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首页文档碳中和资料研究报告全球风险报告_2024

全球风险报告_2024VIP专享VIP免费

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This document is published by the World Economic
Forum as a contribution to a project, insight area
or interaction. The findings, interpretations and
conclusions expressed herein are a result of a
collaborative process facilitated and endorsed by
the World Economic Forum but whose results do
not necessarily represent the views of the World
Economic Forum, nor the entirety of its Members,
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World Economic Forum
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Copyright © 2024
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All rights reserved. No part of this publication may
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ISBN: 978-2-940631-64-3
The report and an interactive data platform are
available at https://www.weforum.org/publications/
global-risks-report-2024/.
The Global Risks Report 2024
January 2024
Global Risks Report 2024 2
Contents
Preface
Overview of methodology
Key findings
Chapter 1: Global Risks 2024: At a turning point
1.1 The world in 2024
1.2 The path to 2026
1.3 False information
1.4 Rise in conflict
1.5 Economic uncertainty
1.6 Looking ahead
Endnotes
Chapter 2: Global Risks 2034: Over the limit
2.1 The world in 2034
2.2 Structural forces
2.3 A 3°C world
2.4 AI in charge
2.5 The end of development?
2.6 Crime wave
2.7 Preparing for the decade ahead
Endnotes
Chapter 3: Responding to global risks
3.1 Localized strategies
3.2 Breakthrough endeavors
3.3 Collective actions
3.4 Cross-border coordination
3.5 Conclusion
Endnotes
Appendix A: Definitions and Global Risks List
Appendix B: Global Risks Perception Survey 2023-2024
Appendix C: Executive Opinion Survey: National Risk Perceptions
Appendix D: Risk governance
Partner Institutes
Acknowledgements
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January2024TheGlobalRisksReport2024TermsofuseanddisclaimerThisdocumentispublishedbytheWorldEconomicForumasacontributiontoaproject,insightareaorinteraction.Thefindings,interpretationsandconclusionsexpressedhereinarearesultofacollaborativeprocessfacilitatedandendorsedbytheWorldEconomicForumbutwhoseresultsdonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheWorldEconomicForum,northeentiretyofitsMembers,Partnersorotherstakeholders.WorldEconomicForumAllrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmay91-93routedelaCapitebereproduced,storedinaretrievalsystem,orCH-1223Cologny/Genevatransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,electronic,Switzerlandmechanical,photocopying,orotherwisewithouttheTel.:+41(0)228691212priorpermissionoftheWorldEconomicForum.Fax:+41(0)227862744E-mail:contact@weforum.orgISBN:978-2-940631-64-3www.weforum.orgThereportandaninteractivedataplatformareCopyright©2024availableathttps://www.weforum.org/publications/bytheWorldEconomicForumglobal-risks-report-2024/.GlobalRisksReport20242ContentsPreface4Overviewofmethodology5Keyfindings6Chapter1:GlobalRisks2024:Ataturningpoint121.1Theworldin2024121.2Thepathto2026141.3Falseinformation181.4Riseinconflict221.5Economicuncertainty271.6Lookingahead32Endnotes33Chapter2:GlobalRisks2034:Overthelimit372.1Theworldin2034372.2Structuralforces402.3A3°Cworld422.4AIincharge502.5Theendofdevelopment?572.6Crimewave682.7Preparingforthedecadeahead76Endnotes77Chapter3:Respondingtoglobalrisks853.1Localizedstrategies863.2Breakthroughendeavors873.3Collectiveactions893.4Cross-bordercoordination903.5Conclusion92Endnotes94AppendixA:DefinitionsandGlobalRisksList95AppendixB:GlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey2023-202499AppendixC:ExecutiveOpinionSurvey:NationalRiskPerceptions102AppendixD:Riskgovernance112PartnerInstitutes115Acknowledgements121GlobalRisksReport20243PrefaceSaadiaZahidiManagingDirectorLastyear’sGlobalRisksReportwarnedofaworldexperimentaltechnologiespresentexistentialthreatsthatwouldnoteasilyreboundfromcontinuedtohumanity?shocks.As2024begins,the19theditionofthereportissetagainstabackdropofrapidlyThesetransnationalriskswillbecomehardertoacceleratingtechnologicalchangeandeconomichandleasglobalcooperationerodes.Inthisyear’suncertainty,astheworldisplaguedbyaduoofGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey,two-thirdsofdangerouscrises:climateandconflict.respondentspredictthatamultipolarorderwilldominateinthenext10years,asmiddleandUnderlyinggeopoliticaltensionscombinedwiththegreatpowerssetandenforce–butalsocontesteruptionofactivehostilitiesinmultipleregionsis-currentrulesandnorms.Thereportconsiderscontributingtoanunstableglobalordercharacterizedtheimplicationsofthisfragmentedworld,wherebypolarizingnarratives,erodingtrustandinsecurity.preparednessforglobalrisksisevermorecriticalbutAtthesametime,countriesaregrapplingwiththeishinderedbylackofconsensusandcooperation.impactsofrecord-breakingextremeweather,asItalsopresentsaconceptualframeworkforclimate-changeadaptationeffortsandresourcesaddressingglobalrisks,identifyingthescopeforfallshortofthetype,scaleandintensityofclimate-“minimumviableeffort”foraction,dependingontherelatedeventsalreadytakingplace.Cost-of-livingnatureoftherisk.pressurescontinuetobite,amidstpersistentlyelevatedinflationandinterestratesandcontinuedTheinsightsinthisreportareunderpinnedbyeconomicuncertaintyinmuchoftheworld.nearlytwodecadesoforiginaldataonglobalriskDespondentheadlinesareborderless,sharedperception.Thereporthighlightsthefindingsfromregularlyandwidely,andasenseoffrustrationatourannualGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey,whichthestatusquoisincreasinglypalpable.Together,bringstogetherthecollectiveintelligenceofnearlythisleavesampleroomforacceleratingrisks–like1,500globalleadersacrossacademia,business,misinformationanddisinformation–topropagategovernment,theinternationalcommunityandcivilinsocietiesthathavealreadybeenpoliticallyandsociety.Italsoleveragesinsightsfromover200economicallyweakenedinrecentyears.thematicexperts,includingtheriskspecialiststhatformtheGlobalRisksReportAdvisoryBoard,GlobalJustasnaturalecosystemscanbepushedtotheFutureCouncilonComplexRisks,andtheChiefRisklimitandbecomesomethingfundamentallynew;OfficersCommunity.Wearealsodeeplygratefulsuchsystemicshiftsarealsotakingplaceacrosstoourlong-standingpartners,MarshMcLennanotherspheres:geostrategic,demographicandandZurichInsuranceGroup,fortheirinvaluabletechnological.Thisyear,weexploretheriseofglobalcontributionsinshapingthethemesandnarrativerisksagainstthebackdropofthese“structuralofthereport.Finally,wewouldliketoexpressourforces”aswellasthetectonicclashesbetweengratitudetothecoreteamthatdevelopedthisreportthem.Thenextsetofglobalconditionsmaynot–EllissaCavaciuti-Wishart,SophieHeadingandnecessarilybebetterorworsethanthelast,buttheKevinKohler–andtoRickyLiandAttilioDiBattistatransitionwillnotbeaneasyone.fortheirsupport.ThereportexplorestheglobalrisklandscapeinthisThefutureisnotfixed.Amultiplicityofdifferentphaseoftransitionandgovernancesystemsbeingfuturesisconceivableoverthenextdecade.stretchedbeyondtheirlimit.ItanalysesthemostAlthoughthisdrivesuncertaintyintheshortterm,severeperceivedriskstoeconomiesandsocietiesitalsoallowsroomforhope.Alongsideglobalrisksovertwoand10years,inthecontextoftheseandtheera-definingchangesunderwaylieuniqueinfluentialforces.Couldwecatapulttoa3°Cworldopportunitiestorebuildtrust,optimismandresilienceastheimpactsofclimatechangeintrinsicallyrewriteinourinstitutionsandsocieties.Itisourhopethattheplanet?Havewereachedthepeakofhumanthereportservesasavitalcalltoactionforopenanddevelopmentforlargepartsoftheglobalpopulation,constructivedialogueamongleadersofgovernment,givendeterioratingdebtandgeo-economicbusinessandcivilsocietytotakeactiontominimizeconditions?Couldwefaceanexplosionofcriminalityglobalrisksandbuilduponlong-termopportunitiesandcorruptionthatfeedsonmorefragilestatesandandsolutions.morevulnerablepopulations?Willan“armsrace”inGlobalRisksReport20244OverviewofmethodologyTheGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey(GRPS)RefertoAppendixB:GlobalRisksPerceptionhasunderpinnedtheGlobalRisksReportfornearlySurvey2023-2024formoredetailonthetwodecadesandistheWorldEconomicForum’smethodology.premiersourceoforiginalglobalrisksdata.Thisyear’sGRPShasbroughttogetherleadinginsightsTocomplementGRPSdataonglobalrisks,theontheevolvingglobalriskslandscapefrom1,490reportalsodrawsontheWorldEconomicForum’sexpertsacrossacademia,business,government,ExecutiveOpinionSurvey(EOS)toidentifyriskstheinternationalcommunityandcivilsociety.thatposethemostseverethreattoeachcountryResponsesfortheGRPS2023-2024werecollectedoverthenexttwoyears,asidentifiedbyoverfrom4Septemberto9October2023.11,000businessleadersin113economies.WhenconsideredincontextwiththeGRPS,thisdata“Globalrisk”isdefinedasthepossibilityoftheprovidesinsightintolocalconcernsandprioritiesoccurrenceofaneventorconditionwhich,ifitandpointstopotential“hotspots”andregionaloccurs,wouldnegativelyimpactasignificantmanifestationsofglobalrisks.RefertoAppendixproportionofglobalGDP,populationornaturalC:ExecutiveOpinionSurvey:NationalRiskresources.RelevantdefinitionsforeachofthePerceptionsformoredetails.34globalrisksareincludedinAppendixA:DefinitionsandGlobalRisksList.Finally,thereportintegratestheviewsofleadingexpertstogenerateforesightandtosupportTheGRPS2023-2024includedthefollowinganalysisofthesurveydata.Contributionswerecomponents:collectedfrom55colleaguesacrosstheWorldEconomicForum’splatforms.Thereportalso–Risklandscapeinvitedrespondentstoassessharnessesqualitativeinsightsfromover160expertsthelikelyimpact(severity)ofglobalrisksoverafromacrossacademia,business,government,one-,two-and10-yearhorizontoillustratethetheinternationalcommunityandcivilsocietypotentialdevelopmentofindividualglobalrisksthroughcommunitymeetings,privateinterviewsovertimeandidentifyareasofkeyconcern.andthematicworkshopsconductedfromMaytoOctober2023.TheseincludetheGlobalRisks–ConsequencesaskedrespondentstoconsiderAdvisoryBoard,GlobalFutureCouncilonComplextherangeofpotentialimpactsofariskarising,RisksandtheChiefRisksOfficersCommunity.tohighlightrelationshipsbetweenglobalrisksRefertoAcknowledgementsformoredetail.andthepotentialforcompoundingcrises.–Riskgovernanceinvitedrespondentstoreflectonwhichapproacheshavethemostpotentialfordrivingactiononglobalriskreductionandpreparedness.–Outlookaskedrespondentstopredicttheevolutionofkeyaspectsunderpinningtheglobalriskslandscape.GlobalRisksReport20245KeyfindingsTheGlobalRisksReport2024presentsthefindingsAlthoughgloballydestabilizingconsequences–oftheGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey(GRPS),suchasthoseseenattheinitialoutbreakofthewhichcapturesinsightsfromnearly1,500globalRussia-UkrainewarortheCOVID-19pandemicexperts.Thereportanalysesglobalrisksthrough–werelargelyavoided,thelonger-termoutlookthreetimeframestosupportdecision-makersinforthesedevelopmentscouldbringfurtherglobalbalancingcurrentcrisesandlonger-termpriorities.shocks.Chapter1exploresthemostseverecurrentrisks,andthoserankedhighestbysurveyrespondents,Asweenter2024,2023-2024GRPSresultsoveratwo-yearperiod,analysingindepththethreehighlightapredominantlynegativeoutlookfortherisksthathaverapidlyacceleratedintothetopworldoverthenexttwoyearsthatisexpectedto10rankingsoverthetwo-yearhorizon.Chapter2worsenoverthenextdecade(FigureA).SurveyedfocusesonthetoprisksemergingoverthenextinSeptember2023,themajorityofrespondentsdecadeagainstabackdropofgeostrategic,climate,(54%)anticipatesomeinstabilityandamoderatetechnologicalanddemographicshifts,divingdeeperriskofglobalcatastrophes,whileanother30%intofourspecificriskoutlooks.Thereportconcludesexpectevenmoreturbulentconditions.Theoutlookbyconsideringapproachesforaddressingcomplexismarkedlymorenegativeoverthe10-yeartimeandnon-linearaspectsofglobalrisksduringthishorizon,withnearlytwo-thirdsofrespondentsperiodofglobalfragmentation.Belowarethekeyexpectingastormyorturbulentoutlook.findingsofthereport.Inthisyear’sreport,wecontextualizeouranalysisAdeterioratingglobaloutlookthroughfourstructuralforcesthatwillshapethematerializationandmanagementofglobalrisksoverLookingbackattheeventsof2023,plentyofthenextdecade.Thesearelonger-termshiftsindevelopmentscapturedtheattentionofpeoplethearrangementofandrelationshipbetweenfouraroundtheworld–whileothersreceivedminimalsystemicelementsofthegloballandscape:scrutiny.Vulnerablepopulationsgrappledwithlethalconflicts,fromSudantoGazaandIsrael,alongside–Trajectoriesrelatingtoglobalwarmingandrecord-breakingheatconditions,drought,wildfiresrelatedconsequencestoEarthsystemsandflooding.Societaldiscontentwaspalpable(Climatechange).inmanycountries,withnewscyclesdominatedbypolarization,violentprotests,riotsandstrikes.–Changesinthesize,growthandstructureofpopulationsaroundtheworld(Demographicbifurcation).FIGUREAShortandlong-termglobaloutlook"Whichofthefollowingbestcharacterizesyouroutlookfortheworldoverthefollowingtimeperiods?"3%1%Shortterm(2years)27%54%15%Longterm(10years)17%46%29%8%1%Stormy:GlobalcatastrophicrisksloomingTurbulent:UpheavalsandelevatedriskofglobalcatastrophesUnsettled:Someinstability,moderateriskofglobalcatastrophesStable:Isolateddisruptions,lowriskofglobalcatastrophesCalm:NegligibleriskofglobalcatastrophesSourceNoteWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksThepercentagesinthegraphmaynotaddupto100%becausefigureshavebeenroundedPerceptionSurvey2023-2024.up/down.GlobalRisksReport20246–Developmentalpathwaysforfrontierimpliessub-optimalalignmentanddecision-making,technologies(Technologicalacceleration).heighteningtheriskofmissingkeymomentsofintervention,whichwouldresultinlong-term–Materialevolutionintheconcentrationandchangestoplanetarysystems.sourcesofgeopoliticalpower(Geostrategicshifts).Chapter2.3:A3°Cworldexplorestheconsequencesofpassingatleastone“climateAnewsetofglobalconditionsistakingshapetippingpoint”withinthenextdecade.Recentacrosseachofthesedomainsandthesetransitionsresearchsuggeststhatthethresholdfortriggeringwillbecharacterizedbyuncertaintyandvolatility.Aslong-term,potentiallyirreversibleandself-societiesseektoadapttothesechangingforces,perpetuatingchangestoselectplanetarysystemstheircapacitytoprepareforandrespondtoglobalislikelytobepassedatorbefore1.5°Cofglobalriskswillbeaffected.warming,whichiscurrentlyanticipatedtobereachedbytheearly2030s.ManyeconomieswillEnvironmentalriskscouldhittheremainlargelyunpreparedfor“non-linear”impacts:pointofnoreturnthepotentialtriggeringofanexusofseveralrelatedsocioenvironmentalriskshasthepotentialtospeedEnvironmentalriskscontinuetodominatetherisksupclimatechange,throughthereleaseofcarbonlandscapeoverallthreetimeframes.Two-thirdsofemissions,andamplifyrelatedimpacts,threateningGRPSrespondentsrankExtremeweatherastheclimate-vulnerablepopulations.Thecollectivetopriskmostlikelytopresentamaterialcrisisonabilityofsocietiestoadaptcouldbeoverwhelmed,aglobalscalein2024(FigureB),withthewarmingconsideringthesheerscaleofpotentialimpactsphaseoftheElNiño-SouthernOscillation(ENSO)andinfrastructureinvestmentrequirements,leavingcycleprojectedtointensifyandpersistuntilMaysomecommunitiesandcountriesunabletoabsorbthisyear.Itisalsoseenasthesecond-mostsevereboththeacuteandchroniceffectsofrapidclimateriskoverthetwo-yeartimeframeandsimilartolastchange.year’srankings,nearlyallenvironmentalrisksfeatureamongthetop10overthelongerterm(FigureC).AspolarizationgrowsandtechnologicalrisksremainHowever,GRPSrespondentsdisagreeaboutunchecked,‘truth’willcometheurgencyofenvironmentalrisks,inparticularunderpressureBiodiversitylossandecosystemcollapseandCriticalchangetoEarthsystems.YoungerSocietalpolarizationfeaturesamongthetoprespondentstendtoranktheserisksfarmorethreerisksoverboththecurrentandtwo-yearhighlyoverthetwo-yearperiodcomparedtooldertimehorizons,ranking#9overthelongerterm.Inagegroups,withbothrisksfeaturingintheirtopaddition,SocietalpolarizationandEconomic10rankingsintheshortterm.Theprivatesectordownturnareseenasthemostinterconnectedhighlightstheserisksastopconcernsoverthe–andthereforeinfluential–risksinthegloballongerterm,incontrasttorespondentsfromcivilrisksnetwork(FigureD),asdriversandpossiblesocietyorgovernmentwhoprioritizetheserisksconsequencesofnumerousrisks.overshortertimeframes.Thisdissonanceinperceptionsofurgencyamongkeydecision-makersFIGUREBCurrentrisklandscape"Pleaseselectuptofiverisksthatyoubelievearemostlikelytopresentamaterialcrisisonaglobalscalein2024."Riskcategories66%53%46%42%39%EconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnological1st2nd3rd4th5thExtremeweatherCost-of-livingcrisisCyberattacksAI-generatedSocietaland/ormisinformationpoliticalpolarizationanddisinformationSourceWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey2023-2024.GlobalRisksReport20247FIGURECGlobalrisksrankedbyseverityovertheshortandlongterm"Pleaseestimatethelikelyimpact(severity)ofthefollowingrisksovera2-yearand10-yearperiod."Riskcategories2years10yearsEconomic1stMisinformationanddisinformation1stExtremeweathereventsEnvironmental2ndExtremeweatherevents2ndCriticalchangetoEarthsystemsGeopolitical3rdSocietalpolarization3rdBiodiversitylossandecosystemcollapseSocietal4thCyberinsecurity4thNaturalresourceshortagesTechnological5thInterstatearmedconflict5thMisinformationanddisinformation6thLackofeconomicopportunity6thAdverseoutcomesofAItechnologies7thInflation7thInvoluntarymigration8thInvoluntarymigration8thCyberinsecurity9thEconomicdownturn9thSocietalpolarization10thPollution10thPollutionSourceWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey2023-2024.Emergingasthemostsevereglobalriskanticipatedriskrankingsoverthetwo-yearperiod(FigureC).overthenexttwoyears,foreignanddomesticAlthougha“softerlanding”appearstobeprevailingactorsalikewillleverageMisinformationandfornow,thenear-termoutlookremainshighlydisinformationtofurtherwidensocietalanduncertain.Therearemultiplesourcesofcontinuedpoliticaldivides(Chapter1.3:Falseinformation).supply-sidepricepressuresloomingoverthenextAsclosetothreebillionpeopleareexpectedtotwoyears,fromElNiñoconditionstothepotentialheadtotheelectoralpollsacrossseveraleconomiesescalationofliveconflicts.Andifinterestrates–includingBangladesh,India,Indonesia,Mexico,remainrelativelyhighforlonger,small-andmedium-Pakistan,theUnitedKingdomandtheUnitedsizedenterprisesandheavilyindebtedcountrieswillStates–overthenexttwoyears,thewidespreadbeparticularlyexposedtodebtdistress(Chapteruseofmisinformationanddisinformation,andtools1.5:Economicuncertainty).todisseminateit,mayunderminethelegitimacyofnewlyelectedgovernments.ResultingunrestcouldEconomicuncertaintywillweighheavilyacrossmostrangefromviolentprotestsandhatecrimestocivilmarkets,butcapitalwillbethecostliestforthemostconfrontationandterrorism.vulnerablecountries.Climate-vulnerableorconflict-pronecountriesstandtobeincreasinglylockedoutBeyondelections,perceptionsofrealityarelikelytoofmuch-neededdigitalandphysicalinfrastructure,alsobecomemorepolarized,infiltratingthepublictradeandgreeninvestmentsandrelatedeconomicdiscourseonissuesrangingfrompublichealthtoopportunities.Astheadaptivecapacitiesofthesesocialjustice.However,astruthisundermined,fragilestateserodesfurther,relatedsocietalandtheriskofdomesticpropagandaandcensorshipenvironmentalimpactsareamplified.willalsoriseinturn.Inresponsetomis-anddisinformation,governmentscouldbeincreasinglySimilarly,theconvergenceoftechnologicalempoweredtocontrolinformationbasedonwhatadvancesandgeopoliticaldynamicswilllikelycreatetheydeterminetobe“true”.Freedomsrelatingtoanewsetofwinnersandlosersacrossadvancedtheinternet,pressandaccesstowidersourcesanddevelopingeconomiesalike(Chapter2.4:AIinofinformationthatarealreadyindeclineriskcharge).Ifcommercialincentivesandgeopoliticaldescendingintobroaderrepressionofinformationimperatives,ratherthanpublicinterest,remainflowsacrossawidersetofcountries.theprimarydriversofthedevelopmentofartificialintelligence(AI)andotherfrontiertechnologies,theEconomicstrainsonlow-anddigitalgapbetweenhigh-andlow-incomecountriesmiddle-incomepeople–andwilldriveastarkdisparityinthedistributionofrelatedcountries–aresettogrowbenefits–andrisks.Vulnerablecountriesandcommunitieswouldbeleftfurtherbehind,digitallyTheCost-of-livingcrisisremainsamajorconcernisolatedfromturbochargedAIbreakthroughsintheoutlookfor2024(FigureB).Theeconomicimpactingeconomicproductivity,finance,climate,risksofInflation(#7)andEconomicdownturneducationandhealthcare,aswellasrelatedjob(#9)arealsonotablenewentrantstothetop10creation.GlobalRisksReport20248FIGUREDGlobalriskslandscape:aninterconnectionsmapIntrastateviolenceCensorshipandsurveillanceNaturalresourceshortagesInvoluntarymigrationErosionofhumanrightsMisinformationanddisinformationCriticalchangetoTerroristattacksAdverseoutcomesofEarthsystemsExtremeInterstatearmedconflictSocietalfrontiertechnologiesBiodiversitylossandweathereventsNon-weatherrelatednaturaldisasterspolarizationTechnologicalpowerecosystemcollapseconcentrationCyberinsecurityPollutionAdverseoutcomesInfectiousdiseasesofAItechnologiesChronichealthconditionsDisruptionstocriticalinfrastructureBiological,chemicalInsufficientinfrastructureandservicesornuclearhazardsLackofeconomicopportunityDisruptionstoasystemicallyimportantsupplychainLabourshortagesConcentrationofGeoeconomicconfrontationstrategicresourcesInflationEconomicdownturnDebtUnemploymentIlliciteconomicactivityAssetbubbleburstsNodesEdgesRiskinfluenceRelativeinfluenceRiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalHighHighMediumMediumLowLowSourceWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey2023-2024.Overthelongerterm,developmentalprogressandSimmeringgeopoliticaltensionslivingstandardsareatrisk.Economic,environmentalcombinedwithtechnologywillandtechnologicaltrendsarelikelytoentrenchexistingdrivenewsecurityriskschallengesaroundlabourandsocialmobility,blockingindividualsfromincomeandskillingopportunities,Asbothaproductanddriverofstatefragility,andthereforetheabilitytoimproveeconomicstatusInterstatearmedconflictisanewentrantintothe(Chapter2.5:Endofdevelopment?).Lackoftopriskrankingsoverthetwo-yearhorizon(Figureeconomicopportunityisatop10riskovertheC).Asthefocusofmajorpowersbecomesstretchedtwo-yearperiod,butisseeminglylessofaconcernacrossmultiplefronts,conflictcontagionisakeyforglobaldecision-makersoverthelonger-termconcern(Chapter1.4:Riseinconflict).Therearehorizon,droppingto#11(FigureE).Highratesofjobseveralfrozenconflictsatriskofheatingupinthenearchurn–bothjobcreationanddestruction–havetheterm,duetospilloverthreatsorgrowingstatefragility.potentialtoresultindeeplybifurcatedlabourmarketsbetweenandwithindevelopedanddevelopingThisbecomesanevenmoreworryingriskintheeconomies.Whiletheproductivitybenefitsofthesecontextofrecenttechnologicaladvances.Intheeconomictransitionsshouldnotbeunderestimated,absenceofconcertedcollaboration,agloballymanufacturing-orservices-ledexportgrowthmightfragmentedapproachtoregulatingfrontiernolongeroffertraditionalpathwaystogreatertechnologiesisunlikelytopreventthespreadofprosperityfordevelopingcountries.itsmostdangerouscapabilitiesand,infact,mayencourageproliferation(Chapter2.4:AIincharge).ThenarrowingofindividualpathwaystostableOverthelonger-term,technologicaladvances,livelihoodswouldalsoimpactmetricsofhumanincludingingenerativeAI,willenablearangeofdevelopment–frompovertytoaccesstoeducationnon-stateandstateactorstoaccessasuperhumanandhealthcare.Markedchangesinthesocialbreadthofknowledgetoconceptualizeanddevelopcontractasintergenerationalmobilitydeclineswouldnewtoolsofdisruptionandconflict,frommalwareradicallyreshapesocietalandpoliticaldynamicsintobiologicalweapons.bothadvancedanddevelopingeconomies.GlobalRisksReport20249Inthisenvironment,thelinesbetweenthestate,includingimplicationsforhigh-stakeshotspots:theorganizedcrime,privatemilitiaandterroristgroupsRussia-Ukrainewar,theMiddleEastconflictandwouldblurfurther.Abroadsetofnon-stateactorstensionsoverTaiwan(Chapter1.4:Riseinconflict).willcapitalizeonweakenedsystems,cementingCoordinatedeffortstoisolate“rogue”statesarethecyclebetweenconflict,fragility,corruptionandlikelytobeincreasinglyfutile,whileinternationalcrime.Illiciteconomicactivity(#31)isoneofthegovernanceandpeacekeepingeffortsshowntobelowest-rankedrisksoverthe10-yearperiodbutisineffectiveat“policing”conflictcouldbesidelined.seentobetriggeredbyanumberofthetop-rankedrisksoverthetwo-and10-yearhorizons(FigureD).TheshiftingbalanceofinfluenceinglobalaffairsEconomichardship–combinedwithtechnologicalisparticularlyevidentintheinternationalizationofadvances,resourcestressandconflict–islikelytoconflicts–wherepivotalpowerswillincreasinglypushmorepeopletowardscrime,militarizationorlendsupportandresourcestogarnerpoliticalradicalizationandcontributetotheglobalizationofallies–butwillalsoshapethelonger-termtrajectoryorganizedcrimeintargetsandoperations(Chapterandmanagementofglobalrisksmorebroadly.For2.6:Crimewave).example,accesstohighlyconcentratedtechstackswillbecomeanevenmorecriticalcomponentThegrowinginternationalizationofconflictsbyofsoftpowerformajorpowerstocementtheirawidersetofpowerscouldleadtodeadlier,influence.However,othercountrieswithcompetitiveprolongedwarfareandoverwhelminghumanitarianadvantagesinupstreamvaluechains–fromcriticalcrises.Withmultiplestatesengagedinproxy,andmineralstohigh-valueIPandcapital–willlikelyperhapsevendirectwarfare,theincentivestoleveragetheseeconomicassetstoobtainaccesscondensedecisiontimethroughtheintegrationtoadvancedtechnologies,leadingtonovelpowerofAIwillgrow.Thecreepofmachineintelligencedynamics.intoconflictdecision-making–toautonomouslyselecttargetsanddetermineobjectives–wouldOpportunitiesforactiontosignificantlyraisetheriskofaccidentalorintentionaladdressglobalrisksinaescalationoverthenextdecade.fragmentedworldIdeologicalandgeoeconomicCooperationwillcomeunderpressureinthisdivideswilldisruptthefutureoffragmented,in-fluxworld.Howeverthereremaingovernancekeyopportunitiesforactionthatcanbetakenlocallyorinternationally,individuallyorcollaboratively–thatAdeeperdivideontheinternationalstagebetweencansignificantlyreducetheimpactofglobalrisks.multiplepolesofpowerandbetweentheGlobalNorthandSouthwouldparalyzeinternationalLocalizedstrategiesleveraginginvestmentgovernancemechanismsanddiverttheattentionandregulationcanreducetheimpactofthoseandresourcesofmajorpowersawayfromurgentinevitablerisksthatwecanpreparefor,andbothglobalrisks.thepublicandprivatesectorcanplayakeyroletoextendthesebenefitstoall.SinglebreakthroughAskedabouttheglobalpoliticaloutlookforendeavors,grownthrougheffortstoprioritizethecooperationonrisksoverthenextdecade,two-futureandfocusonresearchanddevelopment,thirdsofGRPSrespondentsfeelthatwewillfaceacansimilarlyhelpmaketheworldasaferplace.Themultipolarorfragmentedorderinwhichmiddleandcollectiveactionsofindividualcitizens,companiesgreatpowerscontest,setandenforceregionalrulesandcountriesmayseeminsignificantontheirown,andnorms.Overthenextdecade,asdissatisfactionbutatcriticalmasstheycanmovetheneedleonwiththecontinueddominanceoftheGlobalglobalriskreduction.Finally,eveninaworldthatisNorthgrows,anevolvingsetofstateswillseekaincreasinglyfragmented,cross-bordercollaborationmorepivotalinfluenceontheglobalstageacrossatscaleremainscriticalforrisksthataredecisiveformultipledomains,assertingtheirpowerinmilitary,humansecurityandprosperity.technologicalandeconomicterms.ThenextdecadewillusherinaperiodofsignificantAsstatesintheGlobalSouthbearthebruntofachange,stretchingouradaptivecapacitytothechangingclimate,theaftereffectsofpandemic-limit.Amultiplicityofentirelydifferentfuturesiseracrisesandgeoeconomicriftsbetweenmajorconceivableoverthistimeframe,andamorepowers,growingalignmentandpoliticalalliancespositivepathcanbeshapedthroughouractionstowithinthishistoricallydisparategroupofcountriesaddressglobalriskstoday.couldincreasinglyshapesecuritydynamics,GlobalRisksReport202410FIGUREEGlobalrisksrankedbyseverity"Pleaseestimatethelikelyimpact(severity)ofthefollowingrisksovera2-yearand10-yearperiod."Shortterm(2years)Longterm(10years)1stMisinformationanddisinformation1stExtremeweatherevents2ndExtremeweatherevents2ndCriticalchangetoEarthsystems3rdSocietalpolarization3rdBiodiversitylossandecosystemcollapse4thCyberinsecurity4thNaturalresourceshortages5thInterstatearmedconflict5thMisinformationanddisinformation6thLackofeconomicopportunity6thAdverseoutcomesofAItechnologies7thInflation7thInvoluntarymigration8thInvoluntarymigration8thCyberinsecurity9thEconomicdownturn9thSocietalpolarization10thPollution10thPollution11thCriticalchangetoEarthsystems11thLackofeconomicopportunity12thTechnologicalpowerconcentration12thTechnologicalpowerconcentration13thNaturalresourceshortages13thConcentrationofstrategicresources14thGeoeconomicconfrontation14thCensorshipandsurveillance15thErosionofhumanrights15thInterstatearmedconflict16thDebt16thGeoeconomicconfrontation17thIntrastateviolence17thDebt18thInsufficientpublicinfrastructureandservices18thErosionofhumanrights19thDisruptionstoasystemicallyimportantsupplychain19thInfectiousdiseases20thBiodiversitylossandecosystemcollapse20thChronichealthconditions21stCensorshipandsurveillance21stInsufficientpublicinfrastructureandservices22ndLabourshortages22ndIntrastateviolence23rdInfectiousdiseases23rdDisruptionstocriticalinfrastructure24thConcentrationofstrategicresources24thAdverseoutcomesoffrontiertechnologies25thDisruptionstocriticalinfrastructure25thDisruptionstoasystemicallyimportantsupplychain26thAssetbubblebursts26thBiological,chemicalornuclearhazards27thChronichealthconditions27thUnemployment28thIlliciteconomicactivity28thEconomicdownturn29thAdverseoutcomesofAItechnologies29thLabourshortages30thUnemployment30thAssetbubblebursts31stBiological,chemicalornuclearhazards31stIlliciteconomicactivity32ndTerroristattacks32ndInflation33rdNon-weatherrelatednaturaldisasters33rdNon-weatherrelatednaturaldisasters34thAdverseoutcomesoffrontiertechnologies34thTerroristattacksRiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalSourceWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey2023-2024.GlobalRisksReport2024111GlobalRisks2024:AtaturningpointTheGlobalRisksReportanalysesglobalriskslikelytoheightenby2026.Chapter2addressesoverone-,two-and10-yearhorizonstosupportthe10-yearoutlookandhowevolvingrisksmaydecision-makersinadoptingadualvisionthatinteracttocreatefourpotentialhigh-riskoutlooksbalancesshort-andlonger-termrisks.Thisfortheworld.Thethirdandfinalchapterexamineschapteraddressestheoutlookforthefirsttwotheconceptofcooperation,showcasingdifferenttimeframesandexaminesselectedrisksthatareapproachestoaddressglobalrisks.1.1Theworldin2024TheaftermathoftheCOVID-19pandemicandAsweenter2024,resultsoftheForum’sGlobalongoingRussia-UkrainewarhasexposedcracksRisksPerceptionSurvey2023-2024(GRPS)insocietiesthatarebeingfurtherstrainedbyhighlightapredominantlynegativeoutlookforepisodicupheaval.Yettheglobalsystemhasthustheworldovertheshorttermthatisexpectedtofarprovedsurprisinglyresilient.Awidelyanticipatedworsenoverthelongterm(Figure1.1).Surveyedrecessionfailedtomaterializelastyear,andfinancialinSeptember2023,themajorityofrespondentsturbulencewasquicklysubdued,buttheoutlook(54%)anticipatesomeinstabilityandamoderateremainsuncertain.1Politicalstrifeandviolentriskofglobalcatastrophes,whileanother27%conflicts,fromNigerandSudantoGazaandIsrael,expectgreaterturbulenceand3%expectglobalhavecapturedtheattentionandapprehensionofcatastrophicriskstomaterializeintheshortterm.populationsworldwideinsomeinstanceswhileOnly16%expectastableorcalmoutlookintheattractinglittlefocusinothers.Thesedevelopmentsnexttwoyears.Theoutlookismarkedlymorehavenotyetledtowiderregionalconflicts–negativeoverthe10-yeartimeframe,with63%norhavetheycreatedgloballydestabilizingofrespondentsexpectingastormyorturbulentconsequencessuchasthoseseenattheinitialoutlookandlessthan10%expectingacalmoroutbreakofthewarinUkraineortheCOVID-19stablesituation.pandemic–buttheirlong-termoutlookcouldbringfurthershocks.FIGURE1.1Shortandlong-termglobaloutlook"Whichofthefollowingbestcharacterizesyouroutlookfortheworldoverthefollowingtimeperiods?"3%1%Shortterm(2years)27%54%15%Longterm(10years)17%46%29%8%1%Stormy:GlobalcatastrophicrisksloomingTurbulent:UpheavalsandelevatedriskofglobalcatastrophesUnsettled:Someinstability,moderateriskofglobalcatastrophesStable:Isolateddisruptions,lowriskofglobalcatastrophesCalm:NegligibleriskofglobalcatastrophesSourceNoteWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksThepercentagesinthegraphmaynotaddupto100%becausefigureshavebeenroundedPerceptionSurvey2023-2024.up/down.GlobalRisksReport202412GRPSresultsfor2024,2026and2034highlight(ENSO)cycle,isexpectedtostrengthenandpersistcurrentcrisesthatcorroderesilience,aswellasuntilMaythisyear.3Thiscouldcontinuetosetnewnewandrapidlyevolvingsourcesofriskthatwillrecordsinheatconditions,withextremeheatwaves,reshapethenextdecade.Fortheone-yeartimedrought,wildfiresandfloodinganticipated.frame,respondentswereaskedtoselectuptofiverisksthattheyfeelaremostlikelytopresentaAI-generatedmisinformationanddisinformationmaterialcrisisonaglobalscalein2024.Resultsare(53%)andSocietaland/orpoliticalpolarizationsummarizedinFigure1.2.