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The Gathering Storm
Adapting to climate change
in a post-pandemic world
Adaptation Gap
Report 2021
UNEP promotes
environmentally sound
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UNEP's carbon footprint.
© 2021 United Nations Environment Programme
ISBN: 978-92-807-3895-7
Job number: DEW/2393/NA
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United Nations Environment Programme (2021). Adaptation Gap Report 2021: The gathering storm – Adapting to climate
change in a post-pandemic world. Nairobi.
Production
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), UNEP DTU Partnership and World Adaptation Science Programme (WASP).
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Adaptation Gap Report 2021
The Gathering Storm
Adapting to climate change
in a post-pandemic world
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TheGatheringStormAdaptingtoclimatechangeinapost-pandemicworldAdaptationGapReport2021UNEPpromotesenvironmentallysoundpracticesgloballyandinitsownactivities.OurdistributionpolicyaimstoreduceUNEP'scarbonfootprint.©2021UnitedNationsEnvironmentProgrammeISBN:978-92-807-3895-7Jobnumber:DEW/2393/NAThispublicationmaybereproducedinwholeorinpartandinanyformforeducationalornon-profitserviceswithoutspecialpermissionfromthecopyrightholder,providedacknowledgementofthesourceismade.TheUnitedNationsEnvironmentProgrammewouldappreciatereceivingacopyofanypublicationthatusesthispublicationasasource.NouseofthispublicationmaybemadeforresaleoranyothercommercialpurposewhatsoeverwithoutpriorpermissioninwritingfromtheSecretariatoftheUnitedNations.Applicationsforsuchpermission,withastatementofthepurposeandextentofthereproduction,shouldbeaddressedtotheDirector,CommunicationDivision,UnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme,P.O.Box30552,Nairobi00100,Kenya.DisclaimersThedesignationsemployedandthepresentationofthematerialinthispublicationdonotimplytheexpressionofanyopinionwhatsoeveronthepartoftheSecretariatoftheUnitedNationsconcerningthelegalstatusofanycountry,territoryorcityoritsauthorities,orconcerningthedelimitationofitsfrontiersorboundaries.Someillustrationsorgraphicsappearinginthispublicationmayhavebeenadaptedfromcontentpublishedbythirdpartiestoillustratetheauthors’owninterpretationsofthekeymessagesemergingfromsuchthird-partyillustrationsorgraphics.Insuchcases,thematerialinthispublicationdoesnotimplytheexpressionofanyopinionwhatsoeveronthepartofUnitedNationsEnvironmentProgrammeconcerningthesourcematerialsusedasabasisforsuchgraphicsorillustrations.MentionofacommercialcompanyorproductinthisdocumentdoesnotimplyendorsementbytheUnitedNationsEnvironmentProgrammeortheauthors.Theuseofinformationfromthisdocumentforpublicityoradvertisingisnotpermitted.Trademarknamesandsymbolsareusedinaneditorialfashionwithnointentiononinfringementoftrademarkorcopyrightlaws.TheviewsexpressedinthispublicationarethoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsoftheUnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme.Weregretanyerrorsoromissionsthatmayhavebeenunwittinglymade.©Maps,photosandillustrationsasspecifiedSuggestedcitationUnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme(2021).AdaptationGapReport2021:Thegatheringstorm–Adaptingtoclimatechangeinapost-pandemicworld.Nairobi.ProductionUnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme(UNEP),UNEPDTUPartnershipandWorldAdaptationScienceProgramme(WASP).https://www.unep.org/adaptation-gap-report-2021Supportedby:AdaptationGapReport2021TheGatheringStormAdaptingtoclimatechangeinapost-pandemicworldAdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStormIVAcknowledgementsTheUnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme(UNEP)wouldliketothanktheSteeringCommitteemembers,theleadandcontributingauthorsandtheprojectcoordinationteamfortheircontributiontothedevelopmentofthisreport.Theindividualsmentionedbelowcontributedtotheproductionofthereport.Authorsandreviewerscontributedintheirindividualcapacitiesandtheiraffiliationsareonlymentionedforidentificationpurposes.STEERINGCOMMITTEEEdithAdera(AfricanDevelopmentBank),BarbaraBuchner(ClimatePolicyInitiative),MinpengChen(RenminUniversityofChina),BarneyDickson(UNEP),VincentGainey(ForeignCommonwealthandDevelopmentOffice,GovernmentoftheUnitedKingdom),JianLiu(UNEP),AnilMarkandya(BasqueCentreforClimateChange),YoussefNassef(SecretariatoftheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange[UNFCCC]),AnneOlhoff(UNEPDTUPartnership),CynthiaRosenzweig(NASAGoddardInstituteforSpaceStudiesandColumbiaUniversity),MichielSchaeffer(GlobalCentreonAdaptation),AlbertoYanosky(GuyraParaguay).AUTHORS,ORGANIZEDBYCHAPTERChapter1.SettingthesceneLeadauthor:LarsChristiansen(UNEPDTUPartnership).Contributingauthors:HenryNeufeldt(UNEPDTUPartnership),AlexandreMagnan(IDDRI),AnnettMoehner(SecretariatoftheUNFCCC),PaulWatkiss(PaulWatkissAssociates),TimoLeiter(GranthamResearchInstituteonClimateChangeandtheEnvironment,LondonSchoolofEconomicsandPoliticalScience),ArjunaDibley(PollinationandUniversityofOxford).Chapter2.FramingtheAdaptationGapReportLeadauthors:AlexandreMagnan(IDDRI),LarsChristiansen(UNEPDTUPartnership),HenryNeufeldt(UNEPDTUPartnership).Contributingauthors:TimoLeiter(GranthamResearchInstituteonClimateChangeandtheEnvironment,LondonSchoolofEconomicsandPoliticalScience),PaulWatkiss(PaulWatkissAssociates),ArjunaDibley(PollinationandUniversityofOxford),FatinTawfig(SecretariatoftheUNFCCC),ThomWetzer(UniversityofOxford).Chapter3.GlobalprogressonadaptationplanningLeadauthors:AnnettMoehner(SecretariatoftheUNFCCC),MaryamNavi(SecretariatoftheUNFCCC),FatinTawfig(SecretariatoftheUNFCCC),MotsomiMaletjane(SecretariatoftheUNFCCC),MichalNachmany(ClimatePolicyRadar).Chapter4.GlobalprogressonadaptationfinanceLeadauthors:PaulWatkiss(PaulWatkissAssociates),DipeshChapagain(CenterforDevelopmentResearch),PieterPauw(FrankfurtSchoolofFinanceandManagement),GeorgiaSavvidou(ChalmersUniversityofTechnology).Contributingauthor:BlancheButera(independent).Chapter5.GlobalprogressonadaptationimplementationLeadauthors:TimoLeiter(GranthamResearchInstituteonClimateChangeandtheEnvironment,LondonSchoolofEconomicsandPoliticalScience),NickBrooks(Garama3CLtd),AlistairHunt(UniversityofBath),LisaSchipper(UniversityofOxford).Contributingauthors:FinlayPettengale(UniversityofCardiff),ChrisGordon(UniversityofGhana).Chapter6.EmergingconsequencesofCOVID-19onadaptationplanningandfinanceLeadauthors:ArjunaDibley(PollinationandUniversityofOxford),ThomWetzer(UniversityofOxford).Contributingauthors:NishaKrishnan(WorldResourcesInstitute),NanakNarulla(UniversityofOxford),BrianO’Callaghan(UniversityofOxfordandHarvardUniversity),AdrianaQuevedo(ODI),NicolaRanger(UniversityofOxford),BenediktSigner(WorldBank).Chapter7.OutlookonglobalprogressLeadauthors:AlexandreMagnan(IDDRI),HenryNeufeldt(UNEPDTUPartnership).Contributingauthors:AriadnaAnisimov(IDDRI),LarsChristiansen(UNEPDTUPartnership),TimoLeiter(GranthamResearchInstituteonClimateChangeandtheEnvironment,LondonSchoolofEconomicsandPoliticalScience),AnnettMoehner(SecretariatoftheUNFCCC),FatinTawfig(SecretariatoftheUNFCCC),PaulWatkiss(PaulWatkissAssociates).AdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStormVREVIEWERSAaronAtteridge(independent),AndreaHinwood(UNEP),AriadnaAnisimov(IDDRI),AlessandraSgobbi(EuropeanCommission),AnthonyMills(C4EcoSolutions),AntonietaRojasdeArias(CentroparaelDesarrollodelaInvestigaciónCientífica[CEDIC]),BruceCurrie-Alder(InternationalDevelopmentResearchCentre[IDRC]),CarolaKlöck(SciencesPoParis),ChandniSingh(IndianInstituteforHumanSettlements[IIHS]),ChiaraTrabacchi(CDCGroup),ChinweIfejikaSperanza(UniversityofBern),ChristineNegra(VersantVisionLLC),DennisBours(AdaptationFundTechnicalEvaluationReferenceGroup),EdoardoZandri(UNEP),EmmanuelSeck(ENDAEnergie),FranciscoAriasRojas(CentroparaelDesarrollodelaInvestigaciónCientífica[CEDIC]),IanNoble(AustralianNationalUniversity),JayKoh(TheLightsmithGroup),JelenaMiloš(EuropeanCommission),JessicaTroni(UNEP),JoanaTalafre(OkapiEnvironmentalConsultingInc.),JulieTeng(UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme[UNDP]),KatharineVincent(KulimaIntegratedDevelopmentSolutions),KathrynBowen(UniversityofMelbourne),KellydeBruin(EconomicandSocialResearchInstitute),KristieEbi(UniversityofWashington),LeiZhang(RenminUniversityofChina),LiamFee(UNDP),LucyNaydenova(AfricanDevelopmentBank),MaartenKappelle(UNEP),ManishkaDeMel(ColumbiaUniversity),MariaSocorroManguiat(UNEP),MichaelMullan(OECD),MikeHarley(LeicestershireandRutlandWildlifeTrust),MozaharulAlam(UNEP),PrakashBista(UNDP),RishikeshBhandary(BostonUniversityGlobalDevelopmentPolicyCenter),RobertRaw(C4EcoSolutions),RohiniKohli(UNDP),SadyaNdoko(UNDP),SeanFoden(C4EcoSolutions),SherillynRaga(OverseasDevelopmentInsitute[ODI]),SophieRathmes(EuropeanCommission),StephanYaboah(CropsResearchInstitute[CSIR]),SusannahFisher(UniversityCollegeLondon),ValentinaBedoyaSerrati(CEDIC),YingWang(UNEP),YoussefNassef(SecretariatoftheUNFCCC).EDITORSHenryNeufeldt(UNEPDTUPartnership),LarsChristiansen(UNEPDTUPartnership),ThomasDale(UNEPDTUPartnership).SECRETARIATANDPROJECTCOORDINATIONLarsChristiansen(UNEPDTUPartnership),ThomasDale(UNEPDTUPartnership),HenryNeufeldt(UNEPDTUPartnership),AnneOlhoff(UNEPDTUPartnership),YingWang(UNEP),MaartenKappelle(UNEP),EdoardoZandri(UNEP).COMMUNICATIONSANDMEDIAUNEP:DanielCooney,DavidCole,KatieElles,FlorianFussstetter,MariaVittoriaGalassi,NancyGroves,RuneKier,ViolaKup,NicoliendeLange,MichaelLogan,BeverleyMcDonald,PoojaMunshi,KeishamazaRukikaire,LailaSaada,ReaganSirengo,NehaSud,andseveralothermembersoftheUNEPCommunicationDivision.UNEPDTUPartnership:MonnaHammershøyBlegvad,LasseHemmingsen,MetteAnnelieRasmussen.LANGUAGEEDITINGANDTRANSLATIONOFTHEEXECUTIVESUMMARYStrategicAgendaTHANKSALSOTO:UNEP:AbdelmenamMohamed,AngelineDjampou,BarbaraHendrie,DanyGhafari,EkaterinaPoleshchuk,JaneMuriithi,JinhuaZhang,KaisaUusimaa,MagdaBiesada,MartaMoneoLain,NiklasHagelberg,RichardMunang,RulaQalyoubi,SamiDimassi,SofíaMéndezMora,SumaleeKhosla,SusanMutebi-Richards,SuyeonYang,YawoKonko.Finally,UNEPwouldliketothanktheDanishMinistryofForeignAffairs,theNorwegianMinistryofClimateandEnvironment,theNorwegianMinistryofForeignAffairsandtheSwedishInternationalDevelopmentAuthority(SIDA)fortheirsupportintheproductionofthe2021editionoftheAdaptationGapReport.AdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStormVISignpostwherethePasterzenGlacieroncelay,Grossglockner,Austria.Photo:©H.RaabAdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStormVIIContentsAcknowledgementsIVContentsVIIGlossaryIXForewordXIExecutiveSummaryXIIChapter1Settingthescene11.1Context21.2ThesixthAdaptationGapReport2Chapter2FramingtheAdaptationGapReport72.1Introduction82.2Theclimateriskcontext82.3FramingoftheadaptationassessmentpresentedintheAGR202110Chapter3Globalprogressonadaptationplanning153.1Introduction163.2Methodology163.3Progressinadaptationplanning183.4Conclusionandoutlook25Chapter4Globalprogressonadaptationfinance274.1Introduction284.2Thecostsofadaptationandadaptationfinanceneeds294.3Financingadaptation:statusandprogressinadaptationfinanceflows314.4Progress,outlookandrecommendations36Chapter5Globalprogressonadaptationimplementation395.1Introduction405.2Scopeanddatasources415.3Implementedadaptationactions415.4Adaptationoutcomesandriskreduction465.5Outlookandrecommendations48Chapter6EmergingconsequencesofCOVID-19onadaptationplanningandfinance516.1Introduction526.2HowCOVID-19hasimpactedadaptationplanningandfinance536.3TheimpactofCOVID-19onadaptationplanning556.4TheimpactofCOVID-19onadaptationfinancing566.5EmerginglessonsoftheCOVID-19pandemicforadaptationplanningandfinancing59Chapter7Outlookonglobalprogress657.1Synthesisofresultsacrossthechapters667.2Thewayforward70References72AdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStormVIIIPhoto:©DanielKawedAdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStormIXGlossaryTheentriesinthisglossaryareprimarilytakenormodifiedfromdefinitionsprovidedbyreportspublishedbytheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC).Adaptation:Theprocessofadjustmenttoactualorexpectedclimateanditseffects.Inhumansystems,adaptationseekstomoderateoravoidharmorexploitbeneficialopportunities.Insomenaturalsystems,humaninterventionmayfacilitateadjustmenttoexpectedclimateanditseffects.(IPCC,20141).Adaptivecapacity:Theabilityofsystems,institutions,humans,andotherorganismstoadjusttopotentialdamage,totakeadvantageofopportunities,ortorespondtoconsequences(IPCC,20141).Adaptationcosts:Costsofplanning,preparingfor,facilitating,andimplementingadaptationmeasures,includingtransactioncosts(IPCC,20072).Baseline:Thestateagainstwhichchangeismeasured.Itmightbeacurrentbaseline,inwhichcaseitrepresentsobservable,present-dayconditions.Itmightalsobea‘futurebaseline’,whichisaprojectedfuturesetofconditionsexcludingthedrivingfactorofinterest.Alternativeinterpretationsofthereferenceconditionscangiverisetomultiplebaselines(IPCC,20072).Exposure:Thepresenceofpeople,livelihoods,speciesorecosystems,environmentalfunctions,services,andresources,infrastructure,oreconomic,social,orculturalassetsinplacesandsettingsthatcouldbeadverselyaffected(IPCC,20141).Hazard:Thepotentialoccurrenceofanaturalorhumaninducedphysicaleventortrendthatmaycauselossoflife,injury,orotherhealthimpacts,aswellasdamageandlosstoproperty,infrastructure,livelihoods,serviceprovision,ecosystemsandenvironmentalresources(IPCC,20141).Impacts:Theconsequencesofrealizedrisksonnaturalandhumansystems,whererisksresultfromtheinteractionsofclimate-relatedhazards(includingextremeweatherandclimateevents),exposure,andvulnerability.Impactsgenerallyrefertoeffectsonlives;livelihoods;healthandwell-being;ecosystemsandspecies;economic,socialandculturalassets;services(includingecosystemservices);andinfrastructure.Impactsmaybereferredtoasconsequencesoroutcomes,andcanbeadverseorbeneficial(IPCC,20183).Limitstoadaptation:Thepointatwhichanactor’sobjectives(orsystemneeds)cannotbesecuredfromintolerablerisksthroughadaptiveactions.●Hardadaptationlimit:Noadaptiveactionsarepossibletoavoidintolerablerisks.●Softadaptationlimit:Optionsarecurrentlynotavailabletoavoidintolerablerisksthroughadaptiveaction(IPCC,20141).Maladaptation:Actionsthatmayleadtoincreasedriskofadverseclimate-relatedoutcomes,includingviaincreasedgreenhousegas(GHG)emissions,increasedvulnerabilitytoclimatechange,ordiminishedwelfare,noworinthefuture.Maladaptationisusuallyanunintendedconsequence(IPCC,20183).Mitigation(ofclimatechange):Ahumaninterventiontoreducethesourcesorenhancethesinksofgreenhousegases(IPCC,20141).RepresentativeConcentrationPathways(RCPs):[Climatechange]Scenariosthatincludetimeseriesofemissionsandconcentrationsofthefullsuiteofgreenhousegases(GHGs)andaerosolsandchemicallyactivegases,aswellaslanduse/landcover.ThewordrepresentativesignifiesthateachRCPprovidesonlyoneofmanypossiblescenariosthatwouldleadtothespecificradiativeforcingcharacteristics.Thetermpathwayemphasizesthefactthatnotonlythelong-termconcentrationlevelsbutalsothetrajectorytakenovertimetoreachthatoutcome(IPCC,20141).Resilience:Thecapacityofsocial,economicandenvironmentalsystemstocopewithahazardouseventortrendordisturbance,respondingorreorganizinginwaysthatmaintaintheiressentialfunction,identityandstructure,whilealsomaintainingthecapacityforadaptation,learningandtransformation(IPCC,20141).Risk:Thepotentialforconsequenceswheresomethingofvalueisatstakeandwheretheoutcomeisuncertain,recognizingthediversityofvalues.Riskisoftenrepresentedasprobabilityofoccurrenceofhazardouseventsortrendsmultipliedbytheimpactsiftheseeventsortrendsoccur.Riskresultsfromtheinteractionofvulnerability,exposure,andhazard(IPCC,20141).Vulnerability:Thepropensityorpredispositiontobeadverselyaffected.Vulnerabilityencompassesavarietyofconceptsandelementsincludingsensitivityorsusceptibilitytoharmandlackofcapacitytocopeandadapt(IPCC,20141).1https://archive.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg2/WGIIAR5-AnnexII_FINAL.pdf.2https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ar4-wg2-app-1.pdf.3https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/06/SR15_AnnexI_Glossary.pdf.AdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStormXPhoto:©Qimono/PixabayAdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStormXI2021wastheyearinwhichclimateimpactshitdevelopedanddevelopingcountrieswithanewferocity.TheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange,meanwhile,warnedwehaveatbesta50percentchanceoflimitingglobalwarmingtoa1.5°Ctemperaturerisethiscentury.So,evenaswelooktostepupeffortstocutgreenhousegasemissions–effortsthatarestillnotanywherestrongenough–wemustdramaticallyupourgametoadapt.ThisisbecausethesixtheditionoftheUNEPAdaptationGapReportfindsthatclimateimpactscontinuetooutpaceourattemptstoadapttothem.Adaptationfinancingisamajorconcern.Thegapbetweenwhatweneedtospendtoadaptandwhatweareactuallyspendingiswidening.EstimatedcostsofadaptationcontinuetoriseandcouldreachUS$280-500billionperyearby2050fordevelopingcountriesalone.Meanwhile,internationalpublicadaptationfinancehasincreasedmorethan50percentbetween2017–2018and2019–2020butstillremainsfartoolow.COVID-19recoverystimuluspackagesareawindowofopportunityforgreenandresilientrecoveriesthatisbeinglost.US$16.7trillionoffiscalstimulushasbeendeployed,butonlyasmallportionofthisfundinghasgonetowardsadaptation.Lessthanone-thirdof66countriesstudiedexplicitlyfundedCOVID-19measurestoaddressclimaterisksuptoJanuary2021.Moreover,theheightenedcostofservicingdebt,combinedwithdecreasedgovernmentrevenues,mayhamperfuturegovernmentspendingonadaptation,particularlyindevelopingcountries.Atthesametime,thereportalsopointstoanumberofencouragingdevelopments.Implementationofadaptationactionsdidgrow,backedbytheAdaptationFund,theGreenClimateFund,theGlobalEnvironmentFacilityandbilateralpublicfunding.InformationfromtheOrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopmentshowsthatthetop10donorsfundedmorethan2,600projectswithaprincipalfocusonadaptationbetween2010and2019.Thereportalsofindsthatclimatechangeadaptationisincreasinglybeingembeddedinpolicyandplanningacrosstheworld.Around79percentofallcountrieshavenowadoptedatleastonenational-leveladaptationplanninginstrument,anincreaseof7percentsince2020.However,wearejustnotdoingenough.Weneedtoscaleupandfurtherincreasepublicadaptationfinance,includingbyovercomingbarriersforprivatesectorengagement.Asimplementationatcurrentratesmaynotkeeppacewithincreasinglevelsofclimatechange,weneedtoturnthegrowthinpolicyandplanningintorealandrapidimplementationandfinancialsupport.Evenifweweretoturnoffthetapongreenhousegasemissionstoday,theimpactsofclimatechangewouldbewithusfordecadestocome.Thisreportclearlyshowsthatweneedastepchangeinadaptationambitionforfundingandimplementationtosignificantlyreducedamagesandlossesfromclimatechange.Andweneeditnow.IngerAndersenExecutiveDirectorUnitedNationsEnvironmentProgrammeForewordAdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStormXIIExecutivesummaryContextandframingoftheUNEPAdaptationGapReport2021ThesixtheditionoftheUNEPAdaptationGapReport(AGR2021)hasbeenproducedinthesecondyearoftheglobalCOVID-19pandemic.Whileencouragingtrendsintacklingthepandemicareemerging,includingtheunprecedenteddevelopmentandroll-outofhighlyeffectivevaccinesinmanyindustrializedcountries,theCOVID-19crisiscontinuestocreateseverehumanhealthchallenges,economicturmoilandrecurringrestrictionsondailylifeinmostpartsoftheworld.Thepandemic’simpactonglobalclimatechangeadaptationprocessesisincreasinglyvisiblethroughdirecteffectsonadaptationplanningandconstraintsonavailablefinance.Climateimpactsalsotendtobemoresevereinvulnerabledevelopingeconomies,manyofwhicharealsoamongtheworstaffectedbyCOVID-19.Atthesametime,rescueandrecoveryinitiativesdesignedtokickstarteconomiesinthewakeofthepandemicofferauniqueopportunitytosecureagreenrecoverybymainstreamingadaptationintopublicfinancingstreamsworthtrillionsofdollars,dwarfingthesumsotherwisededicatedtoadaptation.Furthermore,climatechangeandthepandemicsharesomestrikingsimilarities:likethepandemic,theclimatechangecrisisisasystemicproblemthatrequirescoordinatedglobal,nationalandlocalresponses.Manyofthelessonslearnedfromhandlingthepandemichavethepotentialtoserveasexamplesofhowtoimproveclimateadaptationplanningandfinancing.Meanwhile,climatechangecontinuesitsunrelentingpathtowardsawarmerfuture.AstheSixthAssessmentReport(AR6)oftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC),releasedinAugust2021,starklydocuments,someimpactsarenowirreversible.Manypartsoftheworldhaveexperiencedunprecedentedclimateimpactsthisyear,suchastheheatdomeandrampantwildfiresinthePacificNorthwestoftheUnitedStatesofAmericaandCanada;severefloodinginWesternEurope,easternpartsoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,theprovinceofHenaninChina,andthestateofMaharashtrainIndia;andimminenthungeraftercontinueddroughtsinMadagascar.Theassessmentreportalsodocumentshow,evenunderthemostoptimisticemissionsmitigationscenarioswherenet-zeroisreachedbyaround2050,globalwarmingwillcontinueintheshorttomediumterm,potentiallylevellingoffat1.5°Cabovepre‑industriallevels.Allthismakesadaptationanincreasinglyurgentglobalimperative.Atthepoliticallevel,internationalclimateeffortsundertheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC)continue,despitethepostponementofthetwenty-sixthsessionoftheConferenceofthePartiestotheUNFCCC(COP26),whichwasputbackfromNovember2020toNovember2021.COP26willhaveastrongfocusonadaptationissuesandwillseeconsultationsandworkproceedtowardsthefirstGlobalStocktakein2023,includingthesubmissionofnewandupdatedNationallyDeterminedContributions(NDCs).AGR2021providesanupdateoncurrentactionsandtheemergingresultsofregional-leveltonational-leveladaptationplanning,financeandimplementationworldwide(figureES.1).Allthreeelementsarecriticalfortrackingandassessingprogresstowardstheglobalgoalonadaptation.AGR2021alsoexpandsandstrengthenstheassessmentoffutureadaptationoutcomes,inparticularthroughtheinclusionofqualitativeexpertjudgements.Inviewoftheongoingpandemic,thereportprovidesanin-depthassessmentoftheemergingconsequencesofCOVID-19inrelationtoadaptationplanningandfinanceandhighlightsthelessonsandopportunitiesforfutureadaptationeffortsthrougheconomicgrowthandclimateresilienceaspartofagreenrecovery.Statusandprogressofglobaladaptationplanning,financeandimplementationPLANNINGDespitetheCOVID-19pandemic,climatechangeadaptationisbecomingincreasinglyembeddedinpolicyandplanningacrosstheworld.National-leveladaptationplanningprocessesremainacriticalelementintheglobalresponsetotheimpactsofclimatechange,asunderscoredbytheParisAgreement.WhileearlyevidencesuggeststhatsomeNationalAdaptationPlan(NAP)developmentprocesseshavebeendelayedbytheCOVID-19pandemic,particularlyamongleastdevelopedcountries,progressisstillbeingmadeonnationaladaptationplanningagendas.Around79percentofallcountrieshavenowadoptedatleastonenational-leveladaptationplanninginstrument(forexample,aplan,strategy,policyorlaw).Thisisanincreaseof7percentsince2020(figureES.1).Furthermore,9percentofcountriesthatdonotcurrentlyhavesuchaninstrumentinplaceareintheprocessofdevelopingone(nochangesince2020).Atleast65percentofcountrieshaveoneormoresectoralplansinplaceandatleast26percenthaveoneormoresubnationalplanninginstruments.ExecutivesummaryXIIIFigureES.1Statusofadaptationplanningworldwide,asat5August2021NoInprogressN/AYesNationalplan,strategy,laworpolicyinplaceIndicatorsofadequacyandeffectivenessofadaptationplanningshowpositivetrendscomparedto2020.Whileitiscurrentlynotpossibletodirectlyassesstheadequacyandeffectivenessofadaptationplanningduetoalackofconsensusondefinitionsandapproachestotheirassessment,itispossibletoanalyserelevantelementsindirectlybyexaminingthecomprehensiveness,inclusiveness,implementability,integration,andmonitoringandevaluation(M&E)ofplanninginstruments.Comparedtoasimilaranalysispresentedinthe2020editionoftheAdaptationGapReport(AGR2020),thisyear’sreport–basedonanupdatedanalysisreflectingnewsubmissionsofNDCs,NAPsandAdaptationCommunications–showsthatcountrieshavemadeconsistentprogressindevelopingadaptationplanninginstrumentsandacrossalmostallindicatorsofadequateandeffectiveadaptationplanning.Thisprogressislargelyincremental(within10percentofthepreviousscore),withtheexceptionofareassuchasstakeholderengagement,genderconsiderationsandtheuseofpolicyinstruments,whichsawlargerincreases(figureES.2).Regardinginclusiveness,morecountriesnowdemonstratestakeholderengagement(anincreasefrom43percentto70percentbetween2020and2021)andgenderconsiderations(anincreasefrom52percentto73percentbetween2020and2021).Therewasalsoasignificantincreaseintheapplicationofpolicyinstrumentsdeemedtoenhancetheimplementabilityofadaptationplansthroughprovisionsforinvestments(50percentin2021comparedto31percentin2020),regulations(49percentin2021comparedto28percentin2020)andincentives(30percentin2021comparedto8percentin2020).Likewise,overtwo-thirdsofallcountries(9percentmorethanin2020)arenowtargetingprioritysectorswiththeirplanninginstruments.Progressisalsobeingmadeonintegration:75percentofcountriesnowhavehorizontalcoordinationmechanisms(comparedto68percentin2020)and32percenthaveverticalcoordinationmechanisms(comparedto26percentin2020).Ontheotherhand,progressismixedforM&E:while26percentofcountrieshaveM&Esystemsinplaceandanother36percentareintheprocessofdevelopingasystem,only8percentofcountrieshaveevaluatedtheiradaptationplans.Thisisfrequentlyattributedtothelackoffinancial,humanandtechnicalresources.Note:TerritoriesmarkedasN/AarethosewhicharerecognizedasdisputedbytheUnitedNationsorwhosestatushasnotyetbeenagreedupon.AdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStormXIVPresentInprogress/partialAbsentIncreaseinpresenceofindicatorsincetheAGR2020CriteriaandindicatorsforadequateandeffectiveadaptationplanningStatusofindicatorsforadequateandeffectiveadaptationplanningacrossthe196PartiestotheUNFCCCPercentageofcountriesNumberofcountries049981471960%25%50%75%100%1.1Optionsaddressassessedrisks2.1Stakeholderengagement2.2Dedicatedstakeholderengagementprocessinplace2.3Gender3.1Centraladministrationincharge3.2Regulations3.3Incentives3.4Directinvestment/funding4.1Horizontalcoordinationmechanism4.2Sectoralplans4.3Verticalcoordinationmechanism4.4Subnationalplans5.1M&Esysteminplace5.2Progress/monitoringreportpublished5.3Evaluationundertakenandpublished1.Comprehensiveness3.Implementability4.Integration2.Inclusiveness5.MonitoringandevaluationFigureES.2AssessingtheadequacyandeffectivenessofadaptationplanningworldwideNote:ThechangesintheM&Eindicators(5.1–5.3)arenotshownbecausethescoringmethodologyhaschangedsince2020.FINANCINGNewestimatesofthecostsofadaptationandtheestimatedfinancialneedsforadaptationfromdevelopingcountriesindicatehighervaluesthanpreviouslyreported.Thereviewofthemostrecentadaptationcostestimatesfromtheliteratureandthefinanceneedsexpressedbycountries’submissionstotheUNFCCCresultedinanumberofmajorfindings.First,estimatesoftheeconomiccostsofclimatechangeindevelopingcountriesarenowgenerallyhigherthanindicatedinearlierstudies.Thisistruebothlaterinthecentury,underhigherwarmingscenarios,butcruciallyalsooverthenexttwodecadesevenunderambitiousmitigationscenarios.Second,theestimatedannualadaptationcostsintheliteraturearenowalsogenerallyintheupperrangeofthe2016estimateoftheAdaptationGapReportofUS$140–300billionby2030andUS$280–500billionby2050.Third,areviewofupdatedNDCsandNAPsindicatesthatestimatesofadaptationfinancingneedsareincreasinginmanycountries,oftenduetotheincorporationofmoresectors.Asectoralanalysisofsubmissionsrevealsthatthefoursectorsofagriculture,infrastructure,wateranddisasterriskmanagementmakeupthree-quartersofquantifiedadaptationfinanceneedssofar(figureES.3).Takentogether,thesefindingssuggestincreasingcostsofadaptationcomparedtopreviousAGRassessments,particularlyintheeventoffailingtomeettheParisAgreementgoalofkeepingtheincreaseintheglobalaveragetemperaturewellbelow2°Cabovepre-industriallevels.Thisnewemergingevidencemeansamoredetailedandsystemicstocktakeofthecostsofadaptationandfinanceneedsisrequired.ExecutivesummaryXVFigureES.3Adaptationfinanceneedsbysectorsbasedon26developingcountries’NDCsandNAPsAgriculture(26.0%)Infrastructure(22.6%)Adaptationfinanceneeds(percentageofannualtotal)Water(15.2%)Disaster(12.5%)Forestsandecosystems(6.4%)Energy(4.6%)Coastalandmarineresources(3.4%)Health(1.7%)Tourism(0.8%)Othersectors(6.8%)Theevidencesuggeststhattheadaptationfinancegapislargerthanindicatedin2020andwidening.Despitearecenttrendofgraduallyincreasinginternationalpublicadaptationfinancefordevelopingcountriesupto2019,adaptationfinanceflowsareprojectedtostabilizeorpossiblyevendeclineasaresultoftheCOVID-19pandemic.Thisisduetofinancialinstitutionsandgovernments–includingthoseinadvancedeconomies,whichprovidethemajorityofdedicatedinternationaladaptationfunding–needingtoprioritizelimitedresourcestomeettheurgenthealthandfinancialneedscausedbyCOVID-19.Whileconclusivedataisstillpending,themostrecentanalysisindicatesthatclimatefinanceflowstodevelopingcountries(forbothmitigationandadaptation)reachedUS$79.6billionin2019.IntheabsenceofasignificantincreaseofaroundUS$20billion(26percent)in2020,theUS$100billionmobilizationgoalfor2020willnothavebeenmet.Despitethelimitationsoftheavailableevidence,estimatedadaptationcostsandlikelyadaptationfinancingneedsindevelopingcountriesarefivetotentimesgreaterthancurrentinternationalpublicadaptationfinanceflows.EvidencesuggeststhatthegapislargerthanindicatedinthepreviousAGR(2020)andiswidening,duetoadaptationcostsandfinanceneedsbeinghigherandfundingflowsremainingstableordecreasing.Thereisanurgentneedtoscaleupandfurtherincreasepublicadaptationfinancebothfordirectinvestmentandforovercomingbarrierstoprivate-sectoradaptation.Newinstruments,actorsandapproachestoscaleupadaptationfinanceareemerging,includingprivate-sectoradaptationfinancing.Theseofferopportunitiestoraiseadaptationfinance(forexample,resiliencebonds)andtousepublicadaptationfinancetoleverageprivateinvestment(forexample,usingblendedfinancetode-riskinvestments).However,duetothebarrierstoprivatefinance(includingaroundinformation,positiveexternalitiesandlowrevenues)andthepublicinterventionsorfinanceneededtoovercomethese,therateofuptakeandthescalingupofthesenewinstrumentsremainsslow.Furthermore,privateinvestmentwillgravitatetoopportunitieswhererevenuesarehighestandrisksarelowest.Itisunlikelytotargetthemostvulnerableinleastdevelopedcountriesornon-marketsectors.Thisunderscoresthecontinuedimportanceofinternationalpublicsupportandtherequirementtofurtherincreaseambition.IMPLEMENTATIONImplementationofadaptationactionsiscontinuingtogrowslowlyworldwide,despiteuncertaintyaboutfuturetrajectories.Althoughtherehasbeenincreasedvariabilityinthenumberofnewprojectsoverthelastfouryears,theimplementationofadaptationinitiativesapprovedunderthethreemultilateralfundsservingtheParisAgreementthroughtheprovisionoffundingforadaptation(theAdaptationFund,theGreenClimateFundandtheGlobalEnvironmentFacility)hasrisenslowlybutsteadily.Thetendencyforlargerprojects(morethanUS$10million)alsoremainsintact.InformationfromtheOrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopmentshowsthatthetop10donorsfundedmorethan2,600projectsbetween2010and2019withaprincipalfocusonadaptation.Thishighlightstheimportantroleofbilateralsupportforadaptation(figureES.4).About20percentoftheprojectsprimarilyaddresstheagriculturalsectorand20percentfocusonecosystems.Almost30percentaremulti-sectoralprojects,whileapproximatelytwoin10projectsweredirectedtowardseitherwaterorAdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStormXVIFigureES.4Numberofnewprincipaladaptationprojectsstartedperyearwithfundingfromthetop10bilateraladaptationdonors02001003004005002010179201117320122092013242201423320152772016430201736120181912019312infrastructure.Thesectoralprioritiesalignwithfourofthetopfiveadaptationprioritiesmentionedincountries’mostrecentlysubmittedNDCs.However,health,thethirdmostfrequentlymentionedpriority,isseldomtheprimaryfocus,confirmingthefindingsoftheprevioustworeports.Regionaldisaggregationshowsthatadaptationinitiativesareconcentratedineastern,southernandwesternAfrica,SouthandSoutheastAsiaandpartsofSouthAmerica(figureES.5).Implementationlevelsmustbefurtherscaleduptoavoidfallingbehindwithmanagingclimaterisks,particularlyindevelopingcountries.Thelimiteddataontheeffectivenessofadaptationactivitiesforreducingclimaterisk,combinedwiththeescalatingimpactsdocumentedinthemostrecentIPCCassessmentreport,impliesthatcurrentimplementationratesmaynotkeeppacewithincreasinglevelsofclimatechange.Thedesignofadaptationinterventionsneedstoconsiderfactorsidentifiedasmakingeffectiveriskreductionmorelikely,includingathoroughunderstandingofclimaterisksandtheirinteractionwithlocalcontexts,inclusionofthetargetpopulationinprojectdesign,jointagreementonobjectivesandwaysofachievingthem,andavoidanceofpotentialandactualnegativeeffectsofadaptationactions(maladaptation).Toavoidfallingfurtherbehind,itisessentialtoenhancetheimplementationofadaptationactionsandensuremoreeffectivemainstreamingofclimaterisksintodecision-makingprocesses,includingtheCOVID-19recovery.Adaptationplanningandimplementationmustalsoconsiderhigher-endclimatescenariosandimpactsprojectedbythemostrecentIPCCSixthAssessmentReport2021toprepareformoreintenserisksthanthosealreadyobserved.EMERGINGCONSEQUENCESOFTHECOVID-19PANDEMICTheCOVID-19pandemicandclimatechangehavecreatedcompoundrisksthatnegativelyaffecttheadaptivecapacityofgovernments,communitiesandsocieties,particularlyindevelopingcountries.Thepandemicandassociatedresponsesbysocietiesmaybecompoundingrisksbyaffectingourabilitytorespondtoclimatechange.Forexample,duringthePacificcyclonesin2020,COVID-19restrictionsimpededdisaster-responseeffortsthroughthequarantiningofsuppliesandaidworkers.Theindirecteffectsofthepandemicalsohavethepotentialtoseverelyreduceadaptivecapacity.Forinstance,thenegativeeconomicconsequences,suchastheslow-downinsomeeconomicsectors,joblossesandincreasedpoverty(anadditional97millionpeoplefellintopovertyin2020)tendtodisproportionallyaffectvulnerablegroupsandfurtherreducetheircapacitytoadapttoextremeclimateevents.Governmentsandbusinesses–particularlysmallandmedium-sizedenterprisesindevelopingcountries–havealsodrawnonfinancialreservesandsome/manyhaveissuednewdebtstodealwiththepandemic,makingthemvulnerabletofutureeconomicshocks,includingfromextremeclimateevents.WhilethestimuluspackagesfortheCOVID-19recoverypresentawindowofopportunityforgreenandresilientrecoveries,theseopportunitiesarenotcurrentlybeingseized.Inresponsetothecurrentpandemic,US$16.7trillionoffiscalstimuluswasdeployedbygovernments.However,onlyasmallproportionofthisfundingappearstohavegonetowardsadaptation.Lessthanone-thirdof66countriesthatwerestudiedexplicitlyfundedspecificmeasurestoaddressphysicalclimaterisksintheirannouncedinvestmentprioritiesuptoJanuary2021(figureES.6).Moreover,thecostsofservicingthedebtraisedtorespondtothepandemic,combinedwithlowergovernmentrevenuesduetotheeconomicimpactsofCOVID-19,mayalsohamperfuturegovernmentspendingonadaptation,particularlyindevelopingcountries.TheCOVID-19crisisalsoprovideslessonstoimproveclimateadaptationplanningandfinancing,aswellasopportunitiestosecureagreenrecovery.ThepandemichighlightstheimportanceofgovernmentsaddressingNote:Theterm'principaladaptationproject'referstoprojectsforwhichadaptationis"fundamentalinthedesignof,orthemotivationfor,theactivity"(OECD).ExecutivesummaryXVIIFigureES.5Geographicdistributionofprincipaladaptationprojectsfundedbythetop10bilateraldonorsFigureES.6Countriesincludingselectedadaptationinterventionsinstimuluspackages,asat31January202101-45-910-1920-4950+N/ANumberofprincipaladaptationprojectsfundedbythetop10bilateraldonorsNotassessedNotenoughinformationNorelevantinvestmentsSelectiveclimateriskmanagementactionsClimateriskintegratedplansAdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStormXVIIIcompoundrisksthroughintegratedriskmanagementapproaches,bringingtogetherasetofcross-cuttingriskmanagementandadaptationobjectives.Forexample,inmanycasescountry-specificriskassessmentsofvulnerablegroups,whichareappliedinadaptationplanningprocesseslikeNAPs,canbeusedinbroaderriskmanagement,includingfortheimpactsofthepandemic.Intermsofadaptationfinance,thepandemichascreatedtheconditionsforextensivefiscalspending.Itiscriticalthatgovernmentsseizethisopportunitytoidentifyandprioritizeinterventionsthatachievebotheconomicgrowthandclimatechangeresiliencethroughagreenrecovery.Particularlyindevelopingcountries,governmentscanalsoincreasetheresilienceoffiscalframeworkstodealwithcompoundrisksbyestablishingflexibledisasterfinanceframeworks.Thesecouldbeconfiguredtoensurethatpredictable,timelyandcost-effectivefinanceisavailabletorespondimmediatelytoanyemergencywiththepotentialforsystemicshocks,suchasthepandemicoranextremeclimateevent.Finally,advancedeconomieshaveaclearroletoplayinhelpingdevelopingcountriesthatarebothvulnerabletoclimatechangeandhavesufferedtheeconomicconsequencesofthepandemictofreeupfiscalspaceforgreenandresilientnationalCOVID-19recoveryeffortsthroughconcessionalfinanceandsubstantivedebtreliefto“buildforwardbetter”.OUTLOOKONTHEGLOBALPROGRESSOFADAPTATIONOverall,progressinnational-leveladaptationplanning,financeandimplementationworldwidegenerallycontinuestogrowandmaybepartiallyaccelerating,butfurtherambitionisneeded.Theimportanceofadaptationatthenationalandinternationallevelsasameanstogalvanizetheresponsetoclimaterisksisnowwidelyacceptedandmainstreamingcontinuestoincrease.Newplanninginstrumentshavebeenreleasedatincreasingratesoverthepastdecadeandthereisevidenceofgrowingmaturityintheirdesign,potentiallyindicatingearlysignsofacceleration.Theimplementationofnewinitiativeswithaprincipalfocusonadaptationhasgenerallyrisensince2010,albeitwithoutindicationsofacceleration.Moreover,increasedvariabilityinthenumberofnewinitiativesoverthelastfouryearsmakesprojectionsintothefuturemoredifficult.Financeforadaptationalsocontinuestogrowglobally.However,thismaynotbethecaseeverywhere,particularlyindevelopingcountriesthatareamongthemostvulnerabletoclimateimpacts.Nonetheless,therearesignsthatamoreclimate-resilientfinancialsystemisevolvingthroughincreasedmainstreamingofclimaterisksandtheemergenceofnewinstruments,actorsandapproaches,eventhoughaccelerationisnotyetvisible.Despiteencouragingtrends,therateandscaleofadaptationprogressatthenationallevelisnotenoughtokeepupwithgrowingneedsandtrackingprogressremainsachallenge.Adaptationcostsappeartoberisingfasterthanadaptationfinance,potentiallyleadingtoawideningoftheadaptationfinancegap.Moreover,financeflowsseemtobelevellingoff,whereastheuptakeandscalingupofinnovativefinancevehiclesisstilltoolowtocatchupwithgrowingadaptationneeds.Whilethelevelofadaptationimplementationisrising,thereisstillscarceevidenceofclimateriskreductionasaresultofadaptationactions.Althoughplanninginstrumentsarematuring,severalindicatorsofeffectivenessandadequacy,suchasforverticalintegrationandincentivesforincreasingimplementability,aremixed.ThecontinuedlowrateofsettingupM&Esystemsisalsoofmajorconcern,althoughthereareencouragingsignsofimprovementasone-thirdofallcountriesarenowintheprocessofdevelopingasystem.Thislimitstheabilitytotrackprogressinadaptation,particularlyinrelationtotheimplementationofadaptationactions.InadditiontomakingtheavailabilityofM&Esystemsmorewidespread,theremustalsobegreaterfocusonassessingeffectivenessandadequacyofadaptationinterventionslimitingclimaterisksratherthansimplymeasuringoutputs.Growingclimaterisksrequireastepchangeinadaptationambition.Overthepasttwodecades,climateriskwarningsdiscussedinIPCCreportshavecontinuallyrisenduetoincreasinglystrongersignalsofreasonsforconcern.ThemostrecentIPCCassessmentreportnowconcludesthatsomeimpactsofclimatechangeareirreversible,evenunderhighlyambitiousmitigationregimes.Adaptationcansignificantlyreducelossanddamage,particularlyinthesecondhalfofthecentury,whenclimateimpactswillaccelerate(figureES.7).Whilestrongmitigationisthewaytominimizeimpactsandlong-termcosts,increasedambitionintermsofadaptation,particularlyforfinanceandimplementation,iscriticaltopreventexistinggapswidening.ExecutivesummaryXIXFigureES.7AdaptationoutcomesbasedoninformationpublishedintheIPCCAR6cyclespecialreportsonlandandocean–cryosphereVeryhigh(veryhighprobabilityofsevererisksandsignificantirreversibilityorpersistenceofimpacts)High(significantandwidespreadimpacts)Moderate(detectablewithatleastmediumconfidence)UndetectableWarmingscenariosLowemissionscenario(RCP2.6)Darkcoloursrepresentrisk-levelunder"no-to-moderate"adaptationscenarioFadedcoloursrepresentrisk-levelunder"maximumpotential"adaptationscenarioHighemissionscenario(RCP8.5)AdaptationscenariosRisklevelResidualriskBaseline(present-day)RiskreductionachievedundermaximumpotentialadaptationHighemissionsLowemissionsPresent-dayEndofthe21stcenturyNote:Present-dayreferstoreferenceperiodsusedintheunderlyingIPCCAssessments(2006-2015intheLandSpecialreport,Hulbertetal.2019;1986-2005intheSROCC,Oppenheimeretal.2019).Source:AdaptedfromHurlbertetal.(2019);Oppenheimeretal.(2019);andMagnanetal.(2021).XX11SettingthesceneLeadauthor:LarsChristiansen(UNEPDTUPartnership).Contributingauthors:HenryNeufeldt(UNEPDTUPartnership),AlexandreMagnan(IDDRI),AnnettMoehner(SecretariatoftheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange),PaulWatkiss(PaulWatkissAssociates),TimoLeiter(GranthamResearchInstituteonClimateChangeandtheEnvironment,LondonSchoolofEconomicsandPoliticalScience),ArjunaDibley(PollinationandUniversityofOxford).FirefightersputoutflameswhilefightingawildfireinHiddenValley,California.Photo:©MelMelcon/APPhotoLosAngelesTimesChapter1AdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStorm21.1ContextIn2021,theglobalCOVID-19pandemicentereditssecondyear.Whileencouragingtrendsareemerging,includingtheunprecedenteddevelopmentandroll-outofvaccinesinmostindustrializedcountries,thepandemiccontinuestoposeseverechallengestohumanhealth,createeconomicturmoilandimposerollingrestrictionsondailylifeinmostpartsoftheworld.Climatechange,inthemeantime,continuesitsunrelentingprogresstowardsawarmer,moreunpredictablefuture,rivenbyextremeeventsandtrends,asstarklydocumentedintherecentSixthAssessmentReport(AR6)oftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC),releasedinAugust2021(IPCC2021).Thesituationisalsoreflectedintheever-increasingrisksoffloods,droughts,stormsandheatwaves.RecentexamplesincludetheheatdomeinthePacificnorthwestoftheUnitedStatesofAmericaandCanadatowardstheendofJune2021,whichsawthelatterbreakitsnationaltemperaturerecordthreedaysinarowandbyatotalof4.6°C(WorldMeteorologicalOrganization2021),andtheseverefloodingeventsinwesternEuropeandtheProvinceofHenaninChinainJuly2021.TherecentAR6reportalsoshowedthatevenunderthemostoptimisticemissionsscenariosthatdelivernet-zerobyaround2050,globalwarmingwillcontinueintheshorttomediumterm,peakingabove1.5°C,comparedtopre-industriallevels.Allthismakestheglobalimperativeofadaptationmoreurgentthaneverbefore.Atthegloballevel,internationalclimateeffortsundertheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC)continue,despitethepostponementofthetwenty-sixthsessionoftheConferenceofthePartiestotheUNFCCC(COP26),whichwasputbackfromNovember2020toNovember2021.ConsultationsandworkareproceedingaheadofthefirstGlobalStocktakein2023,1includingapoliticalpushtofurtherdefineandoperationalizetheglobalgoalonadaptation.2TofacilitatethesediscussionstheUNFCCCAdaptationCommitteealsorecentlypublishedatechnicalreportonapproachestoreviewingoverallprogresstowardsthisgoal(UNFCCCAdaptationCommittee2021).However,whilepromising,suchdevelopmentshavenotyetbeenabletoensurerealprogressonadaptationtrackingmethodologies.Norhavetheybeenabletoresolvetheassociatedand1TheParisAgreementGlobalStocktakeisaprocessfortakingstockoftheimplementationoftheParisAgreementwiththeaimofassessingtheworld’scollectiveprogresstowardsdeliveringontheagreementanditslong-termgoals.ThefirstGlobalStocktakewilltakeplacefrom2021to2023andtheprocesswillberepeatedeveryfiveyears.2TheglobalgoalonadaptationisdefinedintheParisAgreement:“enhancingadaptivecapacity,strengtheningresilienceandreducingvulnerabilitytoclimatechange,withaviewtocontributingtosustainabledevelopmentandensuringanadequateresponseinthecontextofthetemperaturegoalreferredtoinArticle2”.Thetemperaturegoalinquestionmeans“holdingtheincreaseintheglobalaveragetemperaturetowellbelow2°Cabovepre‐industriallevelsandpursuingeffortstolimitthetemperatureincreaseto1.5°Cabovepre‐industriallevels”(UNFCCC2021).3UndertheUNFCCC,financeisoneelementofthe“meansofimplementation”(finance,technologyandcapacity-building).Inthecontextofthisreport,however,capacity-buildingandtechnologytransferareconsideredtobeelementsof“implementation”morebroadly.4Asteeringcommittee,chairedbyUNEP,guidestheproductionofthereport,includingitsthematiccontentandoverallstrategicdirection,theselectionofleadauthors,andthereviewandsign-offofthereport’scontent.ThecommitteeincludesrepresentativesfromUNFCCC,IPCCandWASP,aswellasarepresentativefromtheupcomingCOPhost.persistentdifferenceofopinions,withsomePartiesmaintainingthatglobalindicatorsarenecessaryandothersstatingthattheywillneveradequatelycapturethefullvarietyandbreadthofadaptationacrosscountries(UNFCCC2021;Beauchamp,daSilvaBernardoandBueno2021).Inresponsetotheneedforscience-basedandpolicy-relevantglobalperspectivesonadaptation,theUnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme(UNEP)hasproducedtheAdaptationGapReport(AGR)since2014,makingthis2021reportthesixthedition.Fromtheoutset,thereporthaspursuedtwomaingoals:firstly,toprovidenegotiatorsofPartiestotheUNFCCC,thebroaderUNFCCCconstituencyandcivilsocietywithrobustassessmentsofglobaladaptationgaps;andsecondlytoprovideinformationonthestatusandresultsofglobaladaptationeffortsunderway(box1.1).Assuch,whileitremainsanindependentassessment,theobjectiveoftheAGRiscloselyalignedwiththatoftheUNFCCCGlobalStocktake.1.2ThesixthAdaptationGapReportTheAdaptationGapReport2021–itssixthedition–ispartofanewsetofreportslaunchedin2020intherunuptothe2023GlobalStocktake.Itisstructuredinthreeparts:▶PartI(chapters3to5)assessesnationalandglobalprogressonadaptation,coveringthreecentralelementsoftheadaptationprocess:planning,financing3andimplementation.ThisparthasformedpartofeachAGReditionandindicatesthestatusandtrendsoftheglobaladaptationprocess.Overtime,thereportswillprovideacumulativerecordofprogress.▶PartII(chapter6)presentsadeepdiveintothethreeelementsofpartIbutfocusesonaparticularthemeorsectorofsociety.Thepurposeofthisdeepdiveistwofold:first,itprovidesamoredetailedpictureofprogressinaselectedfocusarea;second,itaddsadditionalperspectives,nuanceanddetailtotheoverallassessmentofprogresscontainedinthereport.Thethemeorsectorisdecidedbythereport’ssteeringcommittee,4takingintoaccountglobaldevelopments,internationalprioritiesandtheneedsoftheUNFCCCandotherglobalagreements.Chapter1–Settingthescene3Box1.1OverviewofpastAdaptationGapReportsaUNEP,inpartnershipwithsponsoringbodiesandotherpartners,includingtheWorldAdaptationScienceProgramme(WASP),bproduceditsfirstAGR(UNEP2014)forCOP20inLima,Peru,in2014.ThereportaroseinresponsetorequestsfromUNFCCCPartiesforanassessmentonadaptationthatwouldcomplementtheannualUNEPEmissionsGapReport(see,forexample,UNEP2020).Inparticular,thereportaimedtoprovideanindependentassessmentofthe“adaptationgap”tohelpinformUNFCCCdiscussionsonadaptationaheadofCOP21inParisin2015.FromthefirstAGR,itwasclearthatassessingtheadaptationgapwasgoingtobeverydifferentandmethodologicallymuchmorechallengingthanevaluatingtheannualemissionsgap.ThefirstAGRproposeddefiningtheadaptationgapas“thedifferencebetweenactuallyimplementedadaptationandasocietallysetgoal,determinedlargelybypreferencesrelatedtotoleratedclimatechangeimpacts,andreflectingresourcelimitationsandcompetingpriorities”(UNEP2014).Italsoprovidedapreliminaryframeworkforassessingadaptationgapsandproposedthreedimensions:thefundinggap,thetechnologygapandtheknowledgegap.ThesecondAGRwasproducedin2016,providinganin-depthassessmentoftheadaptationfinancegap,lookingatbothestimatesofthecostsofadaptationandtheavailabilityofbilateral,multilateralandprivatesectorfinancing.ThethirdAGRwasreleasedin2017anddidnotassessathematicgap.Instead,itfocusedonthemethodologicalissuesinvolvedinassessingglobalprogressonadaptation.In2018,thefourthAGRintroducedathematictopicalongsidetheassessmentofadaptationprogressintermsofenablingenvironments,adaptivecapacityandfinance.Thefocuswasontheadaptationgapinthehealthsector.ThefifthAGR,whichwaspublishedin2020,introducedaframingfocusedonassessingprogressbyaimingtoanswerthreeimportantquestions:Whatarewedoingtodaytoadapt?Towhatextentarewecurrentlyreducingclimaterisks?Towhatextentwillouradaptationtrajectoryhelpusreducefutureclimaterisks?Thereportalsoincludedadeepdiveintotheanswerstothesequestions,focusingonNature-basedSolutions.▶PartIII(coveredinchapters2and7)introducesaframeworkforunderstandingglobalprogressonadaptation,thusguidingthereaderthroughtheanalysisofthereport,andsynthesizesthefindingsdescribedinPartsIandIItoprovideanoverviewofglobalprogressonadaptation.Chapter7alsoprovidesanoverviewoffuturedevelopmentsandoutlinesthechallengesaheadandintendedfutureworktowardsimprovingtheassessmentofglobaladaptation.ThetopicforPartIIofthe2021AdaptationGapReportfocusesontheemergingimpactofCOVID-19onglobaladaptationprocesses.Thereasonsforselectingthistopicaretwofold.Firstly,COVID-19continuestoexertamajorinfluenceonthesocialandeconomiccontextsunderpinningadaptationprocesses,whichrepresentsamajorchallengeindevelopingcountries.Secondly,COVID-19hasledtorecordlevelsoffinancialcreditprovisionandfiscalspendingbygovernmentsaspartoftheirnationalrecoveryplans.Despitetheseriousfiscalconstraintsinherenttothisapproach,suchunprecedentedlevelsofpublicspendingalsopresentgreatopportunitiesforscalingupandmainstreamingclimateriskconsiderationsforagreenerandmoreresilientrecoveryfromtheCOVID-19crisis.Thisyear’sAGRupdatesandexpandstheanalysisbeguninthe2020editionofthereportbyprovidinginformationofdirectrelevancetotheUNFCCCGlobalStocktake:▶Consolidatedcriteriaforassessmentofadaptationprogress,gapsandcontextualelements.Buildingontheworkinitiatedin2020,thisyear’sreportconsolidatesamethodologicalframeworkforassessingprogress,gapsandcontextualelementsinglobaladaptation.Italsoexpandsandstrengthensitsapproachtotheassessmentofadaptationoutcomes,notablythroughtheinclusionofqualitativeexpertassessmentsoffutureoutcomesaAlltheAdaptationGapReportsareavailableat:https://www.unep.org/explore-topics/climate-change/what-we-do/climate-adaptation/world-adaptation-science-programme-5.bSeewww.wasp-adaptation.organdwww.unep.org/explore-topics/climate-change/what-we-do/climate-adaptation/world-adaptation-science-programmeformoreinformation.AdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStorm4(atopicwithonlyverylimitedcoverageinthe2020AGR).TheseadvancesrepresentworkinprogressandareexpectedtoserveasthefirststepinasteadilyimprovingandexpandingmethodologyforoutcomeassessmentinthecontextoftheAGRreports.▶Updatedandexpandedassessmentofprogressinadaptationplanning.Theanalysisintheplanningchapter(chapter3)isupdatedbasedon107neworupdatedNationallyDeterminedContributions(NDCs),14NationalCommunicationsandthreeNationalAdaptationPlans(NAPs),whichhavebeensubmittedsinceOctober2020.Thisprovidesamorecomprehensivepictureofglobalprogressinadaptationplanning.Italsoshedslightoninnovativeadaptationlawsandpolicies,includingevidenceforriskreductionfromadaptationplanning,aswellasaspectsrelatedtoCOVID-19.▶Updatedassessmentsoffinancialneedsforadaptation.ManycountrieshaveupdatedtheiradaptationprioritiesandassociatedfinancingneedsinrecentNDCssubmittedtotheUNFCCC5TheGlobalAdaptationMappingInitiative(GAMI)isacollectiveglobalefforttosystematicallygatherandsynthesizeliteratureonclimatechangeadaptation.TheinitiativewasdevelopedtoprovidesynthesisresultstoinformtheongoingIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)6thAssessmentReport(AR6).Itseekstoanswerthequestion“areweadapting?”Theinitiativehascometogetherwithnofundingandnoformalinstitutionalmechanisms.Moreinformationcanbefoundathttps://globaladaptation.github.io/.Secretariat.Thisenablesthe2021AGRreporttoprovideanupdatedviewonadaptationfinancingfromtheperspectivesofindividualcountries.Itprovideskeyinformationonhowsuchestimateshavechangedovertime.▶Expandeddatasetsforassessingprogressintheimplementationofadaptation.Thedatasourcesofimplementedadaptationmeasureshaveseenamajorexpansiontoincludedatafrommajorbilateraldonorsandrecentfindingsontheextentofadaptationmeasures,theirgeographicdistributionandthepotentialfortransformativechange,asassessedbytheGlobalAdaptationMappingInitiative.5▶AfirstlookathowtheCOVID-19pandemicisaffectingtheglobaladaptationprocess.The2021editionofthereportprovidesafirstassessmentoftheimpactofthepandemiconthenationaladaptationplanningprocessandtheavailabilityoffinancingforadaptation.ItalsopointstosomeimportantlessonsfromfightingtheCOVID-19pandemicthatcanbeappliedtoimprovefutureclimateadaptationplanningandfinancingprocessesandsteps.Chapter1–Settingthescene5InAlbania,UNEPisworkingwiththeMinistryofTourismandEnvironmenttoimprovethecapacityoftheKune-Vainilagoonecosystemtoadapttoclimatechangeandprovidevitalgoodsandservicestolocalcommunities.Learnmoreaboutthisprojecthere.Photo:©UNEP627Leadauthors:AlexandreMagnan(IDDRI),LarsChristiansen(UNEPDTUPartnership),HenryNeufeldt(UNEPDTUPartnership).Contributingauthors:TimoLeiter(GranthamResearchInstituteonClimateChangeandtheEnvironment,LondonSchoolofEconomicsandPoliticalScience),PaulWatkiss(PaulWatkissAssociates),ArjunaDibley(PollinationandUniversityofOxford),FatinTawfig(SecretariatoftheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange),ThomWetzer(UniversityofOxford).FloodinginCapHaïtien,Haiti.Afterdaysofcontinuousrainsin2014,partsofHaiti'snorthsufferedseriousflooding,leavingmorethanadozendeadandthousandshomeless.Photo:©UNPhoto/LoganAbassiFramingtheAdaptationGapReportChapter28AdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStorm2.1IntroductionTheAdaptationGapReportAGR2021buildsontheframingfirstintroducedinthe2020editionofthereporttofurtheradvanceknowledgeonadaptationprogressaroundtheworld.Itfocusesonadaptationprogressattheglobalandnationalscales,relyingprimarilyonpublicationsfromnationalgovernments(forexample,documentssubmittedundertheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange[UNFCCC]process).Ithasalsoexpandedthesourcesofinformationtoincluderecentpeer-reviewedscientificliteratureandreportsbymultilateralorganizationsandthinktanks.Thischapterframesthereportbothintermsoftheclimateriskcontextwithinwhichadaptationistakingplace(section2.2)andtheconceptualandmethodologicalapproachusedtounderstandadaptationprogress(section2.3).2.2TheclimateriskcontextClimateriskisafunctionofexposureandvulnerabilitytoclimatehazards.Currentandfutureclimateriskswillnotonlybedeterminedbychangesinglobaltemperaturelevelsandassociatedhazardsatthelocalscale,theywillultimatelyresultfromthecombinationofthesehazardswiththeaffectedsystems’exposureandvulnerability.Duetointeractionsbetweenaffectedsystems,therearecascadingandoftenreinforcingconsequencesofclimate-drivenhazardsonnaturalsystemsandhumansystemsandsectors.Asaresult,onlyacombinationofadaptation–thepurposeofwhichisprimarilytominimizeexposureandvulnerabilitytoachangingclimate–andambitiousmitigationactionscanreduceclimaterisksoverdifferenttimescalesandinthevariousecologicalandsocietalsystemsaroundtheworld.Accordingly,adaptationmustbeconsideredaprioritynotonlyatthenationalandlocallevelsbutalsoasanissueofhighglobalconcern.Thismeansthereisanurgentneedtotrackglobalprogressonadaptationandidentifygaps.2.2.1AppraisalofclimateriskischangingovertimeOurappraisalofclimateriskhasevolvedaswelearnmoreabouttheinteractionsbetweenrisingtemperaturesandclimateimpacts.SincetheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)ThirdAssessmentReport(Smithetal.2001)thisrelationshiphasbeenexpressedas“reasonsforconcern”andpresentedintheiconic“burningembers”diagramshowninfigure2.1(Zommersetal.2020).TheevolutionofthisframeworkandassociatedconclusionsacrosstheIPCCassessmentcyclesshowthatrisklevelsatagiventemperaturehavegenerallyincreasedfromoneIPCCreporttothenext,particularlyforhigherlevelsofgreenhousegasemissions.Accordingly,climateimpactsarelikelytobelargerthanpreviouslyprojectedandtherelatedcostofadaptationandresiduallossesanddamageswillalsobehigher.Inturn,thismeansitwillbenecessarytobemoreambitiousandactsoonerthananticipatedtoavoidhighrisksthroughmitigationandadaptation.Assessmentsalsoshowthatmoderatelevelsofriskacrossall“burningembers”arevirtuallyunavoidable,eveniftheglobaltemperatureriseiskeptto1.5°Cabovepre-industriallevelsthroughambitiousclimatechangemitigation(Hoegh-Guldbergetal.2018;Magnanetal.2021).Similarly,thisisastrongcalltorampupadaptationplanning,financeandimplementationtoreduceresidualclimateimpactsonpeople,societyandnature.2.2.2EstimatingglobalclimateriskTheNDCsofthePartiesdonotcurrentlyreflectthelevelofambitionrequiredformitigationthatwouldavoidlockingintemperaturechangesthatwillresultinhighriskstoessentiallyallofthe"reasonsforconcern"(UNFCCC2021).Averageglobaltemperaturesareprojectedtoreach3°Cabovepre-industriallevelsattheendofthiscentury,apointatwhichmanyfragileanduniquesystems,forexample,willhavebeenheavilydeterioratedorevenlost(IPCC2021).TheIPCCestimatesthattemperatureswilllikelybeaboveratherthanbelowthe1.5°Cthresholdinthenearterm(2021–2040)evenunderaverylowgreenhousegasemissionsscenario,andwillverylikelycrossthismarkerwithoutstrongmitigationaction(IPCC2021).ThethreerecentspecialreportsoftheIPCConthe1.5°Cthreshold,landandocean–cryosphere,respectively(IPCC2018;IPCC2019a;IPCC2019b),providemoredetailsoftheriskstonaturalandhumansystems,allowingabetterunderstandingof“globalclimaterisk”.Asynthesisstudyusingacompositeriskindexshowsfirstlythatclimatechangeimpactsareexpectedtosubstantiallyincreaseoverthecourseofthiscentury,probablyinanacceleratedway;andsecondly,whiledifferentsocietiesandsocialgroupsaroundtheglobewillbeaffecteddifferentlyinthecomingdecades,climateimpactswillaffectusall(Magnanetal.2021).TheIPCCspecialreportsonocean–cryosphereandland(Hurlbertetal.2019;Oppenheimeretal.2019)assessedclimaterisklevelsundercontrastingmitigation-adaptationscenariosincontextsincludingrepresentativelow-lyingcoastalsettlements(atollislands,deltas,megacities,arcticcommunities),foodinsecurity,landdegradationanddesertification.Thecombinedresultsillustratethepotentialoutcomesofdifferentsocietaladaptationatthegloballevel(figure2.2),withthepotentialtoreducetoday’sglobalclimaterisklevelbyalmostahalfbytheendofthiscenturyunderbothlowandhighmitigationscenarios(Magnanetal.2021).However,evenambitiousadaptationwillnoteliminateallfutureclimaterisks.Residualriskswillriseinthesecondhalfofthecentury,albeitatmuchlowerlevelsthanunderlessambitiousadaptation.Thecontinuousriseinclimateimpactsmeansthatadaptationcostsandthecostsofresiduallossesanddamageswillinvariablycontinuetoriseasthecenturyprogresses.Impactswillbefeltmuchmorestronglyinmanydevelopingcountries,however,strongmitigationactionwouldavoidmanyofthesecosts,particularlyin9Chapter2–FramingtheAdaptationGapReportFigure2.1ComparisonofriskthresholdsacrossIPCCassessmentsa)Uniqueandthreatenedsystemsd)AggregateimpactsLevelofriskVeryhighHighModerateUndetectable7°C6°C5°C3°C4°C2°C1°C0°C7°C6°C5°C3°C4°C2°C1°C0°CTARSmithetal.2009(‘AR4‘)AR5SR15TARSmithetal.2009(‘AR4‘)AR5SR15TARSmithetal.2009(‘AR4‘)AR5SR15TARSmithetal.2009(‘AR4‘)AR5SR15TARSmithetal.2009(‘AR4‘)AR5SR15GlobalmeantemperaturechangeGlobalmeantemperaturechangee)Large-scalediscontinuitiesb)Extremeclimateeventsc)DistributionofimpactsNote:Burningemberslinktheglobalmeansurfacetemperatureincreasetoestimatesofrisktouniqueandthreatenedecosystems(panela),extremeclimateorweatherevents(panelb),distributionofimpacts(panelc),aggregateimpacts(paneld)andlarge-scalediscontinuities(calledlarge-scalesingulareventsintheIPCCFifthAssessmentReport[AR5]andtheSpecialReportonGlobalWarmingof1.5Degrees[SR15](panele).Allburningembersarepresentedwiththesamecolourandtemperaturescale,removingtechnicaldetailsthatvariedbetweentheoriginalpublications.Whiteareasatthetopofeachcolumncorrespondtotemperaturesabovetheassessedrangeinthecorrespondingreport.Dashedlinesconnectthemidpointsbetweenundetectableandmoderaterisk,andmoderateandhighrisk.Risktransitionshavegenerallyshiftedtowardslowertemperatureswithupdatedscientificunderstanding.Source:Zommersetal.