyfallshortofachievingtheirNDCsin2030byanannual2.6GtCO2e.The2030GHGemissionestimatesoftheG20anditsindividualmembersundercurrentpoliciesscenario,unconditionalNDCsandconditionalNDCs(forfourG20members)arepresentedinfigure3.3incomparisonwithhistoricalemissionsfor2015,theyearinwhichcountriesadoptedtheParisAgreementandsubmittedtheirintendedNDCs.FormostG20members,centralestimatesofemissionsprojectionsundercurrentpoliciesfor2030arelowerthanatthetimeoftheEmission’sGapReport2021.ThecentralestimateofaggregateemissionsprojectionsforG20membersin2030undercurrentpoliciesdecreased17EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowby1.3GtCO2eorabout4percentcomparedwiththe2021assessment,mainlyduetotheexpectedemissionreductionsfromtheInflationReductionAct(ofabout1GtCO2e)thatwouldbringtheUnitedStatesofAmerica’semissionsprojectionsfor2030closertotheNDCtarget.TheG20memberswith10percentlowerprojectionscomparedwiththe2021assessmentare:Indonesia,Mexico,SaudiArabiaandtheUnitedStatesofAmerica.Itisworthnotingthatthelowerboundestimatehasdecreasedbyabout2.4GtCO2e(comparedto1.1GtCO2efortheupperboundestimate),indicatingavariedinterpretationofNDCimplementationpoliciesandvariedforecastsonthedeploymentoflow-emissiontechnologiesacrossstudies.AlsonotethatforChinaandIndia,whichareassessedtomeettheirNDCswithexistingpoliciesintable3.1,thecentralestimatesofthecurrentpoliciesscenarioprojectionsarehigherthanthecentralestimatesoftheNDCtargetsmainlyduetothelargevariationofemissionsprojectionsacrossstudies.CO2$18EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowFigure3.3GHG(allgasesandsectors,includingLULUCF)oftheG20anditsindividualmembersby2030undercurrentpoliciesscenario,unconditionalNDCs,andconditionalNDCs(forfourG20members),comparedwith2015historicalemissionsNotes:Forcurrentpoliciesscenarioprojections,estimatesbasedonindependentstudiesarepresented.Barsshowtheaveragevalues(medianvaluesincaseoffiveormorestudies)anderrorbarsshowtheminimumandmaximumvalues(tenthandninetiethpercentilesincaseoffiveormorestudies).ForNDCs,officialvalues(adjustedtoAR6’sGWPs)arepresentedwhereavailable.Forreportingreasons,theemissionsprojectionsforChina,theEU27,IndiaandUnitedStatesofAmericaareshowninthetopfigureandtheotherG20membersareshowninthebottomfigure,usingtwodifferentverticalaxes.SeeappendixB.1fordetailsontheunderlyingstudies.RussianFederationMexicoSaudiArabiaIndonesiaArgentinaSouthAfricaAustraliaTürkiyeBrazilCanadaJapanUnitedKingdomRepublicofKoreaChinaEU27IndiaUSA03691218153GtCO2e3GtCO2e0.00.51.01.52.02.53.0GHGemissions(GtCO2e/year)GHGemissions(GtCO2e/year)Historical2015Currentpolicies(officialdata)Currentpolicies(independentstudies)UnconditionalNDCConditionalNDC3GtCO2e3GtCO2e3GtCO2e3GtCO2e19EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowTosupplementthefindingspresentedabove,table3.2presentspercapitaGHGemissionsin2015,whichareprojectionsfor2030underthecurrentNDCtargetsandcurrentpoliciesscenario,andtheexpectedemissionpeakingyearfortheG20members.Theaveragepercapitaemissionsin2030ofG20membersunderthelatestNDCsareprojectedtobeabout10percentlower(6.7tCO2e)thanunderthecurrentpoliciesscenario(7.4tCO2e).However,theyarenotloweredcomparedwith2010levelsandremainveryfarfromthemedianestimatesconsistentwith2°Cand1.5°Cscenariosby2050,whichare1.9tCO2e(tenthandninetiethpercentilerange:1.2–2.3tCO2e)and0.6tCO2e(0.3–1.1tCO2e),respectively.PercapitaemissionsrangewidelyacrossG20members:emissionsofIndiaareabouthalfoftheG20average,whereasSaudiArabiareachesmorethantwicetheG20average.Australia,theEuropeanUnionandSouthAfricaareprojectedtoreducetheirpercapitaemissionsbymorethanonethirdbetween2010and2030undercurrentpolicies.TheUnitedKingdomevenreacheshalf.Mexicoalsoreaches-10percentand-15percentoftheprojecteddevelopmentofpercapitaemissionsunderbothcurrentpoliciesandNDCscenarios,respectively.PercapitaemissionsundercurrentunconditionalNDCtargetsareprojectedtoincreasebetween2010and2030forsevenG20economies.Onthepeakingofemissions,allAnnexIG20membersandsomenon-AnnexIG20members(Argentina,Brazil,RepublicofKoreaandSouthAfrica)havepeakedtheiremissionsalreadywhiletheNDCsofafewnon-AnnexIG20members(China)areprojectedtopeaktheiremissionsby2030.However,sixofthenon-AnnexIG20membersdonotprojectapeakingby2030underthecurrentpoliciesscenario.Table3.2OverviewofG20memberstatusandprogresstowardsmeetingNDCtargetsCountryUnconditionalNDC:percapitaGHGemissionsCurrentpoliciesscenario:percapitaGHGemissionsEmissionpeakingtCO2e/capin2030vs.2015levelstCO2e/capin2030vs.2015levelsPeakingyearunconditionalNDCPeakingyearcurrentpoliciesArgentina7.7-11%8.70%around2005NotclearAustralia12.2-44%16.8-22%20072009Brazil6.2-9%6.7-1%around2005NotclearCanada10.2-50%14.9-28%20072007China9.818%10.324%Before2030(CO2only)NotclearEU274.8-39%5.4-31%1990orearlier1990orearlierIndia3.162%3.269%NocommitmenttopeakNotexpectedtopeakbefore2030Indonesia7.0-25%6.2-33%NocommitmenttopeakNotclearJapan6.5-35%8.3-17%20132013Mexico5.716%5.39%NocommitmenttopeakNotexpectedtopeakbefore203020EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowRepublicofKorea8.5-34%11.5-10%By2018Possiblypeakedby2020RussianFederation15.258%12.428%1990orearlier(formerSovietrepublic)Peaked,butprojectedtobeonanincreasingtrendby2030SaudiArabia16.7-12%16.7-12%NocommitmenttopeakNotexpectedtopeakbefore2030SouthAfrica6.1-34%6.8-26%around2015around2015Türkiye10.5121%6.434%NocommitmenttopeakNotexpectedtopeakbefore2030UnitedKingdom4.0-49%5.1-34%1990orearlier1990orearlierUnitedStatesofAmerica9.2-49%11.7-36%20072007G206.9-7%7.3-1%NotassessedNotassessedSource:AdaptedfromdenElzenetal.(2022),basingtheassessmentofexpectedemissionpeakyearonthemethodofLevinandRich(2017)Notes:ThepopulationprojectionsarebasedonthemediumfertilityvariantoftheUnitedNationsPopulationProspects2022edition(UnitedNationsDepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairs,PopulationDivision2022).3.4.3OverviewofrecentlyadoptedpoliciesTable3.3presentsselectedenergyandclimatepolicydevelopmentsthatmaycarrysignificant,directimpactontheimplementationofNDCtargetsandlong-termemissionreductiongoalsadoptedinlate2021and2022forthetop-sevenemittingeconomies(Brazil,China,EU27,India,Indonesia,RussianFederationandtheUnitedStatesofAmerica;forotherG20members’policies,seechapter2andappendixB.4).PolicyresponsestotheenergycrisisandthewarinUkrainearenotincluded.Someofthepolicieshighlightedbynationalpolicyexpertswereadoptedafterthepublicationofthescenariostudiesreviewedinsection3.4.1NotableexceptionsincludetheInflationReductionActandtheInfrastructureInvestmentandJobsActoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica.21EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowTable3.3OverviewofrecentpolicymeasuresadoptedbythetopsevenGHG-emittingG20membersin2021and2022thatareexpectedtoaffecttheachievementoftheirNDCtargetsandlong-termpledgesBrazil•InitsupdatedNDC,BrazilcommitstoreducingitsGHGemissionsby37percentin2025andby50percentin2030relativeto2005levels.Ithasalsocommittedtoeliminatingillegaldeforestationby2028(Brazil2022a).•InMay2022,BraziladoptedafederaldecreeestablishingtheproceduresforsettingupanationalsystemforreducingGHGemissionsaswellassectoralplansforclimatechangemitigation.Thedecreealsoestablishesasingleregisterofcarbonandmethanecreditsandclassifiescarboncreditsasfinancialassets.Thedecreeisexpectedtobecomeamanagementmechanismandanoperationalinstrumentforthesectoralplans,whichshouldestablishgradualsectoraltargetsforemissionreductions.ThesesectoralplansmustbeapprovedbytheInterministerialCommitteeonClimateChangeandGreenGrowth.Deadlinesandspecificrulesarenotyetspecifiedunderthedecree(Brazil2022b).China•TherenewableenergydevelopmentinChinahascontinueditsstronggrowth.Bytheendof2021,theinstalledsolarphotovoltaics(PV)andwindcapacitywasmorethan300gigawatts(GW).Since1996,theannualnewlyinstalledsolarPVandwindcapacityhasaccountedforabout55percentofnewenergycapacity(Statista2022).•InApril2022,Chinaannouncedthatitwouldincreasecoalproductionby300milliontonsin2022throughcoalminingcapacityincrease,expandedandnewproduction,andothermeasures.ThiscomesdespiteChina’spledgetostrictlycontrolcoal-firedpowergenerationprojects,limittheincreaseincoalconsumptionoverthe14thFive-YearPlanperiod(2021–2025)andphasedowncoalconsumptionduringthe15thFive-YearPlanperiod(2026–2030).Thetransformationawayfromcoalinfrastructuresischallengedbyenergysecurityconcerns(China,NationalDevelopmentandReformCommission[NDRC]2022;China,NationalStateEnergyAdministration2022;Xinhua2022).•TopeakCO2emissionsandachievecarbonneutrality,ChinahasreleasedanActionPlanforCarbonDioxidePeakingbefore2030andaWorkingGuidanceforCarbonDioxidePeakingandCarbonNeutrality.Specificobjectivesandimplementingplansarepublishedattheregionallevelandacrossallsectorscoveringenergy,industry,urban-ruraldevelopment,transportation,carbonsink,technologydevelopment,carbonmarket,climateandgreenfinance,climateadaptationandsocialawareness(China,NDRC2021a;China,NDRC2021b).EuropeanUnion•InDecember2021,theEuropeanCommissionproposedlegislationtoboosttherenovationanddecarbonizationofbuildingsandreducemethaneemissionsintheenergysectorby80percentin2030(EuropeanCommission2021b;EuropeanCommission2021c).NewrequirementstopromotesustainableproductsandconstructionwereproposedinMarch2022,whichcouldleadto132milliontonsofoilequivalent(Mtoe)ofprimaryenergysavings(EuropeanCommission2022a).•InMay2022,theEuropeanCommissionpresenteditsREPowerEUPlaninordertophaseoutRussianfossilfuels.Amongothers,theplanincludesproposalstoinvest€210billionmostlyincleanenergyandindustry,speeduppermittingproceduresforrenewableenergyprojects,andincreaseambitionsforrenewableenergyandenergyefficiency.TheplanwouldbringtheEU’stotalrenewableenergygenerationto1236GWby2030ifadopted(EuropeanCommission2022b;EuropeanCommission2022c).•TheEU’srevisionandupdateoflegislationunderthe“Fitfor55”packagetoimplementits2030climatetargetisinitsfinalphase.TheEuropeanCommission,EuropeanParliamentandmemberstateshavealreadysupportedabanonthesaleofnewfossilfuelcarsandvansby2035,anEUCarbonBorderAdjustmentMechanism(CBAM),andanexpansionofemissionstradingtonewsectors(EuropeanCouncil2022a;EuropeanCouncil2022b;EuropeanParliament2022).22EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowIndia•InAugust2022,theCabinetapprovedanupdateofIndia’sNDC.TheupdatedNDChasledtomajorpolicesbeingpushedforward,including1)electricvehicles(EVs),2)co-firingofbiomasspelletsinthermalpowerplantsby7percent,3)ethanolblendinginpetrolby20percent,4)inclusionofagroforestryandprivateforestry,5)solarizationofagriculturalpumps,6)cleancooking(byshiftingtoliquefiedpetroleumgas[LPG]),and7)rooftopsolarPV.TheGovernmentofIndiaisconsideringcoalgasification,conversionofcoalintochemicalprojects,ammoniaandhydrogenasfuturefuels.Energystorageissupportedthroughaproductionlinkedschemetopromoterenewableenergy(India,PressInformationBureau2022).•Inrecognitionoftheroleoflifestyles,themovementLifestyleforEnvironmenthasbeenproposedtofosteracitizen-centricapproachtocombatclimatechange(Bhaskar2022;India,PressInformationBureau2022).•TheLokSabhapassedtheEnergyConservation(Amendment)Billon9August2022,aimingtofacilitatetheestablishmentanddevelopmentofdomesticcarbonmarkets.Themarkets’objectiveistoincentivizeactionsforemissionreductionexpectedtoresultinincreasedinvestmentsincleanenergyandenergyefficiencyareas,especiallyintheprivatesector(PRSLegislativeResearch2022).Indonesia•InFebruary2022,theMinistryofEnvironmentandForestryreleasedMinisterialDecreeNo.168/2022onForestryandOtherLandUse(FOLU)NetSink2030alongwithitsoperationalplan.ThisregulationisexpectedtoremoveGHGemissionswhileimplementingtheenergytransitionanddecarbonization.TheFOLUNetSinkcommitmentwasintroducedinthelastLong-TermStrategytoLow-CarbonandClimateResilience2050publishedin2021(ForestHints2022).•TheMinistryofEnergyandMineralResourceshasannouncedanet-zeroemissionroadmapfortheenergysector,whichindicatesthatIndonesiawillnolongerbuildnewfossilfuelpowerplants,withtheexceptionofthe35GWpowercapacityadditionplan,andbegintoretiresubcriticalcoalpowerplantsfrom2030onwards.Intheperiodof2031–2060,45GWofcoalpowerplantswillberetiredandshutdown.Inaddition,theIndonesianState-ownedelectricitycompanyPerusahaanListrikNegaraseekstocancelsomecoalplantsunderconstruction.However,despitetheverbalstatementandpoliticaldecision,noregulationtophaseoutcoalhasbeenissuedyet(InternationalEnergyAgency[IEA]2022;Indonesia,MinistryofEnergyandMineralResources2022;OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment[OECD]CleanEnergyFinanceandInvestmentMobilisationProgramme2021).•TheElectricitySupplyBusinessPlan2021–2030,publishedinOctober2021,aimstoachieverenewableenergycapacitytoaccountfor51.6percentoftotalpoweradditionuntil2030.Hydropowerdominatestheupcomingrenewableplanbyaround25.6percent,followedbysolar(11.5percent),geothermalandotherrenewables(Indonesia,MinistryofEnergyandMineralResources2021;OECDCleanEnergyFinanceandInvestmentMobilisationProgramme2021).RussianFederation•InNovember2021,theRussianFederationreleasedthenewestversionoftheirTransportStrategyuntil2030.Thestrategyoutlinesmeasuresincludingenergy-efficientorelectricvehicles,low-carboninfrastructureandalternativefuelsintendedtoreducetransportemissionsby1.2percentrelativetototalemissionsin2017by2030(RussianFederation2021a).•TheConceptfortheDevelopmentofElectricVehicleProductionwasapprovedbytheRussianFederationinAugust2021,settingatargetforEVstomakeupatleast10percentoftheRussianmarketby2030.InadditiontomeasurespromotingEVproduction,theGovernmentplanstostimulatedemandbyprovidingsubsidiescoveringupto25%ofthepriceofdomesticallyproducedEVs(RussianFederation2021b;Reuters2021).•InAugust2021,theRussianGovernmentapprovedtheconceptfortheDevelopmentofHydrogenEnergy.Theplanpresentsstrategicinitiativestowardsthedevelopment,useandexportoflow-carbonhydrogenenergy(RussianFederation2021a).23EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowUnitedStatesofAmerica•InAugust2022,theUnitedStatesofAmericaenactedtheInflationReductionAct,projectedtoreduceGHGemissionsby1Gt.Thelawmakesmajorinvestmentsincleanenergytechnologiesincludingutility-scaleanddistributedsolar,windandotherrenewableresources,existingzero-emittingnuclearplants,carboncapturefacilitiesinthepowerandindustrialsectors,light,mediumandheavy-dutycleanvehiclesaswellasheatpumpsandotherenergy-efficientupgradesforhomesandbusinesses.TheActalsoprovidestaxcreditsforemergingcleantechnologieslikecleanhydrogenproduction,directaircapturefacilitiesandcleanfuelproduction(UnitedStatesofAmerica,Congress2022a;UnitedStatesofAmerica,DepartmentofEnergy2022;Jenkinsetal.2022;Larsenetal.2022;Mahajanetal.2022).•TheUnitedStatesofAmericaalsoenactedtheInfrastructureInvestmentandJobsActinNovember2021,whichmakesUS$27billioninpowergridandtransmissioninvestments,createsanewUS$7.5billiongrantprogrammeforEVsandalternativefuelinfrastructuredeployment,andprovidesUS$3.5billionandUS$8billionfordirectaircaptureandcleanhydrogenhubs,respectively,amongotherkeyinvestments(UnitedStatesofAmerica,Congress2022b).•In2021and2022,theEnvironmentalProtectionAgencyandNationalHighwayTrafficSafetyAdministrationadoptedstandardsforlight-dutyvehiclesthroughmodelyear2026.TheEnvironmentalProtectionAgencyestimatesthatthestandardswillavoidmorethan3billiontonsofGHGemissionsthrough2050(UnitedStatesofAmerica,DepartmentofTransportationundated;UnitedStatesofAmerica,EnvironmentalProtectionAgency2021;UnitedStatesofAmerica,EnvironmentalProtectionAgency2022).3.5DetailsonG20members’net-zeropledgesAtotalof19G20membershavecommittedtoachievingnet-zeroemissions,upfrom17asatCOP26.Thesetargetsvaryinanumberofimportantcharacteristics,includingtheirlegalstatus;timeline;explicitconsiderationoffairnessandequity;whichsources,sectorsandgasestheycover;whethertheywillallowtheuseofinternationaloffsetstocounttowardstheirachievement;thelevelofdetailtheyprovideontheroleofcarbondioxideremoval;andthenatureofplanning,reviewandreportingontargetimplementation(table3.4).Figure3.4visualizesthedirectionneededforcountriestogetfromtheircurrentemissionlevelstotheirNDCtargetsfor2030andindicatestheirnet-zerotargetsforeachG20memberthathasanetzerotarget(notingthatFrance,GermanyandItalyareonlyassessedaspartoftheEuropeanUnion).ThoseG20memberswhoseemissionshavealreadypeakedwillneedtofurtheracceleratetheiremissiondeclinestotheirnet-zerotargetyear,whilethosememberswhoseemissionswillcontinuetoincreasethrough2030undertheNDCswillrequirefurtherpolicyshiftsandinvestments(includingadequatesupporttodevelopingcountries,whereapplicable)toachievetheemissionreductionsimpliedbytheirnationalnet-zerotargets.Thisillustrationdoesnotconsidertherelativemeritintermsoftheequityorfairnessofthechoicescountriesmakeregardingtheirnationallydeterminedpathwaystonetzero.However,ithighlightsthediscrepancybetweencurrentemissions,near-termNDCtargetsandlong-termnet-zerotargets.ThisservesasaclearremindertoallG20members,orindeedanycountry,thataspirationaltargetssuchasNDCsornet-zerotargetsneedtobebackedupwitheffectivepolicies.Italsoservesasanimportantreminderthatcurrentevidencedoesnotprovideconfidencethatthenationallydeterminednet-zerotargetswillbeachieved.Thishasclearrepercussionsfortheanticipatedglobaltemperatureprojections(seechapter4).24EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowTable3.4Detailsonnet-zerotargetsofG20membersSources:AllindicatorsarebasedonareconciliationofdatafromClimateActionTracker(2022),ClimateWatch(2022)andNetZeroTracker(2022)withthefollowingexceptions:“Coversallsectors”isbasedonClimateWatch(2022);“Reviewprocess”isbasedonClimateActionTracker(2022);“Annualreporting”isbasedonNetZeroTracker(2022);“Removalstransparency”and“Referencetofairness”arebasedonClimateActionTracker(2022)andNetZeroTracker(2022).Notes:Greencheckmarksindicatethecriterionisfulfilled;yellowcheckmarksindicatethecriterionispartiallyfulfilledorfulfilledtoalowerlevelofrobustness;red“X”indicatesthecriterionisnotfulfilled;“?”indicatesthememberhasnotprovidedinformationonthecriterion(whererelevant);“[inconclusive]”indicatesinconsistencyacrossdatasourcesconsulted;“[nodata]”indicatesthedatasourcesconsulteddonottrackdataonthemember.SeeappendixB.5andtherespectivetrackersforfurtherexplanationsofindicatorsandcodingcriteria.1TableXG20NetZeroOverviewNotfulfilledPartiallyfulfilledFulfilledNoinformationG20memberAnnexFundamentalsScopeandcoverageCarbonremovalPlanning,review,reportingSourceTargetyearReferencetofairnessCoversallsectorsCoversallgasesCoversint'lshippingandaviationExcludesint'loffsetsSeparateremovalstargetsRemovalstransparencyPublishedplanReviewprocessAnnualreportingArgentinaNon-AnnexIannounce-ment20505????555?5AustraliaAnnexIlaw2050[incon-clusive]33?55[incon-clusive][incon-clusive]33BrazilNon-AnnexIpolicy205053???555?5CanadaAnnexIlaw2050[incon-clusive]33??5[incon-clusive]333ChinaNon-AnnexIpolicy20603?5??5[incon-clusive]335EuropeanUnionAnnexIlaw20505333353333FranceAnnexIlaw20503335333333GermanyAnnexIlaw2045333555[incon-clusive][incon-clusive]33IndiaNon-AnnexIpolicy20705????555?5IndonesiaNon-AnnexIpolicy206053???5[incon-clusive][incon-clusive]?5ItalyAnnexIpolicy20503???5533[nodata]3JapanAnnexIlaw2050533??5[incon-clusive][incon-clusive]33MexicoNon-AnnexI[nonet-zerotarget]RussianFederationAnnexIlaw20605???55[incon-clusive][incon-clusive]35SaudiArabiaNon-AnnexIannounce-ment20605????55[incon-clusive]35SouthAfricaNon-AnnexIpolicy2050[incon-clusive]35??555?5RepublicofKoreaNon-AnnexIlaw2050533??55[incon-clusive]?3TürkiyeAnnexIannounce-ment20535?3??555?3UnitedKingdomAnnexIlaw20503333553333UnitedStatesofAmericaAnnexIpolicy20505335353333FederationrabianaafricacofKoreasiaFederationrabianaafricacofKoreasiaFederationrabianaafricacofKoreasiaFederationrabianaafricacofKoreasiaFederationrabianaafricacofKoreasiaFederationrabianaafricacofKoreasiaFederationrabianaafricacofKoreasiaFederationrabianaafricacofKoreasiaFederationrabianaafricacofKoreasiaFederationrabianaafricacofKoreasiaFederationrabianaafricacofKoreasiaFederationrabianaafricacofKoreasiaRussianFederationSaudiArabiaArgentinaAustraliaBrazilCanadaSouthAfricaTürkiyeUKUSARepublicofKoreaMexicoIndonesiaJapanIndiaChinaEU27RussianFederationSaudiArabiaArgentinaAustraliaBrazilCanadaSouthAfricaTürkiyeUKUSARepublicofKoreaMexicoIndonesiaJapanIndiaChinaEU27FederationrabianaafricacofKoreasiaFederationrabianaafricacofKoreasiaFederationrabianaafricacofKoreasiaFederationrabianaafricacofKoreasiaFederationrabianaafricacofKoreasiaRussianFederationSaudiArabiaArgentinaAustraliaBrazilCanadaSouthAfricaTürkiyeUKUSARepublicofKoreaMexicoIndonesiaJapanIndiaChinaEU2725EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowFigure3.4EmissionstrajectoriesimpliedbyNDCsandnet-zerotargetsofG20membersNotes:ThefigureshowsnationalnetemissionsinMtCO2e/yearovertime.Thetimingofnet-zerotargetsisapproximateinthisfigureforG20countriesthathavenet-zerotargetsthatonlyapplytoCO2.CO2-onlynet-zerotargetsimplylater(orno)achievementofnet-zeroGHGemissions(seetable3.4).SaudiArabiaArgentinaAustraliaBrazilCanadaSouthAfricaTürkiyeRussianFederationUnitedKingdomUSARepublicofKoreaEmissionstrenduntil2030impliedbyNDCtargetsLinearcontinuationoftheemissionstrendimpliedbyNDCtargetsNetzerowithunclearorCO2-onlycoverageNet-zeroCO2targetsNet-zeroGHGtargetsMexicoIndonesiaJapanIndiaChinaEU27Historicaldata0400060001500080001500003500500002500015000800080006000100006000025000600202020402060202020402060202020402060202020402060020202040206020202040206020202040206020202040206020202040206020202040206020202040206020202040206020202040206020202040206020202040206020202040206026EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowTheemissionsgapLeadauthors:JoeriRogelj(ImperialCollegeLondon,UnitedKingdom;InternationalInstituteforAppliedSystemsAnalysis[IIASA],Austria),MicheldenElzen(PBLNetherlandsEnvironmentalAssessmentAgency,theNetherlands),JoanaPortugal-Pereira(GraduateSchoolofEngineering[COPPE],UniversidadeFederaldoRiodeJaneiro,Brazil)Contributingauthors:TarynFransen(WorldResourcesInstitute,UnitedStatesofAmerica),GauravGanti(ClimateAnalytics,Germany),JarmoKikstra(ImperialCollegeLondon,UnitedKingdom),AlexKöberle(ImperialCollegeLondon,UnitedKingdom),RobinLamboll(ImperialCollegeLondon,UnitedKingdom),ShivikaMittal(ImperialCollegeLondon,UnitedKingdom),Carl-FriedrichSchleussner(ClimateAnalytics,Germany),CleaSchumer(WorldResourcesInstitute,UnitedStatesofAmerica)44.1IntroductionTheemissionsgapisdefinedasthedifferencebetweentheestimatedtotalglobalgreenhousegas(GHG)emissionsresultingfromthefullimplementationofthenationallydeterminedcontributions(NDCs),andthetotalglobalGHGemissionsfromleast-costpathwaysconsistentwiththeParisAgreementlong-termgoaloflimitingglobalaveragetemperatureincreasetowellbelow2°C,andpursuingeffortstolimititto1.5°Crelativetopre-industriallevels.Orinotherwords,thegapbetweenpromisedandneededemissionreductions.Thekeyquestionsassessedinthischapterare,whatisthecurrentbestestimateoftheemissionsgapfor2030consideringthelatestNDCs?WhatlevelsofglobalemissionsareinlinewiththeclimatemitigationgoalsoftheParisAgreement?Whereareweheadedundercurrentpoliciesandvariousmitigationpledgescenariosintermsofglobalwarmingoverthecourseofthecentury?TheassembledscenariosreflectthelatestfindingsfromthereportsreleasedbyIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)WorkingGroupsIandIIIundertheSixthAssessmentReport(AR6)(Canadelletal.2021;IPCC2021;Byersetal.2022;IPCC2022b;Lecocqetal.2022;Riahietal.2022),ensuringconsistencywiththemostrecentclimatescienceandmitigationtrajectoryassumptions.Theachievementofnet-zeroGHGemissions,asaimedforundertheParisAgreement,wasconsideredaspartofthescenarioclassification.CurrentpoliciesandNDCscenariosarealsoalignedwiththeassessmentoftheIPCCAR6WGIIIReport(Lecocqetal.2022),takingintoaccounttheimpact1TheIPCCAR6assessedstudieswithcut-offdatesvaryingbetweenMay2021andOctober2021.ofCOVID-19andupdatedpoliciesonfutureemissionlevels.MovingbeyondtheIPCCassessment,theNDCscenariousesupdatedemissionsprojectionsbasedonthesamestudiesassessedintheAR6WGIIIReport,butincludingNDCupdatesuptoacut-offdateof23September2022.1Improvingonearlieremissionsgapestimates,thischapterusesupdatedinformationonlanduse,land-usechangeandforestryemissionsfromnationalinventorydataandthemostrecentIPCCAR6valuesofglobalwarmingpotentialover100years(GWP100);itharmonizesthedifferencesbetweenglobalemissionsdataandscenarios.Resolvingtheseissuesresultsinchangesintheglobalemissionsprojectionsforcurrentpolicies,NDCsandtemperaturepathways,comparedwithpreviousEmissionsGapReports,aswellaswiththeestimatesincludedintheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC)SynthesisReport(UNFCCC2021)andtheAR6WGIIIReport(IPCC2022).TheupdatesmeanthattheestimatesinthischaptercannotbedirectlycomparedwithpreviousEmissionsGapReportestimates.However,differencesintheestimatesareexplainedinthischapter,andthereport’scentralfindingremains:currentpoliciesandNDCsarewoefullyinsufficienttomeetthetemperaturegoaloftheParisAgreement.Thechapterfirstintroducestheupdatedscenariosthatunderliethequantificationoftheemissionsgap(section4.2).Theemissionsgapassessmentfor2030ispresentedinsection4.3,andtheglobaltemperatureimplicationsarediscussedinsection4.4.27EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindow4.2Scenariosconsideredforthe2030emissionsgapassessmentThissectionupdatesthethreescenariocategoriesconsideredforthe2030emissionsgapassessment.2Thecurrentpolicyscenarioadjustsoriginalmodellingstudiestoaccountfordifferentpolicycut-offdates,whichrangefrom2017to2020,andvaryingconsiderationoftheimpactoftheCOVID-19pandemiconsocioeconomicdrivers.3Thebelow1.5°Cdefinitionusedinthe2022EmissionsGapReportisconsistentwiththeC1acategoryoftheIPCCAR6WGIIISummaryforpolicymakersandselectsscenariosbasedonboththeirtemperatureoutcomeandonwhethertheyreachnet-zeroGHGemissionsoverthecourseofthecenturyinlinewiththeParisAgreementarticle4(Schleussneretal.2022).Thesecategoriescomprisereferenceandcurrentpoliciesscenarios(section4.2.1),newandupdatedNDCscenarios(4.2.2),andleast-costmitigationscenariosstartingin2020consistentwithspecifictemperaturetargets(4.2.3).Allscenariosaresummarizedintable4.1.Table4.1SummaryofassessedscenariosScenarioNumberofscenariosinsetGlobaltotalemissionsin2030(GtCO2e)Estimatedtemperatureoutcomes†ReferenceandcurrentpoliciesscenariosReferenceoryear2010policies2010Thisscenarioonlyincludesclimatepolicesimplementedupto2010andassumesnoadditionalmeasuresfrom2010onward.Currentpolicies2021ThisscenariocoverscurrentpoliciesandprojectsglobalGHGimplicationsofclimatemitigationpoliciesadoptedandimplementedasof2021.Thesescenariosaccountfortheshort-termandmidtermsocioeconomicimpactsofCOVID-192(cut-offdate:November2021)andareadjustedfortheimpactoftheInflationReductionActintheUnitedStatesofAmerica.NDCscenariosUnconditionalNDCs2022ThisscenariocoversallthelatestversionsoftheNDCsthathavebeenindicatedtobeimplementedwithoutanyexplicitexternalsupport(cut-offdate:23September2022).ConditionalNDCs2022Inadditiontotheunconditionalpledges,thisscenariocoversthelatestversionsofNDCstobeimplementedconditionaluponreceivinginternationalsupport(finance,technologytransferand/orcapacity-building)(cut-offdate:23September2022).MitigationscenariosconsistentwithkeepingwarmingbelowspecifictemperaturelimitsBelow2°CN/ALong-termleast-costpathwaystartingfrom2020andconsistentwithholdingglobalwarmingbelow2°Cthroughoutthetwenty-firstcenturywithatleast66%chance.Below1.8°CN/ALong-termleast-costpathwaystartingfrom2020andconsistentwithholdingglobalwarmingbelow1.8°Cthroughoutthetwenty-firstcenturywithatleast66%chance.Below1.5°CN/ALong-termleast-costpathwaystartingfrom2020andconsistentwithholdingglobalwarmingbelow1.5°Cthroughoutthetwenty-firstcenturywithlimitedornoovershoot.3Thisimpliesglobalwarmingin2100beingheldbelow1.5°Cwithatleast66%chance,whilethroughoutthetwenty-firstcenturyitiskeptbelow1.5°Cwithatleast33%chance.Inaddition,consistentwiththeParisAgreement,thesescenariosachievenet-zeroGHGemissionsinthesecondhalfofthecentury.28EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindow4.2.1ReferenceandcurrentpoliciesscenariosTwoscenariosareconsidered:thereferenceoryear2010policiesscenarioandtheupdatedcurrentpoliciesscenario.Theyear2010policiesscenarioassumesthatnoadditionalclimatemitigationpoliciesareimplementedafter2010.GlobalGHGemissionsinthisscenarioarebasedonthescenariosassessedbytheIPCCunderAR6WGIIIcategoryC8(Byersetal.2022;IPCC2022a;Riahietal.2022).Theestimatedglobalemissionsin2030undertheyear2010policiesscenariois66GtCO2e(range:64–68).ThecurrentpoliciesscenarioprojectsglobalGHGemissionsassumingallcurrentlyadoptedandimplementedpolicies(definedaslegislativedecisions,executiveordersorequivalent)arerealizedandthatnoadditionalmeasuresareundertaken.Typically,selectedpoliciesarebasedonliteratureresearch,inputfromtheClimatePolicyDatabase(NewClimateInstitute2020)andacountryexpertreviewofthepoliciesidentified,oftenfollowingamodellingprotocolfortheimplementationofpoliciesinglobalmodelsfromRoelfsemaetal.(2020;2022).ThedataforthisscenarioarebasedonthesamefourmodellingstudiesofthecurrentpoliciesassessmentoftheIPCCAR6WGIIIReport(Lecocqetal.2022),butusingmorerecentdatafromthesamefourmodellingstudiesthatprovideupdatedestimatesthatapplythemostrecentAR6GWP100valuesanduseapolicycut-offdateofNovember2021(seetable4.1andappendixC,availableonline,forfurtherdetail)(ClimateActionTracker2021;Keramidasetal.2021;Riahietal.2021;denElzenetal.2022;Roelfsemaetal.2022).ThescenarioconsiderstheimpactofCOVID-19onGHGemissionsprojections,andtheprojectionsareadjustedtoincludetheexpectedemissionreductionsfromtheInflationReductionActintheUnitedStatesofAmerica(amountingtoabout1GtCO2e).TheGHGemissionsprojectionsforthecurrentpoliciesscenarioswereharmonizedwith2015emissionsbasedontheIPCCAR6historicalemissionsdatabase(seebox4.1).TheresultingmedianestimateofglobalGHGemissionsin2030undercurrentpoliciesis58GtCO2e(range:52–60).Thisis3GtCO2ehigherthantheestimateofthe2021UnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme(UNEP)EmissionsGapReport(accountingfortheimpactoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica).Abouthalfoftheincreaseisduetotheharmonization,aboutonequartertothechangeinglobalwarmingpotential(GWP),andtheremainingincreaseisduetothemethodologicalchoiceofonlyselectingmodelstudiesthatexplicitlyaccountforthemostrecentcurrentpolicesandNDCestimates(table4.2).4.2.2NDCscenariosTheNDCscenarioscoverthemostrecentversionsoftheNDCssubmitted,withacut-offdateof23September2022.TheestimatesarebasedonthestudiesusedintheIPCCAR6WGIIIassessment(seetable4.2ofLecocqetal.2022);however,toreflectNDCssubmittedsincetheIPCCpublication,updatedestimateshavebeenprovided.Thedatacomefromfourmodelgroupswithcut-offdatesrangingfromNovember2021toFebruary2022acrossstudies(ClimateActionTracker2021;Keramidasetal.2021;denElzenetal.2022;Meinshausenetal.2022).ToincludetheimplicationsofneworupdatedNDCssubmittedbycertainG20membersafterthesecut-offdates(i.e.Australia,Brazil,India,Indonesia,RepublicofKoreaandtheUnitedKingdom),NDCemissionestimateswererecalculatedbasedonthehistoricalemissionsdatausedinrespectivestudies(followingthesameapproachasinchapter3).ThelatestversionsoftheunconditionalNDCsresultinanannualemissionsreductionofabout0.7GtCO2ecomparedwithlastyear’sreport(table4.2,NDCupdatescolumn).Aswiththereferenceandcurrentpoliciesscenarios,theNDCscenarioswerealsoharmonizedwithhistorical2015emissions(seebox4.1).Table4.2TheimpactofthevariousupdatesontheGHGemissionsprojections(medianestimates)ScenarioEmissionsGapReport2022EmissionsGapReport2021DifferenceEGR2022-2021FactorsexplainingdifferencesbetweenEGR2022andEGR2021estimatesNDCupdatesMethodsAR6GWPHarmonizationScenarioliteratureupdateYear2010policies66.464.4+2.0+0.9+1.1Currentpolicies58.055.0+3.0+1.3+0.8+1.9-1.0UnconditionalNDCs55.452.0+3.4-0.7+0.8+0.8+2.5ConditionalNDCs52.449.7+2.7-0.7+0.5+0.7+2.2Below2.0°C40.739.2+1.5+0.6+0.9Below1.8°C34.733.2+1.6+0.5+1.1Below1.5°C32.724.6+8.2+0.4+7.8ImpactofInflationReductionActintheUnitedStatesofAmerica.29EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowTheunconditionalandconditionalNDCscenariosresultinprojectedmedianglobalGHGemissionsin2030of55GtCO2e(range:52–57)and52GtCO2e,(range:49–54)respectively.Theseprojectionsare3.5GtCO2eand3GtCO2ehigherthanthemedianestimatesofthe2021UNEPEmissionsGapReport,respectively,forreasonssimilartothoseexplainingthechangesinthecurrentpoliciesscenario(seetable4.2).Theharmonizationofscenarioprojectionsandestimatesofhistoricalemissionsarealsothedominantfactorhere(seetable4.2),inadditiontotheimpactduetothechangeinGWPandthechangeinmethodologicalchoiceofonlyselectingmodelstudiesthataccountforthemostrecentNDCs.Notethatthisyear’supdatealsoaccountsfortheimpactoftheupdatedNDCsmadebetweentheSeptembercut-offdateofthe2021EmissionsGapReportandNovember2021.Box4.1HarmonizationofemissionsdataHistoricalemissioninventoriesandemissionsprojectionsfromglobalintegratedassessmentmodelsdifferandareassociatedwithuncertainties(seechapter2,Dhakaletal.2022).Toensurecomparability,datasourcesinthisyear’sreportwereharmonizedthroughthefollowingthreesteps:1.DiscrepanciesbetweentheemissionsofscenariosfromtheIPCCAR6WGIIIscenariodatabase(Byersetal.2022;Riahietal.2022)andupdatedhistoricalglobalemissionsestimateswereharmonizedaspartoftheIPCCAR6scenariopipeline(Kikstraetal.2022).2.EmissionsdatafromNDCestimates(basedonanationalinventoryapproach)andglobalintegratedassessmentmodellingscenarios(consistentwithabookkeepingapproach)weremadeconceptuallymorecomparableintermsofthelanduse,land-usechangeandforestryemissionsdefinitionthattheyuse,basedontheharmonizationpresentedinGrassietal.(2021)(seechapter2andappendixAforfurtherdetails).3.ThedifferencebetweenhistoricalemissionsassumedinNDCstudiesandthehistoricalemissionsdatabaseoftheIPCCAR6wasresolvedbyapplyingthemodelledabsolutechangebetweentheharmonizationyearandthe2030projectionsofNDCstudiestothehistoricalemissionsdatabaseoftheIPCCAR6for2015.Thesemethodologicalupdatesimprovethecomparabilityofvaluesacrosschapters,butitisimportanttonotethattheylimitthecomparabilityofthisyear’sestimatewiththoseofpreviouseditionsoftheEmissionsGapReport.4.2.3MitigationscenarioskeepingwarmingbelowspecifiedtemperaturelimitsToassesstheemissionsandimplementationgapsin2030,currentpoliciesandNDCscenariosarecomparedwithleast-costmitigationscenariosthatareconsistentwithkeepingwarmingbelowspecifictemperaturelimits.Least-costmitigationscenariosareinlinewiththeprincipleoftheUNFCCCthat“policiesandmeasurestodealwithclimatechangeshouldbecost-effectivesoastoensureglobalbenefitsatthelowestpossiblecost”(UNFCCC1992).However,least-costmitigationscenariosgenerallydonotaccountfortheeconomicco-benefitsandavoideddamagesofmitigation(seebox4.2).Emissionpathwaysfromtheliteraturearecategorizedaccordingtotheirprojectedpeakglobalwarmingoutcomesrelativetopre-industriallevelsoverthecourseofthiscentury.ThreescenariosaredefinedtoreflectthethreedifferentlevelsofwarmingrelevantforthetemperaturegoaloftheParisAgreement:2°C,1.8°Cand1.5°C(seetables4.1and4.3).Asoutlinedintheintroductiontothischapter,thisyearthemitigationscenarioshavebeenupdatedbasedonthelatestsetofscenarioscollectedaspartoftheIPCCAR6WGIIIReport(Byersetal.2022;Riahietal.2022),withtemperatureprojectionsbasedonthephysicalscienceassessmentbyWorkingGroupIundertheIPCCAR6(Forsteretal.2021).30EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowTable4.3GlobaltotalGHGemissionsin2030andglobalwarmingcharacteristicsofdifferentscenariosconsistentwithlimitingglobalwarmingtospecifictemperaturelimitsScenarioNumberofscenariosGlobaltotalGHGemissions(GtCO2e)EstimatedtemperatureoutcomeClosestapproximateIn2030In205050%chance66%chance90%chanceIPCCAR6WGIIIscenarioclassBelow2.0°C(66%chance)19541(37–46)20(16–24)Peak:1.7–1.8°CIn2100:1.4-1.7°CPeak:1.8–1.9°CIn2100:1.6–1.9°CPeak:2.2–2.4°CIn2100:2.0–2.4°CC3aBelow1.8°C(66%chance)13935(28–40)12(8–16)Peak:1.5–1.7°CIn2100:1.3-1.6°CPeak:1.6–1.8°CIn2100:1.4–1.7°CPeak:1.9–2.2°CIn2100:1.8–2.2°CN/ABelow1.5°C(66%in2100withnoorlimitedovershoot)5033(26–34)8(5–13)Peak:1.5–1.6°CIn2100:1.1–1.3°CPeak:1.6–1.7°CIn2100:1.2–1.5°CPeak:1.9–2.1°CIn2100:1.6–1.9°CC1aValuesrepresentthemedianandtenthtoninetiethpercentilerangeacrossscenarios.Percentagechancereferstopeakwarmingatanytimeduringthetwenty-firstcenturyforthebelow1.8°Candbelow2.0°Cscenarios.Whenachievingnet-negativeCO2emissionsinthesecondhalfofthecentury,globalwarmingcanbefurtherreducedfromthesepeakwarmingcharacteristics,asillustratedbythe“Estimatedtemperatureoutcome”columns.Forthebelow1.5°Cscenario,thechanceappliestotheglobalwarmingintheyear2100,whilethe“noorlimitedovershoot”characteristiciscapturedbyensuringprojectionsdonotexceed1.5°Cwithmorethan67percentchanceoverthecourseofthetwenty-firstcenturyor,inotherwords,thatthelowestchanceofwarmingbeinglimitedto1.5°Cthroughouttheentiretwenty-firstcenturyisneverlessthan33percent.ThisdefinitionisidenticaltotheC1categorydefinitionusedbytheIPCCAR6WGIIIreport.ComparedtoIPCC(2022),theEmissionsGapReportanalysisalsoselectsscenariosbasedonwhetherornottheyassumeimmediateaction.Notes:GHGemissionsinthistablehavebeenaggregatedwithGWP100valuesofIPCCAR6.Source:BasedonunderlyingdatafromByersetal.(2022)andRiahietal.(2022)4ThesescenariosareallwithintheIPCCAR6WGIIIcategoryC1.5AdetaileddiscussionofthischangebetweentheIPCCSpecialReportonglobalwarmingof1.5°CandtheAR6WGIIIReportisprovidedinappendixIIItotheIPCCAR6WGIIIReport(IPCC2022a),section3.2.1.The2030emissionbenchmarkvaluesoftheleast-costmitigationpathwaysinthisyear’sreportarehigherthanthoseinpreviousreports,especiallyforthebelow1.5°Cscenario.Therearetwomainreasonsforthis(table4.2).ThemostimportantistheupdateofthescenarioliteratureevidencebasecollectedinsupportoftheIPCCAR6(Byersetal.2022;Riahietal.2022).Therateofemissionsdeclineafter2020inthebelow1.5°Cscenario4issimilartothatoftheIPCCSpecialReportonglobalwarmingof1.5°CandtheIPCCAR6.However,theAR6scenariosshowhigherGHGemissionsin2030becausetheemissionreductionsgenerallystartfromhigherlevelsin2020,asreflectedinthemostrecenthistoricalemissionsinventories(IPCC2022a;IPCC2022b).MorescenariosintheIPCCAR6scenariodatabasealsoendupclosertothetemperaturelimitinthebelow1.5°Cscenariocategory(seetable4.3),whichagainresultsinhigher2030emissionvalues.5Asecond,moreminorcontributingfactor,whichaffectsallscenariocategories,istheupdatetothemostrecentIPCCAR6valuesofGWP100.31EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowBox4.2Puttingcostestimatesfromleast-costemissionsscenariosincontextLeast-costscenariosareconstructedtoachieveglobalemissionreductionsatthelowestcostpossible.However,estimatesofmitigationcostsvaryextensivelyanddependcriticallyonthereferenceandmitigationscenarioassumptionsanddataparameterizationchosen(Köberleetal.2021;Riahietal.2022).Ifareferencescenarioinwhichglobalandlocaleconomiesareattheirefficiencyfrontierisassumed,climatepolicieswillinevitablyentailmacroeconomiccosts.However,theliterature,includingthelatestIPCCassessment,illustratesthatthisisastylizedandunrealisticassumption(Riahietal.2022).Aneconomyatitsefficiencyfrontierimpliesnofossilfuelsubsidies,notaxationthatdistortstheallocationoflabour,no“misallocationorunder-utilizationofproductionfactorssuchasinvoluntaryunemployment”,andno“imperfectinformationornon-rationalbehaviours”(Riahietal.2022).Eachoftheseeconomicimperfectionsarecommonacrossreal-worldeconomiesatalllevelsofdevelopment.However,themodelsthatproduceleast-costpathwaysrarelyrepresentalltheseaspectsandhencedisregardthemintheirmodelestimatesofmitigationcosts.Thisresultsinmitigationcostestimatesthatarebiasedhigh(Köberleetal.2021;Riahietal.2022).Studiesthatmodelareferenceeconomybelowtheefficiencyfrontierfindthatalow-carbontransformationcanresultineconomicstimulusandincreaseeconomicgrowth,conditionalongreeninvestmentsnotreplacinginvestmentinotherpartsoftheeconomy(PollittandMercure2018;Mercureetal.2019;Riahietal.2022).Becauseofregionaldifferencesingovernance,developmentandsocietalandtechnologicalcontext,mitigationcostestimatesdifferbetweencountries.Forexample,undertheidealizedassumptionthatemissionreductionsareachievedthroughagloballyuniformcarbonprice,countrieswithcarbon-intensiveeconomiesorfossilfuelexportingcountrieswouldhaverelativelyhighermacroeconomiccostsastheireconomiesrequireadeepertransformation(Stern,PezzeyandLambie2012;Tavonietal.2015;Böhringeretal.2021).ForadetaileddiscussionseeRiahietal.(2022).Inaddition,mitigationcostestimatesofleast-costpathwaysdisregardtheeconomicbenefitsthataccruethroughavoideddamagesandsocietalco-benefitsofalow-carbontransition,suchasimprovedpublichealthbecauseofimprovedairquality(Köberleetal.2021;Riahietal.2022).Evenwhenconsideringleast-costmitigationscenarioswherecostsarebiasedhigh,thesebenefitslikelyoutstripthemodelledcosts(seefigure4.1)(Riahietal.2022).Forexample,onestudyfoundthathealthco-benefitsoutweighthepolicycostofachievingfairnationalcontributionstolimitwarmingto1.5°CinChinaandIndia,withthemodelledcostscompensatedbyhealthco-benefits(Markandyaetal.2018).Inconclusion,typicallyanideal,perfectlyworkingeconomyisassumedwhenmitigationcostsarequantified,whiletheeconomicco-benefitsandavoideddamagesareunaccountedfor.Asaresult,modelledmitigationcostestimatestypicallyonlyprovidelimitedreal-worldinsightsaboutthenetburdentoeconomiesorsociety.Inallcases,thesemodelledcostsoccurinaworldofcontinuedeconomicdevelopmentandgrowth.CO232EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowFigure4.1EstimatedimplicationsforglobalGDPofmitigationmeasures,co-benefitsandclimatedamagesSources:GlobalbaselineGDPgrowthprojectionsandmodelledmitigationcostsarefromtheIPCCAR6WGIIIscenariodatabase(Byersetal.2022;Riahietal.2022).ModelledGDPco-benefits:cropyieldsbasedonVandycketal.(2018);avoidedlostlabourdaysderivedfromVandycketal.(2018);publichealthbenefitsofahealthierdietfromSpringmannetal.(2016);publichealthbenefitsofaglobalcoalexitbasedonRauneretal.(2020);andanadditionalestimateofco-benefitsfromair-qualityimprovementsfromstringentmitigationfollowingfromMarkandyaetal.(2018).EstimatedGDPreductionsfromeconomy-wideclimatedamagesarebasedontheIPCCAR6WGIICross-WorkingGroupBoxonEconomics(O’Neilletal.2022).Thelatterarequantifiedforwhenaspecificlevelofglobalwarmingisreachedforthefirsttime,irrespectiveofwhenexactlythistakesplace.Notethatundercurrentpolicies,globalwarmingby2050canrangeuptoabout2.0–2.5°C.Globalwarmingof3.0°Cwouldonlybeachievedlaterinthecentury.Notes:DarklinesinglobalbaselineGDPgrowthprojectionsandmodelledmitigationcostsaremedianestimates,withdarkandlightrangesrepresenting25–75percentand5–95percentconfidenceintervalsrespectively.Mitigationco-benefitestimatescannotbeaggregatedacrosssources.4.3TheemissionsgapTheemissionsgapfor2030isdefinedasthedifferencebetweenestimatedglobalGHGemissionsresultingfromfullimplementationofNDCs,andglobaltotalGHGemissionsunderleast-costscenariosthatkeepglobalwarmingtobelow2°C,1.8°Cor1.5°Cwithvaryinglevelsofchance(seetable4.4).Thissectionupdatesthegapbasedonthescenariosdescribedinsection4.2.Figure4.2showstheemissionsgapfor2030,withtable4.4indicatingthedetails.WhilethelatestNDCsnarrowthegapslightlycomparedwithpreviousNDCs,theyarehighlyinsufficienttobridgethegap.Altogether,theyreduceexpectedemissionsin2030undercurrentpoliciesbyonly5percent.MeetingallconditionsandimplementingtheconditionalNDCswouldtakethisreductionto10percent,whereas30or45percentisneededfor2.0°Cor1.5°C,respectively.FullimplementationofunconditionalNDCsisestimatedtoresultinagaptothe1.5°Cscenarioof23GtCO2e(range:20–24).Thisisabout5GtCO2esmallerthanestimatedinthe2021report(UNEP2021)–adifferencethatisalmostentirelyduetoupdatestothe1.5°Cscenarios(seetable4.2).Asoutlinedinsection4.2.3,theseshowhigheremissionsin2030becausetheystarttheirreductionsfromhigher2020emissionlevels,reflectingaglobaldelayinambitiousclimateaction.Thisdelayisnotwithoutconsequences:onaveragethebelow1.5°Cscenariosnowhavealowerchanceofeffectivelykeepingwarmingto1.5°C.IftheconditionalNDCsarealsofullyimplemented,theemissionsgaptothe1.5°Cscenarioisreducedbyabout3GtCO2e.050BaselineGDPgrowthfrom2020to2050ModelledGDPreductions(losses)in2050relativetomedianbaselineGDPgrowthLimitwarmingto1.5°C(>50%)withnoorlimitedovershoot(IPCCAR6WG3categoryC1)Limitwarmingto2.0°C(>67%)withnoorlimitedovershoot(IPCCAR6WG3categoryC3)Modelledco-benefits(gains)in2050relativetomedianbaselineGDPgrowthEstimatedeconomy-wideclimatedamagesrelativetomedianbaselineGDPgrowth100150200ChangeinglobalGDP(%)25th–75thpercentile5th–95thpercentile25th–75thpercentile5th–95thpercentileModelledco-benefits(gains)MedianMedianClimatedamageAvoidedcropyieldlossesAvoidedlostlabourdaysPublichealthbenefitsof…dietarychangeglobalcoalphaseoutairqualityimprovements1.5°C2.0°C2.5°C3.0°CBaselinegrowth2020–2050ModelledmitigationcostsMitigationco-beneﬁtestimatesfrom:Estimatedcostsofclimatechangeofleastcostpathwaysassuminganidealized,perfectlyefficientglobaleconomyanddisregardingco-benefitsandavoidedimpactsforvariouslevelsofglobalwarmingrelativetopre-industriallevels33EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowTheemissionsgapbetweenunconditionalNDCsandbelow2°Cpathwaysisabout15GtCO2e(range:12–16GtCO2e),whichisabout2GtCO2elargerthanlastyear.Themainreasonforthisincreaseintheassessedgapfor2°Cisthatthisyear’sreportcorrectsfordiscrepanciesinhistoricalemissionsthroughharmonization(seetable4.2andbox4.1).Again,theadditionalfullimplementationoftheconditionalNDCs,lowerstheemissionsgaptothe2°Cscenariobyabout3GtCO2e.Inconclusion,thecentralmessageremains:NDCsarehighlyinsufficienttoputtheworldonapathtomeetingthetemperaturegoaloftheParisAgreement.Furthermore,countriesarenotyetontracktoachievethesegloballyinsufficientNDCs.Theimplementationgap,whichisthedifferencebetweenemissionsexpectedunderthecurrentpoliciesscenarioandthoseneededtoachievetheNDCs,isestimatedtobeabout3GtCO2eand6GtCO2efortheunconditionalandconditionalNDCscenariosrespectively(table4.4).Thesegapestimatesare1GtCO2eand3GtCO2elargerthanlastyear,mainlybecauseNDCshavebeenupdatedwhilepolicieshavenotyetfollowedsuit.Figure4.2GHGemissionsunderdifferentscenariosandtheemissionsgapin2030(medianestimateandtenthtoninetiethpercentilerange)Witheightyearslefttobridgetheemissionsgap,theurgencyofrapidemissionreductionsisclear.Theurgencyisequallyevidentwhenconsideringtheremainingcarbonbudget.ThecarbonbudgetreferstothemaximumamountofcumulativenetglobalanthropogenicCO2emissionsthatwouldresultinlimitingglobalwarmingtoagivenlevelwithagivenchance,takingintoaccounttheeffectofotheranthropogenicclimateforcers.TheIPCCestimatesthattheremainingcarbonbudgetfromthebeginningof2020forlimitingwarmingtoamaximumof1.5°Cisapproximately400GtCO2and1,150GtCO2for2°C(bothwitha67percentchance)(IPCC2021).Whencomparingwiththecurrent2°Crange1.8°Crange1.5°CrangeBlueareashowspathwayslimitingglobaltemperatureincreasetobelow2°Cwithabout66%chanceGreenareashowspathwayslimitingglobaltemperatureincreasetobelow1.5°Cwitha66%chanceby2100andminimum33%chanceoverthecourseofthecenturyCurrentpoliciesscenarioConditionalNDCcaseUnconditionalNDCcaseConditionalNDCcaseUnconditionalNDCcaseRemaininggaptostaywithin2°ClimitRemaininggaptostaywithin2°ClimitConditionalNDCscenarioUnconditionalNDCscenario15GtCO2e23GtCO2e20GtCO2eMedianestimateoflevelconsistentwith2°C:41GtCO2e(range:37–46)Medianestimateoflevelconsistentwith1.5°C:33GtCO2e(range:26–34)2010policiesscenarioGtCO2e12GtCO2e203040506070201520202025203034EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowlevelsofannualglobalemissionsprovidedinchapter2,itisevidentthattheremainingcarbonbudgetfor1.5°Cwillbeexhaustedaroundtheendofthisdecade,unlesssignificantemissionreductionsarerapidlyachieved.Inthiscontext,thereisgrowingattentiontothepotentialcontributionsfromreducingemissionsfromshort-livedclimatepollutants,particularlymethaneemissions(seebox4.3).Table4.4GlobaltotalGHGemissionsin2030andtheestimatedemissionsgapunderdifferentscenariosScenarioGHGemissionsin2030(GtCO2e)Estimatedemissionsgapin2030(GtCO2e)MedianandrangeBelow2.0°CBelow1.8°CBelow1.5°CYear2010policies66(64–68)------Currentpolicies58(52–60)17(11–19)23(17–25)25(19–27)UnconditionalNDCs55(52–57)15(12–16)21(17–22)23(20–24)ConditionalNDCs52(49–54)12(8–14)18(14–20)20(16–22)Notes:Thegapnumbersandrangesarecalculatedbasedontheoriginalnumbers(withoutrounding),andthesemaydifferfromtheroundednumbersinthetable.NumbersareroundedtofullGtCO2e.GHGemissionshavebeenaggregatedwiththeIPCCAR6valuesofGWP100.Box4.3TheroleofrapidmethaneemissionreductionsInconjunctionwithCO2emissionreductions,rapidreductionsinemissionsfrommethaneandothershort-livedclimatepollutantsarecriticaltolowerpeakwarming,reducethelikelihoodofovershootanddecreasetherelianceonCO2removalmethodstolimitwarminglaterinthiscentury(IPCC2021;IPCC2022).Globalaveragemethaneconcentrationsintheatmospherehaveincreasedby162percentcomparedwithpre-industriallevels(WMO2021).Thisincreaseislargelydrivenbyanthropogenicsources,mainlyentericfermentationoflivestockandmanure,ricecultivation,waste,andfossilfuelexploration(Jacksonetal.2020).MethanehasasignificantlyhigherglobalwarmingpotentialthanCO2(80and83timeshigherover20yearsforbiogenicandfossilmethane,respectively),butamuchshorteratmosphericlifetime(about12years)(Forsteretal.2021).Reducingmethaneemissionsthereforeaffectswarmingratesinthenearterm,resultinginbenefitsforecosystemsandpeople,andenablinghumanstoadapttoclimatechange(UNEP2021).Estimatesoftheremainingglobalcarbonbudgetfor1.5°Cassumethatmethaneisstronglyreducedbyatleast30percent,40percentand50percentrelativeto2020levelsin2030,2040and2050respectively(IPCC2018).Everyca100Mtshortfallinmethanereductionscomparedwiththesebenchmarksdiminishesthealreadyverysmallcumulativeremainingcarbonbudgetbyaround450GtCO2(UNEP2021).ReducingemissionsfrommethaneisthereforeanessentialpartofParis-compatiblemitigationstrategies.The2021EmissionsGapReport(UNEP2021)foundthatglobalanthropogenicmethaneemissionscanbereducedbyaround30percentby2030throughimplementationofreadilyavailablemethane-targetedmeasures.Implementationofbothreadilyavailablemitigationmeasuresandbroaderstructuralandbehaviouralmeasurescouldreducemethaneemissionsbynearly50percentby2030(UNEP2021).Thelargestmethaneemissionreductionpotentialisavailableinthefossilfuelsector,followedbythewastesectorandtheagriculturesector.Roughlyonethirdofalltechnicalmitigationoptionspayforthemselves,withthelargestfractionintheoilandgassubsector(UNEPandClimateandCleanAirCoalition2021).Torealizethisopportunity,aGlobalMethanePledgewasannouncedatUnitedNationsClimateChangeConferenceoftheParties(COP)26,withtheaimtoreduceglobalanthropogenicmethaneemissionsbyatleast30percentby2030from2020levels.Sofar,122countrieshavejoinedthepledge,coveringhalfofglobalmethaneemissionsandnearlytwothirdsoftheglobaleconomy.LargemethaneemitterssuchasAustralia,China,India,Iran,andtheRussianFederationhaveyettojointhepledge,andeffortstotrackitsimplementationarestillintheprocessofbeingestablished.35EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowLookingbeyond2030,figure4.3projectsglobalGHGemissionsoutto2050underdifferentscenariosandindicatestheassociatedglobalwarmingimplicationsoverthiscentury(seesection4.3).Thefigureillustratesthesubstantialincreaseintheemissionsgapfor2050ifclimateeffortsimpliedbycurrentpoliciesandNDCscenariosarecontinuedwithoutfurtherstrengthening.Implementationofnet-zerotargetsbyaroundmid-centurywouldsignificantlyreducethesegaps,buteventhen,gapswiththe1.5°Cscenarioswouldremain.Figure4.3ProjectionsofGHGemissionsunderdifferentscenariosto2050andindicationsofemissionsgapandglobalwarmingimplicationsoverthiscentury(mediansonly)4.4TemperatureimplicationsoftheemissionsgapNeithercurrentpoliciesnorNDCsputemissionsontracktolimitglobalwarmingtothetemperaturegoaloftheParisAgreement.Theextentoftheshortfallinambitionandimplementationcanalsobeexpressedintermsoftheestimatedresultingglobalwarming.Thesamemethodisappliedasinlastyear’sreport(seebox4.1inUNEP2021)toprojecttheemissionsimplicationsofcurrentpoliciesandNDCsfrom2030outto2100.TheglobalwarmingimplicationsoftheseemissionsaresubsequentlyassessedwithaclimatemodelthatcapturesthelatestclimatescienceassessmentanduncertaintiesoftheIPCCAR6(Smithetal.2018;Forsteretal.2021).ThisapproachallowsaccountingfortheuncertaintiesincurrentpoliciesandNDCs,thedegreetowhichclimateactioncontinuesbeyond2030,andtheuncertaintiesofhowtheclimaterespondstotheseemissions.Astable4.5andfigure4.3show,acontinuationofthelevelofclimatechangemitigationeffortsimpliedbycurrentunconditionalNDCsisestimatedtolimitwarmingoverthetwenty-firstcenturytoabout2.6°C(range:1.9–3.1°C)witha66percentchance,andwarmingisexpectedtoincreasefurtherafter2100asCO2emissionsarenotyetprojectedtoreachnet-zerolevels.ContinuingtheeffortsofconditionalNDCslowerstheseprojectionsbyaround0.2°Cto2.4°C(range:1.8–3.0°C)fora66percentchance.BecausecurrentpoliciesareinsufficienttomeeteventheunconditionalNDCs,acontinuationofcurrentpolicieswouldresultinabout0.2°Chigherestimatesof2.8°C(range:1.9–3.3°C)fora66percentchance.2°Cpathway1.5°CpathwayCurrentpoliciesscenario:2.8°C(66%chance)Estimatedglobalwarmingoverthetwenty-firstcenturyConditionalNDCscenario:2.4°C(66%chance)UnconditionalNDCscenario:2.6°C(66%chance)UnconditionalNDCscenariowithnet-zerotargets:1.8°C(66%chance)GtCO2eConditionalNDCscenariowithnet-zerotargets:1.8°C(66%chance)2010policiesscenarioAreaoffigure4.2Indicativeemissionsgapto2°Cand1.5°CpathwaysfortheconditionalNDCscenarioIndicativeemissionsgapto2°Cand1.5°CpathwaysfortheunconditionalNDCscenario2010030405060702015202020252030203520402045205036EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowTable4.5Estimatedglobalwarmingimplicationsoverthecourseofthetwenty-firstcenturyunderdifferentscenariosandlikelihoodsScenarioEstimatedglobalwarmingoverthetwenty-firstcenturywithvariouschances(medianandrange)66%50%90%Currentpolicies2.8°C(range:1.9–3.3°C)2.6°C(range:1.7–3.0°C)3.3°C(range:2.3–3.9°C)UnconditionalNDCs2.6°C(range:1.9–3.1°C)2.4°C(range:1.7–2.9°C)3.1°C(range:2.3–3.7°C)ConditionalNDCs2.4°C(range:1.8–3.0°C)2.2°C(range:1.7–2.7°C)2.8(range:2.2–3.5°C)UnconditionalNDCsandlong-termnet-zerotargets1.8°C(range:1.8–2.1°C)1.7°C(range:1.7–1.9°C)2.1(range:2.0–2.5°C)ConditionalNDCsandlong-termnet-zerotargets1.8°C(range:1.7–1.9°C)1.7°C(range:1.6–1.8°C)2.0°C(range:2.0–2.3°C)6Thisestimateassumescountries’emissionsremainconstantoncetheirnet-zerotargetisachieved.Net-zerotargetsprovidefurtherinformationabouthowemissionsmightevolveafter2030,assumingthesetargetsareachieved.Thisyear’sreportconsidersnet-zerotargetsandannouncementsoftheG20membersandnineothercountrieswithatleast100MtCO2e/yearemissionsintheyear2018(seeappendixC,tableC.3).6Thisisanexpansionoftheanalysiscomparedwithlastyear,whereonlytargetsofG20memberswereconsidered.Achievingnet-zerotargetsinadditiontounconditionalNDCsresultsinprojectedglobalwarmingbeingheldto1.8°C(range:1.8–2.1°C)witha66percentchance.AssumingthatconditionalNDCsandpledgesareachievedandfollowedbynet-zerotargets,globalwarmingissimilarlyprojectedtobekeptto1.8°C(range:1.7–1.9°C)witha66percentchance.However,inmostcasesneithercurrentpoliciesnorNDCscurrentlytraceacrediblepathfrom2030towardstheachievementofnationalnet-zerotargets(seechapter3).Thesetemperatureprojectionsareslightlylowerthanthosereportedinthe2021EmissionsGapReport,becausethelatestNDCs,iffullyimplemented,lower2030emissionsestimatesbyabout0.7GtCO2e(seetable4.3)andbecausetheinclusionofmorecountriesinthenet-zeroanalysisfurtherlowersemissionsprojectionsoverthecourseofthecentury.Theeffectofthemethodologicalupdatesforthegapestimationsismuchlower,assimilarmethodologicalstepswerealreadyusedinthetemperatureprojectionsinearlierreports.Asillustratedabove,globalwarminglevelsonlygetclosetotheParisAgreementtemperaturegoalwhenfullimplementationofthehighlyuncertainnet-zerotargetsisassumedinadditiontotheNDCscenarios.Inaddition,thereisstillsignificantuncertaintyabouthowmuchwarmingwewillexperienceoverthecourseofthiscentury.Figure4.4showstherangeofglobalwarmingoutcomesunderthreescenarios(currentpolicies,unconditionalNDCsandunconditionalNDCscombinedwithnet-zerotargetsannouncedbycountries).Thefigureillustratesthattheriskoflevelsofwarmingclearlybeyond2°Cremains,evenundertheoptimisticassumptionofcurrentclimatepromisesexpressedinNDCsandnet-zerotargets.Currentpolicyprojectionsgloballyleadtoabouta20percentchanceofglobalwarmingexceeding3°C.IfmeasuresareputinplacethatensurecurrentNDCandnet-zerotargetswillbeachieved,theriskofexceeding3°Cisstronglyreduced.Takingmoreambitiousclimateactionsby2030isurgentlyneededandisofutmostimportanceforgettingtheworldontracktomeetingtheParisAgreement.37EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowFigure4.4RangeofglobalwarmingprojectionsforthreekeyscenariosRangeofglobalwarmingoutcomesprojectedifcurrentpolicies(left),unconditionalNDCs(middle),andunconditionalNDCscombinedwithnet-zerotargetsannouncedbycountries(right)areachieved.??????????higherthan4°C3.0–4.0°C2.5–3.0°C2.0–2.5°C1.5–2.0°Cbelow1.5°C1%7%37%16%43%28%36%19%12%20%61%17%1%1%CurrentpoliciesUnconditionalNDCswithnet-zerotargetsUnconditionalNDCs38EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowTransformationsneededtoachievetheParisAgreementinelectricitysupply,industry,buildingsandtransportationLeadauthors:NiklasHöhne(NewClimateInstitute,Germany),KellyLevin(BezosEarthFund,UnitedStatesofAmerica),JoyashreeRoy(AsianInstituteofTechnology,Thailand,andJadavpurUniversity,India)Contributingauthors:StephenNaimoli(WorldResourcesInstitute,UnitedStatesofAmerica),LouiseJeffery(NewClimateInstitute,Germany),JuditHecke(NewClimateInstitute,Germany),JoshuaMiller(InternationalCouncilonCleanTransportation,UnitedStatesofAmerica)55.1IntroductionInlightofthemagnitudeoftheemissionsgap,wide-ranging,large-scale,rapidandsystemictransformationisnownecessarytoachievethetemperaturegoaloftheParisAgreement.Toinformaction,theemissionsgapcanbetranslatedintosectoraltransformationsthatbendtheemissionstrajectoryby2030andleadtozeroemissionsinthelongerterm.Thechallengeisthatmultiplemajortransformationsmustbeinitiatedinthisdecade,simultaneouslyacrossallsystems.Transformationsofthewaywepowerourhomesandbusinesses;transportpeople,goodsandservices;growandconsumefood;buildourcities;andmanageourlands,areamongtherequiredshifts,whichneedtotakeplacewhilesimultaneouslyimprovingthelivelihoodsofthepoorestincludingwomenandminorities,andachievingtheSustainableDevelopmentGoals.Shiftsareneededfromphasingoutfossilfuels,toelectrifyingtransport,tostoppingdeforestation,toretrofittingbuildings(IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange[IPCC]2021).Theenergy,foodsecurityandcostoflivingcrisesfuelledbythewarinUkraine,withresultingenergysupplyshortagesandpricespikes,hasaddedanadditionalimperativetoact.Theconflicthighlightsthevulnerabilityofthecurrentglobalenergysystem,givenitsdependenceonfossilfuelsproducedfromaverysmallnumberofcountries.Intheshortterm,manygovernmentsseektosecurealternativestoRussianoilandgas;insomecases,coaluseisontherise.Theyalsoaimtoreducedemandforfossilfuelsthroughbehaviouralmeasures,energyefficiencyandfasterinvestmentsinrenewableenergy.Theneteffectontheclimateagendaandtransitiontorenewablesisstillunknown(ClimateActionTracker[CAT]2022b).Thischapterfocusesonthekeytransformationsrequiredinelectricitysupply,industry,buildingsandtransportation,whilechapter6focusesonthetransformationoffoodsystems,andchapter7ontransformingthefinancialsystem.Forthepurposesofthisreport,transformationisdefinedas“thereconfigurationofasystem,includingitscomponentpartsandtheinteractionsbetweentheseelements,suchthatitleadstotheformationofanewsystemthatproducesaqualitativelydifferentoutcome”(Boehmetal.2021).Foreachsector,theshiftsrequiredtolimitwarmingtowellbelow2°C,preferably1.5°C,includingbenchmarksfor2030and2050,areassessedandpressurepointstoaccelerateactionareidentified.Setsofactionsthataremostcriticaltoadvance,aswellassetsofactionsthatshouldbeavoidedgiventhebarrierstheycreatetoacceleratingchange,areoffered,whilehighlightingwhatvariousactorscandotoaccelerateaction.Thechapterpresentsaglobalagenda.Whilethelistofpriorityactionsisrelevantformostcountries,thechapterdoesnotofferrecommendationsatthenationalorregionallevel.Eachnationvariesinitsresources,capacityandemissionscomposition,andaccordingly,mitigationprioritiesandopportunitieswillvary.5.2Initiating,acceleratingandaccomplishingthetransformationtowardszeroemissionsAsignificantchallengeisthattherequiredtransformationshavetohappeninallsectorsandallcountriesinparallel.Thesequencingofactionscanvaryslightlybycountry,butastheremainingcarbonbudgetissolimitedthatthetransitionneedstobeinitiatedatanacceleratedpaceimmediately,everywhere.SectoraltransformationbasedontechnologicalchangecanfollowanS-curvepath,withlimitedchangeinitially,followedbysuddenexponentialgrowthandthenbysaturation(figure5.1,alsoseetheglossary).Withthecleargoaloftransformationtowardszeroemissions,therearethreebroadareasofactionsthatneedtobeundertakeninallemittingsectors:39EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindow●Avoidlock-in:Decisionsmadetodaycandefineemissionstrajectoriesfordecadestocome.Forexample,abuildinglasts80yearsonaverage;acoal-firedpowerplant45years;acementplant40years(Erickson,LazarusandTempest2015).Pipelinesandgasconnectionscreatedecade-longdependencies.Interventionscanalsolockinbehaviourandpoliciesthatreinforceincumbentsystems(Setoetal.2016).Actionstodaythatlockinahigh-energyandhigh-carbonfuturefordecadesmustbeavoided,includingavoidingnewfossilfuelinfrastructureforelectricityandindustry,car-centredcityorregionalplanning,andinefficientnewbuildings.Theseactionsdonotalwaysresultinimmediateemissionreductions,butarefundamentalforthelong-termtransition.●Initiatezero-carbontechnologicaladvancements:Zero-carbontechnologies,marketstructuresandplanningforajusttransformationtypicallyneedtobeadvancedinthebeginningofatransitionandarefundamentalforthelong-termtransition.Formanytransformations,itwillalsobenecessarytophaseoutincumbentfossilfuel-intensiveindustriesatthesametimeaszero-carbonalternativesarescaledup.Focusingonlyonthelatterisrisky,aszero-carbonalternativesmaynotentirelyreplacenewdemandorexistinginfrastructure.●Sustaindeepreductions:Forsectorsandtechnologiesthatareadvancedonthetransformationcurve,deepreductionsneedtobesustained,forexamplethroughfurtherexpansionofrenewables,electrificationofindustry,electricvehiclesandincreasingtheretrofitrateofbuildings.Figure5.1Selectedimportanttransformationinterventions(green)andthingstoavoid(red)groupedby“avoidinglock-in”anddifferentstagesofthetransformationS-curveNotes:Seesections5.5–5.8formoredetails.Theabilitytoachievethetransformationsnecessarydependsonhowaseriesofinterrelatedbarriersanddriversofprogressareapproached.Theseincludethefollowing(Boehmetal.2021,basedonOlssonetal.2004;GeelsandSchot2007;Chapinetal.2010;Folkeetal.2010;Westleyetal.2011;Levinetal.2012;O’BrienandSygna2013;Mooreetal.2014;Fewetal.2017;Pattersonetal.2017;Sterletal.2017;Hölscheretal.2018;Reyersetal.2018;Victor,GeelsandSharpe2019;InitiativeforClimateActionTransparency2020;Levinetal.2020;Ottoetal.2020;SharpeandLenton2021):●Institutions:Institutionsguidedecision-making,andtheirdesigncanstymieoraccelerateprogress.●Policiesandincentives:Strongregulationssuchasmandatesandstandards,andincentivessuchastaxbreaks,caneithersteertowardslow-carbonalternativesorperpetuateanunevenplayingfieldfornewentrants.ExpandrenewablesElectrifyindustryPrepareelectricitysystemforhighsharesofrenewablesAvoidnewfossilfuelinfrastructurePlanajusttransitionDevelopzeroemissionsteelExpandelectricvehiclesShiftmodesintransportReducetransportdemandMinimizeembodiedemissionsBuildonlyzero-emissionsbuildingsIncreaseretrofittingrateDevelopzero-emissionscementCreatecirculareconomyAvoidfossilfuelsubsidiesAvoidfalsedichotomiesAvoiddelayAvoidunsustainablesolutionsAvoidnewgasconnectionsforbuildingsAvoidinefficientbuildingsAvoidnewCO2intensiveindustrialinfrastructureAvoidlock-inSectoraltransformationTimePreparetoenabletransformationtozeroemissionsSustaindeepreductionsELECTRICITYSUPPLYINDUSTRYTRANSPORTATIONBUILDINGS40EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindow●Norms,cultureandbehaviour:Oncenormsandculturethatfavourlow-carbonalternativesareengrainedinbehaviour,changecantakeoffmorerapidlyandishardertoreverse.●Actors:Actorsintheirindividualcapacity(e.g.leaders,citizens,consumers,voters),professionalcapacity(e.g.townplanners,builders,teachers,investors)orcollectivecapacity(e.g.theyouthclimatemovement)cancatalyseandsustainchange.Atthesametime,entrenchedinterestspresentsignificantbarrierstoadvancingsystemschange.Involvingdiversesetsofchampionscanhelpshapedurableoutcomes.●Innovation:Advancesintechnology,practiceandapproachescanhelpleapfrogcurrentonesandhastenratesofdecarbonization(Boehmetal.2021).Theenablingenvironmentforinnovation,e.g.spendingonresearchanddevelopmentandintellectualpropertyrights,canbedesignedinawaythateitheradvancesaninnovationagendaorstymiesprogress.●Exogenousshocks/change:Conflicts,recessions,elections,etc.,createopeningsforadvancingchange,orclosedoorstomakingprogress.Preparingfortheseopeningscanhelpensurethattransformationalchangeiscatalysedratherthanstalled.5.3ElectricitysupplyAchievingthetemperaturegoaloftheParisAgreementrequiresrapidglobaltransformationofthepowersystem,whichisthesinglelargestsourceofenergy-relatedCO2emissionsglobally,covering42percentoftotalenergy-relatedemissions(InternationalEnergyAgency[IEA]2021c).Atleastfourshiftsneedtooccurtodecarbonizepower:(1)steeplyacceleratingtheshareofzero-carbonpower,(2)phasingoutunabatedcoalandgasgeneration,(3)adaptinggrid/storageanddemandmanagement,and(4)ensuringreliableenergyaccessforall(Boehmetal.2022).(1)Steeplyacceleratetheshareofzero-carbonpowerinelectricitygeneration:Theshareofzero-carbonpowerinelectricitygenerationshouldbebetween65and92percentby2030,andbetween98and100percentby2050(MonteithandMenon2020;IEA2021e;InternationalRenewableEnergyAgency[IRENA]2021;Boehmetal.2022).(2)Phaseoutunabatedcoalandgasgeneration:Theshareofgenerationfromunabatedcoalneedstofalltozeroornearzeroin2030,requiringthepaceofchangetoacceleratebyaboutsixtimesinthenexteightyears(IEA2021e;IRENA2021;Boehmetal.2022).Tobealignedwith1.5°C,theshareofgenerationfromunabatednaturalgasneedstofallto17percentin2030beforebeingphasedoutby2040–2050,requiringaturnaroundfromitscurrentupwardtrend(IEA2021b;IRENA2021;Boehmetal.2022).(3)Adaptgrid/storageanddemandmanagement:Adecarbonizedpowersystemrelyingprimarilyonrenewableswillrequiredifferentgridsystemsthanexisttoday.Flexibilitywillbekeyindecentralizedsupply,storageanddemand,giventhecharacteristicsofwindandsolar.(4)Ensurereliableenergyaccessforall:Currently,10percentoftheworld’spopulationhasnoaccesstoelectricityandover40percenthasunreliableaccess(Ayaburietal.2020;WorldBank2022).Ensuringuniversalenergyaccessmustbepartoftheshifttoaglobalcleanenergysystem.Agenericsetofimmediateactionsthatarenecessarytoinitiateandacceleratetheglobaltransformationoftheelectricitysector(table5.1)andrelatedactionsbydifferentgroupsofactors(table5.2)aresummarizedbelow.41EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowTable5.1Actionsthataccelerateorhinderthetransformationoftheelectricitysector1Table5.1ActionsthataccelerateorhinderthetransformationoftheelectricitysectorELECTRICITYSECTORTRANSFORMATIONMOSTIMPORTANTACTIONSACTIONSTOAVOIDEXPANDRENEWABLES:Renewableenergyneedstobeexpandedasfastaspossible.Removingbarriersismostimportant,ascostsarenolongertheissueinmanygeographies.Thiscanbeachievedthroughpolicies,incentives,purchasesofgreenelectricity,removalofadministrativebarriers,anddirectinvestments(Falk,Gaffneyetal.2020;IEA2021e;Clarkeetal.2022).PLANAJUSTTRANSFORMATION:Thetransformationneedstobeplannedcarefullyinregionsthatarecurrentlydependentonfossilfuelextractionforjobsandpublicrevenue.Anticipatingthechangeandplanningforitseemsessential(Falk,Gaffneyetal.2020;IEA2021e).PREPAREELECTRICITYSYSTEMFORHIGHSHARESOFRENEWABLES:Thisincludesprovidingﬂexibleelectricitysupply,short-andlong-termstorage,adaptingthedistributiongrids,consideringvariableelectricitydemand,andadaptingtheelectricitymarkettoincentivizethis(Falk,Gaffneyetal.2020;IEA2021e;Clarkeetal.2022).AVOIDNEWFOSSILFUELINFRASTRUCTURE:Buildingnewfossilfuelinfrastructureneedstobeavoided,asitlocksinfossilfueldependencyandgreenhousegasemissionsfordecades,inparticularforcoalandgas(Falk,Gaffneyetal.2020;Clarkeetal.2022).AVOIDFOSSILFUELSUBSIDIES:Fossilfuelsub-sidiesarestillwidelyappliedandstandinthewayofthetransformation.Itisimportanttoeliminatethesesubsidiesinasociallyacceptablemannerandnottointroducenewones(Falk,Gaffneyetal.2020;Clarkeetal.2022).42EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindow2ELECTRICITYSECTORTRANSFORMATION–RECOMMENDATIONSBYACTORGROUP+Removefossilfuelsubsidiesinasociallyacceptablemanner:WhileallG20membershavepledgedtoremovefossilfuelsubsidies,allG20membersstillapplysomefossilfuelsubsidies.Duetotheenergycrisis,manyhavedecreasedtaxesonfossilfuels,whichisaformofnewfossilfuelsubsidies(Falk,Gaffneyetal.2020;CAT2022b;Clarkeetal.2022).+Removebarrierstotheexpansionofrenewables:Allowproductionforownuse,accelerateplanningandprovisionofsites,removebureaucratichurdles,regulategridaccessandconnection,andeducateworkers(Falk,Gaffneyetal.2020).+Stopexpansionoffossilfuelinfrastructure:Thisisnecessarytoavoidlock-inofcontinuedhighemissionsorexpandingstrandedassets(IEA2021e).Manycoalpowerplantsarestillplannedglobally(GlobalEnergyMonitoretal.2022),andthecurrentenergycrisishasledtoagoldrushfornewfossilgasinfrastructure(CAT2022b).+Planforajustfossilfuelphase-out:Allgovernmentsneedtoplanforfossilfuelphase-outwellaheadandinasociallyjustmanner(Falk,Gaffneyetal.2020).Governmentsshouldquantifyanyinternationalsupporttheyneed.+Adaptmarketrulesofelectricitysystemforhighsharesofrenewables:Adapttheelectricitymarkettocopewiththefundamentallydifferentsituationoflargesharesofelectricityonlybeingavailableundercertainweatherconditions(Falk,Gaffneyetal.2020).+Cooperateonandsupportajustfossilfuelphase-out:Nationalgovernmentsneedtocooperateonjustfossilfuelphase-outplans(IEA2021e).Donorgovernmentsandmultilateraldevelopmentbankscantargetsupportforjobs,skillsandinvestments(IEAetal.2022).SouthAfricaisanexample,whereasetofdonorsprovideUS$8.5billionforajusttransitionawayfromcoal(Mason,ShalalandRumney2021).Donorgovernmentsshouldalsofacilitateexpertexchanges,capacity-buildingandsupportforpolicyreforms,andleveragebothpublicandprivateﬁnance(IEAetal.2022).+Supportinternationalinitiativesonemissions-freeelectricityandpowersystemﬂexibilityandinterconnectionsolutions:Governmentsshouldinitiate,signandimplementinternationalinitiativesoncoalphase-out,theendoffossilfuelproductionandtheendofﬁnancingfossilfuelinfrastructure,andonscalingrenewableelectricity,includingenergystorage,smartgridsandinterconnectionefforts(IEAetal.2022).+Agreetohigherenergyperformancestandards:Inconsultationwithindustry,governmentscancooperateonhigherminimumenergyperformancestandardsforhighenergy-consumingappliances,coupledwithsupportforimplementationofsuchstandards.Thiscancutcostsandgrowthindemand(IEAetal.2022).+Set100percentrenewabletargets:Subnationalgovernmentscancreatedemandforrenewableelectricitybysetting100percentrenewabletargets(Falk,Gaffneyetal.2020).+Planforajustfossilfuelphase-out:Subnationalgovernmentsneedtoplanforfossilfuelphase-outwellaheadandinasociallyjustmanner(Falk,Gaffneyetal.2020).+Supporta100percentrenewableelectricityfuture:Businessesshouldpurchase100percentrenewablepowerwithhighqualitypowerpurchaseagreementsorwithownproduction(notthroughrenewableenergycredits),electrifytheirenergyend-use,andprovidedemandﬂexibility,on-sitestorage,trainingandskills(Falk,Gaffneyetal.2020;Dayetal.2022).+Engagewithordivestfromfossilfuelelectricityutilities:Investorsneedtotakeresponsibilityfortheirsharesandengagewithfossilfuelelectricityutilitiestoincentivizechange,ordivestfromtheseassets.