(46%)followinsecondandthirdplace.ManycountriesarestillstrugglingtoregainlostyearsAfterthehottestNorthernHemispheresummerofprogressthatarosefromtheCOVID-19inrecordedhistoryin2023,2two-thirdsofpandemic,creatingfertilegroundformisinformationrespondentsselectedExtremeweather(66%)asanddisinformationtotakeholdandpolarizethetopriskfacedin2024.ElNiño,orthewarmingcommunities,societiesandcountries.phaseofthealternatingElNiño-SouthernOscillationFIGURE1.2Currentrisklandscape“Pleaseselectuptofiverisksthatyoubelievearemostlikelytopresentamaterialcrisisonaglobalscalein2024.”Extremeweather66%AI-generatedmisinformation53%anddisinformation46%Societaland/orpoliticalpolarization42%39%Cost-of-livingcrisis33%CyberattacksEconomicdownturn25%25%Disruptedsupplychainsfor19%criticalgoodsandresourcesEscalationoroutbreakofinterstatearmedconflict(s)AttacksoncriticalinfrastructureDisruptedsupplychainsforfood18%Censorshipanderosionoffreespeech16%Disruptedsupplychainsforenergy14%Publicdebtdistress14%Skillsorlabourshortages13%Accidentalorintentionalnuclearevent12%Violentcivilstrikesandriots11%9%Accidentalorintentionalrelease7%ofbiologicalagents4%InstitutionalcollapsewithinthefinancialsectorHousingbubbleburstTechbubbleburst4%0255075100Shareofrespondents(%)RiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalSourceWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey2023-2024.GlobalRisksReport202413Mirroringthepreviousyear’ssurveyresults,thehigher;5however,awarmerwinterintheNorthernCost-of-livingcrisis(42%)andCyberattacksHemisphere,forexample,followedbytheeasingof(39%)remainmajorconcernsintheoutlookoveralltheElNiñocycleoverthesummer,couldpartiallyandappearasatop-threeconcernforgovernmentalleviatefurtherenergypricespikesresultingfromandprivate-sectorrespondents,respectively.TheanyescalationoftheIsrael-GazaorRussia-UkraineCost-of-livingcrisisisrankedhigherbyyoungerconflicts.agegroups:itwasselectedby55%ofrespondentsaged39orbelow,comparedtojust28%ofthoseNotably,whilethesurveywasconductedbeforeaged60orover.4theoutbreakoftheformerconflict,aquarterofrespondentsranktheEscalationoroutbreakofAlthoughenergyandfoodcrisesrankedamonginterstatearmedconflict(s)(25%)asamongthethetoprisksof2023,thisyearlessthanone-fifthtopfiverisksfor2024,pointingtoabroadersetofofrespondentsselectedDisruptedsupplychainsconcerns.Atmorethan200,000deathsin2022,forfood(18%)orDisruptedsupplychainsforconflictdeathsareatthehighestlevelindecades,energy(14%)ascoreconcernsfor2024.Thedrivenpredominantlybystate-basedarmedconflict.6surveywasconductedinSeptemberof2023,thustheoutlookmayhavesinceshiftedgiventheRisksrelatingtothefinancial,techandreal-estateconflictintheMiddleEast,particularlyifhostilitiessectorsaretowardsthebottomofrespondents’escalate.Climatepressuresmayyetdrivepricesconcernsfor2024.1.2Thepathto2026Weakenedsystemsonlyrequirethesmallestpricestabilityandeconomicgrowth(Chaptershocktoedgepastthetippingpointofresilience.1.5:Economicuncertainty).EconomicrisksInthesecondtimeframecoveredbythesurvey,arenotablenewentrantstothetop10rankingsrespondentswereaskedtorankthelikelyimpactthisyear,withbothInflation(#7)andEconomicofrisksinthenexttwoyears.Theresultssuggestdownturn(#9)featuringinthetwo-yeartimethatcorrosivesocioeconomicvulnerabilitieswillbeframe(Figure1.3).Economicrisksareprioritizedinamplifiedinthenearterm,withloomingconcernsparticularbypublic-andprivate-sectorrespondentsaboutanEconomicdownturn(Chapter1.5),(Figure1.5).Geoeconomicconfrontation(#14)resurgentriskssuchasInterstatearmedconflictisamarkedabsencefromthetop10rankingsthis(Chapter1.4),andrapidlyevolvingriskslikeyear(Figure1.4)andhasdecreasedinperceivedMisinformationanddisinformation(Chapter1.3).severitycomparedtolastyear’sscores.However,likerelatedeconomicrisks,itfeaturesamongtheAsdiscussedinlastyear’sGlobalRisksReport,lesstopconcernsforbothpublic-andprivate-sectorpredictableandharder-to-handleinflationheightensrespondents(at#10and#11,respectively)asatheriskofmiscalibrationofeffortstobalancecontinuingsourceofeconomicvolatility.FIGURE1.3Globalrisksrankedbyseverityovertheshortterm(2years)"Pleaseestimatethelikelyimpact(severity)ofthefollowingrisksovera2-yearperiod."1stMisinformationanddisinformation6thLackofeconomicopportunity2ndExtremeweatherevents7thInflation3rdSocietalpolarization8thInvoluntarymigration4thCyberinsecurity9thEconomicdownturn5thInterstatearmedconflict10thPollutionRiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalSourceWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey2023-2024.GlobalRisksReport202414FIGURE1.4Annualchangeinglobalriskperceptionsovertheshortterm(2years)PersistentconcernsBiggestincreaseinrankingBiggestfallinranking2ndExtremeweather3rdSocietalpolarization-12thTechnologicalpower1714thGeoeconomicconfrontation114thCyberinsecurity8thInvoluntarymigrationconcentrationOverallranking21stMisinformationand1530thUnemployment11disinformation45thInterstatearmed931stBiological,chemical10conflictornuclearhazards218thInsufficientpublicinfrastructure916thDebt5andservicesRiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalSourceNoteWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksBoldedrisksrefertoglobalrisksthatarecurrentlyintheshort-termtop10riskslist,orwerePerceptionSurveys2022-2023and2023-2024.formerlyinthetop10inGRPS2022-2023.RefertoAppendixB:GlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey2022-2023forfurtherinformationonchangestotheglobalrisklist.NumbersafterarrowsrefertodirectionalchangeinrankingsbetweenGRPS2022-2023andGRPS2023-2024.FIGURE1.5Severitybystakeholderovertheshortterm(2years)CivilsocietyInternationalAcademiaGovernmentPrivatesector1stMisinformationandorganizationsMisinformationandExtremeweathereventsMisinformationanddisinformationdisinformationdisinformationExtremeweathereventsExtremeweathereventsMisinformationandExtremeweatherevents2ndExtremeweathereventsdisinformationMisinformationandSocietalpolarizationCyberinsecurityCyberinsecurity3rdSocietalpolarizationdisinformationSocietalpolarizationLackofeconomicSocietalpolarizationSocietalpolarization4thLackofeconomicopportunityopportunityInterstatearmedconflictInterstatearmedconflictLackofeconomicInflationopportunity5thInvoluntarymigrationNaturalresourceshortagesPollutionPollutionEconomicdownturn6thErosionofhumanrightsInvoluntarymigrationCriticalchangetoEarthInvoluntarymigrationInterstatearmedconflictsystems7thCriticalchangetoPollutionCyberinsecurityCriticalchangetoTechnologicalpowerEarthsystemsEarthsystemsconcentrationLackofeconomicInvoluntarymigrationInflationLackofeconomic8thPollutionopportunityopportunityCyberinsecurityTechnologicalpowerGeoeconomicInvoluntarymigration9thInterstatearmedconflictconcentrationconfrontationIntrastateviolence10thCyberinsecurityRiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalSourceNoteWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksSamplesizebystakeholdergroupvaried,andallrespondentswereweightedequallyforthePerceptionSurvey2023-2024.purposesofglobalrankings.Theseresultsarebasedonapproximatelythefollowing:civilsociety,n=152(10%oftotal);internationalorganisations,n=127(9%);academia,n=276(19%);government,n=183(12%);andprivatesector,n=715(48%).GlobalRisksReport202415Misinformationanddisinformationhasrisenpolarizationandeconomichardshiparediminishingrapidlyinrankingstofirstplaceforthetwo-yeartrustandasenseofsharedvalues.Theerosiontimeframe,andtheriskislikelytobecomemoreofsocialcohesionisleavingampleroomfornewacuteaselectionsinseveraleconomiestakeandevolvingriskstopropagateinturn.Societalplacethisyear(Chapter1.3:Falseinformation).polarization,alongsideEconomicdownturn,Societalpolarizationisthethird-mostsevereisseenasoneofthemostcentralrisksintheriskovertheshortterm,andaconsistentconcerninterconnected“risksnetwork”,withthegreatestacrossnearlyallstakeholdergroupings(Figurespotentialtotriggerandbeinfluencedbyotherrisks1.5and1.6).Divisivefactorssuchaspolitical(Figure1.7).FIGURE1.6Riskperceptionsbyageovertheshortterm(2years)<3030-3940-4950-5960-6970+MisinformationanddisinformationExtremeweathereventsSocietalpolarizationCyberinsecurityInterstatearmedconflictLackofeconomicopportunityInflationInvoluntarymigrationEconomicdownturnPollutionCriticalchangetoEarthsystemsNaturalresourceTechnologicalpowershortagesconcentrationGeoeconomicErosionofhumanrightsconfrontationBiodiversitylossandecosystemcollapseRiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalSourceNoteWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksEachcolumnrepresentsthetop10risksbyagegroup,orderedbyglobalrankingratherthanPerceptionSurvey2022-2023.within-agegrouprankings,tovisualizecommonthemesinriskperceptions.Samplesizebyagegroupvaried,andallrespondentswereweightedequallyforthepurposesofglobalrankings.Theseresultsarebasedonapproximatelythefollowing:<30,n=183(12%oftotal);30-39,n=250(17%);40-49,n=396(27%);50-59,n=406(27%);60-69,n=183(12%);and70+,n=69(5%).GlobalRisksReport202416FIGURE1.7Globalriskslandscape:aninterconnectionsmapIntrastateviolenceCensorshipandsurveillanceNaturalresourceshortagesInvoluntarymigrationErosionofhumanrightsMisinformationanddisinformationCriticalchangetoTerroristattacksAdverseoutcomesofEarthsystemsExtremeInterstatearmedconflictSocietalfrontiertechnologiesBiodiversitylossandweathereventsNon-weatherrelatednaturaldisasterspolarizationTechnologicalpowerecosystemcollapseconcentrationCyberinsecurityPollutionAdverseoutcomesInfectiousdiseasesofAItechnologiesChronichealthconditionsDisruptionstocriticalinfrastructureBiological,chemicalInsufficientinfrastructureandservicesornuclearhazardsLackofeconomicopportunityDisruptionstoasystemicallyimportantsupplychainLabourshortagesConcentrationofGeoeconomicconfrontationstrategicresourcesInflationEconomicdownturnDebtUnemploymentIlliciteconomicactivityAssetbubbleburstsNodesEdgesRiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalRiskinfluenceRelativeinfluenceHighHighMediumMediumLowLowSourceWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey2023-2024.Interstatearmedconflict(#5)risesinthethetwo-yeartimeframerankings,Criticalchangerankingsforthetwo-yearhorizon,acrossnearlytoEarthsystemscomesinat#11,Debtin16thallstakeholdergroups,exceptforgovernmentplace,andAdverseoutcomesofAItechnologiesrespondents.Thisdivergencemaysimplyreflectandotherfrontiertechnologiesin29thandlastdifferentviewsarounddefiningconflict:interstateplace,respectively.armedconflictinthestrictdefinitionhasremainedrelativelyrarethusfar,butinternationalinterventionsThefollowingsectionsexploresomeofthemostinintrastateconflictareontherise(Chapter1.4:severerisksthatmanyexpecttoplayoutovertheRiseinconflict).nexttwoyears,focusingonthreeentrantstothetop10riskslistovertheshortterm:MisinformationExtremeweatherevents,apersistentconcernanddisinformation(#1),Interstatearmedbetweenlastyearandthisyear,isat#2,Cyberconflict(#5)andEconomicdownturn(#9).Weinsecurityat#4,Involuntarymigrationat#8andbrieflydescribethelatestdevelopmentsandkeyPollutionat#10,roundingoutthetop10concernsdriversforfalseinformation,ariseinconflictandinrespondents’riskperceptionsthroughto2026.economicuncertainty,andconsidertheiremergingOverall,globalriskshavelowerseverityscoresimplicationsandknock-oneffects.comparedtolastyear’sresults.7FurtherdowninGlobalRisksReport2024171.3FalseinformationFIGURE1.8Severityscore:MisinformationanddisinformationPersistentfalseinformation(deliberateorotherwise)widelyspreadthroughmedianetworks,shiftingpublicopinioninasignificantwaytowardsdistrustinfactsandauthority.Includes,butisnotlimitedto:false,imposter,manipulatedandfabricatedcontent.Rank:1stAverage:4.72years16%15%23%21%16%7%1%SourceProportionofrespondentsSeverityWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey2023-2024.Note7654321Severitywasassessedona1-7Likertscale[1–Lowseverity,7–Highseverity].ThepercentagesintheHighLowgraphmaynotaddupto100%becausefigureshavebeenroundedup/down.–Misinformationanddisinformationmayradicallydisruptelectoralprocessesinseveraleconomiesoverthenexttwoyears.–Agrowingdistrustofinformation,aswellasmediaandgovernmentsassources,willdeepenpolarizedviews–aviciouscyclethatcouldtriggercivilunrestandpossiblyconfrontation.–Thereisariskofrepressionanderosionofrightsasauthoritiesseektocrackdownontheproliferationoffalseinformation–aswellasrisksarisingfrominaction.ThedisruptivecapabilitiesofmanipulatedNewclassesofcrimeswillalsoproliferate,suchinformationarerapidlyaccelerating,asopenasnon-consensualdeepfakepornographyoraccesstoincreasinglysophisticatedtechnologiesstockmarketmanipulation.11However,evenproliferatesandtrustininformationandinstitutionsastheinsidiousspreadofmisinformationanddeteriorates.Inthenexttwoyears,awidesetdisinformationthreatensthecohesionofsocieties,ofactorswillcapitalizeontheboominsyntheticthereisariskthatsomegovernmentswillactcontent,8amplifyingsocietaldivisions,ideologicaltooslowly,facingatrade-offbetweenpreventingviolenceandpoliticalrepression–ramificationsthatmisinformationandprotectingfreespeech,whilewillpersistfarbeyondtheshortterm.repressivegovernmentscoulduseenhancedregulatorycontroltoerodehumanrights.Misinformationanddisinformation(#1)isanewleaderofthetop10rankingsthisyear.Nolongerrequiringanicheskillset,easy-to-useinterfacestolarge-scaleartificialintelligence(AI)modelshavealreadyenabledanexplosioninfalsifiedinformationandso-called‘synthetic’content,fromsophisticatedvoicecloningtocounterfeitwebsites.Tocombatgrowingrisks,governmentsarebeginningtorolloutnewandevolvingregulationstotargetbothhostsandcreatorsofonlinedisinformationandillegalcontent.9NascentregulationofgenerativeAIwilllikelycomplementtheseefforts.Forexample,requirementsinChinatowatermarkAI-generatedcontentmayhelpidentifyfalseinformation,includingunintentionalmisinformationthroughAIhallucinatedcontent.10Generallyhowever,thespeedandeffectivenessofregulationisunlikelytomatchthepaceofdevelopment.Syntheticcontentwillmanipulateindividuals,JasonGoodman,Unsplashdamageeconomiesandfracturesocietiesinnumerouswaysoverthenexttwoyears.Falsifiedinformationcouldbedeployedinpursuitofdiversegoals,fromclimateactivismtoconflictescalation.GlobalRisksReport202418Mistrustinelectionsdiscern,notonlyfordigitallyliterateindividuals,butalsofordetectionmechanisms.15ResearchandOverthenexttwoyears,closetothreebilliondevelopmentcontinuesatpace,butthisareaofpeoplewillheadtotheelectoralpollsacrossinnovationisradicallyunderfundedincomparisonseveraleconomies,includingtheUnitedStates,totheunderlyingtechnology.16Moreover,evenIndia,theUnitedKingdom,MexicoandIndonesiaifsyntheticcontentislabelledassuch,17these(Figure1.9).12Thepresenceofmisinformationlabelsareoftendigitalandnotvisibletoconsumersanddisinformationintheseelectoralprocessesofcontentorappearaswarningsthatstillallowcouldseriouslydestabilizetherealandperceivedtheinformationtospread.Suchinformationcanlegitimacyofnewlyelectedgovernments,riskingthusstillbeemotivelypowerful,blurringthelinepoliticalunrest,violenceandterrorism,andabetweenmalignandbenignuse.Forexample,anlonger-termerosionofdemocraticprocesses.AI-generatedcampaignvideocouldinfluencevotersandfuelprotests,orinmoreextremescenarios,Recenttechnologicaladvanceshaveenhancedtheleadtoviolenceorradicalization,evenifitcarriesavolume,reachandefficacyoffalsifiedinformation,warningbytheplatformonwhichitissharedthatitwithflowsmoredifficulttotrack,attributeandisfabricatedcontent.18control.ThecapacityofsocialmediacompaniestoensureplatformintegritywilllikelybeoverwhelmedTheimplicationsofthesemanipulativecampaignsinthefaceofmultipleoverlappingcampaigns.13couldbeprofound,threateningdemocraticDisinformationwillalsobeincreasinglypersonalizedprocesses.Ifthelegitimacyofelectionsistoitsrecipientsandtargetedtospecificgroups,questioned,civilconfrontationispossible–andcouldsuchasminoritycommunities,aswellasevenexpandtointernalconflictsandterrorism,anddisseminatedthroughmoreopaquemessagingstatecollapseinmoreextremecases.DependingplatformssuchasWhatsApporWeChat.14onthesystemicimportanceofaneconomy,thereisalsoarisktoglobaltradeandfinancialmarkets.TheidentificationofAI-generatedmis-andState-backedcampaignscoulddeteriorateinterstatedisinformationinthesecampaignswillnotberelations,bywayofstrengthenedsanctionsregimes,clear-cut.ThedifferencebetweenAI-andhuman-cyberoffenseoperationswithrelatedspilloverrisks,generatedcontentisbecomingmoredifficulttoanddetentionofindividuals(includingtargetingprimarilybasedonnationality,ethnicityandreligion).19FIGURE1.9Nationalriskperceptionsinthecontextofupcomingelections“Whichfiverisksaremostlikelytoposethebiggestthreattoyourcountryinthenexttwoyears?”1striskinIndiaMisinformationanddisinformationOver1.4bn(nearly50%internetpenetration)headforageneralelectioninApril-May20246thriskintheUnitedStatesNearly340m(92%internetpenetration)headforapresidentialelectioninNovember20248thriskinEuropeanUnionNearly450m(89%internetpenetration)electtheEUParliamentinJune202411thriskinUnitedKingdomNearly68m(98%internetpenetration)headforageneralelectionbyJanuary202511thriskinMexico128m(79%internetpenetration)headforageneralelectioninJune202418thriskinIndonesiaNearly278m(88%internetpenetration)headforapresidentialelectioninMarch202422ndriskinSouthAfricaOver60m(72%internetpenetration)headforageneralelectionin2024RussiaAround145m(88%internetpenetration)headforapresidentialelectioninMarch2024SourceNoteRankWorldEconomicForumExecutiveOpinionSurvey2023;EUexcludesSlovakia.Worldometer,2023;Statista,2023;DataReportal,2023.1st10th20th30th36thGlobalRisksReport202419Societiesdividedinpoliticalinstitutions,andthreatennationalcohesionandcoherence.TrustinspecificleadersMisinformationanddisinformationandSocietalwillconfertrustininformation,andtheauthorityofpolarizationareseenbyGRPSrespondentstobetheseactors–fromconspiracytheorists,includingthemoststronglyconnectedrisksinthenetwork,politicians,andextremistgroupstoinfluencerswiththelargestpotentialtoamplifyeachother.andbusinessleaders–couldbeamplifiedastheyIndeed,polarizedsocietiesaremorelikelytotrustbecomearbitersoftruth.information(trueorfalse)thatconfirmstheirbeliefs.GivendistrustinthegovernmentandmediaasDefiningtruthsourcesoffalseinformation,20manipulatedcontentmaynotbeneeded–merelyraisingaquestionasFalseinformationcouldnotonlybeusedasatowhetherithasbeenfabricatedmaybesufficientsourceofsocietaldisruption,butalsoofcontrol,toachieverelevantobjectives.Thisthensowsthebydomesticactorsinpursuitofpoliticalagendas.21seedsforfurtherpolarization.Althoughmisinformationanddisinformationhavelonghistories,theerosionofpoliticalchecksandAsidentifiedinlastyear’sGlobalRisksReportbalances,andgrowthintoolsthatspreadand(Chapter1.2:Societalpolarization),thecontrolinformation,couldamplifytheefficacyconsequencescouldbevast.Societiesmaybecomeofdomesticdisinformationoverthenexttwopolarizednotonlyintheirpoliticalaffiliations,butyears.22Globalinternetfreedomisalreadyinalsointheirperceptionsofreality,posingaseriousdeclineandaccesstowidersetsofinformationchallengetosocialcohesionandevenmentalhealth.hasdroppedinnumerouscountries.23FallsinWhenemotionsandideologiesovershadowfacts,pressfreedomsinrecentyearsandarelatedlackmanipulativenarrativescaninfiltratethepublicofstronginvestigativemedia,arealsosignificantdiscourseonissuesrangingfrompublichealthtovulnerabilitiesthataresettogrow.24socialjusticeandeducationtotheenvironment.Falsifiedinformationcanalsofuelanimosity,fromIndeed,theproliferationofmisinformationandbiasanddiscriminationintheworkplacetoviolentdisinformationmaybeleveragedtostrengthendigitalprotests,hatecrimesandterrorism.authoritarianismandtheuseoftechnologytocontrolcitizens.GovernmentsthemselveswillbeincreasinglySomegovernmentsandplatforms,aimingtoinapositiontodeterminewhatistrue,potentiallyprotectfreespeechandcivilliberties,mayfailtoactallowingpoliticalpartiestomonopolizethepublictoeffectivelycurbfalsifiedinformationandharmfuldiscourseandsuppressdissentingvoices,includingcontent,makingthedefinitionof“truth”increasinglyjournalistsandopponents.25Individualshavealreadycontentiousacrosssocieties.Stateandnon-statebeenimprisonedinBelarusandNicaragua,andactorsalikemayleveragefalseinformationtowidenkilledinMyanmarandIran,foronlinespeech.26fracturesinsocietalviews,erodepublicconfidenceSpenserH,UnsplashGlobalRisksReport202420FIGURE1.10RiskinterconnectionsMisinformationanddisinformationIntrastateviolenceCensorshipandsurveillanceErosionofhumanrightsTerroristattacksMisinformationanddisinformationInterstatearmedconflictAdverseoutcomesoffrontiertechnologiesTechnologicalpowerconcentrationCyberinsecuritySocietalAdverseoutcomespolarizationofAItechnologiesInfectiousdiseasesReferenceNodesEdgesRiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalRiskinfluenceRelativeinfluenceHighHighMediumMediumLowLowSourceWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey2023-2024.Theexportofauthoritariandigitalnormstoawiderusedtoconsolidateexistingcontrol,particularlyinsetofcountriescouldcreateaviciouscycle:theflaweddemocraciesorhybridregimes.Yetmoreriskofmisinformationquicklydescendsintothematuredemocraciescouldalsobeatrisk,bothwidespreadcontrolofinformationwhich,inturn,fromextensiveexercisesofgovernmentcontrolleavescitizensvulnerabletopoliticalrepressionorduetotrade-offsbetweenmanagingmis-andanddomesticdisinformation.27GRPSrespondentsdisinformationandprotectingfreespeech.InhighlightstrongbilateralrelationshipsbetweenJanuarylastyear,TwitterandYouTubeagreedtoMisinformationanddisinformation,CensorshipremovelinkstoaBBCdocumentaryinIndia.28andsurveillance(#21)andtheErosionofhumanInMexico,civilsocietyhasbeenconcernedaboutrights(#15),indicatingahigherperceivedlikelihoodthegovernment'sapproachtofakenewsanditsofallthreerisksoccurringtogether(Figure1.10).implicationsforpressfreedomandsafety.29Thisisaparticularconcerninthosecountriesfacingupcomingelections,whereacrackdownonrealorperceivedforeigninterferencecouldbeGlobalRisksReport2024211.4RiseinconflictFIGURE1.11Severityscore:InterstatearmedconflictBilateralormultilateraluseofforcebetweenstates,manifestingasproxywaroropen,hotwar.Rank:5thAverage:4.22years8%13%20%24%19%12%SourceWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisks3%PerceptionSurvey2023-2024.ProportionofrespondentsNoteSeveritySeveritywasassessedona1-7Likertscale[1–Lowseverity,7–Highseverity].Thepercentagesinthe7654321graphmaynotaddupto100%becausefigureshavebeenroundedup/down.HighLow–Escalationinthreekeyhotspots–Ukraine,IsraelandTaiwan–ispossible,withhigh-stakesramificationsforthegeopoliticalorder,globaleconomy,andsafetyandsecurity.–Geographic,ideological,socioeconomicandenvironmentaltrendscouldconvergetosparknewandresurgenthostilities,amplifyingstatefragility.