(2020).thesecondhalfofthecentury(Admiraaletal.2016;DeCianetal.2016;UNEP2016;Hoegh-Guldbergetal.2018;UNEP2021;Chapagainetal.2020).Strongmitigationactionwillimposeearliercosts,butclimatechangecannotbeseenasanoptimizationprobleminwhichestimatedmitigationcostsaresimplycomparedagainsttheestimatedcostsofadaptationanddamage.Suchanapproachdisregardsthesignificantuncertaintiessurroundingallcostestimates.Forinstance,despiteimprovingtobetterreflectobservations(Ueckerdtetal.2019),thetop-downdamagefunctionsusedinintegratedassessmentmodelsarerathersimplisticanddonottakeintoaccountethicalconsiderationsornon-monetarylossanddamage(Walsh,HormioandPurves(eds.)2016;García2020;Hattori2021).Moreover,theydisregardthepossibilityoflarge-scalediscontinuitieswithcatastrophicconsequences(IPCC2018;Dietzetal.2021).Assuch,consideringtheuncertainties,theIPCCspecialreporton1.5°Cestimatesthatlimitingglobalwarmingto1.5°Cinsteadof2°Cwouldavoideconomicdamageof22percent(10–26percent)(Hoegh-Guldbergetal.2018).10AdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStormFigure2.2AdaptationoutcomesbasedoninformationpublishedintheIPCCAR6cyclespecialreportsonlandandocean–cryosphereNote:Present-dayreferstoreferenceperiodsusedintheunderlyingIPCCAssessments(2006-2015intheLandSpecialreport,Hulbertetal.2019;1986-2005intheSROCC,Oppenheimeretal.2019).Source:AdaptedfromHurlbertetal.(2019);Oppenheimeretal.(2019);andMagnanetal.(2021).2.3FramingoftheadaptationassessmentpresentedintheAGR2021Understandingadaptationprogressessentiallymeansaskingthreeintertwinedquestions:●Whatarewedoingtodaytoadapt?●Towhatextentarewecurrentlyreducingclimaterisks?●Dependingonourmitigationtrajectory,willouradaptationtrajectoryhelpusreducefutureclimaterisks?Establishingaclearframing(section2.3.1)andprovidingguidance(section2.3.2)isacriticalpartofassessingglobaladaptationprogress,eventhoughansweringthesequestionsstillraisesimportantmethodologicalissuesanddatachallenges.2.3.1.TheoverarchingframingThisreportbuildsonpreviousAGRs(UNEP2017;UNEP2021)toaddress“adaptationprogress”inthreedistinctways(figure2.3).First,adaptationactionsandoutputsrelatetothequestion:whathasbeendoneuntiltodaytoadapt?OutputsareassessedintheAGRinbothquantitativeterms(forexample,thenumberofplans,theamountoffinancingcommitted,andthetypeandscaleofimplementationactivities)andqualitativeterms(forexample,howactionableplansareandhowtheyaddressclimaterisks,andthetypesandtargetsofaction).Thisprovidesanoverviewofglobalprogressonadaptationplanning,financeandimplementation.Second,itisalsokeytounderstandtheadaptationoutcomesthathavealreadybeenachievedinordertodeterminetheextenttowhichwehaveactuallyreducedclimaterisklevels.AssessingoutcomesisconsiderablyharderthanVeryhigh(veryhighprobabilityofsevererisksandsignificantirreversibilityorpersistenceofimpacts)High(significantandwidespreadimpacts)Moderate(detectablewithatleastmediumconfidence)UndetectableWarmingscenariosLowemissionscenario(RCP2.6)Darkcoloursrepresentrisk-levelunder"no-to-moderate"adaptationscenarioFadedcoloursrepresentrisk-levelunder"maximumpotential"adaptationscenarioHighemissionscenario(RCP8.5)AdaptationscenariosRisklevelResidualriskBaseline(present-day)RiskreductionachievedundermaximumpotentialadaptationHighemissionsLowemissionsPresent-dayEndofthe21stcentury11Chapter2–FramingtheAdaptationGapReporttrackingoutputs,forexample,duetoagapinunderstandingtheeffectsofadaptationoncurrentclimaterisklevels(UNEP2021),aswellasbecauseofthevaluejudgementsassociatedwithmakingstatementsontheresultsofactions(UNEP2017).Third,expectedoutcomesrefertothequestionoftheextenttowhichouradaptationtrajectory(andinrelationwithourmitigationtrajectory)willhelpusreducefutureclimaterisks.Comprehensivelyassessingadaptationprogressintermsoffutureclimaterisksrequiresthecombinedappraisalofbothobservedandexpectedadaptationoutcomes.Inadditiontotheaforementionedchallengesassociatedwithassessingcurrentoutcomes,therearelargeuncertaintiesaroundthewaysinwhichclimatechangewillaffectfutureclimaterisks(IPCC2021),aswellasthedefinitionof“(un)acceptable”levelsofriskfromonesocietytoanother(HandmerandNalau2019).Thismeansthatcautionshouldbeexercisedinourunderstandingofassessmentsoffutureoutcomes.2.3.2.CriteriatoassessadaptationprogressintheAGRseriesTheAGR2020introducedanumberofcategoriesinordertoconsistentlyassessadaptationplanning,financeandimplementation(table2.1).Informationonprogress,gapsandfactorsconstrainingtheinterpretationoffindingsprovidedinthechaptersofthereportformthebasisforthesynthesisinchapter7.Thisreportpresentsafirstattemptatinformingexpectedoutcomesofadaptationintheabsenceofrobustinformationaboutfuturetrendsinplanning,financingandimplementation.Thisisbasedonforward-lookingexpertjudgementandinvolvedasurveytogatheradditionalinsightsintofuturetrendsforthevariousassessmentcriteriabasedontheexpertiseofthechapterauthors,groundedinscientificevidenceanddeepknowledge.GeneralframingPrimaryfocusofAGR2021Currentoutputs(processofadapting)Whatarewedoingtodaytoadapt?UnderstandprogressmadeagainstreducingclimaterisksResult/progressinadaptationatthegloballevelChapter7(exploratory)AdaptationoutcomesStructureofthereportSomecoverinAGR2021Observedoutcomes(today)Towhatextentarewecurrentlyreducingclimaterisks?ExploratoryinAGR2021Exceptedoutcomes(inthefuture)Willouradaptationtrajectoryhelpusreducefutureclimaterisks?Finance(meansofimplementation)Chapters4and6PlanningChapters3and6ImplementationChapters5Figure2.3ConceptualframeworkandstructureoftheUNEPAdaptationGapReport(AGR)seriesonassessingglobalprogressonadaptationNote:ThepanelontheleftdescribestheconceptualframingoftheAGRseries(startingfromAGR2020),whilethepanelontherightillustratesthestructureofthisreportandhowitrelatestotheconceptualframingonoutputs,outcomesandprogress.12AdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStormTable2.1Overarchingcriteriausedtosynthesizefindingsacrossadaptationplanning,financeandimplementationProgressGapsFactorsthatconstraintheinterpretationoffindingsActionablepoliciesrefertotheextenttowhichmultilateralandbilateralcooperationandnationalpoliciesprovideclearguidanceonhowtoimplementadaptationonthegroundAdaptationfinanceillustratesanimportantaspectofinternationalcooperationforplanningandimplementationofadaptationAdaptationgoal(s)refertothedestinationwewanttoachieveinachangingclimate,globallyandnationallyConnectiontoclimateriskreductioniskeytounderstandifexistingorplannedpoliciesandactions(outputs)leadtoeffectiveadaptation(outcomes)EarlysignsoffurtherprogresshighlightemergingexperiencesandknowledgeshowingthatmoreprogressistobeexpectedintheneartolongtermInclusivenessillustratesbroaderconcernsaroundequityandjustice,suchasgenderanddisadvantagedgroupsInformationavailabilityonbothoutputs(whatarewedoingtoadapt?)andoutcomes(towhatextenddoesitallowustoreducerisks?)iskeytoensureconfidenceinjudgingwhetherwefacemoreprogressorbiggergapsKnock-oneffectsrefertothewayprogressatagivenlevel(forexample,national)influencesprogressatsmallerandlargerscalesandpotentiallystimulatesgroupsofactors(forexample,youth)MaturityisthewayadaptationiseithermainstreamedintoexistingpoliciesorconsideredasanoverarchingpolicydimensionMonitoringandevaluationiskeytoallowforplanningandimplementationtoremainadequateandeffectiveovertimeRecognitionofthepolicyrelevanceofadaptationtogalvanizeactionattheinternationalandnationallevelsUncertaintyaroundtheenablingconditionsforadaptationdescribestheexternal,non-climate-relatedfactorsthatcaninfluencevulnerabilitiesandadaptivecapacitiesandthereforemakeadaptationeasierorhardertoachieveNote:GreycellsindicatetheprimaryfocusappliedinAGR2021,basedoninformationfromthecorechapters3–6andasreportedinchapter7(section7.1andfigure7.1).13Chapter2–FramingtheAdaptationGapReportPeoplelivingaroundonethecommunity-protectedareasmakerooffrondsoutofleaves,toothpicksandsticksaspartofaprojectsupportedbyUNEPandpartnerstohelppeoplebuildalternativelivelihoodsanddecreaselogginginCambodia.Learnmoreaboutthisprojecthere.Photo:©UNEP14315Leadauthors:AnnettMoehner(SecretariatoftheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange),MaryamNavi(SecretariatoftheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange),FatinTawfig(SecretariatoftheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange),MotsomiMaletjane(SecretariatoftheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange),MichalNachmany(ClimatePolicyRadar).Photo:©CCAFS/J.L.UrreaGlobalprogressonadaptationplanningChapter3AdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStorm163.1IntroductionIn2021,theIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)concludedthatanthropogenicclimatechangeisalreadyaffectingweatherandclimateextremesacrosstheworldandthatthescaleofrecentchangesacrosstheclimatesystem,aswellasthecurrentstateofmanyofitsaspects,areunprecedented(IPCC2021).Atthesametime,in2021theUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC)foundthatemissionsreductionsthatwereestimatedbasedontargetscommunicatedthroughcountries’neworupdatednationallydeterminedcontributions(NDCs)“fallfarshortofwhatisrequired”tolimitglobalwarmingto1.5°Coreven2.0°Cabovepre-industriallevels(UNFCCC2021a).Thesefindingsunderscoretheurgencyofdeveloping–andsubsequentlyimplementing–adequateandeffectiveadaptationplanstoreducevulnerabilityandbuildresiliencetowithstandthecurrentandfutureimpactsofclimatechange.AllPartiestotheParisAgreement(UNFCCC2016)committoengageinadaptationplanningprocessesandtheimplementationofactions,includingthedevelopmentorenhancementofrelevantplans(article7.9),withaviewtocontributingtotheglobalgoalonadaptationofenhancingadaptivecapacity,strengtheningresilience1Asat5August2021,191ofthePartieswerealsoPartiestotheParisAgreement.Giventhefocusonanalysisatthenationallevel,theEuropeanUnion,whichisalsoaPartytotheUNFCCCandtheParisAgreement,isexcludedfromtheanalysis.andreducingvulnerability(article7.1).TheAgreementalsostressesthatadaptationshouldfollowagender-responsiveandparticipatoryapproach,withaviewtointegratingadaptationintorelevantsocioeconomicandenvironmentalpoliciesandactions(article7.5).AspartoftheGlobalStocktakeundertheUNFCCCprocess,Partieswillreviewtheadequacyandeffectivenessofadaptationandprogresstowardstheglobalgoalonadaptation(articles7.14and14).TheAdaptationGapReport2020(AGR2020)assessedtheglobalstatusofadaptationplanningbyexaminingthenumberofadaptationplansandstrategiesproducedby196PartiestotheUNFCCCandtheextenttowhichtheseplansandstrategiesareeffectiveandadequate(UNEP2021).1Thischapterprovidesanupdateonthepreviousanalysis,providingbothamoreadvancedsnapshotofadaptationplanningworldwideandasenseofhowthiscomparestothe2020assessment.3.2MethodologyApplyingthesamemethodologyastheAGR2020,thischapterlooksattheoverallnumberofnational,subnationalandsectoraladaptationstrategies,plansandlaws.FiveKeymessages▶Countrieshavemadeconsistentprogressindevelopingadaptationplanninginstrumentsandacrossalmostallindicatorsofadequateandeffectiveadaptationplanning.Thisprogressismostlyincremental(within10percentofscoresfromthe2020analysis),withtheexceptionofstakeholderengagement,genderandtheuseofpolicyinstruments,whichsawgreaterimprovements.▶Atpresent,79percentofcountrieshaveatleastonenational-leveladaptationplanninginstrumentinplace,upfrom72percentin2020.▶Intermsoftheadequacyandeffectivenessofthoseplans,therehasbeenasignificantincreaseininclusiveadaptationplanningandtheapplicationofpolicyinstrumentsdeemedtoenhancetheimplementabilityofadaptationplans,includingregulationsandprovisionsforinvestmentandincentives.Countriesalsoprogressedintermsofthecomprehensivenessoftheiradaptationplanning.▶Thereisevidenceofsteadyprogressontheintegrationofadaptationacrosssectorsandlevels,althoughresultsremainmixed,withthree-quartershavinghorizontalcoordinationmechanismsinplace,comparedtojustaroundone-thirdwithverticalcoordinationmechanisms.Furthermore,atleast65percentofcountrieshaveatleastonesectoralplaninplaceandatleast26percenthaveatleastonesubnationalplanninginstrument.▶Onlyaroundaquarterofcountrieshaveamonitoringandevaluationframeworkinplace,reflectingthedifficultyofdesigningandimplementingsuchframeworks.Chapter3–Globalprogressonadaptationplanning17Table3.1Overviewofcriteriausedtoassessadaptationplanning(includingtheirunderlyingrationale)andassociatedindicatorsRationaleIndicators1.ComprehensivenessIdentifyingclimaterisksandhazardsandassessingvulnerabilitytoexistingandfutureclimatehazardsandimpactsconstitutefoundationalstepsoftheadaptationplanningprocess.Countriescanthenusethisinformationtoprioritizesectorsforadaptationmeasuresanddevelopacomprehensiveadaptationplanbyidentifyingadaptationoptionsthatalignwiththeseprioritiesandrespondtotherisks,hazardsandvulnerabilitiestheyface.●Adaptationoptionscomprehensivelyaddressassessedrisks,impacts,hazardsorvulnerabilities2.InclusivenessForadaptationplanningtoadequatelyreflectexistingandforthcomingrisksandvulnerabilitiesandtoeffectivelyenhancetheownershipofanyimplementation,emphasizingtheengagementofallrelevantstakeholdersandgenderconsiderations.●Dedicatedstakeholderengagementprocessinplace●Considerationofgender3.ImplementabilityPlanningcanbeassumedtobeeffectiveifitleadstorealimplementationbypublicandprivateactors.Assuch,planningcanbenefitfromacentraladministrativebodythatisofficiallyinchargeofadaptationpolicymakingandavarietyofpolicyinstruments,includinginvestment,incentivesandregulationsthatleadtothedesiredoutcomes.Presenceof:●acentraladministrativebody●regulations●investments●incentives4.IntegrationIntegratingormainstreamingadaptationplanningandactionhorizontally(acrosssectors)andvertically(acrosslevelsofadministration)isincreasinglyrecognizedasanimportantcomponentofeffectiveadaptationplanning.Thishelpsensurethatadaptationplanningiscomprehensive,avoidstheduplicationofeffortormaladaptation,andenhancessynergies.Presenceof:●sectoraladaptationplansandcoordinationmechanisms●subnationaladaptationplansandcoordinationmechanisms5.Monitoringandevaluation(M&E)aForplanningtoremainadequateandeffective,itmustbeperiodicallymonitoredandevaluated.●M&Esysteminplace●Monitoring/Progressreportpublished●EvaluationundertakenandreportpublishedaTakingintoaccountLeiter(2021),the2020indicatorswereslightlyrevisedtofocusmoreonwhathasbeenachievedtodateratherthanwhathasbeenplanned.criteriaareusedtoshedlightontheextenttowhichtheoutputsofnationaladaptationplanningcanreasonablybeassumedtobeadequate(sufficient)andeffective(successful)inachievingthestatedadaptationtargetsandobjectives(reducingclimaterisksandenhancingresilience).Thefivecriteriaaredetailedintable3.1.2Forexample,the2012UNFCCCLeastDevelopedCountriesExpertGroup(LEG)technicalguidelinesfortheNAPprocess(UNFCCCLEG2012),the2015PEGM&EtoolfortheLEG(UNFCCCLEG2015)andthe2016Guidanceonverticalintegration(Dazéetal.2016).3Forexample,the2018EvaluationoftheEuropeanUnionStrategyonadaptationtoclimatechange(EuropeanCommission2018)andthe2019globalreviewofnationallawsandpoliciesonclimatechangeadaptation(Nachmanyetal.2019).ThesecriteriaandassociatedindicatorswerechosenastheyrespondtotheprovisionsoftheParisAgreementsettingoutthecommitmentsoftheParties(articles7.5and7.9).Theyhavealsobeenincludedinrelevantglobalguidancedocumentsonadaptationplanning2orinpreviousglobalorregionalassessmentsofadaptationplanning.3AdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStorm18Aspartofadeskreviewbytheauthors,424NationalAdaptationPlans(NAPs),518AdaptationCommunications6and151NationallyDeterminedContributions(NDCs)withadaptationcomponents7wereanalysedforevidenceofthechosenindicators.Wherenoneofthesedocumentswasavailableforacountry,NationalCommunicationswereconsulted.8Dataonnationallawsandpolicyinstrumentswasalsodrawnfrom,crosscheckedwithandcomplementedbyGranthamResearchInstituteClimateChangeLawsoftheWorldDatabase.9Datalimitationsincludethelackofrigorousstandardsregardingtheaccuracyandcompletenessofreportingbycountries.Aswiththeinitialanalysis,theaimistoassessasmanycountriesaspossible,withallindicatorsarescoredaspresent,absentorinprogress/partial.Whilethisallowsfortheconstructionofabroadglobalpictureofadaptationplanning,ithidesimportantnuancesandsignificantdifferencesbetweencountries.4Thecut-offfortheanalysisofthevariousdocumentsanddatabaseswas5August2021.5NAPsherereferexclusivelytotheplanssubmittedtotheUNFCCCNAPCentral.Moreinformationisavailableatwww4.unfccc.int/sites/NAPC/News/Pages/national_adaptation_plans.aspx.6Moreinformationavailableatwww.unfccc.int/topics/adaptation-and-resilience/workstreams/adaptation-communications.7Moreinformationavailableatwww4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/Pages/Home.aspx.8AnnexI(www.unfccc.int/NC7)andNon-AnnexI(www.unfccc.int/non-annex-I-NCs).9https://climate-laws.org.10Thisincludesnationalplans,strategies,policiesorlawsexplicitlyandprimarilyfocusedonadaptationorfocusedonclimatechangemorebroadly,withasignificantadaptationcomponent.NationaladaptationprogrammesofactionwerenotincludedinthetallyduetotheiruniqueroleasatoolforLDCstoidentifyandactonurgentpriorityadaptationactivities,ratherthanasaninstrumenttofacilitateanoverarchingorholisticadaptationresponse.Itisalsocriticaltoacknowledgethatplanning(evengoodplanning)isonlyaprecursortotheimplementationofadaptationmeasures.Thischapterstopsshortofassessingwhetherplanshaveactuallyhadanimpactandhavebeenfollowedthroughatthenational,subnationalandsectorallevels.3.3Progressinadaptationplanning3.3.1StatusofadaptationplanningGlobally,79percentofcountrieshaveaddressedadaptationatthenationallevelthroughaplan,strategy,policyorlaw.Thisisanincreaseovertheanalysisfrom2020,when72percentofcountrieshadanationaladaptationinstrumentinplace.Afurther9percentofcountriesareintheprocessofdevelopingtheirfirstnationalinstrument(figure3.1).10Figure3.1Statusofadaptationplanningworldwide,asat5August2021NoInprogressN/AYesNationalplan,strategy,laworpolicyinplaceNote:TerritoriesmarkedasN/AarethosewhicharerecognizedasdisputedbytheUnitedNationsorwhosestatushasnotyetbeenagreedupon.Chapter3–Globalprogressonadaptationplanning19Box3.1ProgressbydevelopingcountriesinformulatingandimplementingNAPsDevelopingcountrieshavemadegradualprogressinformulatingandimplementingNAPssincetheprocesswasestablishedin2010.However,progresshasacceleratedsince2015.AsatSeptember2021,atleast125ofthe154developingcountrieshadundertakenactivitiesrelatedtotheprocesstoformulateandimplementNAPs.Somecountrieshaddevelopedandsubmittedsectoralandthematicstrategiesandotherrelevantoutputs.Twenty‑twocountrieshadputinplaceorwereworkingontheirM&EframeworksorsystemsfortheNAPs.Adetailedsetofmeasuresisshowninfigure3.2below.FourteencountrieshadalsosubmittedatleastoneprojectconceptnotetotheGreenClimateFund(GCF)forimplementingpriorityactionsassociatedwiththeirNAPs.Afurther,eightcountrieshadreceivedapprovalforfundingfromtheLeastDevelopedCountriesFundforactivitiesrelatedtotheprocesstoformulateandimplementNAPs.TechnicalsupportisprovidedbytheLeastDevelopedCountriesExpertGroup,otherconstitutedbodiesundertheUNFCCC,UnitedNationsorganizations,specializedagenciesandotherrelevantorganizations,aswellasbybilateralandmultilateralagencies,includingthroughsupportprogrammes.Figure3.2AggregateprogressintheprocessforformulatingandimplementingNAPsAnalysingpastclimatedataandscenariosofclimatechangePublishingtheroadmapfortheprocessDevelopingaroadmapfortheprocessInitiatingand/orlaunchingtheprocessSubmittingproposalstotheGCFreadinesssupportprogrammeReceivingapprovalfromtheGCFreadinesssupportprogrammeFormulatingamandatefortheprocessInsitutionalarrangementsandcoordinationConsultingstakeholdersforinputandvalidationSynthesizinginformation,stocktaking,gapsandneedsComprehensivelyassessingclimatevulnerabilityIntegratingadaptationintodevelopmentplanningIdentifyingadaptationoptionstoaddresskeyvulnerabilitiesAppraising,prioritisingandrankingadaptationoptionsCompilingdraftNAPsforconsultationandendorsementPublishingNAPsandsubmittingthemtoNAPCentralPrioritizingadaptationinnationalplanningDesigningcoherentNAPimplementationstrategiesDesigningandapplyingaM&EframeworkorsystemCommunicatingprogressonNAPsMonitoringandperiodicallyreviewingtheprocessIterativelyupdatingNAPsNumberofcountriesImplementingandmanagingactionsinNAPs0306090120154ElementA:LayingthegroundworkandaddressinggapsElementB:PreparatoryelementsElementC:ImplementationstrategiesElementD:Reporting,monitoringandreviewSource:InformationupdatedbytheauthorsfromUNFCCC(2020).AdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStorm20Figure3.3Progressionofglobaladaptationplanningsince200025050751001251501751962020201820162014201220102008200620042005200720092011201320152017201920212002200120032000NumberofcountriesScientificmilestonesPolicymilestonesThirdnationalplan,strategy,laworpolicySecondnationalplan,strategy,laworpolicyFirstnationalplan,strategy,laworpolicy2007IPCCFourthAssessmentReport2001IPCCThirdAssessmentReport2007BaliActionPlan2010CancunAgreements2001MarrakeshAccords2014IPCCFifthAssessmentReport2015ParisAgreement2018IPCCSpecialReportonGlobalWarmingof1.5ºC2021IPCCSixthAssessmentReportNote:Datafortheperiod2000–2019hasbeenupdatedsincethe2020analysis,basedonnewdocumentssubmittedbyPartiestotheUNFCCC,which,insomecases,reportedonadaptationplanninginstrumentsestablishedfrom2000to2019thathadnotbeenreflectedinthe2020editionoftheAGR.UnderUNFCCC,theprocessofformulatingandimplementingNAPsremainsacornerstoneofadaptationplanningefforts,particularlyfordevelopingcountries(UNFCCC2020).Indeed,manyofthesecountriesalreadyhaveoneormorenationaladaptationinstrumentsinplaceandaresimultaneouslyintheprocessofformulatingaNAP,highlightingtheaddedvalueofthisinstrumentoverandaboveothernationalplans,policies,lawsandframeworksforadaptation.Box3.1providesanoverviewofNAPprogresstodate.Sincethefirstnational-leveladaptationinstrumentidentifiedinthisanalysiswasestablishedin2000,thepaceofadaptationplanningaroundtheworldhasacceleratedconsiderably.Furthermore,almosthalfofthecountrieswithanationalinstrumentinplacehavedevelopedatleastonefurthernational-levelinstrument,whichservestoreplace,updateorcomplementtheinitialadaptationplan,policy,strategyorlaw.Insomecases,thismayreflectprogressiniterativeadaptationplanning(see,forexample,UNFCCCAdaptationCommittee2019b;Mimuraetal.2014;UNFCCC2019),whereincountriesarebuildingandimprovingontheirinitialplansandotherinstruments.Thegrowthinadaptationplanningthroughouttheworldhastakenplacealongsideincreasinglydirewarningsfromthescientificcommunity–particularlytheIPCC–abouttheneedforadaptation,alongsideanexpansionofinstitutionsundertheUNFCCCtosupporttheadaptationeffortsofcountries(figure3.3;seealsoUNFCCCAdaptationCommittee2019a).Lookingahead,thepresenceofclearlydefinednationaladaptationgoalsandquantitativeandqualitativeadaptationtargetscouldbeanimportantwayofgaugingwhereadaptationplanninghasnowbecomeoutcome-orientedandismeasurable.Indeed,newandupdatedNDCssuggestthatcountriesarealreadymovinginthisdirectionbyincludingmorequantitativeandtime-boundtargetsaspartoftheiradaptationcontributions(box3.2providesasnapshotofrecentdevelopments;seealsoUNFCCC2021).Chapter3–Globalprogressonadaptationplanning21Box3.2NationallawsandpoliciesNationallegislativeandexecutiveactions(laws,policies,strategies,plans,etc.)areessentialtotranslateadaptationplanningintoaction.Settingcleartargets,definingcleargovernanceandaccountabilitymechanisms,securingimplementationbudgetsandtyingpolicyintobroadersocietalframeworksandprocessesareallcriticalaspectsforsuccess.During2020and2021,severalnationallawsandpoliciesfocusingonadaptationordisasterriskmanagementwereadoptedoramendedsignificantly.Forexample,theRussianFederationhaspublisheditsfirstNationalAdaptationActionPlan;SpainandSouthAfricahavepublishednewadaptationpoliciesthatsignificantlyupdateolderones(from2006and2011,respectively);JapanhasupdateditsBasicDisasterPreventionPlantoincludediseaseprevention;andSouthKoreahasamendeditsNationalStrategicPlanforClimateAdaptation(2021–2025).Similarly,DominicapublisheditsClimateResilienceandRecoveryPlan,whichisarequirementoftheClimateResilienceAct2018andisalignedwiththecountry’sNationalResilienceDevelopmentStrategydevelopedin2018.Theplansetstargets,definesinitiativesandoutlinestheresourcesrequiredtoimplementresiliencemeasures.Italsosetsclearandquantifiabletargetsfor2030,includingzerofatalitiesfromextremeweatherevents,90percentofhousingstockbuiltorretrofittedtomeetresilientbuildingcodesand100percentresettlementofindividualslivinginphysicallyvulnerablelocations.Lastly,itincludestime-sensitivetargetsforaccesstoinfrastructureandresourcesduringandafterextremeweatherevents(includingcriticalgovernmentandemergencyservices,water,localandinternationaltransport,power,schools,healthservicesandtelecommunications).3.3.2AdequacyandeffectivenessofadaptationplanningTheresultsoftheassessmentoftheadequacyandeffectivenessofadaptationplanningarediscussedbelow.Table3.2providesanoverviewoftheresultsforall196Parties.Furthermore,giventheacutevulnerabilityofLeastDevelopedCountries(LDCs)andSmallIslandDevelopingStates(SIDS)totheimpactsofclimatechange,thetablealsodisaggregatestheresultsforthesegroups.Figure3.4providesacomparisonwiththesituationin2020.COMPREHENSIVENESSMorethantwo-thirdsofcountriesidentifiedasetofadaptationoptionswithintheiridentifiedprioritysectors,a15percentincreaseonthe2020analysis.Theanalysisofavailablereportinghasshownthat23percenthaveadaptationmeasuresthatpartiallymatchedtheiridentifiedprioritysectors.11Atotalof9percentofcountrieseitherdidnotaddressadaptationoptionsthatlinktokeyprioritieswithintheirassessmentsordidnotaddressanyadaptationoptionsinthedocumentsreviewed.Thisisa15percentreductiononthe2020analysis.INCLUSIVENESSComparedto2020,thenumberofcountriesaddressingstakeholderengagementintheirreportshasincreasedby22percent.Asof5August2021,about70percentofcountrieshavedevelopedtheiradaptationplansthroughconsultationswithabroadrangeofstakeholders.The11Apartialmatchreferstoplansthatidentifiedadaptationmeasuresforsomeorthemajorityofvulnerable/prioritysectorsbutnotforallwithinthedocumentreviewed.stakeholdersinvolvedincludeddifferentgovernmentlevels,non-governmentalandsectoralorganizations,researchinstitutesandtheprivatesector.Outof70percentofcountriesidentifiedasdevelopingadaptationplansthroughstakeholderconsultations,71percent(50percentofallcountries)provideddetailsontheirstakeholderconsultationprocess,whichincludedaspectssuchasidentifyingandinformingrelevantstakeholdersinallkeysectors,organizingparticipatorystakeholderworkshopsorelaboratingontheprocesstoinvolvedifferentrelevantstakeholdersthroughacoordinatingbody.Intermsofgenderconsiderationsinadaptationplanning,thegrowthrateisevenhigher(40percent).ThisismainlyduetotheconsiderablenumberofnewandupdatedNDCssubmittedtotheUNFCCCSecretariatsinceOctober2020.Accordingtothedocumentsreviewed,73percentofcountrieshighlightedtheimportanceofintegratinggenderconsiderationsintoadaptationplanning.Thisrepresentsasignificantincreasefromthepreviousanalysis,whichfoundthat52percentofcountrieswereintegratinggenderconsiderationsintotheirplanning,suggestingthattheyaretakingswiftactionontheimperativeoffollowingagender-responsiveapproach.Thewaycountriesreportongenderconsiderationscontinuestovaryconsiderably,fromgenerallyemphasizingtheimperativeofenhancinggenderequalityintheiradaptationplanningtoaligningtheirapproachestogenderresponsivenesswiththerelevantprovisionsoftheenhancedgenderactionplan(box3.3).AdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStorm22Table3.2AdequacyandeffectivenessofadaptationplanninggloballyandinLDCsandSIDSaPercentageofall196PartiesPercentageofLDCsPercentageofSIDS202120202021202020212020Nationalplans/strategiesInplace(inprogress)79%(9%)72%(9%)72%(15%)64%(11%)82%(8%)80%(5%)Planningisadequatedueto:AddressingclimaterisksComprehensively(partially)68%(23%)59%(22%)59%(28%)62%(21%)74%(23%)75%(22%)InclusivelyengagingstakeholdersandincorporatinggenderconsiderationsEngagingstakeholders(inprogress)70%(9%)43%(15%)67%(11%)36%(13%)79%(10%)40%(15%)Incorporatinggenderconsiderations73%52%78%74%79%65%Planningiseffectivedueto:CatalysingimplementationthroughinstitutionsandpolicyinstrumentsCentraladministrativebodyinplace43%35%41%32%29%18%Atleastonepolicyinstrumentinplace71%48%57%43%61%47%Integratingadaptationacrosssectors/levelsSectoralplansinplace(inprogress)65%(5%)58%(6%)67%(4%)57%(9%)61%(5%)55%(5%)Horizontalcoordinationinplace(inprogress)75%(2%)68%(4%)80%(0%)72%(0%)71%(5%)65%(5%)Subnationalplansinplace(inprogress)26%(10%)21%(9%)13%(6%)11%(4%)3%(11%)0%(5%)Verticalcoordinationinplace(inprogress)32%(8%)26%(8%)30%(4%)23%(2%)13%(8%)10%(5%)Featuringaframeworkformonitoringandevaluation(M&E)M&Eframeworkinplace(underdevelopment)b26%(36%)33%(11%)15%(46%)30%(13%)16%(37%)23%(10%)aTheLDCandSIDScategoriesarenotmutuallyexclusive:somecountriesformpartofbothgroups.In2020,therewere47LDCs.InDecember2020,Vanuatugraduatedfromthecategory,reducingthenumberto46in2021(UnitedNations2020).Thereare38SIDS.bThemethodologyforscoringthisindicatorhaschangedsince2020.Assuch,directcomparisonsshouldbeavoided.Chapter3–Globalprogressonadaptationplanning23Figure3.4Adequacyandeffectivenessofadaptationplanningin2021Note:ThechangesintheM&Eindicators(5.1–5.3)arenotshownbecausethescoringmethodologyhaschangedsince2020.PresentInprogress/partialAbsentIncreaseinpresenceofindicatorsincetheAGR2020CriteriaandindicatorsforadequateandeffectiveadaptationplanningStatusofindicatorsforadequateandeffectiveadaptationplanningacrossthe196PartiestotheUNFCCCPercentageofcountriesNumberofcountries049981471960%25%50%75%100%1.1Optionsaddressassessedrisks2.1Stakeholderengagement2.2Dedicatedstakeholderengagementprocessinplace2.3Gender3.1Centraladministrationincharge3.2Regulations3.3Incentives3.4Directinvestment/funding4.1Horizontalcoordinationmechanism4.2Sectoralplans4.3Verticalcoordinationmechanism4.4Subnationalplans5.1M&Esysteminplace5.2Progress/monitoringreportpublished5.3Evaluationundertakenandpublished1.Comprehensiveness3.Implementability4.Integration2.Inclusiveness5.MonitoringandevaluationInsomecases,countriesalsodescribeeffortstoengageparticulargroupsofstakeholdersintheiradaptationplanning,includingindigenouspeoplesandlocalcommunities.ThisfollowsfromtheacknowledgementoftheParties,inarticle7.5oftheParisAgreement,thatadaptationactionshouldbebasedonandguidedbyaspectssuchastraditionalknowledge,theknowledgeofindigenouspeoplesandlocalknowledgesystems.Inadditiontoconsultingindigenouspeoplesandlocalcommunitieswhileproducingtheirplansandcommitments,therearealsoexamplesofcountriesmakingreferencetosupportingindigenous-ledsolutionsandbetterreflectingthatleadershipinclimateplans,aswellasstrengtheningthecapacityofinstitutionstointegrateindigenousandlocalknowledgeinvulnerabilityandadaptationassessments.IMPLEMENTABILITYAtotalof43percentofcountriesreporthavingputinplaceacentraladministrativebodytooverseeadaptationpolicymakingandimplementation,whiletheremainderhavenotdoneso.Thisrepresentsaslightincreasefromthepreviousanalysisin2020,whichreportedthatonly35percentofcountrieshavesuchabodyinplace.Commoninstitutionalbarriersandenablersrelatedtoadaptationplanningandimplementationforbothdevelopedanddevelopingcountriesincludeinstitutionalcoordinationandkeyactors,advocatesandchampions,initiatingmainstreamingandsustainingmomentumforadaptation.Acentraladministrativebodythatisprimarilyresponsibleforadaptationcanthereforehelpbolstertheeffectivenessandcontinuityofadaptationplanning.AdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStorm24Since2020,therehasbeenanotableincreaseintheapplicationofthevariousinstrumentstoensuretheeffectivenessofthedifferentadaptationplansandpolicies.Almost100countrieshaveaddedatleastonepolicyinstrumentcomparedto2020.Halfthecountrieshavesetasidefinancialresourcestosupporttheiridentifiedadaptationoptions,includingthroughdirectfundingorbudgetallocations,asignificantincreasefromthe31percentmentionedinthe2020editionoftheAGR.Countriesarecontinuingtomakeprogressincostingtheiradaptationoptions,includingaspartofthedevelopmentofNDCsandNAPs,andinvestingdomesticresourcesinadaptation,thoughtherecontinuestobesignificantneedsforinternationalsupportintheformoffinance,technologytransferandcapacity-building,asthemostrecentNDCssubmittedbyPartiestotheUNFCCChavemadeclear(UNFCCC2021).Aroundhalfofcountriesarenowmakinguseofregulatoryinstrumentssuchasstandardsandobligations,buildingcodes,zoning/spatialplanninganddisclosureobligations.Moreover,almostathirdincludeincentivessuchastaxesorsubsidiestoencourageadaptationaction.Yet,aroundaquarterofcountriesdonotapplyanyofthoseinstrumentstoenhancetheimplementabilityoftheiradaptationplans.INTEGRATIONCurrently,75percentofcountriesreporthavinghorizontalcoordinationmechanismsinplace,suchas,interministerialcommittees.Thisisan11percentincreaseinestablished12Thisincludesadaptationplansdevisedforagivensector,butalsoothersectoralplansthatcountriesreferenceascontributingtotheiradaptationgoalsandobjectives.13Subnationalreferstoanyjurisdictionbelowthenationallevel,encompassingstatesandprovincesbutalsocities.However,thefigureonlycapturesplansreferencedinnationalreportsandthusunderestimatesthetruescaleofsubnationalplanning,whichisalsobeingadvancedthroughnetworkssuchasC40Cities,100ResilientCitiesandtheGlobalCovenantofMayors.14Themethodologyforscoringthisindicatorhaschangedsince2020,meaningdirectcomparisonsshouldbeavoided.mechanisms,comparedtothe2020analysis.Additionally,32percenthaveverticalcoordinationmechanismsinplace,suchasanationalcommittee,workinggrouporotherbodyrelatedtoadaptation,withrepresentativesfromdifferentgovernancelevels.Thisis22percenthigherthanfoundinthepreviousanalysis.Lastly,atleast8percentofcountriesareintheprocessofestablishingverticalcoordinationmechanisms.Countriesarealsoadvancinghorizontalandverticalintegrationthroughsectoralandsubnationalplans.Around65percentofcountrieshaveoneormorestand‑alonesectoralplansinplacethataddressclimatechangeadaptation,12whileatleast5percentofcountriesaredevelopingsuchplans.Whilethesefiguresarelimitedtostand-aloneplans,inmanycasescountrieshavealsoembeddedsectoralplanswithinoverarchingnational-levelones.Furthermore,26percentofcountriesmentionatleastonesubnationalplaninplace13andanadditional10percentofcountriesnotedthatsuchplansareinprogress.MONITORINGANDEVALUATIONSome26percentofcountrieshavededicatedmonitoringandevaluation(M&E)systemsforadaptationinplace,withafurther36percentintheprocessofdevelopingsuchasystem.14AquarterofcountrieshavepublishedanM&E-relatedprogressreportwhileonly8percentofcountrieshavealreadyundertakenanevaluationoftheiradaptationplans.Thislimitsopportunitiesforlearningandrevisingadaptationplanningtomakeitmoreadequateandeffective.Box3.3UNFCCCGenderActionPlanAtCOP25in2019,thePartiesagreedafive-yearenhancedLimaworkprogrammeongenderanditsgenderactionplantopromotegenderequalityandenhancetheimplementationofgender-relateddecisionsandmandatesintheUNFCCCprocess.PartieswereinvitedtosubmitinformationoneffortstoimplementthegenderactionplanintheirnationalreportingundertheUNFCCCprocess.Countriesareincreasinglyintegratinggender-responsiveapproachesintoadaptationplanningbyusinggender-disaggregateddataandgenderanalysistoidentifygapsandneeds,aswellasdevelopingtargetsandmeasurestoenhancegenderequalityandmonitoringprogressingender-responsivebudgeting,planningandimplementation.Examplesinclude:▶TheupdatedNDCofCaboVerdecontainsadditionaldetailonmeasuresforclimate-empoweringwomenandreducingtheirvulnerabilities,suchassettingatargetofincreasingthefemaleemploymentratetoatleast40percentinthemarineandcoastalsectorby2030(CaboVerde2021).