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Italy | Pipelines | Energy | Hydrogen | External trade

The Geopolitics of Clean Hydrogen –

Opportunities and Challenges for Italy

by Marco Giuli

keywords

ABSTRACT

The emergence of clean hydrogen as an energy carrier

promises to shape the future geography of the energy trade.

Under growing contestation of interdependence, such a

geography should be read through political lenses alongside

commercial and technological ones. Generally, hydrogen is

likely to reduce the geopolitical sensitivity of energy trade with

respect to a fossil-fuel-based energy order by increasing the

share of energy produced domestically, shifting geostrategic

competition from a focus on grabbing resources to a focus

on mastering technology and setting standards, and oering

petrostates opportunities for economic diversiﬁcation.

Italy can exploit the opportunities oered by a hydrogen

economy for enhancing its energy security and positioning

in the regional energy trade. However, it should be careful

with monitoring how geopolitical barriers such as regional

instability may aect its hydrogen ambitions.

The Geopolitics of Clean Hydrogen – Opportunities and Challenges for Italy

The Geopolitics of Clean Hydrogen –

Opportunities and Challenges for Italy

by Marco Giuli*

Introduction

The energy transition is expected to bring about a structural change in many

socio-technical foundations of our civilisation,1 including the way in which power

and inﬂuence are allocated and exerted on the international stage. It is expected

to reduce those interdependencies born around fossil fuel trade, and to give rise

to emerging interdependencies where technology, infrastructure and regulation

count more than geological endowments.2 Similarly, as electriﬁcation grows and

since electricity is not an ecient carrier over long distances, the energy transition

is expected to deﬁne a world that is less global – at least within the energy issue

area – and more regional, or even national,3 laying the groundwork for major

geopolitical shifts.

The entry of clean hydrogen into the global energy transition equation may

at least to some extent challenge these assumptions. Clean hydrogen includes

hydrogen produced via electrolysis from non-emissive electricity from renewables

(green hydrogen) or nuclear (pink hydrogen), and hydrogen produced through

1 Gavin Bridge et al., “Geographies of Energy Transition: Space, Place and the Low-Carbon Economy”,

in Energy Policy, Vol. 53 (February 2013), p. 331-340, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.10.066.

2 Tom Casier, “The Geopolitics of the EU’s Decarbonization Strategy: A Bird’s Eye Perspective”,

in Claire Dupont and Sebastian Oberthür (eds), Decarbonization in the European Union. Internal

Policies and External Strategies, Basingstoke/New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 159-179.

3 Daniel Scholten et al., “The Geopolitics of Renewables: New Board, New Game”, in Energy Policy,

Vol. 138 (March 2020), Article 111059.

* Marco Giuli is Scientiﬁc Advisor at the Istituto Aari Internazionali (IAI), where he contributes to

the Programme “Energy, Climate and Resources”. He is a Researcher at the Institute for European

Studies of the Free University of Brussels (VUB) and an Associate Policy Analyst at the European

Policy Centre (EPC).

. Paper prepared in the context of the project “The role of Italy in the international economy

of hydrogen: geo-economic and geopolitical implications”, a project run by the Istituto Aari

Internazionali (IAI) with the support of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Aairs and International

Cooperation (MAECI) and Compagnia di San Paolo Foundation. Views expressed are the author’s

alone.

The Geopolitics of Clean Hydrogen – Opportunities and Challenges for Italy

methane reforming with the addition of carbon capture and storage (blue

hydrogen) By oering the possibility of turning electrons into molecules and

then back to electrons, hydrogen promises to become a carrier for clean energy

over long distances, potentially reproducing infrastructural and geographical

interdependencies that were typical of the fossil-fuel-based order, depending on

its generation route. The export of green hydrogen – generated via electrolysis –

might give rise to emerging electrostates. The export of blue hydrogen – produced

from methane reforming processes with the addition of carbon capture and storage

(CCS) – could allow gas exporters to preserve some role in the new energy map.

However, at a closer inspection, hydrogen’s distinctive technological features

may also call into question the possibility for such a carrier to become a “new oil”

in the broader global political picture. Hydrogen’s geopolitical dimension will be

largely deﬁned by what choices states and commercial actors will take with respect

to: producing it domestically or importing it; producing it for export, or using it

domestically and attracting ﬁnal users from abroad; privileging its use in essential

hard-to-abate sectors such as the steel, chemical or reﬁning industries, or as a

substitute for electriﬁcation in residential heating or road transport.4 In turn,

the broader geopolitical environment is also expected to play a role in orienting

actors to make their choices. These questions oblige us to think about hydrogen in

distinctive geopolitical terms.

This paper examines the potential geopolitics of hydrogen, looking ﬁrst at what

type of geography the emergence of hydrogen technologies is likely to produce,

then exploring the potential elements of geopolitical contestations associated with

hydrogen interdependencies, and ﬁnally reﬂecting on geopolitical opportunities

and barriers that Italy could meet as it seeks to become an international hydrogen

actor. This work complements a previous paper that inquired about Italy’s

prospective collocation in an emerging international economy of clean hydrogen.5

1. Deﬁning clean hydrogen geography

At present, hydrogen is not an internationally traded commodity. Hydrogen

is produced nationally by its consumers mostly from natural gas, while cross-

border trade infrastructures are largely non-existent. While production and

consumption of clean hydrogen are likely to maintain a national dimension in

the short term, elements of regionalism or even global trade may emerge over the

long term, reﬂecting the evolution of material conditions such as production cost

dierentials and dynamics in transportation cost, and the will of actors to engage

4 Thijs Van de Graaf et al., “The New Oil? The Geopolitics and International Governance of Hydrogen”,

in Energy Research & Social Science, Vol. 70 (December 2020), Article 101667, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.

erss.2020.101667.

5 Marco Giuli, Italy in the International Hydrogen Economy, Rome, IAI, February 2022, https://www.

iai.it/en/node/14708.

