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2023

GLOBAL LANDSCAPE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY FINANCE 2022 2023

www.irena.org

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

GLOBAL LANDSCAPE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY FINANCE 2023

Unless otherwise stated, material in this publication may be freely used, shared, copied, reproduced, printed and/or

stored, provided that appropriate acknowledgement is given of IRENA as the source and copyright holder. Material in this

publication that is attributed to third parties may be subject to separate terms of use and restrictions, and appropriate

permissions from these third parties may need to be secured before any use of such material.

Citation: IRENA and CPI (2023), Global landscape of renewable energy finance, 2023, International Renewable

Energy Agency, Abu Dhabi.

ISBN: 978-92-9260-523-0

This report has been re-issued since its original release date in February 2023. This revised digital imprint

incorporates updated data.

Acknowledgements

This report was jointly prepared by the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) and Climate Policy Initiative

(CPI). The report was developed under the guidance of Rabia Ferroukhi (Director, IRENA Knowledge, Policy and

Finance Centre) and Ute Collier (IRENA), and Barbara Buchner and Dharshan Wignarajah (Climate Policy Initiative).

The report was authored by Diala Hawila and Faran Rana (IRENA), Costanza Strinati, Sean Stout, Jake Connolly, and

Sandy Fajrian (Climate Policy Initiative), Antonio Barbalho and Sandra Lozo (IRENA consultants).

Input was also provided by IRENA and CPI colleagues, including Divyam Nagpal, Abdullah Abou Ali, Jinlei Feng,

Emanuele Bianco, Dennis Akande, Gerardo Escamilla, Mirjam Reiner, and Hannah Guinto (IRENA), and Chavi Meattle,

and Baysa Naran (CPI).

Valuable review and feedback were provided by IRENA colleagues Elizabeth Press, Xavier Casals and Paul Komor.

The report benefitted from comments of experts including Christine Eibs Singer (Catalyst Energy Advisors), Charlotte

Gardes-Landolfini (International Monetary Fund), Jonathan Coppel (International Energy Agency), Kingsmill Bond

(Rocky Mountain Institute), Laura Fortes (GOGLA), Olivia Coldrey (Sustainable Energy for All), Miquel Muñoz Cabré,

and Danial Duma (Stockholm Environment Institute).

The report was edited by Fayre Makeig.

For further information or to provide feedback: publications@irena.org

This report can be downloaded from www.irena.org/publications

Disclaimer

This publication and the material herein are provided “as is”. All reasonable precautions have been taken by IRENA to verify the reliability of the material

in this publication. However, neither IRENA nor any of its officials, agents, data or other third-party content providers provides a warranty of any kind,

either expressed or implied, and they accept no responsibility or liability for any consequence of use of the publication or material herein.

The information contained herein does not necessarily represent the views of all Members of IRENA. The mention of specific companies or certain

projects or products does not imply that they are endorsed or recommended by IRENA in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned.

The designations employed and the presentation of material herein do not imply the expression of any opinion on the part of IRENA concerning the legal

status of any region, country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of frontiers or boundaries.

Cover photos: Kletr © Shutterstock.com, Evgeny_V © Shutterstock.com, Mabeline72 © Shutterstock.com, Alex Traveler © Shutterstock.com and

isak55 © Shutterstock.com

About IRENA

The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) is an intergovernmental organisation that supports

countries in their transition to a sustainable energy future and serves as the principal platform for international

co-operation, a centre of excellence, and a repository of policy, technology, resource and financial knowledge

on renewable energy. IRENA promotes the widespread adoption and sustainable use of all forms of renewable

energy, including bioenergy, geothermal, hydropower, ocean, solar and wind energy, in the pursuit of

sustainable development, energy access, energy security, and low-carbon economic growth and prosperity.

ExEcutivE Summary

Global investments in energy transition technologies reached USD1.3trillion in 2022, a record

high. Yet, the current pace of investment is not sucient to put the world on track towards

meeting climate or socio-economic development goals.

In 2022, global investments in energy transition technologies – renewable energy, energy

eciency, electriﬁed transport and heat, energy storage, hydrogen and carbon capture and

storage (CCS) – reached USD1.3trillion despite the prevailing macroeconomic, geopolitical and

supply chain challenges. Global investments were up 19% from 2021 levels, and almost 70% from

2019, before the COVID-19 pandemic (Figure S.1). This trend demonstrates a growing recognition

of the climate crisis and energy security risks associated with over-reliance on fossil fuels.

Yet, the current pace of investment is not sucient; annual investments need to at least quadruple.

Keeping the world on track to achieving the energy transition in line with the 1.5°C Scenario laid

out in IRENA’s World energy transitions outlook 2023 will require annual investments of more than

USD 5 trillion on average between 2023 and 2030 (IRENA, 2023a).

















    * *

USDbillion

662 656

749 764 772 839

1 096

1 308

Electriﬁed heat

Renewable energy Electriﬁed transportEnergy eciency Energy storage

Hydrogen Carbon capture and storage

FigureS Annualglobalinvestmentinrenewableenergyenergyefficiencyandothertransition-related

technologies-

Notes: Renewable energy investments for 2021 and 2022 represent preliminary estimates based on data from Bloomberg New

Energy Finance (BNEF). As BNEF has limited coverage of large hydropower investments, these were estimated at USD 7 billion per

year, the annual average investment in 2019 and 2020. Energy efficiency data are from IEA (2022a). These values are in constant

2019 dollars, while all other values are at current prices and exchange rates. Due to the lack of more granular data, the units could

not be harmonised across the databases. For this reason, these numbers are presented together for indicative purposes only

and should not be used to make comparisons between data sources. Data for other energy transition technologies come from

BNEF (2023a).

Based on: IEA (2022a) and BNEF (2023a).