▶Canadacontinuestoadvancegenderequalityandgender-responsiveclimatepolicydevelopmentandactionatthenationalandmultilaterallevels.Itslatestclimateplanincludedagenderanalysistoensuregenderequalityinexistingpoliciesandprogrammesandthedevelopmentofnewones(Canada2021a;Canada2021b).▶TheMarshallIslandscommittedtoincludeenhancedgender-responsiveactionsandinvestmentsinitsNAP(MarshallIslands2020).Chapter3–Globalprogressonadaptationplanning25Thisisamongthelowestscoresintheanalysis,whichislikelyduetothevariouschallengesassociatedwithdesigningandimplementingM&Esystemsforadaptation,suchasalackofstandardbestpracticemethodologiesandthedifficultyofattributingoutcomestospecificadaptationinterventions(Christiansenetal.2016;Bours,McGinnandPringle2014).Indeed,aswiththe2020analysis,countriescontinuetoreferencethesechallengesandstressthatadditionalresourcesandcapacity-buildingarerequiredtoovercomethemanddevelopeffectiveandsustainableM&Esystems.ADAPTATIONPLANNINGINLDCSANDSIDSTheParisAgreementrecognizesthatLDCsandSIDSareparticularlyvulnerabletotheadverseeffectsofclimatechangeandhavesignificantcapacityconstraints(articles9.4and11.10).Tounderstandhowthesecountriesareprogressingwithadaptationplanninginthefaceofthesechallenges,theanalysesmentionedabovehavebeendisaggregatedintoSIDSandLDCs(table3.2).Theseresultsshowthat,whileSIDSandLDCsareperformingonparwiththeglobalaverageinmostareas,inotherareas(forexample,subnationalplans,M&E,policyinstrumentsand–inthecaseofSIDS,verticalcoordinationandcentraladministrativebodiesaswell),theyarelaggingbehindby10percentormore.Insomecases–suchassubnationalplansandverticalcoordination–theseindicatorsmaybeofslightlylessimportanceinsmallercountrieslikeSIDS.StakeholderengagementistheoneareainwhichSIDSsignificantlyoutperformtheglobalaverage.Overall,however,itisclearthatSIDSandLDCscontinuetorequiresupporttoadvancetheiradaptationplanning.3.4ConclusionandoutlookAroundtheworld,countriescontinuetomakeprogressinestablishingadaptationplans,strategiesandlawsatthenational,subnationalandsectorallevels,andintakingstepstobolsterthequalityoftheseinstruments.WhilethewidespreaddisruptioncausedbytheCOVID-19pandemicmayhaveweakenedthisprogressinsomecases(chapter6providesananalysisontheemergingconsequencesofthepandemiconnationaladaptationplanning),itisnotyetpossibletodrawdecisiveconclusionsregardingitsimpactonglobaladaptationplanning.Nonetheless,itisclearthatcountriesremaincommittedtodevelopingnewadaptationplans,strategiesandpoliciestomeettheirevolvingneeds,andtoimprovingtheseinstrumentssothattheyarebetterequippedtoenhancetheiradaptivecapacity,strengthentheirresilienceandreducetheirvulnerabilitytotheimpactsofclimatechange.Indeed,ascomparedwiththebaselineanalysisinAGR2020,thischaptershowsprogressbothintermsofthenumberofplansandtheiradequacyandeffectiveness.WiththeexceptionofM&E,forwhichadirectcomparisonisnotpossibleduetothechangeinscoringmethodology,thisanalysisreflectsprogressinallindicatorsonboththestatusofadaptationplanninganditsadequacyandeffectiveness.While,inmostcases,thisprogresshasbeenincremental,thereareareas,suchasthefieldofgender,wheretherehasbeenalargeboostinprogress.Atthesametime,significantgapsremainwithrespecttoverticalcoordinationmechanisms,subnationalplans,centraladministrativebodiesforadaptationandM&E.Countriesandotherstakeholdersshouldthereforeredoubletheireffortsintheseareas,includingsupportinparticularlychallengingareas,suchasM&E,inordertoputthemselvesandtheworldonapathtowardsadequateandeffectiveadaptationplanning.However,theultimatetestofthisadequacyandeffectivenesswillbewhethertheseplansareimplementedand,inturn,whetherthisimplementationreducesriskandvulnerabilityandbolstersresilienceandadaptivecapacity(chapter5discussesimplementationinfurtherdetail).Photo:©CCAFS26427Leadauthors:PaulWatkiss(PaulWatkissAssociates),DipeshChapagain(CenterforDevelopmentResearch),PieterPauw(FrankfurtSchoolofFinanceandManagement),GeorgiaSavvidou(ChalmersUniversityofTechnology).Contributingauthor:BlancheButera(independent).Photo:©ShutterstockGlobalprogressonadaptationfinanceChapter4AdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStorm284.1IntroductionTheadaptationfinancegaphasbeendefinedasthedifferencebetweentheestimatedcostsofmeetingagivenadaptationtargetandtheamountoffinanceavailabletodoso(UNEP2014).Inpractice,thisisasimplification:estimatingthefinancegapischallenging,bothinconceptualandquantitativeterms(UNEP2016a).Furthermore,whileacommonmonetarymetrichelpsto1ThisreferstocountriesthathaveratifiedoraccededtotheUNFCCCthatarenotincludedinAnnexItotheConvention.TheindustrializedcountrieslistedinAnnexItotheConventionincludesthe24originalOrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment(OECD)members,theEuropeanUnionand14countrieswitheconomiesintransition.TheListofPartiestotheConventionisavailableatwww.unfccc.int/process/parties-non-party-stakeholders/parties-convention-and-observer-states.definetheadaptationfinancegap,itisimportanttonotethatfinanceisameansratherthananend:theavailabilityoffundsdoesnotguaranteethattheywillbeusedefficientlyandeffectively.Thischapterprovidesanupdateontheadaptationfinancegapfordevelopingcountries(definedasthenon-AnnexIcountriesundertheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange[UNFCCC]1),asreportedinpreviousKeymessages▶Sincethe2020editionoftheAdaptationGapReport(AGR),therehavebeensomenewestimatesofthecostsofadaptationfordevelopingcountries,reportinghigherfiguresthanearlierstudies.TherearealsonewestimatesofadaptationfinanceneedsfromsomeupdatedNationallyDeterminedContributionsandNationalAdaptationPlans,whichreporthigherestimatesformanycountries.▶ThisnewevidenceindicatespotentiallyhigheradaptationcostsandfinancingneedsthanindicatedinpreviousAGRs.Thisemergingevidencerequiresadetailedupdatedstocktakeofthecostsofadaptationandfinanceneeds.▶Thecostsofadaptation,andthusadaptationfinanceneeds,willbemuchlowerifthegoalsofParisAgreementaremet.▶Whiletherehasbeenatrendofgraduallyincreasinginternationalpublicadaptationfinancetodevelopingcountriesinrecentyears(upto2019),adaptationfinanceflowsareprojectedtodeclineasaresultoftheCOVID-19pandemic.▶Althoughfinaldatastillneedtobepreparedandanalysedfor2020,unlessitshowsanincreaseinclimatefinanceof26percentbetween2019and2020(comparedtojust2percentbetween2018and2019),theUS$100billiontargetfor2020willnothavebeenmet.▶Therehavebeenpositivetrendsintheemergenceofnewinstruments,actorsandapproachestoscaleupadaptation,includingintheprivatesector.Theseincludeopportunitiestoleverageprivate-sectorinvestmentwithpublicfinance.However,duetothebarrierstoprivatefinanceandthepublicinterventionorfinanceneededtoovercomethese,therateofupscalingremainsslow.Furthermore,private-sectorinvestmentwillbeunevenacrosscountriesandsectorsandisunlikelytotargetthemostvulnerable.▶Theavailableevidencehaslimitationsbutsuggeststhatestimatedadaptationcosts,andlikelyadaptationfinancingneedsindevelopingcountries,arefivetotentimesgreaterthancurrentinternationalpublicadaptationfinanceflows.▶TheevidencesuggeststhatthegapislargerthanindicatedintheAGR2020andiswideningfortworeasons.First,newbottom-upevidenceindicateshigherestimatedadaptationcosts/needs.Second,knownfinanceflowsseembroadlystableormayevenbedecreasing.▶Thereremainsanurgentneedtoscaleupandfurtherincreaseinternationalpublicadaptationfinance,forbothdirectinvestmentandforovercomingbarrierstoprivate-sectoradaptation.Chapter4–Globalprogressonadaptationfinance29AdaptationGapReports(AGRs)(UNEP2014;UNEP2016a;UNEP2016b;UNEP2018;UNEP2021).Ithasreviewedtheevidencebaseontheestimatedcostsofadaptation,includingrecentstudies,andalsoconsideredtheemergingestimatesofcountryadaptationneedsfromNationalAdaptationPlans(NAPs)andNationallyDeterminedContributions(NDCs).Thisprovidesanupdatedviewonthepotentialcostsofadaptation.Ithasalsoreviewedthelatestdataonglobaladaptationfinanceflows.Thisallows,intheory,acomparisonoffinanceflowsagainsttheestimatedadaptationcosts,andthusmakesitpossibletodeterminethepotentialsizeoftheadaptationfinancegap(andwhetherthisischanging)indevelopingcountries.However,theanalysisofbothadaptationcostsandfinanceflowsisverychallenging(UNEP2016a;UNEP2021).Inthisrespect,thischapterprovidesinsightsratherthannewnumbers.Finally,itprovidesanupdateontheopportunitiesandprogresstobridgethegapanddiscussesnewinsightssincethe2020editionoftheAGR(UNEP2021).4.2ThecostsofadaptationandadaptationfinanceneedsPreviousAGRshavereviewedtheevidencebaseforthecostsofadaptationindevelopingcountries,concludingthatthereisnodefinitiveestimateforthe(global)costsofadaptation,notleastbecausethereisnoagreed(quantitative)adaptationtarget.Thewiderangeofcostestimatesintheliteraturereflectsmajordifferencesintargets,futurescenarios,methods,assumptions,coverage(sectorsandimpacts),investmentperiods,uncertaintyandthecostsofimplementation.Akeychallengeisuncertainty.Futureclimatechangevarieswithfutureemissionsscenarios(forexample,aglobaltemperatureriseof2°Cor4°Cbyendofcentury,relativetopre-industriallevels)andtheuncertaintyaroundclimatemodeloutputsforagivenscenario(forexample,wetterordrierclimateprojections).Differentscenariosandmodelsleadtodifferentimpactsofclimatechange,andthusdifferentadaptationcosts.Thisleadstoalargepossiblerangeofvalues,makingproactiveandplannedadaptationdifficultinpractice,sinceitrequiresdecision-makingunderconditionsofuncertaintyandchangestheoptionsandcostscomparedtoanalysesofadaptationforasingle,preciselydefinedfuture.Theamountofadaptationneeded(andthusitstotalcost)alsodependsonthelevelofbenefitsthatadaptationdelivers(thatis,itseffectiveness),whichalsovarieswiththeobjectives.Afurtherissueiswhethercountries’existingadaptationdeficitsareincludedintheestimatedcostofadaptation.Thisdeficitisdefinedastheadverseimpactsofnatural(thatis,non-human-induced)climatevariabilityandextremes(forexample,fromperiodicfloodsthatalreadyhappen,rather2Notethatupdatingtocurrent(2020)prices,thesevaluesarenowequivalenttobetweenUS$155billionandUS$330billionannuallyby2030,risingduetobetweenUS$310billionandUS$555billionby2050.thanthosearisingduetohuman-inducedclimatechange).Thisdeficitisoftenlargeindevelopingcountries.Whiletheexistingadaptationdeficitisnotprimarilycausedbyclimatechange,futureadaptationwillbelesseffectiveandwillinvolvehighercostsifitisnotaddressedfirst.Therearealsoissuesregardingwhetherthesedeficitsareincludedincountryestimatesofadaptationfinanceneeds.4.2.1GlobalcostsofadaptationindevelopingcountriesTheAGR2016(UNEP2016a;UNEP2016b)estimatedthattheannualcostsofadaptationindevelopingcountriescouldbebetweenUS$140billionandUS$300billionby2030.Moreover,withincreasinglevelsofclimatechange,theannualcostwasprojectedtoincreasetobetweenUS$280billionandUS$500billionby2050.2Thefiguresreflectlowandhighfutureemissionsscenarios(approximately2°Cand4°Cpathwaysbytheendofthecentury,relativetopre-industriallevels),therefore,thecostsofadaptationareprojectedtobemuchloweriftheParisAgreementgoalsaremet.Theseestimateswerecompiledfromacombinationofglobalintegrated,globalsectoral,andnationalstudiesandmustonlybeconsideredasindicative(discussiononthechallengesofestimationisincludedinAnnex4.A[online]).ThisrangeofestimateswasreportedinsubsequentAGRs(UNEP2018;UNEP2021).SincetheAGR2016,whichhadaspecialfocusonfinance,therehavenotbeenanymajornewglobalassessmentsnorre-analysisandsynthesisoftheevidenceontheglobalcostsofadaptationindevelopingcountries.Thereare,however,somenewstudiesthatshednewlightonthepreviousAGRestimates.Thissectionsummarizesthefindingsofarapidreviewofnewestimates.AdditionaldetailsandreferencesareprovidedinAnnex4.A(online)ofthischapter.Afirstkeyinsightisthatrecentestimatesoftheeconomicimpactsofclimatechangearegenerallyhigherthanreportedinearlierstudies,bothinthenear-termunderambitiousmitigationscenariosandlaterinthecenturyunderhigherwarmingscenarios.Thisincludesupdatedvaluesfromexistingintegratedassessmentmodels,whichindicatesubstantiallyhigherimpacts(forexample,Nordhaus2017;Chenetal.2020).Italsoincludesestimatesfromothermodellingmethods,includingfromcomputablegeneralequilibriummodels(forexample,Kompas,PhamandChe2018;Boselloetal.2021),andeconometric-basedstudies(Burke,HsiangandMiguel2015;Burke,DavisandDiffenbaugh2018).Thelatterreportmuchhighervaluesbecauseoftheconsiderationofclimatechangeimpactsongrowthratesaswellasoutput.Implicitly,iftheeconomicimpactsofclimatechangearehigherthanpreviouslyanticipated,allotherthingsbeingequal,thecostsofadaptationarealsolikelybehigher(orotherwisetherewillbehigherresidualdamageAdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStorm30afteradaptation).Toillustratethis,thehighersea-levelriseprojectedintherecentIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)AR6report(IPCC2021)wouldbeexpectedtoleadtoincreasedcostsofseadefences(tomaintainsimilarlevelsofprotectionortodelivertheoptimallevelofadaptation),althoughtheeconomicbenefitsofadaptationwouldalsobehigher.Italsohighlightsthatstrongmitigationactionisindispensabletoreduceadaptationcostsandresidualdamageinthelongterm(Chapagainetal.2020;EstradaandBotzen2021;Iizumietal.2020;MarkandyaandGonzález-Eguino2019).Asecondinsightisthattheestimatedcostsofadaptationinmanynationalandsectorstudiesarealsoincreasing,ascomparedtoearlierstudies.Forexample,arecentestimateoftheglobalcostsofadaptationfordevelopingcountries,basedonacompilationofnationalstudiesusingasimilarapproachtotheAGR2016(UNEP2016b),indicatescostsinasimilarrangetothosefoundinthisreportbutwithhigheradaptationcostsinhigh-emissionsscenariosafter2030(Chapagainetal.2020).Similarly,astudyusingglobalintegratedassessmentmodelsestimatedadaptationcostsinlinewiththeupperestimatesinpreviousAGRs(MarkandyaandGonzález-Eguino2019).Findingsfromsectoralstudiesalsoindicatesimilartrends.Therehavebeenseveralstudiesoftheglobalcostsofcoastaladaptation(Nichollsetal.2019;Schinkoetal.2020;Tiggelovenetal.2020;Brownetal.2021;Tamuraetal.2019).Thesestudiesreportcoststhataresignificantlyhigherthanearlierestimates,evenwhenusingthesamemodels.Thisisduetorisingsealevelprojectionsandhigherestimatedcostsfrommaintenancebutalsoupdatedsocioeconomicchangescenarios.Similarfindingsemergeforothersectors,forexampleforriverfloodadaptation(Wardetal.2017),thewatersector(Straatsmaetal.2020)andtheagriculturalsector,(Iizumietal.2020;Baldos,FuglieandHertel2020).ThisnewevidencereinforcestheAGRreportedrangeofestimatedadaptationcostsandplausiblysuggestsahigherupperestimate,althoughmoredetailedsystematicanalysisisneededtoconfirmthis.Ontheotherhand,thereisgrowingevidence–atleastintheshort-term–thattherearemanylow-costadaptationinterventions–socalledno-regretandlow-regretoptions(GlobalCommissiononAdaptation2019)–withhighbenefit-to-costratios.Theseinclude,forexample,weatherandclimateservices,sustainablesoilandlandmanagementoptions,waterefficiencyandcapacity-building.Thishighlightstheincentivestoactearlyandstartscalingupadaptation,whilerecognizingthatmoremajorinvestmentwillbeneededinthemediumtermandbeyond,astheselow-regretactionsdonotdelivermoretransformationaladaptation.Thisearlyactionisparticularlyimportantbecausethelagsintheclimatesystemmeanthatthelargestbenefitsofmitigationwillbefrom2040(EstradaandBotzen2021)andmostoftheimpactsprojectedforthenexttwodecadescanonlybereducedbyadaptation.Overall,thenewevidencereinforcestheestimatespresentedintheAGR2016butindicatesthatthesecouldbetowardsthehigherendoftheranges,especiallyiftheParisGoalsarenotmet.Giventhenewevidencethatisemerging,amoredetailedstocktakeofthecostsofadaptationisnowrequiredanditisthusrecommendedthatamorecomprehensivecostassessmentisundertakeninlinewiththeapproachfromtheAGR2016.4.2.2AdaptationfinanceneedsindevelopingcountriesAfurtherindicationofthecostsofadaptationfordevelopingcountriesisprovidedbythecosts/financeneedsreportedincountries’domesticadaptationambitions,submittedtotheUNFCCCintheformofNDCsandNAPs.ThesubmissionofupdatedNDCsmeansthisisarapidlyevolvingareaandthischapterhasreviewedupdatessubmitteduptotheendofJuly2021.Thereviewfoundthat58developingcountries(specificallynon-AnnexIcountries,thefocusofthischapter)includeestimatesofadaptationfinancingneedsintheirlatestNDCsandNAPs.Thesearegenerallynotbasedondetailedtechnicalanalysesandusearangeofmethods,makingthemdifficulttoaggregateorcompare,bothwitheachotherandagainstthecostsofadaptationreportedabove.Thecostsindicatedinthesepoliticaldocumentsshouldbeinterpretedwithcareforvariousreasons:(i)theirlevelofprecisionvariesconsiderably;(ii)NDCimplementationperiodsvary;(iii)estimatesarepartial(coveringonlylimitednumbersofsectors);and(iv)thereisnocleardifferentiationoftheadaptationdeficitversustheadaptationgap(Pauwetal.2020).Asaresult,thereisalargevariationinestimatedcostsamongcountries.Nevertheless,thesecostestimatesarerelevanttotheinternationalcommunitybecausemanydevelopingcountriesmaketheirNDCimplementationconditionaloninternationalsupport(ibid.).TheremaybebenefitstoencouragingamorerigorousanalysisofadaptationfinanceneedsinNDCs.Thiswillhelprecognizetheissuesaboveandhelpconverttheestimatesintobankableprojectsandpipelinesthatconsiderpotentialfinancing,includingfrompublic,privateandpublic–privatepartnerships.Theindicativefinancingneedsforthese58countriestotalaroundUS$70billionperyearfor2020–2030.ExtrapolationoftheseNDCandNAPestimatesusingpercapitacostsandpopulationestimates(demand-sideadaptationfinanceneeds)toalldevelopingcountries–whilebeinghighlyindicative–wouldincreasetheestimatetoUS$250billionperyearby2030(Chapagainetal.2020).ThisisattheupperrangeofthecostsofadaptationfrommodellingstudiesreportedinpreviousAGRs(US$140billiontoUS$300billionperyearby2030)butmanyNDCsdonotclearlyseparatefinancingtheadaptationdeficitfromfutureclimatechange.SomecountrieshaveupdatedtheiradaptationfinanceneedsintheirupdatedNDCsubmissions.AcomparisonoforiginalandupdatedNDCsindicatesthatadaptationfinanceChapter4–Globalprogressonadaptationfinance31needsforthesecountrieshaveincreased.Forexample,theDominicanRepublic,Cambodia,GuineaandMongoliarevisedtheirNDCsandreportsignificantlyhigheradaptationfinancingneedscomparedtotheirinitialsubmission.Aclearreasonforthisincreaseistheincorporationofmoresectorsintheadaptationplan.Thesectoraldistributionofadaptationfinanceneedsisshowninfigure4.1.Thefigureisbasedonasubsetof26NDCsandNAPsthatprovidesectoralestimates.Theseneedsarefromstudiesthatusedifferentapproachesandmethods(asdiscussedabove)butthatnonethelessprovideusefulinformation.Theanalysisshowsthatthereportedneedsarehighestintheagricultureandinfrastructuresectors,followedbywater,andthendisasterriskmanagement.Thesefoursectorscoverover75percentofadaptationfinanceneedsthathavebeencommunicated.However,thissectoraldistributionmaybeinfluencedbyalargerproportionofAfricancountriesinthesample,whereeconomiesarehighlydependentonnaturalresources.Furtherestimatesofadaptationfinanceneedsfordevelopingcountrieswillbepublishedlaterin2021,bytheUNFCCCStandingCommitteeonFinanceinitsfirstreportontheneedsofdeveloping-countryPartiesrelatedtoimplementingtheUNFCCCandtheParisAgreement.TheseestimateswerenotavailableintimeforinclusioninthiseditionoftheAGR.Alignedwiththerecommendationabove,itwouldalsobeusefultoconsiderthenewevidenceonadaptationfinanceneedsaspartofamoredetailedstocktakeonthecostsofadaptation.Thisshouldalsoassesswhyneedsareincreasing,andwhetherthisisduetohighercosts,greatercoverageorimprovedassessmentmethods.4.3Financingadaptation:statusandprogressinadaptationfinanceflowsThissectionconsidersthemainchannelsofadaptationfinancefordevelopingcountriesandhowtheyhaveevolvedovertime.Itstartswiththeglobalestimatesandthenprovidesabreakdownbybilateral,multilateral,domesticandprivatesources.Theunderstandingofadaptationfinanceflowsisheavilyconstrainedbydataavailabilityandlimitations(seeAnnex4.B[online]).Thereareanumberofsignificantchallengesintrackingadaptationfinance,includingdefinitions,accountingissues,confidentialityrestrictionsandalackofuniversallyacceptedimpactmetrics(UNFCCC2018;UNEP2016b;ClimatePolicyInitiative[CPI]2020;seealsoAnnex4.B[online]).Thesechallengesvarydependingonthesourceoffinance.InternationalpublicbilateralandmultilateralfinanceflowsarewelldocumentedbytheDevelopmentAssistanceCommittee(DAC)databaseoftheOrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment(OECD).However,muchlessdataexistondomesticpublicsectorfinanceandprivate-sectorinvestmentsinadaptation(UNEP2021;UNFCCCStandingCommitteeonFinance2018;WeikmansandRoberts2019;Pauwetal.2016).Detailsofthespecificdatasourcesconsideredfortheassessmentsusedinthischapterareincludedinthefollowingsections,withmoreinformationinAnnex4.B(online).4.3.1Globalclimate-relatedfinanceAccordingtotheCPIGlobalLandscapeofClimateFinance2021(CPI2021),globalclimatefinanceflows–includingpublicandprivateflowsofbothdomesticandinternationalorigin–weretrackedatUS$632billionperyearfor2019–2020.TheseglobalfiguresdonotonlyconcernflowstoUNFCCCdeveloping-countryParties(seenextsection)Figure4.1Adaptationfinanceneedsbysectorbasedon26developingcountries’NDCsandNAPswithsectoraldisaggregationAgriculture(26.0%)Infrastructure(22.6%)Adaptationfinanceneeds(percentageofannualtotal)Water(15.2%)Disaster(12.5%)Forestsandecosystems(6.4%)Energy(4.6%)Coastalandmarineresources(3.4%)Health(1.7%)Tourism(0.8%)Othersectors(6.8%)AdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStorm32andtheyincludefinanceforbothmitigationandadaptation.ThismeanstheyarenotcomparablewiththegoalofmobilizingUS$100billionby2020.Thevastmajority(US$571billion)oftrackedfinanceflowedtomitigation,withUS$46billionforadaptationandUS$15billiontocross-cuttingthemesthatincludebothmitigationandadaptation(ibid.).Adaptationfinancegainedmomentumin2019–2020,increasing53percenttoanannualaverageofUS$46billionfromUS$30billionin2017–2018.However,thelevelstillfallsfarshortofestimatedneeds(GlobalCenteronAdaptation[GCA]2021)andcontinuestoaccountforonlyaminorshareoftotalpublicclimatefinance(14percent).Themajorityofthistrackedadaptationfinancecomesfrompublicfinancechannels(ibid.).Datafordevelopingcountriesfor2020arestillemerging.Studiesundertakenatthestartofthepandemicprojectedtheremightbeadecreaseinfinanceflows(seealsochapter6),withthepotentialforasingle-digitpercentagedeclineinadaptationfinancein2020andapotentiallylargerdeclineinsubsequentyears,duetotheCOVID-19pandemic(CPI2021;GCA2021).Thispredictionwasbasedontheprojectedreductionsininternationaldevelopmentfinance,increaseddebtdistress,andslowvaccineroll-outinclimate-vulnerablecountries(CPI2021;GCA2021).Theseprojectionsneedtobecomparedtotheactualfiguresfor2020and2021oncedataareavailable.However,thereareanumberoffactorspointinginthedirectionofpositivelong-termgrowthinadaptationfinance,includingtheincreaseofadaptationfinanceovertimepriorto2020,thepotentialforfundingtowardsaddressingCOVID-19toincludeadaptationco-benefits(seechapter6)andthepotentialthatincreasingclimateriskdisclosureandstrengthenedaccountingframeworksmaydriveanincreaseinadaptationfinanceflowsandthecapacitytoaccuratelytrackthem.Dataonclimate-relatedfinancetodevelopingnationsshowsanincreasingtrendinfinanceflowsovertime,reachingUS$79.6billionin2019,a2percentincreasecomparedto2018.However,thisfallssomeUS$20billionshortoftheUS$100billiontargetfor2020(OECD2021a).Tomeetthetarget,thecurrenttrendinclimatefinancewouldthereforeneedtoincreasefrom2percent(between2018and2019)to26percent(between2019and2020).4.3.2AdaptationfinancetosupportdevelopingcountriesUndertheUNFCCC,AnnexIIParties3arerequiredtoreportontheclimatefinancethattheyprovidetodevelopingcountries.AnnexIIPartiesusevariousmethodologiestotrackadaptationfinance(seeAnnex4.B[online])andsomecountrieshave3UndertheUNFCCC,AnnexIPartiesincludetheindustrializedcountriesthatweremembersoftheOECDin1992,pluscountrieswitheconomiesintransition.AnnexIIParties(consideredhereasdevelopedcountries)areAnnexIPartiesthatareobligedtoprovidesupporttonon-AnnexIParties(consideredhereasdevelopingcountries).alsochangedthewaytheyreport.Thismakesitverydifficulttocomparedataovertime(WeikmansandRoberts2019).However,itisclearthattheadaptationcomponentofsuchself-reportedfinanceundertheUNFCCChasbeengrowinginrecentyears,atleastbeforetheCOVID-19pandemic.Somenon-AnnexIIcountriesalsoreporttheiradaptation-relatedfinancecontributionstotheOECDDAConavoluntarybasis.TheOECDalsotracksmultilateraladaptationfinancecommittedbymultilateraldevelopmentbanks(MDBs),multilateralclimatefundsandotherinternationalinstitutions(seeAnnex4.C[online]).Thismainlyincludesgrantsandloansofvaryinglevelsofconcessionality,equivalenttoOfficialDevelopmentAssistance(ODA)andOtherOfficialFlows(OOF),asdefinedbytheOECD(seeAnnex4.C[online]).TheRioMarkerandClimateComponentsmethodologiesarecurrentlyusedacrossthelandscapeofbilateralandmultilateralfunderstotrackandreportclimatechangefinance.ExceptforMDBs,whichuseClimateComponents,allfundersuseRioMarker,althoughbothusecompatibledefinitionsofclimatemitigationandadaptation(OECD2018).AccordingtotheRioMarkermethodology,adaptationandmitigationcanbetargetedasa“principal”objective(wheremitigationoradaptation“isexplicitlystatedbutisnotthefundamentaldriverormotivationforundertakingtheactivity”)orisnotbe“targeted”atall(OECD2011).MDBstrackandreportdataontheirclimate-relatedcontributionsfollowingtheirownClimateComponentsmethodology(EuropeanBankforReconstructionandDevelopment2019).Basedonthisapproach,MDBsdeterminethespecificcomponentsofatransactionthatdirectlycontributetomitigation,adaptationorbothsimultaneously.Self-reportingcomeswithsomelimitations.Theattributionoffinancialsupportissubjectivebecausethejudgementandreportingismadebythefundersandisnotindependentlyverified.Thedefinitionofadaptationusedbybothmethodologiesleavesroomforinterpretationandtheaccountingmethodsdiffer(seeAnnex4.C[online]).Severalstudiesclaimthattheself-reportingofdonorsandthelackofindependentqualitycontrolresultinlowdatareliabilityandsometimessubstantialoverestimationsoffinanceflows(JunghansandHarmeling2012;Weikmansetal.2017),especiallyforactivitiestaggedas“significant”(Weiler,KlöckandDornan2018).Finally,historicaldataofloanamountsarereportedbythefundersatfacevalue,insteadofusingthegrant-equivalentamounts,resultinginoverestimatesofloanamounts(OxfamInternational2020;Robertsetal.2021).Moreover,financialflowsreportedincludetheadministrativecostsofdonors,whichinsomecasescanbehigh(AtteridgeandSavvidou2020