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©2022IAIIAIPAPERS2217-JUNE2022ISSN2610-9603ISBN978-88-9368-255-8ItalyPipelinesEnergyHydrogenExternaltradeTheGeopoliticsofCleanHydrogen–OpportunitiesandChallengesforItalybyMarcoGiulikeywordsABSTRACTTheemergenceofcleanhydrogenasanenergycarrierpromisestoshapethefuturegeographyoftheenergytrade.Undergrowingcontestationofinterdependence,suchageographyshouldbereadthroughpoliticallensesalongsidecommercialandtechnologicalones.Generally,hydrogenislikelytoreducethegeopoliticalsensitivityofenergytradewithrespecttoafossil-fuel-basedenergyorderbyincreasingtheshareofenergyproduceddomestically,shiftinggeostrategiccompetitionfromafocusongrabbingresourcestoafocusonmasteringtechnologyandsettingstandards,andofferingpetrostatesopportunitiesforeconomicdiversification.Italycanexploittheopportunitiesofferedbyahydrogeneconomyforenhancingitsenergysecurityandpositioningintheregionalenergytrade.However,itshouldbecarefulwithmonitoringhowgeopoliticalbarrierssuchasregionalinstabilitymayaffectitshydrogenambitions.2TheGeopoliticsofCleanHydrogen–OpportunitiesandChallengesforItaly©2022IAIIAIPAPERS2217-JUNE2022ISSN2610-9603ISBN978-88-9368-255-8TheGeopoliticsofCleanHydrogen–OpportunitiesandChallengesforItalybyMarcoGiuliIntroductionTheenergytransitionisexpectedtobringaboutastructuralchangeinmanysocio-technicalfoundationsofourcivilisation,1includingthewayinwhichpowerandinfluenceareallocatedandexertedontheinternationalstage.Itisexpectedtoreducethoseinterdependenciesbornaroundfossilfueltrade,andtogiverisetoemerginginterdependencieswheretechnology,infrastructureandregulationcountmorethangeologicalendowments.2Similarly,aselectrificationgrowsandsinceelectricityisnotanefficientcarrieroverlongdistances,theenergytransitionisexpectedtodefineaworldthatislessglobal–atleastwithintheenergyissuearea–andmoreregional,orevennational,3layingthegroundworkformajorgeopoliticalshifts.Theentryofcleanhydrogenintotheglobalenergytransitionequationmayatleasttosomeextentchallengetheseassumptions.Cleanhydrogenincludeshydrogenproducedviaelectrolysisfromnon-emissiveelectricityfromrenewables(greenhydrogen)ornuclear(pinkhydrogen),andhydrogenproducedthrough1GavinBridgeetal.,“GeographiesofEnergyTransition:Space,PlaceandtheLow-CarbonEconomy”,inEnergyPolicy,Vol.53(February2013),p.331-340,https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.10.066.2TomCasier,“TheGeopoliticsoftheEU’sDecarbonizationStrategy:ABird’sEyePerspective”,inClaireDupontandSebastianOberthür(eds),DecarbonizationintheEuropeanUnion.InternalPoliciesandExternalStrategies,Basingstoke/NewYork,PalgraveMacmillan,2015,p.159-179.3DanielScholtenetal.,“TheGeopoliticsofRenewables:NewBoard,NewGame”,inEnergyPolicy,Vol.138(March2020),Article111059.MarcoGiuliisScientificAdvisorattheIstitutoAffariInternazionali(IAI),wherehecontributestotheProgramme“Energy,ClimateandResources”.HeisaResearcherattheInstituteforEuropeanStudiesoftheFreeUniversityofBrussels(VUB)andanAssociatePolicyAnalystattheEuropeanPolicyCentre(EPC)..Paperpreparedinthecontextoftheproject“TheroleofItalyintheinternationaleconomyofhydrogen:geo-economicandgeopoliticalimplications”,aprojectrunbytheIstitutoAffariInternazionali(IAI)withthesupportoftheItalianMinistryofForeignAffairsandInternationalCooperation(MAECI)andCompagniadiSanPaoloFoundation.Viewsexpressedaretheauthor’salone.3TheGeopoliticsofCleanHydrogen–OpportunitiesandChallengesforItaly©2022IAIIAIPAPERS2217-JUNE2022ISSN2610-9603ISBN978-88-9368-255-8methanereformingwiththeadditionofcarboncaptureandstorage(bluehydrogen)Byofferingthepossibilityofturningelectronsintomoleculesandthenbacktoelectrons,hydrogenpromisestobecomeacarrierforcleanenergyoverlongdistances,potentiallyreproducinginfrastructuralandgeographicalinterdependenciesthatweretypicalofthefossil-fuel-basedorder,dependingonitsgenerationroute.Theexportofgreenhydrogen–generatedviaelectrolysis–mightgiverisetoemergingelectrostates.Theexportofbluehydrogen–producedfrommethanereformingprocesseswiththeadditionofcarboncaptureandstorage(CCS)–couldallowgasexporterstopreservesomeroleinthenewenergymap.However,atacloserinspection,hydrogen’sdistinctivetechnologicalfeaturesmayalsocallintoquestionthepossibilityforsuchacarriertobecomea“newoil”inthebroaderglobalpoliticalpicture.Hydrogen’sgeopoliticaldimensionwillbelargelydefinedbywhatchoicesstatesandcommercialactorswilltakewithrespectto:producingitdomesticallyorimportingit;producingitforexport,orusingitdomesticallyandattractingfinalusersfromabroad;privilegingitsuseinessentialhard-to-abatesectorssuchasthesteel,chemicalorrefiningindustries,orasasubstituteforelectrificationinresidentialheatingorroadtransport.4Inturn,thebroadergeopoliticalenvironmentisalsoexpectedtoplayaroleinorientingactorstomaketheirchoices.Thesequestionsobligeustothinkabouthydrogenindistinctivegeopoliticalterms.Thispaperexaminesthepotentialgeopoliticsofhydrogen,lookingfirstatwhattypeofgeographytheemergenceofhydrogentechnologiesislikelytoproduce,thenexploringthepotentialelementsofgeopoliticalcontestationsassociatedwithhydrogeninterdependencies,andfinallyreflectingongeopoliticalopportunitiesandbarriersthatItalycouldmeetasitseekstobecomeaninternationalhydrogenactor.ThisworkcomplementsapreviouspaperthatinquiredaboutItaly’sprospectivecollocationinanemerginginternationaleconomyofcleanhydrogen.51.DefiningcleanhydrogengeographyAtpresent,hydrogenisnotaninternationallytradedcommodity.Hydrogenisproducednationallybyitsconsumersmostlyfromnaturalgas,whilecross-bordertradeinfrastructuresarelargelynon-existent.Whileproductionandconsumptionofcleanhydrogenarelikelytomaintainanationaldimensionintheshortterm,elementsofregionalismorevenglobaltrademayemergeoverthelongterm,reflectingtheevolutionofmaterialconditionssuchasproductioncostdifferentialsanddynamicsintransportationcost,andthewillofactorstoengage4ThijsVandeGraafetal.,“TheNewOil?TheGeopoliticsandInternationalGovernanceofHydrogen”,inEnergyResearch&SocialScience,Vol.70(December2020),Article101667,https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2020.101667.5MarcoGiuli,ItalyintheInternationalHydrogenEconomy,Rome,IAI,February2022,https://www.iai.it/en/node/14708.4TheGeopoliticsofCleanHydrogen–OpportunitiesandChallengesforItaly©2022IAIIAIPAPERS2217-JUNE2022ISSN2610-9603ISBN978-88-9368-255-8ininternationalhydrogenrelations.However,asthegeopoliticsoffossilfuelscannotprescindfromtheirpervasivenessintheglobaleconomy,understandingthegeopoliticalimplicationsofahydrogeneconomywouldrequirefirsttomakeassumptionsaboutthesizeofhydrogentrade.1.1AssumingthesizeofcleanhydrogentradeConsideringtheuncertaintieswithrespecttopolicy,technologyandconsumerpreferences,scenariosaboutthefuturedemandforhydrogenshowremarkabledivergences.AccordingtoBloombergNEF,hydrogenmayaccountbetween4and24percentofglobalfinalenergyconsumptionby2050.6AccordingtotheIEAnetzeroscenario,hydrogenconsumptionwouldrisefrom87milliontonnesofhydrogen(MtH2)in2020to528MtH2in2050,68percentofwhichwouldbeproducedviaelectrolysisand38percentviafossilfuels.7AccordingtoascenarioelaboratedbytheHydrogenCouncil,in2050hydrogenwillaccountfor18percentoffinalenergyconsumption,correspondingto641MtH2.Onthebasisoftheseestimates,onecouldconsideraglobalproductionofabout600MtH2/yrby2050(72exajoulesofenergy)asareasonablecentralestimatefromthemostoptimisticscenarios.Assumingthattheinternationaltradeofhydrogenandhydrogenproductswouldamountto25percentofglobalproduction–basedonthecurrentproportionofinternationallytradednaturalgaswithrespecttototalnaturalgasproduction–theinternationallytradedvolumeofhydrogenwouldcorrespondtoabout18exajoules(EJ).Thisamountstoafractionoftradedvolumesoffossilfuelsin2019,totalling217.72EJ.Atthesametime,itisnotanegligibleamountifcomparedtocurrentlytradedvolumesofnaturalgas,amountingto37.2EJin2019.1.2GeographyofcostsandcomparativeadvantagesSeveralconditionscanbeidentifiedfortheemergenceofinternationalhydrogenvaluechains:theexistenceofcomparativeadvantagesbetweendifferenteconomies,structuringtheincentivesfortheemergenceofinterstatetradeofbothhydrogen-relatedproductsandassociatedtechnologies;andthepoliticalwill,atanationallevel,toidentifyopportunitiesforimportingorexportinghydrogenandhydrogen-relatedproductsandtechnologies,adaptingnationalindustrialpoliciesandinternationalpartnershipsaccordingly.86BloombergNEF,HydrogenEconomyOutlook.KeyMessages,30March2020.https://data.bloomberglp.com/professional/sites/24/BNEF-Hydrogen-Economy-Outlook-Key-Messages-30-Mar-2020.pdf.7Whichmodelledhydrogendemandinordertofillgapswhereelectricitycannoteconomicallyreplacefossilfuelsandwherelimitedsustainablebioenergysuppliescannotcopewithdemand.InternationalEnergyAgency(IEA),NetZeroby2050.ARoadmapfortheEnergySector,Revisedversion(4threvision),October2021,https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050.8ThijsVandeGraafetal.,“TheNewOil?”,cit.5TheGeopoliticsofCleanHydrogen–OpportunitiesandChallengesforItaly©2022IAIIAIPAPERS2217-JUNE2022ISSN2610-9603ISBN978-88-9368-255-8Figure1Costofhydrogensupplybylocation(USdollars/kgH2)Source:Author’selaborationonIEA2020data.Thedeterminantsofcomparativeadvantageinthehydrogentradeincludealow-costavailabilityofrenewableenergysources(RES)and/orpotentialandfreshwateravailabilityasforgreenhydrogen;andlow-costnaturalgasavailabilityandCCSpotentialasforbluehydrogen.9Existinggasinterconnectionsidentifymarketaccesspotentialforfuturehydrogenproducers,whiledemandcentresareexpectedtodevelopinlargeclustersofemission-intensiveindustries.TheIEAforeseesthatthelong-termcostofimportedhydrogenislikelytobeunattractivefortheUnitedStateswithrespecttothedomesticproductionofbothblueandgreenhydrogen,whilealargerrationaleforcleanhydrogenimportsispresentinEuropeandJapan(seeFigure1).Ontheotherhand,low-costproducersareexpectedtoemergeinAustralia,theMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,andChile.Takingintoaccounttransportcosts,costdifferentialscreateidealsynergiesbetweenNorthAfricaandNorwayasexportersandEuropeasanimporterviapipelinetrade;andbetweenAustraliaandEastAsiaviaships.Ontheotherhand,countrieslikeChileortheGulfstateswouldbeinapositionofplayingarbitragebetweendifferentregionalmarkets–withanoption,forChile,alsotoservetheLatinAmericanmarketifitweretodevelop.109FridolinPflugmannandNicolaDeBlasio,“GeopoliticalandMarketImplicationsofRenewableHydrogen”,inBelferCenterReports,March2020,https://www.belfercenter.org/node/128441.10Pipelinetradeofpurehydrogeningaseousformismoreconvenientthanshippinghydrogenviaammoniaforupto3,000km(USdollars1.3/kgH2),vialiquidorganichydrogencarriers(LOHC)for6TheGeopoliticsofCleanHydrogen–OpportunitiesandChallengesforItaly©2022IAIIAIPAPERS2217-JUNE2022ISSN2610-9603ISBN978-88-9368-255-8Suchageographywouldtoanotableextentreproducethecurrentgeographicaltrajectoriesofgastrade.1.3PoliticalwillAsecondelementtoconsiderwhenlookingatthefuturegeographyofhydrogentradeisthepoliticalwilltodomesticallydevelophydrogendemandand/orsupplyandopeninguptotheopportunityofinternationalhydrogentrade.Nationalhydrogenstrategies,althoughoftenlackingsufficientdetail,constituteapredictorofcountries’self-perceptionofthepotentialroletheycouldplayinaninternationalhydrogeneconomy.Amongprospectiveexporters,themostambitiousstrategieshavebeenreleasedbyAustralia,11Chile,12Morocco,13Russia,14SaudiArabia,15theUnitedArabEmirates(UAE)16andOman,17whileopportunitiesforcleanhydrogenexportsarealsomentionedinthestrategiesofNewZealand,18Canada19andsuchLatinAmericancountriesasColombia,ArgentinaandBrazil.Otherstrategiesunderlinetheneedforimportingcleanhydrogenfromabroad.TheseincludetheEU,Germany,20theupto4,000km(USdollars1.6/kgH2)andinpureliquidformforupto4,600