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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2023EXECUTIVESUMMARY2GLOBALLANDSCAPEOFRENEWABLEENERGYFINANCE2023©IRENA2023Unlessotherwisestated,materialinthispublicationmaybefreelyused,shared,copied,reproduced,printedand/orstored,providedthatappropriateacknowledgementisgivenofIRENAasthesourceandcopyrightholder.Materialinthispublicationthatisattributedtothirdpartiesmaybesubjecttoseparatetermsofuseandrestrictions,andappropriatepermissionsfromthesethirdpartiesmayneedtobesecuredbeforeanyuseofsuchmaterial.Citation:IRENAandCPI(2023),Globallandscapeofrenewableenergyfinance,2023,InternationalRenewableEnergyAgency,AbuDhabi.ISBN:978-92-9260-523-0Thisreporthasbeenre-issuedsinceitsoriginalreleasedateinFebruary2023.Thisreviseddigitalimprintincorporatesupdateddata.AcknowledgementsThisreportwasjointlypreparedbytheInternationalRenewableEnergyAgency(IRENA)andClimatePolicyInitiative(CPI).ThereportwasdevelopedundertheguidanceofRabiaFerroukhi(Director,IRENAKnowledge,PolicyandFinanceCentre)andUteCollier(IRENA),andBarbaraBuchnerandDharshanWignarajah(ClimatePolicyInitiative).ThereportwasauthoredbyDialaHawilaandFaranRana(IRENA),CostanzaStrinati,SeanStout,JakeConnolly,andSandyFajrian(ClimatePolicyInitiative),AntonioBarbalhoandSandraLozo(IRENAconsultants).InputwasalsoprovidedbyIRENAandCPIcolleagues,includingDivyamNagpal,AbdullahAbouAli,JinleiFeng,EmanueleBianco,DennisAkande,GerardoEscamilla,MirjamReiner,andHannahGuinto(IRENA),andChaviMeattle,andBaysaNaran(CPI).ValuablereviewandfeedbackwereprovidedbyIRENAcolleaguesElizabethPress,XavierCasalsandPaulKomor.ThereportbenefittedfromcommentsofexpertsincludingChristineEibsSinger(CatalystEnergyAdvisors),CharlotteGardes-Landolfini(InternationalMonetaryFund),JonathanCoppel(InternationalEnergyAgency),KingsmillBond(RockyMountainInstitute),LauraFortes(GOGLA),OliviaColdrey(SustainableEnergyforAll),MiquelMuñozCabré,andDanialDuma(StockholmEnvironmentInstitute).ThereportwaseditedbyFayreMakeig.Forfurtherinformationortoprovidefeedback:publications@irena.orgThisreportcanbedownloadedfromwww.irena.org/publicationsDisclaimerThispublicationandthematerialhereinareprovided“asis”.AllreasonableprecautionshavebeentakenbyIRENAtoverifythereliabilityofthematerialinthispublication.However,neitherIRENAnoranyofitsofficials,agents,dataorotherthird-partycontentprovidersprovidesawarrantyofanykind,eitherexpressedorimplied,andtheyacceptnoresponsibilityorliabilityforanyconsequenceofuseofthepublicationormaterialherein.TheinformationcontainedhereindoesnotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsofallMembersofIRENA.ThementionofspecificcompaniesorcertainprojectsorproductsdoesnotimplythattheyareendorsedorrecommendedbyIRENAinpreferencetoothersofasimilarnaturethatarenotmentioned.ThedesignationsemployedandthepresentationofmaterialhereindonotimplytheexpressionofanyopiniononthepartofIRENAconcerningthelegalstatusofanyregion,country,territory,cityorareaorofitsauthorities,orconcerningthedelimitationoffrontiersorboundaries.Coverphotos:Kletr©Shutterstock.com,Evgeny_V©Shutterstock.com,Mabeline72©Shutterstock.com,AlexTraveler©Shutterstock.comandisak55©Shutterstock.comAboutIRENATheInternationalRenewableEnergyAgency(IRENA)isanintergovernmentalorganisationthatsupportscountriesintheirtransitiontoasustainableenergyfutureandservesastheprincipalplatformforinternationalco-operation,acentreofexcellence,andarepositoryofpolicy,technology,resourceandfinancialknowledgeonrenewableenergy.IRENApromotesthewidespreadadoptionandsustainableuseofallformsofrenewableenergy,includingbioenergy,geothermal,hydropower,ocean,solarandwindenergy,inthepursuitofsustainabledevelopment,energyaccess,energysecurity,andlow-carboneconomicgrowthandprosperity.3ExecutiveSummaryGlobalinvestmentsinenergytransitiontechnologiesreachedUSD1.3trillionin2022,arecordhigh.Yet,thecurrentpaceofinvestmentisnotsufficienttoputtheworldontracktowardsmeetingclimateorsocio-economicdevelopmentgoals.In2022,globalinvestmentsinenergytransitiontechnologies–renewableenergy,energyefficiency,electrifiedtransportandheat,energystorage,hydrogenandcarboncaptureandstorage(CCS)–reachedUSD1.3trilliondespitetheprevailingmacroeconomic,geopoliticalandsupplychainchallenges.Globalinvestmentswereup19%from2021levels,andalmost70%from2019,beforetheCOVID-19pandemic(FigureS.1).Thistrenddemonstratesagrowingrecognitionoftheclimatecrisisandenergysecurityrisksassociatedwithover-relianceonfossilfuels.Yet,thecurrentpaceofinvestmentisnotsufficient;annualinvestmentsneedtoatleastquadruple.Keepingtheworldontracktoachievingtheenergytransitioninlinewiththe1.5°CScenariolaidoutinIRENA’sWorldenergytransitionsoutlook2023willrequireannualinvestmentsofmorethanUSD5trilliononaveragebetween2023and2030(IRENA,2023a).USDbillionElectriﬁedheatRenewableenergyElectriﬁedtransportEnergyeciencyEnergystorageHydrogenCarboncaptureandstorageFigureS.1Annualglobalinvestmentinrenewableenergy,energyefficiencyandothertransition-relatedtechnologies,2015-2022Notes:Renewableenergyinvestmentsfor2021and2022representpreliminaryestimatesbasedondatafromBloombergNewEnergyFinance(BNEF).AsBNEFhaslimitedcoverageoflargehydropowerinvestments,thesewereestimatedatUSD7billionperyear,theannualaverageinvestmentin2019and2020.EnergyefficiencydataarefromIEA(2022a).Thesevaluesareinconstant2019dollars,whileallothervaluesareatcurrentpricesandexchangerates.Duetothelackofmoregranulardata,theunitscouldnotbeharmonisedacrossthedatabases.Forthisreason,thesenumbersarepresentedtogetherforindicativepurposesonlyandshouldnotbeusedtomakecomparisonsbetweendatasources.DataforotherenergytransitiontechnologiescomefromBNEF(2023a).Basedon:IEA(2022a)andBNEF(2023a).EXECUTIVESUMMARY4GLOBALLANDSCAPEOFRENEWABLEENERGYFINANCE2023Achievinganenergytransitioninlinewiththe1.5°CScenariorequirestheredirectionofUSD1trillionperyearfromfossilfuelstoenergy-transition-relatedtechnologies;butfossilfuelinvestmentsarestillontherise.Fossilfuelinvestmentshaddeclinedin2020(down22%fromtheUSD1trillioninvestedin2019)mainlyduetotheimpactsoftheCOVID-19pandemiconglobalenergymarkets(IEA,2022c).Nevertheless,2021sawfossilfuelinvestmentsbouncebackup15%toUSD897billion(FigureS.2),andpreliminarydatafor2022suggesttheymighthavealmostreturnedtotheirpre-pandemiclevels(+6%),reachingUSD953billion(IEA,2022c).InvestmentinenergyisstillgoingintofundingnewoilandgasfieldsinsteadofrenewablesanditisestimatedthatUSD570billionwillbespentonnewoilandgasdevelopmentandexplorationeveryyearuntil2030(IISD,2022).Investorsandbankshavealreadycommittedtofinancingfossilfueldevelopmentoverandabovethelimitneededtomeetthe