–Astheworldbecomesmoremultipolar,awideningarrayofpivotalpowerswillstepintothevacuum,potentiallyerodingguardrailstoconflictcontainment.TheworldhasbecomesignificantlylesspeacefulInterstatearmedconflict(#5)isanewentrantoverthepastdecade,withconflicteruptingintothetop10riskrankingsthisyear.Specificmultipleregionslastyear.30Activeconflictsareflashpointscouldabsorbfocusandsplittheatthehighestlevelsindecades,whilerelatedresourcesofmajorpowersoverthenexttwoyears,deathshavewitnessedasteepincrease,nearlydegradingglobalsecurityanddestabilizingthequadruplingoverthetwo-yearperiodfrom2020globalfinancialsystemandsupplychains.Althoughto2022(Figure1.12),largelyattributabletowarbetweentwostatesinthestrictdefinitiondevelopmentsinEthiopiaandUkraine.Whiledifficultremainsrelativelyrare(Figure1.12),thiscouldtoattributetoasinglecause,longer-termshiftsincontributetoconflictcontagion,leadingtorapidlygeopoliticalpower,economicfragilityandlimitstoexpandinghumanitariancrisesthatoverwhelmthetheefficacyandcapacityofinternationalsecuritycapacitytorespond.mechanismshaveallcontributedtothissurge.Daniel,UnsplashGlobalRisksReport202422FIGURE1.12Incidenceandimpactofstate-basedarmedconflict,2007-202260240k50200k40160kNo.ofconflictfatalitiesNo.ofconflicts30120k2080k1040k002007200820092010201120122013201420152016201720182019202020212022YearTotalstate-basedarmedconflictsState-basedarmedconflictfatalitiesInternationalizedarmedconflictsInterstatearmedconflictsSourceNoteUppsalaConflictDataProgram(UCDP),2023.TheUCDPArmedConflictDatabase’sdefinitionofstate-basedarmedconflictisdefinedas“acontestedincompatibilitythatconcernsgovernmentand/orterritorywheretheuseofarmedforcebetweentwoparties,ofwhichatleastoneisthegovernmentofastate,resultsinatleast25battle-relateddeathsinonecalendaryear”.Thismayincludeintrastatearmedconflict(occurringbetweenagovernmentandanon-governmentalparty),internationalizedintrastatearmedconflict(occurringbetweenagovernment,andoneormoreinternaloppositiongroups,withinterventionfromotherstatesoneitherside),andinterstatearmedconflict(occurringbetweentwoormorestatesorgovernments).ThedefinitionofinterstatearmedconflictadoptedbytheGRPSisbroaderthantheUCDP’sdefinitionof“interstatearmedconflict”,encompassingsomeelementsof“internationalizedintrastatearmedconflict”.High-stakeshotspotsOverthenexttwoyears,thewarinUkrainecouldsporadicallyalternatebetweenintensifyingandOverthenexttwoyears,theattentionandrefreezing.Despitesanctions,Russiahascontinuedresourcesofglobalpowersarelikelytobefocusedtobenefitfromenergyprofitsandcommodityonthreehotspotsinparticular:thewarinUkraine,exports–andthiscouldincreasefurtherifthetheIsrael-GazaconflictandtensionsoverTaiwan.conflictintheMiddleEastwidens.31Pro-RussianEscalationinanyoneofthesehotspotswouldorneutralsentimentinEasternandCentralEuroperadicallydisruptglobalsupplychains,financialcouldsoftensupportfromUkraine’sEuropeanmarkets,securitydynamicsandpoliticalstability,allies,32whilesupportintheUnitedStatescouldviscerallythreateningthesenseofsecurityandwaneunderdomesticpressures,otherinternationalsafetyofindividualsworldwide.priorities,orunderanewgovernment.GlobaldivisionswithrespecttotheMiddleEastconflictAllthreeareasstandatageopoliticalcrossroads,mayalsocomplicateeffortsbyUkrainetomaintainwheremajorpowershavevestedinterests:oilandunitywithWesternallies,whilealsogarneringtraderoutesintheMiddleEast,stabilityandthesupportfromtheGlobalSouth.33IftheconflictbalanceofpowerinEasternEurope,andadvancedintensifies,itisstillmorelikelytodosothroughtechnologicalsupplychainsinEastAsia.Eachconventionalratherthannuclearmeans,butitcouldcouldleadtobroaderregionaldestabilization,alsoexpandtoneighbouringcountries.Whilepost-directlydrawinginmajorpower(s)andescalatingconflictscenariosforbothUkraineandRussiaarethescaleofconflict.Allthreealsodirectlyinvolvedifficulttopredict,thewarcould‘refreeze’intoapower(s)reckonedtopossessnuclearcapabilities.prolonged,sporadicconflictthatcouldlastyearsorevendecades.34GlobalRisksReport202423ProximatedevelopmentsintheMiddleEastareaNumerousGRPSrespondentsalsocitedTaiwansourceofconsiderableuncertainty,riskingfurtheranddisputedterritoriesinEastandSouth-EastAsiaindirectordirectconfrontationbetweenglobalasareasofconcern.IncontrasttoRussia,whichpowers.IftheIsrael-Gazaconflictdestabilizesintodoubleditsdefensespendingtargettomorethanwiderregionalwarfare,moreextensiveintervention$100billionin2023,andtheUnitedStates,whichbymajorpowersispossible,includingIranandtheallocatedover$113billioninassistancerelatingtoWest.35BeyondpotentiallyseismicshockstoglobalthewarinUkrainealone,37Chinahaslargelyactedenergypricesandsupplychains,escalationcouldasanon-interventionistpowerinboththeUkrainesplittheattentionandresourcesoftheEUandtheandMiddleEastconflicts,avoidingtheriskofUnitedStatesbetweenUkraineandIsrael.36Theoverstretch.38WhilethereisnoevidencetosuggestscaleofGulfcountries’orWesterninterventionisthatescalationisimminent,thereremainsamaterialuncertain;it’slikelytocontinuetobedeeplypolarizingpossibilityofaccidentalorintentionaloutbreakofdomesticallyandholdsignificantpoliticalsway.hostilities,givenheightenedactivityintheregion.39ClaytonHolmes,UnsplashConflictcontagioncouldincludetheBalkans,Libya,Syria,Kashmir,Guyana,theKurdishregionandKoreanpeninsula.41Ashigh-stakeshotspotsundermineglobalsecurity,Theserisksarewell-recognizedbybusinessawidersetoftrendsmayfuelacombustibleleaders:Interstatearmedconflictfeaturesasenvironmentinwhichnewandexistinghostilitiesareatop-fiveriskin20countries(18%)surveyedmorelikelytoignite.Asconflictsspread,guardrailsintheForum’sExecutiveOpinionSurvey(EOS,totheircontainmentareerodingandresolveforseeAppendixC:ExecutiveOpinionSurvey:long-termsolutionshavestalled.40Inparallel,theNationalRiskPerceptions),includingEgypt,internationalizationofconflictsbyawidersetofIraq,KazakhstanandSerbia,andisthetopriskinalternatepowerswillaccelerate‘multipolarity’andArmenia,Georgia,KyrgyzstanandJapan.theriskofinadvertentescalation.Second,resourcestress,economichardshipFirst,simmeringtensionsandfrozenconflictsandweakenedstatecapacitywilllikelygrowthatareproximatetoexistinghotspotscouldand,inturn,fuelconflict.42Theremayalsobeaheatup.Forexample,spilloverimpactsfromariseof‘ungovernedcountries’,wherenon-statehighconcentrationofconflicts,suchasinAsiaactorsfightforcontroloverlargeswathesofandAfrica(Figure1.13),couldrangefrommoreterritory,orwherepartiesnotrecognizedbythereadilyavailablearmstraffickingtoconflict-driveninternationalsystemgainfullcontrol.Forexample,migration.Otherstatescouldalsodeliberatelyresource-richcountriescouldbecomecaughtinstoketensionsinneighbouringcountriestodivertabattlegroundofproxywarfarebetweenmultipleattentionandresources,throughdisinformationpowers,includingneighbouringeconomies,campaignsorthedeploymentofstate-backedorganizedcrimenetworksandparamilitarygroupsmilitiagroups,forexample.Frozenconflictsatrisk(Chapter2.6:Crimewave).43GlobalRisksReport202424FIGURE1.13GeographyofviolenceA.State-basedarmedconflictsbyregion,2007-20226050No.ofstate-basedconflicts4030201002008200920102011201220132014201520162017201820192020202120222007AmericasEuropeAfricaYearRegionMiddleEastAsiaB.State-basedarmedconflictfatalitiesbyregion,2007-2022250k200kNo.ofconflictfatalities150k100k50k02008200920102011201220132014201520162017201820192020202120222007AfricaTotalYearRegionAmericasEuropeMiddleEastAsiaSourceNoteUppsalaConflictDataProgram(UCDP),2023.RegionsasdefinedbytheUCDP.GlobalRisksReport202425Third,withinstantinformationnetworksandconditions,militarypowerprojectionbytheWestreinforcingalgorithms,thesymbolismofhigh-couldfadefurther,potentiallycreatingpowerstakeshotspotscouldtriggercontagionbeyondvacuumsinpartsofAfrica,theMiddleEastandconflictgeographies.DeeplyingrainedideologicalAsia.France,forexample,haswithdrawntroopsongrievancesareinsomecasesdrivinghostilities,andrequestfromMali,BurkinaFasoandNigeroverthethesedivisionsareresonatingwithcommunitiesandpasttwoyears.44politicalpartieselsewhere.ThisexpandsbeyondreligiousandethnicdivisionstobroaderchallengesAsthedominanceoflong-heldpowercentrestosystemsofgovernance.Nationalidentities,wanes,alternatepowerswillcompeteforinfluenceinternationallawanddemocraticvaluesareininterstateandintrastateconflicts,potentiallycomingintoquestion,contributingtocivilunrest,leadingtodeadlier,prolongedproxywarfareandthreateninghumanrights,andreignitingviolence,overwhelminghumanitariancrises.45Thereareincludinginadvanceddemocraciesandbetweenanumberofincentivestothisinvolvement,fromtheGlobalNorthandSouth.accesstorawresources,suchasmineralsandoil,totheprotectionandpromotionoftrade,North-Southriftinvestmentandsecurityinterests.PivotalpowerswillalsoincreasinglylendsupportandresourcesDissatisfactionwiththecontinuedpolitical,militarytogarnerpoliticalallies,takingadvantageofthisandeconomicdominanceoftheGlobalNorthwideningriftbetweentheGlobalNorthandtheisgrowing,particularlyasstatesintheGlobalGlobalSouth.Southbearthebruntofachangingclimate,theaftereffectsofpandemic-eracrisesandAsanewsetofinfluencesinglobalaffairstakesgeoeconomicriftsbetweenmajorpowers.Historicalshape,politicalalliancesandalignmentwithingrievancesofcolonialism,combinedwithmoretheGlobalSouthwillalsoshapethelonger-termrecentonesregardingthecostsoffoodandfuel,trajectoryofinternationalizedconflicts.Adeepgeopoliticalalliances,theUnitedNationsanddivideontheinternationalstagecouldmeanthatBrettonWoodssystems,andthelossanddamagecoordinatedeffortstoisolate‘rogue’statesmaybeagenda,couldaccelerateanti-Westernsentimentincreasinglyfutile,whileinternationalgovernanceoverthenexttwoyears.Inconjunctionwithmoreandpeacekeepingmechanismsshowntobethinlyspreadresourcesandtightereconomicineffectiveat‘policing’conflictcouldbesidelined.MathiasReding,UnsplashGlobalRisksReport2024261.5EconomicuncertaintyFIGURE1.14Severityscore:EconomicdownturnNear-zeroorslowglobalgrowthlastingforseveralyearsoraglobalcontraction(recessionordepression).Rank:9thAverage:4.12years6%12%20%23%23%13%3%ProportionofrespondentsSourceNoteSeverityWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksSeveritywasassessedona1-7LikertscalePerceptionSurvey2023-2024.[1–Lowseverity,7–Highseverity].Thepercentagesinthe7654321graphmaynotaddupto100%becausefigureshavebeenroundedup/down.HighLow–Thenear-termoutlookremainshighlyuncertainduetodomesticfactorsinsomeoftheworld'slargestmarketsaswellasgeopoliticaldevelopments.–Continuedsupply-sidepressuresanddemanduncertaintycouldcontributetopersistentinflationandhighinterestrates.–Small-andmedium-sizedcompaniesandheavilyindebtedcountrieswillbeparticularlyexposedtoslowinggrowthamidelevatedinterestrates.Accordingtoonenarrative,theglobaleconomyhasInanotherversion,persistentlyelevatedinflationshownsurprisingresilienceinthefaceofthemostinmanycountriesandhighinterestratesareaggressiveglobaltighteningofmonetarypolicyweighingheavilyoneconomicgrowth,particularlyinindecades.Despitewidespreadpredictionsofaexport-andmanufacturing-ledmarkets.Analreadyrecessionin2023(Figure1.15),46theperceptionvisibleeconomicdownturnislikelytospread,ofa‘softerlanding’appearstobeprevailing.withariskthatneweconomicshockswouldbeInflationisfallingamidtightlabourmarketsandunmanageableinsuchfragilityanddebtpassesthestronger-than-anticipatedconsumerspendingtippingpointofsustainability.andgrowth,particularlyintheUnitedStates.47FIGURE1.15Googlesearchfor'Recession'LehmanBrothersCOVID-19declaredRussiainvadescollapseapandemicUkraine100Nov202480Interestovertime60402002010201520202004YearTechnologicalEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalRiskcategoriesSourceGlobalrecessionsoccurredin2009and2020Google,2023.GlobalRisksReport202427FIGURE1.16Nationalriskperceptions:Economicdownturn“Whichfiverisksarethemostlikelytoposethebiggestthreattoyourcountryinthenexttwoyears?”A.Prolongedeconomicstagnation,2022B.Economicdownturn,2023SourceRankWorldEconomicForumExecutiveOpinionSurveys2022and2023.1st10th20th30th36thThesecontrastingnarrativesencapsulatethewithinandbetweeneconomies,particularlywithhighlyuncertaineconomicoutlook.Fearsofanrespecttoinflation,interestratesandgrowthEconomicdownturnarewidespreadamongrates.Withcontrastingviewsaboutthefuture,private-sectorrespondents,featuringasatop-fivetheriskofmiscalibrationbycentralbanks,riskin102countries(90%)surveyedintheEOS,governmentsandcompanieswillriseaccordingly,asignificantuptickfrom2022(Figure1.16).Apotentiallydeepeningandprolongingeconomicslowdowninglobalgrowthisalreadyoccurring,butrisks.Additionally,continuedtradeconflictsanditistakingplaceunderadifferentsetofeconomicgeoeconomicriftsbetweentheUnitedStates,parametersthanpreviouscycles,heighteningEuropeanUnionandChinaaddtothesignificantuncertainty.Overthenexttwoyears,theremayeconomicuncertaintyahead.bealackofcoherenceinforwardprojectionsAdeoluEletu,UnsplashGlobalRisksReport202428Supply-drivenpricepressuresandtheEurozone(Figure1.17).49Inparallel,therehasbeenaslowdownineconomicgrowthinkeyMarketsarealreadyanticipatinginterestratecutsindustriesandmarkets.Theglobaleconomyhadinkeyeconomiesinthefirsthalfofthisyear.48beenproppedupbycontinuedstrengthinservicesHowever,thereareseveralinflationarypressuresthatthroughout2023,whichisnowflagging,whilemaystymieexpectationsandpresentaless-smoothmanufacturinghasalreadybeenincontractionpathtoinflationtargets.Ifpricepressurescontinue,foroverayear(Figure1.18).50EconomicgrowthcentralbankscouldbehesitanttocutratesinisstagnantintheEuropeanUnion,at0.6%lastresponsetosignalsofweakergrowth,resultinginyear,withestimatessuggestingthattheeconomichigher-for-longerinflationandinterestrates.powerhouseofGermanycontractedby0.3%in2023.51ProfitsoftheS&P500,excludingtheReflectingtighterfinancialconditions,bothheadline‘Magnificent7’techstocks,wereestimatedtoandcoreinflationhavedroppedintheUnitedStatescontractby8.6%lastyear.52FIGURE1.17InflationInflationrate,averageconsumerprices+10(Annualpercentchange)/CoreinflationrateAnnualpercentchangeCoreinflationrate+8+6+4EuropeanUnionUnitedStates+2China0-22016201720182019202020212022202320242015SourceIMF,2023;TradingEconomics,2023.FIGURE1.18GlobalPurchasingManagers'Index(PMI)56GlobalPurchasingManagers’Index5554535251PMIComposite50IndexvalueOutputIndexPMIServicesBusiness49ActivityIndexPMIManufacturing48OutputIndex47Nov2023JanAprJulOctJanAprJulGlobalRisksReport20242920222023SourceS&PGlobal,2023.Yetevenasinflationhasbeenpartiallytamedtermeconomicgrowth’.55Yetinvestmentinboththroughhigherinterestrates,ithasnotreachedmanufacturingandenergyinfrastructurehavebeencentralbanktargetsoftwopercentandtherekeydriversofgrowthinrecentyears,replacingremainsamaterialriskoflargelysupply-sidepricelostconstructiondemandtoadegree.56Althoughpressuresoverthenexttwoyears.Forexample,challengesremain,intheabsenceoffurtherElNiño-impactstofoodproductionandlogisticsshocks,thereisroomforanupsidesurprise–coulddriveinflationandcostlydisruptionstosupplylocalconsumptionmayrevive,growthmaybechains.AnyamplificationoftheMiddleEastconflictlesssluggishandtheslowdownshallowerthancouldtriggerpricespikesinenergyandfurtherpervasivemarketexpectations.Inaddition,inthedisruptshippingroutes,compoundingcontinuedabsenceoffurthergeoeconomicbacklash,excessimpactsfromthewarinUkraine.53Thecost-of-capacityinadvancedmanufacturing,particularlyinlivingimpactofpersistentinflation,perceivedtobegreentechnologies,couldhelpcounteractglobaldecliningin2024,couldresurgeasthecontinuedpricepressures,lendingmomentumtothegreenimpactofelevatedpricespersists.Awage-pricetransitionandglobaldemand.57spiralisstillpossible,withEOSrespondentsanticipatinglabourshortagesinkeysectorsandThereissimilaruncertaintyintheUnitedStates.economiesoverthenexttwoyears(ChapterSomeforecastsarealreadypricinginupto2.4%2.5:Endofdevelopment?).Strongerindustrialeconomicgrowthfor2024,andotherspredictratepoliciesandtradecontrolsemanatingfromcutsintheearlyhalfoftheyear.58Fiscalpolicyhasadvancedeconomies,targetingthegreentransitionremainedlooseevenasmonetarypolicytightened,andadvancedtechnology,couldalsoremainawiththeUnitedStatesrunninga$1.7trilliondeficitpersistentinflationarytrendoverthisperiod.in2023,effectivelydoublingthedeficitinthepastyearalone.59Thiscouldcontinuetokeepdemand-Uncertaintywithinglobaldrivenpricepressureshigh.Thecorrelationpowerhousesbetweenconsumersentimentandspendingisalsoaddingtouncertainty:economicpessimismmayTheoutlooksforthetwolargesteconomies–Chinabewidespread,butitisnotnecessarilydampeningandtheUnitedStates–arehighlycomplex,anddemand–yet.60Ontheotherhand,debtservicingthesetwokeysourcesofuncertaintycouldleadtohitover$981billioninQ32023–anincreaseofunanticipated,andpossiblydivergent,implicationsover$753billioncomparedtothesameperiodinforthetrajectoryoftheglobaleconomy.2022,asumsimilartothebudgetaryspendondefense.61AnyfiscalconsolidationintheUnitedChina’seconomyiswidelyexpectedtoslowthisStates–orapoliticalstand-offrelatingtodebtyear,withtheweakeningofthepropertymarketloads–couldhaveaprofoundeffectonglobalandlocalandexternaldemandgenerallycitedmarketsandtrade,whileanyoverestimationofasprimarycauses.54Despiteretainingits‘A1’theslowdowncouldleadtoearlierorsharperlong-termcreditrating,theoutlookforChina’sinterventiononinterestratesandre-sparkgovernmentdebtwasrecentlydowngradedfromdemand-sidepricepressures.Theoutcomeof‘neutral’to‘negative’,reflectingrisksrelatingtheUSpresidentialelectionsinNovembercreatesto‘structurallyandpersistentlylowermedium-additionaluncertaintyforthecountry’seconomicoutlook,dependingonthepolicychoicesofthenextgovernment.62MatthewHenry,UnsplashGlobalRisksReport202430Debtdistressstart-upsstruggleandlarger,morefinanciallyrobustcorporationsconsolidatetheirposition,includinginHigherinterestratesamidslowinggrowthwillstrainthetechsector(Chapter2.4:AIincharge).debtloadsforthepublicandprivatesectoralike.ThecorporatedebtdefaultrateremainsfarlowerHeavilyindebtedcountriesarealsoexposedtothanpeakshitduringthe2008-09GlobalFinancialtheseeconomicconditions.TheriskofsovereignCrisis(Figure1.19).63Themajorityofcorporatedebtdebtdefaultsisrisingbutnotably,evenwithaisalsoyearsfrommaturity.Lessthan14%ofS&PstrongUSdollar,largeremergingeconomies500debtissettomatureinthenexttwoyears,suchasMexicoandBrazilhavelargelyavoidedwithnearlyhalftomatureafter2030.64Inessence,debtdistresstodate.65Thishasbeenattributedtheworld’slargestcompanieswillbeeffectivelytostructurallydifferentconditionsintheseinsulatedfromhigherinterestratesformorethanmarketsthaninthepast,includingcentralbankhalfadecade.independenceandtheaccumulationoflargeforeign-exchangereserves.66InotherpartsoftheHowever,smallandmedium-sizedcompanies,thatworld,likeinEgypt,Ethiopia,Ghana,Lebanon,formthebackboneofmanydomesticmarkets,Pakistan,andTunisia,therisksaremuchhigher.willbeparticularlysensitivetoslowingeconomicTheimpactsoftighterfinancialconditionswillgrowthandpersistentlyhighinterestrates.Asbuildovertime,andpressuresonfiscalbalancesstrugglingcompaniescutcosts,unemploymentwillrise.Givenhistoricallyhighdebtloads,manymayrise,reducingconsumerspendingandcreatinggovernmentsmightbeunableorunwillingtohelpanegativefeedbackloopthatcancontributetocushioneconomicimpactstothesamedegreeasadeepereconomicdownturn.Thiscouldalsotheyhaveinrecentyears,sharpeningtheslowdowncontributetoheightenedmarketconcentration,asforcompaniesandindividuals.FIGURE1.19Corporatedebtdefaults(UnitedStates,2006-2023)161412HYissuerdefaultrate1086420200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018201920202021202220232006YearSourceKraemer&Kugle,2023.GlobalRisksReport2024311.6LookingaheadTheseresultspointtoaglobalriskslandscapeandcorruption.Exponentialtechnologygrowthmaywhereeconomic,geopoliticalandsocietalleavethenextgenerationwithoutaclearpathtovulnerabilitieswillcontinuetobuild.Worryingimprovehumanpotential,securityandwellbeing.developmentsemergingtodayhavethepotentialtobecomechronicglobalrisksoverthenextdecade.HowtheseglobalrisksevolvewillreflecttheglobalconditionsthatareslowlytakingshapeacrossAsconstantupheavalbecomesthenorm,decadesmultiplespheres:geostrategic,environmental,ofinvestmentinhumandevelopment–anddemographicandtechnological.Chapter2humanresilience–areslowlybeingchippedaway,discussesaworldthatisbeingstretchedbeyondpotentiallyleavingevencomparativelystrongitslimit,highlightingaseriesofemergentrisksthatstatesandindividualsvulnerabletorapidshocksarearisinginthecontextofthesestructuralregimefromnovelandresurgentsources.Theimpactsofshifts.Amultiplicityoffuturesareconceivableoverextremeweathermaydepleteavailableeconomicthenextdecade.Whilethenextchapterexploresresourcestomitigateandadapttoclimatechange.themostconcerningpotentialoutcomes,Chapter3Increasingvulnerabilities,broughtaboutbyresourceexploreshowamorepositivepathcanbeshapedstress,conflictandincreasingpolarization,couldthroughactingtoday.exposesocietiesandwholeeconomiestocrimeAliArifSoydaş,UnsplashGlobalRisksReport202432Endnotes1.Gourinchas,Pierre-Olivier,“ResilientGlobalEconomyStillLimpingAlong,WithGrowingDivergences”,IMFBlog,10October2023,https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2023/10/10/resilient-global-economy-still-limping-along-with-growing-divergences.2.Berman,NoahandSabineBaumgartner,“TheWeatherofSummer2023WastheMostExtremeYet”,CouncilonForeignRelations,18September2023,https://www.cfr.org/article/weather-summer-2023-was-most-extreme-yet#:~:text=The%20Weather%20of%20Summer%202023,heat%2C%20wildfires%2C%20and%20storms.&text=The%20summer%20of%202023%20was%20the%20Northern%20Hemisphere’s%20hottest%20in%20recorded%20history.3.Thereisan80%chanceitwillcontinuetoMarch-May2024,anda75-85%chanceitwillbecomeastrongevent.See:NOAAClimatePredictionCenter,“ElNiño/SouthernOscillation(Enso)DiagnosticDiscussion”,12October2023,https://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/analysis_monitoring/enso_advisory/ensodisc.shtml;Becker,Emily,“October2023ElNiñoupdate:bigcats”,NOAA,12October2023,https://www.climate.gov/news-features/blogs/october-2023-el-nino-update-big-cats.4.N=443for39orunderagegroup,andn=252for60andoveragegroup.5.Ciccarelli,Matteo,FriderikeKuikandCatalinaMartínezHernández,“Theoutlookismixed:theasymmetriceffectsofweathershocksoninflation”,EuropeanCentralBank,10October2023,https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-research/resbull/2023/html/ecb.rb231010~d34f3708ac.en.html.6.State-basedarmedconflictisdefinedas:“acontestedincompatibilitythatconcernsgovernmentand/orterritorywheretheuseofarmedforcebetweentwoparties,ofwhichatleastoneisthegovernmentofastate,resultsinatleast25battle-relateddeathsinonecalendaryear.”DepartmentofPeaceandConflictResearch,UppsalaConflictDataProgram,UppsalaUniversity,https://ucdp.uu.se/exploratory,accessed18October2023.7.Theaveragescoringofthetop10rankingsisnearlyafullLikertpointlowerthanlastyear(4.3comparedto5.2,outofapossible7),asistheperceivedseverityofthetoprisk(4.7forMisinformationanddisinformationin2024,against5.5forCost-of-livingcrisisin2023).8.Syntheticcontentreferstothecontent(text,images,videos,audio)thathasbeengeneratedormanipulatedusingdigitaltechnologies,includingartificialintelligenceandmachinelearning.9.AustralianGovernmentDepartmentofInfrastructure,Transport,RegionalDevelopment,CommunicationsandtheArts,NewACMApowerstocombatmisinformationanddisinformation,https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/have-your-say/new-acma-powers-combat-misinformation-and-disinformation,accessed19October2023;Breton,Thierry,FightingdisinformationanddisseminationofillegalcontentinthecontextoftheDigitalServicesActandintimesofconflict,18October2023,speechdeliveredattheEuropeanCommission,Brussels,https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_23_5126;Bhatnaghar,Dhruv,“India’sregulatoryresponsetoonlinemisinformationarguablyviolatesinternationalhumanrightslaw”,OxfordHumanRightsHub,6June2023,https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/indias-regulatory-response-to-online-misinformation-arguably-violates-international-human-rights-law/;Bhardwaj,Deeksha,“Newdigitallawmaycarryafinefordisinformation”,HindustanTimes,19October2023,https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/new-digital-law-may-carry-a-fine-for-disinformation-101695926259938.html.10.Roberts,HuwandEmmieHine,“ThefutureofAIpolicyinChina”,EastAsiaForum,27September2023,https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2023/09/27/the-future-of-ai-policy-in-china/.11.Formoreinformation,seeEuropol,Facingreality?Lawenforcementandthechallengeofdeepfakes,2022,www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/Europol_Innovation_Lab_Facing_Reality_Law_Enforcement_And_The_Challenge_Of_Deepfakes.pdf.12.Worldometer,Countriesintheworldbypopulation(2023),accessed18October2023,https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-country/;Statista,InternetpenetrationrateintheEuropeanUnionfrom2019to2022,bycountry,26July2023,https://www.statista.com/statistics/1246141/eu-internet-penetration-rate/,accessed18October2022;DataReportal,Digital2023:GlobalOverviewReport,26January2023,https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2023-global-overview-report.13.DespitethepotentialbenefitsthatAIcanplayincontentmoderation.See:Fredheim,Rolf,SebastianBay,TetianaHaiduchyk,AntonDekandMarthaStolze,“Socialmediamanipulation2022/2023:Assessingtheabilityofsocialmediacompaniestocombatplatformmanipulation”,NATOStrategicCommunicationsCentreofExcellence,January2023;digwatch,Contentpolicy,GenevaInternetPlatform,https://dig.watch/topics/content-policy,accessed19October2023.14.Fernando,Christine,“Electiondisinformationcampaignstargetedvotersofcolorin2020.Expertsexpect2024tobeworse”,AP,29July2023,https://apnews.com/article/elections-voting-misinformation-race-immigration-712a5c5a9b72c1668b8c9b1eb6e0038a;Shih,Gerry,“InsidethevastdigitalcampaignbyHindunationaliststoinflameIndia”,TheWashingtonPost,26September2023,https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/09/26/hindu-nationalist-social-media-hate-campaign/;Tang,Didi,“TheUSwarnsofaChineseglobaldisinformationcampaignthatcouldunderminepeaceandstability”,AP,4October2023,https://apnews.com/article/disinformation-china-us-xinjiang-global-opinion-c9e033f22622841935a2b1bc1060c01b.15.Groh,Matt,“DetectDeepFakes:HowtocounteractmisinformationcreatedbyAI”,MIT,https://www.media.mit.edu/GlobalRisksReport202433projects/detect-fakes/overview/,accessed18October2023;Europol,Facingreality?Lawenforcementandthechallengeofdeepfakes,2022,www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/Europol_Innovation_Lab_Facing_Reality_Law_Enforcement_And_The_Challenge_Of_Deepfakes.pdf.16.Beyer,JanNicola,“TheracetodetectAIcanbewon”,Politico,10June2023,https://www.politico.eu/article/artificial-intelligence-ai-detection-race-can-be-won/.17.Lawson,Amanda,“ALookatGlobalDeepfakeRegulationApproaches”,ResponsibleArtificialIntelligenceInstitute,24April2023,https://www.responsible.ai/post/a-look-at-global-deepfake-regulation-approaches.18.TheuseofAI-powereddeepfakesincampaignsisacurrentareaofinterestforregulatorsinmanyjurisdictions.Forexample,seeSiemons,Jorja,“DeepfakeAdsStrainPre-AICampaignLaws,PuzzlingUSRegulators”,BloombergLaw,17July2023,https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-data-security/deepfake-ads-rock-pre-ai-campaign-laws-puzzling-us-regulators.19.Jones,Kate,“Legalloopholesandtheriskofforeigninterference”,EuropeanParliament,January2023,https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2023/702575/EXPO_IDA(2023)702575_EN.pdf.20.Edelman,2023EdelmanTrustBarometer,18January2023,https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2023-01/2023%20Edelman%20Trust%20Barometer%20Global%20Report.pdf.21.Herrmann,Katja-Elisabeth,“DisinformationandDemocracy:Navigatingthe2023PoliticalLandscapeinCentralandEasternEurope”,WarsawInstitute,7August2023,https://warsawinstitute.org/disinformation-and-democracy-navigating-the-2023-political-landscape-in-central-and-eastern-europe/;Chacón,MarcosMartínez,“ExpertswarnagainstwaveoffakenewsaheadofMexico’s2024presidentialelection”,AP,25August2023,https://apnews.com/article/mexico-fake-news-social-media-elections-2024-487943383b8f57f5eb0cc9ae1324fcc1.22.Funk,Allie,AdrianShahbazandKianVesteinsson,FreedomontheNet2023:TheRepressivePowerofArtificialIntelligence,FreedomHouse,2023,https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2023/repressive-power-artificial-intelligence.23.LegatumInstitute,The2023LegatumProsperityIndex:SixteenthEdition,2023,https://www.prosperity.com/download_file/view_inline/4789;EconomistIntelligenceUnit,DemocracyIndex2022:FrontlinedemocracyandthebattleforUkraine,2023,https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2022/;FreedomHouse,FreedomontheNet2022:Myanmar,https://freedomhouse.org/country/myanmar/freedom-net/2022,accessed19October2023.24.SeeTheWestminsterDeclaration,anopenletterwarningof“increasinginternationalcensorshipthatthreatenstoerodecenturies-olddemocraticnorms”(https://westminsterdeclaration.org/,accessed21October2023);EconomistIntelligenceUnit,DemocracyIndex2022:FrontlinedemocracyandthebattleforUkraine,2023,https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2022/.25.AmnestyInternational,Internationalmaprevealsstate-sanctionedviolenceagainstprotestersworldwide,19September2023,https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/09/interactive-map-reveals-state-sanctioned-violence-against-protesters-worldwide/,accessed19October2023;Mehrotra,KarishmaandJosephMenn,“HowIndiatamedTwitterandsetaglobalstandardforonlinecensorship”,TheWashingtonPost,8November2023,https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/08/india-twitter-online-censorship/;Duque,EstefannyPerezandEstebanPoncedeLeón,“Mexico’spresidentisweaponizingnarrativesagainstmediaandoppositiontocombatcriticism,”DigitalForensicResearchLab(DFRLab),21June2023,https://dfrlab.org/2023/06/21/mexicos-president-is-weaponizing-narratives-against-media-and-opposition-to-combat-criticism.26.Funk,Allie,AdrianShahbazandKianVesteinsson,FreedomontheNet2023:TheRepressivePowerofArtificialIntelligence,FreedomHouse,2023,https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2023/repressive-power-artificial-intelligence.27.U.S.DepartmentofState,GlobalEngagementCenterSpecialReport:HowthePeople’sRepublicofChinaSeekstoReshapetheGlobalInformationEnvironment,28September2023,https://www.state.gov/gec-special-report-how-the-peoples-republic-of-china-seeks-to-reshape-the-global-information-environment/.28.Mehrotra,KarishmaandJosephMenn,“HowIndiatamedTwitterandsetaglobalstandardforonlinecensorship”,TheWashingtonPost,8November2023,https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/08/india-twitter-online-censorship/;EconomistIntelligenceUnit,DemocracyIndex2022:FrontlinedemocracyandthebattleforUkraine,2023,https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2022/.29.DuqueandPoncedeLeón,21June2023;EconomistIntelligenceUnit,2023.30.InstituteforEconomics&Peace,GlobalPeaceIndex2023,2023,https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/GPI-2023-Web.pdf.31.Gabuev,Alexander,“Putinislookingforabiggerwar,notanoff-ramp,inUkraine”,FinancialTimes,30July2023,https://www