).Regardinggenderconsiderationsaroundequityandjustice,althoughgender-Chapter4–Globalprogressonadaptationfinance33responsivepublicfinanceisthoughttobemoreeffectiveandefficient(UNDP2018),fundersdonotsystematicallyreportdataongender.Furthermore,notallfinancialtransactionsintheOECDDACdatabasesarescreenedagainsttheRiomarkerforadaptation,sotheremaybeadaptation-relatedfinanceflowsthatarenotcaptured(Savvidouetal.2021).Despitethelimitationsmentionedabove,theOECDDACdataprovidesthemostcomprehensiveandcomparablepictureoninternationaldevelopmentfinanceforclimatechange(WeilerandSanubi2019;DoshiandGarschagen2020).Whileitisimportanttoacknowledgethattrackingtheprovisionandreportingoffinancedoesnotprovidemuchinformationaboutefficientoreffectiveuseoffunds(UNEP2021),itisnecessaryforexaminingtheeffectivenessoffinancialcontributions(Savvidouetal.2021).BILATERALPUBLICFLOWSOverall,bilateralflowstodevelopingcountriesreportedtotheOECDDAChaveincreasedbetween2011and2019(figure4.2,PanelA).Therearesubstantiallyhigherallocationstaggedassignificantascomparedtoprincipal.Contributionstaggedas“principally”targetingadaptationwerelowerin2018and2019thanin2017.Althoughthereisnofirmevidenceonthesetrends,itcouldreflecteffortsbycountriestomaketheirfinanceflowsconsistentwithclimate-resilientdevelopmentpathways(article2.1(c)oftheParisAgreement)aspartofmainstreaming,whichintegratesclimateadaptationinexistingpolicies,programmesandplans.However,someanalysespriorto2015dididentifyover-reportingofadaptation-relatedfinanceduetoambiguousdefinitions(RepublicofIndia2015)andpoliticalmotivesinreportingbyfunderinstitutions(JunghansandFigure4.2PanelA:Adaptation-relatedbilateralflowstodevelopingcountriesbetween2011and2019PanelB:ShareoffinancialinstrumentsusedperyearforprincipalandsignificantmarkersAdaptation-relatedfinance(Riomarker:principal)US$billion201120122013201420152016201720182019Adaptation-relatedfinance(Riomarker:significant)0%50%100%Bilateral(Riomarker:principal)Bilateral(Riomarker:significant)039612152.03.06.93.57.23.57.93.712.24.510.85.413.43.213.05.115.16.0AB2019201720152013201120192017201520132011LoanGrantOtherNote:DatarepresentdonorcommitmentsandareinconstantUS$.Dataincludebothadaptationandcross-cuttingfinance(22percentforactivitiestargetingbothadaptationandmitigation).Loansarepresentedatfacevalue.DataincludebothAnnexIIandnon-AnnexIIcountries.AfulllistoffundersisprovidedinAnnex4.C[online].ThecontributionofAnnexIIisover97percentofthetotalsshownforboththe“principal”and“significant”markers.Source:OECDDAC2021.AdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStorm34Harmeling2012,AdaptationWatch2015).Thismeansthatsomecautionisneededininterpretingthedataandtrends.Increasedfinanceforclimatechangeadaptationisacentralissueforclimatejustice(HeffronandMcCauley2018).Thereisagrowingbodyofevidenceindicatingthatfundersarenotstrategicallytargetingtheiradaptationsupporttowardsthosecountrieswiththegreatestvulnerabilityandneeds(Savvidouetal.2021;WeilerandSanubi2019;DoshiandGarschagen2020;Alcayna2020).Theshareoftotaladaptation-relatedfinancecommittedtotheLeastDevelopedCountries(LDCs)for2011–2019was23percentforprincipaland28percentforsignificant.TheRioMarkermethodologyallowsanalysisoftheextenttowhichadaptationfinanceisgenderresponsive.Around60percentofbilateralODAfromOECDDACcontributorsmarkedasrelevanttoadaptationwasalsomarkedassupportinggenderequalityfor2018–2019.Mostofthisadaptation-relatedfinance(86percent)hasasignificantobjectiveforthegendermarker,comparedtojust14percentforprincipal(seeAnnex4.D[online]formoreongenderinadaptationfinance).ThisisdespitetheapprovaloftheUNFCCCGenderActionPlanatCOP23,whichincludestheuseofgender-responsivefinanceasacoretoolforimplementation(UNFCCC2017)anddespitethefactthatfundedprogrammestakingintoaccountgenderdynamicshavebeenfoundtobemoreeffectiveandefficient(UNDP2018).Mostofthefinancewasearmarkedasgrants(64percentforprincipaland73percentforsignificant),withloansbeingthesecond-mostusedinstrument(atfacevalue)(figure4.2,PanelB).Threesectors–agriculture,watersupplyandsanitation,andgeneralenvironmentprotection–receivedwellabove50percentofthetotalfinancethroughouttheperiodforboth“principal”and“significant”markers.Tosomeextent,thisalignswiththeadaptationfinanceneedsexpressedintheNDCsandNAPsofdevelopingcountries(figure4.1).However,basicdevelopmentsectorssuchashealth,educationandotherssuchasdisasterpreventionandpreparedness,andothersocialinfrastructureandservices,receivednegligibleamountsofadaptationspending,despitetheneedsexpressedbycountriesintheirdevelopmentplans(section4.2.2)aswellastheirimportanceinbuildinglong-termresilienceandadaptivecapacity(Atteridge,VerkuijlandDzebo2019).MULTILATERALPUBLICFLOWSAdaptation-relatedfinancialflowstodevelopingcountriesbyMDBsexhibitedastronguptrendthroughto2019(figure4.3,PanelA).SupportforadaptationasashareofoverallMDBclimatefinancerosefrom10percentin2011to39percentin2019(including4percentforactivitiestargetingbothadaptationandmitigation).Duringthesameperiod,atotalof26percentofadaptation-relatedMDBfinancewenttoLDCs.Thetwosectorsofagriculture,ontheonehand,andwatersupplyandsanitation,ontheother,accountfor36percentoffinancecontributionstoadaptation.ThebulkoftheincreaseofcommitmentstoadaptationfromMDBscomesfromdebtinstruments,whichmakeup92percentoftotalcommitmentsfor2015–2019,withjust6percentdeliveredasgrantsand2percentasequityandsharesincollectiveinvestmentvehiclesorunspecifiedfinancialinstruments(figure4.3,PanelB).Adaptationfinanceflowsfrommultilateralclimatefundsarealsopresentedinfigure4.3(PanelB).Multilateralclimatefundshaveacriticalroletoplayintheadaptation-relatedfinancelandscape,giventheirexclusivefocusonsupportingclimatechangeobjectives.IncontrasttoMDBs,multilateralclimatefundsuseahigherproportionofgrantsthanloans.Thetotalshareofgrantswas85percentforcontributionsclassedasprincipaland74percentforsignificant.Notably,from2011to2019,theshareofprincipalcontributionstoleastdevelopedcountriesfrommultilateralclimatefundsincreasedsubstantially,from26percentto63percent(figure4.3,PanelB).Thelargestproportionofprincipaladaptation-relatedfinancefrommultilateralclimatefundsisforthegeneralenvironmentprotectionsector(29percentforbothprincipalandsignificant),followedbywatersupplyandsanitation(14percentforprincipaland17percentforsignificant).PRIVATEFLOWSSofar,fewbiennialreportsbyAnnexIIPartieshavereportedontheprivateclimatefinancethattheymobilizedthroughpublicinterventions.TheUNFCCCStandingCommitteeonFinanceandOECDdatashowthatmobilizedprivate-sectorfinancehasvariedbetween17and27percentofallclimatefinancefordevelopingcountries(Bhattacharyaetal.2020).Thetotalamountofmobilizedprivatefinancehasbeenrelativelystablefrom2017to2019,withanannualaverageofUS$14.4billion(OECD2021b).However,themajorityofprivatefinancemobilizedbypublicclimatefinanceindevelopedcountriesbenefitsmitigationactivities(93percentfor2016–2018)(OECD2020).However,theOECDhasobservedthatthereisroomforimprovementinidentifyingadaptation-relevantactivitieswithinmobilizedprivatefinancedatasets.Trackingmobilizedprivateadaptationfinanceisexpectedtoremainchallenging.Despiteprivate-sectorflowstoadaptationremaininglimitedandbeingchallengingtotrack,thereisconsiderableinnovationinthisarea,increasingthepotentialforprivate-sectorfinancetoplayalargerroleinclosingtheadaptationfinancegap.Insummary(Annex4.E[online]providesareviewofnewdevelopments),therearenowexamplesoftheuseofprivateinvestorsandfinancialmarketstoraiseadaptationfinance,forexample,withgreenandresiliencebonds(debtinstruments).Thereisalsogrowinginvolvementoftheprivatesectorindevelopinganddeliveringadaptationandarangeofnewinstrumentsandapproacheshavebeendevelopedtoencouragethis,incentivizedbyblendingpublicfinancetoaddressbarriersandde-riskprivateinvestment(forexample,seedfunding,concessionallending,guaranteesandequity).Nonetheless,barrierstoprivateinvestmentinadaptation(informationChapter4–Globalprogressonadaptationfinance35gapsanduncertainty,positiveexternalities,lackoforlowrevenues)andthepublicinterventionsorfinanceneededtoovercomethesemeantheuptakeandscaling-upofthesenewinstrumentsremainsslow.Furthermore,private-sectorinvestmentwillgravitatetoopportunitieswhererevenuesarehighestandrisksarelowest,meaningitisunlikelytotargetthemostvulnerableinLDCsornon-marketsectors.Moreworkisneededtoidentifywherepublicfinanceismostneededandmosteffectiveinleveragingprivatefinance,aswellaswhereprivatefinanceisunlikelytofillthegap.DOMESTICFINANCEFLOWSDomesticbudgetsareanunderexaminedbutvitallyimportantsourceofadaptationfinanceandcurrentdataarelargelybasedoncasestudies.Allanetal.(2019)reportthatformanycountries,domesticpublicfinanceforclimatechange(mitigationandadaptation)hasinthepastexceededthatofinternationalsources.Forexample,inGhana,foradaptation,2percentofthetotalannualbudgetwasclimate-relevantbetween2014and2017.Thiscomparesto3percentinAntiguaandBarbudaand8percentinbothKenyaandPakistan(Watsonetal.2020).Figure4.3PanelA:Adaptation-relatedmultilateralflowstodevelopingcountriesbetween2011and2019PanelB:Shareoffinancialinstrumentsusedperyearforclimatefunds(principalandsignificantmarkers)andmultilateraldevelopmentbanks5.10.40.10.60.33.30.60.50.13.90.40.25.50.21.110.40.40.911.20.21.414.90.40.703961215201120122013201420152016201720182019Multilateraldevelopmentbanks(climatecomponents)Climatefunds(Riomarker:principal)Climatefunds(Riomarker:significant)US$billionAB201920172015201320112019201720152013201120192017201520132011Climatefunds(Riomarker:principal)0%50%100%Climatefunds(Riomarker:significant)MultilateraldevelopmentbanksLoanOtherGrantNote:DatarepresentdonorcommitmentsandareinconstantUS$.Dataincludebothadaptationandcross-cuttingfinance(targetingadaptationandmitigationatthesametime).Amountsarepresentedatfacevalue.Dataprovidersusedifferentmethods:MDBsuseClimateComponents;multilateralclimatefundsuseRioMarker(Annex4.C[online]).MultilateralclimatefundsaretheAdaptationFund,ClimateInvestmentFunds(StrategicClimateFund),theGlobalEnvironmentFacility(LeastDevelopedCountriesFund,SpecialClimateChangesTrustFund,GeneralTrustFund),theGreenClimateFund.MDBsincludedinthisdataaretheAfricanDevelopmentBank,theAsianDevelopmentBank,theAsianInfrastructureInvestmentBank,theCaribbeanDevelopmentBank,theDevelopmentBankofLatinAmerica,theEuropeanBankforReconstructionandDevelopment,theEuropeanInvestmentBank,theIslamicDevelopmentBank,theInternationalFinanceCorporation,theInter-AmericanDevelopmentBankGroup,andtheWorldBankGroup.Source:OECDDAC2021.AdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStorm36Similarly,5percentofthebudgetofNepalisconsideredasbeing“highlyrelevant”toclimatechange(Nepal2021).However,countriesapplytheirowndefinitionsandmethodsandtransparencyisoftenlow(Watsonetal.2020).Furthermore,otheraspectsofcountries’budgetscancounteractdomesticfinanceforadaptationbyincreasingemissionsorvulnerability(ibid.).Thereisgrowingrecognitionoftherolefiscalpolicycanplayinbuildingresiliencetoclimatechange.Thisincludestaxes,pricesupports,revenueandexpendituremeasuresthatworktoreduce,retainortransferclimate-relatedrisksandhelpbuildresiliencetoshocks(InternationalMonetaryFund2019;WorldBank2019).Thisisinlinewitharticle2.1(c)oftheParisAgreement,whichstatesthatallcountriesneedtomaketheirfinanceflowsconsistentwithlow-carbonandclimate-resilientdevelopmentpathways(Zamariolietal.2021).However,emergingevidenceshowsthattheCOVID-19pandemicledtotaxrevenuereductionsinmanycountries.Incombinationwiththeneedsofgovernmentstoreallocateresourcestowardshealthorsocialservices,thiscouldcausecountriestocutdomesticclimatefinanceflows(Caldwell,AlayzaandLarsen2021).4.4Progress,outlookandrecommendationsThischapterhasprovidedanupdateontheadaptationfinancegapindevelopingcountries.EstimatingthisgapischallengingbuttheevidencesuggeststhatthecostsofadaptationandreportedneedsfromupdatedNDCsandNAPsarehigherthaninpreviousAGRs.Atthesametime,thisreviewhasfoundthatpublicfinanceflowsforadaptationhaveremainedbroadlystableinrecentyearsandmayevenhavedecreasedslightlysincetheCOVID-19pandemic.ThesetwofindingssuggestthatnotonlyisthegaplargerthanindicatedintheAGR2020butitisalsowidening.Takentogether,theevidenceindicatesthatestimatedadaptationcosts,andsimilarlylikelyadaptationfinanceneedsindevelopingcountriesarefivetotentimesgreaterthancurrentinternationalpublicadaptationfinanceflows,asizeablefinancegap.Whilethereissomepromisinginnovationtoincentivizeprivate-sectoranddomesticadaptationfinancing,dataonsuchflowsarescarceandthereislittleevidencetosuggestsuchfinancewillbridgetheadaptationfinancegap.Relatedtothis,whilethereisanupwardtrendinclimatefinance,basedoncurrentprojections(OECD2021b;Bhattacharyaetal.2020),itseemsunlikelythattheUS$100billiontargetfor2020hasbeenmet,particularlytheinferredadaptationcomponentofthistarget.ThereviewinthisAGRhasalsofoundthatthereisnowmoreevidenceonthecostsofadaptation,onadaptationfinanceneedsandonfinanceflows.ThismakesittimelytoundertakeamoredetailedstocktakeanditisrecommendedthatamorecomprehensivecostassessmentisundertakeninlinewiththeAGR2016.Moreover,thereisalsomoreevidenceonthebenefitsofadaptationanditseffectiveness,whichwarrantsconsiderationinsuchastocktake,includingamoredetailedanalysisofthepotentialrolesandcomplementarityofpublicandprivateadaptation.SuchinformationwouldalsoprovideimportantinsightsneededforUNFCCCnegotiationsonfutureclimatefinancetargets.Chapter4–Globalprogressonadaptationfinance37Photo:©CIAT/GeorginaSmithAdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStorm38539Chapter5GlobalprogressonadaptationimplementationLeadauthors:TimoLeiter(GranthamResearchInstituteonClimateChangeandtheEnvironment,LondonSchoolofEconomicsandPoliticalScience),NickBrooks(Garama3CLtd),AlistairHunt(UniversityofBath),LisaSchipper(UniversityofOxford).Contributingauthors:FinlayPettengale(UniversityofCardiff),ChrisGordon(InstituteforEnvironmentandSanitationStudies,UniversityofGhana).AmeteorologistattheBassefieldstationintheUpperRiverRegionofTheGambia,oneofninestationsthathavebeenupgradedtobecomeautomaticandprovidereliableandtimelyclimateinformationthankstoaprojectsupportedbyUNEPanditspartners.Learnmoreaboutthisprojecthere.Photo:©UNEPAdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStorm405.1IntroductionTheobjectiveofthischapteristoprovideaglobalassessmentoftheimplementationofadaptation,withaparticularfocusondevelopingcountries.Itprovidesessentialinformationthatwouldnotbeapparentfromsolelyfocusingontheamountoffinanceand/ortheextentandqualityofplanning,namelywhetheradaptationisactuallytakingplace,andwhereandinwhichsectorsitishappening.Inaddition,thischapterassessestheavailabledataonresultsandriskreductionachievedandconcludeswithrecommendationsforthedesignandassessmentofadaptationactions.Theassessmentofglobalimplementationofadaptationinthe2020editionoftheAdaptationGapReport(AGR2020)wasbasedonananalysisofprojectdocumentsfromthethreefundsthatservetheParisAgreement(UNEP2021a),andontheinitialresultsfromtheGlobalAdaptationMappingInitiative(GAMI),aresearchinitiativethatsystematicallyassesseddocumentedadaptationinthescientificliterature(Berrang-Fordetal.2021).Thisyear’sAGRupdatesandexpandsthe2020analysisbyassessingdatafromthetop10bilateraladaptationdonorsoverthe10-yearperiodfrom2010to2019.Whileitdoesnotcaptureadaptationbeingimplementedbyallactorsandhaslimitedcoverageofactionsindevelopedcountries,thiscombinationofdatasourcesprovidesoneofthemostcomprehensiveglobalassessmentsoftheextent,locationandfocusofadaptationactionsgloballyavailabletodate.Assuch,itsfindingsaredirectlyrelevantfortheGlobalStocktake.Keymessages▶Intheperiodbetween2010and2019,morethan2,600principaladaptationprojectshavebeenfundedbythetop10bilateraldonorsonadaptation,underscoringthesignificanceofbilateralfinanceasadriverofadaptation.Furthermore,thenumberofnewprincipaladaptationprojectsthatstartedduringthelatterhalfofthisperiodis50percenthigherthanthetotalnumberfortheprecedingfiveyears,illustratingastrongaccelerationinadaptationimplementedwithbilateralsupportsincetheadoptionoftheParisAgreementin2015.▶Thenumberofactivitiesmarkedasprincipaladaptationbythetop10donorsintheOrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment(OECD)CreditorReportingSystemisactuallysignificantlyhigherthan2,600.However,morethanone-thirdoftheseactivitieswerenotfoundtomeettheOECDcriteriaforprincipaladaptation,meaningprincipaladaptationisbeingover-reported.Thisanalysisconfirmssimilarfindingsbycivilsocietyorganizationsandacademia.▶Undermultilateraladaptationfinance,between1December2020and30September2021,39newprincipaladaptationprojectsfundedbytheAdaptationFund,theGreenClimateFundandtheGlobalEnvironmentFacilitywerestarted–anincreaseof10percentcomparedwiththe397projectsstartedbetween2006and2020(assessedinthe2020AdaptationGapReport).▶Thesectorsprioritizedacrosscountries'mostrecentNationallyDeterminedContributionscloselymatchtheprimarysectorsbeingaddressedbyprojectssupportedwithbilateralandmultilateraladaptationfunding,withagriculture,water,ecosystemsandinfrastructurefeaturinginthetopfivesectorsineachlist.▶Evidenceassessedinthischaptersuggeststhatimplementationofadaptationisunevenlydistributed,withcertainregionshavingrelativelylittleevidencetosuggestthatadaptationistakingplace,particularlyNorthAfrica,EasternEurope,CentralAsia,theMiddleEastandpartsofSouthAmerica.▶Dataonadaptationoutcomesandevidenceofriskreductionremainsscarce.Lessthan2percentofthe1,682scientificjournalarticlesthatdocumentimplementedadaptationprovideprimaryevidenceofriskreduction.▶Poorunderstandingofcontextualdriversofvulnerability,top-downdesign,limitedconsiderationoffutureclimaterisksandunclearsuccesscriteriareducethelikelihoodofadaptationprojectsachievingriskreduction.Moreattentionisthereforeneededoninclusiveprojectdesignandimplementationtobetterelaboratetheintendedadaptationprocessandpreventmaladaptation.Chapter5–Globalprogressonadaptationimplementation41ThescopeandcontentofthischapterarecomplementarytoWorkingGroupII(WGII)oftheSixthAssessmentReport(AR6)oftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC),1whichwillbepublishedinFebruary2022.TheWGIIAR6willgointodetailonkeysectorsandallgeographicregions.5.2ScopeanddatasourcesAdaptationactionsareundertakenfromthelocaltointernationallevelandarecarriedoutbyavarietyofdifferentactors.Atthenationallevel,countriesareonlyjustbeginningtoreportontheimplementationoftheirnationaladaptationplans(Leiter2021).Consequently,countrysubmissionstotheUNFrameworkConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC)presentlydonotprovideasufficientbasisfordeterminingthelevelofimplementationworldwide.Thischapterthereforeusesthreecomprehensivedatasourcestoobtainanindicationofadaptationactionsglobally:1.projectdocumentsfromthreefundsservingtheParisAgreement(AdaptationFund[AF],GreenClimateFund[GCF]andGlobalEnvironmentFacility[GEF];alladaptationprojectsuntil30September2021);2.OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment(OECD)statisticsonaidactivitiestargetingadaptationtoclimatechange(availablefor2010-2019,coveringallrecipientcountriesofdevelopmentaid);3.implementedadaptationasdocumentedinscientificjournals(globalcoverage,journalsindexedinWebofScience,ScopusorMedline,publicationsbetweenJanuary2013andDecember2019).Thesedatasourcescomplementeachotherand,combined,areabletoprovideuniqueinsightsintotheextentandstatusofimplementedadaptationactionsglobally.However,theydonotprovidearepresentativeoverviewofadaptationbeingimplementedacrossallscalesandbyallactorgroups.DatafromthethreefundsservingtheParisAgreementandOECDstatistics,forexample,bothexclusivelyprovideinformationaboutadaptationprojectsfundedbyinternationalfinanceflowsandthereforedonotcaptureactionsimplementedwithfinancefromothersources.Asaresult,adaptationimplementedbyactorsmorelikelytooperatewithoutthisfunding(e.g.localorinternationalnon-governmentalorganizations[NGOs],communitygroups,theprivatesectorandthenational1WGIIoftheIPCCwillpreparethe“Impacts,AdaptationandVulnerability”sectionoftheoverallIPCCAR6.2The41projectsincludesevenprojectsthatwerestartedin2020,fiveafterthecut-offdateoftheAGR2020andtwothathadnotpreviouslybeenidentified.3IntheorderofadaptationfinancereportedtotheOECD,startingwiththehighestcontributors:Japan,Germany,EuropeanUnion(EU)institutions,France,Netherlands,UnitedStates,UnitedKingdom,Sweden,SwitzerlandandKorea.4TheUSrejoinedtheParisAgreementon19February2021andthecurrentadministrationhaspledgedtoquadrupleUSclimatefinancecomparedtoits2013-2016levels,toover11billionperyear.governmentsofdevelopedcountries)arelikelytobeunderrepresented.Toacertainextent,theseactionscouldbecapturedbyGAMI.However,thiswouldrequirethemtobedocumentedinscientificarticles,whichislikelytobetheexceptionratherthantherule.Nevertheless,thethreedatasourcesusedprovidelongitudinalcoverageover15,10and8years,respectively,whichenablestheidentificationoftrendsandnewdevelopmentsovertime.FurtherinformationabouttheanalysisconductedforthischapterisdescribedinAnnex5.A(online).5.3Implementedadaptationactions5.3.1InternationallyfundedadaptationactionsTheAGR2020identified397projectsprimarilyaimedatadaptationthatwerestartedbetween2006and2020,fundedbythethreefundsservingtheParisAgreement(AF,GCFandGEFfromitsLeastDevelopedCountriesFund[GEF-LDCF]andSpecialClimateChangeFund[GEF‑SCCF]).Sevenmoreadaptationprojectswerestartedin2020,and34betweenJanuaryandSeptember2021,givingatotalof437supportedprincipaladaptationprojects.Thisisanincreaseofalmost10percentsincetheAGR2020,despitethepandemic.Since2015,aquarterofnewprincipaladaptationprojectshavegrantvolumesaboveUS$10million(table5.1andfigure5.12).Thenumberofnewadaptationprojectsthatwerestartedin2020and2021issimilartothenumberofnewlystartedprojectsperyearintheperiodfrom2015to2019.However,thisnumbercouldhavebeenhigherhadthepandemicnotoccurred.Asanewdatasource,thisyear’simplementationchapteralsoincludesbilaterallyfundedadaptationprojects.Between2010and2019,thetop10bilateraladaptationdonors3funded2,607principaladaptationprojects.Table5.2showsthenumberofnewlystartedprojectsperyearperdonorandfigure5.2showsthedevelopmentofthetotalnumberofprojectsthroughoutthedecade.Theoveralltrendhasbeenupwardexceptfor2018,whenthenumberofprojectsfundedbytheUSfellsubstantiallyduetothepreviousadministration’spositiononclimatechange.4Thisfallwaspartiallyoffsetin2019byastrongincreaseinthenumberofprojectssupportedbyFrance,GermanyandtheUK(table5.2).Despitethedropin2018,thecombinednumberofnewprojectsstartedinthelastfiveyearsofthedecade(2015-2019)was50percenthigherthanforthefirstfiveyears,whichillustratesthestrongaccelerationintheimplementationofprincipaladaptationprojectssincetheadoptionoftheParisAgreement.AdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStorm42Figure5.1Numberofnewprincipaladaptationprojectsperyearandsizeofgrant(excludingco-financing)fundedbytheAF,GCFandGEC-LDCF/SCCF,asat30September2021010203040502021202020192018201720162015US$0.5-10millionUS$10-25millionUS$25-50million>US$50millionNumberofprojectsTable5.1NumberofAF,GCFandGEFprincipaladaptationprojectsstartedsince2006,andnumberofprincipaladaptationprojectsstartedin2020and2021,asat30September2021TotalNewin2020Newin2021AF98156GCF681813GEF-LDCF17219GEF-SCCF7611GEF–StrategicPriorityonAdaptation(SPA)(2004-2010)22N/AN/ATotal4363529Table5.2Numberofnewprincipaladaptationprojectsstartedperyearwithfundingfromthetop10adaptationdonors2010201120122013201420152016201720182019TotalperdonorEUinstitutions715121731422294754220France2814102427272730449240Germany5313741474955585091464Japan482426443429231498259RepublicofKorea803104437121566Netherlands2192225691149Sweden6112121252111225116Switzerland121515212179101711120UnitedKingdom251082914502015553229UnitedStates3852687178802451811615844Totalperyear1791732092422332774303611913122607Chapter5–Globalprogressonadaptationimplementation43Figure5.2Numberofnewprincipaladaptationprojectsstartedperyearwithfundingfromthetop10bilateraladaptationdonors02001003004005002010179201117320122092013242201423320152772016430201736120181912019312Thenumberofactivitiesmarkedasprincipaladaptationbythetop10donorsintheOECDCreditorReportingSystemisactuallysignificantlyhigherthan2,607.However,morethanone-thirdoftheactivitieswerenotfoundtomeettheOECDcriteriaforprincipaladaptation,whichtheOECDdefinesasadaptationbeing“fundamentalinthedesignof,orthemotivationfor,theactivity”(OECD2016).Thismeansthatprincipaladaptationisbeingover-reported,whichconfirmssimilarfindingsbycivilsocietyorganizationsandacademia.Thenumbersreportedintable5.2aretheresultofmanualscreeningoftheinformationprovidedintheOECDdatabase,andthereforedonotincludeprojectsthatwerenotfoundtomeettheOECDcriteriaforprincipaladaptation(seeAnnex5.A[online]).Almostone-thirdofthebilaterallyfundedprincipaladaptationprojectsaddressmultiplesectors,while21percentfocusprimarilyonagricultureand20percentonecosystems(figure5.3,PanelA).AcomparisonwiththeprioritysectorsmentionedinthemostrecentNationallyDeterminedContribution(NDC)ofeachcountry(seePanelB)showsaclosematch,withagriculture,water,ecosystemsandinfrastructureoccupyingfourofthetopfivepositionseach.NDCsmentioninghealthasaprioritysectorforadaptationincreasedinfrequency,from25percentofallNDCswithanadaptationcomponentinthefirstroundof(intended)NDCsto45percentofeachcountry’smostrecentNDC,uptoAugust2021.Thisincreaseislikelyduetotheincreaseinawarenessofhealth-relatedmatterscausedbyCOVID-19.Overthe10-yearperiod,thecompositionofprimarysectorsaddressedbynewprincipaladaptationprojectshasremainedrelativelyconstant.Agricultureisanexceptiontothis,havingincreasedsignificantlytoanaverageofalmost25percentoverthelastfiveyearscomparedto16percentfortheperiod2010-2014(figure5.4).WaterastheprimaryFigure5.3PanelA:Primarysectorsaddressedbybilaterallyfundedprincipaladaptationprojectsbetween2010and2019PanelB:Sectorsidentifiedasadaptationprioritiesincountries’mostrecentNDCs0Multisectoral28%22%21%12%10%59%56%45%36%34%60%50%40%30%20%10%0%AgricultureEcosystemsWaterInfrastructureAgricultureWaterHealthEcosystemsInfrastructureandTransportABNote:Sectorsaremarkedinthesamecolourinbothpanelstofacilitatecomparison.ThebarsinPanelAaddupto100percentbecauseeachprojectwasassignedtojustoneprimarysector.ThebarsinPanelBdonotaddupto100percentbecauseeachNDCmentionsmultiplesectors.InPanelB,eachbarshowsthepercentageofNDCsmentioningaparticularsectoroutofallNDCs(countingthemostrecentonepercountry).Source:DataforPanelBwassourcedfromDeutscheGesellschaftfürInternationaleZusammenarbeit(GIZ2021).Note:Theterm'principaladaptationproject'referstoprojectsforwhichadaptationis"fundamentalinthedesignof,orthemotivationfor,theactivity"(OECD2016).AdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStorm44Figure5.4Compositionofprimarysectorsaddressedbynewprincipaladaptationprojectsperyear0%20%40%60%80%100%2019201820172016201520142013201220112010FisheryUrbanClimateInformationInfrastructureWaterEcosystemsAgricultureMultisectoralFigure5.5Geographicdistributionofprincipaladaptationprojectsfundedbythetop10bilateraldonors01-45-910-1920-4950+N/ANumberofprincipaladaptationprojectsfundedbythetop10bilateraldonorsNote:CountriesandterritoriesmarkedasN/Aareeithera)countriesthathavereportedtheprovisionofadaptationsupporttotheOECDaspartofOfficialDevelopmentAssistance,andthusarehighlyunlikelytoberecipientsofbilateralsupportforadaptation;orb)territoriesthatarerecognizedasdisputedbytheUnitedNationsorwhosestatushasnotyetbeenagreedupon.Chapter5–Globalprogressonadaptationimplementation45sectoraccountedforlessthan10percentofnewadaptationprojectsin2013,2015and2016,buthassteadilyincreasedsincethenandreached21percentin2019.Ecosystemsastheprimarysectoraccountedfor18-25percentofnewadaptationprojectsovermostoftheperiod2010-2019,butsawastrongdecreasein2018and2019to11percentand7percent,respectively.Ofthe2,607principaladaptationprojects,133projects(~5percent)wereidentifiedasaimingtoenhancethegenerationandutilizationofclimateinformationasaprimaryobjective.ThisislowerthanwasindicatedintheAGR2020,whichdeterminedthat12percentofthe397adaptationprojectsfundedbythethreefundsservingtheParisAgreementfocusedonclimateinformation.However,theAGR2020appliedabroaderdefinitionthatalsocountedprojectsthathadasinglecomponentrelatedtoclimateinformation.Regardingtheextenttowhichbilaterallyfundedadaptationprojectspromotegenderequality,approximately4percentofallprojectsintheOECDCreditorReportingSystemmarkedashavingadaptationasaprincipalobjectivearealsomarkedashavinggenderequalityasaprincipalobjective.ThisrateisslightlylowerthanthatfoundinprojectsofthefundsservingtheParisAgreement,whichtheAGR2020determinedtobearound6percent.Figure5.5showsthenumberofprincipaladaptationprojectspercountry.Thefigureshowsthatbilaterallyfundedadaptationprojectsareunevenlydistributedamongcountries,withthemajorityofprojectsbeinglocatedinEast,SouthernandWestAfrica,South-EastAsiaandpartsofSouthAmerica.FewerprojectsarefoundinCentralAsia,theMiddleEastandpartsofNorthAfrica.Forty-fivepercentofprincipaladaptationprojectswerelocatedinLeastDevelopedCountries(LDCs)while9percentwerelocatedinSmallIslandDevelopingStates(SIDS),demonstratingasimilar–albeitslightlylower–focusonLDCsandSIDStothatfoundforthethreefundsservingtheParisAgreementbytheAGR2020(53percentand14percent,respectively).5.3.2ImplementedadaptationactionsdocumentedinscientificjournalsGAMIidentifiedandanalysedjournalarticlespublishedbetweenJanuary2013andDecember2019thatdescribeimplementedadaptationactions(Berrang-Fordetal.2021).Itfoundthatonlyafractionofthetensofthousandsofpublishedarticlesthatdirectlyaddressadaptationtoclimatechangeactuallydocumentimplementation,afindingconfirmedbyanotherreviewoftheadaptationliterature(Sietsmaetal.2021).Intotal,GAMIidentified1,682journalarticlesthatdescribeimplementedadaptationactionsacrosstheglobe,althoughsomeregionsandcountriesareassociatedwithafarlargernumberofpublicationsthanothers.Morethan50articleswereidentifiedforBangladesh,China,Ethiopia,Ghana,India,Kenya,Nepal,andtheUnitedStates(figure5.6).Figure5.6Geographicdistributionofimplementedadaptationactionsdocumentedinscientificjournalarticles01-45-910-1920-4950+N/ANumberofadaptationactionsdocumentedinjournalarticlesincludedintheGAMIdatabaseNote:TerritoriesmarkedasN/AarethosethatarerecognizedasdisputedbytheUnitedNationsorwhosestatushasnotyetbeenagreedupon.Source:DataprovidedbyGAMI(Berrang-Fordetal.2021).AdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStorm46Acomparisonwiththemapofbilaterallyfundedadaptationprojects(figure5.5)showsthatsomeareasarecharacterizedbyalownumberofadaptationprojectsandonlyafewcasesofimplementedadaptationdocumentedinjournalarticles,inparticularNorthAfrica,EasternEurope,CentralAsia,theMiddleEastandpartsofSouthAmerica.Thelownumberofadaptationprojectsbeingdocumentedintheseregionscould–inpart–beexacerbatedbyissuessuchasreportingbiascausedby,forexample,languagebarrierswhichhinderthepublicationofarticlesinEnglish.Asaresult,itcannotnecessarilybeconcludedthatadaptationactionsarelessfrequentintheseregions.However,thefactthatdatafromboththeGAMIandOECDdatabasesprovideonlylimitedevidencethatadaptationistakingplaceintheseregionssuggeststhatadaptationisnotascommoninsomeoftheseregionsaselsewhere.FurtherresultsfromGAMIincludingsectoralcomposition,targetedclimatehazards,targetedactors,thepotentialfortransformativeadaptation,andthemethodsused,areoutlinedinBerrang-Fordetal.(2021).Inaddition,aseriesofassociatedarticlesareexaminingvariousdimensionsofadaptation,suchasequity,health,genderandresponsestospecifichazardsorinspecificregions.55.4AdaptationoutcomesandriskreductionTheultimategoalofadaptationistoreducerisksassociatedwiththeimpactsofclimatechangethathavenotbeenavoidedthroughmitigation.Byreducingtheserisks,adaptationseekstomaintainorenhancehumanandecologicalwell-beinginthefaceofclimatechange(seechapter2).5.4.1AssessingadaptationperformanceAreviewofimplementedadaptationfoundthateffectivenessismostcommonlydescribedintermsofreducedriskorvulnerabilityandincreasedwell-being(Owen2020).Theframingofadaptationcaninfluencewhichoftheseconcepts(risk,vulnerability,resilience,well-beingorothers)areemphasizedinthedefinitionofeffectiveness(Singhetal.2021).Importantly,theoutcomesofadaptationactionsarenotjusteithersuccessfulorunsuccessful,butcanfallalongacontinuumfromnegativeoutcomes(referredtoas“maladaptation”)toeffectiveadaptation(Schipper2020;TubiandWilliams2021).Figure5.7visualizesthiscontinuumingeneraltermsandbyprovidingatangibleexampleofhowdifferingadaptationoutcomescouldmaterializeinasmallholderfarmingcontext.Furthermore,adaptationoutcomesarerarelyconsistentacrossdifferentsocialgroups,andinsomecasesadaptationactionscanbenefitcertaingroupswhileharmingothers(therebyleadingto5Alistofassociatedarticlesisavailableathttps://globaladaptation.github.io/results.html.6Seehttps://unstats.un.org/unsd/envstats/ClimateChange_StatAndInd_global.cshtml.maladaptation).Additionally,theeffectivenessofadaptationcandecreaseovertimeifclimatehazardsbecomemoreintenseand/ormorefrequent.Assessmentoftheextenttowhichadaptationinterventionsreducerisksassociatedwithclimatechangeisacriticalprerequisiteforcontinuouslyimprovingadaptationactionsandavoidingmaladaptation.However,anumberofchallengestoassessingadaptationoutcomesexist,whichlimititsapplication(Bours,McGinnandPringle2014a).Principalamongthesechallengesisthateffectivenessisrelativetothelevelofclimatehazards(ratherthananabsolutevalue),thatthecompositionoffactorsthatdeterminerisksandtheirrelativeimportancecanbeverydynamic,andthatadaptationishighlysiteandcontextspecific,meaningtherecanbenogloballystandardizedindicatorstouniversallyandcomprehensivelyassessthesuccessofadaptationinterventions(Arentetal.2014;LeiterandPringle2018).TheUNStatisticsDivision’smulti-yearprocess6toidentifyagloballyapplicableandfeasiblesetofadaptationindicatorsdemonstratesthetrade-offs,thelackofgloballyavailabledataandthechallengetoexpresslocaladaptationoutcomesthroughglobalindicators.Inaddition,indicatorsbasedonnationalaveragesdonotaccountforinequalitiesanddifferencesinpeople’svulnerabilitythatarecrucialtodeterminetheeffectivenessandfairnessofadaptation.Atthenationalandsubnationallevel,avarietyofindicatorshavebeenusedtoassessadaptationactions,andsector-specificassessmentpracticesareevolvingaswell(Mäkinenetal.2018;Leiteretal.2019;Brooksetal.2019;FoodandAgricultureOrganization[FAO]2019;Donattietal.2020).However,adaptationindicatorsrelyonapriorunderstandingofhowadaptationisexpectedtoworkandwhatitaimstoachieve.Theoriesofchangeorsimilarwaysofoutliningtheintendedchangeprocessfromactionstooutcomescanhelptodesignadaptationinterventionsandtoguidetheformulationofsuitableindicators(Bours,McGinnandPringle2014b;Oberlacketal.2019).Inthisway,adaptationactionsdonotgainrelevancethroughtheirindicatorsbutthroughhowtheyaddresscurrentandfutureclimaterisksinawaythatisrobustandaccountsforcontextandequity(seesection5.4.3).Todate,manymonitoringandevaluation(M&E)systemsofadaptationprojectsremainfocusedoneasilymeasurableshort-termoutputssuchaspeoplesupported,policiesdrafted,orassetsimproved,andareillequippedtoassesschangesinvulnerabilityorrisksordetectmaladaptation(Eriksenetal.2021).Indeed,indicatorsusedbythethreefundsservingtheParisAgreementtoassessportfolio-wideperformanceprimarilymeasureoutputs(Leiteretal.2019).ThewaymostadaptationprojectsandtheirresultsarecurrentlyassessedthereforelimitsourunderstandingChapter5–Globalprogressonadaptationimplementation47oftheeffectivenessofadaptation.Annex5.B(online)discussesseveralapproaches(frommobile-phonebasedhouseholdsurveysandcombinationsofprocessandoutcome-baseddata,tostatisticallyverifiedresilienceindicatorsandqualitativeevaluations)thatcanbefurtherexploredtoadvancetheassessmentofadaptation,butthereisnoone-size-fits-allapproachtoadaptationM&E.TheappropriatenessofparticularM&EapproachesdependsonthepurposeofundertakingM&Eandassociatedinformationneeds,aswellastheavailableresourcesandlinkstodecision-makingprocesses(Leiter2017).5.4.2GlobalstatusofadaptationresultsFundsservingtheParisAgreement,aswellassomebilaterallysupportedclimatefunds,publishperformancedatathatareoftenbasedonportfolio-widestandardindicators,suchasthenumberofbeneficiaries.AsatJune2020,theLDCFhasreachedmorethan16.2milliondirectbeneficiariesandtrained508,000people,whiletheSCCFhasreachedover6.4milliondirectbeneficiariesandtrained80,000people(GEF2021).Asat31December2020,GCF‑fundedadaptationprojectswerereportedtohavereachedatotalof49milliondirectandindirectbeneficiaries(GCF2021).Throughitsprojectsapprovedbefore30June2021,AFisexpectingtoreach10milliondirectbeneficiaries(AF2021).Whilethistypeofdataindicatesafund’sreachandlevelofactivity,itdoesnotprovideinformationabouttheactualoutcomesofadaptation–i.e.towhatextentthebeneficiarieshavebecomemoreresilientandagainstwhatlevelofclimaterisk.Duetodifferentcalculationmethods,evendatausingseeminglyidenticalindicatorsarenotcurrentlycomparableacrossfunds(Pauw,GrüningandMenzel2020;AF2021).Therehavealsobeeninstancesofdoublecountingofbeneficiaries(Binetetal.2021).Furthermore,itisdifficulttointerpretindicatorswithoutcontext.Forexample,theindicator“Metersofcoastlineprotected”,aportfolioindicatorusedbyAF,sayslittleabouthoweffectivethisprotectionisinreducingclimaterisk,particularlyrisksassociatedwithfuturesea-levelriseandassociatedhazards.Consequently,Figure5.7Asimplifiedcontinuumofadaptationoutcomes,fromirreversiblemaladaptationtotransformativeadaptationHighervulnerabilitytoclimatechangethanbefore,andthenatureofvulnerabilityisnewordifferent.Choicesmadeleadtopathwaylockinthatunderminesfutureadaptationopportunities.TargetpopulationirreversiblymorevulnerabletoclimatechangeTargetpopulationmorevulnerabletoclimatechange,stillfixableOthergroupsadverselyaffectedbystrategyIneffectiveadaptationShort-medium-termeffectiveness,nonegativeconsequencesinlongtermLong-termpositiveimpactsTransformationtoclimate-resilientpathwaySmallholdersselllandwhenthevalueisnearlyworthlessduetoclimatepressures.Theyquitfarmingandmoveintowagelabourinaclimate-sensitivesectormeaningthatlossofemploymentislikleyinthenearfuture.ExamplesOutcomesSpectrum(worsttobest)Smallholdersmaintainlandbutengageinseasonalwagelabourelsewhere,meaningthatopportunitiestoimprovefarmingconditionsaremissedandmakingchangestolivelihoodstrategyiscostlyorimpossible.Irrigationisdevelopedthatextendslifeoffarmingpracticesinthetargetlocation.However,thiscreatessignificantwaterstressdownstreamleadingtonewclimatechangevulnerability.Small-scaleirrigationisdevelopedforfarmers,butclimatechangecontinuestoposeasignificantchallengeforagriculture.Mediationgroupswithupstream/downstreamusersareestablishedtohelpcreatesustainablequotasforwateruses,makingeveryonehappyandbuildingsocialcapital.Fewornoreal-worldexamplesexist–thisisanidealoutcome.Highervulnerabilitytoclimatechangethanbefore.Highopportunitycosts.Highriskofpathwaylock-in,butsomeopportunitiestoreverseremain.MaladaptationEffectiveadaptationHigherornewvulnerabilityintroduced.Limitedornooptionsforaddressingnewvulnerability.Strategyhasnegligiblepositiveornegativeimpact.Impactsofclimatechangeareaddressed,butnottherootcausesofvulnerability.Vulnerabilitytoclimatechangeisaddressed.Rootcausesofvulnerabilityisaddressedthroughsystemtransformation.Source:AdaptedfromSchipper(2020).AdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStorm48whilethedatacanbeaggregatedacrossprojects,thisdoesnotnecessarilyleadtoameaningfulstatementaboutriskreductionanditleavesoutwhobenefits.Thisexampleillustratesthelimitsofstandardindicators,whichcanbeusefulforaccountabilityandcommunicationpurposes,butlessusefulforunderstandingcontext-dependentresults.ArecentevaluationbytheGCFIndependentEvaluationUnit(IEU)(Binetetal.2021)likewisefoundthatthe“depthofimpactforadaptationinterventionscannotbemonitoredwiththecurrentsetofindicators”.ProjectscouldthereforeemployamixofdifferentM&Eapproachestogeneratemultipletypesofinformationfordifferenttargetaudiencesandbebasedontheoriesofchangedevelopedtogetherwithstakeholdersandbeneficiaries(seesubsection5.4.1).Evidenceofriskreductionbeingachievedbyadaptationactionsdocumentedinthescientificliteratureisalsoverylimited.Lessthan2percentofthearticlesidentifiedbyGAMIprovideprimaryevidenceofriskreduction(Berrang-Fordetal.2021).Itwasfoundthatmanyarticlesassumedratherthanobservedorempiricallydemonstratedriskreduction.Just30outofthe1,682articles(1.8percent7)offeredevidenceofriskreduction,halfofthemthroughquantitativeassessments,11throughqualitativemethods,andfourusingacombinationofbothmethods(Berrang-Fordetal.2021,SupplementaryMaterials4).Whilethisfindingdoesnotnecessarilymeanthattheother98percentdidnotcontributetoriskreduction,itshowsthatquantitativeorqualitativeevidenceofriskreductionisrare.Italsohighlightsthelimitedfocusgiventoassessingtheoutcomesofadaptationactions,reinforcingtheneedtodesignadaptationactionsinawaythatincreasesthechanceofriskreductionbeingachieved,particularlyforthosemostvulnerabletoclimatechange.5.4.3ProjectdesignandfactorsthatsupportorhinderriskreductionAstakeholder-informedunderstandingofcurrentandexpectedclimatehazardsandvulnerabilityintherespectivelocation,howtheyaffectthepopulationandwhoismostatrisk,iscriticallyimportantforadaptationplanning(seechapter3).However,the1,682articlesidentifiedbyGAMIandameta-analysisof34adaptationprojectsshowthatclimateriskcontextsareoftenpoorlyarticulatedinthedesignofadaptationinterventions(Berrang-Fordetal.2021;Eriksenetal.2021).Indeed,arecentevaluationoftheadaptationportfoliooftheGCFfoundthatestablishingtheclimaterationale(i.e.theexplanationofaproject’scontributiontoadaptation)isthebiggesthurdleinprojectdevelopment(Binetetal.2021).Theevaluationconcludesthatclearerguidanceisneededonwhatcountsasadaptationandhowtodraftameaningfulclimaterationale.7TheAGR2020reportedthisfigureas“lessthan3.5%”(58outofthe1,682articles),butare-analysisofthese58articlesin2021revealedthatsomeactuallydidnotprovidesufficientevidence,leavingjust30articles(seeBerrang-Fordetal.2021,SupplementaryMaterials2).Recentresearchidentifiedseveralfactorsthathinderachievementofriskreductionoutcomes(Eriksenetal.2021),namely:I.poorunderstandingofcontextualdriversofvulnerability;II.top-downdesignandimplementationwithinadequaterepresentationofvulnerableandmarginalizedgroups(e.g.womenandindigenousgroups);III.rebrandingdevelopmentactivitiesasadaptationwithoutconsideringclimaterisks;IV.failingtoidentifycriteriaforadaptationsuccessand/orallowingsuccesstobedefinedimplicitlybydominantgroups.Thereviewof34adaptationprojectsfoundthatdespiteintentionsbeingstatedinprojectdocuments,theseoftendidnottrulyaddresstheunderlyingdriversofvulnerabilitytoclimatechange,particularlywheretheseareembeddedindeep-rootedeconomicandpoliticalstructures(Eriksenetal.2021).Toanalysethisdimension,greaterattentiontothesedriversisessentialifthepositivetransformationpromisedbymanyadaptationinterventionsistobedelivered.Furthermore,adaptationismorelikelytobeeffectivewhereitinvolvesgenuineandsubstantialparticipationbythoseitisintendedtosupport,inplanning,implementationandM&E(Buontempoetal.2014;Forsyth2018;Vincentetal.2020).Thisfindinghasmotivatedtheprinciplesfor“locally-ledadaptation”spearheadedbytheInternationalInstituteforEnvironmentandDevelopment(IIED)(Soanesetal.2021).Itspremiseisthataparticipatoryapproach,includingjointagreementonwhatconstitutes“successful”adaptationandhowitcanbereached,willincreaseownershipandbemoreeffective.Such“bottom-up”insightscanalsobecombinedwith“top‑down”climatescenariostointegratescientificandlocalknowledge(Conwayetal.2019).Finally,progressivelyhigherlevelsofwarmingandassociatedincreasesinclimaterisksalsoneedtobeconsidered,giventhatcurrentNDCsareprojectedtosubstantiallybreachthetemperaturegoalsoftheParisAgreement(UNFCCC2021).5.5OutlookandrecommendationsDespitethegrowingnumberofadaptationprojects,thelackofknowledgeabouttheiroutcomesandtheincreasingconcernoverthewayadaptationprojectsarecurrentlyplannedandimplemented–andtheimplicationsthishasfortheireffectiveness–isacallforaction.Thissectionoutlinesthemainrecommendationstoimproveadaptationdesign,implementationandassessment.Chapter5–Globalprogressonadaptationimplementation49Mainrecommendations:1.Ensurethatplanningisriskfocusedandclearlyexplainshowadaptationisexpectedtotakeplace.Aprerequisiteforachievingriskreductionisthatprojectsaregroundedinaninclusiveunderstandingofclimaterisksandvulnerabilityandthatitisclearlyelaboratedhowtheiractivitiesaddressclimaterisks.AsidentifiedbytheevaluationofGCF’sadaptationportfolioandbytheanalysisofGAMI’sdatabaseof1,682articles,thereisaneedtosubstantiatehowobjectiveswillbeachieved.Ratherthanjustaddingsomevagueresiliencetargetsorindicatorsthatmostlyrepresentbusinessasusual,projectproposalsneedtospecifyhowadaptationisenvisagedtoachieveitsobjectives.Tofacilitatethischange,betterguidanceisneededonhowtodesignadaptationprojects.Theassociateddevelopmentandapprovalprocessesalsoneedtobemodifiedaccordingly,includingprojecttemplateswhichcurrentlypaytoolittleattentiontoadaptationmechanisms.2.Ensurethatplanningisinclusiveandcontextinformed.Tounderstandtheriskcontextoflocallyimplementedadaptationactionsanddevelopanappropriatetheoryofchange,genuine,substantialandsustainedinclusionofthevulnerableandmarginalizedmustbeensured.Suchanapproachcanalsohelptopreventmaladaptationsincesocialexclusionofcertaingroups(e.g.womenorindigenouspeoples)duringprojectdevelopmentcanleaveimportantsourcesofriskunaddressed(Forsyth2018).Theprinciplesforlocallyledadaptationcanbeusedtosupportaparticipatoryapproach(Soanesetal.2021).3.Facilitatetheassessmentofadaptationoutcomesandcommunicatetheresults.Thereneedstobeastrongerfocusonassessingwhethertheadaptationmechanismworksasintendedandwhethertheintendedoutcomes–andnotjusttheoutputs–arebeingachieved.Thiscouldinvolveapplyingcomplementaryadaptation-specificassessmentsinadditiontocommonprojectmonitoringarrangementsandaccountability-focusedindicators(Leiter2018).Thischangewouldrequirecommitmentandadequateresourcing.Theresultsshouldbemadepubliclyavailableandbeeasilyaccessible.Thesameappliestoprojectevaluationswhichoftenremaininternaldocuments,therebypreventingopportunitiesforlearning.4.Validateoutcomeindicatorsandusemultiplesources.Indicatorsthatarechosentorepresentconceptslikeresilience,vulnerabilityoradaptivecapacityneedtobejustifiedonthebasisofempiricalevidence(i.e.howtheymeasuretherespectiveconceptneedstobedemonstrable).However,inpracticetheyareoftenchosenonthebasisofdataavailabilityoreaseofmeasurement.Tobettermeasureriskreduction,indicatorsneedtobegroundedinawellinformedunderstandingofcontextsandpotentialfuturerisks.Surveysandinterviewswithrelevantactorscanyieldvaluableinsightsthatquantitativeindicatorscannotcapture.Thisapproachisalsousuallycheaperthangatheringnewquantitativedata.5.Promotereflectivemonitoring.Suitableapproachestomonitoring,evaluationandlearningneedtobeappliedtoactivelysupportdecision-makingratherthansimplyservingasaonce-a-yearaccountabilitytool.Beyondindicators,themonitoringsystemneedstobeabletodetectunintendedconsequencesincludingmaladaptationinordertosupportadjustmentstoactionsasnecessary.Monitoringshouldthereforetakeareflectiveapproachthatinvolvesactivesharingofexperiencesasimplementationunfolds.Assuch,itmayincludemultipletypesofinformationtomeettheneedsofdifferentusers(Faulkner,AyersandHuq2015).6.Planforhigher-endimpacts.Theextremeeventsexperiencedthroughout2021,manyofthemrecordbreaking,underscoretheneedtoconsiderhigher-endclimatescenariosandtoplanwithsufficientsafetymargins(e.g.notrelyingonthelowerboundofestimatedsea-levelrise).Thisrequiresenhancedadaptationambitiontoaddressimpactsthatmightfalloutsidetherangeofpreviouslymodelledoranticipatedimpacts.Morethananythingelse,theseeventsunderscoretheurgentneedtodecarbonizetheglobaleconomymuchfasterthanNDCscurrentlyforesee(UNEP2021b).Thisistheonlywaytoavoidescalatingclimaterisksandtopreventtheadaptationgapfromwideningfurther.50651EmergingconsequencesofCOVID-19onadaptationplanningandfinanceLeadauthors:ArjunaDibley(PollinationandUniversityofOxford),ThomWetzer(UniversityofOxford).Contributingauthors:NishaKrishnan(WorldResourcesInstitute),NanakNarulla(UniversityofOxford),BrianO’Callaghan(UniversityofOxfordandHarvardUniversity),AdrianaQuevedo(ODI),NicolaRanger(UniversityofOxford),BenediktSigner(WorldBank).Photo:©CCAFSSEA/LeocadioSebastianChapter6AdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStorm526.1IntroductionTheCOVID-19pandemichasreverberatedthroughouttheworld,placingstrainonmanyofthesystemsthatareessentialtoourlives.Thecrisishasrevealedandreinforcedmanyofthepre-existingvulnerabilitiesandfaultlinesrunningacrossourglobalizedworld.Ithasalsodemonstratedthatthenotionallydistinctdomainsofhealth,economics,societyandenvironmentareinfactcomplex,nested,interconnectedsystems,whichrequirecoordinatedglobalresponses(OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment[OECD]2020a).Climatechangeadaptationpractitionersaredealingwithasimilarlycomplexproblemthatalsocrossesphysical,temporalandorganizationalboundaries.AswithCOVID-19,theclimatecrisisactsasathreatmultiplierofpre-existingvulnerabilities,impactingpeople,livelihoodsand1Infull,article7.1oftheParisAgreementreads“Partiesherebyestablishtheglobalgoalonadaptationofenhancingadaptivecapacity,strengtheningresilienceandreducingvulnerabilitytoclimatechange,withaviewtocontributingtosustainabledevelopmentandensuringanadequateadaptationresponseinthecontextofthetemperaturegoalreferredtoinArticle2.”ecosystems.ThesethreatsareaddressedbytheParisAgreement,whichestablishedtheglobalgoalonadaptationof“enhancingadaptivecapacity,strengtheningresilienceandreducingvulnerabilitytoclimatechange”.1ThischapteraimstosynthesizetheliteraturethatdescribeshowCOVID-19hasimpactedcountry-level“adaptivecapacity”(seetheglossaryforadefinitionanddiscussionbelow)andidentifiesemergingopportunitiesforpolicymakersanddecisionmakerstoimprovetheirresponsestoboththehealthandclimatecrises.Forinstance,thesignificantfiscalspendingonthehealthemergency,welfarepaymentsandeconomicrecoverymaymakeongoingspendingonmeasurestoincreasepreparednessforclimatehazardsmorechallengingforsomegovernments.However,italsopresentsanopportunitytoinvestinprogrammesandpoliciesthatenablegovernmentsto“buildforwardbetter”.Keymessages▶COVID-19andclimatechangehavehadacompoundingeffect,creatingsignificanthumansufferingandstretchingtheeconomicanddisasterresponsecapacityofgovernmentsaroundtheworld.Thecompoundnatureoftheseriskscontinuestoimpacttheadaptivecapacityofgovernments,communities,societiesandsocialgroups,particularlythosethatareeitheralreadyvulnerable(forexample,womenandindigenousgroups)andthoseindevelopingcountries.▶Thepandemichasdelayedexistingadaptationplanninginsomecountriesanddisrupteddisasterriskfinances.NationalAdaptationPlanprocesseshavebeenhamperedbyhealthrestrictions,aswellasbythepoliticalandbudgetaryfocusonimmediatepandemicresponses.Additionally,budgetsforemergencydisasterriskmanagementhavebeendepleted,raisingconcernsaboutareductioninadaptivecapacityforsubsequenthealthemergenciesandclimateshocks.▶COVID-19hasexacerbatedpre-existingfinancialbarrierstoinvestmentinadaptation.However,thereisanopportunitytoredresstheselowlevelsofinvestmentbydirectingrecoveryfundingintogreenandresilientrecoveries.Inresponsetothepandemic,asat15August2021,US$16.7trillionoffiscalstimulushadbeenannouncedbycountries.Lessthanone-thirdof66studiedcountrieshadexplicitlyfundedspecificmeasurestoaddressphysicalclimaterisksintheirannouncedinvestmentprioritiesuptoJanuary2021.Thecostsofservicingthedebtraisedtorespondtothepandemic,combinedwithdecreasedgovernmentrevenuesduetotheeconomicimpactsofCOVID-19,mayalsohamperfuturegovernmentspendingonadaptation,particularlyindevelopingcountries.▶COVID-19provideslessonsforimprovingclimateadaptationplanningandfinancing.COVID-19highlightstheimportanceofgovernmentsaddressingcompoundrisksthroughintegratedriskmanagementapproaches.Thepandemicalsodeepenstheneedforsubstantivedebtreliefforheavilyindebtedandclimate-vulnerablecountriesandcreatesanopportunityto“buildforwardbetter”,throughinvestmentinactivitiesthatsupportgreeneconomicrecoveryandbuildadaptivecapacity.53Chapter6–EmergingconsequencesofCOVID-19onadaptationplanningandfinanceThischapterfocusesongovernmental–ratherthansocietal,businessorhousehold–contributionstocountry-leveladaptivecapacity.Nonetheless,itisimportanttonotethatthesedimensionsareinterlinkedandcannotbeneatlyseparated.Thechapteralsofocusesprimarilyontheimpactsofthepandemiconadaptationfinancingandplanning,sincetheimpactsonimplementationarestillemergingandarenotwelldocumentedinexistingstudies.Tosynthesizetheliterature,theauthorsconductedarapidreviewofpeer-reviewedliteratureandreportsfrommultilateralorganizationsandpolicyinstitutions,publishedinorafter2020,onthelinkbetweenCOVID-19andadaptationfinancingandplanning.2Thechapterisorganizedasfollows.Section6.2exploresthewaysinwhichthepandemicandclimatechangeinteractandcreate“compoundrisks”,whichincreasethevulnerabilityandthreatentheadaptivecapacityofgovernmentsandsocieties.Section6.3setsouthowCOVID-19hasdelayedexistingadaptationplanningprocessesinsomecountries,creatingpotentialcompoundrisksinthefuture.Section6.4analysestheemergingimplicationsofCOVID-19foradaptationfinancing.Asgovernmentsmovefromdeploying“rescue”stimulusto“recovery”spending,thechaptersynthesizesexistingdatatodeterminewhethercountriesareinvestinginrecoveriesthatarebotheconomicallyeffectiveandbuildingcountries’adaptivecapacitytoclimatechange.Ouranalysisofthesefiscalflowsisconstrainedbypre-existingdifficultiesinherentinclassifyingandtrackingadaptationspending.3Section6.5outlineslessonsforgovernmentsandmultilateralinstitutionsonhowtoaddresstheadaptationfinancingandplanningimpactsofCOVID-19,asidentifiedabove,toenableCOVID-19toactasacatalyst,ratherthananimpediment,toenhancingglobalclimateadaptivecapacity.6.2HowCOVID-19hasimpactedadaptationplanningandfinanceClimatechangeandCOVID-19sharemanysimilarities.LiketheCOVID-19crisis,theclimatecrisisisasystemicproblemthatrequirescoordinatedglobalanddomesticresponses.Bothcrisesareprotracted,witheffectsthatunfoldovermonthsandyears,andaredeeplyentangledwithothersocial,environmentalandeconomicshocksanddisruptions(Phillipsetal.2020).Theybothrevealtheinequityinwhoexperiences,andhastheabilitytorespondto,theeffectsofcrises(Doddsetal.2020;Pateletal.2Thischapterisnotintendedtobeacomprehensivecatalogueoftheliterature.Instead,itaimstosynthesizetheinformationmostrelevanttogovernmentandcivil-societydecision-makingatthepointofintersectionbetweenCOVID-19andclimatechangeadaptation.KeywordsearcheswereconductedacrossGoogleScholar,ProQuestandScopus.Thefirst100resultsofeachsearch,organisedbycitationsandrelevance,werereviewed.WeselectedsourceswhichweremostrelevanttothekeythemesintheAdaptationGapReport(AGR),namelyadaptationplanning,financingandimplementation.3Aschapter4acknowledges,difficultieswithtrackingadaptationfinancestemfrom,amongotherthings,“…definitionalchallenges,accountingissues,confidentialityrestrictions,andalackofuniversallyacceptedimpactmetrics”.2020).Emergingevidencesuggeststhatthepandemichasalsoimpactedclimateadaptationatmultiplescales.ThissectionhighlightshowCOVID-19hashadaparticularlysignificantimpactonthe“adaptivecapacity”ofcountries(definedbelow),bycreatingorexacerbatingcompoundrisksatmultiplelevels.6.2.1COVID-19andadaptivecapacityTheemergingliteratureonCOVID-19andclimateadaptationsuggeststhatthepandemicimpactstheParisAgreement’sgoalsof“enhancingadaptivecapacity”,“strengtheningresilience”and“reducingvulnerability”.Ashighlightedbythe2018editionoftheAdaptationGapReport(AGR),thedistinctionbetweenthesetermsisnotwellestablishedintheliterature,withmanyoftheirkeyconstructsoverlappingoneanother.Instead,thereportsuggestedthatitmaybemorehelpfultodrawadistinctionbetween“adaptivecapacity”ontheonehand,andcountryexposureandsensitivitytophysicalclimatehazards,ontheother.Adaptivecapacityisabroadconceptwithmultipledefinitions.TheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)hasdefinedtheconceptasreferringtotheabilityofsystems,institutionsandhumanstoadjusttopotentialclimatedamage,totakeadvantageofopportunities,ortorespondtoconsequences(IPCC2014).Academicscholarshipmakesthepointthatmultipleactorsworktogethertoenableadaptivecapacity,includinggovernments,businessesandcommunities,andhighlightstheimportanceoftheinteractionsbetweentheselayers.Todate,theliteratureontheimpactsofCOVID-19onadaptationhasprimarilyfocusedonthewaythepandemichasimpactedinstitutionsandtheeconomy.Reflectingthisemphasisintheliterature,thischapterfocusesprimarilyontheissueofthe“adaptivecapacity”ofgovernments.TheliteraturehighlightsthattheimpactofCOVID-19onphysicalclimaterisksisuncertain.Althoughthegovernment-imposedrestrictionsonmovementandeconomicactivitythatwereenactedinresponsetothepandemicledtoareductioninemissionswithinsomesectors,itslong-termeffectsonclimatehazardswillbecontingentonthelengthofthepandemicandgovernmentresponsestoit(Forsteretal.2020;leQuéréetal.2020;Shanetal.2020).Atthetimeofwriting,theemissionreductionsinducedbygovernment-imposedrestrictionsonmovementandeconomicactivityareunlikelytomeaningfullyreduceclimatehazards.Despitetemporarilyslowingtheusageoftheglobalcarbonbudget,theydonotappeartohavereducedemissionspermanently,withmostcountrieshavingalreadyreturnedAdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStorm54totheirpre-pandemicemissionlevels(IPCC2021).However,ashighlightedintheremainderofthischapter,existingresearchshowswithgreatercertaintythatCOVID-19anditsassociatedpolicy,economicandsocialresponsesarealreadyimpactingtheadaptivecapacityofgovernments.6.2.2COVID-19andclimatechangepresent“compoundingrisks”thatimpactadaptivecapacityIntheliteratureontheCOVID-19pandemicandclimateadaptation,“compoundrisk”(box6.1)hasbeenusedtodescribethewayinwhichthepandemicandclimatechangeinteract.4Ontheonehand,climatechangemayhavecontributedtoconditionsthatexacerbatethepandemic(amongotherhealthimpacts;see,forexample,UNEP2018).5IncreasedriskofCOVID-19infectionhasbeenassociatedwithexposuretohigherlevelsofcertainairpollutants(Cole,OzgenandStrobl2020),andsomescholarshavelinkedgeographicshiftsinwildlifeinducedbyclimatechangeandecosystemdegradationwiththespreadofzoonoticdiseases,suchasCOVID-19(Carlsonetal.2020;Everardetal.2020;Dasgupta2021;UNEPandInternationalLivestockResearchInstitute2020).Ontheotherhand,thepandemicandthesocialresponsestoitmayalsobeimpactingourabilitytorespondtoclimatechange(Ranger,MahulandMonasterolo2021).Thischapterfocusesprimarilyonthelatter.In2020,droughts,cyclones,andfloodsexacerbatedbyclimatechangedamagedcriticalinfrastructureor4Otherterminologyhasbeenusedtodescribetypesofcomplexrisks,suchas“cascading”,“interconnected”or“amplified”risks(Simpsonetal.,2021).5Studiesonthissubjectundertakenindifferentregionshaveshownthatimpactsareambiguousanddiverse,indicatingtheneedforinvestmentincountry-specificresearchtobuildunderstandingoftherequiredadaptationprocesses.impededthepublichealthresponsesneededtocontainepidemics(Phillipsetal.2020).InMorocco,forexample,droughtsoccurredinparalleltothepandemic,leadingtomajorincreasesinunemploymentinruralcommunitiesasfarmerswithlowerincomesstruggledtofindwork.Similarly,indevelopedeconomies,wehaveseenacompoundingofthepandemicandclimaterisks.IntheUnitedStatesofAmerica,theavailableevidencesuggeststhatemergencyresponsemeasuresforCOVID-19,coupledwithresponsestoincreasedmajorhurricanesandwildfires,mayhaveexacerbatedstaffingshortfallsattheUnitedStatesFederalEmergencyManagementAgencyin2020(UnitedSatesGovernmentAccountabilityOffice2020).Box6.2containsacasestudyofhowthepandemichasreducedtheresilienceofPacificstatestocyclones.Whilethischapterfocusesonthegovernmentlevel,itisimportanttoacknowledgethatCOVID-19hasalsodiminishedadaptivecapacityatotherscales,makingcommunities,organizationsandhouseholdsmorevulnerable,whichhasaknock-onnegativeimpactoncountry-leveladaptivecapacity.Atthehouseholdlevel,theWorldBankestimatesthatanadditional97millionpeoplefellintopovertyin2020,drivenbytheeconomicshockscausedbytheCOVID-19pandemic(WorldBank2021b).Thelinksbetweenpovertyandclimatevulnerabilityarewelldocumented:povertyisbothadriverandaresultofvulnerabilitytoclimatechangeshocksandstressors(Hallegatte,FayandBarbier2018;Thomasetal.2019).TherehavealsobeensystematicreductionsinadaptivecapacityBox6.1Whatisa“compoundingrisk”?Compoundriskisatermthatisusedinmultipledomains,includingclimatescience(IPCC2012),disasterriskresponseandothersciences,withdifferentmeanings.Thecommondenominator,however,isthatcompoundrisksbuildoneachotherandexacerbatehazardsandotheroutcomes.Amongothers,thecontext-specificdifferencesintheterm’sdefinitioncentreonwhetherthecausalbasisofsuchrisksshouldberelatedandonwhethersocialandphysicalinteractionshouldbeconsideredthesameorseparate(PescaroliandAlexander2018).Inthischapter,thetermisusedtorefertointeractionsnotonlybetweenphysicalhazardsbutalsoinvolvingotherareas,suchassocialandeconomicsystems.Theconceptofcompoundriskiswidelyusedinrelationtoclimateadaptation.Zscheischleretal.