1.5°Ctarget.OverthesixyearsfollowingtheParisClimateAgreement,somelargemulti-nationalbanksmaintainedandevenincreasedtheirinvestmentsinfossilfuelsatanaverageofaboutUSD750billiondollarsperyear(EnvironmentalFinance,2022a).Theworld’s60largestcommercialbanksinvestedaroundUSD4.6trillioninfossilfuelsbetween2015and2021,morethanone-quarterofwhichcamefromUSbanks(EnvironmentalFinance,2022a).USDbillionREFFREFFREFFREFFREFFREFFREFFREFFFossilfuelpowergenerationOilandgasupstreamOilandgasdownstreamandinfrastructureOtherrenewableenergyCoalminingandinfrastructureSolarOnshoreandoshorewindFigureS.2Annualinvestmentinrenewableenergyvs.fossilfuels,2015-2022Note:FF=fossilfuel;RE=renewableenergy.Basedon:CPI(2022a)andIEA(2022b).5ExecutiveSummaryFossilfuelcompaniesbasedinemergingmarketsanddevelopingeconomieshavecontinuedtoattractsubstantialvolumesoffinancing.Between2016and2022,theiroutstandingdebtroseby400%forcoaland225%foroilandgas,despitetheneedtoaligninvestmentswiththegoalsoutlinedintheParisAgreement(IMF,2022a).InAfrica,capitalexpendituresforoilandgasexplorationrosefromUSD3.4billionin2020toUSD5.1billionin2022.Africancompaniesaccountedforlessthanone-thirdofthissum.Inadditiontodirectinvestmentsinassets,thefossilfuelindustrycontinuestoreceiveconsiderablesupportthroughsubsidies.Between2013and2020,USD2.9trillionwasspentgloballyonfossilfuelsubsidies(FossilFuelsSubsidyTracker,2022).In2020,Europewastheregionprovidingthemostsubsidies,havingovertakentheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica(MENA)(FigureS.3).Onapercapitabasis,fossilfuelsubsidiesinEuropetotalledUSD113perperson,morethantriplethoseinMENA(USD36perperson).However,fossilfuelsubsidiesinMENAmakeup1.56%ofthegrossdomesticproduct(GDP)whileinEurope,theyconstituteonly0.3%ofGDP.USDbillionEuropeEurasiaEastAsiaandthePaciﬁcLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanMiddleEastandNorthAfricaSouthAsiaSub-SaharanAfricaNorthAmerica(excludingMexico)OtherAsiaOtherOceaniaFigureS.3Annualfossilfuelsubsidiesbyregion,2013-2020Source:FossilFuelsSubsidyTracker(2022).6GLOBALLANDSCAPEOFRENEWABLEENERGYFINANCE2023Subsidiesdoubledin2021across51countries,fromUSD362billionin2020toUSD697billion,withconsumptionsubsidiesexpectedtohaverisenevenfurtherin2022duetocontemporaneouspricepressures(OECDandIEA,2022).Thephasingoutofinvestmentsinfossilfuelassetsshouldbecoupledwiththeeliminationofsubsidiestoensurethatthefullcostsoffossilfuelsarereflectedintheirpriceandtoleveltheplayingfieldwithrenewablesandotherenergy-transition-relatedtechnologies.However,thephaseoutofsubsidiesneedstobeaccompaniedbyapropersafetynettoensureadequatestandardsoflivingforvulnerablepopulations(IRENA,2022a).Investmentsinrenewableenergycontinuetogrow,butnotatthepaceneededtoachieveclimate,energyaccessandenergysecurityobjectivesalongwithothersocio-economicdevelopmentgoalsby2030.Despitemultipleeconomic,socialandgeopoliticalchallenges,annualinvestmentsinrenewableenergycontinuedapositivetrendthatbeganafter2018(seeFigureS.4).Preliminarydatasuggestthatin2021,investmentsreachedUSD430billion(24%upfrom2020)andin2022theyfurtherincreasedby16%reachingalmostUSD0.5trillion(BNEF,2023b).1Yet,investmentin2022waslessthanone-thirdoftheaverageinvestmentneededeachyearbetween2023and2030(aboutUSD1.6trillioninrenewablepowerandthedirectuseofrenewables)accordingtoIRENA’s1.5°CScenario(IRENA,2023a).USDbillionOnshorewindOshorewindSolarthermalincludingCSPSolarPVBiofuelsHydropowerUnknownMarineBiomassGeothermalCompoundannualgrowthrate-FigureS.4Annualfinancialcommitmentsinrenewableenergy,bytechnology,2013-2022Note:CAGR=compoundannualgrowthrate;CSP=concentratedsolarpower;PV=photovoltaic.Source:CPI(2022a).Investmentsfor2021and2022arepreliminaryestimatesbasedondatafromBNEF(2023b).AsBNEFdatahaslimitedcoverageoflargehydropowerinvestments,thesewereassumedtobeUSD7billionperyear,equivalenttotheannualaverageinvestmentfortheprecedingtwoyears.1Thesefiguresrepresent“primary”financialtransactionsinbothlarge-andsmall-scaleprojectsthatdirectlycontributetodeploymentofrenewableenergy,andthereforeexcludesecondarytransactions,e.g.refinancingofexistingdebtsorpublictradinginfinancialmarkets.NotethatthisisdifferentfrominvestmentsdiscussedinChapter3fortheoff-gridrenewableenergysectorwhichrelatestocorporate-leveltransactions(bothprimaryandsecondary)andisthereforedifferentfrominvestmentsdiscussedinChapter2(althoughsomeoverlapispossible).Formoredetails,pleaseseethemethodologydocument(Appendix).Aspreviouslynoted,2021and2022investmentnumbersinChapters1and2arepreliminaryestimatesbasedonBNEF(2023b).7ExecutiveSummaryInvestmentsarealsonotflowingatthepaceorscaleneededtoachievetheimprovementsinlivelihoodsandwelfareenvisionedinthe2030AgendaforSustainableDevelopment.Despiteprogressinenergyaccess,approximately733millionpeoplehadnoaccesstoelectricityandnearly2.4billionpeoplereliedontraditionalfuelsandtechnologiesforcookingattheendof2020(IEA,IRENA,etal.2022).Between2010and2021,theoff-gridrenewablessectorattractedmorethanUSD3billion(WoodMackenzie,2022a).Investmentsinoff-gridsolutionsreachedUSD558millionin2021,a27%increasefrom2020(FigureS.5).ButthisamountisfarshortoftheUSD2.3billionneededannuallyinoff-gridsolarproductsalone(notincludingmini-grids)between2021and2030toaccelerateprogresstowardsuniversalenergyaccess(ESMAPetal.2022a).2Althoughontherise,off-gridinvestmentsareconcentratedamongsevenlargeincumbentcompaniesthathavealreadyreachedscaleandarelookingtofurthersolidifytheirmarketpositionthroughtheirabilitytoattractcapital.TheaveragetransactionsizeclimbedfromUSD1.1millionin2017to1.7millionby2020,beforemorethandoublingtoUSD3.7millionin2021(FigureS.5).Whileatrendofgrowingticketsizeisasignofsectorgrowthandmaturity,itmayalsoindicateexistingchallengesforenterpriseslookingforsmallerinvestments.OverallinvestmentsUSDmillion(constant)Averageticketsize(USDmillion)OverallinvestmentsAverageticketsizeFigureS.5Annualinvestmentinoff-gridrenewableenergyandaveragetransactionsize,2010-2021Basedon:WoodMackenzie(2022a).2Thiswillbeneededonboththesupplysideforoff-gridrenewableenergycompaniesanddemandside(mainlyintheformofpublicfunding)toenhanceaffordabilityforconsumers.Investmentshavebecomefurtherconcentratedinspecifictechnologiesanduses.Tobestsupporttheenergytransition,morefundsneedtoflowtolessmaturetechnologiesandtosectorsbeyondpower.Whileannualrenewableenergyinvestmentshavebeengrowingovertime,thesehavebeenconcentratedinthepowersector.Between2013and2020,powergenerationassetsattracted,onaverage,90%ofrenewableinvestmentseachyear,andupto97%in2021and2022.8GLOBALLANDSCAPEOFRENEWABLEENERGYFINANCE2023Solarandwindtechnologiesconsistentlyattractthelargestshareofinvestmentbyawidemargin.In2020,solarphotovoltaic(PV)aloneattracted43%ofthetotal,followedbyonshoreandoffshorewind(at35%and12%,respectively).Investmentsinenduses,i.e.directapplications,whichincludeheatgeneration(e.g.solarwaterheaters,geothermalheatpumps,biomassboilers)andtransport(e.g.biofuels)arelagging;theywillneedtoincreasefromUSD13billionin2022toanaverageUSD269billioneachyearbetweennowand2030(IRENA,2023a).Intheoff-gridspace,solarPVproductsalsodominate,attracting92%ofoverallinvestmentsin2010-2021,owingchieflytotheirmodularanddistributedcharacteristics,andtheiradaptabilitytoawidevarietyofapplications.Solarhomesystems(SHSs)arethemostfundedtechnology(FigureS.6).Eventhoughthemajorityofoff-gridinvestmentswenttoresidentialapplicationsbetween2010and2021,thesharegoingtocommercialandindustrial(C&I)applicationshasbeenexpandingovertime(from8%in2015to32%in2021)asconsumerneedsgrowbeyondbasichouseholdaccesstomoreenergy-intensiveusesinlocalindustryandagriculture.PoweringC&Iapplicationscanpromotelocaleconomiesbycreatingjobsandspurringeconomicgrowth,whilealsoenhancingfoodsecurityandresilienceagainsttheimpactsofclimatevariabilityonagri-foodchains(IRENA,2016b).USDmillion(constant)InvestmentsinsolarhomesystemsbysectorInvestmentsinmicrominigridsbysectorCommercialandindustrialCommunitiesandothereconomicactivitiesCommunitiesandothereconomicactivitiesMultipleResidentialMicro-/mini-gridsMultipleSolarlightsSolarhomesystemsAncillaryproductsandservicesOthero-gridsolarMultipleCommercialandindustrialResidentialFigureS.6Annualinvestmentinoff-gridrenewableenergy,byoff-gridproduct,andenergyuse,2010-2021Basedon:WoodMackenzie(2022a).9ExecutiveSummaryInvestmentsareincreasinglyfocusedinanumberofregionsandcountries.Theyneedtobemoreuniversalforamoreinclusiveenergytransition.Althoughrenewableenergyinvestmentsareontheriseglobally,theycontinuetobefocusedinanumberofcountriesandregions.TheEastAsiaandPacificregioncontinuestoattractthemajorityofinvestment–two-thirdsoftheglobaltotalin2022(FigureS.7)–primarilyledbyChina.AsuiteofpoliciesincludingtaxexemptionshavedriveninvestmentsinsolarandwindinChina,puttingthecountryontracktomeetingthetargetssetoutinthe14thFive-YearPlan(CarbonBrief,2021).VietNamsawinvestmentinsolarPVgrowbyanaverageof219%peryearbetween2013and2020,drivenmainlybyfeed-intariffs(Lorimer,2021).NorthAmericaexcludingMexicoattractedthesecond-largestshareofinvestmentin2022,mainlydrivenbytheproductiontaxcreditintheUnitedStates,followedbyEurope,wherenet-zerocommitmentsandextensivepoliciestophaseoutfossilfuelsaredrivinggrowthinrenewables.IntheUnitedStates,the2022InflationReductionAct–encompassingnewtaxcredits,USD30billioningrantsandloansforcleanenergygenerationandstorage,andUSD60billioninsupportofmanufacturingoflow-carboncomponents–isexpectedtoattractUSD114billioninvestmentby2031.InEurope,theEuropeanCommissionpresentedaGreenDealIndustrialPlanfortheNet-ZeroAge,whichwouldprovideinvestmentaidandtaxbreakstowardstechnologicaldevelopment,manufacturing,productionandinstallationofnet-zeroproductsingreensectorsincludingrenewablesandhydrogen(Bloomberg,2023;EuropeanCommission,2023).TheplanlookstomobiliseEUR225billioninloansfromitsexistingRecoveryandResilienceFacility,andanadditionalEUR20billioningrants(EuropeanCommission,2023).EuropeEastAsiaandPaciﬁcNorthAmerica(excludingMexico)EurasiaSouthAsiaSub-SaharanAfricaOthersLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanFigureS.7Investmentinrenewableenergybyregionofdestination,2013-2022Note:“NorthAmerica(excludingMexico)”includesBermuda,CanadaandtheUnitedStates.“Others”includetheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,OtherOceania,Transregional,OtherAsiaandUnknown.Formoredetailsonthegeographicclassificationusedintheanalysis,pleaseseemethodologydocument(Appendix).Source:CPI(2022a).10GLOBALLANDSCAPEOFRENEWABLEENERGYFINANCE2023Regionshometoabout120developingandemergingmarketscontinuetoreceivecomparativelylowinvestment.Acrosstheseregions,thebulkofrenewableenergyinvestmentsiscapturedbyahandfulofcountries:Brazil,ChileandIndia.Inotherwords,morethan50%oftheworld’spopulation,mostlyresidingindevelopingandemergingcountries,receivedonly15%ofglobalinvestmentsinrenewablesin2022.Further,theshareofrenewableenergyinvestmentsgoingtotheseregionshasbeenprogressivelydecliningyearonyear(e.g.from27%in2017to15%in2022).Inabsoluteterms,annualinvestmentshavebeendecliningprecipitouslysince2018atanaveragerateof36%.Countriesdefinedas“leastdeveloped”bytheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChangeattractedonly0.84%ofrenewableenergyinvestmentsonaveragebetween2013and2020.Lookingatinvestmentsonapercapitabasisfurtherrevealsthedisparityininvestments.InEastAsiaandPacific,investmentpercapitaincreasedby51%between2015and2021fromUSD70/personin2015toUSD105/personin2021.ThebulkoftheincreasetookplaceinChina,whileJapanexperienceda45%declineoverthesameperiod.Excludingthesetwocountries,theregionexperiencedamorethan6-foldincreaseledbycountriessuchasVietNamandRepublicofKorea.InSouthAsia,investmentspercapitadeclinedby6%between2015and2021,howeverthetrueextentofthedeclineismaskedbyIndiawhichsawinvestmentpercapitagrowby34%inthesameperiod.ExcludingIndia,investmentpercapitadeclinedby61%fromUSD12/personin2015toUSD5/personin2021.Themoststriking–andrapidlygrowing–disparityisbetweenSub-SaharanAfricaandbothNorthAmerica(excludingMexico)andEurope.In2015,renewableenergyinvestmentpercapitainNorthAmerica(excludingMexico)orEuropewasalmost23timeshigherthanthatofSub-SaharanAfrica.In2021,investmentpercapitainEuropewas41timesthatinSub-SaharanAfrica(whichin2021felltojustUSD3/personfromUSD6/personin2015),andNorthAmericawas57timesmore.Sub-SaharanAfricaremainstheprimarydestinationforinvestmentinoff-gridrenewables.TheregionattractedUSD2.2billionin2010-2021–morethan70%ofglobaloff-gridinvestments.Electrificationratesinthisregionareamongthelowestintheworld,with568millionpeoplelackingaccesstoelectricityin2020(IEA,IRENAetal.2022).WithinSub-SaharanAfrica,EastAfrica–hometothreeofthetopfiverecipientcountriesofoff-gridinvestment(Kenya,theUnitedRepublicofTanzaniaandRwanda)-attracted43%ofthetotal.Investmentinthesedestinationsbenefitedfromtheexistingmobilemoneyecosystem,whichwasleveragedbythepay-as-you-go(PAYG)businessmodel.Approximately78%ofthetotalcommitmentsinoff-gridrenewablesin2010-2021(orUSD2.4billion)involvedthefundingofcompaniesorprojectsusingPAYG,withEastAfricaaccountingforUSD917million.DuringtheCOVID-19pandemic,off-gridrenewableenergyinvestmentsinSoutheastAsiadeclinedby98%,leavingkeyoff-gridmarketsevenmorevulnerable.Althoughthemajorityofcountriesintheregionhaveachievedhighornear-universalratesofelectricityaccess,partsofthepopulationsincountriessuchasMyanmarandCambodia(26%and15%,respectivelyin2020)stilllackaccesstoelectricity(WorldBank,2022).WhereastheregionattractedUSD137millioninoff-gridrenewableenergyinvestmentsover2018-2019(ledprimarilybyMyanmar),during2020-2021,investmentsplummetedtoUSD3million,likelyduetotheimpactsoftheCOVID-19pandemicandpoliticaldevelopments(ESMAPetal.2022b).11ExecutiveSummaryInvestmentshavebeenprimarilymadebyprivateactors.Privatecapitalflowstothetechnologiesandcountrieswiththeleastrisks–realorperceived.Theprivatesectorprovidesthelion’sshareofglobalinvestmentsinrenewableenergy,committingaround75%ofthetotalintheperiod2013-2020(FigureS.8).Theshareofpublicversusprivateinvestmentsvariesbycontextandtechnology.Typically,lowersharesofpublicfinancearedevotedtorenewableenergytechnologiesthatarecommerciallyviableandhighlycompetitive,whichmakesthemattractiveforprivateinvestors.Forexample,in2020,83%ofcommitmentsinsolarPVcamefromprivatefinance.Meanwhile,geothermalandhydropowerrelymostlyonpublicfinance;only32%and3%ofinvestmentsinthesetechnologies,respectively,camefromprivateinvestorsin2020.DebtEquity2013-2020,USDbillionPublicPrivateHouseholds/IndividualsState-ownedFISOENationalDFIMultilateralDFIMultilateralclimatefundsGovernmentExportCreditAgencyBilateralDFIInstitutionalinvestorsFundsCorporationCommercialFIPrivatePublicFigureS.8Debtandequityinvestmentbytypeofinvestor,2013-2020Note:DFI=developmentfinanceinstitution;FI=financeinstitution;SOE=state-ownedenterprise.Source:CPI(2022a).Globally,commercialfinancialinstitutionsandcorporationsarethemainprivatefinanceproviders,accountingtogetherforalmost85%ofprivatefinanceforrenewablesin2020(FigureS.9).Upuntil2018,privateinvestmentscamepredominantlyfromcorporations(onaverage,65%during2013-2018),butin2019and2020theshareofcorporationswentdownto41%peryear,andalargershareofinvestmentswasfilledbycommercialfinancialinstitutions(43%).12GLOBALLANDSCAPEOFRENEWABLEENERGYFINANCE2023Thisalignswiththefallingshareofequityfinancingglobally,from77%in2013to43%by2020(FigureS.10)ascorporationstogetherwithhouseholds/individualsprovided83%ofequityfinancingduring2013-2020(FigureS.8).Duringthistime,theshareofdebtfinancingincreasedfrom23%in2013to56%in2020(FigureS.10).ThisislikelylinkedtothematurationandconsolidationofmajorrenewabletechnologiessuchassolarPVandonshorewindthatareabletoattracthighlevelsofdebt,aslendersareabletoenvisionregularandpredictablecashflowsoverthelongterm,facilitatedbypowerpurchaseagreements(PPAs)inmanycountries.InstitutionalinvestorsCommercialFIHouseholds/IndividualsFundsCorporationFigureS.9Privateinvestmentinrenewableenergybyinvestor,2013-2020Note:FI=financeinstitution.Source:CPI(2022a).UnknownProject-levelequityGrantBalancesheetﬁnancing(equityportion)Project-levelmarketratedebtLow-costprojectdebtBalancesheetﬁnancing(debtportion)FigureS.10Investmentinrenewableenergy,byfinancialinstrument,2013-2020Source:CPI(2022a).13ExecutiveSummaryIntheoff-gridspace,debtandequityinvestmentscontributedabout47%and48%oftheoverallfinancing,respectivelybetween2010and2021,withanadditional5%contributedbygrants.Bytechnology,debtfinancingconstitutedthemajorityoftheinvestmentsinsolarhomesystemsandsolarlights(54%ofthetotalandrisingovertime)whileequityfinancingdominatedthemicro-/mini-gridspace.PriortotheCOVID-19pandemic,themajorityofoff-gridfinancingcamefromequityinvestmentsowingtothedominationbyprivateequity,venturecapitalandinfrastructurefundsandthelackofdebtaccessforthesector.Eversince,theshareofprivateequityhasseenarelativedecline(FigureS.11),inpartduetotheuncertaintiesposedbythepandemic,andthelimitedtrackrecordofexitsandcapitalrecyclinginthesector.Thecontributionofdebthasincreasedsharplyoverthepasttwoyears,particularlyasdebt-preferringDFIsbolsteredtheirsupportduringthepandemic(FigureS.14)andmajoroff-gridcompanieswereabletocapitaliseontheirstrongmarketpositiontosecure(large-size)predominantlydebt-baseddealsfrombothpublicandprivateinvestors(ESMAPetal.2022b).Anotherremarkabletrendistheincreaseinlocalcurrencydebt,drivenmainlybymarketsinKenyaandNigeria.Goingforward,widespreadmobilisationoflow-costdebtwillbecriticalfordeploymentofcapital-intensiverenewableenergyprojects,whileequityfinancingwillalsoremainkey,particularlytokick-startrelativelylessmaturetechnologies,andfinanceprojectsinrelativelyhigh-riskorcredit-constrainedcontexts.USDmillion(constant)ForeigncurrencydebtEquityGrantLocalcurrencydebtFigureS.11Annualinvestmentinoff-gridrenewableenergy,byfinancinginstrumentandlocalversusforeigncurrencydebt,2013-2021Basedon:WoodMackenzie(2022a).14GLOBALLANDSCAPEOFRENEWABLEENERGYFINANCE2023Themajorityofpublicinvestmentsaremadedomesticallywithrelativelylittleinternationalcollaboration.Theinternationalflowofpublicmoneytorenewableenergyhasbeenindeclinesince2018.Publicfundsarelimited,sogovernmentshavebeenfocusingwhatisavailableonde-riskingprojectsandimprovingtheirrisk-returnprofilestoattractprivatecapital.Globally,thepublicsectorprovidedlessthanone-thirdofrenewableenergyinvestmentin2020.State-ownedfinancialinstitutions,nationalDFIsandstate-ownedenterpriseswerethemainsourcesthatyear,providingmorethan80%ofpublicfinance(FigureS.12).MultilateralDFIsprovided9%ofpublicfinance–inlinewiththeirpastannualcommitments–andaccountedforabouthalfofinternationalflowscomingfromthepublicsector.CommitmentsfrombilateralDFIsin2020fell70%comparedto2019,largelyduetoa96%declineininternationalcommitmentsbytheGermanDevelopmentBank(KfW).ThismeansthatmultilateralandbilateralDFIsprovidedlessthan3%oftotalrenewableenergyinvestmentsin2020.MultilateralclimatefundsPublicfundExportCreditAgencyState-ownedFIGovernmentBilateralDFIMultilateralDFISOENationalDFIFigureS.12Publicinvestmentinrenewableenergybyinvestortype,2013-2020Note:DFI=developmentfinanceinstitution;FI=financeinstitution;SOE=state-ownedenterprise.Source:CPI(2022a).Inaddition,financingfromDFIswasprovidedmainlyintheformofdebtfinancingatmarketrates(requiringrepaymentwithinterestrateschargedatmarketvalue).Grantsandconcessionalloansamountedtojust1%oftotalrenewableenergyfinance,equivalenttoUSD5billion.Sincetheinterestratesarethesame,theonlydifferencethatDFIfinancingprovidesistomakingfinanceavailable,albeitatthesamehighcostsforusers.FigureS.13illustratestheportionofDFIfundingprovidedintheformofgrantsandlow-costdebt.15ExecutiveSummaryGrantUnknownProject-levelmarketratedebtProject-levelequityLow-costprojectdebtBilateralDFIsMultilateralDFIsUnknownProject-levelmarketratedebtGrantProject-levelequityLow-costprojectdebtBalancesheetﬁnancing(equityportion