+Donotinvestinorinsurenewfossilfuelinfrastructure:Investors,banksandinsurersshouldrefrainfrominvestingin,supportingorinsuringnewfossilfuelinfra-structure(Falk,Gaffneyetal.2020).+Purchase100percentrenewableelectricity:Citizenswiththeeconomicpowertodososhouldcreatedemandforrenewableenergybypurchasing100percentrenewablepowerfromhighqualityproviders(Falk,Gaffneyetal.2020).NATIONALGOVERNMENTSINTERNATIONALCOOPERATIONSUBNATIONALGOVERNMENTSBUSINESSESINVESTORS,PRIVATEANDDEVELOPMENTBANKSCITIZENSTable5.2Immediateactionstoacceleratethetransformationoftheelectricitysectorbyactorgroups43EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindow5.4IndustryTheindustrysectoristhelargestcontributortoglobalemissionswhendirectandindirectemissionsareincluded,andthesecond-largestcontributorwhenonlydirectemissionsareconsidered(IPCC2022).Todate,effortstodecreaseemissionshavemainlyfocusedonimprovedenergyefficiencyandapplicationofbestavailabletechnologies.Asmanyindustrialprocesseshavealreadyreachedmaximumtheoreticallyattainableenergyefficiency,thekeytransformationsneededtobringtheindustrysectortoaParis-compatiblepathwayinclude(1)electrifyingindustryandtransformproductionprocesses,using(2)newfuels,and(3)specificsolutionsforhard-to-abatesectors;(4)acceleratingmaterialefficiencyandscalingupenergyefficiencyeverywhere,and(5)promotecircularmaterialflow.(1)Electrifyindustry:TogetontrackfortheParisAgreement,theshareofelectricityinindustry’sfinalenergydemandmustincreaseto35percentin2030and50–55percentin2050(CAT2020).Theshareofelectricityreached28.5percentin2019,butdecreasedslightlyto28.4percentin2020(IEA2021b).(2)Reducedemandforanddecreasecarbonintensityofglobalcementandsteelproduction:Demandreduction,substitutionandcarbonmanagementarecrucialfordecarbonizingtheindustrialsector.Thecarbonintensityofglobalcementproductionneedstobereducedby40percentfrom2015levelsby2030,andatleast85–91percentby2050(CAT2020).Thecarbonintensityofglobalsteelproductionneedstobereducedby25–30percentfrom2015levelsby2030,and93–100percentby2050(CAT2020).(3)Growandintegrategreenhydrogenproductioncapacity:Thereisvastpotentialforgreenhydrogentohelpdecarbonizeseveralsectors,especiallythehard-to-abateenergy-intensiveindustrysectorsthatcannotuseelectricity.Greenhydrogenproductioncapacityneedstogrowto0.23–3.5Mt(25GWcumulativeelectrolysercapacity)by2026(inordertoachievecostsbelowUS$2/kg)andthenmassivelyscaleupto500–800Mt(2,630–20,000GWcumulativeelectrolysercapacity)by2050(UnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange2021),upfromalmost0tonstoday(IEA2021d).(4)Accelerateandscaleupmaterialandenergyefficiency:Demandformaterialshasgrown2.5–3.5timesoverthepast25years(Bashmakovetal.2022).Materialprocessingandrisingdemandarethemaindriversofindustrialemissions.Basicmaterialsproductionleadstoincreasesinbothdirectandindirectemissions.Supplysideinterventionsincludechangingthematerialintensityoftheproductused.(5)Promotecircularmaterialflow:Recyclingofwastematerialshelpstoreduceemissions,butthegrowingcomplexityofproductdesignandfunctionalityincreasesthedemandformaterials.Therearestillhugegapsandregionalvariationsinrecycling.Theratesofrecyclingacrossvariousmetalsvariesfrom20to85percent,andtherecyclingrateofend-of-lifewastefromindustrialmaterialisverylowatca10percent(IPCC2022;TeskeandPregger2022).Agenericsetofimmediateactionsnecessarytoinitiateandacceleratetheglobaltransformationoftheindustrysectoraresummarizedintable5.3,andrelatedactionsbydifferentgroupsofactorsaresummarizedintable5.4.44EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowTable5.3Actionsthataccelerateorhinderthetransformationoftheindustrysector3Table5.3ActionsthataccelerateorhinderthetransformationoftheindustrysectorINDUSTRYTRANSFORMATIONMOSTIMPORTANTACTIONSACTIONSTOAVOIDFULLDECARBONIZATIONOFINDUSTRIALPRODUCTION:Fulldecarbonizationneedstobeinitiatedtodaybyuseofelectricity,greenhydrogenandcarbonmanagementforheatsourcesandfeedstock;forcement,ironandsteel;andchemicalsandplastics(Rissmanetal.2020;Royetal.2021;Bashmakovetal.2022).REDUCEMATERIALWASTEANDRECIRCULATEMATERIALS:Costsandemissionscanbeloweredbyusingfewermaterialsandbyincreasingtheusablelifetimethroughappropriateinfrastructure,industrialparksandnetworks,policiesandexpertise(Falk,Gaffneyetal.2020;Rissmanetal.2020;Bashmakovetal.2022).REDUCEDEMANDANDENHANCEACCESSTOENERGY-EFFICIENT,MATERIAL-EFFICIENTANDCO2-NEUTRALMATERIALS:Accesstomaterial-eﬃcientdesign,light-weightproducts,andproductswithlongerlifetimereducestotalproductdemandandmaterialsneeded.Promotionofsharingeconomyreducesthedemandforauto-mobilesandbuildings,andcanbefacilitatedbyincreaseddigitalizationwithstrategicpoliciestoavoidreboundindemand(Rissmanetal.2020;Bashmakovetal.2022;Creutzig,Royetal.2022).Materialusecanalsobereducedthroughprocesschangeandtechnologychoice.AVOIDNEWCO2-INTENSIVEINFRASTRUCTURE:Thepipelineoflong-lived,carbon-intensivenewindustrialinfrastructure(e.g.steel,cement,chemicals)needstobeavoidedbyincentivizingnewlow-carbonprocesses(Falk,Gaffneyetal.2020;Bashmakovetal.2022).AVOIDFOCUSONNARROWLYDEFINEDPOLICIES:Policiesthatsupportlinearproductionprocesseswhichgeneratemorewasteneedtobeavoidedandtobereplacedbysequential,cross-sectoralpolicieswhichhaveawideimpactonsocietalandenvironmentaldomains(Rissmanetal.2020;IPCC2022)45EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowTable5.4Immediateactionstoacceleratethetransformationoftheindustrysectorbyactorgroups4INDUSTRYSECTORTRANSFORMATION–RECOMMENDATIONSBYACTORGROUP+Supportzero-carbonindustrialprocesses:Implementstrategic,well-designedpolicyandincentivestoaccelerateinnovation,technologydeploymentofcleanenergyandlow-carboninputmaterials,e.g.developmentofnew,CO2-freeprocessesorcarboncapture(Rissmanetal.2020).+Promotecircularmaterialﬂow:Incentivizetheuseofrecycledmaterials,reducedemandthroughmaterialeﬃciency(e.g.fostershifttopaperwhichuseslesspulp),substitutelow-carbonforhigh-carbonmaterials,andintroducecirculareconomymeasuressuchasimprovingproductlongevity,reusabilityandrecyclability(Millward-Hopkinsetal.2018;Rissmanetal.2020).+Promoteelectriﬁcation:Introducepoliciestoincentivizeelectriﬁcationoftheindustrialprocessesthatcurrentlyusefossilfuels(Rissmanetal.2020).+Supportalternativecarbonpricingmechanisms:Implementcarbonpricingpoliciestoincentivizeindustryleadershipinlow-carbonaction,improveproductivityanddriveinnovation(Rissmanetal.2020;WorldBank2021).+Supportresearchandinnovation:Removebarrierstoandinvestinresearch,development,deploymentandinnovation,andsupportenergyeﬃciencyand/oremissionsstandards(Falk,Gaffneyetal.2020;Rissmanetal.2020;Bashmakovetal.2022).+Promotelow-carbonproducts:Ensurelabellingandgovernmentprocurementoflow-carbonproducts,informationdissemination,promotingrepairwork,datacollectionandimplementationofdisclosurerequirements,andincentivesforrecycling(Rissmanetal.2020;Bashmakovetal.2022).+Planajusttransformation:Preparenational-levelplansforsocialprotectiontostaygendersensitive,meetdevelopmentneedsoflow-andmiddle-incomecountries,andenhancesocialacceptanceofnewproductionsystemswiththeaimtoensureajusttransformationfordisplacedworkersandaffectedcommunities(Rissmanetal.2020).+Cooperateonzero-carbonbasicmaterials:Internationalcooperationandcoordinationmaybeparticularlyimportantinenablingchangeinemissions-intensiveandhighlytradedbasicmaterialsindustries(IPCC2022).Thiscanincludeprocurementcommitments,strategicdialogues,sharedlearningonpilotprojects,andstandardadoption(IEAetal.2022).Additionally,fundingwillneedtobesigniﬁcantlyincreasedtosupporttheindustrialtransition(IEAetal.2022).+Sharebestpractice:Thereneedstobesupportforlow-andmiddle-incomecountrieswhilemakingtheInternationalOrganizationforStandardizationmoreprogressive,helpinginthedevelopmentofstandardsandregulations,sharingtechnology,andaccountingtoreducewasteintheglobalsupplychain.Globaldecarbonizationeffortsneedtoacknowledgevariousstartingpointsandstagesofhumanandeconomicdevelopment(Rissmanetal.2020;Bashmakovetal.2022).+Cooperateonhydrogen:Internationalcooperationandcoordinationisimportanttodevelopamarketforhydrogenfromrenewablesources,withcoordinatedtargets,standards,andbilateralandmultilateralcooperationagreementsandblendedﬁnance(IEAetal.2022).+Regionalplanningandregulation:Reconsiderregionalspatialplanningandregulations,reformprocurementguidelines,explorecarbonpricinginstruments,engageinlabelling,alignregulationstofacilitateimplementation,andensureaccountabilityforemissions(Bashmakovetal.2022).+Cooperatewithvariousstakeholders:Mitigationactionsareimplementedatsubnationallevels,sosubnationalgovernmentsmustcooperatewithnationalgovernments,industryandcitizensinimplementingmitigationactions(IPCC2022).+Planandimplementzero-emissiontransformation:Companies,includingthoseoperatinginhard-to-abatesectors,needtoplantheiroperationstobecomezerocarbonandtoimplementtheseplans(Falk,Bergmarketal.2020;Royetal.2021).+Designlong-livedproducts:Industrialserviceprovidersshouldleadindesignoflong-livedrepairableproductsandhelpinthedigitizationoftheprocesses(Rissmanetal.2020;Bashmakovetal.2022;Creutzig,Royetal.2022).+Createcircularsupplychains:Createcircularandvalue-freesupplychainsthroughcollaborationwithsuppliersandcustomers(Falk,Gaffneyetal.2020).NATIONALGOVERNMENTSINTERNATIONALCOOPERATIONSUBNATIONALGOVERNMENTSBUSINESSES46EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindow5.5TransportationTransportationisthesecond-largestsourceofenergy-relatedCO2emissionsglobally,contributing25percentoftotalenergy-relatedCO2emissions(IEA2021c).Transformationofthetransportationsystemrequiresanumberofshifts:(1)ashifttolow-emittingmodesoftransport,(2)anaccelerationofthemovetozero-carboncarsandtrucks,and(3)preparationforthemovetozero-carbonaviationandshipping.Inaddition,carandplaneusebyfrequenttravellersshouldbeabated.Theseshiftsshouldbepromotedsimultaneously,andmanyactionscanaddressmorethanoneshift.(1)Shifttolow-emittingmodesoftransport:Asignificantshifttoloweremittingmodes,includingpublictransport,walkingandcycling,isrequiredalongsidetheelectrificationoftransportmodestoalignwithawell-below2°Cand1.5°Cpathway(InstituteforTransportationandDevelopmentPolicy[ITDP]andUniversityofCaliforniaDavis2021).Currently,privatelight-dutyvehiclesmakeup53.2percentofalltrips(asat2015,InternationalTransportForum2021).Thenumberoftripsmadebyprivatelight-dutyvehiclesneedstodecreaseby4–14percentbelowbusiness-as-usuallevelsby2030.Thenumberofkilometresofpublictransitper1,000inhabitantsmustbedoubledby2030,whilethenumberofkilometresofhigh-qualitybicyclelanesper1,000inhabitantsshouldbeincreasedfivefold(TransformativeUrbanMobilityInitiative2021;Boehmetal.2022).(2)Acceleratethemovetozero-carboncarsandtrucks:Light-dutyelectricvehiclesalesreached8.3percentoftotalsalesin2021(Irle2021).Thismustincreasetobetween35percentand95percentby2030,andreach100percentby2035,requiringanincreaseintherateofchangeby1.8to6timesinthenexteightyears(BloombergNewEnergyFinance[BloombergNEF]2018;ICCT2021;IEA2021e;IRENA2021;McKerracheretal.2022;Boehmetal.2022;CheungandO’Donovan2022).Heaviervehicles,includingbusesandmedium-andheavy-dutyvehicles(MHDVs),shouldalsobedecarbonized.Buseshaveproventobeasuccessstoryforvehicleelectrification,reachingahighof43percentofbussalesin2017,drivenlargelybydemandinChina(BloombergNEF2021).However,saleshaveslowedsincethen,fallingto39percentin2020,whereastheshareneedstoincreaseto60–100percentin2030and100percentin2050(ICCT2021;IEA2021e;IRENA2021;Boehmetal.2022;SenandMiller2022).Zero-carbonoptionsforMHDVshaveonlyjustbeguntohitthemarket,reaching0.2percentofsalesin2020(BloombergNEF2021).ElectricandfuelcellMHDVsarerequiredtoreachbetween5and45percentofsalesin2030,and100percentbetween2040and2050(IEA2021e;IRENA2021;Boehmetal.2022;SenandMiller2022;Xie,DallmannandMuncrief2022).(3)Transformationtozero-carbonaviationandshipping:Sustainableaviationfuelsarerequiredtomeet13–18percentofaviationfuelneedsin2030and78–100percentin2050,requiringasignificantincreaseinuptake(IEA2021e;UniversityMaritimeAdvisoryServices2021;Boehmetal.2022;Graveretal.2022).Maritimeshippingfacessimilarproblems,withadearthofoptionsfordecarbonizationoutsidezero-emissionsfuels.Vesselshavenotyetbeguntousezero-emissionsshippingfuels,butzero-emissionsfuelswillneedtomeet5–17percentofmaritimeshippingneedsin2030and84–93percentby2050(IEA2021e;Boehmetal.2022).INDUSTRYSECTORTRANSFORMATION–RECOMMENDATIONSBYACTORGROUP+Engagewithordivestfromemissions-intensiveindustry:Investorscanactivelyengagewiththecompaniestheyownsharesoftomovethemtowardszeroemissions.Ifthisisnotsuccessful,theyshoulddivest(Creutzig,Royetal.2022).+Investinlow-carbonenergyandprocesstechnologies:Investorsandbanksshouldenableinvestmentinlow-carbonenergyandprocesstechnologiesandnovelchemistries.Investmentstosigniﬁcantlyreducecostsofnewtechnologiesandinnovationswillbeessentialforuptakebydevelopingcountries(Rissmanetal.2020).+Driveawarenessofclimaterisk:Despitevariousregulatoryandvoluntaryinitiatives,climate-relatedﬁnancialrisksremaingrosslyunderestimated.Banksandﬁnancialinstitutionscandriveawarenessandactions(Roy2021).+Consumesustainably:Userscanpracticesustainableconsumptionbyintensiveuseoflonger-livedrepairableproductsandavoidingshortlifespanproducts(Creutzig,Royetal.2022).+Lobby:Citizenscanjoinvariouslobbygroupstoadvocatenewnarrativestoinﬂuencesocialnorms,corporateadvertisementsandpublicpolicy.Professionalscanengageinmonitoring,developandcommunicateembodiedemissions(Creutzig,Royetal.2022).INVESTORS,PRIVATEANDDEVELOPMENTBANKSCITIZENS47EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowAgenericsetofimmediateactionsthatarenecessarytoinitiateandacceleratetheglobaltransformationofthetransportsector(table5.5)andrelatedactionsbydifferentgroupsofactors(table5.6)aresummarizedbelow.Table5.5ActionsthataccelerateorhinderthetransformationofthetransportsectorTable5.6Immediateactionstoacceleratethetransformationofthetransportsectorbyactorgroups6Table5.5ActionsthataccelerateorhinderthetransformationofthetransportsectorTRANSPORTSECTORTRANSFORMATIONMOSTIMPORTANTACTIONSACTIONSTOAVOIDAVOID:Adoptintegratedland-useplanningtoavoidtransportneedbyprioritizingmovingpeopleandimprovingtransportaccessoverprivatecars.SHIFT:Makeinvestmentsin,establishpricingforandshifttowardslow-carbonmodesoftransport(trains,publictransport,cycling).IMPROVE:Completetransformationtozero-emissionsvehicletechnologiesforcars,vans,busesandtrucks,andforshipsandplanesincombinationwithzero-emissionsfuels.AVOIDUNSUSTAINABLESOLUTIONS:Avoidsupportingtechnologiesthatareincompatiblewithdeepdecarbonization,suchasnaturalgasinroadtransportandbiofuelsthatleadtodeforestationand/orcompetewithfoodproduction(Searchingeretal.2019).AVOIDDELAY:Itisimportantnottodelaytransportelectriﬁcationuntiltheelectricitygridsarecleaner(Senetal.2021).AVOIDFALSEDICHOTOMIES:A1.5°Cpathwayrequiresbothelectriﬁcationoftransportationandinvestmentinmorecompactcities(publictransit,walking,biking).7TRANSPORTSECTORTRANSFORMATION–RECOMMENDATIONSBYACTORGROUP+Setmandatestoswitchtozero-emissionsroadvehiclesbyspeciﬁcdates:Governments,regionsandcitiescansetregulationstoshifttowards100percentzero-emissionsvehiclesalesfornewbusesby2030,carsandvansby2035,andtrucksby2040(Halletal.2021;SenandMiller2022).Thesecanbecomplementedwithdemand-sideactiontoaccelerateuptake.SettingCO2standardsformanufacturerswillalsohelpacceleratethetransition.+Regulateandincentivizezero-carbonfuelsforaviation:Developregulationsandsupportﬁscalpoliciestotransitionto100percentlow-carbonfuelsforaviationandmarinesectorsby2050,includingadvancedbiofuels,greenhydrogen,renewableelectricity,ande-fuelsgeneratedwithadditionalrenewableelectricity(Graveretal.2022;PavlenkoandO’Malley2022).+Adjusttaxation/pricingschemes:Alignpricing,taxesandfeesonvehiclesales(Wappelhorst2022),ownership,fuelsandtransportationactivitytosupportenvironmentalobjectives(technologychanges,modeshift,avoidedtravel)(Jaramilloetal.2022).+Investinzero-emissionstransportinfrastructure:Aligntransportationinfrastructurefundingtoinvestinhighqualityzero-emissionspublictransport,rail,walking/bicyclingfacilities,ships,aeroplanesandvehicle-charginginfrastructure(Minjaresetal.2021;Jaramilloetal.2022;Ragonetal.2022).NATIONALGOVERNMENTS48EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowTRANSPORTSECTORTRANSFORMATION–RECOMMENDATIONSBYACTORGROUP+Cooperateonﬁnancingandpolicydevelopment:Enhancetheofferofinternationalﬁnancialandtechnicalassistancetosupportmoreambitioustransformationsandpolicydevelopmentinemergingmarketsanddevelopingeconomies(Khanetal.2022).Inaddition,governmentsshouldexchangebestpracticeandimproverulesgoverningtradeofvehicles(IEAetal.2022).+Coordinationontargetsettingandstandards:Governmentsandvehiclemanufacturerscanagreeontargetsforachievingnet-zerovehiclesales,harmonizedstandards,andscalinguprelatedinfrastructure(IEAetal.2022).+Planinfrastructureandsupportingpoliciestoreducetraveldemand:Initiateorintensifysystemicplanningandinfrastructurechangesthatreducetransportdemand(ITDPandUniversityofCaliforniaDavis2021;Creutzig,Niamiretal.2022;Creutzig,Royetal.2022;Jaramilloetal.2022).Thiscanincludethedevelopmentoflow-andzero-emissionzonestoaccelerateshiftstozero-emissionsvehiclesincities(Cui,GodeandWappelhorst2021).+Planinfrastructureandsupportingpoliciesforzero-emissionsvehicles:Investinsmart-charginginfrastructureandsupportregulationfortheaccelerationofrapiddeployment.+Adjusttaxation/pricingschemes:Regionalandlocalgovernmentshouldalignonlocalpricing(Basmaetal.2022),taxesandfeesoncarownership,parkingandcaraccesstocities,andpublictransporttosupporttransformation(technologychanges,modeshift,avoidedtravel)(Jaramilloetal.2022).+Worktowardszero-emissionstransport:Businessﬂeetownersandoperators,andsharedmobilityplatforms,canworktowards100percentzero-emissionscars(ClimateGroup2022),vans,trucks,buses,vessels(Martin2021)andaeroplaneﬂeets(seeactionEinAustriaetal.2022).+Reducetravelinoperations:Thisespeciallyappliestolong-haulﬂights,andcanincludethepromotionoftelecommuting,andprovisionofworkplacechargingofelectricvehicles.INTERNATIONALCOOPERATIONSUBNATIONALGOVERNMENTSBUSINESSES+Investinzero-emissionstransportinfrastructure:Investintransitandactivetransportinfrastructure(Jaramilloetal.2022).+Supportzero-emissionsvehicles,vesselsandplanes:Supportanacceleratedtransitiontozero-emissionsvehiclesbyproactiveengagementwithinvestees,encouragingalltheirholdingstodecarbonizetheirﬂeets,bymakingcapitalandﬁnancialproductsavailableforconsumers,businessesandcharginginfrastructuremanufacturers(seeactionsFandGinAustriaetal.2022).+Adoptactivemobilitypractices:Optforwalkingandcyclingwhereabilityanddistanceallows,anduseteleworkingortelecommutinginothercases(Creutzig,Royetal.2022).+Usepublictransit:Optforpublictransitsuchas(ideallyzero-emissions)busesandtrainsforcommutingwhereavailable,andwhenactivemodesoftransportarenotpractical.+Usezero-emissionsvehicles:Choosezero-emissionsvehicleswhenpurchasing,leasingorrenting(wherepossible).+Avoidlong-haulﬂights:Avoidtheuseofprivatejetsandlimitlongﬂightswheneveralternativesexist,suchastrainsorelectricvehicles(Creutzig,Royetal.2022).INVESTORS,PRIVATEANDDEVELOPMENTBANKSCITIZENS49EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindow5.6BuildingsDirectemissionsthroughbuildingoperationsarerelativelysmallcomparedtoothersectorsandareestimatedat5percentofglobalgreenhousegasemissions,butthisnumberincreasesto17percentwhenaccountingforindirectemissionsfromelectricityandheatconsumption(IPCC2022).Whiledirectemissionshaveremainedrelativelystableat3gigatonsofCO2peryear,indirectemissionshavealmostdoubledsince1990(IEA2020).Todecreaseemissionsinthebuildingsector,fourmajorshiftsarenecessary:(1)excessfloorareamustbeminimized,(2)energyintensitymustbereduced,(3)theemissionsintensityofenergyusemustdecline,and(4)embodiedemissionsfromconstructionmustbereduced(Boehmetal.2022).(1)Reduceexcessfloorarea:Energyuseandemissionsfromspaceandwaterheatingandcoolingaredirectlylinkedtothetotalamountoffloorareathatundergoesactivethermalcontrol.Furthermore,thegreatertheextentofnewfloorareathatisconstructed,themorematerialsarerequired,andthehigheraretheembodiedemissions.Theamountoffloorareausedperpersonvastlydiffersacrosscountries,butalsowithincountries.Minimizingtheamountoffloorareawhichiswellabovetheareanecessarytomeetbasicneeds,canhavealargeeffectonemissionsinthesector.(2)Reduceenergyintensityofbuildings:Theenergythatisusedforheating,coolingandappliancespersquaremetreoffloorarea,needstodecreasegloballyby10–30percentincommercialbuildingsand20–30percentinresidentialbuildings,relativeto2015levels,by2030(CAT2020).Globalaverageenergyintensityinbuildingsreducedby19percentbetween2000and2015,butthereductionhasslowedinrecentyears,withonlyanadditional2percentbetween2015and2019(Boehmetal.2022).(3)Reduceemissionsintensityofenergyuseinbuildings:Emissionsintensity,ortheamountofCO2emittedperfloorarea,isrelatedtoenergyintensity,butaddsthedecarbonizationfactor,meaningthataswitchfromfossilfuelstoelectricpower(sourcedfromrenewableenergy)isneeded.Inbuildings,thisentailsinstallingandreplacingcookingandheatingdeviceswithcleanertechnologies,suchasheatpumpsinsteadofoilorgasheating,ordistrictheatingindenseurbanareas(CAT2020).Emissionsintensityinbuildingsneedsbereducedby45–65percentforresidentialbuildingsand65–75percentforcommercialbuildingscomparedto2015levelsby2030,and95–100percentby2050(CAT2020).Althoughemissionsintensityhasdecreasedsteadily,thepaceneedstobeacceleratedtomeetthesetargets(Boehmetal.2022).(4)Reduceemissionsfromconstruction:Theproductionofmaterialssuchassteel,cementandconcretetoconstructbuildingsisahighlyenergy-andemissions-intensiveprocess.Whilemeasurestoreducetheemissionsintensityofthesematerialsshouldbepursued(seesectiononindustryabove),furtherreductionscanbeachievedbymoreefficientuseofthesematerials.Thiscanincludereconstructingexistingbuildings(ratherthandemolitionandnewconstruction),minimizingthevolumeofmaterialsrequiredandsubstitutingalternativeconstructionmaterials(EnergyTransitionsCommission2019).Integratedplanninganddesigncanbeusedtominimizeenergydemandthroughoutthebuildingconstructionphase,includingtransportandon-siteenergyuse.Furnishingtheinteriorofbuildingscanalsobeenergyintensive,withcirculareconomyprinciplesprovidingopportunitiesforlifecycleemissionreductions.Agenericsetofimmediateactionsthatarenecessarytoinitiateandacceleratetheglobaltransformationofthebuildingssector(table5.7)andrelatedactionsbydifferentgroupsofactors(table5.8)aresummarizedbelow.50EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowTable5.7Actionsthataccelerateorhinderthetransformationofthebuildingssector9Table5.7ActionsthataccelerateorhinderthetransformationofthebuildingssectorBUILDINGSSECTORTRANSFORMATIONMOSTIMPORTANTACTIONSACTIONSTOAVOIDEFFICIENTBUILDINGSHELL:Optimizebuildingshellstominimizetheneedforactiveheatingandcooling.SCALEUPZERO-EMISSIONSHEATINGANDCOOLINGTECHNOLOGY:Highlyeﬃcientairconditionersandheatpumpswithouthydroﬂuoro-carbonscanbepoweredbyrenewables,eitheron-siteorsuppliedoff-sitethroughelectricity.ALLNEWBUILDINGSSHOULDBEZEROCARBONINOPERATION:Newbuildingsshouldbedesignedandconstructedsothattheyarezerocarboninoperation,withaminimalenergydemandthatismetthroughzero-carbonsources(IEA2021e).MINIMIZEEMBODIEDEMISSIONS:Emissionsfromconstructionmaterialsshouldbeminimizedbyreducingtheemissionsintensityofsteelandcementproductionandsubstitutinglowercarbonmaterials,includingrecycledmaterials,wherepossible.INCREASERETROFITTINGRATE:2.5–3.5percentofbuildingsneedtoberetroﬁttedeveryyear,butrecentratesarebelow1percentperyear(IEA2021a).AVOIDINEFFICIENTBUILDINGS:Duetothelonglifetimeofbuildings,thelock-ineffectofineﬃcientnewbuildingsissigniﬁcantandcurrentlypotentiallyincentivizedbylowambitionornobuildingcodes(Cabezaetal.2022).AVOIDNEWFOSSILGASCONNECTIONS:Newgasconnectionsshouldbeavoidedtonotcreatealock-in,whichwouldlastdecades.Improvedinsulationandelectricheatingandcoolingcanreducefossilgasdemand.PHASEOUTFOSSILFUELSUBSIDIES:Severalcountriessubsidizefossilfueluseinbuildings,directlyorindirectly.51EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowTable5.8Recommendationsfromimmediateactionstoacceleratethetransformationofthebuildingssectorbyactorgroups10BUILDINGSSECTORTRANSFORMATION–RECOMMENDATIONSBYACTORGROUP+Regulatetowardszero-carbonbuildingstock:Requireallnewbuildingstobezerocarboninoperationandintroduceminimumenergyperformancestandardsforexistingbuildingstoincreaseretroﬁtrates,bothaccompaniedbyacomprehensiveenforcementstrategy(CAT2022a).Buildingscodescanbeusedtoacceleratethetransitiontousinglow-carbonbuildingmaterialsforconstruction,andinlimitingemissionsduringtheend-of-lifephaseofabuilding.Settingrequirementstocalculateandmonitortheseembodiedemissionsisanimportantﬁrststep(Jordanetal.2020).