(2020)reviewedhistoricalinstancesofcompoundeventsrelatedtoweatherextremesandconcludedthatmanymajorcatastrophesbearthehallmarkofbeingcausedbycompoundevents.Forexample,theynotedthatin1983,thelargestsynchronouswheatfailureinmodernhistorywasdrivenbyastrongElNiñoevent,whichfuelledheatwavesanddroughtsincrop‑producingregionsacrossmultiplecontinents.Maladaptationisanotherexampleofcompoundrisk,thistimeinherentinadaptationprojects.Maladaptationreferstoadaptationprojectswhichinadvertentlyincreasethevulnerabilityofcommunitiesorspecificsegmentsofcommunities(forexample,womenandindigenousgroups).Someadaptationprogrammesexplicitlytrytoavoidsuchriskcompounding.55Chapter6–EmergingconsequencesofCOVID-19onadaptationplanningandfinanceinbusiness.Firms–particularlysmalltomedium-sizedenterprisesindevelopingcountries–havealsoexperiencedsevereandwidespreadshocks,withdecliningsalesandrisingjoblosses(Adianetal.2020;Christineetal.2020).Furthermore,theCOVID-19pandemiccouldtriggerextensivecorporatedebtdistress,buildingonhighpre-pandemicover-indebtedness(Liu,GarridoandDelong2020).Moreover,compoundshockscausedbytheCOVID-19pandemichavereverberatedalongexistinglinesofinequality,exacerbatingexistingsocioeconomicinequities.Theliteraturedocumentssomeofthemanydisproportionatehealth,economicandsocialimpactsofCOVID-19experiencedbygroupsalreadyfacingstructuralinequalitiesalongsocioeconomic,gender,classandethniclines(Doddsetal.2020;Pateletal.2020).Suchinequalities,whichleavemanyunabletotakeappropriatepreventativemeasures,mayalsoexacerbatethepandemic.ThecompoundnatureofbothclimatechangeandtheCOVID-19pandemichassignificantpolicyimplications,particularlyforgovernmentadaptationplanningandfinance,whichwediscussinthefollowingsections.6.3TheimpactofCOVID-19onadaptationplanningCOVID-19hasimpactedarangeofadaptationplanningprocesses.Thissectionfocusesontheimpactonnationaladaptationplanninganddisasterriskplanning.Chapter3ofthisreportprovidesfurtherdetailsonprogressmadeinnationaladaptationplanningduring2020and2021.6.3.1COVID-19hasimpactedthedevelopmentofNationalAdaptationPlansNationalAdaptationPlans(NAPs)areaplanningprocessthroughwhichcountriescanidentifymedium-termandlong‑termadaptationneedsandbringadaptationintocountry-levelpolicymakingprocesses.BetweenthecreationoftheprocesstoformulateandimplementNAPsin2010and31July2021,only24ofthe154developingcountrieshadsofarcompletedandsubmittedtheirfirstNAPs.However,asatSeptember2021,atleast125developingcountriesareintheprocessofformulatingandimplementingNAPs.EmergingevidencesuggeststhatwhileCOVID-19hashamperedsomeNAPprocesses,particularlyamongLeastDevelopedCountries(LDCs),countriesareworkingtoprogresstheirNAPsdespitetheconstraintsofthecurrentenvironment(UnitedNationalsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange[UNFCCC]2021).Thisviewissupportedbyqualitativeevidence(box6.3).TheseconstraintsarealsolikelytohavebeenexperiencedacrossadaptationplanningandimplementationprocessesbeyondNAPs,particularlyinLDCs(CaldwellandAlayza2021).Despiteconstraints,directsupporthascontinuedtobeprovidedthroughouttheCOVID-19pandemic,includingthroughtheOpenNAPinitiativeandthroughvirtualadministrationofsupportprogrammes,wherepossible.EighteenLDCsparticipatingintheOpenNAPinitiativereportedprogress,despiteCOVID-19(UNFCCC2021).Thereisalsoanecdotalevidencethatacceleratingdigitalizationtrends,drivenbyCOVID-19,havecreatednewopportunitiesforcommunityengagementandconsultationinplanningprocessesbyincreasingaccessibilityandinclusivityofconsultationsforcertaingroupswithincommunities(McKinleyetal.2021).6.3.2COVID-19hasimpactedcontingentdisasterriskfinancesCOVID-19hascreatedadditionalvulnerabilitytofutureclimate-relatedshocks,sincecontingentfundingretainedfordisasterreliefhasbeenredirectedtoaddresspandemicrelatedshocks.ThisdepletionhasbeenpartlyamplifiedbyrequestsfromrecipientcountriestodivertclimatechangeadaptationanddisasterriskreductionaidtoCOVID-19responses(Quevedo,PetersandCao2020).Forexample,asatJuly2020,India,NepalandPakistanhadallmaderequeststotheGlobalFacilityforDisasterReductionandRecovery.ManydonorsareacceptingtheserequestsandareprovidingadditionalflexibilitytorecipientsinhowtheyBox6.2HowCOVID-19reducedtheadaptivecapacityofPacificStatestoCycloneHaroldInApril2020,category5tropicalcycloneHaroldhitSmallIslandDevelopingStatesinthePacific,includingFiji,theSolomonIslandsandVanuatu.Theimpactofthecyclonewascatastrophic,withasmanyas90percentofthepopulationinSanma,themostaffectedprovinceofVanuatu,losingtheirhomes.Atfirst,responsemeasurestotheCOVID-19pandemicinthePacificimpededtheresponseofgovernmentstothecyclone.InFiji,thedisasterresponsewasconstrainedbyCOVID-19restrictions,sincethecountry’sevacuationcentreshadtoadheretoCOVID-19protocols,whichincludedrestrictionsoncapacityandsocialgatherings.InVanuatu,officialsbannedforeignaidworkersfromenteringthecountrytoassistwithdisasterrecovery,inlinewithstrictmeasurestopreventtheimportationofCOVID-19intothecountry.Furthermore,aidsupplieshadtobequarantinedforthreedaysbeforedisbursementtopreventthespreadofthediseaseinacountrywithweakhealthinfrastructure.Sources:Gunia2020;WorldMeteorologicalOrganization2020.AdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStorm56Box6.3TheimpactofCOVID-19onNAPprocessesForsomecountries,suchasGhana,COVID-19servedasa“wakeupcall”toinstigatetheNAPprocess(UNEP2020b).However,theavailableevidencesuggeststhatformanyothergovernments,COVID-19hasslowedthedevelopmentofNAPsin2020and2021.TheNAPGlobalNetwork,whichsupportscountriesinadvancingtheirNAPprocesses,carriedoutresearchwithpartnercountriesonhowthepandemicimpactedcountryNAPprocesses.Theresearch,whichisbackedbyothersimilarstudies,foundthatinsomecasesthepandemichad“completelystalled”or“delayed”NAPprocesses.Itcitedanumberoffactors:▶Cancelledmeetingsandconsultations:ProhibitionontravelinsomecountriesandphysicaldistancingrequirementslimitedtheabilitytocarryoutNAPmeetings.ThiswasparticularlyproblematicforcommunitieswithlimitedornoInternetaccessandalsohadthepotentialtorestricttheextenttowhichtheperspectivesofvulnerablegroupslikewomenandindigenouspeoplesareconsideredwithinNAPs.▶Divertingpoliticalsupportforadaptation:Politicianswerefocusedonrespondingtoshort-termissues,triggeredbywavesoftheCOVID-19pandemic.Forexample,theNAPofSouthAfricawasduetobeapprovedbythecabinetofthecountry’sgovernmentinApril2020buthadtobeputonholdbecauseofthepandemic.▶Morecompetitionforadaptationfundingandresources:SomecountriesreportedfacingdifficultiesaccessingthesamelevelsofbudgetsupportbecauseofCOVID-19.Inaddition,severalcountriesreportedconcernsthatthedebttheyweretakingonmightcreatefutureproblemsforadaptationfunding(seefurtherdiscussiononthistopicbelowinsection6.4).Sources:NAPGlobalNetwork2021.usefundsandincludingCOVID-19innewfundingcalls(Cornish2021).Whilethisdemonstratestheresponsivenessofpre-allocatedfinancingframeworkstoimminentcrises,asemergencyfundsaredepleteditalsoindicatespotentialvulnerabilitytofuturecompoundingCOVID-19shocksornaturaldisasters(MahulandSigner2020).Theextentofthisvulnerabilitywilldependontheresponsesofdonorsinaddressingshort-termshortfallsandlonger-termfundingtrends.6.4TheimpactofCOVID-19onadaptationfinancing6.4.1RecordfiscalspendinginresponsetoCOVID-19:awindowofopportunityforgreenandresilientrecoveriesInresponsetotheimmediatehealthcrisiscausedbytheCOVID-19pandemic,governmentshaveannouncedUS$16.7trillioninfiscalsupportasat15August2021.Ofthisfigure,75percent(US$12.5trillion)hasbeendirectedtoimmediate“rescue”initiativesdesignedtokeepbusinessesandpeopleafloat,13percent(US$2.3trillion)to“recovery”initiativesdesignedtorejuvenateeconomiesandtheremainderelsewhere(Desvars-Larriveetal.2020;InternationalMonetaryFund[IMF]2021b;O’Callaghanetal.2021).RelativetoEmergingMarketandDevelopingEconomies(EMDEs),AdvancedEconomies(AEs)havedeployedmorefiscalspending,forlonger.Excludingloans,equityandguarantees,between2020and2022,advancedeconomiesareexpectedtodeployovereighttimesmorespendingrelativetoGrossDomesticProduct(GDP)thanlow-incomedevelopingcountries(figure6.1).WhilecountriescontinuetodeployrescuespendinginresponsetooutbreaksofCOVID-19,theopportunitiesforincreasedadaptationsupportaregreatestinrecoveryspending.AsdiscussedintheEmissionsGapReport2021andtheAGR2020,andascalledforbyworldleadersandmultilateralorganizations,COVID-19recoveryspendingpresentsawindowofopportunitytoinvestinagreen,resilientandinclusiveeconomicrecovery(forexample,AsianDevelopmentBank2020;G72021b;O’CallaghanandMurdock2021;OECD2020b;UNEP2020c).Investmentinadaptationactivitiescangeneratedurableeconomicbenefitsandreduceclimatevulnerability.TheGlobalCommissiononAdaptationhasestimatedthatinvestmentinadaptationcandeliverbenefit–costratiosofbetween2:1and10:1,largelythroughavoidingfuturecosts(GlobalCenteronAdaptation2019).Similarly,asdiscussedintheAGR2020,nature-basedsolutionsareasourceofinvestmentwiththepotentialtoreduceclimaterisksandvulnerability,whileprovidingeconomic,environmental,andsocialinclusionco-benefits(UNEP2021).AnIMFworkingpaperestimatedthatforeverydollarspentonecosystemconservation(aformofnature-basedsolution),almostsevenmoreweregeneratedintheeconomyoverfiveyears(Batinietal.2021).57Chapter6–EmergingconsequencesofCOVID-19onadaptationplanningandfinance6.4.2EmergingevidenceindicatesafailuretocapitalizeonopportunitiesInitialanalysisofCOVID-19stimuluspackagesindicateslimitedinvestmentingreenandresilientrecoveries,withsomerecoverypackageslikelydeepeningclimatevulnerability.However,aconclusiveassessmentisconstrainedbythelackofcomprehensive,globaldataandanalysisonCOVID-19recoveryspendingallocatedtoadaptationinvestments.6AnanalysisbytheWorldResourcesInstitute(KrishnanandBrandon2021)ofresponseandrecoverypackagesannouncedupto31January2021by66economicallyandgeographicallydiversecountries,includingallG20andV20countries,7foundthatlessthanone-third(just17countriesandtheEU)ofthecountriesstudiedexplicitlyflaggedorincorporatedphysicalclimaterisks,adaptationorresilienceintheirannouncedinvestmentandpriorities(asdefinedinCaldwellandAlayza2021).Investmentwascategorizedasadaptationorresilienceifitexplicitlymentionedaddressingclimatehazardsorrisksthroughoneofthefollowingapproaches:climateriskconsiderations;localdecision-making;shock-responsivesocialsafetynets,includingforvulnerablepopulations;projectsinurbanareas;waterresourcesmanagement;foodsecurity;nature-6Thisisduetodifferinggeographicandsectoralcoverageofexistingstimulus-relateddatabases;thelackofstandarddefinitionsforadaptation;fundingpackagesbeingreleasedwithvaryinglevelsofexplanatorydetail;difficultiesdistinguishingbetweenfundingthathasbeenannouncedandfundingthathasbeenlegallycommittedanddeployed;andalackofattentiontoadaptation-relatedissueswithinrecoverypackages.However,therearesomehigh-levelestimatesofhowadaptationhasfeaturedinrecoveryspendingwithinregionalandeconomicgroupingsandtheimpactofthepandemiconinternationalpublicadaptationfinanceflows.7ThisincludesallcountriesfromtheG20,48countriesfromtheV20,thesixcountrychampionsfortheAdaptationandResiliencetrackoftheUnitedNationsClimateActionSummit2019andthe20conveningcountriesoftheGlobalCommissiononAdaptation.Takingintoaccountoverlaps,thisgivesatotalof72countries,sixofwhichweredroppedfromthestudyduetolackofprimaryinformation.8Thisstudydidnotexplicitlylookformitigationactionsinstimuluspackages,sinceothers,suchasthosebyVividEconomics(2021aand2021b),werecomprehensivelyanalyzingtheseactions.basedsolutions;disasterprevention;andinfrastructure(KrishnanandBrandon2021).Thestudyalsolookedatwhetheraddressingphysicalclimateriskswasmentionedintheintroductionsorpreamblesofcountries’stimuluspackages.8Forexample,ifacountrymentionedimprovingwatermanagementpracticestoaddressreducedwateravailabilityorifitinvestedinearlywarningsystems,thenitwasconsideredtohaveselectiveclimateriskmanagementactions.The13countries(18percent)thatcitedadaptationandresilienceasacoreobjectiveoftheirrecovery,alongsidejobsandgrowth,areclassifiedashaving“climateriskintegratedplans”(figure6.2).Thestudyfoundthatalmostallthecountriesthatcitedtheneedtomanageclimaterisksareonthefront-linewhenitcomestoexperiencingclimatechangeimpacts,includingseveraloftheSmallIslandDevelopingStates.SectoralanalysisofCOVID-19pandemicstimuluspackagesindicatesthatsomecountrieshaveinvestedmoreinactivitiesthatwillincreaseclimatechangevulnerabilitythaninthosethatwillreduceit.TheVividEconomicsGreennessofStimulusIndexfoundthat,asat1February2021,onlyUS$141billionofUS$667billionoftrackedgreenstimulushadbeendirectedtowards“natureandbiodiversity”,Figure6.1Revenueandspendingmeasuresasapercentageof2020GDPfordifferentcountryincomegroups0%5%15%10%20%25%30%AEsEMDEsLIDCsG20Global20202021Note:Thedataforthisfigureandsection6.4hasbeencollectedandanalysedusingIMFWorldEconomicOutlookclassificationsofcountries(IMF2021c).Assuch,thecountrycompositiongroupingsusedbytheIMFhavebeenapplied.However,itshouldbenotedthatthegroupingsofAdvancedEconomies(AEs),EmergingMarketandDevelopingEconomies(EMDEs)andLow-IncomeDevelopingCountries(LIDCs)maynotdirectlyoverlapwiththegroupingsof“developed”,“developing”and“leastdeveloped”countriesdiscussedelsewhereinthisreport.AdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStorm58Figure6.2Countriesincludingselectedadaptationinterventionsinstimuluspackages,asat31January2021Note:Thefigureisbasedonthesamesampleof72countriesdescribedaboveinfootnote7.ThefigureonlyhighlightsmeasuresatthenationallevelandthusexcludesmeasuresattheEuropeanUnionlevel.TerritoriesrecognizedasdisputedbytheUnitedNationsorwhosestatushasnotyetbeenagreedareincludedinthenotassessedcategory.Source:AdaptedfromKrishnanandBrandon(2021).comparedtoUS$262billionofstimulusdirectlyassociatedwithpollutionoractivitiesexpectedtonegativelyimpactbiodiversity(VividEconomics2021a).Furthermore,italsofoundthat,despiteencouragingexamplesofgreenandresilientstimulus,thepackagesannouncedby15oftheG20nationswillhaveanetnegativeenvironmentalimpactandevenintheNationalResilienceandRecoveryPlansinEurope,thereismorespendingthatwilldamagenaturethanenhanceit(VividEconomics2021b).6.4.3COVID-19maybeencouraginggreaterinternationalpublicfinanceflowsintheshorttermbutthisisunlikelytoapplytoadaptationfinanceOverthelast18months,thedemandsoninternationalpublicfinancehaveincreasedsignificantly.Notonlyareinternationalfinancialinstitutionsfacingsimultaneouspressurestochannelresourcestoaddresstheongoinghealthcrisis,theymustalsorespondstrategicallytotheeconomicandclimatecrises.Similarly,developed9TheUNFCCCbiennialassessments,whichareconsideredthemostauthoritativesourceonclimatefinanceflowsfrombilateralandmultilateralactors,haveatwo-yearlag(the2020reportwillreportonflowsfor2017and2018).economiesarealsounderdomesticfiscalpressureandmaybeconstrainedintheirabilitiestochanneladditionalfinancetomultilateraldevelopmentbanks(MDBs)andothercountriesinthemediumtolongerterm(OECD2020c).ComprehensivereportingacrossMDBsandbilateralandothermultilateralinstitutionsonpublicfinance(particularlyclimatefinance),islimited.Italsohasatwo-yeartimelag,9whichmakesithardtoprojecttrendswithahighdegreeofconfidence.Theanalysesconsideredinthissectionallfocuson2020flowstocountrieseligibletoreceiveOfficialDevelopmentAssistance(ODA).Takentogether,theyprovidesomeclarityontheshort-termoutlook.PreliminaryanalysisfromtheOECDDevelopmentAssistanceCommittee(DAC)indicatesthat,asawhole,ODAflowsfromits29membercountriesandEUinstitutionsreachedtheirhighesteverrecordedlevel,risingby3.5percentin2020over2019flows(OECD2021).ThesefiguresdemonstratedthewillingnessofDACmemberstomaintainorincreaseODAbudgetsin2020,likelyinresponsetoimmediateneedsNotassessedNotenoughinformationNorelevantinvestmentsSelectiveclimateriskmanagementactionsClimateriskintegratedplans59Chapter6–EmergingconsequencesofCOVID-19onadaptationplanningandfinancerelatedtothepandemic.ItremainstobeseenwhethertheseoverallODAlevelswillbesustainedinthemedium-tolong‑termorwillexperienceadelayedtightening,consistentwithpreviousfinancialcrises(OECD2020d).Drillingdownmorespecificallyintoclimatefinance,the2020JointReportonMultilateralDevelopmentBanks’ClimateFinance(EuropeanBankforReconstructionandDevelopment2021),anannualreportjointlypublishedbynineMDBs,showsthatwhiletheparticipatingMDBs’overallclimatefinancefordevelopingcountriesfellbyalmost5percentin2020(ascomparedto2019),theshareofadaptationfinanceslightlyincreasedfrom34percentof2019to35percentof2020flows,continuingthepositivetrendofthelastfiveyears,albeitwithadeclineinabsoluteterms(seechapter4forfurtherdetails).10ThisindicatesthattherearelikelyopportunitiesnotonlyforMDBs,butforcountriestocontinuetoinvestinadaptivecapacitywhileadvancingtheirrecoveryfromthepandemic.However,thisstudyonlyexaminesMDBs’ownclimate-relatedinvestmentandrepresentsasmallsubsetofinternationalpublicclimatefinance.Lookingforward,theClimatePolicyInstituteandtheGlobalCenteronAdaptation(GCA)studiedthepotentialimpactonadaptationfinanceflowsinthepost-COVID-19world:basedoninterviewswithrepresentativesfromdevelopmentfinanceinstitutions,theyprojectedthat–duetothecompetingpressuresonfinanciers–therewouldbeasingle-digitpercentagedeclineinadaptationfinancein2020,withthepotentialforalargerfallinfollowingyears.Theestimateddeclineisbasedonseveralvariables,includingprojectedreductionsininternationaldevelopmentfinance,increaseddebtdistressandslowvaccineroll-outinclimate-vulnerablecountries(GCA2021).6.4.4COVID-19induceddebtdistressandongoingeconomicdisruptionsmayconstrainfutureclimateadaptationspendingCOVID-19hasexacerbatedfiscaldistressformanycountries,particularlyEmergingMarketandDevelopingEconomies.Manygovernmentshavehadtoincreaseborrowingtofinancethefiscalrescueandrecoverypackages(amongothermeasures).ThemedianpublicdebtamongLow-IncomeDevelopingEconomiesrosefrom38.7percentofGDPover2010–2014to44.3percentpre-crisis,peakingat49.5percentin2020(IMF2019;IMF2021b).Averagepublicdebtworldwidereached97.3percentofGDPin2020,13percentagepointshigherthanthepre-pandemicprojection(IMF2021b).11Suchadditionalborrowing,combinedwithadropinGDPduetotheeconomicimpactofthepandemic,hasledtomuchhigherdebt-to-GDPratiosworldwide.Asaconsequence,andincombinationwithfallsinrevenuefrom10Forreference,adaptationfinancemadeupjust20percentofMDBclimatefinanceflowsin2015.11AdvancedeconomieshavetakenonsignificantlymoredebtasaproportionofGDPduringCOVID-19thanLIDCs(16.3percentfrom2019-20,comparedto5.2percent),reflectingthefactthattheyarebetterplacedtoaccessinternationalcapitalmarketsandservicedebtinthelong-term(IMF,2021b).lowereconomicactivity,manycountrieshavesignificantlyreducedfiscalspace(IMF2021c).Fiscalspaceisanecessarybutnotsufficientconditionforadaptationspending.Politicalorpolicybarriers,suchasareluctancetotakeondebttoinvestinadaptation,couldpreventspendingonadaptation(Mortimer,WhelanandLee2020).However,limitedfiscalspacecouldexacerbatethesebarriers,makingitharderforgovernmentstocommitfundstoadaptation.Thepandemiccouldresultindowngradestocountries’creditratings,increasingthecostofpublicborrowingandfurtherconstrainingaccesstofinancingandtheabilitytoinvestinadaptation(OECD2020d).Furthermore,publicandprivatedebtmaynothavefullypricedinclimaterisks,leadingtothepotentialoffuturerepricingofsuchdebtandpossibleincreaseddebtservicingcostsfornations(ClimatePolicyInitiative2020;Dibley,WetzerandHepburn2021;MonasteroloandVolz2020;Klusaketal.2021).Asaconsequence,researchersestimatethatcriticallyindebtedcountriesaremorelikelytoconstrainspendingonadaptation(Kaiseretal.2021).Thisisreflectedinqualitativeevidence(seebox6.3).ThecompoundingofCOVID-19debtandclimateriskcouldbeaproblemforadaptationspendingbygovernments.Countrieswithlimitedfiscalspace–furtherreducedduringtheCOVID-19pandemic–maylackthefinancingneededtoimplementadaptationmeasures,inturnleavingthemmoreexposedtoclimateriskthroughlowerpreparednessandthereforealsomorelikelytoexperiencefurtherincreasesinborrowingcosts(Dibley,WetzerandHepburn2021).However,thisriskcouldbemitigatedbyusingCOVID-19recoveryspendingtoadvanceadaptationgoals(asdiscussedinsections6.4.1and6.4.2).6.5EmerginglessonsoftheCOVID-19pandemicforadaptationplanningandfinancingAsdiscussedinsection6.1,therearesimilaritiesinthesystemic,compoundingandunequalnatureofCOVID-19andclimatechange.Thefollowinglessons,drawnfromacrosstheliterature,areintendedtoaddressthissystemicandinstitutionalnatureofthechallenge.6.5.1LessonsforadaptationplanningGovernmentsshoulddevelopanintegratedapproachtothegovernanceofriskmanagementthatisbasedonwideconsultation.Asdiscussedaboveinsection6.2,theCOVID-19pandemiccompoundsclimate-relatedrisks.ThismakesitimportantforgovernmentstoadoptanAdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStorm60integratedapproachtoriskmanagementacrosshazardstoacknowledgesuchriskcompounding(Ranger,MahulandMonasterolo2021;MonasteroloandVolz2020).TheWorldBank(2021a)outlineshowthismorecomprehensiveapproachtoriskmanagementwithinpublicfinanceframeworks–incorporatingclimate,pandemicsandothermajorrisks–couldformanimportantpartofawidershifttowardsawhole-of-governmentintegratedapproachtoriskmanagement.Severalyearsago,theWorldBanksuggestedthatcountriesestablishanationalriskboardtosupportgovernment-widecoordinationintheirmanagementofcriticalrisks(WorldBank2013),12asuggestionmadeallthemoretimelybytheCOVID-19pandemic.Inmanycountries,thisapproachisalreadypractisedtosomeextent,typicallywithcabinetoffices,ministries/departmentsandequivalentinstitutionalbodiesholdingresponsibilitiesformonitoringandmanagingnationalcriticalrisks.Anationalriskboardcouldbringtogetherasetofcross-cuttingriskmanagementandadaptationobjectives,anationalriskassessment,asystemofnationalfinancialprotectionplanningandamuchwiderandintegratedapproachtofiscalriskmanagement,therebydrivingawhole-of-governmentapproach.Donorscouldalsocontinuetosupportdevelopingcountriestobetterplanforcompoundrisks,includingthroughtheestablishmentofflexiblefundingmechanismsand12Nationalriskboardsperformasimilar,whole-of-governmentroletonationalplatformsfordisasterriskreduction,asadvocatedundertheSendaiFrameworkforDisasterRiskReduction.improvinggovernanceandaccountabilityforcross-sectoraldecision-making(Hallegatte,RentschlerandRozenberg2020;Kruczkiewiczetal.2021).Governmentsshouldleverageexistingadaptationpolicyprocessestomanagecompoundrisks.WhileCOVID-19hasimpededadaptationplanningprocesses,ithasalsoreinforcedtherelevanceofplanningforcompoundingrisks.Todoso,governmentscouldbetterleverageexistingadaptationplanningprocesses,includingtheclimaterationalesofprojectproposalstotheGreenClimateFundandadaptation-specificsectionsofNationallyDeterminedContributions(NDCs)andNAPs(Hammill2020).Forexample,governmentsthathavedevelopedaNAPmayhaveundergonerigorous,country-specificriskassessmentsandidentifiedmedium-termandlong-termprioritiesforbuildingadaptivecapacitytoclimatechange.TheseassessmentscanofferaraftofbenefitsduringtheCOVID-19pandemic,includingidentifyingvulnerablepopulations(forexample,womenandindigenousgroups)andplacesthatarelikelytobedisproportionatelyaffectedduringthecompoundingcrises.Thiswouldhelpprovidemechanismsandinstitutionalframeworksthroughwhichtodeployimmediatesupportandofferinvestmentoptionstoinformresilientstimuluspackages(Hammill2020;WorldBank2020a).Box6.4providesanexampleofhowintegratedplanningcanhelprespondinapracticalwaytocompoundingdisasters(WorldHealthOrganization2021).Photo:©Shutterstock61Chapter6–EmergingconsequencesofCOVID-19onadaptationplanningandfinanceBox6.4LeveragingexistingclimatedisasterriskresponsetoolstomanagetheCOVID-19pandemicinPakistanTheCOVID-19pandemichashighlightedhowintegratedriskmanagementcanoffermultiplebenefits.InPakistan,aspartofthecountry’sresponsetotheCOVID-19crisis,in2020itdevelopedaMultidimensionalVulnerabilityIndextoidentifythecommunitiesmostatriskfromthepandemic.TheIndexwasimplementedthroughamapthatintegratedphysicalclimatechangerisksaspartofitsassessment.Itdrewontoolsdevelopedforassessingfloodanddroughtriskandcreatedanintegratedvulnerabilitytool,whichwasappliedduringthepandemic.Sources:Quevedo,PetersandCao(2020).PlannedNAPprocessescanbeusedtohelpcountriesaddressspecificrisksexposedbyCOVID-19,suchasthroughsupportforincreasedfoodsecurity.Forexample,theGovernmentoftheDominicanRepublicisplanningtodesignthecountry’sNAPprocesstoincorporateadaptationstrategiesforthewater,agricultureandfoodsecuritysectorsthatwillseektocreatesynergieswiththegovernment’sprogrammestofinancefarmersaffectedbyCOVID-19.TheprojectsprioritizedundertheNAPwillincludeclimate-resilientinvestmentinfoodproduction.However,theusefulnessofNAPsformanagingcompoundrisksiscontingentontherigouroftheassessments.Forinstance,fewNAPscurrentlyintegratehealthrisks,letaloneotherrisks,aspartofanintegratedriskmanagementprocess(WorldHealthOrganization2021).UNEPhasdevelopedresourcestoencouragegovernmentstointegratehealthconsiderationsintoNAPs(UNEP2020a).Additionally,asatJuly2021,UNEPissupporting18nationalgovernmentstoadvancetheirNAPprocesses,includingprojectsthatsimultaneouslylinktotheCOVID-19responseandrecovery(UNEP2020c).Governmentsshouldcontinuetobeencouragedtoensure–withsupportwhererequired–thatNAPsareunderpinnedbyrigorous,forward-lookingclimatechangeriskassessmentstoidentifymedium-tolong-termadaptationpriorities.6.5.2LessonsforadaptationfinancingGovernmentanddonorscouldincreaseinvestmenttoimproveadaptivecapacity.TheCOVID-19pandemichasspurredextensivefiscalspending.Governmentsshouldensurethatrecoveryspendingisusedtobuildforwardbetterbyactivelytargetingincreasesinclimateadaptivecapacity.ThissuggestionisinlinewiththecommuniquéofG7climateandenvironmentministersfollowingtheirmeetinginMay2021(G72021a),whichstressedtheimportanceofincreasedactiononadaptation(includingbyreaffirmingtheircommitmenttoarticle9.4oftheParisAgreement,whichcallsfortheprovisionofscaled-upfinancialresourcescontributingtoadaptationaction)andcommittedcountriestoworkingintensivelytoincreasethequantityoffinanceforadaptation.SimilarcommitmentshavebeenmadebytheG7worldleaders,G20energyandclimateministersandAfricanministersfortheenvironment(G72021b;G202021;UNEP,AfricanMinisterialConferenceontheEnvironmentandtheAfricanUnion2020).Whencraftingstimuluspackages,governmentscanapplyemergingframeworkstoidentifyandprioritizeinterventionsthatachievebotheconomicrecoveryandclimatechangeresilience,suchastheWorldBank’sProposedSustainabilityChecklistforAssessingEconomicRecoveryInterventions(WorldBank2020b),theWorldBankAdaptationPrinciples(Hallegatte,RentschlerandRozenberg,2020)andtheGCAFrameworkforIdentifyingEffectiveInterventions(GCA2021).Inaddition,ifavailable,countriescanuseexistingcountry-specificadaptationplansandinstrumentsasastartingpointtoidentifystimulusmeasuressuitedtolocalcontexts,asillustratedbythecasestudyinbox6.5.Governmentsanddonorscouldincreasetheresilienceoffiscalframeworkstodealwithcompoundrisks.COVID-19hasreinforcedtheneedforgovernmentsanddonorstoensuretherapidavailabilityoffinanceafterdisasterstomitigateeconomicshocksandenableaswiftandeffectiveemergencyandrecoveryresponse(Wahbaetal.2020).Suchfinancingcanreducethefinancialshockofdisastersonagovernment’sbalancesheetandensurethatpredictable,timelyandcost-effectivefinanceisavailabletorespondtotheemergency(WorldBank2021a).InthecontextoftheCOVID-19pandemic,countriesthathadpre-arrangeddisasterfinanceinplacewereabletorespondtothepandemicswiftly.Forinstance,inSierraLeone,havinglearnedfromitsresponsetotheEbolaoutbreakin2013–2014,thegovernmentwasabletoadjustitsnationalsocialsafetynetprogrammetorapidlyreachvulnerablehouseholdswithdonorsupportinitsresponsetothepandemic(Sandfordetal.2020).Despiteitsimportance,priorto2020manygovernments’fiscalandmacrofinancialframeworksdidnotanticipateorprepareforsystemicshocksliketheCOVID-19pandemic(OECD2020a).However,somegovernmentsarenowtakingstepstomanagesystemicshocksbeyondpandemics,includingclimateshocks(WorldBank2021a).Tobuildresiliencetocompoundrisks,theWorldBankAdaptationPrinciplesincludetherecommendationthatcountriesbuildflexibility,redundancyorbothintobudgetstoaccountforongoingcoststhatthecountrywillface(OECDandWorldBank2019).Forexample,theBhutangovernmentalbudgetprocessincludesfinancialallocationsfornaturaldisastersandclimatechangeimpactrisksaspartofa“fiscalriskAdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStorm62allocationmatrix”(Hallegatte,RentschlerandRozenberg2020).Takingsuchanapproachtoriskwithinpublicfinanceframeworkscouldenhanceacountry’sadaptivecapacitybyenablingittomanagerisksinanintegratedway.Developedeconomiescouldsignificantlyincreasedirectgrants,concessionalfinancewithadaptationrequirementsandsupportforlocalcapacity-buildingtohelpcountriescountertheeconomicpainsoftheCOVID-19pandemicandmeetadaptationrequirements.Asdiscussedabove,highlyclimate-vulnerablenationsrequirebetteraccesstoconcessionalfinance,alongsidesubstantivedebtreliefinordertocreatethefiscalspacenecessarytoinvestinadaptivecapacity(Dibley,WetzerandHepburn2021;Kaiseretal.2021).Somegovernmentsandinternationalfinancialinstitutionshavealreadycontributedtosuchcauses(UNEP2020a),whileothershavepledgedtodomoreinthefaceofthepandemic(WorldBankandIMF2020).Inthisrespect,theincreaseinSpecialDrawingRights(SDRs)bytheIMFinAugust2021(equivalenttoUS$650billion)ishistoricallysignificantinsize(IMF2021a).However,tomeettheneedsofvulnerablecountries,theamountoffinanceprovidedwillneedtobesubstantiallyhigherthancurrentcommitments(O’CallaghanandMurdock2021;UnitedNations2020).Anambitiousandwell-targetedpackageofsupport,withadaptationpriorities,cansupportcountry-leveladaptationcapacityinavarietyofways,suchasfreeingupfiscalspaceforeconomicallyvulnerablecountries,helpingdrivetherecoveryfromtheCOVID-19pandemicandensuringtheplannedfiscalinterventionpromoteswell-definedadaptationobjectives(forexample,UNEP2021b).Astrategydesignedalongtheselinescantakevariousforms,includingdebtrelief,incentivizinggreaterprivatedebtreliefandprivate-sectorinvestmentinadaptation,orusingpromisingdebtreliefmechanisms(seebox6.6;chapter4;Khan2020;SinghandWidge2021;Volzetal.2021).Inadditiontoprovidingsupportintheformoffinance,governmentsanddonorsshouldhelpfundandsupportcapacity-buildingforcompoundriskmanagement.Thiscouldincludeassistinggovernmenttreasuriestobetterevaluateclimatephysicalandtransitionrisks,includingconsideringhowtomanagesuchrisksinthecontextofthepandemicandothercompoundingevents.Suchsupportcouldalsohelptodeveloplocalresearchcapabilitiesinthisarea.Box6.5Identifyingadaptationmeasuresthatmeetshort-andlong-termgoalsinFijiCountriescanincreasetheadaptivecapacityoftheirrecoveriesbyidentifyingfiscalstimulusprioritiesfromwithinexistinggovernmentresilienceplans.Forexample,theWorldBankidentifiedinterventionswiththepotentialtoreconciletheshort-termeconomicandjobcreationneedsofFijiwithlonger-termclimatechangeadaptationgoals,bydrawingonthecountry’sexistingClimateVulnerabilityAssessment(CVA).TheCVAwasproducedin2017andproposedalistof125interventionsthatwouldbemosteffectiveinreducingthecountry’svulnerabilitytotheimpactsofclimatechange.In2020,theWorldBankscreenedeachproposalagainstitsProposedSustainabilityChecklistforAssessingEconomicRecoveryInterventionstonarrowthelistto63coreinterventionsthatcouldenableFijito“buildforwardbetter”.However,thecountry’sgovernmentwilllikelybeoperatinginafiscallyconstrainedenvironment,withtheeconomycontractingby15.7percentin2020andthetotaloutstandingdebtofthecountryexpectedtoincreasefrom62.3percentofGDPattheendof2020to91.6percentofGDPattheendofthe2022financialyear.Theanalysissuggestedthat,ifpre-existingplanninginstrumentsaresufficientlyrobust,governmentscanapplymorerigorousconstraintsandstillidentifyinterventionsthatdeliverco-benefits.Forexample,evenassessingproposalsagainstabudgetcut-offof3percentofGDPandsolelyprioritizingshort-termstimuluseffectsresultedinalistof10initiativesthatcouldcontributetoresilience,long-termeconomicdevelopmentanddecarbonization.Sources:WorldBank2020a;AsianDevelopmentBank2021.63Chapter6–EmergingconsequencesofCOVID-19onadaptationplanningandfinanceBox6.6Debt-for-climateswaps:apromisingdebtreliefmechanismDebt-for-climate(DFC)swapshavebeenidentifiedasapromisingdebtreliefinstrumenttogeneratefiscalspaceforcountriestoallowgreenandresilientinvestmentaspartoftherecoveryfromCOVID-19.DFCswapsinvolveadebtornationcommittingtogreaterclimateambition,fundingorbothfordomesticclimateactivities,ontermsagreedwiththecreditorinsteadofcontinuingtomakeexternaldebtservicingpayments.Thetypesofclimateactionssuitableforadebtornationdependonthespecificcircumstancesofindividualcountries,includingtheirlevelofvulnerabilitytoclimatechange.ThegenericstructureofaDFCswapagreementisshowninfigure6.3below.Figure6.3GenericstructureofaDFCswapatthecountrylevelSource:SinghandWidge(2021).DFCshavethreeprimarybenefits:increasedclimatespending,whileavoidingdebtservicingpaymentsdedicatedtoclimate-positiveactivities;boostingeconomicrecovery,withdirectinvestmentthatstimulatesprivateinvestmentandassistseconomicrecovery;andreducedexternalcountrydebt.DFCswapsareparticularlysuitedtocountrieswithhighlevelsofbilateralpublicexternaldebtwithothercountriesandarecurrentlynotcapturedbytheG20DebtServiceSuspensionInitiative.Thisprimarilymeansmiddle-incomeandsomelow-incomecountries.Sources:SinghandWidge(2021);Volzetal.