)FigureS.13PortionofDFIfundingintheformofgrantsandlow-costdebtNote:DFI=developmentfinanceinstitution.Source:CPI(2022a).Intheoff-gridspace,theroleofthepublicsector,inparticularDFIs,ismuchmoreimportant.DFIswerethelargestpubliccapitalproviders(accountingfor79%ofthepublicinvestmentsinoff-gridsolutionsand27%ofthetotalinvestmentsinoff-gridsolutionsin2010-2021).Notably,DFIs’contributionsafterthepandemicconstitutehalfoftheiroverallcontributionssince2010(FigureS.14).PublicfinanceflowstotheGlobalSouthareessentialtoachievingthe1.5°CScenarioanditssocio-economicbenefits(togetherwithprogressivefiscalmeasuresandothergovernmentprogrammessuchasdistributionalpolicy,asoutlinedinIRENA[2022a]).Infact,almost80%oftheoff-gridinvestmentsbetween2010and2021involvedNorth–Southflows.However,theinternationalflowofpublicfinancegoingtorenewableenergyinthebroadercontexthasbeenindeclinesince2018(IEA,IRENAetal.2022).Preliminarydatashowthatthedowntrendcontinuedthrough2021.16GLOBALLANDSCAPEOFRENEWABLEENERGYFINANCE2023Toachieveajustandinclusiveenergytransition,publicfinancing–includingthroughinternationalcollaboration–hasacriticalroletoplayacrossabroadspectrumofpolicies.Amongriskmitigationinstruments,sovereignguaranteeshavebeenpreferredforlenderslookingtoobtaina“one-size-fits-all”solutionforcreditrisks.Butsuchguaranteesaretreatedascontingentliabilitiesandmayhamperacountry’sabilitytotakeonadditionaldebtforcriticalinfrastructuredevelopmentandotherinvestments(IRENA,2020a).Moreover,sovereigndebtsarealreadystressedtotheirbreakingpointinmanyemergingeconomiesgrapplingwithhighinflationandcurrencyfluctuationsordevaluationsinthewakeoftheCOVID-19pandemic.Inthismacroeconomicenvironment,manycountriescannotaccessaffordablecapitalininternationalfinancialmarketsorprovidesovereignguaranteestomitigaterisk.Giventheurgentneedtostepupthepaceandgeographicspreadoftheenergytransition,andtocaptureitsfullpotentialinachievingsocio-economicdevelopmentgoals,moreinnovativeinstrumentsareneededthathelpunder-investedcountriesreapthelong-termbenefitsoftheenergytransitionwithoutputtingtheirfiscallyconstrainedeconomiesatafurtherdisadvantage.USDmillion(constant)InstitutionalinvestorsPrivateequity,venturecapitalandinfrastructurefundsDevelopmentﬁnanceInstitutionsGovernmentagenciesandintergovernmentalinstitutionsIndividuals(incl.crowdfundingplatforms)CorporationsandbusinessassociationsUndisclosedOthers(incl.non-proﬁt/impactfunding)CommercialﬁnancialinstitutionsFigureS.14Annualcommitmentstooff-gridrenewableenergybytypeofinvestor,2015-2021Note:Definitionsofallinvestortypeincludedinthisanalysisareprovidedintheaccompanyingmethodologydocument(Appendix).Basedon:WoodMackenzie(2022a).17ExecutiveSummaryPublicfundingmustflowintotherenewableenergysector(coveringallsegmentsofthevaluechain),thewiderenergysectorandtheeconomyasawhole,forajustandequitableenergytransition.Publicfundscanbemobilisedandprovidedusingavarietyofinstruments.FigureS.15showsthetypesofinstrumentsthatcanbeusedtochannelpublicfinance,thesourcesofpublicfunds(domesticorinternationalthroughcollaboration)andtheintermediariesthatcanhelpchannelthem(e.g.governments,nationalDFIs,localbanks,multilateralandbilateralDFIs,exportcreditagencies,globalfundsincludingtheJustEnergyTransitionPartnership[JETP]andUN-linkedfundssuchastheGreenClimateFund).Theseinstrumentscanbeexistingornewlydesignedandmayinclude(1)governmentspendingsuchasgrants,rebatesandsubsidies;(2)debtincludingexistingandnewissuances,creditinstruments,concessionalfinancingandguarantees;(3)equityanddirectownershipofassets(suchastransmissionlinesorlandtobuildprojects)and(4)fiscalpolicyandregulationsincludingtaxesandlevies,exemptions,accelerateddepreciation,deferralsandregulationssuchasPPAs(especiallywhenthetariffspaidtoproducers–inadditiontothecostofrunningthesystem–arelowerthanwhatiscollectedbyconsumersandthedifferenceispaidthroughagovernmentsubsidy).However,suchinstrumentsshouldbeusedwithcautionastonotconcentratethebenefitsamongasmallnumberofplayersintheindustry,andinstrumentsshouldbedesignedinawaythatdistributesthebenefitsinanequitableandfairway.AsshowninFigureS.15,publicfinanceflowsviainstrumentsinvariouspolicycategoriesofIRENA’sbroadpolicyframework.Examplesincludethefollowing:PotentialinstrumentsCategoriesofpoliciesIntermediariesSourcesoffundsGovernmentsNationalInternationalSOFIs/SOEs/NationalDFIsLocalbanks/MicroFinanceInstitutionsCo-operatives/Foundations/NGOsCrowdfundingplatformsDirectinvestmentsingovernment-ownedassets,designingandfundingpoliciesInvestmentininfrastructurethatsupportintegrationofrenewablesintotheenergysystemSupportforlong-termenergyplanning,capacitybuildingandtraining,researchanddevelopment,technicalassistance,etc.PoliciestoaddressmisalignmentsandmarketfailuresGovernmentspendingincludinggrants,rebates,subsidiesDebtincludingexistingandnewissuances,creditinstruments,concessionalﬁnancing,guaranteesEquityanddirectownershipofassetsFiscalpolicyandregulationsincludingtaxesandlevies,exemptions,accelerateddepreciation,andregulationssuchasPPAsMultilateralandbilateralDFIsExportCreditAgenciesGlobalfunds(e.g.GCF,JETP)CarbonFinancePlatformsInternationalandSouth-SouthcollaborationMacroeconomicpolicies(formulateandimplementﬁscal,monetaryandforeignexchangepoliciesthatimpactthedeliveryofpublicfunds)StructuralchangeandjusttransitionpoliciesEnablingpoliciesIntegratingpoliciesDeploymentpoliciesFigureS.15TheflowofpublicfinanceforajustandinclusiveenergytransitionNote:DFI=developmentfinanceinstitution;GCF=GreenClimateFund;JETP=JustEnergyTransitionPartnership;NGO=non-governmentalorganisation;PPA=powerpurchaseagreement;SOFI=state-ownedfinancialinstitution;SOE=state-ownedenterprise.18GLOBALLANDSCAPEOFRENEWABLEENERGYFINANCE20231.Underdeploymentpolicies,publicfundscanflowasdirectinvestmentsingovernment-ownedenergy-transition-relatedassets,public-privatepartnerships,orindesigningandfundingpoliciesthatcanattractorsupportprivateinvestment(e.g.capitalsubsidies,grantsandtariff-basedmechanismssuchasauctions,feed-intariffsandfeed-inpremiums).2.Underintegratingpolicies,publicinvestmentscangointoinfrastructureandassetsthatsupporttheintegrationofrenewablesintotheenergysystem(e.g.regionalandnationaltransmissionlines,pumpedhydroelectricenergystoragefacilities).3.Underenablingpolicies,publicmoneycansupportlong-termenergyplanning,capacitybuildingandtraining,researchanddevelopment,thedevelopmentoflocalindustryandvaluechains,aswellastechnicalassistanceofferedviamultilateraldevelopmentbanks(MDBs)andinter-governmentalorganisationssuchasIRENA.4.Understructuralchangeandjusttransitionpolicies,publicfundscangointotheredesignofpowermarketstomakethemmoreconduciveforlargesharesofvariablerenewableenergy,towardscompensationforthephasing-outoffossilfuels,aswellaspoliciestoensurethattheenergytransitionpromotesgenderequalityandsocialinclusion,amongmanyotherpriorities.5.TheglobalpolicyframeworkdefinesinternationalandSouth-Southcollaboration,whichiskeytostructuringandensuringtheinternationalflowsfromtheGlobalNorthtotheGlobalSouth.6.Inaddition,althoughnotdirectlyrelatedtoanyspecificsector,therearemacroeconomicpolicies(fiscal,monetaryandcurrencyexchangepolicies)thataffectthedeliveryofpublicfundstowardstheenergytransition.Someelementspresentedintheframework(FigureS.15)mightoverlap.Forexample,taxincentivesareatthesametimefiscalormacroeconomicpolicieswhileactingasdeploymentpolicies,andfundinggridinfrastructurecanbeviewedasanenablingoranintegratingpolicy.Whilefundingcapacitybuildingispartofanenablingpolicy,thesefundsalsofacilitatestructuralchange,beingpartofsocialdevelopmentprogrammes,andeducation,socialprotectionandcompensationpolicies,etc.Thus,therearecomplexinter-linkagesandfeedbackloopsbetweenthedifferentpoliciesandinstruments.Byunderstandingthebroadstructuralworkingsunderlyingtherenewableenergy“economy”,publicpolicyandfinancingcanbestrategicallyusedtoadvancetheenergytransition.Governmentsfromdevelopedanddevelopingcountrieswillplayacentralroleinprovidinganenablingenvironmentforbothpublicandprivateinvestments.Amorecomprehensivewayofdefiningrisk(includingrisksharing)isneeded.Anarrowinvestor-centricfocusontheriskofinvestmentinenergyassetsnotpayingoffneedstobebroadenedtoincludeenvironmental,planetaryandsocialrisks.Theseincludetheriskofleavingalargepartof19ExecutiveSummarythepopulationoutoftheenergytransitionandlockedinunderdevelopment,andtheriskoftheSustainableDevelopmentGoalsremainingfarfrombeingmet.Thisishowinvestmentrisksmustbeviewedfromtheperspectiveofgovernmentsandtheinternationalcommunity.Andwiththeverylimitedpublicfundsavailableinthedevelopingworld,theinternationalcommunitymuststepup.Theavailabilityofcapitalforpublicinvestmentsinrenewableenergywillneedtobeincreased,andlendingtodevelopingnationstransformed.Today’senvironmentcallsforafundamentalshiftinhowlendingismadetodevelopingnations,especiallythoseaffectedbyeconomicandclimatecrises,andparticularlyhowcountriesintheGlobalNorthsupportcountriesintheGlobalSouthtocopewithandadapttocrisesrelatedtoclimatechange,thecostoflivinganddebt.ThesituationindevelopingcountriesisbeingmademoredifficultamidtighteningmonetarypoliciesandastrengtheningUSdollar.Oneinfivecountriesisexperiencingfiscalandfinancialstress,whichleftunaddressedwoulddeepenhardship,increasedebtdefaults,wideninequalityanddelaytheenergytransition.Atthe27thUnitedNationsClimateChangeConference(COP27)adecisionwasreachedtoestablishalossanddamagefund,particularlyforthosenationsmostvulnerabletoclimateevents.Detailsregardingtheamountsinvolved,andhowthefacilitywillbesetupandoperationalisedareyettobenegotiated.Thefundisexpectedtoaddressadverseeffectsofclimateimpactssuchasdroughts,floods,risingseasandotherdisastersthatimpairthedeploymentofrenewableenergy.Tappingpoolsofpublicfundsforbothdevelopedanddevelopingcountrieswithoutburdeningthefiscalspaceremainsakeypriority.Governmentsshouldadopta“doingmorewithwhatisavailable”approachthroughenhancedcollaborationamongDFIsandMDBs,andbyexploringthefollowingmechanisms:CapitalreleasefrombalancesheetsofDFIs.Balancesheetsofinvestorsandfinancialinstitutionsdiscloserightsandobligationsconnectedtotheowningandlendingofassets.ItispossibleforDFIstousethoseelementstoraiseadditionalfundsthroughpostingexistingassetsascollateral(providedtheirvalueisfreeandclearofanyencumbrances),andpartiallyrepackagingreceivablesfromguaranteedloanrepayments(e.g.loansthatareguaranteedbyinsurers)intonewfinancialstructuredproductsinthemarket.TheDFIscouldoffera(highrated)newdebtproduct(e.g.acollateraliseddebtobligation)3guaranteedandmanagedbyabanksuchasanMDBtoqualifiedinvestors(e.g.pensionfunds,insurers,institutionalinvestors,etc.)andtradedoninternationalexchanges.However,suchaproductshouldbeusedwithrigorousduediligence.3Collateraliseddebtobligationsareasset-backedsecuritiesthatbundletogetheradiversifiedportfolioofinstruments(e.g.loans,bonds).Cashflowsfromunderlyingassetsareusedtorepayinvestors.20GLOBALLANDSCAPEOFRENEWABLEENERGYFINANCE2023ProductinnovationamongMDBs.Multilateralsbenefitfromtheconveningpowergrantedbyshareholdersinbothdevelopedanddevelopingcountries,tocraft,implementandoperateinnovativeframeworkstomobilisecapitalandmitigaterisks.Inparticular,liquidityfacilitiescanbescaleduptoassistrenewableenergyinvestorsinfulfillingtheirbusinessobligationsbyensuringanuninterruptedflowofpaymentsfromoff-takers–withoutposingaburdenonthefiscalspaceofdevelopingcountries(local-currency-denominatedPPAscanalsobenefitfromthisfacility).TheseliquidityfacilitiescanevolvetoincorporatetheroleofguarantorsupportedbyMDBsandDFIsincompliancewithguidelinesissuedbymultilateralsandagreedbyshareholders.Thehighlycapitalisedguarantorbecomesasupranationalfacilitytomitigatecreditandforeignexchangerisksforrenewableenergyinvestorsandlenders.MDBs,undertheapprovalofhostgovernments,canallocatefundsandcreditlinestothefacilityuptoprudentlimitsdeterminedbyministriesoffinanceandcentralbanks.BroadeningcapitalisationroutesforMDBs.Capitalcallingfromshareholdershasbeenthecommonapproachadoptedbymultilateralstoexpandtechnicalassistanceandlendingprogrammes.ThenewcapitalincreasesMDBs’fundavailabilityandenablesthemtoplacebondsintheglobalcapitalmarket,therebyraisingadditionalcapital.BondsareplacedasAAA-ratedobligationsguaranteedbyMDBs–defacto,suchinstitutionshaveanenviabletrackrecordrecognisedbycountriesandmarketparticipantsinmanagingrisks–thatcanbeplacedinthemarket,ifappropriatefinancingvehiclesareusedandtargetmarketsareidentified.MDBsshouldnowconsiderrisk-tiereddebtobligationplacementswithadifferentinvestmentgrade(BBB+andabove,e.g.multi-ratedgreenbonds),implyingdifferentlevelofreturnstobondholders.Theinitiativebroadensaccesstotheinvestorbase–frominstitutionalinvestorsandsovereignwealthfundstocorporate/qualifiedinvestors–increasingtheamountofcapitalthatcouldbecomeavailableanddeployedinrenewableenergyinvestments.Meanwhile,publicfinanceandpolicyshouldcontinuetobeusedtocrowdinprivatecapital.Policiesandinstrumentsbeyondthoseusedtomitigaterisksareneeded.Publicfinanceshouldcontinuetobeusedstrategicallytocrowdinadditionalprivatecapital.Riskmitigationinstruments(e.g.guarantees,currencyhedginginstrumentsandliquidityreservefacilities)willstillplayamajorrole,butpublicfinanceandpolicymustgobeyondriskmitigation.Examplesincludefundingcapacitybuilding,supportforpilotprojectsandinnovativefinancinginstrumentssuchasblendedfinanceinitiatives,etc.Inaddition,policymakersmayconsiderthefollowing:Incentiviseaninvestmentswapfromfossilfuelstorenewableenergybybanksandnationaloilcompanies.Incentivisinginvestorstodivertfundstowardstheenergytransitioncanbedonethroughmeasuressuchasphasingoutoffossilfuelsubsidiesandadaptingfiscalsystemstoaccountfortheenvironmental,socialandhealthimpactsofafossil-fuel-basedenergysystem.However,thephaseoutofsubsidiesshouldbeaccompaniedbyapropersafetynettoensureadequatestandardsoflivingforvulnerablepopulations(IRENA,2022a).21ExecutiveSummaryAsupplementalwayofincentivisingthisshiftisthroughhighlightingandrecognisingtheleadershiproleofthoseinstitutionsthatarepavingtheroadthroughearlyinvestmentsintheenergytransition.Morethan30significantfinancialinstitutionsincludingbanks,insurers,assetownersandassetmanagershavecommittedtostopfinancingfossilfuels.Governmentsandcivilsocietiescantakeactiontorewardtheirleadershipandencourageotherinstitutionstotakesimilarsteps.Afterthat,publicpressure,alongwithpolicyandregulation,canfurtherinfluencefinancialdecision-makinginfavourofrenewableenergyandotherenergytransitiontechnologies(EnvironmentalFinance,2022a).Mobiliseinstitutionalinvestmentandpromotegreateruseofgreenbondsforrenewables.WithaboutUSD87trillionofassetsundermanagement,institutionalinvestorshaveakeyroletoplayinreachingtheinvestmentlevelsrequiredfortheongoingglobalenergytransition.Greaterparticipationofinstitutionalcapitalwillrequireacombinationofeffectivepoliciesandregulations,capitalmarketsolutionsthataddresstheneedsofthisinvestorclass(e.g.greenbonds),aswellasavarietyofinternalchangesandcapacitybuildingonthepartofinstitutionalinvestors(IRENA,2020d).Greenbondscanhelpattractinstitutionalinvestorsandchannelconsiderableadditionalprivatecapitalintherenewableenergysector,helpingtofillthesignificantoutstandinginvestmentgap.Greenbondshaveexperiencedsignificantgrowthoverthepastdecade(about103%ayearin2011-2021),increasingfromaboutUSD800millionofissuancesin2007toaboutUSD545billionofissuancesin2021–anall-timeannualhighdespitepandemic-inducedeconomicchallenges.ThecumulativevalueofgreenbondissuancesbroketheUSD1trillionthresholdattheendof2020andstoodataboutUSD1.64trillionasoftheendof2021(EnvironmentalFinance,2022b).Somerecommendedactionsforpolicymakersandpublicfinanceproviderstofurtherincreasegreenbondissuancesincludetheadoptionofgreenbondstandardsinlinewithinternationalclimateobjectives,theprovisionoftechnicalassistanceandeconomicincentivesforgreenbondmarketdevelopmentandthecreationofbankableprojectpipelines(IRENA,2020e).Implementregulatorysandboxesforbroadeningaccesstocapitalandcreditinstruments.Regulatorysandboxesdesignedtoservebroadersocialandenvironmentalgoalscanhelpunlockmoreinvestments.Byenactingregulatorysandboxesforstart-upsandinvestorsforbothgridandoff-gridinitiatives,newsolutionsmayemergetowardsenablingaccesstopoolsofcapital/creditinstruments.SuchinitiativescanbenefitfromMDBs’support(Barbalhoetal.2022)inconnectionwithotheravailablefundingagenciesatlocal,regionalandgloballevels.Furthermore,companiescanbeinvitedtoparticipateinthesandboxwithaviewtopilotinnovativeconceptsthatfacilitateriskmitigation,includingforeignexchangerisksinelectricityexchanges.FacilitatelocalcurrencylendinganddenominatePPAs(atleastpartially)inlocalcurrencies.LocalcurrencyPPAsarehelpfultoaddresstherisksofcurrencydevaluationswhichmayotherwisecripplepoweroff-takers’abilitytomakepaymentstopowerproducersinhardcurrency(suchastheUSD)attimeswhenthedomesticcurrencyplummets.Relativelyestablishedmarketsintheoff-gridspace,forinstance,suchasKenyaandNigeriaareseeingmorelocalcurrencydebtfinancing.22GLOBALLANDSCAPEOFRENEWABLEENERGYFINANCE2023During2020-2021,about28%ofdebtinthetwocountrieswasdenominatedinlocalcurrencies(primarilytheKenyanshilling,followedbytheNigeriannaira),comparedwithjust11%duringthepre-pandemicyears.Goingforward,low-costlocalcurrencyfinancingwillbepreferredforthenextphaseoftheoff-gridrenewableenergysector’sdevelopment.Acomplementarymechanismtoaddressforeigncurrencyrisksistofacilitatelocalcurrencylendingforprojectswithdevelopmentcapitalchannelledthroughintermediariesincludingnationalbanksornon-bankingfinancialinstitutions.Severalcountries,includingBangladesh,BrazilandJordan,havepilotedsuchapproachestocatalyseinvestmentintotherenewableenergysector.Enhancetheparticipationofcorporateactors.Althoughcompaniesthatproducerenewableenergyarealreadyprovidingsubstantialinvestmentinthesector,non-energy-producingcorporationshaveapreeminentroletoplayintheenergytransitionbydrivingdemandforrenewableenergy.Bysettinguptherightenablingframework,policymakerscanencourageactivecorporatesourcingandunlockadditionalcapitalinthesector.Recommendedactionsinclude,forexample,establishingatransparentsystemforthecertificationandtrackingofrenewableenergyattributecertificates,enablingthird-partysalesbetweencompaniesandindependentpowerproducers,andcreatingincentivesforutilitiestoprovidegreenprocurementoptionsforcompanies(IRENA,2018b).Incentivisetheparticipationofphilanthropies.AccordingtoOxfam’sreporttitledSurvivaloftheRichest:HowWeMustTaxtheSuper-RichNowtoFightInequality,therichest1%ownalmosthalfoftheworld’swealthwhilethepooresthalfoftheworldownjust0.75%(Oxfam,2023).Totapintotheexistingwealth,governmentsshouldlookatincentivisingphilanthropiestomobiliseadditionalfundsintosupportforrenewableenergythatcanhelpfightpoverty,inequality,climatechangeandhumanitariancrises.Philanthropiesareplayinganincreasinglyimportantroleinbridgingfundinggaps,especiallyintheenergyaccesscontext,wherefundshavegoneintomarketdevelopment(e.g.technologyinnovationfunds)anddeliveringfinancingforendusersandenterprisesthroughvariousinstruments,suchasresults-basedgrantsandequity.Individuals(high-net-worthindividuals,familiesorhouseholds)investedanaverageofUSD20millionperyearinoff-gridrenewablesduring2015-2021,primarilythroughdedicatedcrowdfundingplatforms(IRENA,2022f).In2021,individuals,bequests,foundationsandcorporationsgaveanestimatedUSD485billiontocharitiesintheUnitedStatesalone.Theseweredistributedtowardseducation,humanservices,foundations,public-societybenefitorganisations,health,internationalaffairs,andenvironmentalandothersocialservices(GivingUSA2022).Theenergytransitionbeingtiedtoalltheseobjectives,tappingintothesefundscanhelpfillgapsleftbygovernments,andsupportthelivelihoodsandwell-beingofrelativelypoorpopulationswithoutrelyingonfossilfuels(Dennis,2022).www.irena.org©IRENA2023

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