km(USdollars1.9/kgH2).IEA,TheFutureofHydrogen.SeizingToday’sOpportunities,June2019,p.78,https://www.iea.org/reports/the-future-of-hydrogen.11COAGEnergyCouncil,Australia‘sNationalHydrogenStrategy,2019,https://www.industry.gov.au/node/69001.12Chile,NationalGreenHydrogenStrategy,MinistryofEnergy,November2020,https://energia.gob.cl/sites/default/files/national_green_hydrogen_strategy_-_chile.pdf.13LucaFranza,CleanMoleculesacrosstheMediterranean.ThePotentialforNorthAfricanHydrogenImportsintoItalyandtheEU,Rome,IAI,April2021,p.13-17,https://www.iai.it/en/node/13116.14YanaZabanovaandKirstenWestphal,“RussiaintheGlobalHydrogenRace”,inSWPCommentaries,No.34(May2021),https://doi.org/10.18449/2021C34.15JanFrederikBraun,“SaudiArabia’sCleanHydrogenPlansforConvertingAmbitionsintoAction”,inEnergyPost,19March2021,https://energypost.eu/?p=32318.16WatsonFarley&Williams,“HydrogenintheUAE”,inWFWArticles,2June2021,https://www.wfw.com/articles/hydrogen-in-the-uae.17JamesBurgess,“World’sLargestRenewableHydrogenDeveloperAdds25-GWOmanExportProject”,inS&PGlobal,18May2021,https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/petrochemicals/051821-worlds-largest-renewable-hydrogen-developer-adds-25-gw-oman-export-project.18NewZealand,AVisionforHydrogeninNewZealand.GreenPaper,MinistryofBusiness,Innovation&Employment,September2019,https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/6798.19Canada,HydrogenStrategyforCanada,MinistryforNaturalResources,December2020,https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/node/23080.20Germany,TheNationalHydrogenStrategy,FederalMinistryforEconomicAffairsandEnergy,June2020,https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/EN/Publikationen/Energie/the-national-hydrogen-strategy.html;BerndRadowitz,“World’sLargestHydroDamCouldSendCheapGreenHydrogenfromCongotoGermany”,inRechargeNews,8September2020,https://www.rechargenews.com/transition/2-1-871059.7TheGeopoliticsofCleanHydrogen–OpportunitiesandChallengesforItaly©2022IAIIAIPAPERS2217-JUNE2022ISSN2610-9603ISBN978-88-9368-255-8Netherlands,Japan,21andSouthKorea.22Yet,noteverystrategyisoutward-looking.TheUnitedStates,23France,24Poland,Spain,Portugal,andChina25emphasisetheprospectsofdevelopingadomesticsupplychain,seekingindustrialprimacyandsecuritygains.Table1summarisesthetargetsandtechnologicalpreferencesofthemainnationalstrategies,atthetimeofwriting.Table1NationalhydrogenstrategiesCountryElectrolysistarget(2030)Domesticusetarget(2030)ProductionrouteFinaluseCommittedpublicinvestment(bndollars)Australia--Coal+CCUSGas+CCUSRES+electrolysisBuildings,electricity,exports,industry,shipping,roadtransport0.9Canada-4MtH2/yBiomassby-productRES+electrolysisGas+CCUSOil+CCUSBuildings,electricity,exports,mining,refining,shipping,roadtransport0.019Chile25GW-RES+electrolysisBuildings,exports,chemicals,mining,refining,roadtransport0.05(2021)China-0.1-0.2MtH2/y(2025)RES+electrolysisTransport,industry-CzechRep.-0.1MtH2/yNuclear+electrolysisChemicals,roadtransport-EU40GW-RES+electrolysisIndustry,refining,roadtransport4.3France6.5GWNuclear,RES+electrolysisIndustry,refining,roadtransport8.2Germany5GW-RES+electrolysisAviation,electricity,industry,refining,shipping,roadtransport10.321MonicaNagashima,“Japan’sHydrogenSocietyAmbition.2020StatusandPerspectives”,inNotesdel’Ifri,September2020,https://www.ifri.org/en/node/17801.22SichaoKan,“SouthKorea’sHydrogenStrategyandIndustrialPerspectives”,inÉditoÉnergieIfri,25March2020,https://www.ifri.org/en/node/17067.23USDepartmentofEnergy,HydrogenStrategyEnablingaLow-CarbonEconomy,July2020,https://www.energy.gov/node/4497695.24France,Stratégienationalepourledéveloppementdel’hydrogènedécarbonéenFrance.Dossierdepresse,8September2020,https://www.entreprises.gouv.fr/fr/node/212551.25MichalMeidan,“China’sEmergingHydrogenStrategy”,inISPICommentaries,21May2021,https://www.ispionline.it/en/node/30431.8TheGeopoliticsofCleanHydrogen–OpportunitiesandChallengesforItaly©2022IAIIAIPAPERS2217-JUNE2022ISSN2610-9603ISBN978-88-9368-255-8Hungary240MW0.03MtH2/yNuclear,RES+electrolysisGas+CCUSElectricity,industry,roadtransport-Japan3MtH2/yNuclear,RES+electrolysisGas,coal+CCUSBuildings,electricity,steel,refining,shipping,roadtransport6.5SouthKorea-1.94MtH2/yNuclear,RES+electrolysisGas+CCUSBuildings,electricity,roadtransport2.2Netherlands3-4GWRES+electrolysisGas+CCUSAviation,buildings,electricity,industry,refining,shipping,roadtransport0.08Norway--RES+electrolysisGas+CCUSIndustry,shipping,roadtransport0.021Portugal2-2.5GWRES+electrolysisElectricity,industry,roadtransport1Russia-2MtH2(export)ElectrolysisGas+CCUSElectricity,industry,chemicals,exports-Spain4GW-RES+electrolysisAviation,electricity,chemicals,refining,shipping,roadtransport1.8UK5GW-Nuclear,RES+electrolysisGas+CCUSAviation,buildings,electricity,industry,refining,shipping,roadtransport1.3Note:CCUS=Carboncaptureutilisationandstorage;GW=Gigawatts.Source:IEA(2021)andChina’sNationalEnergyAdministration(2022).1.4ThreescenariosforhydrogentradeHowever,materialcomplementaritiesandpoliticalwilldonotnecessarilyguaranteethedevelopmentofalarge-scalehydrogentradeandinterstateinterdependencies.Policyandinstitutionalcontexts,marketdynamicsandtheoverallgeopoliticalcontextmayaffectthefuturegeographyofhydrogen.Differentscenarioscoulddevelop–partlyexcludingeachother,butalsopartiallyoverlapping.Nationalscenario.Undera“national”hydrogenscenario,countrieswouldmostlyprocurethecleanhydrogentheyneeddomestically–alsoimplyingformanyofthemareducedshareofhydrogeninfinalenergyconsumptionandprivilegingalternativeswherepossible.Anationalscenariocouldbecomedominantasaresultofincreasingpowerrivalryandcontestationofeconomicinterdependenceand/orsharpreductioninhydrogenproductioncostsamonglargeconsumers.Intechnologicalterms,itmightbefavouredbybreakthroughsinCCSinlargeindustrialeconomies,whichwouldcontinuetoimportnaturalgastoproducefossil-basedhydrogendomestically–asolutionthatwouldhavetheadvantageof9TheGeopoliticsofCleanHydrogen–OpportunitiesandChallengesforItaly©2022IAIIAIPAPERS2217-JUNE2022ISSN2610-9603ISBN978-88-9368-255-8notrequiringtherefurbishmentofexistinggasimportinfrastructures.Similarly,marketsforgreenhydrogenwillremainnationalinthosecontextswhererenewableelectricityproductioncontinuestoexpandandundergocostreduction.Anotherdynamicthatcouldplayinfavourofanationalscenario–butnotnecessarilyalternativetoafutureofabundanttradeinterdependence–isthatnaturalgasorlow-costrenewableelectricitysuppliersandpotentialsuppliers–i.e.,Russia,Norway,Chile,AustraliaortheGulfcountries–developin-houseleadmarketsanddemandforhydrogen,attractinganindustrialbasefromOrganisationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(OECD)countries.Regionalscenario.Undera“regional”scenario,internationalhydrogentradewouldmostlyoccurwithinregions,viapipelineovershortdistances,reproducingthecurrentstateofcross-borderelectricitytradeortheearlyinternationaltradeofnaturalgas.Low-costproducerswoulddirectlyshiphydrogenandderivedproductstonearbyindustrialregions,whichcouldretainanenergy-intensiveindustrialbaseandprovidecoreandancillarytechnologyforhydrogenproductiontoprospectivesuppliers.Undersuchascenario,EuropeanhydrogenclusterswouldbesuppliedcleanhydrogenfromtheNorthSea,theformerSovietUnionandNorthAfricabymakinguseofexistingpipelinenetworks.Thisscenariorequiresinvestmentintherepurposingofcross-bordergaspipelines,tomakethemviableforpurehydrogentransport.RegionalmarketsarealsolikelytoemergeinEastAsia,asAustraliaisadoptinganexport-drivenhydrogenstrategy,properlymatchingtheimport-drivenstrategyofJapanandSingapore–poorinnaturalresourcesandwithlimitedRESpotential.Suchatraderouterequiresthedevelopmentofseabornetrade,pavingthewayforapossibleglobalscenario.Aregionalscenariowillalsobedrivenbygeopolitics,whensomeformofregionalmultipolarityemergesaroundlargeeconomicblocs,withtradedenominatedincurrencyofregionalreference.Globalscenario.Undera“global”scenario,differentregionswouldintegratethankstotechnologicaldevelopmentsreducingbarrierstolong-distanceshippingtrade.Inpoliticalterms,aglobalscenariowouldbebestservedbyaglobalisedordersupportingmultilateraltradeinstitutionsandsecuringworldwideflowsacrosscriticalchokepoints.However,itmayalsooccurundercontestedinterdependence,wherebystatesquestionconnectivitywithunfriendlynearbypartnersandpoliticallyselectmoredistantnationstoexchangeenergywith.Tothisextent,prospectivelow-costgreenhydrogenproducerssuchasChile,AustraliaorNorwaycouldsupplydifferentworldregions.Whilethesescenariosconstituteideal-types,thereisachancethattheirdifferentelementsmaycoexist.Also,movingfromadominantnationalscenariotowardsamoreinternationalisedoneisapatternforeseenbymostprojections.Tothisextent,onecanassumeaninterstatehydrogentradetodevelopalongsidethegeographicalarticulationsoutlinedinthissectionoverthelongterm,pendingalargenumberoftechnologicalandgeopoliticalunknowns.10TheGeopoliticsofCleanHydrogen–OpportunitiesandChallengesforItaly©2022IAIIAIPAPERS2217-JUNE2022ISSN2610-9603ISBN978-88-9368-255-82.ThegeopoliticalaspectsofcleanhydrogentradeNowthatthegeographicaltrajectoriesofhydrogeninterdependencehavebeendefined,thissectionidentifiesthepotentialelementsofpoliticalcontestationassociatedwithsuchtrajectories.Theseincludeinterstatecompetitiontosecuresupplyandachievetechnologicalprimacy,fromthepointofviewofprospectiveimporters;thepoliticalfalloutofhydrogenexportsfromthepointofviewofhydrogenproducers;andthepotentialelementsofNorth-Southrivalryinthecontextofproductionoutsourcing.Supplysecurity.Byreplacingamountsofimportedhydrocarbonswithalargelydomesticresource,nationalproductionofcleanhydrogenisexpectedtoimprovethesupplysecurityoftoday’slargeenergyimporters.Notably,anaccelerationofhydrogendeploymentwasseeninEuropeasananswertothemountingpoliticaluneaseassociatedwithdependenceonforeigngas.26Aquestionemerges,therefore,whetherhydrogentradeprovidesopportunitiesformanipulatinginterdependencewithcoerciveaims.Hydrogen’sgaseousstateandcomplexlogisticsshowsimilaritieswiththetechnicalfeaturesofnaturalgasandmayreproducethegeopoliticalconcernsassociatedwithit.Theemergenceofaninterstatetradeislikelytorequirelongtermsupplycontractssecuringreturnstoverycapital-intensiveinvestments.Thismeansthatintheshort-to-mediumterm,consumersmightgetentrenchedinclosesectoralinterdependencewithasmallnumberofsuppliers,waitingfortechnologytoallowmoreflexibilityandoptionalityinsupplies.Asageneralassumption,areturntoageopoliticalframingofenergysecuritymaypushlargeconsumerstolimitasmuchaspossiblecontestedconnections,privilegingdomesticsupplyandselectingpartnersbasedongeopolitical,ratherthancommercial,factors.Derived-resourcesgeopolitics.Asanenergycarrier,hydrogenreliesoncertainnaturalresourcesforitsgeneration.Tothisextent,formsofpoliticalcontestationassociatedwiththedistribution,transportanduseofsuchadditionalresources(inputs)shouldbeconsidered.Asforgreenhydrogen,asourceofconcernrelatestotheamountoffreshwaterneededinelectrolysis.27Especiallyingeographicalcontextswherethisresourceisscarce,hydrogengenerationmaygiverisetodomesticcontestationorinterstatecompetitionforthecontrolofwaterresources.Whiledesalinationcanpavethewayfortheuseofsaltwater,theprocessisalsoenergy-intensiveandraisesthecostsofgreenhydrogenproduction,potentiallyinducingreconsiderationwithrespecttolocationalchoices.Bluehydrogenreliesontheuseofnaturalgas,arguablyraisinggeopoliticalconcernswithrespecttothisresource.Thecurrentdynamicsingaspricesandthegasmarketoutlook,alongsidethetarnishedgeopoliticalreputationofgasfollowingRussia’saggression26EuropeanCommission,REPowerEU:JointEuropeanActionforMoreAffordable,SecureandSustainableEnergy(COM/2022/108),8