.ft.com/content/861a8955-924e-4d3e-8c59-73a13403e191?emailId=14610ce2-9840-46c0-9173-de0cd6676cbf&segmentId=22011ee7-896a-8c4c-22a0-7603348b7f22.32.Euronews,Russia’sBalkanpowerplaycontinuesasKosovotensionsflare,27September2023,https://www.euronews.com/2023/09/27/russias-balkan-power-play-continues-as-kosovo-tensions-flare;Henley,Jon,“Slovakia’spro-RussiaformerPMreachesdealtoformcoalitiongovernment”,TheGuardian,11October2023,https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/02/slovakias-pro-russia-former-pm-robert-fico-invited-to-form-coalition;Schwarz,Karl-Peter,“InCentralEurope,timemaynotbeonUkraine’sside”,GIS,26September2023,https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/central-europe-ukraine-support/.33.Kusa,Iliya,“WhatDoestheConflictintheMiddleEastMeanforUkraine?”,CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace,8GlobalRisksReport202434November2023,https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90945.34.Toosi,Nahal,“Ukrainecouldjoinranksof‘frozen’conflicts,U.S.officialssay”,Politico,18May2023,https://www.politico.com/news/2023/05/18/ukraine-russia-south-korea-00097563.35.Rosenzweig-Ziff,Dan,“Here’showworldleadersarereactingtotheIsrael-Gazawar”,TheWashingtonPost,11October2023,https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/10/israel-hamas-war-global-reaction/;Cohen,Patricia,“RiskofaWiderMiddleEastWarThreatensa‘Fragile’WorldEconomy”,TheNewYorkTimes,1November2023.36.Kusa,8November2023.37.Faulconbridge,Guy,“Bloodandbillions:thecostofRussia’swarinUkraine”,Reuters,23August2023,https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/blood-billions-cost-russias-war-ukraine-2023-08-23/;Reynolds,Stefani,“ThePast,Present,andFutureofU.S.AssistancetoUkraine:ADeepDiveintotheData”,CenterforStrategic&InternationalStudies,26September,2023,https://www.csis.org/analysis/past-present-and-future-us-assistance-ukraine-deep-dive-data.38.Aboudouh,Ahmed,“China’sapproachtothewarinGazaisnotanti-Israel.It’sdesignedtocontaintheUS”,ChathamHouse,25October2023,https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/10/chinas-approach-war-gaza-not-anti-israel-its-designed-contain-us.39.Reuters,Taiwansays37Chinesemilitaryaircraftentereditsairdefencezone,8June2023,https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/08/taiwan-says-37-chinese-military-aircraft-entered-its-air-defence-zone;Reuters,ChineseblockadeofTaiwanwouldlikelyfail,Pentagonofficialssay,19September2023,https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/chinese-blockade-taiwan-would-likely-fail-pentagon-official-says-2023-09-19/;InstituteforEconomics&Peace,2023.40.Beals,EmmaandPeterSalisbury,“AWorldatWar:WhatIsBehindtheGlobalExplosionofViolentConflict?”,ForeignAffairs,30October2023,https://www.foreignaffairs.com/africa/world-war/.41.Forexample,seeNadhim,Firdews,“AFlashPoint:WhereistheKirkukConflictHeading?”,EmiratesPolicyCentre,6October2023,https://epc.ae/en/details/scenario/a-flash-point-where-is-the-kirkuk-conflict-heading-.42.LegatumInstitute,2023;Szayna,ThomasS.,et.al.,ConflictTrendsandConflictDrivers:AnEmpiricalAssessmentofHistoricalConflictPatternsandFutureConflictProjections,RandCorporation,2017,https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1063.html.43.Pinto,TeresaNogueira,“IstheThirdCongoWarapproaching?”,GIS,12April2023,https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/drc-war/;Africanews,TheUNworriesaboutariskof‘directconfrontation’betweenDRCandRwanda,18October2023,https://www.africanews.com/2023/10/18/the-un-worries-about-a-risk-of-direct-confrontation-between-drc-and-rwanda/.44.Ndiaga,Thiam,“BurkinaFasomarksofficialendofFrenchmilitaryoperationsonitssoil”,Reuters,20February2023,https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-marks-official-end-french-military-operations-its-soil-2023-02-19/#:~:text=In%20January%2C%20Burkina%20Faso%20gave,the%20country%20to%20defend%20itself;Reuters,WithdrawalofFrenchtroopsfromNigernearlyhalf-complete,colonelsays,20October2023,https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/withdrawal-french-troops-niger-nearly-half-complete-colonel-says-2023-10-20/;Schofield,Hugh,“Francecallstimeonanti-jihadistOperationBarkhaneinSahel”,BBC,9November2022,https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63575602.45.Davies,Shawn,TheresePetterssonandMagnusÖberg,“Organizedviolence1989-2022andthereturnofconflictsbetweenstates?”,JournalofPeaceResearch,vol.60,no.4,13July2023,pp.691-708,https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00223433231185169#:~:text=of%20all%20one%2Dsided%20violence,%2C%20non%2Dstate%20fatalities%20decreased.46.GoogleTrends,Searchterm:Recession,2023,https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=all&q=recession&hl=en,accessed5December2023.47.Harris,Karen,DuniganO’Keeffe,JeffreyCraneandJasonHeinrich,“GlobalRecessionWatch:TheLatestData”,Bain&Company,27September2023,https://www.bain.com/insights/global-recession-watch-latest-data-snap-chart/;Mena,Bryan,“TheUSeconomygrewatablisteringratedespitehighinterestrates”,CNNBusiness,26October2023,https://edition.cnn.com/2023/10/26/economy/us-economy-third-quarter-gdp/index.html#:~:text=The%20US%20economy%20expanded%20at,the%20Commerce%20Department%20reported%20Thursday.48.Sen,Conor,“TheCaseforTwoFedRateCutsinEarly2024IsBuilding”,Bloomberg,17November2023,https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-11-17/the-case-for-two-fed-rate-cuts-in-early-2024-is-building.49.IMF,Inflationrate,averageconsumerprices,2023,https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PCPIPCH@WEO/OEMDC,accessed4December2023;TradingEconomics,ChinaCoreInflationRate,https://tradingeconomics.com/china/core-inflation-rate,accessed5December2023;TradingEconomics,EuropeanUnionCoreInflationRate,https://tradingeconomics.com/european-union/core-inflation-rate,accessed5December2023;TradingEconomics,UnitedStatesCoreInflationRate,https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/core-inflation-rate#:~:text=US%20Annual%20Core%20Inflation%20Rate,4.3%25%20in%20the%20prior%20month,accessed5December2023.50.S&PGlobal,PMIbyS&PGlobal,2023,https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/mi/products/pmi.html,accessed5December2023.51.Grobe,Stefan,“BrusselscutsEUgrowthforecastagaintojust0.6%thisyear”,Euronews,15November2023,https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/11/15/brussels-cuts-eu-growth-forecast-again-to-just-06-this-year#:~:text=Europe’s%20economy%20will%20grow%20less,than%20its%20previous%20summer%20projections;EuropeanCommission,EconomicforecastforGermany,15November2023,https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-surveillance-eu-economies/germany/economic-forecast-germany_en#:~:text=Economic%20activity%20in%20GlobalRisksReport202435Germany%20is,weighing%20on%20consumption%20and%20investment.,accessed21November2023.52.Saul,Derek,“S&P500DipsTo5-MonthLowAsEarningsSeasonHighlightsStrugglesof‘Magnificent7’TechStocksToKeepRallyAfloat”,Forbes,26October2023,https://www.forbes.com/sites/dereksaul/2023/10/26/sp-500-dips-to-5-month-low-as-earnings-season-highlights-struggles-of-magnificent-7-tech-stocks-to-keep-rally-afloat/.53.WorldBank,ConflictinMiddleEastCouldBring‘DualShock’toGlobalCommodityMarkets[Pressrelease],30October2023,https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/10/26/commodity-markets-outlook-october-2023-press-release;Alvarez,Jorge,MehdiBenatiyaAndaloussiandMartinStuermer,“GeoeconomicFragmentationThreatensFoodSecurityandCleanEnergyTransition”,IMFBlog,3October2023,https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2023/10/03/geoeconomic-fragmentation-threatens-food-security-and-clean-energy-transition.54.Cash,JoeandRyanWoo,“IMFupgradesChina’s2023,2024GDPgrowthforecasts”,Reuters,7November2023,https://www.reuters.com/world/china/imf-upgrades-chinas-2023-2024-gdp-growth-forecasts-2023-11-07/.55.Tan,Clement,“Moody’scutChina’screditoutlooktonegativeonrisingdebtrisks”,CNBC,5December2023,https://www.cnbc.com/2023/12/05/moodys-cut-chinas-credit-outlook-to-negative-on-rising-debt-risks.html.56.Rahim,Saad,Macro&Markets,speechpresentedatWorldEconomicForum,Geneva,November2023.57.Durfee,Don,KevinYaoandEduardoBaptista,“China’shigh-techmanufacturingloansraisefearsofwaveofcheapexports”,Reuters,13November2023,https://www.reuters.com/world/china/with-manufacturing-loans-rising-can-china-avoid-new-supply-glut-2023-11-12/.58.GoldmanSachs,TheS&P500Indexisforecasttoreturn6%in2024,20November2023,https://www.goldmansachs.com/intelligence/pages/the-sp-500-index-is-forecast-to-return-six-percent.html#:~:text=The%20S%26P%20500%20index%20is%20expected%20to%20rise%20to%204700,already%20reflected%20in%20stock%20prices;McDougall,Mary,"Investorsreducebetsoninterestratecutsin2024",FinancialTimes,6January2024,https://www.ft.com/content/39596533-a41c-43a6-a639-8d5b9605be3e.59.Whenadjustedforaccountingrelatingtostudentloans.See:Rappeport,AlanandJimTankersley,“U.S.Deficit,Peggedat$1.7Trillion,EffectivelyDoubledin2023”,NewYorkTimes,20October2023,https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/20/business/treasury-report-shows-1-7-trillion-deficit.html.60.TheEconomist,Thepandemichasbrokenacloselyfollowedsurveyofsentiment,7September2023,https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2023/09/07/the-pandemic-has-broken-a-closely-followed-survey-of-sentiment.61.StLouisFed,Table3.2.FederalGovernmentCurrentReceiptsandExpenditures:Quarterly,https://fred.stlouisfed.org/release/tables?rid=53&eid=5272#snid=5308,accessed21November2023;Egan,Matt,“USdebt:Federalinterestpaymentscouldsoonexceedmilitaryspending”,CNN,1November2023,https://edition.cnn.com/2022/11/01/economy/inflation-fed-debt-military/index.html.62.Dolan,Mike,“AsUSelectionlooms,investorsfearforfiscalpeace”,Reuters,4October2023,https://www.reuters.com/markets/us/us-election-looms-investors-fear-fiscal-peace-mike-dolan-2023-10-04/;Rodden,Jonathan,et.al.,“Polarisedelectionsraiseeconomicuncertainty”,CEPR,22December2020,https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/polarised-elections-raise-economic-uncertainty.63.Kraemer,NickW.andBrendenJKugle,“Default,Transition,andRecovery:HigherRatesForEvenLongerCouldPushTheU.S.Speculative-GradeCorporateDefaultRateTo5%BySeptember2024”,S&PGlobal,16November2023,https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/research/articles/231116-default-transition-and-recovery-higher-rates-for-even-longer-could-push-the-u-s-speculative-grade-corporat-12916045.64.GoldmanSachs,TopofMind:CorporateCreditConcerns,GlobalMacroResearchIssue121,10August,2023,https://www.goldmansachs.com/intelligence/pages/top-of-mind/corporate-credit-concerns/report.pdf.65.Reuters,“IMF-WorldBankmeetings:Whichdevelopingcountriesfacedebtcrisis?”,Reuters,6October2023,https://www.reuters.com/markets/developing-countries-facing-debt-crunch-2023-10-04/.66.Rogoff,Kenneth,“Whyhaveemergingmarketsnotspiralledintoadebtcrisis?”,TheGuardian,2November2023,https://www.theguardian.com/business/2023/nov/02/emerging-markets-debt-crisis-defaults.GlobalRisksReport2024362GlobalRisks2034:OverthelimitThischapterfocusesonthelonger-termhorizon,addressed,contributetothesenegative,longer-highlightingrisksthatmaybecomethemostseveretermoutcomes,attention,planningandactionoverthenextdecade.Whiletheshort-termriskstodaycanstillsetusonamarkedlymorepositivelandscapedescribedinChapter1may,ifnottrajectory.2.1Theworldin2034Thenextdecadewillusherinaperiodofsignificantthirds(63%)ofrespondentstotheGRPSpredictachange,stretchingouradaptivecapacitytothelimit.turbulentorstormyoutlook,withupheavalsandanGRPSrespondentsarefarlessoptimisticaboutelevatedriskofglobalcatastrophesatbest(Chaptertheoutlookfortheworldoverthelongertermthan1,Figure1.1).theshortterm.AsnotedinChapter1,nearlytwo-FIGURE2.1Relativeseverityofrisksovera2and10-yearperiodVisiblearea6Deterioratingrisks7CriticalchangetoEarthsystemsExtremeweathereventsBiodiversitylossandecosystemcollapse1Naturalresourceshortages17AdverseoutcomesofAItechnologiesCyberinsecurityMisinformationanddisinformationInvoluntarymigrationSocietalpolarization5PollutionLong-termseverity(10years)TechnologicalpowerconcentrationLackofeconomicopportunityConcentrationofstrategicresourcesGeoeconomicconfrontationCensorshipandsurveillanceInterstatearmedconflictInfectiousdiseasesDebtChronichealthconditionsErosionofhumanrightsInsufficientpublicinfrastructureandservicesBiological,chemicalorIntrastateviolenceDisruptionstoasystemicallyimportantsupplychainAAddvveerrsseeoouuttccoommeessnuclearhazardsEconomicdownturnooffffrroonnttiieerrtteecchhnnoollooggiieessDisruptionstocriticalinfrastructureUnemployment4IlliciteconomicactivityNon-weatherrelatednaturaldisastersInflationTerroristattacksLabourshortagesAssetbubbleburstsRiskcategories3EconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnological23456Short-termseverity(2years)SourceNoteWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksSeveritywasassessedona1-7Likertscale[1–Lowseverity,7–Highseverity].PerceptionSurvey2023-2024.GlobalRisksReport202437Comparingthetwo-and10-yeartimeframesMirroringlastyear’sresults,theperceivedseverityrevealsadeterioratingglobalriskslandscape.ofBiodiversitylossandecosystemcollapseThirty-threeofthe34globalrisksincreaseinworsensthemostofallrisks,increasingbyafullseverityscoreoverthelonger-term,reflectingtwoLikertpoints,risingfrom#20intheshort-termrespondents’concernsabouttheheightenedto3rdplace.CriticalchangetoEarthsystemsfrequencyorintensityoftheserisksoverthecourse(#2)andNaturalresourceshortages(#4)arealsoofthe10-yearhorizon(Figure2.1).amongthoseperceivedtomateriallydeteriorate,contributingtotheirentranceintothetop10rankingEnvironmentalandtechnologicalrisksareamongofrisksoverthenext10years,whiletherelatedriskthoseexpectedtodeterioratethemostinseverityofInvoluntarymigrationrisesoneplaceto#7overoverthisperiodanddominatethelonger-termthenextdecade.Pollutionremainsin10thplace.Inglobalriskslandscape.Nearlyallenvironmentalcontrast,Non-weatherrelatednaturaldisastersrisksareincludedinthetop10rankingsforthe(#33)fallsclosetothebottomofrankingsoverbothdecadeahead(Figure2.2).Extremeweathertimehorizons,likelyreflectingthenatureofsuchaeventsareanticipatedtobecomeevenmoretailriskandtheoftengeographicallyisolatednaturesevere,asthetoprankedriskoverthenextdecade.oftheseevents.FIGURE2.2Globalrisksrankedbyseverityoverthelongterm(10years)"Pleaseestimatethelikelyimpact(severity)ofthefollowingrisksovera10-yearperiod."1stExtremeweatherevents6thAdverseoutcomesofAItechnologies2ndCriticalchangetoEarthsystems7thInvoluntarymigration3rdBiodiversitylossandecosystemcollapse8thCyberinsecurity4thNaturalresourceshortages9thSocietalpolarization5thMisinformationanddisinformation10thPollutionRiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalSourceWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey2023-2024.Theseresultshighlightdivergentperceptionsoverthetwo-yearperiodto#6overthe10-yeararoundthecomparativeurgencyofenvironmentalperiod,likelyreflectingthepossiblesystemicrisks.BiodiversitylossandecosystemcollapseorevenexistentialnatureofrelatedrisksasAI(#20inthetwo-yeartimeframe)andCriticalpenetrateseconomic,socialandpoliticalsystemschangetoEarthsystems(#11inthetwo-year(Chapter2.4:AIincharge).Despiteworseningtimeframe)featureinthelonger-termrankingsforseverityscoresoverthistimeframe,themostallstakeholdergroups(Figure2.3).However,itprominenttechnologicalrisksintheshortterm,appearsthatyoungerrespondentsprioritizetheseMisinformationanddisinformationandCyberrisksasamoreurgentconcern,rankingtheminsecurity,dropinrankingbutremaininthehigherinthetwo-yearperiodcomparedtoothertop10overthelonger-term,at5thand8thagegroups(Chapter1,Figure1.6).Private-sectorplace,respectively.TherelatedriskofSocietalrespondents,unlikethosefromcivilsocietyorpolarizationalsodropsfrom3rdplaceintheshortgovernment,feelthatmostenvironmentalriskswilltermto9thplaceoverthelonger-termhorizon.materializeoveralongertimeframe(Figures1.5and2.3).ThisdissonanceinperceptionsamongDespiteasmallincreaseinperceivedseverity,thekeydecision-makerscouldmeanthetimetoactsocietalriskofLackofeconomicopportunitymaysoonpass,withoutsufficientprogressmadefallsfrom#6overtwoyearsto#11intheglobal(Chapter2.3:A3°Cworld).rankings;however,itmakesthetop10rankingsforbothcivilsocietyandacademiarespondentsoverConcernsaroundthepossibleimplicationsofthelonger-termhorizon(Figure2.3).Thedivergencerecenttechnologicaldevelopmentsarealsoclearlyfromperceptionsofthepublicsector–whichdoevident.AdverseoutcomesofAItechnologiesnotrankthisriskinthetop10–coupledwiththeisanticipatedtoexperienceoneofthelargestlong-term,cumulativeeffectsofalow-opportunitydeteriorationsinseverity.Itrapidlyrisesfrom#29worldonthenextgenerationmakethisarisktoGlobalRisksReport202438FIGURE2.3Severitybystakeholderoverthelongterm(10years)CivilsocietyInternationalAcademiaGovernmentPrivatesector1stCriticalchangetoorganizationExtremeweathereventsCriticalchangetoExtremeweathereventsExtremeweathereventsEarthsystemsEarthsystemsCriticalchangetoExtremeweathereventsCriticalchangeto2ndBiodiversitylossandCriticalchangetoEarthsystemsEarthsystemsEarthsystemsBiodiversitylossandBiodiversitylossandBiodiversitylossandecosystemcollapseNaturalresourceshortagesecosystemcollapseecosystemcollapseecosystemcollapse3rdExtremeweathereventsMisinformationandNaturalresourceshortagesNaturalresourceshortagesBiodiversitylossanddisinformation4thNaturalresourceshortagesecosystemcollapseNaturalresourceshortagesAdverseoutcomesAdverseoutcomesInvoluntarymigrationofAItechnologiesofAItechnologies5thLackofeconomicInvoluntarymigrationCyberinsecurityMisinformationandopportunityAdverseoutcomesdisinformationofAItechnologiesSocietalpolarizationInvoluntarymigrationSocietalpolarization6thInvoluntarymigrationPollutionCyberinsecurityMisinformationandCyberinsecurity7thMisinformationandSocietalpolarizationdisinformationdisinformationAdverseoutcomesPollutionInvoluntarymigrationMisinformationandofAItechnologies8thAdverseoutcomesdisinformationLackofeconomicSocietalpolarizationPollutionofAItechnologiesCyberinsecurityopportunity9thCyberinsecurity10thSocietalpolarizationRiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalSourceWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey2023-2024.watchoverthecomingyears(Chapter2.5:Endmanyofeconomicrisks,hasdecreasedsignificantlyofdevelopment?).TherelatedeconomicriskofinperceivedseverityoverbothtimehorizonswhenIlliciteconomicactivityisperceivedtobeoflowercomparedtolastyear’sscores.1severityoverbothtimeperiods.However,itisseentobedrivenbyseveralrisksrankedinboththeIndeed,geopoliticalrisksarenoticeablyabsentshort-andlonger-termtop10,suggestingitmaybefromthetop10rankingsoverthenextdecade.anunderappreciatedriskoverthecomingdecadeInterstatearmedconflictexhibitsthesamelong-(Chapter2.6:Crimewave).termseverityscoreaslastyearbutfallsfrom5thto15thplaceoverthe10-yearperiod.SimilartoInflationistheonlyriskwithaseverityscorelastyear,Terroristattackssitsinthebottomleftpredictedtoimproveoverthenextdecade,andquadrantofFigure2.1,indicatinglowerperceiveditmovesfrom#7to#32.Infact,mosteconomicseverityoverboththeshortandlongterm.Whilerisksfallrapidlyincomparativerankingsofriskthelatestavailabledataindicatesthatoverallperceptionoverthenextdecade,with,forexample,lethalityremainscontainedcomparedtootherrisks,Economicdownturndroppingfrom#9to#28at6,701globalfatalitiesin2022,terrorismhastheoverthelonger-termhorizon.Thismayreflectthatpotentialtosparkbroaderconflictandunrest,suchGeoeconomicconfrontation(#16),akeydriverofasthecurrentconflictintheMiddleEast.2GlobalRisksReport2024392.2StructuralforcesAcrossseveralspheres–geostrategic,Therearefourstructuralforcesthatarethemosttechnological,climaticanddemographic–wearemateriallyinfluentialtotheglobalriskslandscape.transitioningtoanewunderlyingsetofconditionsThesearesummarizedinBox2.14andinclude:andparameters.Theseshiftsformthebackdroptechnologicalacceleration;geostrategicshifts;totheglobalrisksthatwillplayoutovertheclimatechange;anddemographicbifurcation.Whilenextdecade.Thisyear,theGlobalRisksReportallfourforceshaveglobalramifications,some,suchintroducestheconceptofstructuralforcestoasthechangingclimate,aremoremulti-directionalouranalysisofglobalrisksoverthenextdecade.3intheirdevelopment,whichcouldallowforseveralWedefinetheseasthelong-termshiftinthepotentialfutures.Similarly,whileallrepresentarrangementof,andrelationbetween,thelonger-termshiftstothestructurallandscape,systemicelementsofthegloballandscape.somehavethepotentialtomanifestmorequicklyTheseforceshavethepotentialtomateriallyimpactduetounderlyingvariables.Geostrategicshifts,forthespeed,spreadorscopeofglobalrisks,andwillexample,mayleadtoalackofalignmentbetweenbeinfluencedinturnbyeachother.powers,whiletechnologicalaccelerationcanfosternewdiscoveriesthattransformsystemsrapidly.BOX2.1StructuralforcesClimatechangeencompassestherangeofpossibletrajectoriesofglobalwarmingandconsequencestoTechnologicalaccelerationrelatestodevelopmentEarthsystems.pathwaysofemergingtechnologies.ClimatechangeischaracterizedasasystemicshiftAsubsetofkeytechnologies,includinggeneral-purposeinthisyear’sanalysisbecausethethresholdof1.5°CAI,isanticipatedtoexperiencesignificant,acceleratedabovepre-industrialtemperatures,specifiedinthedevelopmentoverthenext10years.2015ParisAgreement,isanticipatedtobecrossedbytheearlytomid-2030s.Giventhesheerscopeoffrontierdevelopmentandgeneral-purposeapplications,multipletrajectoriesHowever,globalwarmingpathwayswillstillbemayarise.Quantumcomputing,forexample,couldinfluencedbythespeedatwhichdecarbonizationallowcomputepowertoleapfrogand,alongsidetakesplace,anddeploymentofclimatesolutions.anticipatedbenefits,rapidlygiverisetonovelglobalrisks.DegradationofenvironmentalsystemscouldalsoTechnologicalexperimentation,suchasbrain-computeraccelerateestimatedtrajectories,totheextentthatinterfaces,couldblurtheboundariesbetweentechnologythey“naturally”contributetoglobalwarmingandandhumanity,tounknowneffects.relatedeffects(suchasthereversalofcarbonsinks).GeostrategicshiftsreferstoevolvingsourcesandDemographicbifurcationreferstochangesintheconcentrationofgeopoliticalpower.size,growthandstructureofpopulationsaroundtheworld.This,inturn,influencesthealignmentofthegeopoliticalorder,impactingrelatedalliancesanddynamics,aswellThedemographicdivideiswidening.Polarizinggrowthastheoffensiveanddefensiveprojectionofsoftandatthetopandbottomendofpopulationpyramids,hardpoweroverthenextdecade.Economicpowerisandbetweencountriesandregions,willhavematerialbecomingmorediffuse,forinstance,reflectingchangesimplicationsforrelatedsocioeconomicandpoliticalincurrencydependencies,sourcesofenergy,availablesystems.capitalandsizeofconsumermarkets.ConcentrationsofeconomicandmilitarypowerarealsohighlyrelatedtoAsiacontinuestodominateintermsofabsolutetechnologicalandresourceassets.populationgrowth.Mostcountrieswillcontinuetograpplewithanageingpopulation,combiningalong-Whilealternatefuturesarepossible,anarrayofpowerstermriseinlifeexpectancywithdecliningfertilityrates.willlikelyasserttheirdominanceontheglobalstageinaIncontrast,Africafacesaradicallydifferentpolicymultipolarworld.challenge:by2030,youngAfricansareexpectedtoconstitute42%ofglobalyouth.SourceNoteWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksReport2024.RefertoAppendixA:DefinitionsandGlobalRisksListforfurtherdetail.GlobalRisksReport202440ElizabethLies,UnsplashAsthesestructuralforcesinteract,weconsiderfoureconomicopportunity(#11)isapersistentbutemergingglobalrisksandhowtheymayevolvelowerpriorityriskforglobaldecision-makersoverthenextdecade:overthelonger-termhorizon.Couldclosingdevelopmentalpathwaysleavevulnerable–Earthsystems:allstakeholdergroupsagreepopulationsandcountries,andthenextthatCriticalchangetoEarthsystems(#2)generation,withlittlehopeforabrighterfuture?posesoneofthemostsevererisksfacedoverthenextdecade.Couldanthropogenic(in)action–Organizedcrime:IlliciteconomicactivityandclimatechangepushselectEarthsystems(#31)isoneofthelowest-rankedrisksinthepastthetippingpoint,catapultingtowardsaglobalrisksnetwork,buttheconvergenceof3°Cworldtowhichwecannotadapt?severaltop-rankedriskscouldturnanunder-the-radarchronicriskintoapressingcrisis.Will–AItechnologies:anumberofAdversetransnationalcrimenetworkssubsumefragileoutcomesofAItechnologies(#6)arestatesandvulnerablepopulations,capitalizinganticipatedtorapidlyriseoverthenextdecade.onhighlydisruptivetechnologiesandweakenedCouldpowerfulfrontiertechnologiesdestabilizestatecapacity?globaleconomicandsecuritydynamicsandputtech–anditsconcentratedowners–incharge?Thefutureshighlightedineachofthefollowingsectionsisonlyoneofamultiplicityofpossibilities,–Humandevelopment:featuringasatopandwehighlightopportunitiestoshapeamoreriskoverthetwo-yearperiodandjustoutofpositivepathforwardbyactingtoday.thetop10overthenextdecade,LackofGlobalRisksReport2024412.3A3°CworldFIGURE2.4Severityscore:CriticalchangetoEarthsystemsLong-term,potentiallyirreversibleandself-perpetuatingchangestocriticalplanetarysystems,asaresultofbreachingacriticalthresholdor‘tippingpoint’,ataregionalorgloballevel,thathaveabruptandsevereimpactsonplanethealthorhumanwelfare.Includes,butisnotlimitedto:sealevelrisefromcollapsingicesheets;carbonreleasefromthawingpermafrost;anddisruptionofoceanoratmosphericcurrents.10-yearrank:2nd10-yearaverage:5.92years10%9%18%21%20%14%6%2%10years48%24%13%8%Source3%2%WorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey2023-2024.ProportionofrespondentsSeverityNote7654321Severitywasassessedona1-7Likertscale[1–Lowseverity,7–Highseverity].ThepercentagesintheHighLowgraphsmaynotaddupto100%becausefigureshavebeenroundedup/down.–Thresholdsforlarge-scaleandself-perpetuatingchangestoplanetarysystemsarelikelytobeexceededwithinthenextdecade.–Thepaceandscaleofclimate-changeadaptationeffortsarealreadyfallingshort,withsocietiesincreasinglyexposedtoenvironmentalimpactstowhichtheymaybeunabletoadapt,fuelingdisplacementandmigration.–Nascentmitigationtechnologies,whileattractiveinsomerespects,couldhaveunintendedenvironmentalandsocialconsequences,withimplicationsforlegalliabilities,geopoliticaldynamicsandtheclimateagenda.Currenttrajectoriesofglobalwarmingmeanthatatasystemiclevel,intensifyingimpactstofood,leastone“climatetippingpoint”5(orthethresholdwaterandhealthsecurity.Yetastheneedforatwhichlong-term,potentiallyirreversibleandclimatesolutionsbecomemoreurgent,theriskofself-perpetuatingchangetoaplanetarysystemtechnology-inducedtippingpoints–suchasfromoccurs)couldbepassedwithinthenext10years.6geoengineering–willalsogrow.UndernearlyallIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)scenarios,the1.5°CthresholdwillBreachedthresholdsbecrossedintheearly2030s.7Basedonthelatestresearch,atleastfoursystemsareconsideredlikelyItremainschallengingtodefineclimatetippingtotipat1.5°C(Figure2.5):low-latitudecoralreefspointsandassesstheirlikelihood.However,thedie-off(highconfidence),collapseoftheGreenlandlatestresearchincreasinglysuggeststhatlong-termandWestAntarcticIceSheets(highconfidence),changestoplanetarysystemswillbetriggeredandabruptthawingofpermafrost(mediumoverthenextdecade,possiblywithouttheworldconfidence).8Thereisalsonewevidencetosuggestrealizingthatthepointofnoreturn–thepointofthattheNorthAtlanticSubpolarGyrecirculationintervention-haspassed.Importantly,mostofthecouldadditionallybeplacedatriskat1.5°C,IPCCscenariosallowfortemperatureovershootwhiletheborealforest,mangrovesandseagrass–however,thebreachingofcriticalthresholdswillmeadowswillstarttobecomevulnerable.9triggerlong-lastingandfundamentalchanges,10withafreshsetofclimateandenvironmentalconditionsWithCriticalchangetoEarthsystemsathatcouldrewriteourcollectiveunderstandingofnewentranttotheglobalriskslistthisyear,therisksposedbyclimatechange.allstakeholdergroupsagreedthatitposesoneofthemostsevererisksfacedovertheWhilerecentresearchsuggeststhatthetrajectorynextdecade(Figure2.3).Whilethesechangesof1.5°Cmaybelockedinregardlessofactionemergecomparativelysilently,withtheireffectsbuildingoverthelongterm,impactsarefeltonGlobalRisksReport202442FIGURE2.5ExamplesofglobalandregionaltippingpointsBorealpermafrostGreenlandicesheetBorealpermafrostAbruptthawCollapseCollapseBorealforestLabradorsea/BorealforestNorthernexpansionsubpolargyreSoutherndiebackCollapseLow-latitudecoralreefsAtlanticMeridionalOverturningCirculationDie-off(AMOC)CollapseSahel/WestAfricanmonsoonGreeningAmazonrainforestDiebackMountainglaciersLossCategoryWestAntarcticEastAntarcticEastAntarcticCryosphereentitiesicesheeticesheetsubglacialbasinsCirculationpatternsBiospherecomponentsCollapseCollapseCollapseGlobalwarmingthresholds1.5°C>1.5-2°C>2-4°C>4°CSourceMcKay,et.al.,2022;OECD,2022;Lenton,et.al.,2023.takentoday,estimatesrelatingtoclimatetippingthepointatwhichtheGreenlandIceSheetreflectspointsmaybeconservativeorevenoptimistic.11lessheatthanitabsorbs.ButnotalltippingpointsMostclimatemodels,whetherpublic,privatewillbevisibleatthecurrentlevelofmodellingandoracademic,donotadequatelycapturenon-monitoring.Thecomparativelyslowvelocityofmostlinearimpacts.Forexample,thetransitionofthecriticalchangestoEarthsystems–timebetweenAmazonintosavannahwilllikelybecausedbyathetippingpointandwhenimpactsarefullyfeltcombinationofclimateandecologicalimpacts,–meansthatmostwillbesilent,withimpactspossiblytransitioningwellbefore3°Cofwarminggraduallybuildingoverthelonger-term.