(2021).SovereigndebtCreditornationpartlyforgivessovereigndebtaCreditorislikelytobeanothernationState,butprivatesectorcreditorsarealsoencouragedtoparticipateinaDFCswap.bAn“escrow”isalegalvehicleinwhichfundsareheldintrust—usuallybyathirdparty—andcanonlybereleasedoncespecificconditionsaremet.Thesefundsshouldbesufficientlytransparentsothepublicisabletodeterminetowherefundshavebeendispersed.Inthisexample,fundsmightbeheldinanescrow/funduntilagovernmenthastakenpreliminarystepstoimplementaclimateprojectoroncetheprojecthasachievedreductionsinriskorvulnerability.ProceedsusedinanagreeduponmannerAvoideddebtservicepaymentstransferredCreditoraDebtornationEscrow/fundbClimateprojects64765OutlookonglobalprogressChapter7Leadauthors:AlexandreMagnan(IDDRI),HenryNeufeldt(UNEPDTUPartnership).Contributingauthors:AriadnaAnisimov(IDDRI),LarsChristiansen(UNEPDTUPartnership),TimoLeiter(GranthamResearchInstituteonClimateChangeandtheEnvironment,LondonSchoolofEconomicsandPoliticalScience),AnnettMoehner(SecretariatoftheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange),FatinTawfig(SecretariatoftheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange),PaulWatkiss(PaulWatkissAssociates).AwomansurveyshercropsinavillagecommunitygardenintheincreasinglydrynortheasternprovincewhereUNEPandpartnersarehelpingcommunitiesadapttoclimatechangeinJappineh,TheGambia.Learnmoreaboutthisprojecthere.Photo:©UNEPAdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStorm66Thischaptersynthesizesfindingsfromchapters3to6ofthisreport,withtheaimofprovidinganoverviewofthestatusofglobalprogressonadaptation(section7.1).Italsooffersanoutlookforfuturedevelopmentsintermsoftrackingadaptationprogressglobally(section7.2).7.1SynthesisofresultsacrossthechaptersBuildingontheframingintable2.1(chapter2),thissectionsynthesizesknowledgefromchaptersofthisAdaptationGapReport(AGR)onprogress,gapsandfactorsconstrainingtheinterpretationoffindingsrelatedtoadaptationplanning,financeandimplementation.Italsoprovidesinsightsinexpectedfuturetrends,basedonthechapterauthors’expertjudgement.Figure7.1providesacontextualvisualizationoftheresults(panelA)andsynthesizesthemusingtheassessmentcriteriadescribedinchapter2ofthisreport(section2.3.2andtable2.1).7.1.1ProgressThereismorerobustevidencecomparedtoAGR2020thatprogressmadeworldwideoverthelastdecadeinenhancingnational-leveladaptationcontinuestoaccelerate.Thisconclusionissupportedbymultiplefindingsbelow.Recognitionofthepolicyimportanceofadaptationtogalvanizeactionattheinternationalandnationallevels:Climateadaptationhasbecomeanestablishedpartofclimatepolicyactionworldwide(UNEP2021a).Nearlyeightoutof10countrieshaveatleastonenational-levelplanninginstrumentinplacethataddressesadaptation(includingregularupdatesandadditions)andaboutonein10countriesareintheprocessofdevelopinganewone.Resultsalsoshowsomesignsofacceleration:amongcountrieswithoneorseveralnational-levelplanninginstrument(s)thataddressadaptation,almostoneinfivehaveintroducedsuchaninstrumentinthepastfiveyears(includingonecountryin2021).Theanalysisalsoshowssomeaccelerationsince2015intermsofthenumberofadaptation-relatedprojectsfinancedthroughinternationalfunders(AdaptationFund,GreenClimateFundandtheGlobalEnvironmentFacility).Lastly,thereisqualitativeinformationsuggestingthattheCOVID-19crisishasservedasa“wake-upcall”toinstigateoraccelerateadaptationprocesses,suchastheNationalAdaptationPlan(NAP)developmentprocessesinsomecountries(forexample,Ghana).Increasingmaturityinthewayadaptationisconsideredinpoliciesandstrategies:Approachestoadaptationatthenationalleveldemonstratevaryingdegreesofmaturity–eitherthroughadaptation-centredinstrumentsormainstreamingoftheadaptationcomponentintoexistingplanningprocesses–dependingonnationalcircumstancesandriskprofiles.Forexample,sixoutof10countriesnowhaveoneormorestand-alonesectoralplanninginstrumentsinplaceandatleastoneoutoffourhasoneormoresubnationalplanninginstrument(s).Theinclusionofverticalcoordinationmechanismsinadaptationplanninginstruments,whichfacilitatesgovernanceacrosslevelsofadministration,hasalsoprogressedsinceAGR2020,witha22percentincreaseinthenumberofsuchmechanisms.Stakeholderengagement(differentgovernmentlevels,non-governmentalandsectoralorganizations,researchinstitutes,andtheprivatesector)innational-levelprocesseshasalsoincreasedbyabout20percentcomparedtotheassessmentofadaptationplansinAGR2020.Actionablepoliciesprovidingguidanceonhowtooperationalizeadaptation:Theincreasinglevelsofadaptationfinancereportedbymultilateralandbilateralfundingagencies(forexample,thehundredsofprojectsindevelopingcountriesthathavereceivedsupportfrommultilateralclimatefundssince2005)indicatethatthereisincreasingfocusonmoreactionablepolicies.Themovetowardsmorestand-alonesectoralplansisanillustrationofthisphenomenon:besidesmoreintegratedplanscontributingtomoreactionablepolicies,morededicatedplansalsoindicatesector-specificapproachestothetopic.Earlysignssuggestingmoreprogressintheneartolong-termfuture:Evidenceofmoreclimate-resilientandsustainablefinancialsystemsandinvestmentsisaccumulating(forexample,throughincreasingmeasuresaddressingclimateriskstocomponentsofthefinancialsystem,suchasindustries,corporations,enterprisesandNoteforfigure7.1:Synthesisofprogressandgapsinadaptationatthenational-level,asreportedinthecorrespondingchapters.Thisfigureisbasedontheframingtable(table2.1inchapter2).PanelA.Thebackgroundcolouringillustratestheincreaseinclimaterisksforvariouswarmingscenarios(RepresentativeConcentrationPathway[RCP]2.6andRCP8.5)andadaptationscenarios(with/without)(Oppenheimeretal.2019;Hurlbertetal.2019;Magnanetal.2021).Theblueandlight-redcurveddrawingsrepresentriskscenariosunderRCP2.6andRCP8.5,respectively,whilethecentralblackdrawingrepresentsahypotheticalriskscenariounderaspeculative,midwaywarmingscenario.Thisfigureispurelyillustrativeanddoesnotrelyonanyquantitativedata.Thewhiteverticalbarsshow,fortoday(left)andbytheendofthiscentury(right),thelevelofriskreductiontobeexpectedfromverylimitedadaptationefforts(topofwhiteboxes)tohighadaptationefforts(bottomofwhiteboxes),i.e.the“adaptationspace”.Thedownwardblackarrowswithinthesewhiteboxesprovideatheoreticalinterpretationofobservedprogressanduncertainty:thesolidarrowsillustratetheprogressthatcanbeassessedandreportedbasedonevidence,andthedottedarrowsreflectknowledgegapsandthereforepotentialadaptationgaps.Together,thesolidanddottedarrowswithinthesameboxhelpunderstandthebalancebetweenwhatweknowhasbeenachievedandwhatweareuncertainaboutbecauseofalackofinformation;theythereforehelpbalanceprogressandpotentialgaps.PanelB.appliesthegeneralframingusedinthisreport(progress,gaps,contextualfactorsthatconstraintheinterpretationoftheresults;seetable2.1)tothefindingsofthemainchapters(3–6).Chapter7–Outlookonglobalprogress67Figure7.1Synthesisofprogressandgapsinadaptationatthenational-level,asreportedinthecorrespondingchaptersRecentpastTodayEndofcenturyWithoutadaptationWithoutadaptationWithadaptationWithadaptationRiskscenariosunderRCP2.6(blue)andRCP8.5(red),withandwithoutadaptation,areinspiredbytherecentIPCCspecialreports(SRCCL;SROCC).Themidwayriskscenario(black)ispurelyhypotheticalandisusedforillustrativepurposes.AIncreasingclimaterisklevels(fromundetectable,toverylow,toveryhigh)GlobalclimateriskscenariosAdaptationprogressRCP8.5(mean)RCP2.6(mean)HypotheticalillustrativemidwayscenarioFulladaptationspaceVirtuallycertainprogressUncertainprogressEvidenceofadaptationprogressIdentificationofgapsFactorsthatconstraintheinterpretationoffindings•Recognitionoftheimportanceofadaptationinpolicyisontheriseinnational-levelpolicydocumentsacrosstheworld,aswellasinclimatefinance•Morematurityinthewayadaptationiseithermainstreamedintoexistingpoliciesorconsideredasanoverarchingpolicyareainitsownright;however,levelsofmaturityvarysignificantlyacrosscountries•Actionablepoliciesprovidingguidanceonhowtooperationalizenational-leveladaptationplanningareincreasing,asillustratedbyincreasinglevelsofadaptationfinancereportedbymulti-andbilateralfundingagencies,andthemovetowardsmoresectoraladaptationplans•Earlysignsoffurtherprogress,suchastheemergenceofnewinstruments,actorsandapproachestoscaleupadaptationfinance,indicatesthatmoreknowledge,experienceandprogress,aretobeexpectedintheneartolong-termfuture•Intermsofadaptationfinance,thereissomeindicationthatasizeableadaptationfinancegapremains(i.e.adaptationcostsareincreasingatahigherratethanadaptation-orientedfinancialflows)•Monitoringandevaluationsystemscontinuetobeunderrepresentedandareonlyinplaceinaboutone-quarterofcountries•Evidencethatpresentactionishavingtheintendedknock-oneffectsseemstobelimited(e.g.inmanycountriesitremainsunclearwhethernationalplanningprocessesareactuallyleadingtoimplementationatboththenationalandmorelocallevels)•Intermsofconnectiontoclimateriskreduction,national-leveldata(outputs)providesverylimitedevidenceofeffectiveclimateriskreductiontodayandinthefuture(outcomes)•Gender,and,morebroadly,equityandjusticeissues,remainunderconsideredinpractice,despiterisingpolicyattention•Vagueadaptationgoalsatthegloballeveldonotfacilitatetheidentificationofpreciseglobal-leveltargets(i.e.atmultiplescales,includingglobal)orguideanalysisofadaptationprogress•Thereisstillagapintheavailabilityofinformationonbothadaptationoutputs(whathasbeendonetoadapt?)andadaptationoutcomes(towhatextenthasthisreducedclimaterisks?)•UncertaintyaroundtheenablingconditionsforadaptationnowandinthefutureisillustratedbytheconsequencesoftheCOVID-19pandemic(e.g.falteringofpublicfinanceflowsandbudgetdepletionmorebroadly;disruptionofdevelopment-anddisaster-relatedinstitutionsandprocesseswithimplicationsonadaptationdynamics)BAdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStorm68consumers).TheanalysisalsoconfirmsanimportantpointmadeinAGR2020ontheemergenceofnewinstruments,actorsandapproachestoscaleupadaptationfinance,includingprivateadaptation,despitetheeffectsoftheCOVID-19crisis(section7.1.3)(UNEP2021a).Thereiswidespreadagreementthatcontinuedefforttowardsmoreclimate-prooffinancialsystemsandinvestmentswillbeimportanttoprogressivelyminimizeandcounteractcascadingrisksthroughoutsocietiesasawholeandensurelonger-termandtransformationalreductionsinclimatevulnerability.7.1.2GapsThisyear’sreportwarnsthatdespiteencouragingtrends,adaptationprogressmadeatthenationalleveltodatedoesnotappeartobeattheappropriatescale.Fiveaspectssupportthisconclusion.Adaptationfinance:Estimatesofadaptationcostsandadaptationfinanceneeds,asreportedinupdatedNDCs,appeartoindicatehighertotalsthanpreviousAGRs,whileadaptation-orientedfinancialflowsappeartobebroadlysimilar.Thissuggeststhatasizeableadaptationfinancegapremainsinplaceandislikelyincreasing.Besidesincompleteinformationonpublicflows,informationonprivateflowsalsoremainsunclear.Therehavebeenpositivetrendsintheemergenceofnewinstruments,actorsandapproachestoscaleupadaptation,includingbytheprivatesector,buttherateremainsslowandisunlikelytofillthegap.Lastly,itisalsounclearexactlyhowadaptationfinancingflowshavebeenimpactedbythepandemic,notleastbecauseuptomid-2021COVID-19stimuluspackageswerenotveryexplicitabouthowtheyconsiderphysicalclimaterisk,adaptationorresiliencedimensionsintheirannouncedinvestmentpriorities.Monitoringandevaluation:Monitoringandevaluation(M&E)enablestheadjustmentofadaptationobjectives,strategiesandresourcesovertimeandisthereforekeytoensureadequateandeffectiveadaptationplanningandimplementation.Whileoverone-thirdofthecountrieshaveanadaptation-dedicatedM&Esystemunderdevelopment,onlyaboutone-quarteralreadyhaveoneinplace.Inaddition,thereareindicationsthatM&Eapproachesstillstronglyfocusonoutputsattheexpenseofoutcomesandlackperspectiveonriskreductionperse,partlyduetodifficultiesidentifyinghowthiscanbemeasuredinrelationtoclimatehazardsusingclimatedataandscenarios.Similarly,therehasbeenlittleattentiononassessingtheeffectivenessoftransformationaladaptation.Knock-oneffects:ThisreportreinforcestheconclusionsoftheAGR2020.Whileintheory,national-leveladaptationplanningplaysasubstantialroleinstimulatingthedevelopmentofsubnationalandsectoraladaptation1https://globaladaptation.github.io/.strategiesandplans,inpractice,itremainsunclearwhethertheplanningprocessesinvariouscountriesleadtoactualimplementationatthenationalandsubnationallevels.Forexample,morethan60percentofcountrieswithaNAParenotyettrackingitsimplementation(Leiter2021).Moreover,evencountrieswithhorizontaland/orverticalcoordinationmechanismsinplaceintheirplanninginstrumentsflageffectivecoordinationasacontinuingareaofdifficulty.Connectiontoclimateriskreduction:National-leveldataprovideverylimitedevidenceofeffectiveclimateriskreductiontodayandevenmoreinthefuture.Thereisalsoalackofevidenceinthescientificliterature:outofmorethan1,680scientificpapersanalysedbytheGlobalAdaptationMappingInitiative(GAMI),1lessthan2percentcontainempiricalevidenceofriskreductionasaresultofadaptation-relatedinterventions(Berrang-Fordetal.2021).Whilethisdoesnotexcludethepossibilityofreducingclimaterisks,adaptationinitiativesarestillverymuchoperatingonthebasisoftheassumptionthattheintendedresultsarebeingachieved.Genderandequity:Despitebroadrecognitionofgenderasanimportantadaptationdimension,thenational-levelpolicydocumentsofaboutsevenoutof10countriestendtounderscoretheimportanceofintegratinggenderconsiderationsintoadaptationplanning.Inaddition,thewayinwhichcountriesreportongenderconsiderationsvariedconsiderably,rangingfromgeneralstatementsthroughtomoreelaboratewaysoftakinggenderintoaccountinactionplans.7.1.3FactorsconstrainingtheinterpretationofthefindingsTherearethreemaintypesoflimitationsanduncertaintiestobeconsidered:Lackofclarityinadaptationgoals:TheGlobalGoalonAdaptationisnotspecificintermsofresilienceandvulnerabilityatthegloballevelandonclimateriskreductionnowandinthefuture.Whiletherearereasonsthatarticle7oftheParisAgreementdoesnotprovideaprecisedefinition(suchastoaccommodateinterpretationbyavarietyofParties),thishasresultedincertainlimitations,suchasthedifficultytoinferpreciseglobal-leveltargetsandguidetheanalysisofadaptationprogress(MagnanandRibera2016).Thereisanexpectationthatwithgrowingexperienceinadaptation,reportingundertheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC)willcontinuouslyconvergeandbecomemoreinformative.Improvedinformationacrosscountries’reportinghasthepotentialtoadvanceinformationonsomequantitativeindicators(forexample,therelativenumberofactionsimplementedonthegroundorat-riskpopulationgroupscoveredbyspecificinterventions).Morequalitativegoalscouldalsoemerge,forexampleintermsofknowledgeatthelocalscaleofriskChapter7–Outlookonglobalprogress69reduction,theinclusionofequitydimensionsorextendingthetimescaleofplanningfromtheshort-to-mediumtermtothelongerterm.Todatehowever,thisremainslargelyaspirational.Availabilityofinformation:InformationlevelsonthethreedimensionsconsideredintheUNEPAGRs(planning,finance,implementation)havenotimprovedsince2020.Thismeanstherearestillsubstantiallimitationsanduncertainties:▶First,therearegapsindataavailability.Forexample,itremainschallengingtogetasenseofthescaleofprivatefinancededicatedtoadaptationbecausedatabasesaremostlyscatteredordifficulttoaccess.Similarly,anddespiterecentprogressundertheGAMI,thereisalackofcomprehensivedatabasesgatheringinformationonadaptationplanningandimplementationinhigh-incomecountriesbecauseadaptationisfrequentlymainstreamedatsubnationalandsectorallevels.Dataonprojectoutcomesandevaluationsarealsooftennotpubliclyavailable.▶Second,thereareknowledgegapsinunderstandingtheeffectivenessofawiderangeofclimateadaptationmeasuresandpoliciesintermsoftheadaptationprocessitself(forexample,theextenttowhichvulnerablepopulationgroupsareincludedandequityissuesareconsidered),butalsointermsoftheiractualcontributionstoclimateriskreductionnowandinthefuture.Itisthereforeunclearwhethercurrentadaptationapproachescontributetolong-termsuccessfuladaptationortoanincreasedlevelofmaladaptation.Inturn,thislimitsourunderstandingofthecontributionofadaptation-relatednationalplans,strategies,frameworksandlawstosocietalresilienceandclimateriskreductionacrosssectors,territoriesandpopulationgroups.▶Third,thelackofunderstandingoffuturerisklevelsundervariouswarmingand(national-level)socioeconomicscenariospreventscomparisonofadaptationoutputsobservedtodaywithpotentialoutcomesinthefuture.Thereare,however,avenuesforimprovement.Inprinciple,forexample,itispossibletoassessprogressinimplementationofclimate-relevantinterventionsandcomparethiswithlevelsofexposureinthefuture,whichwouldgiveusaproxyforunderstandingprogressorgaps.Uncertaintyaroundtheenablingconditionsforadaptation:Externalfactorsthatarenotclimate-relatedhaveaconsiderableinfluenceonvulnerabilitytrendsandtheextentandtimeoftheemergenceofclimaterisks.Thisincludes,forexample,changestothepoliticaleconomyofnations(forexample,changesintherightsofwomenandindigenousgroups),geopoliticalshiftsandglobalshocks.TheCOVID-19crisis,whichisexpectedtohaveincreasinglyprofoundimplicationsforfutureadaptationeffortsandoutcomes(thoughnotfullystudiedandunderstood),illustratesthisphenomenon.Forexample,theglobalpandemiccrisisappearstohavehaltedthetrendforthegradualincreaseininternationalpublicadaptationfinanceobservedinrecentyears.Thereisalsoemergingevidencethatthepandemichasdisruptedexistingadaptationplanninganddisasterriskfinancing.Insomecountries,NAPprocesseshavebeenhamperedbyhealthrestrictions,aswellasbythefocusonimmediatepandemicresponsesattheexpenseofclimatechangeadaptation.Additionally,somecontingentdisasterriskmanagementbudgetshavebeendepleted,raisingconcernsofreducedadaptivecapacitytorespondtosubsequenthealthemergenciesandclimateshocks.Onamorepositivenote,theCOVID-19crisisalsohighlightstheimportanceforgovernmentstoaddresscompoundrisksthroughintegratedriskmanagementapproachesandprovidesopportunitiesforgovernmentsanddonorstofinanceactivitiesthatsupporteconomicrecovery,whilealsobuildingadaptivecapacity.7.1.4Exploratoryforward-lookingfindingsWhilechapters3to6areessentiallybackward-looking,anexploratoryforward-lookingapproachhasalsobeenused,basedonexpertjudgement,tocomplementlimiteddataandevidence.Thefindingsarebothencouragingandworryingatthesametime.Crucially,thereisoverallconsensusamongtheauthorsofthisreportandintheliteraturethatmoreambitiousadaptationwillbecriticalgoingforward.RecentconclusionsfromtheIPCCstatethattheParisAgreementtemperaturegoalisinperil,withtheglobalmeansurfacetemperaturerapidlyapproaching1.5°Cabovepre-industriallevels(IPCC2021).Moreover,therecentNDCsynthesisbytheUNFCCCconfirmsthattheworldisnotonapathtowards2°C(UNFCCC2021;UNEP2021b).ThechaptersofthisAGRindicatethatadaptationplanningandimplementationaremostlyincrementalandstillfollowinghistoricalandcurrenteventsandtrends,ratherthantakingamoreanticipatoryapproachandconsideringunexpectedfactors(forexample,tippingpointsinclimateandsocialsystems).Theauthorsofthisreportalsoexpectthatadaptationcostsandneedswilllikelycontinuetorise,especiallyifinsufficientprogressismadetowardsthetemperaturegoaloftheParisAgreement.Publicadaptationfinanceflowsarealsolikelytocontinuetoincreasemodestly,butwillnotclosethefinancegap,whileprivateadaptationflowswillcontinuetoincrease,butwillbeunevenandoftennotreachthoseingreatestneed.Overall,thelargeadaptationfinancegapislikelytoremainanditisplausiblethatitwillevengrow.TheCOVID-19pandemicisalsoexpectedtonegativelyimpactadaptivecapacityatmultiplescales,affectingawiderangeofstakeholders.Forexample,theeconomicshocksofCOVID-19havecontributedtohouseholdvulnerability(witharound100millionmorepeoplefallingintopovertyin2020),joblossesanddecliningsalesforbusinesses.Thepandemichasalsoexacerbatedhighlevelsofexistingcorporatedebtandtheprevalenceofunsustainablesovereigndebt,whichwillAdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStorm70likelyhamperfuturegovernmentspendingonadaptation,particularlyindevelopingcountries.Thelengthanddepthoftheseconsequenceswillvaryacrossandwithincountriesandwillbecomemoreapparentovertimebutthereseemstobegeneralagreementthatlong-termadaptationchallengesintermsofplanning,financeandimplementationwillbesubstantiallyaffected.Tosummarize,theleveloftransformationrequiredtoaddressfutureclimaterisksdoesnotyetseemtobematerializing.However,thisconclusiondeservessomecautionduetothedifficultiesintrackingtransformationaladaptationprocesses,partlybecausedatacollectiononsuchfutureprocesseshasnotreallybeguninthescientificandpolicymakingcommunities.Thisreportthereforecallsforthescalingupofeffortstodevelopmethodsthatcombinemetricsorindicatorsonresilience(groundedinempiricalstudiesandrecognizingthecontextualnatureofresilienceandadaptation);adaptationperformanceintermsofimplementation;andtheeffectsonactualriskreductionnowandinthefuture(inrelationtomeasuring“successfuladaptation”andtheriskofmaladaptation).Progressmaybeslowintheseareas,buttheauthorsofthisreportestimatethatfurtherdevelopmentandpromotionofrobustassessmentanddecision-makingapproachesarelikelyasclimatechangeimpactsintensify,increasinglyhighlightingtheneedforenhancedadaptationambitions.7.2ThewayforwardThissectiondiscussessomeoverarchingchallengesinassessingadaptationprogressandoutlineskeytakeawaysforfutureworkontrackingitglobally.7.2.1ThechallengesaheadThisreportraisesseveralrecurringknowledgebarrierstounderstandadaptation,globallyandacrossscales,alignedwiththosedescribedinpreviousAGRs.Theselimitationsunderpinanumberofkeyrecommendationsforthescientificandpolicymakingcommunities.First,onclimatehazards,itiscrucialtobetterunderstandfutureclimatetrendsandhazardsatthenationallevel,aswellasatthesubnationallevels(forexample,tohighlightlevelsofcross-scalehomogeneity/heterogeneityintermsofadaptation-relatedchallenges).TheIPCCSixthAssessmentReport(AR6)(IPCC2021)containsground-breakinginformationinthisarea(seethecontributionofWorkingGroupI,releasedinAugust2021).ThecontributionofWorkingGroupII,dueinearly2022,willprovideadditionalinformation,forexamplethroughtheidentificationofrepresentativekeyrisksrelevanttotheinterpretationofdangerousinterferenceswiththeclimatesystemstressedbyUNFCCC.Second,climateriskprojectionsneedtobedramaticallyimprovedastheyarekeytoinformingtheassessmentofadaptationprogressorgaps.Giventhemultidimensionalnatureofclimaterisk(hazard,exposure,vulnerabilityandincludingadaptivecapacity),ahardpushisespeciallyneededtobettercombineclimateprojectionswithscenariosonsocietalexposureandvulnerability(Garschagenetal.2021;Magnanetal.2021),forexamplethroughamoresystematicapplicationoftheSharedSocioeconomicPathwaysapproachtonationalcontexts.Suchcombinedscenarioscanbehighlybeneficialtothepolicymakingcommunity.Byallowingcontrastingrisklevelsundervariouswarmingscenariosandadaptationscenarios(forexample,business-as-usual,mediumambition,highambition),theywillinturnhighlightPhoto:©ShutterstockChapter7–Outlookonglobalprogress71therangeofpossibleriskreductions(forexample,business-as-usualversushighadaptation),supporttheidentificationoffeasibleadaptationscenarios,dependingoncontext-specificrisktolerancepatterns,andprovideasenseoftheresidualrisksexpectedtopersistevenafteradaptation.Third,thereisanurgentneedforscience-basedadvancestounderstandtheeffectivenessofadaptationresponsesintermsoftheirabilitytoreduceclimaterisklevels,bothnowandinthefuture,andthereforesupportsuccessfuladaptationoverthelongrun,whilelimitingtheriskofmaladaptation.Thereisemergingscientificliteratureonframeworkstoassesseffectiveness,butmoreisneeded,especiallyonnational-levelpolicyanalysis.Lastly,theavailabilityofmultipletypesofdataandinformationneedstobesubstantiallyincreased,includingonprivateclimatefinance(toprovidemorecomprehensiveinformationontrendsinadaptationfinance)andadaptationplansimplementedlocally(tobettercapturetheknock-oneffectofnational-levelpolicies).7.2.2TowardsthenextgenerationofapproachesfortrackingadaptationprogressTheUNFCCCAdaptationCommitteerecentlypreparedseveraltechnicalpapers,includingonein2021,toreviewexistingapproachesforadaptationprogresstracking,especiallyfromtheperspectiveoftheGlobalStocktakeandwithaviewtoopeningupavenuestodevelopfurthermethodologicalguidance(UNFCCCAdaptationCommittee2021a).2AmongseveralissuesidentifiedbytheAdaptationCommittee,twotouchoncriticalpointsraisedthroughouttheAGRseries,namelythetypeofinformationneededtounderstandadaptationprogressandthewaytouse/aggregatethedataandinformation.Inadditiontoreinforcingcautionabouttheoverallfeasibilityofaggregatingquantitativeindicatorsanddata,the2ForinterimguidancedraftedbyAdaptationCommitteeonAdaptationCommunications,seeUNFCCCAdaptationCommittee(2021b).3Seeforexamplethe2019ProgressReporttoParliament:www.theccc.org.uk/publication/progress-in-preparing-for-climate-change-2019-progress-report-to-parliament/.4Seeforexamplethe2021MethodologicalReportavailableontheprojectwebpage:www.iddri.org/en/project/assessing-global-progress-climate-adaptation-gap-track-2021.AdaptationCommitteepaperarguesthatastandardizedapproachtoassessprogresscarriestheriskofmaskingboththesensitivitiesofnationalcontextsintermsofexposureandvulnerabilitytoclimatechange,andthedivergenceofapproachestomonitor,evaluateandreportonadaptationaction.Inlinewithfindingsfromthescientificcommunity,thepaperalsoemphasizesthatexistingapproachesusuallyrelyonjustafewdifferenttypesofinformation(oftenjustone),suchasnationalcommunicationsorquantitativeindicators/statisticaldata.Yetitisincreasinglyacknowledgedthatmultiplesourcesofinformation(bothquantitativeandqualitativedata,bothscientifically-basedandfromtraditionalknowledgesystems,etc.)providedifferenttypesofunderstandingsthatdonotcompetewithbutcomplementeachother.Forexample,quantitativedatasetshelpdescribeformaldimensionsofvulnerabilityconditionsbutareunabletoreflectmorequalitativedimensions.Ontheotherhand,traditionalandindigenousknowledgeortheperspectivesofwomenandothervulnerablegroupsarekeytoreflectingsuchqualitativeandoftenintuitiveinformationonvulnerabilityandriskonthegroundbutcanbehardtoincludeintraditionalscientificanalysis.Lastly,thepaperalsowarnsagainsttheriskofthedilutionandlossofinformationthroughoutthecomplexsynthesisandreportingmechanismsundertheUNFCCC.Theissuemaynotalwaysbedataitself,butratherthewayinformationisusedtoinformpolicyandactionathigherlevels.Beingabletoidentifynewapproachestoallowdifferenttypesofinformation(quantitativeandqualitative,andevaluativeanddescriptive)tobebroughttogetheratmultiplescalesisanemergingchallenge.Forexample,recentpublicationshaveusedexpertjudgementapproachestounderstandfutureclimateriskatlocallevels(Oppenheimeretal.2019;Duvatetal.2021)orsupportamorecomprehensiveassessmentofadaptation(forexample,theUKClimateChangeCommitteeregularreports3andGAP-TrackapproachbyIDDRI4).Suchapproachesprovidepromisingwaysforward,butstillneedfurtherexplorationandvalidation.AdaptationGapReport2021:TheGatheringStorm72ReferencesChapter1Beauchamp,E.,daSilvaBernardo,C.andBueno,M.(2021).ProgressingtheGlobalGoalonAdaptation—keyissues.London:InternationalInstituteforEnvironmentandDevelopment.https://pubs.iied.org/17773iied.IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(2021).ClimateChange2021:ThePhysicalScienceBasis.ContributionofWorkingGroupItotheSixthAssessmentReportoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange.www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/.UnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme(2014).TheAdaptationGapReport2014.Nairobi.www.unep.org/resources/adaptation-gap-report-2014.UnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme(2020).EmissionsGapReport2020.Nairobi.https://www.unep.org/emissions-gap-report-2020.UnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange(2021).Co-chairs’summaryofthePresidencies’consultationsonadaptation23–24February2021.https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Co-chairs_summary_adaptation_consultations_Final.pdf.UnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChangeAdaptationCommittee(2021).Approachestoreviewingtheoverallprogressmadeinachievingtheglobalgoalonadaptation.9April2021.AC/2021/TP/GGA.https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/ac2021_tp_gga.pdf.WorldMeteorologicalOrganization(WMO)(2021).Juneendswithexceptionalheat.https://public.wmo.int/en/me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