March2022,https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:52022DC0108.27About9litresofwaterareneededtoproduce1kgH2,amountingtoabout33.3kWhofenergy.11TheGeopoliticsofCleanHydrogen–OpportunitiesandChallengesforItaly©2022IAIIAIPAPERS2217-JUNE2022ISSN2610-9603ISBN978-88-9368-255-8ofUkraine,maysignificantlycomplicatetheuptakeofsuchtechnology–alreadyperceivedascontroversialinEurope.Technologicalmastery.Thegeopoliticsoftheenergytransitionwillbedefinedlessbyaccesstoresourcesthanbymasteryofinnovationinprocessandproducts,complexinfrastructure,andinfluenceonprocessesofstandardisationandregulation.28Thoseactorsthatarebetterplacedintermsofinnovativeecosystems,marketsize,financialavailabilitiesandadministrativecapacitywillbemorelikelytosettherulesofthegame,inaprocessthatitselfbecomesanarenaofcooperationand/orcompetition.Research,intellectualproperty,industrialpolicy,tradeandtaxandcarbonpricingpoliciesalongwiththeirsurroundingbureaucratic-industrialecosystemsareexpectedtoachievestrategiccentralityintheenergyorder.Innovationagenciesandpublicprocurementauthoritiesarealsogoingtoprovideresources,designpoliciesandpracticesandcreateleadmarketscriticaltotheachievementofglobalprimacyincleanenergysystems.TheEUandsomeEuropeanmemberstatessuchasGermanyaretryingtoachievesuchprimacybywayofbecomingearlyadoptersofcleanhydrogentechnologiesandusingtheEUregulatorypowertosetstandardsforreference.29However,otheractorsarealsointherace,followingdifferentapproaches.Australia,SouthKoreaandJapan,forinstance,areestablishingtradepartnershipsaimedatfirstdevelopingfossil-basedhydrogenintofinalusesevenwithoutdecarbonisingitfirst.Thesecountriescalculatethatcleanhydrogenistooexpensiveatthemoment,sothatinordertodominatetechnologyandsetfuturestandards,amarketneedstobedevelopedbywayofthemoreaffordablegreyorbrown/blackhydrogen–producedviamethanereformingorlignite/coalgasificationwithoutcarboncapture.Thesedifferencesmaycomplicateinternationalcooperationandencouragefragmentation.Resourcecurse?Theriskofemergenceoftheresourcecurse(definedasthetendencyofresource-richcountriestoexperiencelesslong-termeconomicgrowth,lessdemocracyandlessdevelopmentthancountrieswithfewernaturalresources)wouldbearguablylesspronouncedwithhydrogenthanwithfossilfuels.Severalexportersofoilandgasshowadequateconditionsforbecominglow-costproducersofcleanhydrogen,cleanammoniaorhydrogen-basede-fuels.ThisisespeciallythecaseforGulfcountriessuchasSaudiArabia,OmanandtheUAE,aswellasNorthAfricancountries.Aquestionis,however,whetherintheseeconomieshydrogencanplayarolecomparabletotheoneplayedbyfossilfuelsasadefiningfeatureofi)thesocialcontract,preservinglocalregimes’outputlegitimacybyprovidingthemwithsufficientmaterialandideationalresourcestoallocateanddistributeamongtheirconstituencies;andii)theframingofenergyexportsascriticalfornationalsovereigntyandpower.Theseexpectationslargely28MeghanO’Sullivan,IndraOverlandandDavidSandalow,“TheGeopoliticsofRenewableEnergy”,inColumbiaCenteronGlobalEnergyPolicyWorkingPapers,June2017,https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/node/2004.29EuropeanCommissionwebsite:HydrogenandDecarbonisedGasMarketPackage,https://europa.eu/!YPpd33.12TheGeopoliticsofCleanHydrogen–OpportunitiesandChallengesforItaly©2022IAIIAIPAPERS2217-JUNE2022ISSN2610-9603ISBN978-88-9368-255-8dependonthesizeofthetrade.Hydrogen’slowertradedvolumesmakeitunlikelythatitwillplayarolecomparabletooilinproducingcountries.Hydrogenismoreaboutanindustrialchallengethanageologicalbonanza,requiringhighskillsandsystemintegration.Tothisextent,thehydrogenindustrypromisestorestondifferentsocio-technicalfoundationsthanthosesupportingoilandgas.Instead,hydrogenshouldbeseenbyoilandgassuppliersasaspringboardforindustrialdiversification,allowingforamoremixedeconomyspecialisinginhydrogen-consumingsectorssuchassteel,fertilisersorproductionofe-fuels.Itisthereforelesslikelyforhydrogentoprovidealifelinetopetrostates’renteconomies,actinginsteadasanopportunityforindustrialtransformationandamorebalancedeconomy.Theriskofgreenneocolonialism.PotentialinterstategeopoliticalgrievancesmayarisewithrespecttoNorth-Southdualism,andnotablywithreferencetothenotionof“greencolonialism”.WhilethisconceptwasoriginallyusedinreferencetothemarginalisationoftheGlobalSouth’slocalcommunitiesinthecontextofGlobalNorth–drivenconservationinitiatives,aquestioniswhethergreencolonialismcouldtakenew,extractiveformsinthecontextoftheenergytransition.OfparticularconcernarecaseswhereadvancedeconomiesextractintheSouththeresourcesfunctionaltoreachingtheirobjectivesinanexploitativemannerorattheexpenseoflocalcommunities.Asseeninsection2,hydrogeninterdependenceislikelytofirstariseamongOECDcountries.Yet,Europe’sappetiteforwinningthetechnologicalracehasbeenpushingafrantichydrogendiplomacywithseveralSub-SaharanAfricancountries,raisingtheriskthatlocalelitesmayfindmoreprofitabletosellcleanelectricityviahydrogentoforeignmarketsthanprovidingelectricitytotheirownpopulation.AparticularlycontestedcaseistheexpansionoftheIngaIIIdamintheDemocraticRepublicofCongo(DRC),eyedbytheGermangovernmentasapossiblesourceofgreenhydrogen.FactorsofmajorcontroversyincludethefactthattheDRCisoneoftheleastelectrifiedcountriesinAfrica,andthattheconstructionwouldrequiretherelocationofthousandsoflocals,inacontextplaguedwithcorruptionandhumanrightsabuses.However,thiscase’speculiaritiesareunlikelytobereplicatedinmostotherprospectivehydrogenexporters.3.ItalyinthegeopoliticsofcleanhydrogenItalyhasshownsupportforhydrogeninitiatives.Theprimaryguidelinesforanationalhydrogenstrategyaimatreachinga2percenthydrogenshareoffinalenergyconsumptionby2030,amountingtoabout700,000tH2peryear–andupto20percentby2050–intheelaborationofitsrecoveryandresilienceplan.Accordingtotheguidelines,thesetargetsrequireupto10billioneurobetween2020and2030.AfirststepisItaly’sNationalRecoveryandResiliencePlan(PNRR),whichallocates3.19billioneurotohydrogen.SeveralItalianactorssuggestaroleforthecountryasaregionalhubforcleanhydrogen.13TheGeopoliticsofCleanHydrogen–OpportunitiesandChallengesforItaly©2022IAIIAIPAPERS2217-JUNE2022ISSN2610-9603ISBN978-88-9368-255-8Fromageopoliticalperspective,hydrogencanaffectItaly’spowerpositionintwodifferentways.TheintroductionofhydrogencanreduceItaly’sexposuretothegeopoliticalriskassociatedwithdependenceonimportedfossilfuels.Inalow-demandscenarioItalycouldcopewithitshydrogenneedsthroughthedomesticproductionofgreenhydrogen.30However,takingamoreexpansiveuseofhydrogen(estimatedat20percentofatotalfinalenergyconsumptionof70milliontonnesofoilequivalent,Mtoe,in2050)intoconsideration,31theimportofupto2MtH2/ywasestimated.Thiswouldsuggestarateofexternalrelianceofabout30percent,considerablylowerthanItaly’scurrentexternaldependenceonnaturalgas(95percentin2019),oil(93.9percent)orcoal(98.4percent).32Inaddition,hydrogencanenhanceItaly’scentralitywithinadecarbonisedregionalenergysystem,thankstoItaly’sgeographicalposition,abundantinfrastructuralconnectionsandvastdiplomatic-corporatenetworksacrosstheMediterraneanregionandtheAfricancontinent.However,thevalueoftheseassetsneedstobeunderstoodinthecontextofgeopoliticalopportunitiesandbarriers.OpportunitiestodevelopItaly’scentralityintheforthcominghydrogentradearisefromacombinationofinfrastructuralendowmentsandsomegeopoliticalfactors.Italy’sassetscouldallowthecountrytoactasabridgebetweenprospectivelow-costcleanhydrogenproductionregionsandcoredemandregionsinnorth-westEurope.SuchadevelopmentwouldprovideItalywithgeostrategiccentrality,alsoofferinggassuppliersintheMediterraneanafutureofeconomicdiversificationandconnectivitythatcouldmitigatethegeopoliticalriskassociatedwithEurope’sphase-downoffossilfuelimportsfromNorthAfrica.33Sofar,cooperationinthefieldofhydrogenwasmentionedinthecontextofanagreementbetweenEniandAlgeria’sSonatrachaimedatincreasingAlgeriansuppliesofnaturalgasviatheTransmedpipelineasof2023.34Atthesametime,regionalcooperationinthefieldofrenewableenergy–whereItalianfirmsareactiveinseveralNorthAfricancountries–canhelpcreatethebasisfortradeingreenhydrogeninthefuture.ThecurrentsecuritypredicamentineasternEuropemightsupporttheseambitions.Italy’sexternalhydrogenpolicyhasbeensofarlargelyaby-productofenergydiplomacyeffortstoreduceimportsofRussiannaturalgas.Atthesametime,othercoredemandregionsinEuropehavetoreconsiderplanstogetfuturehydrogensupplies(orgassuppliestoconverttohydrogen)fromRussia.Asystem30MarcoGiuli,ItalyintheInternationalHydrogenEconomy,cit.31RicardoEnergy&Environment,AssessmentoftheLong-termStrategiesofEUMemberStates–Italy,October2021,https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/lts/lts_it_summary_en.pdf.SeealsoEuropeanCommissionwebsite:NationalLong-termStrategies,https://ec.europa.eu/info/energy-climate-change-environment/implementation-eu-countries/energy-and-climate-governance-and-reporting/national-long-term-strategies_en.32EuropeanCommissionwebsite:EnergyUnionIndicatorsWebtool:NetImportDependcy-HardCoal,https://ec.europa.eu/energy/data-analysis/energy-union-indicators/database_en?indicator=SoS1&type=bar&subindicator=SoS1-A3.33LucaFranza,CleanMoleculesacrosstheMediterranean,cit.34Eni,EniandSonatrachAgreetoIncreaseGasSuppliesfromAlgeriathroughTransmed,11April2022,https://www.eni.com/en-IT/media/press-release/2022/04/eni-and-sonatrach-agree-to-increase-gas-supplies-from-algeria-through-transmed.html.14TheGeopoliticsofCleanHydrogen–OpportunitiesandChallengesforItaly©2022IAIIAIPAPERS2217-JUNE2022ISSN2610-9603ISBN978-88-9368-255-8reconfigurationrequiredbytheinterruptionofRussiangassupplies–liketheoneadvocatedbytheEuropeanCommission’sroadmaptorespondtothegeopoliticalturbulenceunleashedbyRussia’sinvasionofUkraine–mightnotbereversedeasily.Tothisextent,thenew-foundcentralityofMediterraneanenergycouldconstituteageopoliticalopportunityforItalytodevelopitshydrogendiplomacy.Alongsideopportunities,geopoliticalchallengesforItaly’shydrogendiplomacyarepresent.First,theNorthAfricanregionisaffectedbyseverepoliticalinstability.Algeriahasbeenexperiencingaprotractedtensionbetweenthepolitical-militarycomplex’sdesiretomaintainstabilityandsocietalpressuresfromayoung,growingpopulationdemandingreformsandeconomicopportunities.Externally,tensionhasbeengrowingwithMoroccooveramulti-decaderivalryintheWesternSaharaissue,whichhasre-ignitedwithsevereconsequencesontheenergybusinessacrosstheregion.Algeria’sshutdownofflowstoMoroccoandthreatstoshutdowngasexportstoSpainsignalthewillingnessofthecountry’sleaderstoweaponiseenergyininter-statecontroversies.InthecentralMediterranean,Libya–alsoconnectedtoItalyviavastinfrastructuresandcorporatepresence–isplaguedbyfactionalrivalriesthathaveproveddisruptiveforenergyoperations.Suchanenvironmentraisespoliticalrisksforthesizeableinvestmentthatahydrogenpartnershipwouldrequire,andonceinplacetheriskofsupplydisruptionswithapoliticalorigincannotbeneglected.Second,thesecuritycrisisineasternEuropehasraisedareconsiderationontheroleofgasintheenergytransitionduetoagrowingpoliticalriskassociatedwithitandtheimpactithasonpricesandthereforecompetitiveness.Tothisextent,theprospectofatransitionalroleforfossil-basedhydrogencouldalsobereconsidered,astheprospectof“higherforlonger”gaspriceswouldarguablyshiftthepoliticalandeconomicfavourtowardselectrolysis–withunclearconsequencesonthetimetableofhydrogenuptake,asmostscenariosarestillbasedontheassumptionofgaspriceslowerthan10USdollarspermillionBritishthermalunits(mmBTU).ConclusionsandrecommendationsTheinternationalcleanhydrogentradeisexpectedtobelessgeopoliticallysensitivethanthehydrocarbontrade.Tradedamountsareexpectedtobelowerthanoilandgastoday,andtoalargeextentdomesticallygeneratedhydrogenisexpectedtoreplaceimportedfossilfuels