(Figure2.5),duetoland-usechangesanddeforestation.12MostmodelsalsofailtocaptureAssuch,climatetippingpointsarerisksthataretheinterconnectednessofthesesystems:howwell-knownbutnotnecessarilywell-understood.couldcascadingeffectsfromthepassingofoneGRPSresultsindicatethattheimpactsofclimatetippingpointlowerthecriticalthresholdforothers?changearewell-recognizedbyglobaldecision-Forexample,meltingoftheGreenlandIceSheetmakers.However,ifcriticalchangestoEarthcouldleadtoaninfluxoffreshwater,destabilizingsystemsareseenaslonger-termrisks–withtheAtlanticMeridionalOverturningCirculationlikelihoodsorimpactsunderestimated,orsimply(AMOC)andcreatingconditionsthatmelttheWestdismissedastoouncertain–interventionmaycomeAntarcticIceSheetfaster.13toolatetopreventcascadingplanetarychange,hinderingourabilitytofullyadapttorelatedimpacts.Earlywarningsignssuggestthatseveralsystems,includingtheGreenlandIceSheet,AMOCandLimitstoclimateadaptationAmazonrainforest,arelosingresilience,14anditispossiblethatsomecriticalthresholdshaveOverthenext10years,manyeconomiescouldalreadybeencrossed.15Indeed,notalltippingremainlargelyunpreparedforthesenon-linearpointswillbeobserved.Somewillmanifestasimpactsofclimatechange.Thisisnotthefirsttimedistinctchanges,suchasanoceanheatwavethatthatabruptchangestoourplanetarysystemhaveprecipitatesthecollapseofcoralreefs.The“edge”ofthesethresholdscanbesharp–forexample,GlobalRisksReport202443BOX2.2Thenextglobalshock?CollapseoftheAMOCyears,andmaybecloserthananticipatedtoacriticaltransition.18AcollapseofthissystemwouldResearchsuggeststhatthetippingpointofwhollyreorganizeoceancirculation,resultingintheAtlanticMeridionalOverturningCirculationglobalandregionalcooling,andaredistribution(AMOC)is“possible”at1.4°C,butonly“likely”ofheat,rainfallandseaice.Sealevelsandat4.0°C.16However,aprofoundshiftatmuchagricultural,marineandterrestrialsystemslowertemperaturescannotberuledout.17Whilewouldbeimpacted,andglobalfoodsecuritytimescalesandtemperaturethresholdsareheavilycompromised.19debatedamongthescientificcommunity,thereissomeevidencetosuggestthatthecirculationofthiscurrentisatitsweakestpointinover1,000occurred:tippingpointsinourplanet’shistoryhaveshortages(Figure2.6).Alongsideenvironmentalledtoalternativestablestatestowhichlifehasimpacts,severalGRPSrespondentsalsohighlightadaptedovertime.20Rather,theriskisposedtopossiblesocioeconomicimplications,includingsocioeconomicstructures:isthealternatestateoneInvoluntarymigration,Chronichealthconditions,towhichweashumansocietiescanadapt?InfectiousdiseasesandEconomicdownturn.Indeed,asexploredinlastyear’sGlobalRisksClimatetippingpointscouldresultinasocio-Report(Chapter2.2:Naturalecosystems),thisenvironmentalcrisis,intensifyingcurrentrisks.nexusofsocioenvironmentalriskshavethepotentialGRPSrespondentsforeseeahighlyrelatedclustertoaccelerateclimatechange,throughthereleaseofofenvironmentalrisks,withbilateralconnectionstoemissions,andamplifyrelatedimpacts,threateningCriticalchangetoEarthsystems.Thisincludesclimate-vulnerablepopulations.Biodiversitylossandecosystemcollapse,ExtremeweathereventsandPollution,withThecollectiveabilitytoadapttotheseimpactsmaystrongpotentialtoleadtoNaturalresourcebeoverwhelmedbyseveralfactors.FIGURE2.6ClimatetippingpointsRiskinterconnections:CriticalchangetoEarthsystemsNaturalresourceshortagesInvoluntarymigrationCriticalchangetoExtremeEarthsystemsweathereventsBiodiversitylossandecosystemcollapsePollutionInfectiousdiseasesChronichealthconditionsReferenceEconomicdownturnNodesEdgesRiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalRiskinfluenceRelativeinfluenceHighHighMediumMediumLowLowSourceWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey2023-2024.GlobalRisksReport202444First,adaptationeffortsareunlikelytoradicallyIndeed,adaptationeffortsindevelopingcountriesprogressoverthenextdecade,particularlyincouldbeconstrainedbyfinances,pairedwiththethemostclimate-vulnerableeconomies.Despitesheerscopeofinfrastructureinvestmentneedsoverpersistentandextremeweatherimpacts,Failurethenextdecade(Figure2.8).23Asthefragilityofofclimate-changeadaptationwasatop-fiveriskhighly-exposed,low-resiliencestatesrises,internalinonlysixcountriesforthetwo-yeartimeframeconflictsandborderclashesoverresourcescould(comparedto16in2023).Figure2.721presentsabecomemorecommon(Chapter1.4:RiseinregionalcomparisonofthelatestExecutiveOpinionconflict),24andmanycountriescouldincreasinglySurvey(EOS)results,highlightinganumberofbeseenastoohighrisktooperateorinvestinclimate-vulnerablemarketsacrossdeveloping(Chapter2.5:Endofdevelopment?),erodingregions(shadedorange),22butwhereafailuretoadaptivecapacitiesfurther.Relatedsocioeconomicadapttoclimatechangeisnotarelativelyhightippingpoints–suchaslandabandonmentortheconcernforsome.Thislikelyreflectsfarmoreexitofinvestmentandinsuranceinhigh-riskregionspressingchallenges,includingstatefragility,poverty–couldthereforeoccurevenbeforeplanetarytippingandconflict–suchasinYemenandtheDemocraticpointsaredemonstrablybreached.25AdvancedRepublicoftheCongo–butcouldhinderclimate-economieswillnotbeinsulatedfromsomeoftheseadaptiveactionfrombeingundertaken,inadvanceeffects.Forexample,inAustralianearly521,000oftheseimpactsintensifyingfurther.homesarepredictedtobeuninsurableby2030duetotherisksofextremeweather.26FIGURE2.7Adaptationreadiness“Whichfiverisksarethemostlikelytoposethebiggestthreattoyourcountryinthenexttwoyears?”Top10GeorgiaUzbekistanKazakhstanKyrgyzstanArmeniaCentralAsiaJapanMongoliaSouthKoreaBulgariaEstoniaEasternAsiaItalyGermanySwitzerlandLuxembourgPolandUkraineYemen36thEuropeSwedenPeruColombiaParaguayBoliviaEcuadorBahamasBrazilLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanEgyptAlgeriaHondurasMiddleEastandElSalvadorVenezuelaNorthernAfricaIraqUnitedStatesNorthernAmericaCanadaNewZealandAustraliaOceaniaLaoPDRPhilippinesIndonesiaSouth-easternAsiaIndiaPakistanNepalVietNamThailandSouthernAsiaLesothoMaliBangladeshGhanaBeninAngolaSub-SaharanAfricaChadMalawiNigeriaLaoPDRRwandaKenyaSenegalDemocraticRepublicoftheCongoUnitedRepublicofTanzaniaZimbabweSierraLeoneCameroon1st10th20th30thRiskrankingGlobaladaptionscore0255075100LowHighSourceNoteND-GainCountryIndex;WorldEconomicForumThecolourofthedatapointsreflectstheND-GAINCountryIndex(2021),whichsummarizesaExecutiveOpinionSurvey2023.country’svulnerabilitytoclimatechangeandotherglobalchallengesincombinationwithitsreadinesstoimproveresilience.Ahigherscore(blue)indicatesahigherdegreeofoverallreadiness.Thex-axisdisplaysthecomparativerankingofFailuretoadapttoclimatechangeinnationalriskperceptions,ascapturedbytheEOSsurvey.GlobalRisksReport202445FIGURE2.8AdaptationfinancegapUS$387billion/yearupto2030400US$billion/yearfordevelopingcountries300TheadaptationfinancegapisestimatedatUS$125billion/yearUS$194toUS$366thisdecadebillion/year(basedon2021adaptationfinanceflows)200100US$21billionin20210InternationalModelledcostsAdaptationpublicfinanceflowsofadaptationfinancingneedsSourceUNAdaptationGapReport,2023.Inaddition,longleadtimesfordevelopingseveralglobalandregionalpowers.China,SouthappropriateinfrastructuremaychallengereadinessKorea,Japan,RussiaandSaudiArabiaareamongforregionalorlocalchangesthatmanifestabruptly.thelargestnetimportersoffoodandagriculturalForexample,thecollapseofcoralreefsystemsproducts,whereasArgentina,Australia,Brazil,–whichabsorbmorethan90%ofwaveenergyCanada,NewZealand,ThailandandtheUnited–couldleavecoastalcommunitiesvulnerabletoStatescomprisesomeofthelargestexporters.31stormsurges,potentiallydoublingannualfloodAtadomesticlevel,intensifyingcompetitionfordamageonaglobalscale.27Extremeweather,aresourcescouldsparkdisputesoverdwindlingparallelphenomenonoccurringalongsideplanetaryfreshwatersources,arablelandandhabitablechanges,ismutuallyreinforcing:theformercanareas.Ontheinternationalstage,changestopushaplanetarysystemintoanalternativestateagriculturalproductivityandwateravailability(forexampleaheatwavecollapsingcoralsystems),couldalterglobaltradepatternsandalliances,orwhilemanyoftheclimatetippingpointsareevenbecomeabargainingchipinthecontentiousanticipatedtoshiftweatherpatternsandincreasemanagementofmigrationflowsbetweenhostextremeweatherinturn,creatingpositivefeedbackcountries,addinganadditionallayerofcomplexityloopsofgreenhousegasemissions.28toshiftinggeostrategicdynamics.Together,theseenvironmentalandplanetaryTherearealsoclearlimitstoadaptation,andchangescouldradicallyimpacteconomicgrowthtippingpointswillinducechangesthat,althoughandinsurabilityoverthenextdecade,29drivingfood,longer-terminnature,arelikelytooverwhelmwaterandhealthinsecurity.Immediateimpactsevenwell-implementedadaptationsolutionsandcouldreduceagriculturalproductivityandpotentiallymakerelocationandmigrationmorelikely.32Forcausesimultaneousharvestfailuresinkeyregions.example,theThwaitesGlacier,whichplaysakeyForexample,somestudiessuggestthatthelossofroleinstabilizingtheWestAntarcticIceSheet,maysignificanticemassfromtheGreenlandIceSheethavealreadypassedanirreversibletippingpoint.33couldleadtodroughtsandagriculturallossintheAlthoughresearchisevolvingandimpacttimeSahelregion,innorthernAfrica,atthesametimeasframesarehighlyuncertain,thiscouldcauseaseaitreducesmarineprimaryproductivityintheNorthlevelriseofmorethanhalfametre,or,throughtheAtlantic.30AlthoughspecificgeographicimpactsdestabilizationoftheWestAntarcticIceSheet,uparehighlycomplexduetotheinfluenceofmultipleto3.2metresoverlongertimescalesaccordingtoplanetarysystems,foodandwaterinsecuritysomeestimates,34dramaticallyalteringcoastlinesareakeysourceofexposure–orleverage–forandsubmergingsomeislandstates(Figure2.9).35GlobalRisksReport202446FIGURE2.9Indicativesealevelrise,selectedcountriesBelgiumandtheNetherlandsSealevelrise:Sealevelrise:+0.6m+3.2mSealevelrise:+0.0mUnitedArabEmiratesSealevelrise:Sealevelrise:+0.6m+3.2mSealevelrise:+0.0mUnitedStatesSealevelrise:Sealevelrise:+0.6m+3.2mSealevelrise:+0.0mBangladeshSealevelrise:Sealevelrise:+0.6m+3.2mSealevelrise:+0.0mBelowwaterlevelSourceNoteClimateCentral,2023.Areaslowerthantheselectedwaterlevelandwithanunobstructedpathtotheoceanareshadedblue.Bydefault,areasbelowthewaterlevelbutthatappeartobeprotectedbyridges(andintheUnitedStates,levees)arenotshaded.GlobalRisksReport202447BOX2.3Thenextglobalshock?toreleaseharmfulcontaminantsandancient“new”diseases,bothmicrobialandvirus-related,Ancientpandemictowhichhumanshavelittlenaturalresistance,withinthenextdecade.38Further,asbothstatesTheArcticisthefastestwarmingregiononEarth,andanimalsexploitthewarmingoftheArcticexperiencingglobalwarminglevelsthataremoreregion,hostswillbecomemorereadilyavailable,thandoublethoseoftheglobalaverage.36Furtherincreasingthelikelihoodofthebiologicalthreat.39warmingwillleadtogradualreductionsinthepermafrost,whileabruptthawingcouldoccurduetoheatwaves,wildfiresandotherenvironmentalshifts.37Althoughan“improbable”tailrisk,itdoesnotrequirethefullcollapseofthepermafrostIvanBandura,UnsplashTechnologicaltippingpointsoverthenextdecade,givensignificantinfrastructureandinvestmentrequirements,resultinginanoverallAscriticalthresholdsarebreached,thepressureslowdowninclimatemitigationatacriticaltime.toactfastandatscalewillmount,andthefocusoftheNetZeroagendawillincreasinglyexpandSecond,dependentonthespecificfrontierbeyonddecarbonization,tothe“reversal”ofclimatetechnologyinquestion,consequencesareunknownchangethroughfrontiertechnologicalsolutions,orhighlyuncertain.Deploymentcouldpossiblyleadlikegeoengineering.40However,thesenascenttounintendedchangesto,forexample,regionaltechnologiescouldposesevereexternalitiesofprecipitation.43Inaddition,geologicalstoragetheirown,raisingcomplexquestionsaroundofcarbonrisksfuture“venting”,withpotentiallyaccountability.harmfulconsequencesfornearbycommunities.44SRMcouldreducethefrequencyandintensityofGeoengineeringsolutionshavethepotentialtotemperatureextremes,butinvolvessignificantrisks,counterkeydriverstoclimatechangeandrelatedlikesuddenterminationshocksandlarge-scalesaltenvironmentalimpacts.Somedirectlyremoveandaciddeposition.45carbondioxidefromtheatmosphere(forexample,throughdirectaircaptureandcarbonstorage),Astheimpactsofclimatechangebecomewhileothersintervenetocooltheclimate,suchasincreasinglyevident,theseexternalitiescouldsolarradiationmanagement(SRM).41Investmentincomplicateexistingquestionsaroundlegalcarboncaptureandstoragehasalreadydoubledaccountabilityforclimatechange.Thelossandtohitarecordhighof$6.4billionin2023,anddamageagenda,aswellasclimate-relatedtheUnitedStateshasalreadygranted$1.2billionlitigation,islikelytogainspeed,targetinglocal,inlong-termfundingtotwoDirectAirCapturestateandnationalgovernments.46However,hubdevelopmentsinthestatesofTexasanddeploymentofthesetechnologiesbyselectactorsLouisiana42–abipartisanmovethatcouldsurvivecouldchallengetheselegalavenues,simultaneouslytheoutcomesofthe2024elections.givingrisetoadditionalliabilities.Forexample,economicdamage,agriculturallossesorhealthDeploymentofgeoengineeringtechnologiesisproblemsfromshiftingweatherpatterns,acidnuanced,posingglobalbenefitsbutalsopresentingrain,changestoairquality,orthespreadofsystem-wideandlocalizedrisks.First,agrowingcommunicablediseasesispossibleunderbothfocuson“abated”emissions(fossilfuelemissionsclimatechangeandan“engineered”climate47–caughtthroughtechnologies)couldshiftcapitalandmodelledattributioncouldbechallengingifandfocusawayfromemissionsreductionandbotheffectsareinplay.Insomecases,engineeredadaptation.Thiscomplacencycouldtakeholdeffectsmayexceedanticipatedlocalimpactsfrombeforecarbonremovalisabletosufficientlyscaleclimatechange,leadingtogeopoliticaltensionsandpossiblyevencross-borderconflict.48GlobalRisksReport202448BOX2.4Thenextglobalshock?UngoverneddeploymentDeliberateclimatemanipulationmayformthenext10years,includingbyasinglecountry,non-state“ManhattanProject”,asgovernmentsbecomeactorssuchasphilanthropists,orbycompaniesmoreselectiveaboutclimate-relatedtechnologiesforcommercialgain.50Whilesometechnologiesthatcanbescaledanddeliveredinpolicy-relevantonlyhavetemporaryeffects,thereisagreatdealtimeframes.49Althoughhighlyunlikely,theofuncertaintyaroundimpactsevenoverashort-unilateralandungoverneddeploymentofclimatetermtimeframe.manipulationtechnologyispossiblewithinthenextActingtodayoutcomesoffrontiertechnologies,includinggeoengineering(Figure2.10).TheseeffortscouldAddressingtheriskofcriticalchangestoEarthbesupportedthroughthecreationofaglobaldatasystemsrequiresanevolvedapproachtoclimatecommonsforclimatesciencealongsidefurtherriskmanagementanddecision-making.Whileinvestmentinrelevantequipment(suchasremoteclimatemodelsareeffectiveatillustratingpotentialsensingequipmentandcomputingpower)andhazards,vulnerabilitiesandexposuresfordecision-ecologicalforecasting.makers,51thecurrentlimitationsofthesetoolsmeansthatwearestillenteringuncharteredGRPSrespondentsfeelthatGlobaltreatiesandterritory.Climateandeconomicmodellingcouldagreementshavethemostpotentialfordrivingbeimprovedtofullyconsiderthelonger-term,action.Morecredibleemissionsreductionsremainnon-linearandcascadingimpactsofEarthsystemthefastestandmosteffectivemeanstoavoidorchangesthroughmorepowerfultoolsforanalysingmitigatethelikelihoodofclimatetippingpoints.theEarthasanintegratedwhole,combiningclimateHowever,withevidencesuggestingthatsomeofandecologicaltippingpointswithbroaderplanetarythesetippingpointsarealreadylockedin,theratioboundaries.52Partoftheseeffortswillrequiretheofadaptationtomitigationeffortswillneedtobetranslationofscientificfindingstoinformdecision-rebalancedthroughNationalandlocalregulation,making,whichhasproveddifficultinaclimateascomplementaryobjectives.Expandingaccesscontext,butmaybeevenmorechallengingwhentoexistingadaptationsolutionswillbeessential,overlaidwiththenaturecontext.includingearly-warningsystems,anddecentralizedrenewableenergy(disconnectedfromthegrid)Indeed,aroundone-halfofGRPSrespondentstoempowerlocalcommunities.StatesandhighlighttheneedforenhancedResearchanddevelopmentbankswillneedtoworkcloselydevelopmentwithrespecttobothCriticaltogethertode-riskinvestmentfortheprivatesectorchangestoEarthsystems,butalsoAdverseinpriorityareasandmarkets.FIGURE2.10Riskgovernance:A3°Cworld“Whichapproach(es)doyouexpecttohavethemostpotentialfordrivingactiononriskreductionandpreparednessoverthenext10years?Selectuptothreeforeachrisk.”Approachaaa.Financialinstrumentsb.Nationalandlocalregulationsibibc.Minilateraltreatiesand49%45%53%agreementsd.Globaltreatiesand29%24%h8%cagreementshce.Developmentassistancef.Corporatestrategies37%11%34%19%g.Research&developmenth.Publicawarenessand51%28%25%65%58%15%13%56%gdgdeducationi.Multi-stakeholderengagementfefeShareofrespondentsCriticalchangetoEarthsystemsAdverseoutcomesoffrontiertechnologiesSourceRiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey2023-2024.GlobalRisksReport2024492.4AIinchargeFIGURE2.11Severityscore:AdverseoutcomesofAItechnologiesIntendedorunintendednegativeconsequencesofadvancesinAIandrelatedtechnologicalcapabilities(includinggenerativeAI)onindividuals,businesses,ecosystemsand/oreconomies.10-yearrank:6th10-yearaverage:5.32years5%7%16%20%23%21%8%10years27%24%22%13%8%4%2%SourceProportionofrespondentsSeverityWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey2023-2024.Note7654321Severitywasassessedona1-7Likertscale[1–Lowseverity,7–Highseverity].ThepercentagesintheHighLowgraphsmaynotaddupto100%becausefigureshavebeenroundedup/down.–MarketconcentrationandnationalsecurityincentivescouldconstrainthescopeofguardrailstoAIdevelopment.–AdverseoutcomesofadvancedAIcouldcreateanewsetofdividesbetweenthosewhoareabletoaccessorproducetechnologyresourcesandintellectualproperty(IP)andthosewhocannot.–DeeperintegrationofAIinconflictdecisionscouldleadtounintendedescalation,whileopenaccesstoAIapplicationsmayasymmetricallyempowermaliciousactors.Uncheckedproliferationofincreasinglypowerful,GRPSrespondentsinclude:misinformationandgeneral-purposeAItechnologieswillradicallydisinformation(Chapter1.3:Falseinformation);reshapeeconomiesandsocietiesoverthecomingjoblossanddisplacement(Chapter2.5:decade–forbetterandforworse.AlongsideEndofdevelopment?);criminaluseandproductivitybenefitsandbreakthroughsinfieldscyberattacks(Chapter2.6:Crimewave);biasandasdiverseashealthcare,educationandclimatediscrimination;useincriticaldecision-makingbychange,advancedAIcarriesmajorsocietalrisks.bothorganizationsandstates;andAI’sintegrationItwillalsointeractwithparalleladvancementsinintoweaponryandwarfare.othertechnologies,fromquantumcomputingtosyntheticbiology,amplifyingadverseconsequencesTodate,theprecautionaryprinciple(prudenceinposedbythesefrontierdevelopments(Boxes2.5thefaceofuncertainty)haslargelynotbeenappliedand2.7).IntentionalmisuseisnotrequiredfortheinthedevelopmentofAI,asregulatorserredonimplicationstobeprofound.Novelriskswillarisethesideofinnovation.However,rapidlyevolvingfromself-improvinggenerativeAImodelsthataredevelopmentofandrelianceonadvancedmachinehandedincreasingcontroloverthephysicalworld,intelligenceisoutpacingourabilitytoadapt–bothtriggeringlarge-scalechangestosocioeconomictounderstandthetechnologyitself(the“BlackBoxstructures.53Problem”)andtocreateregulatorysafeguards(the“PacingProblem”),withregulationplayingcatchAdverseoutcomesofAItechnologiesisanotheruptothetechnology.54Thespeedofadvances,newentranttothetop10rankings,deterioratingdepthofmarketpowerandstrategicimportanceofsignificantlyinperceivedriskseverityoverthetheindustrywillcontinuetochallengetheappetitelonger-termhorizon(Figure2.11).Alongsidetheandregulatorycapacityofgovernanceinstitutions.possibilityofanentityachievingartificialgeneralDownstreamriskscouldendangerpoliticalsystems,intelligence(AGI)–learningtoaccomplishanyeconomicmarketsandglobalsecurityandstability.humanoranimaltask–keyconcernscitedbyGlobalRisksReport202450FIGURE2.12TechnologicalpowerRiskinterconnections:AdverseconsequencesofAItechnologiesandTechnologicalpowerconcentrationErosionofhumanrightsCensorshipandsurveillanceSocietalMisinformationanddisinformationpolarizationAdverseoutcomesoffrontiertechnologiesTechnologicalpowerconcentrationCyberinsecurityAdverseoutcomesofAItechnologiesReferenceLackofeconomicopportunityNodesEdgesRiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalRiskinfluenceRelativeinfluenceHighHighMediumMediumLowLowSourceWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey2023-2024.EntrenchedmarketconcentrationofAIfoundationmodels,56includinginfinanceandthepublicsector,oroverrelianceonasinglePrivatesector-leddevelopmentofapowerfuldual-cloudprovider,couldgiverisetosystemiccyberuse(bothcivilianandmilitary)technologymakesvulnerabilities,paralyzingcriticalinfrastructure.regulatoryguardrailsevenmoreessential.However,commercialincentivesandnationalsecurity-drivenGiventhestrategicsignificanceofAItechnologies,“techwars”mayoutstripregulatoryeffortstocurbnationalsecurityobjectiveswilllikelyremaintheadversesocietalandsecurityoutcomes.primaryobjectiveofinnovationandindustrialpolicyinseveraleconomiesinresponsetomarketGRPSrespondentshighlightCyberinsecurityconcentration,shapingupstreammarketdynamicsandTechnologicalpowerconcentrationas(Figure2.14).StateswillaimforsecuringtheirtheonlyriskdriversofAdverseoutcomesofAIsupplychains,onshoringandfriend-shoringtechnologies(Figure2.12).TheproductionofAIwherepossible.Forexample,Chinaispursuingtechnologiesishighlyconcentrated,inasingular,alargelyindependentsupplychain,givenexportgloballyintegratedsupplychainthatfavorsafewcontrolsthatblockaccesstothemostadvancedcompaniesandcountries(Figure2.13).55Thissemiconductorchips.57Somestatesmayseektocreatessignificantsupply-chainrisksthatmaycapturelucrativeeconomicgainsassociatedwithunfoldoverthecomingdecade.Forexample,thesetechnologies,whileotherswillaimtoaddressexportcontrolsoverearlystagesofthesupplyconcentration,potentiallyatthepriceofinnovation.chain(includingminerals),couldraiseoverallBuildingonahistoryoftacklinganti-competitivecostsandleadtopersistentinflationarypressures.practicesinthetechsector,58theEUplanstoRestrictedaccesstomorecomplexinputs(suchasdeploynewmechanismstodisruptthedominancesemiconductors)couldradicallyalterthetrajectoryofdigital“gatekeepers”andisalsoreportedlyofadvancedtechnologicaldeploymentwithinaconsideringaninvestigationintoanti-competitivecountry.Theextensivedeploymentofasmallsetpracticesingraphicsprocessingunit(GPU)chips.59GlobalRisksReport202451FIGURE2.13IndicativevaluechainofgenerativeAItechnologiesRawresourcesLithographyTalent&IPDataAsdescribedinlastyear’sGlobalRisksASML(Netherlands)reportedlyholdsTheUShasproducedmorethan70%ProprietarydatasetscanlendaReport(Chapter3:ResourceRivalries),90%ofthegloballithographymarket,ofthemostcitedAIresearchpaperscompetitiveadvantage;largertheextractionandprocessingofcriticalalthoughCanon(Japan)haveoverthepastthreeyears,followedbycompaniesarefavouredduetometalsandmineralsusedinadvancedannouncedthattheirlatestmachineChinaandtheUK.economiesofscaleandnetworkAIchipsarehighlygeographicallycanproduceadvanced2-5nmchips.effects,particularlyBigTechcompaniesconcentrated.thatcontroldatageneratedonline.FabricationAssembly,testing&Foundationmodelpackaging(ATP)TaiwanSemiconductorManufacturingAlthoughcomparativelynascent,earlyCompany(TSMC)holdsarounda56%Over80%oftheworld’sATPproductionsignssuggestthatthemarketforshareoftheglobalsemiconductoriscurrentlycentredinAsia,splitbetweenfoundationmodelstendtowardsfoundrymarket,followedbySamsungIntegratedDeviceManufacturersandconcentration,givenbotheconomiesatnearly12%.OutsourcedSemiconductorAssemblyofscaleandscope.andTest(OSAT)companies.MemoryDesignComputationalpowerApplicationsSamsung(SouthKorea)isakeyvendorGenerativeAIisdependentonadvancedMostcompaniesaccesscomputepowerOpen-sourcemodelswillincreaseformemorystoragetechnologies(DRAMsemiconductortechnology.Nvidia(US)throughcloudplatforms.Amazon(US)competitiveness,howeverthelonger-andNAND,at43%and33%ofglobalhascaptured95%ofthemarketforholdsaround32%marketshare,termmarketstructurewilldependonproductionrespectively),alongsideSKGPUchipsthatcanbeusedforfollowedbyMicrosoft(US)at22%.theextentofregulatedaccesstoHynix(SouthKorea).machinelearning.foundationalmodels.LevelofconcentrationHighLowSourceNoteWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksReport2024.Subjecttorestrictions.High-levelforillustrativepurposesonly,doesnotincludeallrelevantsteps(including,forexample,inference,webaccess,etc.).FIGURE2.14Nationalsecurityasadriverofindustrialpolicy28economiesranked“Ensurenationalsecurity”asthetopobjectivecurrentlyorientingpolicy.Ofthese:19economiesfeltnationalsecurityshouldbedeprioritizedasatopobjectiveintermsofinnovationandindustrialpolicy,includingtheUnitedKingdom,Türkiye,andItaly,infavourof,forexample,addressingenvironmentandeducationpriorities.Source17economiesWorldEconomicForumExecutiveOpinionSurveyranked“Ensurenationalsecurity”asthetopchallengethatshouldorientpolicy.Ofthese:2023.9economiesrankednationalsecurityasthetopobjectiveandthetopchallengethatorientsinnovationandindustrialpolicyintheircountry,includingtheUnitedStates,HongKong,UnitedArabEmiratesandPakistan.8economiesfeltnationalsecurityshouldbeprioritizedasatopchallenge,includingBangladesh,MongoliaandMalaysia,aheadofcurrenteconomicobjectives,forexample.NotePrivatesectorrespondentsfrom113economieswereaskedtorankthethreeobjectivesthatcurrentlyorientinnovationandindustrialpolicyandthreechallengesthatshouldorientinnovationandindustrialpolicyintheircountry.Thesamesevenoptionsappliedinbothquestions:(1)Acceleratelifelonglearningandtalentdevelopment;(2)Acceleratethegreentransition;(3)Addressfoodandwaterscarcity;(4)Ensurenationalsecurity;(5)Maximizeeconomicgrowthandemployment;(6)Protectpublichealthandwellbeing;(7)Reduceinequalityandpromotediversityandinclusion.Thefinalrankingof“Ensurenationalsecurity”bycountryisbasedonasimplytallyofthenumberoftimesitwasselected.GlobalRisksReport202452However,despitesubstantialstateintervention–inhealthcaresystems.Intheabsenceofstrongandinsomecases,becauseofoffensiveeconomicethicalguardrails,medicaldataobtainedfromapolicy–productionwillremainheavilyconcentrated.fitnesstracker,forinstance,couldindividualizeBarrierstoentryremainhigh,andtherearelimitstoadvertising,facilitatediscriminatoryprofilingfortheextenttowhichstatepoliciescanlowerthem.healthinsurance,orunderpinnew,moreinvasiveSizeableupfrontcapitalexpenditureforinnovationformsofemployeemonitoring.Evenasdataandinfrastructure,economiesofscaleandscope,accessenablesnewhealthcaresolutionsandearlyanichetalentpool,informationasymmetries,diagnosis,medicalresearchanddevelopmentcouldandproprietarydatapoolswillcontinuetofavorbegearedtowardsthewealthy–thosewhohaveestablishedcompanies.60Verticalintegrationcouldtheresourcestoaffordthistypeofpervasivedailybecomemoreprevalent,asproducersoffoundationdatacollectionandmonitoringthatisthenusedmodelsincreasinglyexpandtodownstreamusesortotrainAIforvariousapplications.Additionally,partnerwithplatformcompaniesthatcontrolonlinetheinfluenceofupstreamcompaniescoulddatapoolsoroffercloudservices.61meanthataccountabilityforrelatedrisks,frombiasedalgorithmstodiagnosticerrors,ispushedRegulatorycontrolsondownstreamapplicationsdownstreaminsomejurisdictions,particularlyincouldentrenchmarketpowerfurther.Forexample,countrieswithmorelimitedmarketpower,inreturntheuseofalicensingregimecouldembedtheforaccesstothesetechnologies.powerofexistingplayers,evenasitenhancesoversightoffrontierAI.62Asgovernmentsseektomanagethehigherriskapplications,widespreaddependenceontheunderlyingtechstack(thetechnologiesusedtodevelopanapplication)willlikelylendtechleadersadisproportionateinfluenceonlegislativediscourse,shapingindustrynormsandstandardsoverthenextdecade.Whiledownstreamapplicationsarefarmorecompetitive,upstreamcommercialmotives–ratherthanpublicinterest–couldbecometheguidingforceofAIdevelopmentanddeployment.Thistrade-offcanalreadybeseeninthedistinctlackofconsistentself-regulationbytheindustry,withresponsibleAIteamsamongthefirsttobesubjecttoredundanciesasthesectordownsizedinrecentyears.63Techcompaniescouldbeleftlargelyinchargeofpricesaswellasprivacy,andtheymayholdexcessiveswayoverpreventingcompetitiveinnovation.Ifmonopoly-oroligopoly-ledprofitmaximizationisMohammadRahmani,UnsplashtheprimaryobjectiveofAIdeploymentoverthenextdecade,theconsequencesforapplicationsacrosshealthcare,education,military,legalandfinancialsectorswillbevast.Inhealthcare,forexample,asthevolumeandgranularityofhealthdataincreasesexponentially,thecommercializationofrelateddatapoolsfordownstreamAIapplicationscouldcompromiseindividualprivacyanderodetrustBOX2.5Thenextglobalshock