+Incentivizezero-carbonbuildingstock:Modifycoststructuresinfavourofzero-carbonoptionsthroughtaxesandsubsidies,provideincentivesfor‘bestinclass’technologiesandpractices,improveaccesstoﬁnance,andaddressthelandlord-tenantdilemma(CAT2022a).+Facilitatezero-carbonbuildingstock:Ensureanappropriatelyskilledworkforceandincreaseinstitutionalcapacityforenforcementandawareness-raising(CAT2022a).+Provideaccessandfavourableconditionstoﬁnance:Support,de-riskorguaranteetheupfrontinvestmentsrequiredtoachieveazero-carbonbuildingstock(GlobalABCandUNEP2022).+Supportskillsandknowledgegrowth:Expandthemassivelyneededskillstrainingandknowledgeexchange(GlobalABCandUNEP2022).+Implementzero-emissionsbuildingstockplans:Subnationalgovernmentsinparticularcitiesshouldplanandimplementhowtoarriveatan100percentzero-emissionsbuildingstock(Burrowsetal.2021).Particularlyimportantisthatthedesignofanynewconstructionisfossilfuelfree,andthepresenceofavisiontorapidlyreduceembodiedemissions.+Integratelowemissionsrequirementsinurbanplanning:Thisincludeszoningandparks(Jordanetal.2020).+Addrequirementsontopofnationalrequirements:Strongerrequirementsatsubnationallevelcanacceleratethetransformation(Falk,Gaffneyetal.2020).Severalexamplesexistwhere,forexample,citiesaddrenewableobligationsorlow/nointerestloansforlow-incomehouseholdsthatarenotrequiredatthenationallevel(CAT2022a).+Constructionandbuildingmaterialcompaniesreviewbusinessmodels:Makeandimplementzero-emissionsplanswithzero-carbonbuildingmaterialsifthebusinessmodelreliesoncarbonintensiverawmaterialsandhighenergybuildings(Falk,Gaffneyetal.2020).+Achievezero-carbonownedorrentedbuildingstock:Buildingownersshouldmaketheirbuildingstockzerocarbonwithoutoverburdeningtenants.Companiesthatownorrentbuildingsfortheiroperation,suchasoﬃces,shops,warehousesandfactories,shoulddothesame(Falk,Gaffneyetal.2020;WorldEconomicForum2021).NATIONALGOVERNMENTSINTERNATIONALCOOPERATIONSUBNATIONALGOVERNMENTSBUSINESSES+Adjuststrategyandinvestmentcriteriaforzero-carbonbuildingstock:Reviewstrategiesandaligninvestmentcriteriawithazero-carbonbuildingstock.Thisincludesthehighneedforlong-term,low-interestloansforzero-carbonbuildingswiththeirhigherupfrontinvestmentandloweroperatingcosts.+Supportbuildingretroﬁts:Financialinstitutions,inparticularbanks,shouldactivelysupportbuildingretroﬁtswithfavourableconditions.+Retroﬁt:Privatehomeownersshouldretroﬁttheirbuildingstobecomezerocarbon,whererelevant.+Tenantschallengelandlords:Tenantsshouldactivelyapproachtheirlandlordsandaskforzero-carbonbuildingsandnecessaryretroﬁts.+Adoptenergy-savingbehaviour:Citizensshouldsaveenergybychoosingdesiredinsidetemperaturesthatdonotgreatlydifferfromoutsidetemperatures,switchingoffunnecessarylightsandbeingmindfulwhenusingappliances(Creutzig,Royetal.2022).INVESTORS,PRIVATEANDDEVELOPMENTBANKSCITIZENS52EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowTransformingfoodsystemsLeadauthors:AlineMosnier(SustainableDevelopmentSolutionsNetwork,France),MarcoSpringmann(UniversityofOxford,UnitedKingdom),ShenggenFan(ChinaAgriculturalUniversity,China)Contributingauthors:BruceCampbell(Clim-EATandUniversityofCopenhagen,Denmark),HelenHarwatt(ChathamHouse,UnitedKingdom),JuliaRochaRomero(UNEP-CCC,Denmark),WeiZhang(CGIARandInternationalFoodPolicyResearchInstitute[IFPRI],UnitedStatesofAmerica)66.1IntroductionFoodsystemsaremajorcontributorstoclimatechangeandotherenvironmentalproblems,suchasland-usechangeandbiodiversityloss,depletionoffreshwaterresources,andpollutionofaquaticandterrestrialecosystemsthroughnitrogenandphosphorusrun-offfromfertilizerandmanureapplication(CordellandWhite2014;Crippaetal.2021;DiazandRosenberg2008;Foleyetal.2005;Newboldetal.2015;RobertsonandVitousek2009;ShiklomanovandRodda2004;IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange[IPCC]2019;Wadaetal.2010;Willettetal.2019).Ifcurrenttrendscontinue,theenvironmentalpressuresonfoodsystemsarelikelytointensify(Jalavaetal.2014;TilmanandClark2014;Davisetal.2016;Springmannetal.2016;Springmann,Clarketal.2018).KeytargetsofseveralSustainableDevelopmentGoals(SDGs)areprojectedtobeatrisk(Springmann,Clarketal.2018;Springmannetal.2020),andthegreenhousegas(GHG)emissionsfromfoodsystemscould,ontheirown,precludeachievingtheParisAgreementgoaloflimitingglobalwarmingtobelow2°C,aimingfor1.5°C(Clarketal.2020).Transformingfoodsystemsisthereforeimperativeforavoidingdangerouslevelsofclimatechangeandotherenvironmentalproblems.Moreover,transformingfoodsystemsisnotonlyimportantforaddressingclimatechangeandenvironmentaldegradation,butalsoessentialforensuringhealthydietsandfoodsecurityforall.Currently,imbalanceddietsthatarelowinfruits,vegetables,nutsandwholegrainsandhighinredandprocessedmeatarealeadinghealthburdeninmostregionsandareresponsibleformorethanoneinfiveprematuredeathsglobally(GBD2017DietCollaborators2019;Springmann,Mozaffarianetal.2021).Inaddition,about2billionpeopleareoverweightandobese,and2billionhavenutritionaldeficiencies,whileabout800millionarestillsufferingfromhungerduetopovertyandpoorlydevelopedfoodsystems(FoodandAgricultureOrganizationoftheUnitedNations[FAO]etal.2020).Asthedietarytransitiontowardsmoreprocessedandhigh-valueproductscontinuesinmanyregionsoftheworld,thesedietaryhealthrisksareexpectedtoworsen(Springmannetal.2016;Springmann,Wiebeetal.2018).Atthesametime,manyoftheworld’spoorcannotaffordtopayforhealthyandsustainablediets(FAOetal.2020;Springmann,Clarketal.2021),andtheongoingcrisescausedbyCOVID-19,thewarinUkraine,andwidespreadextremeclimateeventsarefurtherexacerbatingthissituationbydisruptingfoodsystemsandincreasingthecostsoffoods(Guénette,KoseandSugawara2022;OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment[OECD]2020;OgundejiandOkolie2022)(seebox6.1).Adoptingafoodsystemslenscanhelpinidentifyingthesynergiesandtrade-offsacrossthevariousinterconnectedenvironmental,healthandeconomicimpacts.Comparedtothetraditionalcategorizationofagriculture,forestryandotherlanduse(AFOLU),foodsystemsincludepre-andpost-productionprocesses,whicharerelatedtothetransportation,industrialactivities,storageandconsumptionoffood(IPCC2019;Rosenzweigetal.2020).Theinclusionofseveralsectorsmakesthecomputationoffoodsystememissionsmoredifficultandincreasestheriskofdoublecountingwhensummedwithandcomparedtoindividualsectors(figure6.1).However,havingafoodsystemsapproachthatexplicitlyconnectsthesupplyanddemandsidesandalltheactorsofthefoodsupplychainhasmanyadvantages.Itensuresthatclimatechangemitigationstrategiesarecompatiblewithfoodsecurity,andfacilitatesthedesignofintegratedadaptationandmitigationpolicies,includingtheirtrade-offsandsynergies(Rosenzweigetal.2020).Thisisparticularlyimportantinthecurrentcontextinwhichmultiplecrisesimpactthesupplyanddemandoffood.53EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowThischapterpresentstheneeds,currentstateandoptionsforacceleratingafoodsystemtransformation.ItfocusesonGHGemissionsandclimatechange,butalsodiscussesimportantsynergiesandtrade-offswiththeenvironmental,health,andeconomic/equitydimensionsthroughoutthechapter.Thechapterwillpresentanddiscusstransformativesolutionsthatcandecreaseemissionsinthesupplyanddemandsideoffoodsystemsalongwithexamplesofinitiativesalreadyinplaceinvariouspartsoftheworld.ItwillalsodiscusshowfurtheractionscanbeacceleratedtoensurethatfoodsystemscontributetheirsharetofulfillingthegoalsoftheParisAgreement.Box6.1EquityandjusticeasvitalcomponentstoacceleratetransformationsoffoodsystemsAlthoughanyclimatestabilizationpathwayrequiresasubstantialreductioninemissionsfromfoodsystems,suchmitigationeffortsmustnotcomeattheexpenseofthehealthandlivelihoodsoflow-incomepopulations.Ataper-personlevel,therichest10percentoftheworld’spopulationproducesthehighestemissions,whilethepoorestproducetheleastemissionsandsufferthehighestconsequencesofclimatechangeduetotheirsocioeconomicstatusandreducedadaptivecapacities.In2021,approximately828millionpeoplewereaffectedbyhungerglobally,andthisfigureisestimatedtocontinueincreasingwiththeinstabilitycausedbyCOVID-19andthewarinUkraine.Thecurrentriseininflationandenergypricesaddsfurtherpressuretotheworld’sfoodsupplychain.Theseadverseimpactsconcerneveryone,buttheyareespeciallyfeltbythepoorestandthemostvulnerableinsociety,themajorityofwhomarewomen.Betterdistributionoffoodandmoreefficientuseofresourceisessentialtofightfoodinsecurityandmalnutritionwithinthedecade(FAOetal.2022).Reducingtheuseofmuchoftheworld'sgrainproductiontofeedanimalsandproducingmorefoodfordirecthumanconsumptioncansignificantlycontributetothisobjective(IPCC2022a).Inmosthighandmiddle-incomecountries,healthierandmoresustainabledietscanbecheaperthancurrentdiets,butinmanylow-incomecountries,theyarehigherincostthantheprevalentstarch-baseddiets(FAOetal.2020;Springmann,Clarketal.2021).Makinghealthyandsustainabledietsaffordableforallispossible,butwillrequirededicatedfoodsysteminterventionsinlow-incomesettings(Springmann,Clarketal.2021).Povertyalleviationremainsaprimegoaloflow-incomecountries,andagriculturaldevelopmentwillremainakeypartoftheirdevelopmentstrategies,withclimateactionsmorefocusedonadaptationthanmitigation.Climate-resilientdevelopmentinAfrica’sruralareas,ifitistotackleentrenchedchronicpoverty,willneedtobetransformational,withelementsoffarmconsolidation,irrigationdevelopment,improvedfertilizerusage,increasedmarketaccessandenhancedsocialsafetynets,amongotherelements(Orretal.2013;Beegle,CoudouelandMonsalve2018;Leforeetal.2019;Giller2022).Someoftheexpectedchangescanproducemitigationco-benefits,butinothercasesfoodsystememissionsarelikelytorise(Springmann,Wiebeetal.2018).Animportantobjectiveisthereforetoensurethatruraltransformationisplacedonalowemissionstrajectory.54EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowFigure6.1ClassificationoffoodsystemsemissionsandthedifferencetostandardemissionscategoriesoftheIPCCNotes:TheIPCCcategoriesincludedinfoodsystemsareshownwithinthefadedgreysquare.ThisfigureshowsthemaindifferencesandoverlapswiththemoretraditionalIPCCcategoryofAFOLU(Crippaetal.2021;IPCC2019).ForallofficialIPCCcategories,onlypartsareincludedinfoodsystems.Althoughsomeagriculturalproductionisdedicatedtonon-fooduses,non-foodcropsonlyrepresent2percentoftheemissions,somostofagriculturalproductionisincludedinfoodsystems.Fromthecategorylanduse,land-usechangeandforestry(LULUCF),weonlyincludeemissionsfromlanduseandland-usechangewithinfoodsystems.Thus,emissionsand/orsequestrationinremainingforestlandareexcludedfromfoodsystems.WefollowedFAO’sdefinitionforthecategoriesenergy,industrialprocessesandproductuse(IPPU),andwaste(Tubielloetal.2021).6.2TransformationneedsandpotentialThefoodsystemiscurrentlyresponsibleforaboutathirdoftotalGHGemissionsor18(range:14–22)gigatonsofCO2equivalent(GtCO2e)peryear(IPCC2019;Crippaetal.2021).Thelargestcontributionstemsfromagriculturalproduction(7.1GtCO2e,39percent)includingtheproductionofinputssuchasfertilizers,followedbychangesinlanduse(5.7GtCO2e,32percent),andsupplychainactivities(5.2GtCO2e,29percent).Thelatterincludesretail,transport,consumption,fuelproduction,wastemanagement,industrialprocessesandpackaging.Developingcountriescurrentlycontributeaboutthreequarters(73percent)ofemissionsfromfoodsystems,butgiventheirlargepopulations,percapitaemissionfootprintsareuptofourtimeslowerthanthoseinindustrializedcountries(Crippaetal.2021).Foodsystememissionsareprojectedtoincreasebyupto60–90percentbetween2010and2050withoutdedicatedmeasuresandifcurrenttrendscontinuewithrespecttopopulationgrowthanddietarychangestowardsmoreanimalsourcefoods,especiallyinlowandmiddle-incomecountries(Riahietal.2017;Springmann,Clarketal.2018;Mbowetal.2020).BoththecurrentandtheprojectedlevelsoffoodsystememissionsareatoddswiththescaleofrapidemissionsreductionsneededacrossallsectorstoachievetheParisAgreementgoals(Clarketal.2020;IPCC2022b).Eveniffossilfuelemissionswerequicklyreduced,foodsystememissionscouldpreventachievingthewellbelow2°C,preferably1.5°Cgoalbytheendofthecentury(Clarketal.2020).Forhavinga66percentchanceoflimitingglobalwarmingtobelow2°C,estimatesfromintegratedassessmentmodelshavesuggestedalimitofagriculturalemissions(i.e.methaneandnitrousoxide)ofabout5GtCO2ein2050,inadditiontodecarbonizingtheenergysystemandlimitingemissionsfromland-usechanges(Costaetal.2022;Willettetal.2019).Arangeoftransformationdomainswithseveralmitigationmeasureshavebeenidentifiedwherefoodsystemscancontributetobridgetheemissionsgap(Springmann,Clark,etal.2018;Roeetal.2019;Clarketal.2020;IPCC2022b).Theyinclude:1)demand-sidechanges,includingdietarychangestowardssustainableandnutritionallybalanceddiets,andreductionsinfoodlossandwaste,ForestryChangesinwoodybiomassstocksLULUCLanduseandland-usechangeandCO2removalsfromsoilsrelatedtoagriculturallandEntericfermentation,manuremanagement,burningofcropresidues,agriculturalsoils,indirectN2OinagricultureProductionofnon-foodcropsAgricultureWasteSolidfoodwaste,foodincineration,industrialanddomesticwastewaterIndustrialprocessesandproductuse(IPPU)RefrigerationfromretailEnergyOn-farmenergyuse,transportation,fertilizermanufacturing,packaging,retailOtherGHGsrelatedtoenergyuse(includingbioenergyandBECCS)OtherGHGsrelatedtotheproductionofminerals,metal,high-valuechemicalsOtherGHGsrelatedtowastewater,landfill,wasteincinerationFoodsupplychainFoodsystemsemissionsAFOLU55EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindow2)protectionofnaturalecosystems,includingreductionsindeforestationforagricultureanddegradationofagriculturalland,3)improvementsinfoodproductionatthefarmlevel,includingchangesinthecompositionofanimalfeeds,betterricemanagement,bettermanuremanagement,andimprovementsincropnutrientmanagement,and4)decarbonizingthefoodsupplychain,includinginretail,transport,fueluse,industrialprocesses,wastemanagementandpackaging.Figure6.2providesanoverviewofthemitigationpotentialsofthedifferentmeasures.Wefocusonthetechnicalmitigationpotentialsinthefigure,butnotethateconomicpotentials(i.e.thoseachievablebelowacostofcarbonofUS$100/tCO2e)aremuchlowerandoftenjusthalfofthetechnicallyachievablepotential(IPCC2022b).Toavoiddoublecountingintheseestimates,thechapterisolatesthedemand-sideimpactsfromlanduseandtechnicalimprovementsatthefarmlevel.However,anyonedomainwillgenerallybeaffectedbychangesinanyotherdomain.Forexample,dietarychangestowardsmoreplant-baseddietswillreducethedemandforcroplandthattheneasesmeasurestoreducedeforestation.Inaddition,eachestimateissubjecttoconsiderableuncertainty.Thisisespeciallyevidentfortechnologiesormanagementpracticesthathavenotyetbeenproventoworkatscale,includingbioenergywithcarboncaptureandstorage(LowandSchäfer2020)andarangeofsoil-relatedactivitiesoftenclassifiedasregenerativeagriculture(Willettetal.2019;Giller2022).Whatisclearhoweveristhatthereisnosimplesolution,andacombinationofmeasureswillbeneededtotransformfoodsystemsinlinewithtargetsandpathwaysforreducingemissions.Whencombiningmitigationmeasures,carewillhavetobetakentoavoidtrade-offswithotherissuesofconcern,includingfoodsecurityandhealth,andinsteadgeneratesynergies.Especiallywhenitcomestofoodanddiets,importantsynergiesexistacrossthepublichealthconcernsfortheprovisionofhealthydietsandtheeliminationofmalnutritionandtheclimatechangeconcernforreducingemissions(Springmann,Wiebeetal.2018;Willettetal.2019).Figure6.2FoodsystemsemissionstrajectoryandmitigationpotentialsbytransformationdomainNotes:CurrentfoodsystemsemissionswereadaptedfromCrippaetal.(2021),futureprojectionsfromCostaetal.(2022)andthetargetvalueforlimitingglobalwarmingtobelow2°CfromWillettetal.(2019).TheprojectionsoffutureemissionsarebasedonlifecycleassessmentsthatincludeallGHGemissionsandland-useeffectsbutholdtechnologiesconstantatcurrentlevels.Themitigationpotentialsdenotetechnicalpotentialsand,exceptfordietchangesandsupplychains,wereadoptedfromtheIPCCSixthAssessmentReport(AR6)(2022b).ThepotentialsfordietarychangeswereupdatedbasedonSpringmannetal.(2018),whicharecontrolledfordoublecountingandincludeallGHGemissionsexceptthoseforland-usechanges.TheestimateofcurrentsupplychainemissionsfromCrippaetal.(2021)wasusedasanillustrativevalueformitigationpotentialfordecarbonizingsupplychains.GHGemissions(GtCO2e)05201520302050Target2°C1015202530Demand-sidechangesProtectionofecosystemsFarm-levelimprovementsDecarbonizingsupplychainLesslossandwasteFlexitariandietsPescatariandietsVegetariandietsVegandietsReduceconversionofcoastalwetlandsReduceconversionofpeatlandsReduceconversionofgrasslandsReducedeforestationManuremanagementCropnutrientmanagementRicemanagementFeedcompositionSoilcarbonmanagementingrasslandSoilcarbonmanagementincroplandsDecarbonizesupplychains56EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindow6.3SignsofprogressandoptionsforfurtheractionTheevolutionofglobalGHGemissionspertransformationdomainhighlightssignsofprogressandoptionsforfurtheraction.Italsoshowssomeencouragingexamplesacrosstheworld.Globalfoodsystememissionshaveincreasedduringthelasttwodecades(figure6.3).Emissionsfromagriculturehaveonlyslightlyincreased,whileemissionsfromthefoodsupplychainhavedramaticallyincreased(FAO2021a;Ritchie2019).Thefollowingexamineskeysubcategorieswithineachtransformationdomaintogetamoredetailedunderstandingoftheirrelativeimportanceanddiscussconcretemitigationoptions.Theselectedsubcategoriesaremeatconsumptionfordemand-sidechanges,deforestationfortheprotectionofnaturalecosystems,nitrousoxideemissionsfromagriculturalsoilsforimprovementsinfoodproductionatfarmlevel,andenergyuseinfoodsystemsfordecarbonizingthefoodsupplychain.Figure6.3showstheevolutionofemissionsbysubcategories.Thesesubcategoriestogetheraccountformorethanhalfoftotalemissionsfromfoodsystems.Figure6.3Averageglobalannualemissionsfromfoodsystemsbetween2000–2009and2010–2019Source:TheGHGemissionsfromfoodsystemssupplychain,agriculture,andlanduseandland-usechange(LULUC)excludingforestcoverchangearetakenfromFAOSTATEmissionssharesandEmissionsTotals(Tubielloetal.2021).EmissionsfromtreecoverlossaretakenfromGlobalForestWatch(Curtisetal.2018).ThisselectionleadstohighertotalemissionsfromfoodsystemsthanCrippaetal.(2021),Tubielloetal.(2022),andCostaetal.(2022).6.3.1SustainableandnutritionallybalanceddietsTheproductionofmeatwasresponsibleforapproximately54percentofGHGemissionsfromagriculturebetween2018and2020(OECDandFAO2021).Lifecycleanalysesindicatethatmeatproduction—frominputsinitsproductiontoretail—hasamedianvalueofCO2eper100gofproteinthatissignificantlyhigherthanalternativeplant-basedsourcesofprotein(PooreandNemecek2018).Forexample,beefhasamedianGHGintensitythatismorethan5–10timeshigherthanporkandpoultry,and50–100timeshigherthanplant-basedproteinsourcessuchasbeansandlentils.Inadditiontotheclimatebenefits,eatinglessredmeat,onlymoderateamountsofpoultry,seafoodandleanfishaswellasincreasingtheintakeofplant-basedfoodsisassociatedwithalowerriskofmajorchronicdiseases(Springmann,Wiebeetal.2018;FAOandWHO2019;Willettetal.2019).GHGemissions(GtCO2e/year)0123456LULUCAgricultureSupplychainLULUCAgri-cultureSupplychain04812162024TreecoverlossduetoshiftingagricultureAgriculturalorganicsoilsOtherEntericfermentationNitrogenemissionsManuremanagement-nonN2ORicecultivationOtherEnergyWasteIPPUagrifoodsystemsCommodity-driventreecoverlossAverage2000–2009Average2010–2019Totalaverage2000–2009Totalaverage2010–201957EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowTheproductionofmeathasmorethanquadrupledsincethe1960s(Ritchie2019).However,developmentsinhowmuchmeatindividualsconsumepercountryhavebeenuneven.Weseeahighcorrelationbetweenmeatconsumptionandincomelevel.Theaveragedailymeatconsumptionpercapitavariesfromaround25ginlow-andlower-middle-incomecountrieswhichasatotaliswithintherangeofrecommendedintake,butredmeatconsumptionaloneisabovetherecommendedlevels.Inupper-middle-incomecountriesandhigh-incomecountries,averagemeatconsumptionisfaraboverecommendedlevelswith105g/cap/dinupper-middle-incomecountriesand154g/cap/dinhigh-incomecountries.Inmanyindustrializedcountrieswherethepercapitaredmeatconsumptionhasstartedtodecreaseitispartlycompensatedbyanincreaseinpoultryconsumption.Thesetrendsshowthatprogressonchangingdietshasbeenverylimited.Thisisalsoreflectedinareviewofthenationallydeterminedcontributions(NDCs)thatshowstheinactiontowardsreducingmeatconsumptionbothinhigh-incomeandhigher-middle-incomecountries(box6.2).Meatproductionisprojectedtoincreasemorethan60percentbetween2010and2050,primarilybeingdrivenbypopulationandeconomicgrowth,especiallyinlow-andmiddle-incomecountries.However,ifeverybodyontheplanetconsumedwithinlevelsrecommendedforhealthandtheenvironment(14g/dorlessofredmeat,29g/dorlessofpoultry,and28g/dorlessoffish),meatproductionwouldnotneedtoincreasebeyondcurrentlevels(Springmann,Clarketal.2018).Table6.1ExamplesofpositiveshiftsinmeatconsumptionAreaPositiveshiftsSlovenia,UruguayandEcuadorAveragepercapitameatconsumptionbetween2010and2019hasdecreaseddespiteeconomicgrowth(Ritchie2019).Moreresearchisneededtohighlightthedeterminantsofthischange.EuropeandNorthAmericaVegetariandietsareincreasinginpopularity.Non-meatconsumersrepresentbetween5and10percentofthetotalpopulation(KansasStateUniversity2022;LuskandNorwood2016).GlobalTotalconsumptionofmeatsubstituteshasincreasedbymorethanthreetimes,andtotalconsumptionofmilksubstituteshasalmostdoubledbetween2013and2020(Friedlingsteinetal.2022).Intheseareas,meatconsumptioncurrentlyfarexceedsrecommendedlevels.Box6.2CoverageoffoodsysteminrevisedNDCsCurrently,allNDCsincludefoodsystems.However,demand-sidemeasuresandactionstoreduceemissionsfromfoodprocessing,storageandtransportationofthefoodsystemsarefrequentlyoverlooked(FoodandLandUseCoalition[FOLU]andFood,Environment,LandandDevelopmentActionTracker2021;GlobalAlliancefortheFutureofFood2022;Hamiltonetal.2021).NoneoftherevisedNDCssubmittedaheadofthe2021UnitedNationsClimateChangeConferenceoftheParties(COP26)mentiontheneedtoreducetheconsumptionofanimalprotein.FoodlossandwasteareonlycoveredinafewNDCsincludingtheonesfortheUnitedKingdom,theEuropeanUnion,FranceandSouthAfrica(GlobalAlliancefortheFutureofFood,2022).Ontheproductionside,theagricultureandlandusesectorsfeatureprominentlyintheNDCsofdevelopingcountrieswith86percentprioritizingmitigationinthesesectors(Crumpleretal.2021),butsustainablelivestockproductioncouldbebettercovered,especiallybylargemeatproducingcountries(GlobalAlliancefortheFutureofFood,2022).Agroecologyandregenerativeapproachesarecommon,butaclearoperationaldefinitionofregenerativeagricultureisneeded.ExceptforColombia,foodsystemsactorstendedtobeoverlookedindomesticconsultationprocesseswhichhaslikelyledtogapsinfoodsystemscoverageintheNDCs.WithnewdataavailableinFAOSTATEmissionssharesandtheEmissionsDatabaseforGlobalAtmosphereResearch’sglobalfoodemission(EDGAR-FOOD)databases(Crippaetal.2022)releasedin2021,quantifyinganddiscerningfoodsystems-relatedemissionsandacquiringdataonemissionpatternshasimproved.ThisshouldfacilitatethecoverageoffoodsystemsinfutureNDCs(Crippaetal.2021).58EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindow6.3.1ProtectionofremainingnaturalecosystemsForthistransformationdomain,theselectedsubcategoryisdeforestation,themainsourceofemissionsfromLULUC(figure6.3).Deforestationalsoreducesthefutureremovalsofatmosphericcarboninnaturalforests,furtherexacerbatingclimatechange(Maxwelletal.2019).Atthegloballevel,foodsystemscanbedirectlyrelatedtoalmosthalfoftreecoverlossthroughcommodity-drivendeforestationandshiftingagriculture,andthecontributioncouldbehigheriflinkedtowildfires(Curtisetal.2018;Pendrilletal.2022).Haltingdeforestationthereforeiskeyforbothenvironmentprotectionandclimatechangemitigation.TheSDGsincludeatargetofhaltingdeforestationby2020(target15.1),andtheobjectivehasbeenrestatedinseveraldeclarationse.g.duringCOP26withtheGlasgowLeaders’DeclarationonForestsandLandUse.Despiteallthesecommitments,deforestationrelatedtofoodsystemshascontinuedtoincreasefrom8millionhectares(Mha)peryearin2001–2010to11.5Mha/yearin2011–2020accordingtostatisticsfromtheGlobalForestWatch(GFW)ontreecoverlossdrivenbycommoditiesandshiftingagriculture(GFW2022).Itisestimatedthat29–39percentofemissionsweredrivenbyinternationaltrade(Pendrilletal.2019).GlobalGHGemissionsestimatesfordeforestationin2001–2020varybetween3.4and9.5GtCO2peryearonaverage(FAO2021a;Grassietal.2022;Friedlingsteinetal.2022;GFW2022).Differencescanbepartlyexplainedduetodifferencesindefinitionsofforestsanddeforestation.Uncertaintyincarbonstocksinforestsisanothersourceofvariationacrossestimates,especiallyatfinescales.Withoutnewforestconservationpolicies,289millionhectaresoftropicalforestcouldbeclearedby2050(BuschandEngelmann2017)andhavedramaticimpactsonclimatechange,traditionallivelihoods,humanhealth,biodiversitylossandecosystemservices.Withlessthaneightyearstoclosetheemissionsgapthereisaneedforeffective,unifiedandpublicsystemsofmonitoring,reportingandverification(MRV)ofdeforestationtomakegovernmentsandcompaniesaccountablefortheirdeforestationcommitments(Nabuursetal.2022).Localcommunitiesandtraditionallymarginalizedgroupssuchasindigenouscommunitiesinhabitingandorlivingclosetoforestedareasaredeeplyvulnerabletotheimpactsofdeforestationandthereforeshouldbecloselyinvolved(FAO2022).Theircontributionsandknowledgeareinvaluableandcanhelptoaddressimportantsourcesofrisk.Table6.2ExamplesofpositiveshiftsinaddressingdeforestationAreaPositiveshiftsBrazilTherewasanimpressiveslowdownindeforestationintheBrazilianAmazonbetween2005and2011.Thecombinationofreal-timemonitoring(RealTimeDeforestationDetectionSystem),publicreleaseofannualdeforestationdata(BasinRestorationProgram),stronglawenforcement,expansionofprotectedterritoryandadoptionofaconditionalruralcreditpolicyhasbeenkeytocurbingdeforestationduringthatperiod(Assunção,GandourandRocha2015).Unfortunately,politicalchangesmeanthatdeforestationhasincreasedagainsincethen,evenifitremainsbelowitspeakin2005(zuErmgassenetal.2020).IndonesiaDeforestationinIndonesiahasbeenreducedforthefourthyearinarow(GFW2022;Gaveauetal.2022).Themoratoriumonnewlicencesforprimaryforestsandpeatlandsintroducedin2011hasplayedanimportantroletoreduceconversionofnaturalforestsandpeatlanddrainagetoinstalltimberoroilpalmplantations.Morethan80percentoftheoilpalmrefiningcapacitiesandthepulpandpaperindustryinIndonesiahavealsocommittedto‘NoDeforestation,NoPeatandNoExploitation’.EuropeanUnionInSeptember2022,theEuropeanParliamentvotedtoenablealawthatconditionsfarmerstodocumentthatproductsbeingsoldtotheEuropeanUnionareneitherinvolvedwithhumanrightsabusenordeforestation.Beingresponsibleforapproximately16percentofdeforestationinthetropics(Pachecoetal.2021),theEuropeanUnioncanaddressitsconsumptionofproductsassociatedwithecosystemdegradationtohaverealimpacts.59EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindow6.3.2ReductionofemissionsfromagriculturalproductionEntericfermentationofruminantlivestockisthemajorsourceofemissionsfromagriculturalproduction.beyondchangesindiets,thereductionofmethaneemissionsfromruminantscanbeachievedthroughchangesinfeedlevelandfeedcomposition,whichcanalsoincreaseanimalproductivity(Franketal.2018;Arndtetal.2022).Growingriceisanotherimportantsourceofemissionsfromagriculture,especiallyforlow-andmiddle-incomecountries.Paddyfarmingreliesonfloodedcultivationfieldsthatemitlargequantitiesofmethaneintotheatmosphereviaanaerobicdecomposition(Guptaetal.2021).Changesinwatermanagementcansignificantlyreducemethaneemissionsfromrice(Islam2021).AnotherprominentGHGisnitrousoxide,whichismainlyemittedfromagriculturalactivities.Thisincludesemissionsfromtheapplicationofsyntheticfertilizersonagriculturallandandfromlivestockmanurethatiseitherusedasorganicfertilizersforcropsorleftonpastures.In2019,nitrousoxideemissionsfromsoilsrepresented25percentoftotalagriculturalemissions(FAO2021a),makingitthesecondlargestsourceofemissionsfromagricultureaftermethaneemissions.Productionofsyntheticfertilizersisalsoalargesourceofemissionsfromthesupplychain.reducingon-farmsyntheticfertilizerwouldthereforeleadtoareductioninthissourceofemissionstoo.Tacklingexcessiveon-farmnitrogenusecarriesimportantco-benefitsforairpollutionthroughreducedammoniaemissionsthatwouldotherwisecontributetoparticularmatterconcentrations,andforwaterquality,asexcessivenitrogenuseleadstotheexcessivegrowthofaquaticplantsandalgaethatcanreducethediversityofanimalsandplantsandcompromisethepossibleusesoftheaffectedwater(deVries2021;Maúreetal.2021).Globalnitrogenemissionsfromsyntheticfertilizersandlivestockmanurehavecontinuedtogrowafter2010,andtheaverageannualemissionsin2010–2019were14percenthigherthanin2000–2009(FAO2022).Whileaverageannualemissionshavebeennearlystableinhigh-incomecountriesandonlyincreasedby7percentinupper-middle-incomecountries,theyhavestronglyincreasedinlower-middle-incomeandlow-incomecountries(by25and69percent,respectively).Reducingnitrogenusewithoutimpactingyieldisnotstraightforwardduetothefactthatdifferentcropshavedifferentneedsindependentoffactorssuchastopographyandslope(whichcanvaryduringthegrowingcycle),croptypeandweatherconditions(SharmaandBali2018).Fromequityandfoodsecurityperspectives,unequalaccesstofertilizersisanimportantareaofconcern.Forexample,judicioususeoffertilizersandorganicnutrientsareessentialtoincreasingcropproductivityinlargeareasofinherentlypoorandhighlyweatheredsoilsinAfrica(ZingoreandNjoroge2022).Forcontext,toachieveself-sufficiencyinmaizeinninecountriesinsub-SaharanAfrica,maizeyieldswouldhavetoincreasefromabout20percentofwater-limitedyieldpotentialcurrentlytoapproximately50–75percentofthepotential,withnitrogeninputrisingdisproportionatelymore(by9–15times)(Rurindaetal.2020).Table6.3ExamplesofpositiveshiftsinemissionsfromagriculturalproductionAreaPositiveshiftsChinaNitrogenemissionsfromsyntheticfertilizersandlivestockmanurehavereducedoverthelastthreeyearsbecauseofalongfocusonreducingfertilizeruse.Since2005,apolicyonzeroincreaseinchemicalfertilizerusehasbeenintroduced(Wangetal.2022)andaprogrammehasbeenrunningtotestsoilsandusefertilizersbasedonexactneeds,withUS$1.2billionofgovernmentinvestment.Theschemehasbeenappliedon100Mhaofland,whichhasincreasedtheefficiencyoffertilizeruseby5percentwhileincreasinggrainharvestsby6–10percent.In2017,theGovernmentofChinastartedafive-prongedpushtodevelopgreenagriculture.Thisincludedreplacingchemicalfertilizerswithorganiccompostmadefromfruits,vegetablesandtea(KunandGenxing2021).EuropeNitrousoxideemissionsdeclinedfrom1990levels(IPCC2022b)andthenitrogensurplusappliedtoagriculturallandwasreducedby18percentbetween2000and2009,(Cook2018),mainlythankstopublicregulation.TheEuropeanUnionNitratesDirective(91/676/EEC)wasestablishedin1991tobalancefertilizationrequirementsandprohibitednitrogenapplicationduringsomeperiods(EuropeanEnvironmentAgency2020).Thishasbeenstrengthenedbyotherdirectivesonimprovingthequalityofwaterandsettingemissionreductioncommitmentsbycountry,andpolicyinstrumentswithintheCommonAgriculturalPolicy.DenmarkFromthe1980s,awiderangeofpolicyinstrumentswereintroducedthatledtoacutinnitrogenusebyalmosttwobetween1990and2011withoutreductionofagriculturalproduction(Petersenetal.2021).Akeyfactorofsuccesswasthedefinitionofseveralactionplanswithcleartargetsthathavebeenprogressivelyadjustedaccordingtothemonitoredprogress.Introductionoffarm-levelnitrogenquotashasalsoprovedtobecostlybuteffective.60EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowIndiaLegumessuchasbeans,peasandlentilsincreasethereleaseofammoniumnitrogenintothesoil.Thegreateravailabilityofnitrogeninthesoilcanreducetheneedsfornitrogenfertilizersforothercropswhenlegumesareusedinrotationsorascovercropsorintercrops.Indiahasobservedaconsistentincreaseintheproductionoflegumesinthelastfiveyears.In2020,somestatesdecidedtoincludepulsesinthePublicDistributionPackagethatpreviouslyonlyincludedwheatandricetofurtherencourageproduction.NorthAmericaPrecisionfarmingtechniqueshaveincreasinglybeenadopted.Theseincludeamanagementapproachthatfocuseson(nearreal-time)observation,measurementandresponsestovariabilityincrops,fieldsandanimals.However,ithasnotyettranslatedintolowernitrogenemissions.Itisnotsoclearifeventhemostpromisingtechnologiesforreducednutrientuse(SharmaandBali2018)cansignificantlyreducenitrogeninputuseandincreaseeconomicbenefits(Späti,HuberandFinger2021).VietNamThenationalstrategyforachievingemissionreductionsinriceincludescontrolledwatermanagement,reductionofstrawburningandconversionofinefficientricelandforotheruses.Low-emissionpracticeshavealreadybeensuccessfullyimplementedinAnGiang,amajorrice-producingprovinceintheMekongDelta,contributingtoareductionofover2megatons(Mt)ofCO2e/yearandimprovingsmallholderfamers’netincomeperhectareby7–25percentthroughtheuseofalternatewettinganddrying(Tranetal.2019).IntheMekong,alternatewettinganddryingcouldbepractisedonanadditional900,000hectares,resultinginemissionreductionsof10.97MtCO2e.GlobalTheareaunderorganicfarmingisincreasinginallcontinentswithcloseto75millionhagloballyin2020(1.6percentofglobalfarmland)comparedto11Mhain1999(Willeretal.2021).ThecontributionoforganicfarmingtotheoverallreductioninGHGemissionsisdebatedbecauseofindirectland-useeffectsduetoloweryieldsandtheincreasedmanure-relatedemissionscomparedtosyntheticfertilizers(Smithetal.2019).6.3.3DecarbonizingthefoodsupplychainEnergyusealongthewholefoodsupplychainisthesourceofemissionsinthefoodsystemsthathasgrownthefastestduringthelasttwodecades.Thiscoversemissionsfromon-farmfueluseformachineryandirrigation,foodtransportation,energyuseforcooking,coolingandfreezinginthefoodprocessingindustryandforpackaging,energyusewithinretailandsupermarkets,andhouseholdfood-relatedenergyconsumption.Householdfood-relatedenergyconsumptionincludesenergyuserelatedtotraveltopurchasefoods,foodstorageinfreezers/refrigerators,mealpreparationandclean-up(Pelletieretal.2011).Householdsrepresent30percentoftotalfoodsystems’energyemissions,whiletheretailandsupermarketsectorcomesecondwith20percentoffoodsystems’energyemissions(Tubielloetal.2021),anumberonlyexpectedtoincreaseassupermarketscontinueexpandingindevelopingcountries(Reardon,TimmerandMinten2012).Despiteahighaveragedistancetravelledformanyfoodproducts(Pelletieretal.2011),transportrepresentsonlybetween5and11percentoftotalemissionsfromenergyintheglobalfoodsystem(PooreandNemecek,2018;Tubielloetal.2022).Therapidgrowthinfluorinatedgases(F-gases)emissionsfromcoolingequipmentusedinthefoodchain,particularlyinemergingeconomies,isworryingasF-gasesgreatlycontributetoclimatechangeduetotheirsignificantlyhigherwarmingpotentialthanCO2.Thefoodandbeverageindustryisacriticalareaofactivitycharacterizedby:alargegeographicalspreadunlikemanyotherindustries,largemultinationalcorporationsalongsidenumeroussmallandmediumenterprises,abroadheterogeneityofproductsthatcutacrossverydifferentprocesses,andstringentrequirementsrelatedtorapidpost-productionshelflifeandhealthconsiderations(Sovacooletal.2021).Thisleadstospecificmitigationoptionsandpotentialscomparedwithotherindustries.Themainoptionsincludeimprovedmanagementandtechnologiestoincreaseenergyuseefficiencyandbetterwasterecoveryanduseofby-products(Sovacooletal.2021).Moregenerally,thefoodsectorhasgreatpotentialforadoptingrenewablesourcesofelectricityorheat,especiallybiomasswasteorbiogasfromanaerobicdigestion.Itisprojectedthatrenewableenergycouldcover60percentofexistingheatdemandsofthesector(InternationalRenewableEnergyAgency[IRENA]2015).Simplethingslikeputtingdoorsonrefrigeratorsinsupermarketscouldalsohelpcutenergyuse,butthisisoftenperceivedasasalesbarrier(Jesse,PerottiandRoos2022).61EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowTable6.4ExamplesofpositiveshiftsindecarbonizingsupplychainsAreaPositiveshiftsKenyaAmajordairyprocessorhaspartneredwithanoff-gridsolartechnologyprovidertoprovidesolar-poweredirrigationtosupportfoddercropsandwateraccessforcattle,thusboostingmilkproduction(IRENAandFAO2021;Lukhanyu2021).EuropeAleadingEuropeandairyproducerisworkingcloselywithalmost8,000farmsinsevencountriestopromotecircularfarmingpractices.Asaresult,thecarbonfootprintofmilkproductionforthecompanyislessthanhalftheglobalaverageperkilogram(Jesse,PerottiandRoos2022).6.4Howcantransformationbeaccelerated?Althoughafoodsystemstransformationisessentialforlimitingglobalwarmingandwouldhaveanumberofotherenvironmental,health,foodsecurityandequitybenefits,littleprogresshasbeenmadeinthelasttwodecades(UNEPandUNDP2021).Inthisfinalsection,theroleofdifferentactorsinacceleratingtransformationsisdiscussed.Mainactorsincludenationalgovernments,citiesandlocalgovernments,theprivatesector,civilsocietyandthescientificcommunity.6.4.1NationalgovernmentsAtthenationallevel,structuresforfoodsystemgovernancethatintegraterelevantsectorsandfoodsystemcomponentsareessentialtodrivetransformativeaction(Springmannetal.2020;Steineretal.2020).Oneofthefirstchallengestoscalingtransformationsisthefragmentizedstateofdata,information,knowledgeandawarenessacrosssectors,populationgroupsandpublicandprivateagencies(OECDandFAO2022).Multicomponentapproachesthatcombinee.g.informationcampaignswitheconomicincentivesandfiscalmeasuresaremorelikelytoleadtomeaningfulchangesthanthenarrowfocusontheprovisionofinformationthatmanygovernmentshavetraditionallyfollowed(Mozaffarianetal.2012;Mozaffarian2016).Reformingnationaldietaryguidelinescanbeagoodstartandhelpguidecitizensmakehealthierandmoresustainablefoodchoices(e.g.Seychelles,MinistryofHealth2020),butthisneedstobedisseminatedboththrougheducationalprogrammesandgovernment-sponsoredcampaigns(Springmannetal.2020),andcombinedwithothermeasuressuchasmandatorylabellingandtheprovisionofadditionalinformatione.g.carbonfootprintdata.Thepracticeofpublicinstitutionsmakingtheirdatasetsavailabletothewiderpublic('opengovernmentdata')allowscitizens,civilsocietyorganizationsandbusinessestocreativelyuseandcombinethesedata,whichmayinturnleadtoinnovativewaysofdeliveringpublicservices(Deconincketal.2021)andincreasedtrustforupcomingpolicyreforms.Fiscalpolicies,includingtaxationandtheprovisionofdirectedsubsidies,isanothermeasurethatcancontributetofoodsystemtransformation.Aglobalanalysiswithcountry-leveldatahasshownthattaxingfoodsinaccordancewiththeirGHGemissionscouldimprovedietsandreduceemissionsbyabout1GtCO2eforamodestcarbonpriceofaboutUS$50/tCO2e(Springmannetal.2017).Whenexaminingsubsidies,currentlyapproximately87percentofsupporttoagriculturalproducersiseitherdistortingpricesorsupportingapproachesthatareharmfultonatureandhealth(UNEPandUNDP2021).Reformsarenecessarytodirectsubsidiestotheproductionofhealthyandmoresustainablefoodstoincreasetheiravailability,reducetheirpricesandincreasetheirconsumption,whichcarriesknock-oneffectsintheformofreducedGHGemissions(FOLU2019;SpringmannandFreund2022).Lastly,targetedinvestmentsandregulationcanalsoplayarole.Reducingon-farmemissionswillrequireincreasedinvestmentinpublicinfrastructuresuchasstorageorwastemanagement.Moreovertosupportfarmers,thefoodindustryandretailerscaninvestinrenewableenergyandequipmentviasubsidizedloans(UNEPandUNDP2021).6.4.2CitiesandlocalgovernmentsCitieswillbehometotwothirdsoftheworld’spopulationby2050andalreadyapproximately70percentofallfoodproducedworldwideisconsumedinsidecities(UnitedNationsDepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairs2019).Citymanagementcanthereforeplayakeyroleinfoodsystemstransformation.Since2015,city-to-citycooperationandbestpracticesexchangeshavebeenfosteredbytheMilanUrbanFoodPolicyPact,whichincludes225citiesworldwide.Inmanycities,thishastranslatedintorevisedpublicprocurementpolicies(e.g.forpublicschools,canteens,hospitals,carecentresandsoon)toalignthemwithhealthydietrecommendations(FAOetal.2020),toincreasetheshareoforganicproductsand/orfromlocalsuppliersandtoreducewastethroughdirectives,resolutionsororders,forexample.Moreover,integratingfoodproduction,accessanddistributionacrossurbanplanningmustbeconsideredascitiesexpand(FAOetal.2020).Policiesrelatedtofoodsystemsinsidecitiesalsopositivelyimpactthecreationofjobsrelatedtoproducing,distributing,delivering,redistributingandrecyclingfood.62EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowLastly,citiesandlocalgovernmentscanserveastestinggroundsforpoliciesthatcouldbescalednationallyandforinnovativesolutions,includingthosefromstart-ups.6.4.3PrivatesectorBusinessopportunitiesinimplementingtheSDGsrelatedtofoodhavebeenestimatedtobearoundUS$4.5trillionoutofthetotalfoodsectorturnoverofUS$10trillionperyearby2030,representingahugeopportunityforcurrentbusinessesandforentrepreneurshipinthesector(FOLU2019).Giventheinvestmentopportunitiesinthefoodsystem,companiesandtheirinvestorscouldpursuenewopportunities,disruptiveinnovationsandtechnologytransferinlinewithsocialandenvironmentalgoals.Newproteinsourcesareadisruptivetechnology.In2021,plant-basedmeatsubstitutesgeneratedUS$5billioninsales,andforecastssuggestuptoUS$85billionin2030(Thornton,Gurney-SmithandWollenberg,forthcoming).Processingplant-basedproteinsourcessuchaslegumesintomeatsubstitutesgeneratefivetimeshigheremissionsthanunprocessedplant-basedsources,butremains5–8timeslowerthanthosefrombeef(Clune,CrossinandVerghese2017;Rubio,XiangandKaplan2020;Smetanaetal.2015).Incontrast,lab-grownmeat(sometimesreferredtoascellularmeat)currentlyhasfootprintsthatcanbeashighasthoseofbeef(Smetanaetal.2015;WorldEconomicForum2019).Anotherimportantareatodrivefoodsystemtransformation,fromaprivatesectorperspective,includessector-andcompany-widetargetstoreduceemissionsandeventuallyreachcarbonneutrality(Burnsetal.2022).TheScience-BasedTargetsinitiative(SBTi)andotherentitiesoffercompanieswithtarget-settingmethodologiesbasedonthebestscientificevidenceandguidelinestotrackGHGemissionswithinthecompanies’operations.Thisinitiativealreadycomprisesover1,200companiesworldwide.Akeyaspectisenhancedtransparencythroughsystematicreportingandverificationofcompanyoperations.AnexamplethatopenlyaccessibleinformationcanhelpdriveactionistheBigClimateDatabasedevelopedinDenmarkusinglifecycleassessments,whichhasalreadybeenusedbyseveralsupermarketchainsandthefoodserviceindustry.Publicdisclosureofdatausedtomeasureprogressandindependentauditsandinitiatives,suchasthoseoftheWorldBenchmarkingAlliancewhichrankscompaniesontheirperformance,willbeimportantinassessingprogressandincreasingaccountability.6.4.4Civilsociety(citizensandnon-governmentalorganizations)Citizenscandrivefoodsystemstransformationthroughtheirconsumptionchoices,theirelectoralchoicesandtheirmobilizationinfavouroragainstcertainpolicyreformsrelatedtofoodsystemse.g.throughboycott,publicdemonstration,disruptionoftraffic,etc.Socialmediahasalsoplayedanimportantroleinraisingawarenessontheneedtoshiftdietsandhowtoshiftdietstoreduceourcarbonfootprint.Butthismayonlyreachacertainaudiencee.g.withahighereducationlevel(Ekeretal.2021).Animportantvoiceforcivilsocietyinitiativesarenon-governmentalorganizations(NGOs).Theyoftenworkcloselywithcitizensandcanrepresentamultitudeofvoicesatlocal,nationalandinternationallevelsofgovernance.Forexample,theUnitedNationsWorldFoodProgramme(WFP)workswithover1,000NGOsworldwidetosupport'closetocitizen'activitiesandefforts.63EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowTable6.5Potentialsolutionsandbarrierstofoodsystemstransformationbyactorgroup6.4.4InternationalcooperationInternationalcooperationisessentialamidastronginterconnectednessofcountries’foodsystems,largeinequalitiessuchastheimpactsofclimatechangeonfoodproductionandthecomplexityofclimatechange.Whiledevelopmentsinfoodtradeoverthepastdecadeshaveincreasedfoodavailabilityanddiversity,ithasalsoincreasedthevulnerabilityofsomecountries’foodsystemstoclimateandpoliticalshocks(WangandDai2021)andacceleratedthedestructionofnaturalecosystemssuchastropicalforests(zuErmgassenetal.2020).Withstronginterconnectedness,evenwell-intentionednationalpoliciestoreduceGHGemissionsfromfoodsystemscanbeoffsetbyspilloverstotherestoftheworldand/orcouldraisefoodpricesbutcouldalsospurpositivechangeinothercountries.Thenegativeimpactsofclimatechangeonagriculturalproductionarealsoespeciallystrongindevelopingcountries.Internationalcooperationtoensurethatnoonewillbeleftbehindiscrucial.Channellingemergencyfoodaidwhentherearecrises,avoidingtradedisruptionsevenwhenthereisawar,orreducingfoodoverconsumptioncanallcontributetoreducinginequalitieswithinglobalfoodsystems.Manytechnologiesexistthatarecapableofincreasingcropandlivestockproductivity,enhancingnutritionoffoodcropsandreducingGHGemissions(PathakandAggarwal2012;1Table6.5PotentialsolutionsandbarrierstofoodsystemstransformationbyactorgroupMAJORTRANSFORMATIONGAPSPOTENTIALSOLUTIONSBARRIERSNationalgovernments–Absenceofnationalstrategyandclearmeasurabletargets–Lackofdataandcapacity–Lackofkeyperformanceindicatorstomonitorprogress–Weakevaluationofexternalitiesandincorporationintonationalaccounting›Science-basednationalfoodsystemstransformationstrategyandcorrespondingnationalcoordinationandaccountabilitymechanism›Opengovernmentdata›Integratelowcarbonintonationalfoodanddietaryguidelines›Strengthennationallandmonitoringsystemforcarbonreduction!Unbalancedpoweracrossministries(andobjectives)!Lackofmultisectoralcoordination!AcceptabilityofmeasuresversussuccessatnextelectionsCitiesandlocalgovernments–Carbonreductionisnotpartofthelocalandcitygovernmentmandate–Lackofawarenessofcarbonfootprintoffoodsystems›Strengthencoordinationbetweennationalandcitygovernments/localplansandpolicies›Strengthencoordinationbetweenurbanandruralareas›Alignpublicprocurementwithhealthyandsustainablediets!Localeconomicdevelopmentversuscarbonreduction!Nationalversuslocal/cityinterestsPrivatesector–Lackofcommitments–Lackofcapacity–Lobbyagainsttaxesandenvironmentalregulations›Monitoranddiscloseprogresstowardsenvironmentalcommitments›Remove'bestbefore'labelfromfreshfruitsandvegetables!EconomicproﬁtabilityversussocialandenvironmentalobjectivesCivilsociety–Lackofknowledgeandincentives–Smallnumberofplatformswhichenableinvolvementindecision-making–Lackofresources(NGOs)›Socialcampaignsandsocialmovements›Mainstreamlowcarbonintoteachingcurriculums›NGOsdevelopscorecardsforcompanies!Budgetconstraints!Well-being,culturalnormsandpreferencesversussocialandenvironmentalgoalsAcademia–Sciencenotfullyalignedwithsocietalneeds–Interdisciplinaryapproachesrequiredbutdiﬃculttoimplement›Buildstrongscience-policyinterfacebetweengovernmentsandacademia›Independentmonitoringofprogresstowardstargetsrelatedtofoodpolicy!Disciplinaryfundingstructuresandresearchtraditions!Independence/separationofacademiafrompolicyprocesses64EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowFan2021;Islam2021;Huangetal.2022)butmuchneedstobedonetoscaleup,adapttolocalcontextsandalsoensuretheequitabledistributionofcostsandbenefits.Internationalcooperations,includingSouth-Southcooperation,haveacriticalroleinlow-emissiontechnologytransferandscaling.Ashighlightedinthischapter,positiveexamplesofreducingGHGemissionsfromfoodsystemsexistbuttheyarescarce.InternationalnetworkssuchastheMilanUrbanFoodPolicyPactforcities,theWorldBusinessCouncilforSustainableDevelopmentforprivatecompanies,andtheFood,Agriculture,Biodiversity,LandandEnergyConsortiumforscientistscanhelpinsharingpositiveexperienceandpeerlearningacrosscountries,fosteringinnovation.Inthesamevein,aglobaldataandknowledgeplatformwouldbedesirabletoguidefoodsystemstransformationusingsciencebasedrecommendations(Singhetal.2021).DuringCOP26inGlasgow,variousinternationalkeyfoodsystems-relatedactivitieswereannounced(box6.3).Theseandsimilarinitiativescarrythepotentialtouniteactorsinternationally,(e.g.countries,internationalorganizations,thinktanks,developmentbanksandmore)tomobilizeresourcesandcapacityandpursuecommongoals.Box6.3COP26initiativesthatbearstrongmitigativepotentialwithregardstolandandfoodsystemsemissionsandtheprotectionofnaturalecosystemsTheGlasgowLeaders’DeclarationonForestsandLandUsereaffirmsthecriticalroleofforests“inenablingtheworldtomeetitssustainabledevelopmentgoals”andtheneedto“reduce,halt,andreverseforestlossandlanddegradationby2030”.TheDeclarationhas141signatorygovernmentsthattogetherrepresentaround91percentofforestedareas.TheForest,AgricultureandCommodityTradeRoadmapaimstohaltforestlossassociatedwithagriculturalcommodityproductionandtrade,joinedby28countriesand12companiessofarthatholdaconsiderablemarketshareinforestcommodities(thatis,insoy,palmoil,cocoaandcattle).TheHighAmbitionCoalitionforNatureandPeopleincludesnearly100countriesthatpushfortheratificationofambitiouspost-2020biodiversitytargetsattheupcomingConventiononBiologicalDiversity,suchasplacing30percentoftheterritoryunderprotectionby2030.TheGlobalMethanePledge,currentlysignedby122countries,aimstoreducemethaneemissionsby30percentbelow2020levels.65EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowTransformingthefinancesystemtoenabletheachievementoftheParisAgreementLeadauthors:PieterPauw(EindhovenUniversityofTechnology,theNetherlands),DipakDasgupta(TheEnergyandResourcesInstitute-TERI,India),HeleendeConinck(EindhovenUniversityofTechnology,theNetherlands)Contributingauthors:LiliaCouto(UniversityCollegeLondonInstituteforSustainableResourcesandChathamHouse,UnitedKingdom),MichaelKönig(theFrankfurtSchool–UNEPCentreforClimateandSustainableEnergyFinance,Germany),GeorgeMarbuah(StockholmEnvironmentInstitute,Sweden),LuisZamarioli(theFrankfurtSchool–UNEPCentreforClimateandSustainableEnergyFinance,Germany)77.1Introduction:TheneedforatransformationofthefinancialsystemArealignmentofthefinancialsystemisacriticalenablerofthesectoraltransitionsrequiredtoaddressthecurrentclimatecrises.Article2.1(c)oftheParisAgreementcallsforthisandestablishesanewobjectiveforallcountriestomakefinanceflowsconsistentwithlow-carbonandclimate-resilientdevelopmentpathways(UnitedNationsFrameworkonClimateChangeConvention[UNFCCC]2015).IncontrasttothemobilizationofclimatefinancefordevelopingcountriesundertheUNFCCC(article9),anotherkeygoal,theclimateconsistencyoffinanceflowsrepresentsanewpurposethatreliesonsupportandactiontotransformtheglobalfinancialsystem(Zamariolietal.2021).Thischapterthereforefocusesonatransformationofthefinancialsystemthatengagesallrelevantactors,includinggovernments,centralbanks,commercialbanksandinstitutionalinvestors.Thesuccessofthetransformationcanultimatelybemeasuredbasedontwoindicators:arapidincreaseininvestmentsinlow-carbonassetsworldwideandarapiddecreaseininvestmentsingreenhousegas(GHG)-intensiveassets.Althoughthishassignificanceforallsectors,examplesinthischapterfocusontheenergysector,whereliteratureonfinanceandtransformationisemerging(SteffenandSchmidt2021).1Methodologicalissuesanddatalimitationspersist.Limiteddataavailabilitypreventsafullaccountingofdomesticgovernmentexpendituresonclimatefinanceandofprivatesectorinvestmentsinenergyefficiency,transportandlanduse(Buchneretal.2021).Investmentsinlow-carbonassetsneedtorapidlyincrease.Trackedclimate-relatedinvestmentsinmitigationrosesignificantlytoaboutUS$571billionperyearin2019–2020(Buchneretal.2021).1However,theIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)estimatesthatglobalmitigationinvestmentsneedtoincreasebythefactorof3to6.Indevelopingcountries,thisgapisevenlarger(seefigure7.1)(Kreibiehletal.2022).Accesstocapitalindevelopingcountriesismoredifficultandfinancingcostsmuchhigher,reflectingperceivedcross-borderinvestmentrisksandinternationalcapitalmarketinefficiencies(seebox7.1).66EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowFigure7.1Financeflowsandmitigationinvestmentneedsbysector,typeofeconomyandregionSource:AdaptedandmodifiedfromFigureTS.25fromPathak,M.,Slade,R.,Shukla,P.R.,Skea,J.,Pichs-Madruga,R.,Ürge-Vorsatz,D.etal.(2022).Technicalsummary.InClimateChange2022:MitigationofClimateChange.ContributionofWorkingGroupIIItotheSixthAssessmentReportoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange.IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange.Geneva.https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGIII_TS.pdf.0Actualyearlyflowcomparedtoaverageannualneeds(billionUS$2015/year)Energyefficiency(IEA)TransportElectricityAgriculture,forestryandotherlanduse100015005002000Averageflows(2017–2020)Annualmitigationinvestmentneeds(averageduntil2030)lowlowhighhighMultiplicationfactorsValueGDPshareSectorx2x7x7x70Actualyearlyflowcomparedtoaverageannualneeds(billionUS$2015/year)DevelopingcountriesDevelopedcountries100020003000Typeofeconomyx4x74%9%2%4%x3x5x2x5x10x310Actualyearlyflowcomparedtoaverageannualneeds(billionUS$2015/year)EastAsiaNorthAmericaEuropeSouthAsiaLatinAmericaandCaribbeanJapan,AustraliaandNewZealandEasternEuropeandWest-CentralAsiaAfricaSouth-EastAsiaanddevelopingPacificMiddleEast6009003001200Regionx4x2x3x6x2x4x4x8x3x7x7x15x5x12x6x12x14x28x7x1467EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowBox7.1Financingthelow-carbontransformationindevelopingcountries2Parry,BlackandVernon(2021)estimatethatimplicitfossilfuelsubsidies(underchargedenvironmentalcosts,includingclimatechange,andforegoneconsumptiontaxes)amountaroundUS$5.9trillionperyear.Developingeconomiesaccountfor83percentofglobalpopulation,onehalfofglobalGDP(inpurchasingpowerparityterms),and36percentofglobalGDP(atmarket-basedexchangerates)(WorldBank2020).Giventheirdevelopmentneedsandlowpercapitaconsumptionofenergy,virtuallytheentirefutureincreaseinglobalprimaryenergydemandisexpectedtooccurintheseeconomies(InternationalEnergyAgency2021).An'efficient'globalfinancialmarketwouldmobilizeflowsfromcapitalabundanthigh-incomeeconomiesforinvestmentinfaster-growingandcapital-scarcedevelopingeconomiesintheory(seesection7.3),butthismobilizationismissinginpractice(Agenor2001;GourinchasandJeanne2006;Obstfeld2021).Thereareatleastthree‘frictions’thatpreventcapitalmarketsfrominvestingmoreindevelopingcountries.First,theperceivedhighrisksofinvesting(Koepke2018),sometimesattributedtoweakerpolicysettingsandcompoundedbycreditratingagencyriskassessmentandtheirobservedbiasortendencytoassignhighercreditratingstofirmsandenterpriseslocatedinfinancialcentres(Ioannou,WójcikandPažitka2021).Exchangerateriskscanbeanadditionaldeterrentincontextswherelocalcapitalmarketsarenotwelldevelopedandtheriskscannotbehedgedbecauseoflimitedriskmarkets.Inmarkedcontrast,investmentsinfossilfuelsectorsinmanydevelopingcountriesareconsideredlessriskybecausesuchinvestments,asgloballytradedprimaryenergysources,havegreaterassetbackingandliquidity.Forexample,thesinglebiggestprivateinvestmentinsub-SaharanAfricain2020wasinfossilfuel(liquefiednaturalgas[LNG])exportinvestment(Pekic2022).Second,persistent‘home-bias’ofinvestorsinhigh-incomemarketstoinvestwithintheirownborders,contraveningefficientcapitalmarketsfunctioning(HauandRey2008)(Ardalan2019).Finally,observedprocyclicalvolatilityofcapitalflows(largerinflowsin‘goodtimes’andfasteroutflowsin‘badtimes’)canexacerbatetheproblemandleadtoperiodiceconomiccrises,debtdefaultsandexchangeratevolatility(Dadush,DasguptaandRatha2000).Thesethreefrictionscanpotentiallyworsenwithincreasingclimatevulnerabilityandunsustainabledebtburdens(Volzetal.2020)orleadtoa“climateinvestmenttrap”,especiallyforleastdevelopedcountries,asinsub-SaharanAfrica(Amelietal.2021).Multilateraldevelopmentbanks(MDBs)andregionaldevelopmentbankscanplayalargerandcountercyclicalrole,buttheiroverallroleinglobalcapitalmarketsisrelativelysmallanddecreasing(seesection2).StrategicinternationalpositioningandgrowingfinancialresourceshaveledtoalternativeSouth-Southfinancinginrecentyears(Chen,DollarandTang2016).Somedevelopingcountrieshavealsobenefitedfromnewmarketinstruments,suchasgreenbonds(seesection2),butthishasnotprovidedasolutiontothefinancingdifficulties.Investmentsinfossilfuelassetsneedtodeclinerapidly,becausetheyworkagainstthecleanenergytransitionnowandlockinGHGemissionsfordecadestocome,leadingtostrandedassetsinthefuture(Campiglioetal.2018;Mercureetal.2018;Kreibiehletal.2022).ThefinancialsectorhashistoricallyfundedandishighlyexposedtoGHG-intensiveassets(seesection7.2),includingfossilfuelextractionandGHG-intensiveindustrialsectors(e.g.steelandcement).Forexample,oftheequityholdingsportfoliosoftheEuropeanUnion's50biggestbanks,4–13percentisdirectlyinthefossilfuelsectorand36–48percentisinclimate-relevantsectorssuchasfossilfuels,utilitiesandenergy-intensiveindustries(Battistonetal.2017).Acrossallportfoliosintheenergysector,renewablepowergeneratedhigherreturnsthanfossilfuelinvestments(Fomicovetal.2020).Additionally,currentreturnsinfossilfuelinvestmentsareonlypossiblebecauseofthecontinuedabsenceofcleargovernmentpoliciestocounteractrisingclimaterisk(Griffinetal.2015)andbecauseofcontinuedpublicfossilfuelsubsidies.Explicitfossilfuel-relatedsubsidies(US$340billionannually)2areestimatedtobemuchgreaterthanforrenewableenergy(US$170billion)(IPCC2022).Itisalsointhelong-terminterestofthefinancialsystemtoreduceinvestmentsinfossilfuelassets,becauseaconsiderableshareoffossilfuelassetsislikelytobecomestranded(Campiglioetal.2018;Mercureetal.2018;Kreibiehletal.2022).Basedonongoinglow-carbontechnologytrends,globalestimatesofpotentialstrandedfossilfuelassetsamounttoatleastUS$1trillion.Whenmorestringentpoliciestolimitglobalwarmingtowellbelow2°Careadopted,thesecanincreasetoUS$4trillion(Mercureetal.2018).Togetherwithsocietalandlitigationrisks,thesetechnologicalandpolicyriskscausea“transitionrisk”that68EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowshouldbemanagedtoavoidfinancialinstability(Campiglioetal.2018).Theburstingofacarbonbubblecannotberuledout(Griffinetal.2015).7.2AligningfinancialsystemactorswithclimatechangeThecorefunctionofthelargeandcomplexglobalfinancialsystemis“tofacilitatetheallocationanddeploymentofresources,spatiallyandacrosstime,inanuncertainenvironment”(Merton1990).Thefinancialsystemisanetworkofprivateandpublicinstitutionssuchasbanks,institutionalinvestorsandpublicinstitutionsthatregulatethesafetyandsoundnessofthesystembutalsoco-lendorfinancedirectly.Financialsystemsareregulatedastheyinfluencetheeconomicsystem,andtheircapabilitiesfacilitatethegrowthandproductivityofrealassets(seefigure7.2formoreinsightintokeyrolesandrelationsofactorsinthefinancialsystem).Thesizeofassetsheldbyamyriadoffinancialactorsinglobalcapitalmarketsisverylarge:recentestimatesindicateUS$128trillioninglobalbondmarkets(InternationalCapitalMarketAssociation2020),US$83trillioninbankingcredit(BankforInternationalSettlements2021),andUS$124trillioninequitymarkets(SecuritiesIndustryandFinancialMarketsAssociation2021),totallingsomeUS$225trillionincredittothenon-financialsector(BankforInternationalSettlements2021)andgrowingbyabout7percent(US$15trillion)annually.Givenrapidlychangingeconomicopportunities,risksandreturns,decisionsbyactorsincapitalmarketstochangetheirallocationofassetsevenmodestly,ornot,haveanenormousbearingoneconomictransitions(seebox7.2).Figure7.2Thefinancialsystem,itsactorsandtheirrolesandrelationsSource:Authors’illustration,basedonClimateFinanceLeadershipInitiative(2019)SystemicriskDevelopmentfinanceinstitutionsExportcreditagenciesFundowner,includinginstitutionalinvestorsClimatefundsRisksharing,co-lendingDelegateDirect:publicfinanceAssetmanager,includingcommercialbanksRatingsagenciesEquityandbondmarketsInsurancesLoans,bonds,sharesRisk/returnIndirect:policiesinfluenceinvestmentsPrivateandpubliccorporates(CAPEXandOPEX)FossilfuelflowsClimate-consistentflowsFinancialregulatorsandcentralbanksGovernments(e.g.fiscalpolicy)69EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowBox7.2Complexityoffinancialsystem,policyandclimatefinanceprogressClimate-relatedinvestmentshaveincreasedconsiderablyoverrecentyearsandsohastheinterestinclimateactionofvariousactorsinthefinancialsystem.Nevertheless,progressonthealignmentoffinancialflowstowardsthegoalsoftheParisAgreementremainsslow(Kreibiehletal.2022).Thisboxthereforeputstheclimate-relatedfinanceflowsinabroadermacrofinancialeconomicperspective.Trackedclimate-relatedfinanceflowsfallconsistentlyshortofthelevelsneeded.Theirshareintotalcredittothenon-financialsector(coredebt)during2012–2021remainedverylow(risingfrom0.23percentin2012to0.32percentin2021)(IPCC2022;BankforInternationalSettlements2022).Inequitymarkets(reportedfrompublicdata),themarketcapitalizationofthetop-tenlistedrenewableenergycompaniesgloballywasasmall0.2percent(US$215billion)ofglobalequitymarketsin2021.Toputthisinperspective,marketcapitalizationofmajortechnologystockswasbiggerandrosefaster(US$600billionin2012tooverUS$9trillionby2021).Evenhighlyspeculativecryptocurrencystocks(withenergy-intensive‘mining’operations)reachedhigherpeakvaluations(US$2trillionin2022),beforeslidingrecently.Inthewakeofthe2008financialcrisis,there-emergenceoftherealestateandhousingsectorasareinvigoratedglobalassetclass,afteritsearliermarketcollapse,hasbeenremarkable(Fields2017;Ghent,TorousandValkanov2019;Christophers2021).Between2012and2021,aperiodthatsawasurgeindebtandequitymarkets,therewasnosignificantincreaseintherelativescaleofclimatefinance,despitelargetechnologygainsasseeninrenewableenergy.Incontrast,othersectors,manyhighlyspeculative,sawextremelyrapidgrowth,attractingbiggerinvestmentandfinancingsupport.Theshareof‘zombie’firms,forexample,definedasfirmsunabletoevencoverdebtservicingcostsfromcurrentprofits,rosefrom4percentinlate1980sto15percentby2017.Suchmisallocationinfinancialmarketscanbeattributedtolownominalinterestratesandquantitativeeasingpoliciesaswellasariseincentralbankbalancesheetassets,whichhitcreditworthyfirms(Acharyaetal.2019).Aconsensusoncuttingwealthtaxesemergedinpublicfinances(Lierse2022)whilefossilfuelfinancingremainedunabated(Kirschetal.2022).Whethersuchbroadermacroeconomicpolicyandfinancedirectionscarriedsignificantnegativeeffectsontheslow,observedprogressofclimatefinanceisacomplexquestion(van’tKloosterandFontan2020),buttherelativemagnitudesconfirmthatclimatefinancehasnotbeensignificantinthefinancialsystemnorintheoverallmacrofinancialsettingglobally.Aglobaltransformationfromaheavilyfossilfuelenergy-dependenteconomytoalow-carboneconomyisexpectedtorequireinvestmentsofatleastUS$4–6trillionayear,arelativelysmall(1.5–2percent)shareoftotalfinancialassetsmanaged,butsignificant(20–28percent)intermsoftheadditionalannualresourcestobeallocated.Whilethesizeoftheglobalfinancialsystemisclearlysufficienttoclosefundinggaps,thereisaqualitativemismatchbetweenavailableandrequiredtypesofcapital(PolzinandSanders2020;IPCC2022).Table7.1ActorsinthefinancialsystemrelevanttoclimatechangeActorRoleinfinancialsystemGovernmentsSetoutpoliciesandregulations,especiallytomanagepublicgoodsexternalities,suchasclimate.Inaddition,governmentsinfluenceinvestmentsthroughfiscalpolicylevers(includinggreenprocurement),publicfinance(includinggrants,loansandsovereignguarantees)andinformationinstruments(Whitleyetal.2018).Furthermore,governmentsownandoperatefinancialinstitutionssuchasdevelopmentfinanceinstitutions(DFIs),‘green’banks,climatefunds,exportcreditandaidagencies(seebelow).CentralbanksandfinancialregulatorsPrimarymandatetoensurepricestabilityandfinancialstabilityintheeconomy.Institutionalsettingsvarybetweencountries,butmanycentralbanksalsohaveamandatetosupportgovernmentpolicies.DikauandVolz(2021)foundthat114centralbanksconsidercurbingclimatechangeaspartoftheirexistingmandate.Besides,climatechangeposesriskstofinancialstabilityandhasimplicationsforprudentialregulation.70EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowDFIs(bilateralandmultilateral)Providefinancialandtechnicalsupporttodevelopingcountriespublicandprivatesectors,therebyfillinggapswheregovernmentsandotherfinancialactorscannotdeployneededinvestmentsincriticalsectorsoftheeconomy.Backedbytheirshareholders,DFIshaverecognizedtheneedtoplayanessentialrolethroughinitiatives(e.g.greenbondprogrammesbytheInternationalFinanceCorporation,AfricanDevelopmentBankandEuropeanInvestmentBank;mainstreamingclimateinfinancialinstitutions’initiatives)inaddressingglobaldevelopmentchallengessuchasclimatechange.InternationalclimatefundsChannelinternationalpublicfinancetomitigationandadaptationprojectsindevelopingcountries.Thefundsvaryinsize,geographiccoverage,aimsandgovernance.Exportcreditagencies(ECAs)Officialorquasi-officialgovernmentagenciesthatprovidegovernment-backedsupportfortheinternationaloperationsofcorporationsfromtheirhomecountry.Suchsupportcaneithertaketheformofcredits(financialsupport)orcreditinsuranceandguarantees(purecover)orboth,dependingontheECA'smandate.Thisway,ECAscancrowdinbillionsofdollarsofprivateinvestment.InsuranceindustryProvidesinsuranceasariskmanagementinstrumenttohedgeagainsttheriskofcontingentoruncertain(financial)loss.Insurancepayoutsforcatastropheshaveincreasedsignificantlyoverthelast10years,andthistrendisexpectedtocontinue(Kreibiehletal.2022).CommercialbanksCommercialbanksarefinancialinstitutionsthatacceptdepositsfromthepublicandgiveloansforthepurposesofconsumptionandinvestmenttomakeprofit.Loansfromcommercialbanksarethemostimportantsourceofexternalfinanceforfirms.InstitutionalinvestorsInstitutionalinvestors,suchasmutualfunds,pensionfundsandinsurancecompaniesinvestmoneyonbehalfofothers.Theyhavelargeassetsundermanagement(US$84trillion)inOrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment(OECD)countriesin2017(OECD2018)andlongtimescalesoftheirliabilities,whichcanpotentiallymatchthetimescalesofclimatechange(Amelietal.2020).EquitymarketsComparedtootherfinancialinstruments(e.g.debtinstruments,guaranteesandgrants),equityinvestmentsrequireenhancedassessmentandgovernance(OECD2021)becauseofincreasedinvestors’ownershipofacompanyorassetclass.CreditratingagenciesCreditratingagencies(CRAs)arecrucialactorsforaccesstofinanceoninternationalanddomesticcapitalmarkets.CRAsratethecreditworthinessofdebtandequitysecuritiesbasedonquantitativeandqualitativeanalyses(Mathiesen2018).Notes:Seealsofigure7.2.Theactorswithinthefinancialsystemcanplaykeyrolesinshapingitstransformation(seeHölscher,WittmayerandLoorbach2018).Someoftheactorsinthefinancialsystemhaveanexplicitmandateoraimtoenableactiononclimatechange(table7.1).However,itisnottheprimaryobjectiveofanyofthem,exceptfortheclimatefunds,toaddressclimatechange.Furthermore,successfulintegrationofclimaterisksintofinancialdecision-makingrequiresatime-horizonofmultipledecades,butmostactorsintheclimatefinancesystemtypicallyhavetime-horizonsof1–5years(Chenet2019).AligningtheactorsofthefinancialsystemwiththegoalsoftheParisAgreementisthereforechallenging.PublicsectoractorsPublicsectorauthoritiesaremoststronglylinkedtoclimatechange,inparticulargovernments,centralbanksandregulators,DFIsandclimatefunds.Governments,assignatoriestotheParisAgreement,havearesponsibilitytoimplementitsarticle2.1(c),buttheyarealsoimportanttogiveclimatepolicysignalstoaddressmacroeconomicuncertaintyandtohelpguideinvestmentdecisions(Kreibiehletal.2022).Centralbanksandfinancialregulatorsrecognizethatclimatechangecanimpactthemacroeconomicaggregatesthattheyarerequiredtostabilize,suchasinflationandemployment(Robins,DikauandVolz2021).Furthermore,climateimpactsandthetransitiontonetzerowillaffectfinancialmarkets(keyforthemonetarytransmission),financialinstitutions(oftensupervisedbycentralbanks)andthebroaderfinancialsystem,forwhichcentralbankshave71EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowamacroprudentialmandate(Chenet,Ryan-CollinsandvanLerven2021;Svartzmanetal.2021).Centralbanksmustchoosehowtoreacttoclimatechange:bytryingtomaintainthestatusquobyfocusingpurelyonclimateriskassessment,whichismoreeasilyframedwithintheirprimarymandateoffinancialstability,orproactivelybyaddressingclimatechangeandtransitionrisksbyincludingclimateriskcriteria,e.g.intheirassetpurchaseprogrammes,adjustingcollateralframeworksandcapitalrequirements(seeBoltonetal.2020).Theformerwillposeabarriertothetransformationofthefinancialsystembecauseriskdisclosurealonedoesnotensuretheexpectedshiftinfinancialdecision-making(Amelietal.2021).BilateralandmultilateralDFIshaverecognizedtheirroleinaddressingclimatechange.Forexample,someEuropeanDFIshavecommittedtoendinglendingtofossilfuelprojectsby2030aswellasimmediatelyceasingthefinancingofnewoilandcoalprojects(e.g.EuropeanInvestmentBank,InvestmentFundforDevelopingCountries[IFU],andSwedfund,whichhasinvestedinrenewablesonlysince2014).Usinginstrumentssuchasloans,guaranteesandequityacquisitions,manyDFIsleveragetheirfinancialresourcestomobilizeandscaleupfinancetoaddressclimatechangeindevelopingcountries(Lemma2015;Attridge,teVeldeandAndreasen2019).However,despitetheirpotentialsignificanceinclimatefinance,theeightlargestinternationalDFIsonlymobilizedUS$50billioninmitigationfinancein2020(AfricanDevelopmentBanketal.2020).Thismayreflecttheirpreferencefordirectprojectfinanceoperations(Hourcade,DasguptaandGhersi2020)overde-riskingandcrowdinginprivatecapital(AfricanDevelopmentBanketal.2015)aswellaslimitsontheircapitalexposure(single-countryexposurelimits).ClimatefundshaveastrongerfocusonclimatechangethanDFIsbuttheyarerelativelysmall:together,theyheldUS$34.8billionindepositsfromdonorsandcommittedUS$28.4billioninapprovedprojectsbyJanuary2022(ClimateFundsUpdate2022).Somefundsfunctionexclusivelythroughgrants,asinthecaseoftheAdaptationFund,whileothers,suchastheGreenClimateFund(GCF),useavarietyoffinancialinstrumentstoengagepublicandprivateactorstoimplementandco-financeprojects.Since2020,theGCFalsointendstosupportmainstreamingofclimateconsiderationsindevelopingcountries’nationalfinancialsystems,bydevelopingclimateinvestmentcapacitiesofnationalinstitutionsorbyformulatingsupportivepolicy/regulatoryframeworks(GCF2020).Finally,exportcreditagencies:between2016and2018,ECAsfromOECDmembersreportedUS$5.7billionofclimatefinancethroughexportcredits(OECD2021).Inthesameperiod,theECAsoftheG20providedat3TheBaselaccordsproviderecommendationsonbankingregulationsissuedbytheBaselCommitteeonBankingSupervision.BaselIIIintroducesstricterstandardsforbanksonboththeliquidityoftheirassetsandtherobustnessoftheircapital.leastUS$120.3billioninsupportforfossilfuelprojects(excludingtheExport-ImportBankoftheUnitedStates)(TuckerandDeAngelis2020).ECAsthuscurrentlytendtoworkagainsttheimplementationofarticle2.1(c)andthelow-carbontransformation(seeShishlov,CenskowskyandDarouich2021).Ifthepublicsector-backedfinancialsystemactorswouldworkinanalignedwaytowardsshiftingfinancialflowsawayfromhigh-GHGinvestmentstolow-GHGones,theycouldmultiplyeachother’simpactandincreasetheviabilityoflow-GHGprojects.PrivatesectoractorsPrivateactorsinthefinancialsystemincludecommercialbanks,insurancecompanies,institutionalinvestorsandprivateequity(equitymarkets).Commercialbanksaresimultaneouslyanimportantsourceofdebtfinancingforlow-carboninvestments(Polzin,SandersandTäube2017)andasourceoffossilfuelfinancing.Asanillustration,theworld’s60largestbanksaloneprovidedUS$4.6trillioninfossilfuelfinancinginthesixyearssincetheadoptionoftheParisAgreement,withnosignofdecline(seeKirschetal.2022).Macroprudentialregulation,suchasBaselIII,3promotesshort-termismandhencenegativelyaffectsthealreadyproblematicaccesstofinanceoflow-emissionsectors(Campiglio2016).Fortheinsuranceindustry,climatechangeisathreatbecauselosseslimittheaffordability(throughincreasedpremiums)andavailabilityofcoverage(wheninsurerswithdrawfromparticularperilsandgeographicalareas)(Collier,ElliottandLehtonen2021).Financialinstrumentsarebeingdevelopedbyprivateinsurersandotherfinancialservicesentitiestopriceinclimaterisks,butamajorityofthecompaniesdoesnotintegrateclimatechangeintotheirriskmanagementpractices(e.g.ThistletwaiteandWood2018).Furthermore,internalconflictsmayarisewhenaninsurer’sunderwritersadviseagainstissuinginsuranceinareaswithincreasingclimaterisk,whiledoingsowoulddecreasethevalueoftheinsurer’srealestateinvestmentsinthatsamearea(Riedl2022).Institutionalinvestors(includinginsurers)accountedforjust0.2percentoftotalclimate-relatedfinanceflowsin2016(Amelietal.2020).Theverybroadcurrentpermissiveclassificationsofenvironmental,socialandgovernance(ESG)investmentsobscuresratherthanpromotesscaled-upclimatefinances(Berg,KölbelandRigobon2019).Moresignificantactionhasalsobeenlimitedbytheprioritiesofinstitutionalinvestorsonshort-termreturns,lackofclimateexpertiseandtheirlingeringscepticismaboutclimateriskexposure.72EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowInequitymarkets,privateequityexpansion(e.g.corporatefinancingorearly-stageinvestorsintoaportfolioofstart-ups)isessentialforriskiertranchesoflow-carboninvestments(Hourcadeetal.2021),butprivateequityenergyinvestmentscontinuetobedominatedbyGHG-intensiveactivities.ThehighercostofequitycapitalforGHG-intensiveproductionactivitiesprovidesstillarelativelyweakmarketdisincentivemechanism(Trinksetal.2022).Whilestillpredominantlyabarriertoaddressingclimatechange,privateactorsinthefinancialsystemdemonstrateawillingnesstoactonclimatechange.Forexample,theUnitedNations-convenedNet-ZeroBankingAlliancebringstogetheraglobalgroupof117banks,currentlyrepresentingabout39percentofglobalbankingassets(UNEPFinanceInitiative2022).InsurancecompaniesandinstitutionalinvestorsareincreasinglyawareoftheriskclimatechangeisposingaswellasincreasingESGpressuresfromshareholdersandstakeholders.However,effectshavebeenlimitedsofar.ThisiswhereCRAsmaycontribute.ClimateandESGrisksareincreasinglyintegratedintoCRAs’ratingmethodologies(Mathiesen2018;Angelovaetal.2021)andclimateriskshavestartedtonegativelyaffectcreditratings(CevikandJalles2020).Especiallyindevelopingcountries,higher-riskpremiumshavealreadyraisedcostsofpublic(sovereign)capital(Beirne,RenzhiandVolz2021;Klingetal.2021).However,climateriskstendtomaterializewithhighuncertaintiesandonlongertime-horizons(NetworkforGreeningtheFinancialSystem[NGFS]2020;CoelhoandRestoy2022),whileratingsissuedbyCRAsarerelativelyshort-term-oriented.ThelimitedresponsebyCRAstothegrowingscientificandeconomicevidenceofclimate-relatedrisksmaycausemarketsandinvestorstostruggletocorrectlyidentify,priceandmanagetheirinvestments(Agarwalaetal.2021).Insummary,mostactorsinthefinancialsystemonlyaligntheiractivitieswiththeaimsoftheParisAgreementtoalimitedextentcomparedtothetotalscaleoftheiractivities.Foractorstodomoreandmovefastertoaddresstheclimatecrisis,bothindividuallyandasasystem,externalforcesofclimatepolicy-settingbygovernmentsaswellasfinancialregulatorsandsupervisorsarenecessary.Box7.3GenderresponsivetransformationofthefinancialsystemAgrowingnumberofrecentstudies(e.g.Bosone,BogliardiandGiudici2022;Clancyetal.2020;RobinoandJackson2022)haveconsolidatedtheimportanceofagenderlensandgenderresponsivenessininvestmentsandfinancialpoliciesforlow-carbontransitions,bothintermsofequityandincreasedimpact.Agenderedapproachshouldensurethatwomenwillgainequallyintheemergingopportunitiesfromagreeneconomy,whilealsoimprovingeffectivenesstodecarbonizethrough,forexample,girls’education.Womenareinordinatelyaffectedbyclimatechange,creatingstronglinksbetweengenderandadaptation.Yetevidencehasshowntherelevanceofgenderandgender-smartinvestmentsalsoformostmitigation-relatedareas,fromrenewableenergytoagricultureandforestry,infrastructureandwaste.Thepracticeisdevelopingtoboostwomen’sfinancialinclusioninclimatefinance/investment,withtheexampleofclimatefunds(Kreibiehletal.2022).Overall,however,practiceandliteratureremaindeficient,particularlyinadvancingthebusinesscasetomainstreaminggenderinthebroadercontextofshiftingfinanceflows.7.3Transformingthefinancialsystem:SixapproachestopublicpolicyInspiredbytheinnovationsystemliterature(Bergeketal.2008;Geels2002),thefinancialsystemcanbeviewedasacomplexconstellationofactors,interactionsandinstitutionswithaspecificinternaldynamic,aswellasarelationtotherealeconomyofprojects,assetsandpolicyinstruments.Whenasystemisinfluencedbyexternalpressuresorbysocial,technologicalorinstitutionalinnovationswithinthesystem,itcanchangerapidly.Thishasbeenextensivelydocumentedfortechnologicalinnovationsystems(Blancoetal.2022)andrecentlyscholarsstartedapplyingtheconcepttofinance(Hafneretal.2020;Naidoo2020;SteffenandSchmidt2021).Processestoshapetransitionsarenecessarilyaboutinteractionsbetweentechnology,policy/power/politics,economics/business/markets,andculture/discourse/publicopinion(Geels2011).Therearemultipleapproachestoreachinflectionpointsthatleadtoafinancialsystemcapableofsupportingactionstolimitwarmingto1.5°C:▶Increasetheefficiencyoffinancialmarkets.Inwell-developedfinancialmarkets,marketsfunctionefficiently,butintheir‘weak’form,marketsareinefficient,especiallyinthecontextofuncertainty.However,agentscancorrectthiswithtimeandbetterinformation(Kruegeretal.2020).Financialinnovationsthrough‘engineering’ofnewfinancial73EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowproductstoaddressspecialneedsareamarkofsuchrelativelyefficientmarkets.Themainpolicyprescriptionisbetterinformation,includingtaxonomiesforsustainableeconomicactivitiesandtransparencythroughdisclosureofclimaterisks(Carney2015;Dietzetal.2016;ZenghelisandStern2016;Campiglioetal.2018).Indevelopingcountrycontexts(Bond,TyboutandUtar2015;Hamidetal.2017),prioritieswillincludecapacity-buildingandstrengtheninginstitutions(Banga2019).Relyingsolelyontheefficientmarketsandinformationdisclosurecanhideimperfectionsthatareinherenttofinancialmarkets’structureandpractices(Ameli,KothariandGrubb2021;BoltonandKacpercyzk2021)anddependontheuncertain(behavioural)responsesofboards,stockholdersandmarketstosuchdisclosures.Examplesofincreasingtheefficiencyoffinancialmarketscanbefoundinbothdevelopedanddevelopingcountries.Forexample:●throughvoluntarydisclosures(e.g.recommendationsfromtheTaskForceonClimate-RelatedFinancialRiskDisclosures)andmandatoryrules(e.g.EuropeanUnionCorporateSustainabilityReportingDirective)onenterprises’observedemissionsandprojectedrisksfromclimatechange●thedefinitionoflow-carbonconsistentortransitionactivitiesviataxonomiesandclassificationsystems(e.g.ChineseGreenBondCatalogueandGreenIndustryGuidingCatalogue;BangladeshiGreenTaxonomy;EuropeanUnionTaxonomyforsustainableactivities)●theprotectionofconsumersofESG-relatedservicesagainst‘greenwashing’(e.g.bytheUnitedStatesofAmericaSecuritiesandExchangeCommissionortheGermanFederalFinancialSupervisoryAuthority)▶Introducecarbonpricing.Inthepresenceofstrongexternalitiesandmissingorincompletefuturesmarkets,thisapproachsuggeststhatthemostimportantresponseistopricecarbonexplicitlyandhighenoughforittoprovidesignalsforinvestorstoalterdecisions(Aghionetal.2016).Thiscanbedonethroughcarbontaxesorthroughcap-and-tradesystems(Haites2018).Carbontaxeshavepracticalappealbecausetheyprovidemorecertaintyoverfutureemissionsprices,helpingencouragelow-carboninvestmentsandlowerenergyuse.Emissionstradingschemes,ontheotherhand,providecertaintyoverfutureemissionlevels.Theycanbedesignedtomimicsomeoftheadvantagesoftaxes,includingthroughcarbonpricefloors(Newbery,ReinerandRitz2019).Anincreasingnumberofcountriesareputtingcarbonpricinginplace.Emissiontradingschemesandcarbontaxesnowcover30percentofallglobalemissions,withaglobalaveragepriceofUS$6pertonofCO2(Black,ParryandZhunussova2022).Boththecoverageandthepriceareinsufficienttotransformthefinancialsystem:theInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)(Black,ParryandZhunussova2022)suggestedaglobalaveragepriceofUS$75asrequiredby2030.Similarly,theHigh-LevelCommissiononCarbonPrices(2017)concludedthatanexplicitcarbonpricelevelshouldbeatleastUS$50–100/tonsofCO2(tCO2)by2030tolimitglobalwarmingtobetween1.5°Cand2°Cwarmingabovepre-industriallevels,providedasupportivepolicyenvironmentisinplace.Thereportproposedthatthisgoalcanalsobeachievedwithlowernear-termcarbonprices,butthatthiswouldrequirestrongeractionthroughotherpoliciesandinstrumentsand/orhighercarbonpriceslater(SternandStiglitz2017).Currently,thereareproposalsforhighernear-terminternationalcarbonpricefloors(Chateau,JaumotteandSchwerhoff2022),differentiatedbetweenhigh-,medium-andlow-incomecountries(US$75,US$50andUS$25,respectively).Injurisdictionswithoutexplicitcarbonpricing,shadowpricingisatoolforfirms,developmentbanksandgovernmentstointernalizeacarbonpriceininvestmentsandtakemoreinformeddecisions.Rising(minimum)carbonpricefloorscanstrengthensuchfutureinvestmentdecision-making(SternandStiglitz2017).▶Nudgefinancialbehaviour.Climatefinancemarketsaresubjecttodeepinformationasymmetry,risk-aversionandherdbehaviour(contagionandbandwagon),allofwhichresultininefficientchoices,statusquoanddeteractions.Inaddition,thefinancialsystemischaracterizedbytheexistenceofstrongandcomplexnetworks,nodesandinter-linkagesamongfinancialinstitutions(Battistonetal.2016),(Hüser2015).Whilethismightcreatehard-to-changebehaviourandinertia,theycanbeaddressedthroughcrediblepublicsignalsdirectedatsuchfinancialnetworksandnodes.Routinesarestronglydeterminedbynetworksandarerelativelyeasilyadaptable:imitationofotheractors’newroutinescanresultinherdingeffectstowardstransformation(SteffenandSchmidt2021).Onthedemandside,solutionstoreduceconsumptionofGHG-intensiveusescanbesignificant,reducing40–70percentofthegapinlow-carbontransition(Creutzigetal.2016;Creutzigetal.2022;IPCC74EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindow2022)andcanenhancehouseholdwelfare.Currentdemand-sidepolicystrategies,however,stillrelyheavilyonindividualself-responsibility.Governmentsneedtosteermoreactively,throughtaxes,subsidies,regulations,standards,labellingandpublicinfrastructure,especiallyinsectorssuchasmobility,food,housingandurbantransitions(Mobergetal.2019).Inthecaseofelectricvehicles,forexample,inadditiontosubsidiesandtaxrebates,chargingdensity,fuelpricesandroadpriorityincentivesareincreasinglyimportantacrosscountries(IngeborgrudandRyghaug2019;Wangetal.2019).Greenfinanceinstitutionsadditionallyplayacriticalrole(PolzinandSanders2020;Song,XieandShen2021)innudginginvestorandfinancialbehaviour(Zhang,LiandJi2020;Koutsandreasetal.2022).Institutionsandlocalgovernmentspledgingtodivestfromcarbon-intenseassets,forexamplecoalandoilcompanies,canhelp.Buildingonclimateawarenessanditsassociatedmoralclaims,shareholdersandactivistscreateuncertaintyamonginstitutionalinvestorsaboutthefuturestabilityofthefossilfuelindustryanditsreliabilityasacontinuingsourceofprofitableinvestment(AylingandGunningham2017).Theeffectivenessofdivestmenthasbeencriticized,forexamplebecauseentitiesthataredivestingdonotaccountforalargeshareofinvestors,theeffectsmightonlybetemporary(Ansar,CaldecottandTilbury2013),orbecauseinvestmentfundsarenotmandatedtooperatebasedonethicsbutonrulesthatprotectthemfromtheforcesofpolitics(Mercure2019).However,thestigmatizationandreputationaldamagesimpactthefossilfuelcompanies(AylingandGunningham2017).Basedonadivestmentcampaignby350.org,about1500institutionsin71countriesrepresentingUS$40trillioninassetsaredivesting(Lipman2021).Divestmentalsotakesplaceoutsideofthismovement.Forexample,Europe’sbiggestpensionfund,ABPoftheNetherlands,pledgedtodivestUS$17.4billionworthoffossilfuelassetsby2023(Marsh2021)andstatedthatitreducedtheCO2footprintofitsportfolioby40percentin2022comparedwith2015(ABP2022).▶Createmarkets.Publicpolicycanacceleratenewproductmarketsforlow-carbontechnology,replacingtheolder,inefficient(fossilfuel-based)technology.Publicpolicyactionsinclude:(a)financialandproductmarketregulations(suchasfuelorenergy-efficiencystandards),(b)alteringtherisk-rewardprofilesofinvestmentclassesthroughpublicpolicies,taxesandsubsidiesand(c)directlyengaginginpublicfinancingthroughpublicfinancialinstitutions,greenbanksandinnovationfunds,publicfinancialguaranteestoprivateinvestments,andbypubliccontractingandguaranteedpurchaseagreements.Allactionslowertherisksofnewtechnologyandcanleadthefinancialsystemtofollowandshiftfinancialflowsaccordingly.ThemostimportantrecentexampleofswiftpublicactionstorapidlydevelopaproductmarketusingablendofindirectanddirectinstrumentswasthedevelopmentofCOVID-19vaccines.Inthecaseoflow-carbonproductmarkets,anexampleistherapiduptakeofLEDsinIndia’slightingmarketfromnegligibletoadominantshareinfiveyears(annualsalesgrew130timesbetween2014and2018)(Kamatetal.2020),attributabletoaprogrammeaimedatloweringpricesthroughat-scalepublicagencyprocurement.Industrializedcountriescansupportthecreationofmarketsindevelopingcountries.Developmentbanks,includinggreenbanks,canplayamoreactiveroletostimulatefinancialmarketsasnewerproductmarketsarebeingaccelerated.Thesebanksareatthenexusofthepublicandprivatesectorsandthedevelopedanddevelopingworlds,andwiththeirabilitytoprovideconcessionalpublicfinancing,alongsidetechnicalandpolicyexpertise,andworkingwithdomesticfinancialinstitutions,theycanlowerrisksinnewlow-carbonassetmarkets(e.g.acceleratedsolarrooftoppowerinIndia).MDBscansupportmarketcreationthroughshiftingfinancialflows,stimulatinginnovationandhelpingtosetstandards(e.g.forfossilfuelexclusionpolicies,GHGaccountingandclimateriskdisclosure).Consistencyofpublicpolicyis,however,essential:signalsmustgoinonedirection.Alignmentofpublicpoliciestowardscreatingnewmarketsinlow-carbonenergytransitionalsorequiresexitingfromsubsidiesandothersupporttofossilfuelsectors,suchasguaranteesfromECAs.Steeringinotherdirectionsprolongsthestatusquo,andisexpensiveandineffective.Italsopreventsnormsandpracticesfromchanging,becausesignalstowardstheactorsinthefinancialsystemareunclear.▶Mobilizecentralbanks.Centralbanksareincreasinglyaddressingtheclimatecrisis,andhavedifferenttoolsattheirdisposal(seesection7.2).InDecember2017,eightcentralbanksandsupervisorsestablishedtheNGFS,whichhasnowgrownto116membersand18observers.Mandatesofcentralbanksindevelopingcountriesareoftenbroaderthanthoseofcentralbanksindevelopedcountries;Moreconcreteactiontowardsthisapproachcanthereforebeobserved.Forexample,theReserveBankofIndiarequiresthatcommercialbanksallocateacertainproportionoflendingtoalistof‘prioritysectors’,includingrenewableenergy,andBangladeshBankhasintroducedaminimumcreditquotaof5percentthatfinancialinstitutionsmustallocatetogreensectors(Campiglioetal.2018).75EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowFurthermore,prudentialregulationsareincreasinglystartingtoincludeclimatechange.Prudentialregulationaimsatensuringthatbanksandotherfinancialinstitutions(themicrolevel)andthewholeofthefinancialsystem(themacrolevel)arerobustagainstmarketrisks.Apartfromstresstesting,centralbankscouldalsoconsidergreenquantitativeeasingandmakingtransitionplans,ortransitionpathways,mandatoryforcommercialbanks,forexamplethroughscience-basednet-zerotargetswithinterimemissionsreductiontargetseveryfiveyears,sectoraldecarbonizationtrajectoriesfortheentireportfolio,andminimizingtheuseofoffsets(PinkoandPastor2022).TheEuropeanCentralBank,forexample,announcedtheincorporationofclimatecriteriaintheirassetpurchaseprogrammesin2022.Theprioritizationofwhichbondstopurchase,ortokeepintheirportfolio,iscrucial.Bychoosingtoreleasehigh-emittingassetsfirst,centralbankssendastrongsignaltothemarketforfirmsandfinancialinstitutions.Thesameistrueforchangingcapitalrequirementsandcollateralframeworks.AnotherimportantrecentdevelopmentisthattheIMFhassetupaspecialResilienceandSustainabilityTrustFund(specialdrawingrights[SDR]33billion,equivalenttoUS$45billion)aspartoftherecentSDRissuanceofUS$650billioninAugust2021.Aimistohelplow-incomeandvulnerablemiddle-incomecountriesaccesslong-termfunding(upto20years)forclimatechangeandotherstructuralchallenges,atlowinterestrates,usingapartofnewSDRreserves(IMF2022).▶Setupclimateclubsandcross-borderfinanceinitiatives.Thisapproachdrawsfromgametheoryliterature,andsuggestsastrongadvantageofsmaller‘clubs’ofcooperatingcountries(Nordhaus2015),tomovefasteroncommitmentstoshiftingfinancialflows(sinceglobalclimateagreementshavegreaterdifficultiesincoordinatedactions).Becauseofthesmallersizeandleverageofparticipatingcountries,suchclubscouldalterpolicynormsandchangethecourseoffinancethroughcrediblefinancialcommitmentdevices,suchassovereignguaranteesoncross-borderfinancialflows.Forexample,atCOP26inGlasgow,agroupof34countriessignedanagreementtoendnewdirectpublicsupportfortheinternationalunabatedfossilfuelenergysectorbytheendof2022,exceptinlimitedandclearlydefinedcircumstancesthatareconsistentwitha1.5°CwarminglimitandthegoalsoftheParisAgreement(UnitedNationsClimateChangeConferenceoftheParties2021).ThisagreementdirectlytargetsECAs.Forthetransitionofthefinancialsystem,itiscrucialthatthisagreementisfullyimplementedandthatadditionalcountriesjointheagreement,asJapandidinthecontextoftheG7meetingin2022.TheInternationalJustEnergyTransitionPartnershipinitiativewasalsoannouncedatCOP26,andcouldbeenlargedandoperationalized.Climateclubsaremoreeffectiveandcoulddomore;theycurrentlyprimarilyactasinformation-sharingandvoluntaryarrangementsamongsmallgroupsofinfluentialcooperatingcountries(suchasattheG20)(UngerandThielges2021).Anotherexampleisfossilfuelsubsidyreform,anemergingnorm(SkovgaardandvanAsselt2019)thatisadvocatedbyclimateclubs.Forexample,afterearliercommitmentsbytheG20andtheAsia-PacificEconomicCooperationtoreformfossilfuelsubsidies,thiswasalsomentionedintheUNFCCCGlasgowClimatePact.Ademonstrationeffectcausedbydeepeningtheseinitiativesdomesticallywouldhaveanimportantimpact.Evidenceontheeffectivenessofthesixapproachesabovesuggeststhatthereisnosingle‘silverbullet’thatwilltransformthefinancialsystem,andthatmultipleinstruments,institutionsandactorsunderdifferentapproachesneedtobemobilized(seetable7.2).Forexample,whileinstitutionalinvestorsaremakingmarketsmoreefficientbyapplyingexclusionaryscreens(ornot),theyhavedonesosolelyonthebasisofscope1emissionsintensity,andonlyfortheindustrieswiththehighestCO2emissions(oilandgas,utilities,andmotorindustries)(BoltonandKacperczyk2021).Itwilltaketimeandmorereliabledatatoovercomesuchshortcomings.Similarly,whengovernmentspostponeambitiousclimatepolicy,thetransitionrisksaredownplayed,whichmakestheshort-termeffectsforfinancialstabilitylessproblematic,thuslimitingactionbycentralbankswiththemandatestheyhave(eveniflong-termrisksareaggravated).Instead,nestedandcoordinatedapproachesarelikelytoworkbetterintransformingclimatefinance(SchmidtandSewerin2019;Bhandary,GallagherandZhang2020):theensurethatactionisimplementedinthesamedirection,tailoredtocontextsandpursuedacrossmajorgroupsofcountries,withequityandajusttransitionwithinandbetweencountries.Theinstitutionalchallengestoachievingsuchcoordinatedandcooperativeactions,however,ultimatelydependonpublicsupportandpressurestoavertthesignificantrisksofinaction.Adoptingmultipleapproachesinthesamedirectionultimatelyhelpsaddressavarietyofdifferentbindingconstraintstoacceleratethepaceofchange.Low-carbontransitionsareundertakenbyawiderangeofactorswithdifferinginterests,resources,capabilitiesandbeliefsabouttheirpreferredsolutions(Geels,BerkhoutandvanVuuren2016;Edomahetal.2020).Theotherreasonisthatamultiplicityofapproachesmaysignalastronger‘wholeof76EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowsociety’commitment.Forexample,combinationsofcarbontaxes,useofpooledgreenbondmarketsandsupportivestatefiscalpolicieshaveworkedinsomecontexts(Hoff2017;Nassiry2018;Andersen2020;Hansetal.2022).These,inturn,helpdrivefastermovementupthetypicalS-curvesobservedintheuptakeoflargesystem/technological/financetransitionswheresuchtransitionsaretypicallynon-linear(Dasgupta2015;Grubb,DrummondandHughes2020).Table7.2Acceleratingclimatefinanceflowsforemissionsgapreductionandlow-carbontransition:Multipleapproaches,instrumentsandactorsInstrumentsInstitutionsandactorsIncreasetheefficiencyoffinancialmarkets•Financialtransparencyrulesandprotectionofinvestorsandconsumers•Climate-relatedfinancialriskdisclosure(voluntaryandmandatory)•Taxonomiesandclassificationsystems•Financialengineering(structuredfinance,asset-backednon-recoursedebt,venturecapital,privateequityetc.)•Definitionsanddisclosure/recognitionofriskofstrandedassets•Greenbondsandbondmarketclassificationsandstandards,includingESGstandards•Capacity-building•Financialregulatoryinstitutions•Centralbanks•Creditratingandrelatedagencies•Banksandinstitutionalinvestors•BondmarketregulatorsIntroducecarbonpricing•Carbontaxes•Emissionstradingschemes•Fossilfuelsubsidyreduction•Carboncreditinstruments•Ministriesoffinanceandtreasuries•Financialregulatoryagencies•Ministriesofpower/environment•Internationalagreements(e.g.UNFCCC)Nudgefinancialbehaviour•Nudgestoaddressherdbehaviourandbehaviouralandsysteminertias,andtoprovidebenefitsfromswitchingtolow-carbonalternatives•Divestmentmovements•Taxbenefitstoacceleratelow-carboninvestments•Producttaxes,subsidies,regulations,standards,labellingandpublicinfrastructure•CarbontaxesandregulationsonGHG-intensiveactivities•Ministriesoffinanceandtreasuries•Ministriesofenvironment•Largecorporates,supplychains•MDBs,DFIs,ECAsCreatemarkets•Publicbondsandguaranteeissuancesfordomestic,early-stageresearchanddevelopmentinvestmentanddirectinvestmentsupport,greenbanks•Innovationintermediariesandinvestment•Public-privatepartnerships•Enablingpolicysupport(feed-intariffs,reverseauctionsetc.)•Productmarketregulationsandstandards•Publicprocurementcontractsandpurchaseguarantees•Taxesandsubsidies•Ministriesoffinanceandtreasuries•Nationalandregionaldevelopmentbanksandgreenbanks•Citiesandregions•Privateequityinvestors77EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowMobilizecentralbanks•Prioritysectorlendingandcreditquotas•Prudentiallendingstandardsandbanksupervision,collateralrequirements•Stresstestingandfinancialstabilityprudentialrequirements•Enhancedliquiditysupporttofinancialsystem•Creatingnewassetclassesforclimateinbanking/investmentregulation•Quantitativeeasingandcentralbankbalancesheetactivities•Low-carbonclimateremediationassets•IMFSDRissuancefundingforclimateinvestmentsupportinlow-incomecontexts•Centralbanks•Financialregulators•IMF•BanksandinstitutionalinvestorsSetupclimateclubsandinternationalcross-borderfinancialinitiativesInstrumentsdependsontypeofinitiative,butinclude:•Voluntarystandardsandagreementsonfossilfuelsubsidyreductions•AgreementonECAnorms•Justtransitioninitiativesandfinancialsupportstructures•Multilateralandbilateralclimatefunds•Multi-sovereignandotherguaranteesupporttode-riskandleverageprivateinvestment•Climatefunds•MDBs,ECAs•Multi-sovereignguaranteemechanisms•CRAs•G7/G20agreements•LargerprivateinstitutionalactorsNotes:Therearesignificantoverlapsbetweencategories,andonlyalimitedexercisehasbeenconductedtonetouttheseoverlaps.78EmissionsGapReport2022:TheClosingWindowReferencesIUABCDChapter1IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(2022a).ClimateChange2022:Impacts,Adaptation,andVulnerability.WorkingGroupIIContributiontotheSixthAssessmentReportoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange.Geneva.https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGII_FinalDraft_FullReport.pdf.__________(2022b).ClimateChange2022:MitigationofClimateChange.WorkingGroupIIIContributiontotheSixthAssessmentReportoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange.Geneva.https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/.UnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange(2022a).ReportoftheConferenceofthePartiesServingastheMeetingofthePartiestotheParisAgreementonitsThirdSession,HeldinGlasgowfrom31Octoberto13November2021.Addendum.PartTwo:ActionTakenbytheConferenceofthePartiesServingastheMeetingofthePartiestotheParisAgreementatitsThirdSession.8March.FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/10/Add.1.https:/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