,improvingenergysecurity.Nevertheless,dependingonhydrogenuptake,formsofgeopoliticalcontestationmaypersistregardingresourcesneededforhydrogengeneration,potentiallyaffectinglocationalchoices.Competitionisexpectedtofocusonthemasteryoftechnologyandstandards,whereEuropeorEastAsiancountriesholdanadvantageousposition.Forpetrostates,hydrogencouldbeasourceofindustrialdiversification,unlikelytoreproducetheeconomicandpoliticaldownsidesassociatedwithfossil-basedrenteconomies.However,hydrogen’sreproductionofcertainphysicalfeaturesofnaturalgassuggestscautionaboutdevelopinginterdependenceswithcountriespronetomanipulatethemorcharacterisedbydomesticpoliticalrisk.15TheGeopoliticsofCleanHydrogen–OpportunitiesandChallengesforItaly©2022IAIIAIPAPERS2217-JUNE2022ISSN2610-9603ISBN978-88-9368-255-8Italy’shydrogenambitionsandthetechnologicalandpoliticalcontextsarestilltoouncleartoallowanelaboratedmappingofgeopoliticalopportunitiesandrisks.Inacontextaffectedbydeepuncertainty,itisthereforerecommendedtofocusonno-regretoptions.Italyshould:•Achieveaclearerpictureoftechnologicalandgeopoliticalopportunities,toensurethatitshydrogendiplomacycanreconcileasmuchaspossibleeconomic,geopoliticalandsustainabilityprioritiesinlinewithbroaderEUobjectives.Risksexistthatinthepursuitofgeostrategiccentrality,araceforpotentiallyexpensiveinfrastructuraladaptationendsupwithstrandedassetsastechnologymovestowardsprivilegingalternativesolutions.Seekingconnectivitycannotbeseparatedfromacarefulappreciationoftechnologicaldevelopmentsandgeopoliticaldevelopments.•Withrespecttoinfrastructureconnectivity,privilegeintheshorttomediumtermadistributedmodel,withoutcommittingfromthestarttotheexpensivecreationorrefurbishmentofinternationaltransportinfrastructuresbeforeachievingmoreclarityonlong-termdemandprospects–bothinItalyandinEurope.•Minimisegeopoliticalrisksbyprivilegingdomesticsupplytodedicatetohard-to-abatesectors,keepingdemandatthelowendofranges.If,however,Italychoosesanexpansivepathwaytohydrogendevelopment,classicalsupplysecuritymeasurestoreduceexposuretopoliticalriskshouldincludemaintainingsufficientdomesticback-upcapacity,andsecuringsufficientintegrationwithEuropeanpartners.Inparticular,promotingconnectivitywiththeIberianPeninsulawouldhelpItalianindustryaccesshydrogenfromsafesourcesandthroughsaferoutes,withinacommonregulatoryspace.•SupportthedevelopmentofrenewableenergycapacitiesacrosstheMediterraneanasanoptionthatinanycasewillcontributetoregionaldecarbonisation,regardlessoftheexportpotentialforhydrogen.InconsiderationofthespecificchallengesoftheMediterraneanregion,particularattentionshouldbedevotedtosafeguardingwatersecurityandlocalaccesstorenewableelectricity.•Asgeopoliticaltensionsmayneverthelesspersistinconnectionwithresourceexploitation,climateandenergydiplomacywillplayanimportantroleinminimisingthepotentialforconflict.Especiallyinternationalorganisationsshouldbemobilisedtofavourdialogueonhydrogengeopoliticsbetweeninstitutionalandbusinessactors.Updated16June202216TheGeopoliticsofCleanHydrogen–OpportunitiesandChallengesforItaly©2022IAIIAIPAPERS2217-JUNE2022ISSN2610-9603ISBN978-88-9368-255-8ReferencesBloombergNEF,HydrogenEconomyOutlook.KeyMessages,30March2020.https://data.bloomberglp.com/professional/sites/24/BNEF-Hydrogen-Economy-Outlook-Key-Messages-30-Mar-2020.pdfJanFrederikBraun,“SaudiArabia’sCleanHydrogenPlansforConvertingAmbitionsintoAction”,inEnergyPost,19March2021,https://energypost.eu/?p=32318GavinBridgeetal.,“GeographiesofEnergyTransition:Space,PlaceandtheLow-CarbonEconomy”,inEnergyPolicy,Vol.53(February2013),p.331-340,https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.10.066JamesBurgess,“World’sLargestRenewableHydrogenDeveloperAdds25-GWOmanExportProject”,inS&PGlobal,18May2021,https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/petrochemicals/051821-worlds-largest-renewable-hydrogen-developer-adds-25-gw-oman-export-projectCanada,HydrogenStrategyforCanada,MinistryforNaturalResources,December2020,https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/node/23080TomCasier,“TheGeopoliticsoftheEU’sDecarbonizationStrategy:ABird’sEyePerspective”,inClaireDupontandSebastianOberthür(eds),DecarbonizationintheEuropeanUnion.InternalPoliciesandExternalStrategies,Basingstoke/NewYork,PalgraveMacmillan,2015,p.159-179Chile,NationalGreenHydrogenStrategy,MinistryofEnergy,November2020,https://energia.gob.cl/sites/default/files/national_green_hydrogen_strategy_-_chile.pdfCOAGEnergyCouncil,Australia‘sNationalHydrogenStrategy,2019,https://www.industry.gov.au/node/69001Eni,EniandSonatrachAgreetoIncreaseGasSuppliesfromAlgeriathroughTransmed,11April2022,https://www.eni.com/en-IT/media/press-release/2022/04/eni-and-sonatrach-agree-to-increase-gas-supplies-from-algeria-through-transmed.htmlEuropeanCommission,REPowerEU:JointEuropeanActionforMoreAffordable,SecureandSustainableEnergy(COM/2022/108),8March2022,https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:52022DC0108France,Stratégienationalepourledéveloppementdel’hydrogènedécarbonéenFrance.Dossierdepresse,8September2020,https://www.entreprises.gouv.fr/fr/node/21255117TheGeopoliticsofCleanHydrogen–OpportunitiesandChallengesforItaly©2022IAIIAIPAPERS2217-JUNE2022ISSN2610-9603ISBN978-88-9368-255-8LucaFranza,CleanMoleculesacrosstheMediterranean.ThePotentialforNorthAfricanHydrogenImportsintoItalyandtheEU,Rome,IAI,April2021,https://www.iai.it/en/node/13116Germany,TheNationalHydrogenStrategy,FederalMinistryforEconomicAffairsandEnergy,June2020,https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/EN/Publikationen/Energie/the-national-hydrogen-strategy.htmlMarcoGiuli,ItalyintheInternationalHydrogenEconomy,Rome,IAI,February2022,https://www.iai.it/en/node/14708InternationalEnergyAgency(IEA),TheFutureofHydrogen.SeizingTo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