?BreakthroughinquantumcomputingQuantumcomputingcouldbreakandremakerecordsandsoldtothehighestbidder.65Largeormonopoliesovercomputepower,posingradicalevenglobalinfrastructure–suchasbanks,powerrisksinitsdevelopment.64Criminalactorshavegridsandhospitals–couldalsobeparalyzed.Yetalreadylaunchedharvestattacks(alsoknownitisnotjustwidespreadproliferationofthislevelas“StoreNow,DecryptLater”,orSNDL)inofcomputepowerthatisconcerning.Althoughanticipationofacryptographicallysignificantarguablyatailrisk,66ifcryptographically-significantcomputer.Tradesecretsacrossmultipleindustries,quantumcomputingcapabilityiscovertlyachievedincludingpharmaceuticalsandtechnologicalandsubsequentlyuncovered,itmayrapidlyhardware,couldbecompromised,alongsidedestabilizeglobalsecuritydynamics.criticallysensitivedatasuchaselectronichealthGlobalRisksReport202453AIwinnersandlosersinformation).67Imbalancesinmilitarycapabilitiescouldalsobeentrenched,withrelatedapplicationsIndeed,extensiveintegrationofAItechnologiesraisingsignificantethicalandhumanrightsmaycreateanewsetofwinnersandlosersconcernsaroundaccountability.acrossadvancedanddevelopingeconomiesalike.Thedigitalgapbetweenhigh-andlow-incomeAssuch,accesstothetechstackwillbecomecountriesislikelytoleadtostarkdisparitiesinanevenmorecriticalcomponentofsoftpowerthesocietalimpact–bothbenefitsandrisks–offorrivalstatestocementtheirinfluence.TheAItechnologies.Themostvulnerablecountriesself-reinforcingnatureofAIdevelopmentissuchandcommunitiesinadvancedanddevelopingthatproducersofthesetechnologieswillonlyeconomiescouldbeleftfurtherbehind,digitallybecomemorefirmlyestablishedasAIisutilizedtoisolatedfromturbochargedAIbreakthroughsachievethenexttechnologicalbreakthrough(orineconomicproductivity,finance,climate,the“rich-get-richer”effect).68However,awideningeducationandhealthcare(Chapter2.5:Endofarrayofpivotalpowerscouldleveragetheirowndevelopment?).DominanceoftheGlobalNorthincompetitiveadvantagesinthehighlyconcentratedtechstackdevelopmentcouldperpetuatesocial,valuechaintoobtainaccesstothesetechnologiesculturalandpoliticalbiases,whileresiliencetoonmorefavorableterms,leadingtonovelpowerrisksposedbyAI,frommis-anddisinformationtodynamics.Thiscouldrangefromsuppliersofcriminaluse,mayalsobelowerintheGlobalSouth.criticalminerals,includingAustralia,Canada,Techtalent–andthereforethedeepunderstandingIndonesia,Morocco,VietNamandChile,tothoseofthesetechnologies–isconcentratedinlimitedthatcouldleverageIP,suchasJapanandSouthmarkets,withtheresultingknowledgegapmakingKorea,orcapital,likeNorwayandSingapore.effectiveregulationchallenging.Acrosscountries,Further,ahandfulofstates,suchasIndia,mayAItoolscouldbelicensedorrepurposedastoolssoonhavethescaleandeconomicmighttoofrepression,whererelevantnormsorregulationsdisrupttechnologydevelopmentdirectly,withnewarenascentornon-existent(Chapter1.3:Falseinnovationscapturingmarketshareorkeystagesofthevalue-addedsupplychain.69BOX2.6Thenextglobalshock?Theunelectedbillionairethesecompaniesispredominantlyexercisedintheregulatoryspherefornow,controloverdual-Technologicalpowerinthehandsoftheunelecteduse,generalpurposetechnologieswillcontinueisseenbynumerousGRPSrespondentstobetoconfersignificantanddirectpowertoprivateabiggerconcernthanpowerconcentratedinactors.Theriskofunilateralactionbyindividualsgovernment.TheinfluenceofBigTechcompaniescouldriseinavarietyofnewdomainswithisalreadytransnational,competingwiththelikessignificantconsequences–suchastheuseofofnationstates,70andgenerativeAIwillcontinueciviliansatellitesinthewarinUkraine.71tocatalysethepowerofthesecompaniesandassociatedfounders.AlthoughtheinfluenceofMichaelDziedzic,UnsplashGlobalRisksReport202454AIescalationThemostsevereriskliesinAIapplicationstonuclearweapons.WhilegovernmentshaveTheapplicationofAItechnologiestomilitaryindicatedthathumancontrolwillbemaintainedoverobjectivescouldthreatenglobalstabilityovernuclearweaponsystems,inprincipleAImayofferthenextdecade,withtheintegrationofmachinethegreatestdefensebycondensingdecisiontime:intelligenceintoconflictdecision-makingposingamakingdecisionsatsilicon,notbiologicalspeed.78severerisk.72Atthesametime,AI-enabledlaunchsystemscoulderodestrategicstability,givenitstheoreticalAIwillboostcyberwarfarecapabilities,enablingpotentialtotargetnuclearassetsandsecondstrikeentireoffensiveanddefensivesystemsthatcouldcapability,combinedwiththenearimpossibleactautonomously,withunpredictableimpactsdetectionofitsdevelopmentbyrivalstates.79tonetworksandconnectedinfrastructure.WhenIfstatesincorporateAIintonuclearweaponry,thisitcomestokineticwarfare,globalandregionalwouldsignificantlyraisetheriskofaccidentalorpowershaveinvestedheavilyindevelopingintentionalescalationoverthenextdecade,withAI-drivenweaponssystems,andthedegreeofpotentiallyexistentialconsequences.autonomyaffordedtotheseisincreasing:land,airandsea-basedweaponscanalreadyundertakeIncontrasttotheupstreamtechstack,thesurveillancewithouthumaninput.73AttemptshavedownstreamapplicationofAIisamorecompetitivebeenmadetoestablishinternationalgovernancemarket.Despitebeingamongthemostpowerfularoundtheiruse;however,agreementshaveyetofemergingdual-usetechnologies,theeconomictobeestablished.74AbstentionsandvotesagainstandtechnicalbarrierstoaccessingfrontierAIadraftUNresolutionrelatingtoautonomousaresignificantlylowerthanforitstechnologicalweaponssystemslastyearwerenotable,includingcounterparts,suchasgeoengineeringandquantumChina,NorthKorea,Iran,Israel,Türkiye,Unitedcomputing.ManyGRPSrespondentshighlightArabEmirates,IndiaandRussia.75Thereremainsconcernsaroundsuddenandwidespreadaccessamaterialchance,therefore,thatthesesystemstogenerativeAIapplications,giventhataccesscouldbeempoweredtoautonomouslytaketotheinterneteffectivelyequatestoaccesstodecisionsonlethalactions,includinggoalcreationthesemodels.Maliciousactorscanleverageaandtheselectionoftargets.76Thepotentialforsuperhumanbreadthofknowledgetoconceptualizemiscalculationinthesescenariosishigh.77Forandproliferatedangerouscapabilities,fromexample,AIcouldmisinterpretthe“unwritten”misinformationandmalwaretobiologicalweaponsnormsofgeopoliticalposturing,suchasflying(Box2.7),threateninghumanrightsandsafetyinafighterjetsclosetoairspaceormilitaryassetsofmyriadofways.rivalpowers,asamaterialthreat,initiatingconflict.AlessioSoggetti,UnsplashBOX2.7Thenextglobalshock?Novelbioweaponseventually,autonomousresearch,whilebiologicaldesigntoolscouldallowthecreationofnewTheattempteduseofbiochemicalweaponsbyproteinsandbiologicalagentsthatovercomethenon-stateactorshashistoricallybeenlimited,trade-offbetweentransmissibilityandvirulenceprimarilyduetohighknowledgebarriers.80ofpathogens.81Impactscouldbedevastating,WithoutregulationlimitingopenaccesstothewithpathogenspotentiallyusedtodisablemilitarymostpowerfulapplicationsofAItechnologies,apersonnelbeforeaconflict,mimicawidespreadcombinationofAItoolscouldenablethecreationglobalpandemicorevenlethallytargetspecificofmoretargetedandseverebiologicalweaponsethnicities.byawidespectrumofnon-technicalactors.Largelanguagemodelscouldprovideinformationondual-usetopics,laboratoryassistanceand,GlobalRisksReport202455ActingtodaySolutionsproposedincludebutarenotlimitedto:registrationandlicensingofthemostpowerfulGRPSrespondentsidentifyPublicawarenessandversionsofthetechnology,tieringaccesstoeducationasoneofthemosteffectivemechanismscomputingpower,implementationofprovenancetoaddressriskpreparednessandreductionofand/orwatermarkingsystems,Know-Your-AdverseoutcomesofAItechnologies(FigureCustomerproceduresandmandatoryincident2.15)andasakeytooltomanagelocalimpactsdisclosures,andcreatingarobustauditingandaswellasbuildgovernancecapacityandsocietalcertificationsystem.84resilience.LiteracyingenerativeAIisessential,forregulatorsandforbroadersociety.AIliteracycouldGRPSrespondentsalsonotetheroleofGlobalbeintegratedintopubliceducationsystemsandtreatiesandagreementsinthemanagementoftrainingsforjournalistsanddecision-makerstonotbothAdverseoutcomesofAItechnologiesandonlyunderstandcapabilitiesofAIsystemsbutalsoTechnologicalpowerconcentration.SeveralAItoidentifytrustworthysourcesofinformation.governanceframeworkshavealreadyemergedatagloballeveltoprovidehighlevelguidanceforAIGRPSrespondentsalsohighlighttheneedfordevelopment,includingthelatestG7HiroshimaNationalandlocalregulations.Whilenational-ProcessonGenerativeArtificialIntelligence,aswellleveleffortswillnotnecessarilypreventtherapidastheBletchleyDeclaration.Inaddition,therehaveglobalproliferationofAIandrelatedrisks,robustalreadybeencallsforan“AIversion”oftheIPCC.85butflexiblestandard-settingcanhelpensurethatThisentitycould,incollaborationwiththeprivatetechnologicaldevelopmentanddeploymentaresector,enableglobalscientificconsensusaroundthealignedwithsocietalneeds.TheapplicationofrisksandopportunitiesposedbyfrontierAI.Similarly,existinglegislationaroundintellectualproperty,itcouldcommunicatefindingstodecision-makers,employment,competitionpolicy,dataprotection,basedonbestavailableprojectionsofglobalAIprivacy,andhumanrightswillneedtoevolvetohardwareandsoftware,albeitwithfasterassessmentaddressnewchallengesposedbygenerativeAI.82cyclesbynecessity.OversightcouldalsoextendtoaOtherkeyareasanticipatedtobeaddressedbyreportingdatabaseandregistryofcrucialAIsystems.variousregulatoryregimesovertheshorttermHowever,themostexistentialoftheseriskswillrequireincludetheidentificationofAI-generatedproducts,extensivecooperationbetweenpowers,toachieveblocksorlimitationstotheriskiestuses,andmutualrestraintaroundtheproliferationofhigh-impactdeterminationofliabilityforAI-inducedharms.83technologies,aswellastheinadvertentescalationinmilitaryAI(Chapter3:Respondingtoglobalrisks).FIGURE2.15Riskgovernance:AIincharge“Whichapproach(es)doyouexpecttohavethemostpotentialfordrivingactiononriskreductionandpreparednessoverthenext10years?Selectuptothreeforeachrisk.”Approachaaa.Financialinstrumentsb.Nationalandlocalregulationsibibc.Minilateraltreatiesand46%54%46%46%agreementsd.Globaltreatiesandh10%ch14%cagreements58%10%26%24%e.Developmentassistancef.Corporatestrategies51%6%48%47%29%16%50%g.Research&development17%h.Publicawarenessandgdgdeducationi.Multi-stakeholderengagementfefeShareofrespondentsAdverseoutcomesofAItechnologiesTechnologicalpowerconcentrationSourceRiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey2023-2024.GlobalRisksReport2024562.5Theendofdevelopment?FIGURE2.16Severityscore:LackofeconomicopportunityPersistentbarrierstotherealizationofeconomicpotentialandsecurity.Includes,butisnotlimitedto:growingorpersistentpoverty;presentorperceivedincomeandwealthinequality;andunequalaccesstoeducational,technologicalandeconomicopportunities.10-yearrank:11th10-yearaverage:4.92years8%10%21%26%21%11%19%2%10years19%19%24%11%6%2%ProportionofrespondentsSourceNoteSeverityWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksSeveritywasassessedona1-7LikertscalePerceptionSurvey2023-2024.[1–Lowseverity,7–Highseverity].Thepercentagesinthe7654321graphsmaynotaddupto100%becausefigureshavebeenroundedup/down.HighLow–Humandevelopmentandprosperitymaystallasbarrierstoeconomicmobilityarisefromclimate,technologicalandgeopoliticalconstraints.–Deeplybifurcatedlabourmarketscouldwideninequalitybetween–andcreateadditionalriskswithin–developedanddevelopingeconomies,asdemographicstructuresandjobdemandandsupplydiverge.–Livingstandardscouldrecedeforpopulationssufferingentrenchedunemploymentandeconomicdistress,radicallyreshapingpoliticaldynamics.Theworldhasmaderapidstridesacrossmosteconomicmobilitywillstallandreverse.Theclimatehumandevelopmentindicatorsoverrecenttransition,advancesinAI,demographicshiftsdecades,butthefragilityofthesecollectivegainsandgeopoliticaldynamicscouldinteractovertheisevident.Inparticular,theCOVID-19pandemiccomingdecadetocementthemismatchbetweenchallengedglobaladvancement,withvisiblethedemandandsupplyoflabourbetweenandreversalsin2020acrossmultipleeconomiesandwithincountries.Theconsequencesforsocietalregions(Figure2.17),asprogressslidwithrespectcohesionandpoliticaloutcomesarewide-reaching,toeducation,healthcareandpoverty.86Economicthreateningstandardsoflivingforalargesegmentmobility–ortheabilitytoimproveeconomicofthepopulationinmanyeconomies.statusandrelatedoutcomes–isperceivedtobedwindlingindevelopedanddevelopingeconomiesalike,asjobmarketschangeandcurrenteducation,labourandsocialpoliciesbecomeoutdatedagainstabackdropofchangingdemographics.Lackofeconomicopportunityisanewentranttotheglobalriskslist.Itfeaturesinthetop10riskslistoverthetwo-yearhorizonandisexpectedtoworseninperceivedseverityoverthelongerterm(Figure2.16).AlongsideUnemploymentastheprimarydriver,GRPSrespondentsconsideraLackofeconomicopportunitytostemfromacomplexmixofotherglobalrisks.Thisincludesshort-termeconomicrisks,suchasEconomicdownturnandInflation,andpressingsocietalriskssuchasErosionofhumanrights,IntrastateviolenceandSocietalpolarization(Figure2.18).Withoutcarefulmanagementofthelarge-scaleGeneButty,Unsplasheconomictransformationsthataretakingplace,GlobalRisksReport202457FIGURE2.17HumanDevelopmentIndexscores,selectedeconomies,1990-20201.0Icelandicbankingcollapse0.9EndoftheSyrianCovid-190.8IrishTroublescivilwarpandemic0.7WorldHumanDevelopmentIndexscore(0-1)HurricaneMariahitsDominica0.6InvasionofIraqHurricane0.5inHondurasCycloneNargisinMyanmarSudanbeginsEarthquake0.4toexportoilinHaitiFirstmulti-partyelectionsinMalawisince19640.3EthnicviolenceinBurundi0.21990199520002005201020152021RiskcategoriesYearSourceUNDP,2023.EconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalGlobalRisksReport202458FIGURE2.18HumandevelopmentRiskinterconnections:LackofeconomicopportunityIntrastateviolenceErosionofhumanrightsInvoluntarymigrationTechnologicalpowerconcentrationSocietalpolarizationChronichealthconditionsInsufficientinfrastructureandservicesReferenceLaacckkooffeeccoonnomomicicopoppoprtourntiutynityLabourshortagesConcentrationofstrategicresourcesInflationEconomicdownturnDebtIlliciteconomicactivityNodesEdgesUnemploymentRiskinfluenceRelativeinfluenceAssetbubbleburstsHighHighMediumMediumRiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalLowLowSourceWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey2023-2024.Bifurcatedmarketsofnewincomeopportunitiesacrossarangeofsectors.Forexample,AIandMachineLearningDisruptionstolabourmarketsarelikelytoescalateSpecialistsisanticipatedtobethefastest-growingworldwideasaresultofthetwolarge-scalejob,growingby40%(1millionjobs)by2027,whileeconomictransformationsthatareconcurrentlythegreentransitionisestimatedtoleadtomoretakingplace,drivenbyclimateactionandAIthan30millionjobsby2030.87Mirroringdemandintegration.Thesetwintransitionswilldramaticallyforrenewableinfrastructure,theglobalconstructionreshapethequality,quantityanddistributionofsectorisexpectedtodoubleinsizeinthe10-yearjobcreationaswellasjobloss,drivingdivergentperiodfrom2020to2030,whilerelatedjobs,risks.Someeconomiesandcommunities,isolatedincludingthoseintradesandengineering,arefromjob-creationandreskillingopportunities,amongthoseanticipatedtoexperiencethelargestwillencountersaturatedlabourmarkets,growthinthecomingyears(Figure2.19).88hinderingdevelopment.Inothers,challengestosocialandlabourmobilitycouldcontributetoHowever,relatedjobchurnislikelytobesignificant,shortagesincriticalindustries,slowingeconomicasthesetransitionsdisplaceworkersinparallel,transformationsandprogress.potentiallyleadingtonetjoblossoverall.Thelatestestimatesanticipatestructuraljobgrowthof69Bothtransitionsoffervaluableopportunitiestomillion,setagainstjoblossesof83million,overtackleeconomicinequalitythroughthegenerationthenextfiveyears.89Thislevelofjobchurnwillbeparticularlychallengingtomanage,astheseimpactsGlobalRisksReport202459FIGURE2.19Top10jobs,2023-2027A.Top10largestgrowthjobsB.Top10fastestgrowingjobs1stAgriculturalEquipmentOperators1stAIandMachineLearningSpecialists2ndHeavyTruckandBusDrivers2ndSustainabilitySpecialists3rdVocationalEducationTeachers3rdBusinessIntelligenceAnalysts4thMechanicsandMachineryRepairers4thInformationSecurityAnalysts5thBusinessDevelopmentProfessionals5thFintechEngineers6thBuildingFrameandRelatedTradesWorkers6thDataAnalystsandScientists7thUniversityandHigherEducationTeachers7thRoboticsEngineers8thElectrotechnologyEngineers8thElectrotechnologyEngineers9thSheetandStructuralMetalWorkers,Moulders,andWelders9thAgriculturalEquipmentOperators10thSpecialEducationTeachers10thDigitalTransformationSpecialistsSourceNoteWorldEconomicForumFutureofJobsReport2023.A.Thejobsforwhichemploymentfiguresareexpectedtoincreasethemostinrealtermsfrom2023to2027whensurveyresponsesarenormalizedtolabour-marketstatisticsfromtheILO.B.Thejobswhichsurveyrespondentsexpecttogrowmostquicklyfrom2023to2027asafractionofpresentemploymentfigures.willnotbeevenlydistributedbetweenorwithinrankings:low-andlower-middleincomecountrieseconomies.Inmanycases,jobscreatedwillnottendtorankUnemploymenthigher,whileupper-beinthesamelocation,industryorskillsbracketmiddleandhigh-incomerespondentsaremoreasavailableordisplacedworkers,thusrelyingconcernedaboutLabourshortages.onlabourmobilitytofillthem.AgrowinglabourmismatchbetweencountriesisalreadyevidentJobcreationinrespectiveeconomiesoverthecomingfromEOSresults:Labourshortagesfeatureinthedecadewillbemateriallyshapedbyaccesstoandtopfiveriskrankingsfor52countriesoverthenextselecteddeploymentofinvestmentfortheclimatetwoyears,while,incomparison,Unemploymentandtech-relatedtransitions.Forexample,botharefeaturesinthetopfiverisksin30countries.Asbeingwidelysupportedbygovernments,withfundingshowninFigure2.20,nearlyallcountriessurveyedandsubsidiestargetedatthedomesticgrowthofincludeatleastoneoftheserisksintheirtop10relatedindustries(Chapter2.4:AIincharge).BenjaminDisinger,UnsplashGlobalRisksReport202460FIGURE2.20Nationalriskperceptions:Employment“Whichfiverisksarethemostlikelytoposethebiggestthreattoyourcountryinthenexttwoyears?”1stMauritiusIrelandSwitzerlandHongKongSAR,ChinaUruguayTop10NetherlandsJamaicaFinlandCzechiaGermanySingaporeAustriaCroatiaMongoliaMalaysiaSerbia10thJapanLuxembourgCanadaPortugalGreeceArmeniaPanamaBosniaandHerzegovinaSloveniaSriLankaDenmarkIcelandThailandSouthKoreaCyprusGuatemalaMaltaEstoniaBulgariaKuwaitBahrainLithuaniaFranceRomaniaSpainVietNamTaiwan,ChinaHungaryAngolaNewZealandLaoPDRQatarANepalUnitedItalyBCOmanIndiaKingdomAustraliaBrazilAPolandLesothoUzbekistanArgentinaEgyptNigeriaRwandaDominicanRepublicElSalvadorNorthMacedoniaBahamasSouthAfricaMexicoTunisiaBelgiumTürkiyeSwedenSaudiArabiaJordanBChadKyrgyzstanHondurasParaguayPhilippinesUnitedStatesGeorgiaKazakhstanEcuadorCostaRicaUnitedArabEmiratesIran(IslamicRepublicof)CZimbabweSierraLeoneBangladeshBeninUkraineColombiaKenyaLatviaPakistanChileBolivia(PlurinationalStateof)YemenLabourshortagesIndonesiaCôteD'IvoireMoroccoMalawi20thUnitedRepublicofTanzaniaIraqAlgeriaPeruBotswanaGhanaCameroon30thDemocraticRepublicoftheCongoMaliSenegal36th30th20th10thTop101st36thUnemploymentIncomegroupLowincomeLowermiddleincomeUppermiddleincomeHighincomeTop10risksSourceNoteWorldEconomicForumExecutiveOpinionSurvey2023.ThetoprightboxindicatesthatbothLabourshortagesandUnemploymentfeatureinthetop10risksatanationallevel.However,ascapital–andthereforerisk–remainsinvestmentoroperations.Withmanyalreadycostly,investmentwilllikelybecomeevenmoreholdingsub-investment-gradecreditratings,privateheavilyconcentratedincomparativelystableinterestcoulddryupfurther,givenheightenedadvancedeconomies.Inflowsofpublicandprivatepolitical,regulatory,societalandeconomiccapitaltoacceleratetheenergytransitionhavebeeninstability,aswellastheadverseeffectsofclimateparticularlypronouncedintheUnitedStates,Chinachange.91Indeed,expertsconsultedworrythatandtheEU,duetomoresophisticatedfinancingevenpublishedestimationsofclimate-relatedmechanismsandpolicyincentives.90migrationcoulddrivecapitalelsewhere(Chapter2.3:A3°Cworld).ThiswouldexacerbateexistingIncontrast,relativelylessstable,lower-income,challengesintermsofpublicanddevelopmentconflict-proneorclimate-vulnerabledevelopingfinancing.92ManyoftheLeastDevelopedCountrieseconomiesmaybeseenastoohigh-riskfor(LDCs),grapplingwithdebtdistress,alreadyfaceGlobalRisksReport202461largefinancinggapsinreachingdevelopmentgoalsabsorbagrowingworkforce,whileothersectorsinthemediumterm(Figure2.21)–andgeopoliticalalsocouldbecomeatriskinalowgrowth,high-instabilitycouldfurtherhinderinternationalfinancialrate,low-investmentworld.Thisisachallengeeffortstosupporttheseeconomies,fromdebtthatwillnotbelimitedtotheLDCs–selectrestructuringtoforeignaid(Box2.8).middle-incomeeconomiesthathavesoughtgrowththroughanexport-ledmodelmayalsoThisglobalgapbetweenjob-creatinginvestmentsfacesubstantialjoberosion.93Mirroringtrendsandwillingworkforceswillthereforeleadtoinmanufacturing,severalcountrieshaverelieddivergentrisksinthedemandandsupplyofonrapidgrowthindigitallydeliveredserviceslabour.Thedemographicdividendofsomeexports(Figure2.22),94yettheindustriesandjobdevelopingmarketsmayquicklyturnintoafunctionsmostimpactedbygenerativeAIaredemographicdilemmainwhichunemploymentamongthosemostcommonlyoutsourcedandbecomesachronicrisk.Intheabsenceofoffshored,suchasinformationtechnology,financesubstantivedomesticorforeigninvestment,someandhumanresources.95Althoughhigher-valueeconomiesmaybeunabletogeneratesufficientincomeopportunitieswillbecreatedthroughgreen-andtech-relatedincomeopportunitiestoAIaugmentation,thesejobsarelikelytobeFIGURE2.21FundinggapsintheLeastDevelopedCountriesProjectedspendingin2025onSustainableDevelopmentGoalsandfinancingneedstoreachthosegoalsby2030,dollarspercapitaAfghanistanAngolaBangladeshBeninBhutanBurkinaFasoBurundiCambodiaCentralAfricanRepublicChadComorosCongo,Dem.Rep.oftheDjiboutiEritreaEthiopiaGambiaGuineaGuinea-BissauHaitiKiribatiLaoPDRLesothoLiberiaMalawiMaliMauritaniaMozambiqueMyanmarNepalNigerRwandaSaoTomeandPrincipeSenegalSierraLeoneSolomonIslandsSomaliaSouthSudanSudanTimor-LesteTogoTuvaluUgandaTanzania,UnitedRepublicofYemenZambia02505007501000125015001750ProjectedspendingDollarspercapitaFinancingneedSourceNoteUNCTAD,2023.Asof31August2023,sixLeastDevelopedCountries(LDCs)wereindebtdistressand15wereathighriskofdebtdistress.GlobalRisksReport202462concentratedintechnologicallyadvancedregions,forthelargestemittersinthemediumtermand,givenbuildingonexistingdividesineducationalandgeopoliticaldynamicsandsocietaldiscontent,isdigitalliteracythatcannotbebridgedwithoutmorelikelytoincentivizethereplacementoflower-investment(Chapter2.4:AIincharge).Theskilled,routinejobs(muscletomachinepower)lowercostoflabourmaystillincentivizeoffshoringthanencourageimmigrationandimprovedlabourtoadegree;however,protectionismindigitalmobility.Indeed,grapplingwithshrinkingandageingservicescouldstrengthen.Forexample,strongerworkforces,companiesinadvancedeconomieswilldatalocalizationrequirementswouldeffectivelyseektocapitalizeontheproductivitybenefitsoffered“reshore”theseindustries.96Assuch,amorebyAI,deployingthemrapidlyandatscale.Generativefundamentalquestionisrapidlyemerging:canAIwillincreasinglybesubstitutedformiddle-skilledmanufacturing-andservices-ledexportgrowthworkers(biologicaltomachineintelligence),particularlyremainanaccessiblepathwaytogreaterprosperityintheservicessector.Therapiddeploymentofthesefordevelopingcountries?technologiescouldcrowdouthumancompetencieswithinarelativelyshortperiodoftime–leadingtoInmostadvancedeconomies,thecreationofshiftsfromtalentshortagestounderemploymentand“boots-on-the-ground”greeninfrastructurejobsunemploymentinsomepartsoftheseeconomiesandcouldexacerbatealreadytightlabourmarkets.97Thiscreatingknock-oneffectsindevelopingeconomies.couldbeasevereconstrainttothegreentransitionFIGURE2.22Serviceexports,selectedeconomiesandeconomygroupsA.Growthinexportsofcommercialservices,bygroupsofeconomies,2005-2022Index(2005=100)Least-developed500economies400Otherdeveloping300economies200Restoftheworld10020102015202020222005B.Shareoftelecommunication,computerandinformationservices,otherbusinessservices,andfinance,2019and20222019,Top10WTOmembers2022,Top10WTOmembersIsrael32.8%Dominica35.3%58.6%UnitedKingdom29.6%Samoa29.7%47.9%27.4%Israel29.3%Seychelles26.4%28.6%60India26.2%UnitedKindgom28.4%Nepal25.7%Philippines26.9%25.1%India25.7%Ghana25.1%Tonga25.3%Philippines22.9%AfghanistanCostaRica16.6%GhanaCostaRicaDominicaSingapore204060020400PercentagePercentageSourceWTO,2023.GlobalRisksReport202463BOX2.8Thenextglobalshock?developmentimperatives,resultinginselectiveeffortstocreategoodforafew,ratherthanPost-SDGsgoodforall.Forexample,aidfinancingcouldbedivertedfromnaturerestorationoreducationAs2030approaches,demonstrableerosionintothebuildingofdual-useinfrastructuresuchcriticalpillarsoftheSustainableDevelopmentasports.Amidslowinggrowth,investmentGoals(SDGs)couldsetthetoneforthenextfromChinacoulddryupfurther,resultingindecade,asinternationalsupportforsustainablecancellationsanddelaysofcriticalinfrastructuredevelopmentpathwaysnarrow.Inlightofprojects,destabilizinglow-andmiddle-incomedomesticchallengesanddeclininginternationalcountries,particularlyinsub-SaharanAfrica.98cooperation,thereisariskofanaccompanyingriseindeprivation.Thedistributionofaidcouldbecomeprimarilydrivenbynarrowsecurityinterests,ratherthanbroader,traditionalStrandedpeopleArabEmirates,SaudiArabia,Qatar,Türkiye,SouthAfrica,Australia,BrazilandArgentina.IndividualpathwaystoeconomicprosperitycouldalsodivergebecauseofthesetwineconomicThelatestestimatessuggestthatthreeintransitions,perpetuatingtechnological,educationalfiveworkerswillrequiretrainingbefore2027.andsocietaldivides.IntheabsenceofeffectiveHowever,barriersofsocioeconomicclassandpoliciesencouragingreskillingalongsidelabouragemayhindereconomicmobility,entrenchingandsocialmobility,accesstoincomeopportunitiesexistinginequalities.Forexample,despiteAI-willnarrowforawideningsegmentoftheglobaldrivenadvancesineducation,notallworkers–population,creatingpocketsofunemploymentandbetweenandwithincountries–willhaveaccesseconomicdistressthatimpactblue-andwhite-toadequatereskillingopportunities.100Thosewithcollarworkersalike.theeconomicresourcestoadapttonewindustrieswillhaveabetterchanceatmaintainingeconomicThisdisruptionisimminentbutmaycatchthestabilityandcapturehigherwages.Thosewithoutworkforcebysurprise.Forexample,fourin10accesstoqualityretrainingwillbeforcedintoexecutivesbelieveAIwillleadtonetjoblossesthislessstableorsecuremeansofemployment.year–comparedtoonlyonein10employees.99Additionally,theautomationofentrylevelfunctionsEOSresultspointtoapotentialskillsgapwithincouldcreateahighereducationalbarriertoentryseveralcountries,suggestingthatdomesticworkersintotheworkforce,magnifyingchallengesofwillfacebarrierstomatchingjobdemandwithinthesocialmobility.Overthelongerterm,thejobsofnexttwoyears.Respondentsinnumerouscountrieshigher-skilled,moreexpensiveworkersmayalsoselectedbothUnemploymentandLabourcomeunderthreatfrombothmachineintelligenceshortagesintheirtop10rankings(Figure2.20).andmachinepower,withbarriersarisingdueThisincludesarangeofhigh-,upper-middle,andtoskillsobsolescenceandatrophy,aswellaslower-middleincomecountries,suchastheUnitedadvancementsintechnology.FelipheSchiarolli,UnsplashGlobalRisksReport202464Ifadequatesocialprotectionsystemsarenotinfiscalspacetoeasethetransitionforindividuals,place,displacedworkerswhostruggletore-entertheserisksremainaconcerninadvancedtheworkforcecouldfacehigherratesofpoverty,economies,too.Forexample,workersfromhungerandhomelessness,particularlyinthenear“dirty”sectorscouldbecomestrandedinfossiltermifcostsandinflationremainhigherforlonger.fuel-dependentlocaleconomies,withfewotherAccesstobasicnecessities,includinghealthcareopportunitiesavailable.Displacedolderworkerswillandhousing,couldbecomerestricted.Intheexacerbatethegrowingstrainonsocialsystemsabsenceofsupportedpathwaystosafeandsecureandhealthcare,creatingadifferentbutrelatedlivelihoods,moreindividualscouldalsobepushedlivelihoodcrisis:growingretirementinsecurity.intocrime,militarizationorradicalization(ChapterAnticipatedjobdisruptioncouldalsoenable2.6:Crimewave).Forcedeconomicdisplacementknowledge,technology,incomeandwealthtocouldbecomemorecommon,withindividualsbecomeevenmoreconcentrated,perpetuatingmigratinginsearchofbettereconomicopportunitycyclesofpoverty.Anindividualbornintoalessand,possibly,socialassistance–yeteventhismayprivilegedbackgroundislikelytofaceformidablebeapathwaythatsomeindividualscannotafford.andpotentiallyhigherbarrierstoreachingtheirfullpotential,underminingnotionsofmeritocracyandWhilemanyoftheseconsequencesmaybefeltfairnessthatunderpinstableandinclusivesocieties.mostacutelyindevelopingeconomies,withlessBOX2.9Thenextglobalshock?white-andblue-collardisplacementcouldfeatureheavilyinpoliticalplatformsduringelectioncycles,Greenlashmeetstechlashinteractingtopolarizeelectoratesinsomecasesoralignhistoricallyunlikelygroupingsinothers.DeepeningfrustrationwitheconomicconditionsThiscouldbeadynamictowatchinupcomingwilldrivesocietaldivisions,asindividualsdemandelectionsinboththeUnitedStatesandUnitedbetteropportunities,incomeequalityandKingdom,wheretradeunionshavehistoricallyimprovedlivingstandards.Theanti-techandanti-representedkeypartsofvotingcoalitions,andsustainabilitybacklashwillbefueledbyworkerswhoseelectoralpowercouldultimatelyslowthethreatenedbythesetwotransitions.Relatedrolloutofthetwineconomictransitions.strikesandriotscouldgrow,disruptingbusinesscontinuityonaregularbasisanddisruptingessentialinfrastructure,fromfinancialinstitutionstopublicservicesandtransport.BothDeliaGiandeini,UnsplashGlobalRisksReport202465NickVanDenBerg,UnsplashStalledlivingstandardsInthisenvironment,publicdemandsformoreinterventionistgovernmentsmayrecalibratefiscalAsthelivelihoodsandwell-beingofindividualspolicies,withgovernmentsfacingincreasingcomeunderthreat,fiscalspaceandpoliticalpressuretoimplementpoliciesthatprioritizeappetitewillinteracttoshapetheresponseofgeneroussafetynetsandemploymentstability.governmentsinbothadvancedanddevelopingSupportfortechnological(automationorAI)taxeseconomies.Iftheseeconomictransformationsareandwealthredistributioncouldgrow.101Generally,notmanagedcarefully,relatedeconomichardshiphowever,givendebtsustainabilityconcerns,thecouldmeanthatmetricsofhumandevelopment–abilityofgovernmentstoaffordtomitigatetherisksfrompovertytoaccesstoeducationandhealthcareofclimate-andAI-relatedjobdisplacementon–recedeforlargeswathesoftheglobalpopulation.individuals–throughhigherunemploymentbenefits,Andifstandardsoflivingarenotpreservedforthemoregenerousminimumwagesorsubsidiesforcurrentandnextgeneration,societalandpoliticalretrainingforexample–willbedrivenpartiallybydynamicscouldradicallyshiftinmanyeconomies.relatedproductivityenhancements,leadingtogrowthinGDPandtaxrevenue.AslabourmarketsAsoutlinedinlastyear’sGlobalRisksReportbifurcate,theabilityofgovernmentstosupporttheir(Chapter2.6:Economicstability),competingworkforcesthroughtheseradicaltransformations,demandsforinvestmentmeanthatfewcountriesandmaintaindevelopmentalprogressandarelikelytohavethefiscalheadroomtoinvestinstandardsofliving,coulddivergeinturn.humancapitalforthelongerterm–ineducationandhealthcaresystems,componentsthatareIneconomieswheregovernmenteffortsare–orfundamentaltotherealizationofeconomicareseentobe–inadequate,populistmovementsopportunities.Thiswillbefeltmostacutelyinthewillcapitalizeonthedisillusionmentofthemostvulnerablemarkets,whichaspreviouslylower-andmiddle-classes,whoseeverylittlenoted,couldfaceapotentialinvestmentcrisisopportunityintheirownandtheirchildren’sfuture.withcorrosivelong-termimpacts.AsfiscalAlthoughitmayequallyencourageinnovationspaceissqueezedandprivatefinanceremainsandentrepreneurship,anaspirationgapwillfuelconstrained,thesemarketswillbeincreasinglyfrustration.Digitallyconnectedpeopleindevelopingforcedtochoosebetween,forinstance,payingandadvancedeconomiesalikewillseeabetterexternaldebt,providingastrongandimmediatelifeelsewhere,butlimitedeconomicopportunitiessafetynetforstrugglingindividuals,investinginintheirownenvironmentwillpreventthemfromthefuturegrowthdividendsofferedbyclimateaccessingthisleveloflivingstandards.Evensmallactionandtechnologicaldevelopment,managingshiftsinaccesstoincomeandopportunity–andadaptingtoclimatechange,orshoringuptheperceivedoractual–maysparkprotestsandcivillonger-termadaptivecapacitiesofhumancapitalunrestanddeepenanti-immigrationsentimentandthroughhealthandeducationsystems.hatecrimesagainstmigrantpopulations.Inthemostextremescenarios,discontentwiththestatusquocouldevenpushsocietiestowardsmoreopenrebellionandcallsforregimechange.GlobalRisksReport202466Actingtodaythepotentialprivateinvestorbase–orblendedfinancestructures,includingwiththesupportofAsmuchasthegreentransitionandfrontierAIposephilanthropicinvestors,couldimprovetheperceivedradicaldisruptionstotraditionaleconomicmodelsrisk-returnprofile,openingtheseinvestmentandpathwaystodevelopment,theyalsoofferopportunitiestoinstitutionalinvestors.102substantialopportunities.Withcarefulmanagementandadegreeofinternationalcooperation,Inthefaceofthesestructuralshiftstotheeffectivelabourandsocialmobilitycanensurethatemploymentlandscape,veryfewdemographicprosperity,ratherthanrisks,aresharedacrossgroups,industriesorcountriescanremainborders,unleashingproductivitybenefitsofferedcomplacent.Recognizingthatboththeimpactsofbybotheconomictransformations,andenhancingclimateandAIonjobmarketswillnotbeuniform,humandevelopment.solutionstoimproveeconomicmobilitymustbetailoredtoaddressspecificvulnerabilities,suchForexample,whileUnemploymentisconsideredaslabourshortages,onanindustry-andcountry-tobeaddressedprimarilybyCorporatestrategieslevelbasis.Forexample,humancapitalthatisandNationalandlocalregulations(Figure2.23),a“stranded”bythegreentransition–i.e.,displacedriseinremoteworkandnon-traditionalemploymentworkersfromcarbon-intensiveindustries–couldarrangements,alongsidetechnologyandskillshelpaddressgreenlabourshortagesifgeographic,transfers,couldhelpaddressglobalinequalitieseconomicorskillsbarrierscanbeovercome.Ainaccesstoeconomicopportunities.Currentstrongerfocusonsectorsthatgobeyondnarroweffortstoreshapetheglobaltaxregimeshouldalsodefinitionsoftechandgreen,suchashealth,care,targetemergingsourcesofinequityandsupporteducation,tourism,hospitality,agriculture,personaldevelopingmarketsincapturingashareoftheservicesandculture–eachofwhichtendstonextgenerationofvaluechains.Thesupportoffavourhumantraitsandgeneratelarge-scalemultilateralandinternationalfinancemechanismsemployment–canalsohelpcountriessupportthecouldalsoreducerealandperceivedrisksinthestructuraltransitionsoftheirlabourmarketsandmostvulnerablecountriestounlockfinancingflows.workforces.ThepublicandprivatesectorwillneedTheexpandeduseofguaranteescouldbroadentoworktogethertoensuretheskillstransitionfromsunsettosunriseroles.FIGURE2.23Riskgovernance:Endofdevelopment?“Whichapproach(es)doyouexpecttohavethemostpotentialfordrivingactiononriskreductionandpreparednessoverthenext10years?Selectuptothreeforeachrisk.”Approachaaaa.Financialinstrumentsib.Nationalandlocalregulationsibbibc.Minilateraltreatiesand45%37%44%53%19%36%45%40%47%agreementsd.Globaltreatiesandhchchc34%agreements16%50%10%32%13%e.Developmentassistance32%10%f.Corporatestrategies16%20%16%12%g.Research&development28%h.Publicawarenessand37%gdg53%dg52%42%deducationi.Multi-stakeholderengagement53%fefefeShareofrespondentsLackofeconomicopportunityLabourshortagesUnemploymentSourceRiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey2023-2024.GlobalRisksReport2024672.6CrimewaveFIGURE2.24Severityscore:IlliciteconomicactivityGlobalproliferationoforganizedcrimeortheillicitactivitiesofbusinessesthatundermineeconomicadvancementandgrowth.Includes,butisnotlimitedto:illicitfinancialflows(e.g.taxevasion,sanctionsevasion,moneylaundering)andillicittradeandtrafficking(e.g.counterfeiting,humantrafficking,wildlifetrade,weapons).10-yearrank:31st10-yearaverage:4.02years7%13%26%26%19%6%3%10years8%12%17%26%20%13%5%SourceProportionofrespondentsSeverityWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey2023-2024.Note7654321Severitywasassessedona1-7Likertscale[1–Lowseverity,7–Highseverity].ThepercentagesintheHighLowgraphmaynotaddupto100%becausefigureshavebeenroundedup/down.–Statefragility,fueledbyclimatechange,conflictandeconomichardship,willcreateorwidenagovernancegapinwhichtransnationalorganizedcrimecanflourish.–Technologicaladvanceswillopennewmarketsandallowcrimenetworkstospread,andthehumanandeconomiccostofcrimemayriseintandem.–Astheeaseandattractivenessoftheseparalleleconomiesgrows,thelinesbetweencriminalsandthestatelikelywillblur.OrganizedcrimemaycontinuetoglobalizeindriverstoIlliciteconomicactivityareamongthetermsofbothtargetsandoperations,andindoingmostsevereperceivedrisksovertheshort-andso,couldbecomeapowerfulanddestabilizinglonger-termhorizon.Itisamongthetop10mostpresenceinawidersetofcountries.Thelatestconnectedrisksinthenetwork,seentobedrivendatasuggeststhatactivityhasalreadystartedtobyEconomicdownturn,Lackofeconomicriseacrossallcriminalmarketsandactors(Figureopportunity,CyberinsecurityandInvoluntary2.25).103Notwithstandingadropinhomiciderates,migration,togetherwithUnemployment,organizedcrimeremainsasignificantcontributortoIntrastateviolenceandGeoeconomiclethalviolence:between2000and2019,itresultedconfrontation,amongothers(Figure2.26).inroughlythesamenumberofkillingsasallarmedconflictsacrosstheworldcombined,atarateofTherearethreeconcurrenttrendsthatwillfuelapproximately65,000deathsperyear.104crimesyndicatesandrelatedillicitmarketsoverthenextdecade.First,societalfragility,arisingfromIlliciteconomicactivityisanunder-the-radargeopolitical,socioeconomicandenvironmentalrisk–itrankscomparativelylowintermsofvulnerabilities,maydriveanexpansioninillicitperceivedseverityoverboththetwo-and10-markets.Inparallel,advancesintechnologywillyeartimehorizons,at#28and#31respectivelybreakdownbarrierstoentry–borders,languages,(Figure2.24).Whilenarrowerthanthedefinitionskillsets–openingalternaterevenuestreams,adoptedbytheGRPS,thissectionwillfocusparticularlyinthecyberdomain,andallowingspecificallyonorganizedcrimeinlightofthesetransnationalcriminalnetworkstospread.Finally,recentdatatrendstoexplorewhetheremergingtheerosionoflegitimategovernancemaycreategeostrategic,environmental,demographicandavacuumofpowerforcriminalorganizationstotechnologicalforcescouldturnthealready-chronicflourish,contestingfragileregimesforterritorialriskoforganizedcrimeintoapressingcrisisovercontrol,orcapitalizingonlucrativepartnershipswiththenextdecade.Indeed,manyoftheperceivedstateactors.GlobalRisksReport202468FIGURE2.25Criminalmarketsandactors,2021vs2023A.GlobalcriminalmarketsGlobalcriminalmarketsaverage5.82HumantraffickingHumansmuggling5.164.02Extortionandprotectionracketeering5.214.98Armstrafficking4.59Tradeincounterfeitgood4.06Illicittradeinexcisablegood4.834.75Floracrimes4.08Faunacrimes4.82Non-renewableresourcecrimesHerointrade5.34Cocainetrade4.95Cannabistrade4.55SynthethicdrugtradeCyber-dependentcrimes5.98Financialcrimes123456789100GlobalCriminalMarketsIndex2021average2023averageB.GlobalcriminalactorsGlobalcriminalactorsaverageMafia-stylegroups4.02CriminalnetworksState-embeddedactors5.665.95ForeignactorsPrivatesectoractors5.544.76123456789100GlobalCriminalActorsIndex2021average2023averageSourceSourceGlobalInitiativeAgainstTransnationalOrganizedCrime,2023.Globalaverages2021versus2023.AnumberofnewindicatorswereaddedtotheGlobalOrganizedCrimeIndexin2023,identifiedbyanasterisk.Financialcrimesreferstoorganizedcrimethatresultsinafinanciallosstothestate,entityand/orprivateindividualsthrougharangeofactivities.However,givenoverlapwithothercategories,wheresuchactivitiesareattributabletoanothercriminalmarketundertheindex,financialcrimesfallundertheirrespectivemarketindicator(forexample,procurementfraudforloggingcontractsfallsunderfloracrime).GlobalRisksReport202469FIGURE2.26OrganizedcrimeRiskinterconnections:IlliciteconomicactivityandCyberinsecurityIntrastateviolenceCensorshipandsurveillanceInvoluntarymigrationTerroristattacksMisinformationanddisinformationSocietalAdverseoutcomesofpolarizationfrontiertechnologiesTechnologicalpowerconcentrationCybbeerrininsseeccuruitryityAdverseoutcomesofAItechnologiesDisruptionstocriticalinfrastructureReferenceDisruptionstoasystemicallyLackofeconomicopportunityimportantsupplychainGeoeconomicconfrontationConcentrationofInflationstrategicresourcesEconomicdownturnDebtUnemploymentIlliciteconomicactivityRiskcategoriesNodesEdgesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalRiskinfluenceRelativeinfluenceHighHighMediumMediumLowLowSourceWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey2023-2024.Vulnerablemarketstoexpand(Chapter2.4:AIincharge).108IllegalminingofcriticalresourceswillbeamajorsourceofOverthecomingdecade,paralleleconomies(orinstabilityacrossmultipleregions,fromSouth-Eastblackmarkets)105arelikelytoproliferate,creatingAsiatoLatinAmerica,drivingviolence,corruption,lucrativerevenuestreamsandrecruitmentpoolsforthedisplacementofIndigenouspopulationsandorganizedcrimenetworks,asthecostsofcrimeenvironmentaldestruction.109Asscarcitydrivesupspreadmorewidelytocitizens.resourcevalue,environmentalcrimessuchasillegalloggingcoulddriveforcedlabourandhumanrightsResourcestress,conflictandeconomichardshipabuses,andacceleratebroaderenvironmentalwillinteracttodrivemorepervasivedemandimpactsinturn.110Similarly,thefisheriessectorcouldforsmugglingaswellasvulnerabilitytocriminalincreasinglyattracttheinterestoforganizedcrimeactivities.106Demandforillegalsmugglingofdrugs,groups.Illegal,unreportedandunregulatedfishingisweapons,resources,cash,pharmaceuticalsandarevenuestreamthatcanbeengagedinwithrelativepeoplewillincreaseintandemwithgeopolitical,impunity,withjurisdictionalchallengeshamperingeconomicandenvironmentaldevelopments.enforcement.ThepracticealsocomplementsotherExpandedsanctionsregimes(Chapter1.4:Riseinformsofmarinetrafficking,includingdrugsandconflict),offensivegeoeconomicpolicies,climate-people.111relatedinvoluntarymigration,andevenanticipatedpricevolatilityintheliciteconomy–infood,fuel,Atthesametime,socioeconomicvulnerabilitieshealthorcriticalminerals–couldalldriveanarisingfromthesesametrendswillheightenexpansioninillegalsmugglinginnewgeographicexposuretocriminalnetworks.Conflict-orclimate-marketsorinnewproducts.107Forexample,relatedmigrationwilllikelydriveexploitationongoingmarketconcentrationinthetechvaluebycriminalactorsengagingin,forexample,chainmeansthattechnology-relatedsmuggling,childlabourandcyberslavery.112Additionally,includinginsemiconductors,islikelytocontinuesocialdisintegration,urbansegregation,povertyandeconomicinequalitiesareallwell-knownGlobalRisksReport202470potentialdriversofcriminalactivityandcouldnewtechnologiestodiversifyillicitfundingandleadmorepeopletowardscriminalactivity.113fragmentthephysicalpresenceoforganizedcrime.UnemploymentisseentobethestrongestThiswillposesignificantriskstoindividualsanddriverofIlliciteconomicactivity(selectedbylegalbusinesses–andhasthepotentialtoleadtomorethan40%ofGRPSrespondents).Ifpovertyviolencethatchallengesthepowerofgovernmentsandunemploymentbecomechronicconcernsinandthreatenstheterritorialcontrolofstates.114countriesvulnerabletolivelihoodcrises(Chapter2.5:Endofdevelopment?),crimemaybecomeNewtoolsandcapabilitieswillopennewmarketsthepredominantsourceofincomeandtheonlywayforcriminalnetworks,withcybercrimeofferingantoaccessnecessitiesforsomecommunities.increasinglylow-riskandlow-costrevenuestreamfororganizedcrime.115Phishingattacks,forexample,canCybervulnerabilitiesnowbeeasilyandaccuratelytranslatedintominoritylanguagesusinggenerativeAI.OverthecomingInparallel,rapidintegrationofadvancedyears,moresophisticatedcyberdefenseswillshifttechnologiesareexposingabroadersubsettargetstowardslessdigitallyliterateindividualsorlessoftheglobalpopulationtopotentialdigitalandsecureinfrastructureandsystems.Alreadyprevalentphysicalexploitation.OrganizedcrimenetworkswillinLatinAmerica,cybercrimewillcontinuetospreadincreasinglyadoptblendedbusinessmodelsutilizingtopartsofAsiaandWestandSouthernAfrica,asaffluencygrowsandinternetconnectivitybringslargeswathesoftheglobalpopulationonline.116FIGURE2.27Nationalriskperceptions,byregion:Cybercrimeandcyberinsecurity“Whichfiverisksarethemostlikelytoposethebiggestthreattoyourcountryinthenexttwoyears?”Top10GeorgiaArmeniaUzbekistanKazakhstanCentralAsiaJapanSouthKoreaMongoliaKyrgyzstanEasternAsiaLithuaniaCzechiaUnitedKingdomTürkiyeDenmarkGermanyPortugalLatviaItalyHungaryBelgiumSerbiaEuropeJamaicaSwedenUkraineNorthMacedoniaBulgariaLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanBrazilParaguayMexicoColombiaBoliviaMiddleEastandUnitedArabEmiratesOmanGuatemalaKuwaitEcuadorVenezuelaNorthernAfricaSaudiArabiaYemenIraqIranAlgeriaMoroccoNorthernAmericaBahrainJordanEgyptQatarTunisiaCanadaUnitedStatesofAmericaAustraliaNewZealandOceaniaSingaporeThailandIndonesiaMalaysiaLaoPDRSouth-easternAsiaBangladeshNepalPhilippinesIndiaVietNamPakistanSouthernAsiaSriLankaNigeriaSub-SaharanAfricaCameroonKenyaBeninRwandaAngolaSouthAfricaCôteD'IvoireTanzaniaDemocraticRepublicoftheCongoBotswanaMali1st10th20th30th36thRiskrankingCriminalityscore0246810LowHighSourceNoteWorldEconomicForumExecutiveOpinionSurvey2023;Thecolourofthedatapointsreflectscountries’criminalityscores,whicharebasedontheGlobalGlobalInitiativeAgainstTransnationalOrganizedCrime,2023.OrganizedCrimeIndex2023.Thescoreconsistsoftheaverageof10criminalmarketsandfourcriminalactortypes.Ahigherscore(red)indicatesagreaterdegreeofseverityofitscriminalityconditions.Thex-axisdisplaysthecomparativerankingofCybercrimeandcyberinsecurityinnationalriskperceptions,ascapturedbytheEOSsurvey.GlobalRisksReport202471Figure2.27outlinesagrowingconcernaroundtheoftheirnetworkstostrengthenstrategicfootholdsriskofCybercrimeandcyberinsecurityamongofeconomicandpoliticalactivity.Enabledbybusinessleadersindevelopingregions.Itrankstechnology,crimenetworkscanspreadtoexploitamongthetop10risksoverthenexttwoyearsheighteneddemand,regulatoryandenforcementformarketsalreadygrapplingwithhigherlevelsgaps,andnegativepublicperceptionsofpoliceofcriminality,suchasCameroon,Mali,Thailandandstatelegitimacy,withfinancing,suppliers,andtheUnitedArabEmirates.Theadoptionofcustomersandviolenceoriginatinginseparatethesedigitallyblendedmodels,leveragingcybermarkets.119EOSresultssuggestthatthismayandphysicalrevenuestreams,wasseenbysomebeanunderappreciatedriskamongbusinessexpertsconsultedtopotentiallyleadtoadropinperceptions,withmoretraditionalformsofcrimeviolenceiftheseactivitiessupersedealternateforms–includingillicittradeandtrafficking–anticipatedofillicitrevenue,suchasdrugtrafficking.Notably,toremainlargelyconcentratedinLatinAmericahowever,thedestructiveinfluenceofcybercrimeandtheCaribbeanoverthenexttwoyears(Figureputsmoreciviliansatriskthanwhenconcentrated2.28).Ofnoteareseveraleconomies,suchasbetweencriminalactorsinintergangwarfare,inNigeria,Kenya,TürkiyeandIndonesia,thatareadditiontobeingassociatedwithotherformsofalreadyexperiencinghigherlevelsofcriminalityphysicalviolence,suchashumantrafficking.117(shadeddarkerorange),despiteIlliciteconomicactivitynotrankingashighlyinriskperceptions.Organizedcrimegroupswillalsoincreasinglyutilizetechnologies118toenablegeographicexpansionFIGURE2.28Nationalriskperceptions,byregion:Illiciteconomicactivity“Whichfiverisksarethemostlikelytoposethebiggestthreattoyourcountryinthenexttwoyears?”Top10KyrgyzstanKazakhstanGeorgiaUzbekistanJapanCentralAsiaMongoliaSouthKoreaArmeniaEasternAsiaBulgariaMaltaRomaniaUkraineSerbiaTürkiyePolandItalyNetherlandsSwedenEuropePeruJamaicaHondurasBahamasUruguayElSalvadorFranceIcelandLatinAmericaandParaguaytheCaribbeanEcuadorMexicoColombiaEgyptQatarIraqAlgeriaMoroccoSaudiArabiaBahrainMiddleEastandTunisiaYemenNorthernAfricaNorthernAmericaOmanCanadaUnitedStatesofAmericaIranOceaniaNewZealandAustraliaSouth-easternAsiaIndonesiaMalaysiaVietNamThailandSouthernAsiaSingaporeIndiaBangladeshNepalSriLankaPakistanLaoPDRPhilippinesSub-SaharanAfricaCameroonSouthAfricaBeninTanzaniaNigeriaChadKenyaSenegalRwandaSierraLeoneCôteD'IvoireMalawiAngolaLesotho1st10th20th30th36thRiskrankingCriminalityscore0246810LowHighSourceNoteWorldEconomicForumExecutiveOpinionSurvey2023;Thecolourofthedatapointsreflectscountries’criminalityscores,whicharebasedontheGlobalGlobalInitiativeAgainstTransnationalOrganizedCrime,2023.OrganizedCrimeIndex2023.Thescoreconsistsoftheaverageof10criminalmarketsandfourcriminalactortypes.Ahigherscore(red)indicatesagreaterdegreeofseverityofitscriminalityconditions.Thex-axisdisplaysthecomparativerankingofIlliciteconomicactivityinnationalriskperceptions,ascapturedbytheEOSsurvey.GlobalRisksReport202472Technology-enabledproliferationofillicitactivitiessyndicatescouldalsoleadtopoliticalviolencethatinnewmarketsandgeographiescouldhavechallengesthepowerofgovernments,mirroringnumerousimplicationsatastate,companyandrecentdevelopmentsthroughoutLatinAmericaindividuallevel.Alongsidecybersecurityconcerns,itandtheCaribbean,suchasinHaiti.120Ariseincouldexposebusinessestoarangeofheightened“ungoverned”spaceswillalsolikelybeseeninrisks,fromreputationalthreatsandregulatorythegrowthofarmedandradicalizedgroupsandscrutinyrelatingtofinancialflowsandsupplydisenchantedyouthsinmanycitiesthroughoutthechainstoimpactsonthelong-termviabilityanddevelopedworld,threateningpublicsafetyandsuccessoflegitimatemarkets.Inmoreextremesecurity.scenarios,geographicexpansionofthesecriminalBOX2.10Thenextglobalshock?inindustrializedeconomies,enabledby“crimeasaservice”constructionofillicitlaboratories.GlobalfentanylepidemicConcerningly,however,fentanylisfarmorepotentthannaturalopium,withseverehealthimplicationsEnforcementoftheTaliban’sbanandthenearifitweretopenetratemarketsmorebroadly.ItiseradicationofpoppyproductioninAfghanistantheleadingcauseofdeathinyoungadultsinthecouldhavewidespreadimplicationsfortheglobalUnitedStates,withoverdosedeathsattributabledrugtrade.121Historicallyaccountingforaroundtofentanylusereachingalmost110,000in202280%ofopiumproduction,Afghanistan’srapid–althoughtheUnitedStatesandChinarecentlyshortfallinsupplycouldbelargelymetthroughreachedadealtolimittheexportofpre-cursorsyntheticdrugs.Fentanyl,forexample,offerschemicals.122significantadvantagestocrimegroups:itislesslabour-intensive,requiressmallervolumesofprecursormaterialsandoffersalowercostrevenuestream.Someexpertsconsultedreferencedearlysignsofon-shoredproductionRandyLaybourne,UnsplashState-enabledcriminalitycorruptioncouldeffectivelyleadtocontroloftransportationhubs,lawenforcementandGrowingstatefragilitywillstrengthentheeaseandpartsofthepublicsectorbyorganizedcrimeattractivenessoftheseparalleleconomiesforagroups.124Thisinturnwouldunderminetherulebroadersetofactors,eitherbecauseofreducedoflaw,distortcompetitionandweakeneconomicstatecapacitytorespondor,insomecases,growthfurther,erodingbothsocietaltrustandblurringofthelinesbetweencriminalsandthestate.enforcementcapacities.Figure2.30125depictsIndeed,thestateitselfcouldsupportorbecomethissymbioticrelationship,wherebycriminalityissusceptibletoorganizedcrimeoverthenextgenerallyfoundhand-in-handwithfragilestatesdecade.123thathavehigherlevelsofconflictandcorruption.Fueledbyfragility,morewidespreadcorruptionState“sponsorship”ofillicitactivitiesmayalsocouldcreateaviciouscyclewherebystatesarebecomemorecommon(Box2.11).Incyberspace,unabletorebuildtheresiliencetoeffectivelyforexample,commodifiedproducts(includingcounterorganizedcrimeandcouldinsteadberansomware)andservices-for-hire(suchasmoneycapturedbycriminalnetworks.Forexample,laundering)arenoweasilyaccessibleforlesstechnicallycompetentactors.126ThisincludesGlobalRisksReport202473procurementbystatesandstate-backedactorstoasa“transnationalcriminalorganization”bytheconductespionageandforeigninterference.127TheUnitedStates.Theorganizationhasanetworkoflinesbetweenorganizedcrime,privatemilitiaandeconomicentities,includingminingcompanies,terroristgroupswillalsoblur.SymbioticpartnershipsparticularlyacrossAfrica.128Thepresenceofthesebetweenstatesandorganizedcrimecouldgrow,groupscouldfurtherfuelthecyclebetweenconflict,suchasinacquiringthedataofinvestigativefragility,corruptionandcrime,particularlywherethejournalistsamidabroadercrackdownonstatedoesnothavethecapacitytoenforcelegalinformationflows(Chapter1.3:Falseinformation),rights.Notonlycanthepresenceofthesegroupsinreturnforconcessionsandbilateralagreements.drivelethalviolence,buttheyalsoofferaneconomicpathwayforillicitactivitiesasotherpathwaysstall.State-sponsoredgroupsmayincreasinglyadoptForexample,climatechangehasledtoadeclineinblendedbusinessmodels,undertakingbothlicitandarablelandandfishstocksinLakeChad,promptingillicitactivities.Forexample,theWagnerGroupisasomeindividualstojoinarmedgroupsasanprivatemilitarycompanythathasbeendesignatedalternativesourceofincome.129FIGURE2.29Crimeandstatefragility120100Fragilestatesindex(0-120)806040200Size0246810GlobalPeaceIndexCorruptionPerceptionIndexCriminalityscoreLesspeaceful0255075100MoreHighLowpeacefulSourceNoteGlobalInitiativeAgainstTransnationalOrganizedCrime,2023;Large,reddotsinthetoprightindicatecountrieswithhighlevelsoffragility,corruptionandFundforPeace,2023;InstituteforEconomics&Peace,2023;criminality,andlowlevelsofpeacefulness.They-axisdepictscountries’fragilityscores,whichTransparencyInternational,2023.arebasedon12keypolitical,socialandeconomicindicatorsoutlinedintheFragileStatesIndex2023.Ahigherscore(top)indicatesahigherlevelofrelativefragility.Thex-axisreflectscountries’criminalityscores,whicharebasedontheGlobalOrganizedCrimeIndex2023.Ahigherscore(right)indicatesmoreseverecriminalityconditions.Thecolourofdatapointsrepresentscountries’perceivedlevelsofpublic-sectorcorruption,basedontheCorruptionsPerceptionsIndex2022.Lowscores(shadedred),then,canbeinterpretedasindicatingahighlycorruptcountry.Thesizeofthedotsdepictscountries’levelofpeacefulness,basedon23qualitativeandquantitativeindicatorsoutlinedintheGlobalPeaceIndex2023.Ahighscore(largedot)canbeinterpretedasacountryhavingalowerstateofpeace.GlobalRisksReport202474BOX2.11Thenextglobalshock?Statecriminalexample,NorthKoreastole$200millionincryptocurrenciesoveraneight-monthperiodInamoreextremescenario,thestateitselfmaylastyear,allegedlytofundtheirnuclearweaponsbecomethecriminal.Cybercrimecouldcreateprogramme.130Autocraticgovernments,fragilelucrativeillicitfundingstreamsthataredifficultregimesand“ungovernedstates”aremoretoattributetoanyparticularstateandthatcansusceptibletosuchcapture.beusedforgovernmentservices,illegalpoliticalactivities(suchasassassinationsordisinformationcampaigns)orevenpoliticalcampaigns.ForActingtodayWithconstraintstointernationalcooperation,theremaybeashifttowardsunilateral,bilateralToeffectivelypreventthespreadofillicitactivityandregionalagreementsoncrime,althoughacrossbothgeographicandeconomicmarkets,thesemayprovelesseffectiveataddressingthreekeyareascouldbetackled:thecapabilitytotransnationalcriminalnetworksthattranscendlaunderillicitprofits;communicationsthatenablepoliticalalliancesandcountryborders.GRPSextensivecriminalnetworks;andcorruption.131Forrespondentsrecognizethecontinuedneedforexample,whilethecounter-riskofsurveillanceneedsGlobaltreatiesandagreementstoboostlocaltobehandledcarefully,thedismantlingofencryptedefforts.WhileitwasconsideredcomparativelycommunicationscouldbearadicaltooltodisruptlessimportantinthecontextofCyberinsecurity,transnationalcrimenetworks.ThetakedownofthedevelopmentofaUNtreatyoncybercrimeEncroChat,forinstance,ledto6,558arrestsandisseenbysometobeanencouragingstep,closetoEUR900millionincriminalfundsseizedornotwithstandingthatitisaccompaniedbydeepfrozen.132Allthreepillarscanbetackledatmultipleconcernsaroundrelatedgovernmentrepressionlayersofgovernance;however,GRPSrespondentsofhumanrights.133Ifadopted,itwouldbethefirstfeelthatNationalandlocalregulationshavetheframeworkforinternationalcooperationonacybermostpotentialfordrivingactiononriskreductionissue,addressingtheprevention,investigationandpreparednesswithrespecttoIlliciteconomicandprosecutionofcybercrime.134Alongsidetheseactivity(Figure2.30).efforts,afocusonsocioeconomicdriverswillalsobeessentialtoreduceentrypathwaysinto,anddemandfor,criminalactivities.FIGURE2.30Riskgovernance:Crimewave“Whichapproach(es)doyouexpecttohavethemostpotentialfordrivingactiononriskreductionandpreparednessoverthenext10years?Selectuptothreeforeachrisk.”Approachaaa.Financialinstrumentsb.Nationalandlocalregulationsibibc.Minilateraltreatiesand48%61%agreementsd.Globaltreatiesand42%35%28%agreementsh15%chce.Developmentassistance38%23%f.Corporatestrategies48%12%g.Research&developmenth.Publicawarenessand9%31%17%40%25%20%education55%33%i.Multi-stakeholderengagementgdgdShareofrespondentsfefeCyberinsecurityIlliciteconomicactivitySourceRiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey2023-2024.GlobalRisksReport2024752.7PreparingforthedecadeaheadWhenaskedabouttheglobalpoliticaloutlookenvironmentalcrisistohigh-speedtechnologicalforcooperationonrisksoverthenextdecade,advances,couldbeinincreasinglyshortsupply,two-thirdsofrespondents(66%)believethatwerequiringnewapproachestoaddressingglobalwillfaceamultipolarorfragmentedorder,inwhichrisks.Thenextchapter(Chapter3:Respondingtomiddleandgreatpowerscontest,setandenforceglobalrisks)exploresdifferenttypesofglobalrisksregionalrulesandnorms(Figure2.31).Cooperationandhowtoaddressthemaheadofthenextdecadeonurgentglobalissues,fromaninterrelatedinanewmultipolarcontext.FIGURE2.31Globalpoliticaloutlook“Whichofthefollowingbestcharacterizestheglobalpoliticalenvironmentforcooperationonglobalrisksin10years?”66%Multipolarorfragmentedorderinwhichmiddleandgreatpowerscontest,set,andenforceregionalrulesandnorms15%Bipolarorbifurcatedordershapedbystrategiccompetitionbetweentwosuperpowers10%Realignmenttowardsanewinternationalorderledbyanalternativesuperpower9%ContinuationorreinvigorationoftheUS-led,rules-basedinternationalorderSourceWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey2022-2023.GlobalRisksReport202476Endnotes1.Severityscoresof3.9forthetwo-yearand4.7forthe10-yearhorizonin2024,comparedto5.3and5.2,respectively,in2023.2.InstituteforEconomics&Peace,GlobalTerrorismIndex2023,2023,https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/GTI-2023-web-170423.pdf.3.Longer-term,macro,structuraltrendsanduncertaintiesareoftenusedinconductingstrategicforesightexercises.Forexample,theEU’s2023StrategicForesightoutlinesasetofkeysocialandeconomicchallenges,includingtheriseofgeopoliticsandreconfigurationofglobalization.TheUSNationalIntelligenceCouncil’sGlobalTrends2024Reportoutlinesfour“structuralforces”,definedas“conditionsandtrendsthataresomewhatknowableorforecastablewithdatabecauseofexistingconditionsofpatterns”,andincludesadetailedsetofpredictionsrelatingtodemographicsandhumandevelopment,environment,economicsandtechnology.Thestructuralforcesadoptedforthepurposesofthisreportbuildonandadapttheseconcepts,todefinethemostmateriallonger-termshiftsinthesystemicelementsofthegloballandscape,identifiedthroughexpertstakeholderconsultation.Formoreinformation,see:NationalIntelligenceCouncil,GlobalTrends2040:Amorecontestedworld,March2021,https://www.dni.gov/index.php/gt2040-home,andEuropeanCommission,2023StrategicForesightReport,6July2023,https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/strategic-planning/strategic-foresight/2023-strategic-foresight-report_en.4.Theglobalpopulationisprojectedtoincreasebynearly0.7billionpeopleoverthenextdecade,butpopulationgrowthhasbeenslowingoverthepast50years,withtheglobalgrowthratehitting0.82%in2021.Thisreflectsrapidlyfallingfertilityratesoverthesameperiod,droppingtoaround2.3birthsperwoman,globally,in2021.Incontrast,lifeexpectancygloballygrewbyalmostnineyearssince1990.Seethefollowingforfurtherdetails:PRB,Africa’sFuture:YouthandtheDataDefiningTheirLives,https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-update-2022;https://www.prb.org/resources/africas-future-youth-and-the-data-defining-their-lives/#:~:text=By%202030%2C%20young%20Africans%20are,critical%20now%20more%20than%20ever,accessed30November,2023;Rotman,David,“We’renotpreparedfortheendofMoore’slaw”,MITTechnologyReview,24February2020,https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/02/24/905789/were-not-prepared-for-the-end-of-moores-law/;Singh,Anuraag,GiorgioTriulziandChristopherL.Magee,“Technologicalimprovementratepredictionsforalltechnologies:Useofpatentdataandanextendeddomaindescription”,ResearchPolicy,vol.50,issue9,November2021,https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0048733321000950;WorldMeteorologicalAssociation,WMOGlobalAnnualtoDecadalClimateUpdate,May2023,https://library.wmo.int/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=22272#.ZGZbQqXMK5c;Diffenbaugh,NoahS.andElizabethA.Barnes,“Data-drivenpredictionsofthetimeremaininguntilcriticalglobalwarmingthresholdsarereached”,PNAS,30January2023,vol.120,no.6,https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2207183120;IPCC,ClimateChange2022:Impacts,AdaptationandVulnerability,27February2022,https://www.ipcc.ch/report/sixth-assessment-report-working-group-ii/.5.TheIPCCdefinesatippingpointasa“criticalthresholdbeyondwhichasystemreorganises,oftenabruptlyand/orirreversibly”.IPCC,IPCCSixthAssessmentReport(AR6),https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_SYR_Annex-I.pdf,accessed30November,2023.6.Atthecurrentlevelofglobalwarming(~1.1°C),fiveclimatesystemscouldhavepassedtippingpointsintheory,including:low-latitudecoralreefs;thepermafrost;theGreenlandandWestAntarcticicesheets;andtheLabrador-IrmingerSeasConvection.At1.5°Cofwarming,anotherfivecouldbeplacedatrisk:theBorealForests(NorthandSouth);AtlanticM.O.Circulation(AMOC);BarentsSeaice;andMountainGlaciers.Notably,however,thisistheminimumtemperaturelevelinwhatcanbequitelargeuncertaintybandings.See:McKay,DavidI.Armstrong,et.al.,“Exceeding1.5°Cglobalwarmingcouldtriggermultipleclimatetippingpoints”,Science,vol.377,iss6611,9September2022,https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.abn7950.7.IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC),ClimateChange2022:Impacts,AdaptationandVulnerability,27February2022,https://www.ipcc.ch/report/sixth-assessment-report-working-group-ii/.8.McKay,et.al.,2022.9.Lenton,TimothyM.,et.al.,GlobalTippingPoints,December2023,https://global-tipping-points.org/.10.Tollefson,Jeff,“CatastrophicchangeloomsasEarthnearsclimate‘tippingpoints’,reportsays”,Nature,6December2023,https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-023-03849-y.11.Diffenbaugh,NoahS.andElizabethA.Barnes,“Data-drivenpredictionsofthetimeremaininguntilcriticalglobalwarmingthresholdsarereached”,PNAS,vol.120,no.6,30January2023,https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2207183120;Naughten,Kaitlin,A.,PaulR.HollandandJanDeRydt,“UnavoidablefutureincreaseinWestAntarcticice-shelfmeltingoverthetwenty-firstcentury”,NatureClimateChange,vol.13,23October2023,pp.1222-1228,https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-023-01818-x;Lenton,et.al.,2023.12.Lenton,et.al.,2023.13.Wunderling,et.al.,“Interactingtippingelementsincreaseriskofclimatedominoeffectsunderglobalwarming”,EarthSystemDynamics,vol.12,3June2021,pp.601-619,https://esd.copernicus.org/articles/12/601/2021/esd-12-601-2021.pdf.14.Lenton,et.al.,2023.GlobalRisksReport20247715.Minimumthresholdsforsometippingpointscouldbeaslowas0.8°C.See:McKay,et.al.,2022.16.McKay,et.al.,2022.17.OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment(OECD),ClimateTippingPoints:InsightsforEffectivePolicyAction,Paris:OECD,2022,https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/environment/climate-tipping-points_abc5a69e-en.18.Boers,Niklas,“Observation-basedearly-warningsignalsforacollapseoftheAtlanticMeridionalOverturningCirculation”,NatureClimateChange,vol.11,5August2021,pp.680-688,https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-021-01097-4;Caesar,L.,et.al.,“CurrentAtlanticMeridionalOverturningCirculationweakestinlastmillennium”,NatureGeoscience,vol.14,17February2022,pp.118-120,https://www.nature.com/articles/s41561-021-00699-z;Lenton,et.al.,2023.19.OECD,2022;Lenton,et.al.,2023.20.Brovkin,Victor,et.al.,“Pastabruptchanges,tippingpointsandcascadingimpactsintheEarthsystem”,NatureGeoscience,vol.14,29July2021,pp.550-558,https://www.nature.com/articles/s41561-021-00790-5.21.UniversityofNotreDame,ND-Gain:NotreDameGlobalAdaptationInitiative,https://gain.nd.edu/our-work/country-index/rankings/,accessed27October2023.22.Ibid.23.UNEnvironmentProgramme(UNEP),AdaptationGapReport2023,2November2023,https://www.unep.org/resources/adaptation-gap-report-2023.24.Nagano,TakatoandTakashiSekiyama,“ReviewofVulnerabilityFactorsLinkingClimateChangeandConflict”,Climate,vol.11,no.5,9May2023,https://www.mdpi.com/2225-1154/11/5/104.25.Co-DesigningtheAssessmentofClimateChangeCosts(OACCH),TheEconomicCostofClimateChangeinEurope:ClimateandSocio-EconomicTippingPoints,2021,https://www.coacch.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/COACCH_Policy-Brief-3_Tipping-PointsWEB_REV.pdf.26.UnitedNationsUniversity–InstituteforEnvironmentandHumanSecurity(UNUEHS),2023InterconnectedDisasterRisks,2023,https://interconnectedrisks.org/.27.OECD,2022;Beck,MichaelW.,et.al.,“Theglobalfloodprotectionsavingsprovidedbycoralreefs”,NatureCommunications,vol.9,12June2018,https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-018-04568-z.28.Alsoworthnotingisthecontributionofclimatetippingpointstoclimatechangemorebroadly.Overthenextcentury,alongsidemethane,thecollapseofpermafrostcouldreleasemorethandoubletheremainingcarbonbudgetformaintainingwarmingbelow1.5°C(888Gtagainst400Gt),whichalsorepresentsthree-quartersofthebudgetformaintainingwarmingbelow2°C.See:OECD,2022.29.WTW,Thepotentialforrate-inducedclimatetippingpointsininsurancemarkets,26October2023,https://www.wtwco.com/en-gh/insights/2023/10/the-potential-for-rate-induced-climate-tipping-points-in-insurance-markets.30.Kwiatkowski,Lester,et.al,“DeclineinAtlanticPrimaryProductionAcceleratedbyGreenlandIceSheetMelt”,GeophysicalResearchLetters,vol.46,no.20,23October2019,pp.11347-11357,https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1029/2019GL085267;Defrance,Dmitri,GillesRamstein,SyvlieSylvieCharbitandJean-PaulVanderlinden,“ConsequencesofrapidicesheetmeltingontheSahelianpopulationvulnerability”,PNAS,vol.114,no.25,5June2017,pp.65333-6538,https://www.pnas.org/doi/full/10.1073/pnas.1619358114.31.Huang,Jikun,MartínPiñeiroandValeriaPiñeiro,“BRIEF2:Globalfoodsecurityandmarketstability:Theroleandconcernsoflargenetfoodimportersandexporters”,InternationalFoodPolicyResearchInstitute,2018,https://www.ifpri.org/publication/brief-2-global-food-security-and-market-stability-role-and-concerns-large-net-food.32.Surminski,Swenja,“StayingAboveWater:ASystemicResponsetoRisingFloodRisk”,MarshMcLennan,February2023,https://www.marshmclennan.com/insights/publications/2023/february/staying-above-water-a-systemic-response-to-rising-flood-risk.html.33.Gramling,Carolyn,“The‘Doomsday’glaciermaysoontriggeradramaticsea-levelrise”,ScienceNewsExplores,24January2022,https://www.snexplores.org/article/antarctica-thwaites-glacier-ice-shelf-collapse-climate-5-years;Fox,Douglas,“Antarctica’sCollapseCouldBeginEvenSoonerThanAnticipated”,ScientificAmerican,1November2022,https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/antarcticas-collapse-could-begin-even-sooner-than-anticipated/#:~:text=The%20Thwaites%20Glacier%20itself%20holds,meters%E2%80%94more%20than%2010%20feet.;Luhn,Alec,“’Doomsday’glacierinAntarcticaisn’tasvulnerableasfeared”,NewScientist,8June2023,https://www.newscientist.com/article/2377267-doomsday-glacier-in-antarctica-isnt-as-vulnerable-as-feared/;Naughten,etal.,2023;Chowdjury,Joie,“AtHistoricITLOSHearings,StatesStakeOutPositionsonClimateDutiesandOceanProtection”,CenterforInternationalEnvironmentalLaw,https://www.ciel.org/at-historic-itlos-hearings-states-stake-out-positions-on-climate-duties-and-ocean-protection/,accessed30October2023.34.Gramling,2022;Fox,2022;Luhn,2023;Naughten,etal.,2023;Chowdjury,2023.35.ClimateCentral,CoastalRiskScreeningTool,https://coastal.climatecentral.org/map/10/101.3975/14.0894/?theme=water_level&map_type=water_level_above_mhhw&basemap=roadmap&contiguous=true&elevation_model=best_available&refresh=true&water_level=0.0&water_unit=m,accessed6November2023.36.OECD,2022.37.deBruin,JelteG.H.,VictorF.BenseandMartineJ.vanderPloeg,“InferringPermafrostActiveLayerThermalPropertiesFromNumericalModelOptimization”,GeophysicalResearchLetters,vol.48,no.16,16July2021,https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1029/2021GL093306;Miner,KimberleyR.,et.al.,“PermafrostcarbonemissionsinachangingArctic”,NatureReviewsEarth&Environment,vol.3,11January2022,pp.55-67,https://www.GlobalRisksReport202478nature.com/articles/s43017-021-00230-3.38.Lemieux,Audrée,et.al.,“ViralspilloverriskincreaseswithclimatechangeinHighArcticlakesediments”,ProceedingsoftheRoyalSocietyB:BiologicalSciences,19October2022,https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rspb.2022.1073;Miner,Kimberley,et.al.,“EmergentbiogeochemicalrisksfromArcticpermafrostdegradation”,NatureClimateChange,vol.11,October2021,pp.811-819,https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-021-01162-y.epdf?sharing_token=1IQrLZoEAZpmBtUsUpUBotRgN0jAjWel9jnR3ZoTv0Pjhsh49EkPfNM8CfwtqRog4DeRF4tchrdaO9TbkQzrpKzauUxHOoaBSK_B3rBXK__e9elk7NvOLd1-LydkUP0w4J6TSV0Mr5KsOOzegbKfzPS-SJEF3wyR-4_ewU8hIrwWPLVaYgr0fjQqL9jBw9cttuljuSfDFl9DIB4gBFn3pw_beEV1FNI49ztDNfe2iAE%3D&tracking_referrer=edition.cnn.com.39.Boren,Zach,“Thepermafrostpandemic:couldthemeltingArcticreleaseadeadlydisease?”,Unearthed,3July2020,https://unearthed.greenpeace.org/2020/07/03/arctic-permafrost-pandemic-life-uh-finds-a-way/.40.Definedastheintentional,large-scalemanipulationofanenvironmentalprocessonEarthtocounteracttheeffectsofclimatechange.See:Grisé,Michelle,et.al.,ClimateControl:InternationalLegalMechanismsforManagingtheGeopoliticalRisksofGeoengineering,SantaMonica:RandCorporation,2021,https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA1133-1.html;Kulkarni,Sanjana,“ReversingClimateChangewithGeoengineering”,HarvardUniversity,3January2022,https://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2022/reversing-climate-change-with-geoengineering/.41.Technologiesthatwouldreduceorstopglobalwarmingbyincreasingtheamountofincomingsunlightthatisreflectedbytheatmospherebacktospace,suchasstratosphericaerosolinjection,thereleaseofhighlyreflectivefineparticlesintothestratosphere,andmarinecloudbrightening.See:Felgenhauer,Tyleret.al.,SolarRadiationModification:ARisk-RiskAnalysis,CarnegieClimateGovernanceInitiative,March2022,https://www.c2g2.net/wp-content/uploads/202203-C2G-RR-Full.pdf.42.U.S.DepartmentofEnergy,Biden-HarrisAdministrationA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ew2023:Keymarkettrends,2023,https://www.iea.org/reports/critical-minerals-market-review-2023/key-market-trends;FreeMalaysiaToday,Copsbustdiesel,foodsmugglingsyndicates,21October2023,https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2023/10/21/cops-bust-diesel-food-smuggling-syndicates/.108.Fist,TimandErichGrunewald,“PreventingAIChipSmugglingtoChina:AWorkingPaper”,CenterforaNewAmericanGlobalRisksReport202482Security,24October2023,https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/preventing-ai-chip-smuggling-to-china.109.Bandura,RominaandAustinHardman,Environmental,Social,andGovernanceBestPracticesAppliedtoMiningOperations,CenterforStrategicandInternationalStudies,16November2023,https://www.csis.org/analysis/environmental-social-and-governance-best-practices-applied-mining-operations.110.WalkFree,GlobalSlaveryIndex2023,June2023,https://cdn.walkfree.org/content/uploads/2023/05/17114737/Global-Slavery-Index-2023.pdf.111.Urbina,Ian,“TheCrimesBehindTheSeafoodYouEat”,TheNewYorker,9October2023,https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/10/16/the-crimes-behind-the-seafood-you-eat;INTERPOL,FisheriesCrime,accessed12December2023,https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Environmental-crime/Fisheries-crime.112.Goodkind,Nicole,“Illegalchildlaborisontheriseinatightjobmarket”,CNN,30July2023,https://edition.cnn.com/2023/07/30/economy/child-labor-louisiana-texas/index.html;Turner,MarkandAntheaMcCarthy-Jones,“CyberslaverystartsupinSoutheastAsia”,EastAsiaForum,14June2023,https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2023/06/14/cyber-slavery-starts-up-in-southeast-asia/;UNICEF,Childrenrecruitedbyarmedforcesorarmedgroups,https://www.unicef.org/protection/children-recruited-by-armed-forces,accessed26October2023.113.Sugiharti,Lilik,RudiPurwono,MiguelAngelEsquiviasandHildaRohmawati,“TheNexusbetweenCrimeRates,Poverty,andIncomeInequality:ACaseStudyofIndonesia”,EconomiesSpecialIssue:NexusbetweenPoliticsandEconomicsintheEmergingCountries–II,vol.11,no.2,13February2023,https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7099/11/2/62;GlobalInitiativeAgainstTransnationalOrganizedCrime,HowGlobalisationAffectsTransnationalCrime:ACFRdiscussionwithNetworkMember,PhilWilliams,31May2012,https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/how-globalisation-affects-transnational-crime/;Bastrup-Birk,etal.,2023.114.EconomistIntelligenceUnit,DemocracyIndex2022:FrontlinedemocracyandthebattleforUkraine,2023,https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2022/;Bastrup-Birk,etal.,2023.115.Itshouldbenotedthatcyber-dependentcriminalactivitymayoperateunderadifferentorganizationalmodel,comparedtocyber-enabledorcyber-assistedcriminalactivity.Foranoverview,seeUnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime(UNODC),DigestofCyberOrganizedCrime,October2021,https://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/tools_and_publications/21-05344_eBook.pdf;DiNicola,Andrea,“Towardsdigitalorganizedcrimeanddigitalsociologyoforganizedcrime”,TrendsinOrganizedCrime,30May2022,https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12117-022-09457-y.116.Thereisapositivenexusbetweencrime,incomeandinequality,whichsuggeststhatevencountriesbecomingmoreaffluentfaceahighercrimerisk.Notably,however,low-incomecountrieswillremainlargelyexcludedastargets,asweakeconomicconditionstendtocontainthepervasivenessofcriminalactivity,eventhoughdeeperpovertylevelsmaytriggermorecriminalactions.See:GlobalInitiativeAgainstTransnationalOrganizedCrime,2023,andSugiharti,etal.,2023.117.Doyle,Sean,“Cybercrimeandviolentcrimeareconverging:here’showtodealwithit”,WorldEconomicForum,31October2023,https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2023/10/cybercrime-violent-crime/.118.Theinteractionoftechnologywithcrimecanbedifferentiatedintothreecategories:cyber-assistedcrimesarefacilitatedbyinformationcommunicationtechnologies(ICT);cyber-enabledcrimesaretraditionalcrimesthataremagnifiedbyICT;andcyber-dependentcrimesarethosethatcanonlybecommittedusingcomputers,computernetworksorotherformsofICT.See:UNODC,2021,andDiNicola,2022.119.UNODC,2019.120.EconomistIntelligenceUnit,2023;Bastrup-Birk,etal.,2023.121.Limaye,Yogita,“InsidetheTaliban’swarondrugs–opiumpoppycropsslashed”,BBC,6June2023,https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-65787391;Felbab-Brown,Vanda,“HowtheTalibanSupressedOpiuminAfghanistan–andWhyThere’sLittletoCelebrate”,Time,17July2023,https://time.com/6294753/taliban-opium-suppression-afghanistan/.122.DebusmannJr.,Bernd,“CanJoeBiden’splanstoptheflowoffentanyltotheUS?”,BBCNews,22November2023,https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-67489395;Murray,Christine,“HowfentanylchangedthegameforMexico’sdrugcartels”,FinancialTimes,25July2023,https://www.ft.com/content/5d030731-4625-4521-81e4-b492108a87d7?emailId=f3a86169-2892-41dd-a199-92d84f841019&segmentId=22011ee7-896a-8c4c-22a0-7603348b7f22;Yousif,Nadine,“Howthefentanylcrisis’fourthwavehashiteverycorneroftheUS”,BBC,17September2023,https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-66826895.123.GlobalInitiativeAgainstTransnationalOrganizedCrime,2023.124.EuropeanUnionAgencyforLawEnforcementCooperation(Europol),EuropeanFinancialandEconomicCrimeThreatAssessment2023:TheOtherSideoftheCoin:AnAnalysisofFinancialandEconomicCrime,2023,https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/The%20Other%20Side%20of%20the%20Coin%20-%20Analysis%20of%20Financial%20and%20Economic%20Crime%20%28EN%29.pdf.125.TransparencyInternational,CorruptionsPerceptionIndex2022,https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022,accessed6November2023.126.Europol,2023.127.Kurmanath,K.V.,“Beware,youremailboxcanbecometargetofstealthcyberattacks”,TheHinduBusinessline,23September2023,https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/info-tech/beware-your-email-box-can-become-target-of-stealth-cyber-attacks/article67334570.ece;Martin,R.,“ThinkingaboutthesecurityofAIsystems”,NationalCyberSecurityCentre,30August2023,https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/blog-post/thinking-about-security-ai-systems.GlobalRisksReport202483128.Stanyard,Julia,ThierryVircoulon,andJulianRademeyer,TheGreyZone:Russia’smilitary,mercenaryandcriminalengagementinAfrica,GlobalInitiativeAgainstTransnationalOrganizedCrime,February2023,https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Julia-Stanyard-T-Vircoulon-J-Rademeyer-The-grey-zone-Russias-military-mercenary-and-criminal-engagement-in-Africa-GI-TOC-February-2023-v3-1.pdf.129.UNODC,2019.130.Chiang,Sheila,“NorthKoreanhackershaveallegedlystolenhundredsofmillionsincryptotofundnuclearprograms”,CNBC,5September2023,https://www.cnbc.com/2023/09/06/north-korea-hackers-stole-crypto-to-fund-nuclear-program-trm-chainalysis.html.131.AdaptedfromEuropol,2023.132.Europol,DismantlingencryptedcriminalEncroChatcommunicationsleadstoover6500arrestsandclosetoEUR900millionseized[Pressrelease],https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/dismantling-encrypted-criminal-encrochat-communications-leads-to-over-6-500-arrests-and-close-to-eur-900-million-seized,accessed26October2023.133.Rodriguez,Katitza,“UNCybercrimeTreaty:AMenaceintheMaking”,HumanRightsWatch,16October2023,https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/10/16/un-cybercrime-treaty-menace-making#:~:text=In%20requiring%20mutual%20legal%20assistance,through%20an%20unprecedented%20multilateral%20tool..134.Wilkinson,Isabella,“WhatistheUNcybercrimetreatyandwhydoesitmatter?”,ChathamHouse,2August2023,https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/08/what-un-cybercrime-treaty-and-why-does-it-matter#:~:text=In%20August%202023%2C%20state%20representatives,General%20Assembly%20in%20September%202024.GlobalRisksReport2024843RespondingtoglobalrisksThepreviouschaptersoutlinedagloballandscapegoods,usebyonecountryneitherpreventsaccesswhereamyriadofvulnerabilitiesarestretchingnorreducesavailabilitytoothers.Forexample,ifaourcapacitytorespondtokeyglobalchallenges.singlenationalgovernmentimplementsapolicythatThischapterconsidersthewaysinwhichwecanslowsthespreadofaninfectiousdisease,theentireaddressglobalrisks,givenincreasinglycomplexglobalcommunitywillbenefitfromit.andnon-linearaspectsofhowtheywillevolve,againstabackdropofafragmentedgeopoliticalAswithglobalpublicgoods,riskreductioneffortsenvironmentwherecooperationmaybeinshorttendtosufferfromthe“freeriderproblem.”Insupply.aworldcharacterizedbydifferentandattimescompetingpowercentrespursuingtheirownManagingavolatilerisklandscapeinalowinterests,governmentsmaybeincentivizedtocooperationworldtransfertheburdenofpreventionorpreparednesstoothers,whilereapingthebenefitsofothers’Someofthechallengeswefacearerisksfamiliarinvestmentswithoutincurringthecosts.Similarly,tohumanhistory–pandemicsandgeopoliticalnotalleffortsofriskreductionrequirethesamelevelconflicts–whileothersarenewandfast-evolving,ofcooperationtobeimplemented,fallingalongasuchasEarthsystemchangesortheadversespectrumrangingfromthosethatrequiretheefforteffectsofnewtechnologies.Manyglobalrisksofonlyonecountryorstakeholder,tothosethatareinherentlyinterconnectedandmayhavefardemandthecollaborationofall.2reachingconsequencestohumandevelopment-erodingresilienceandreducingourcollectiveBuildinguponestablishednotionsofpubliccapacitytorespond.goods,3therearefourbroadcategoriesofapproachingglobalriskreduction,basedontheWhilecollaborativeeffortremainsthecornerstonelevelofcooperationrequired:localizedstrategies;ofaddressingglobalrisks,notallrequiredeepbreakthroughendeavors;collectiveactions;andglobalcooperationastheonlyviablesolution.Inancross-bordercoordination.increasinglyfragmentedworld,examiningalternativepathswithvaryingdegreesofcooperationcanBoththedegreeofcomplexityandthespeedofprovideabroadermentalmodeltosupportplanningtheglobalrisksdiscussedinthisreportwilldemandandpreparation.flexibleandagileapproachesthatemployallavailableleversatourdisposal.ThereareactionsImplementingglobalriskreductionmeasuresisthatcanbetakenindividuallyorcollectivelytoequivalenttoprovidingaglobalpublicgood.1implementpreparednessmeasuresfortherisksweThesegoodsaredefinedasnon-excludableandcannotavoid–andtocometogethertopreventornon-rivalrous,whichmeansthat,unlikecommonlessenthelikelihoodoftherisksthatwecan.MikaBaumeister,UnsplashGlobalRisksReport2024853.1LocalizedstrategiesLocalizedstrategiesthataddressglobalrisksexample,caneliminatediseasessuchaspolio.atalocallevelrequirelittleornocross-bordercoordination.TheyareconcernedmainlywithThereareseveralglobalriskgovernanceincreasingacommunity'spreparednesstobearapproacheshighlightedwithintheGRPSthatwouldtheeffectsofinevitableglobalrisks,butdonotfallunderlocalmeasures:Publicawarenessandsignificantlymitigatetheirimpactbeyondnationaleducation,FinancialinstrumentsandNationalborders.andlocalregulations.PublicawarenessandeducationinitiativescanbeeffectiveinreducingtheWithloomingurgencytoadapttoavoidtheworstimpactofAI-enabledmisinformationonlocalmediaimpactsofachangingclimate,localmeasuresenvironments.Whileitisdifficultforsinglecountriespresentarelativelyagileresponsetorisk,tocontrolthediffusionofAI-generatedcontent,unencumberedbylengthyprocessesthatareitisintheirpowertoincludeAI-literacyinpubliccommontoglobalagreements.MeasuresrangeeducationsystemsandtoprioritizetheissuesfrominstigatingmoreresilientbuildingcodesofunderstandingAI’scapabilitiesandidentifyingtomakinginvestmentsinwildfiremanagement,trustworthysourcesofinformation.Financialflooddefensesandheatwavemitigation.instruments–includinginsurance,catastropheInfrastructureinvestmentcanalsoenhanceabondsorpublic-riskpools–canalleviatetheeffectscountry’spreparednesstotacklepandemics.ofnaturaldisastersandgeoeconomicshocks,whileWhenCOVID-19hit,itwasthecapacityofnationalsocialsafetynetsandpensionsrepresentimportanthealthsystems–i.e.,availabilityofhospitalbeds,toolsinmanaginglonger-termrisksassociatedwithintensivecareunitsandmedicalpersonnel–thatdemographictrendsandsocietalpolarization.largelydictateditslocalimpact.WhilelocalizedstrategiesaregenerallyassociatedwithboostingNationalandlocalregulationsareidentifiedpreparedness,therearesomecaseswheretheybythemajorityofGRPSrespondentsaskeyforpreventglobalrisksfrommaterializingaltogether.drivingactiononanumberofeconomicrisksLocalcompliancewithvaccineguidance,for(Figure3.1).AppropriatefiscalandmonetaryFIGURE3.1TopglobalrisksaddressedbyNationalandlocalregulations"Whichapproach(es)doyouexpecttohavethemostpotentialfordrivingactiononriskreductionandpreparednessoverthenext10years?"Nationalandlocalregulations(e.g.environmental,operational,financialregulationsandincentives)Censorshipandsurveillance64%61%Illiciteconomicactivity61%Biodiversitylossand60%ecosystemcollapse59%Inflation57%Insufficientpublic56%54%infrastructureandservices53%Pollution53%AssetbubbleburstsAdverseoutcomesofAItechnologiesAdverseoutcomesoffrontiertechnologiesDisruptionstocriticalinfrastructure0255075100Shareofrespondents(%)RiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalSourceNoteWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksRespondentscouldselectuptothreeresponsesfromthefollowingnineoptions:Financialinstruments,PerceptionSurvey2023-2024.Nationalandlocalregulations,Minilateraltreatiesandagreements,Globaltreatiesandagreements,Developmentassistance,corporatestrategies,Research&development,Publicawarenessandeducation,Multi-stakeholderengagement.GlobalRisksReport202486policiesareemployedtocontrolInflationandbuildexample,economicleverstotackleinflationinoneresilienceagainstAssetbubblebursts.Nationaleconomycanleadtodebtconcernsinanothergovernmentsalsohavethepowertoactagainst(Chapter1.5:Economicuncertainty).Illiciteconomicactivityandreducetheircountries’vulnerabilitytoorganizedcrime.ProtectionagainstThepublicandprivatesectors,aloneandinBiodiversitylossandecosystemcollapseaspartnership,canplayaroleinscalinglocalwellasPollutioncanalsobemanagedvialocalorresponses,bringingdowncostsandexpandingnationalenvironmentalregulation.riskreductioncapabilitiestoall.Businessesarekeydevelopers,testersandearlyadoptersofnewLocalizedstrategiescanbeenactedtechnologies,suchasfoodsthatrapidlygrowinindependently,andthusfacefewerhurdlesinextremelyadverseenvironmentsorAItoolstospottermsofcooperationrequirements.However,nascentwildfires.4Likewise,governmentshavethetheyarenotfreefromchallenges.Investmenttoabilitytostepinandde-riskinvestmentstohelpboostresilienceiscostlyandnotallcountriesorclosethegapineconomicopportunityandbolsterjurisdictionshavethesameresources,technologyresilience(Chapter2.5:Endofdevelopment?).andcapacity.InanenvironmentofrisingcostsandNovelapproachestoownershipoflocalnarrowapproachestointernationalinvestment,theinfrastructure,involvingregulatorinterventionandcapacityandfinancingforimplementingeffectivecommunityownership,canallowprojectstobecomelocalmeasurestendtobemoreconcentratedmorebankable,feasibleandtargeted,whilelocalinhigher-incomecountries,perpetuatingratheractiongroupscanoftenmobilizeeffectivedisasterthanaddressinginequality.Theymayalsohaveresponseaswellasdirectfundstoprevention.5unintendedspillovereffectsacrossborders;for3.2BreakthroughendeavorsInsomecases,theactionofanindividualorhavepivotedbasedonasingleideaoraction,suchasentitycanbeenoughtoprovidea“breakthrough”thetargetedeffortofeliminatingchlorofluorocarbonsdevelopmenttoaddressriskortoserveasthe(CFCs)toprotecttheozonelayer,resultinginapositivetippingpointtoanalternate“safestate.”significantimpactonaglobalproblem.ThesebreakthroughendeavorsareasequallyrelevantforpreventingormitigatingthelikelihoodofGRPSrespondentsnotethatR&Dcanplayariskastheyareforlesseningtheimpact.keyroleinaddressinghealth,environmentalandtechnologicalrisks(Figure3.2).DuringtheManybreakthroughendeavorsfallundertheapproachCOVID-19pandemic,theconcentratedeffortsofaofResearch&development(R&D),encompassingfewpharmaceuticalcompaniesmadeadifferenceactivitiessuchasmedicalbreakthroughs,newfortheglobalcommunity.Supportedbysignificanttechnologiesoranovelapproachtoquantifyingandfundingfromgovernments,theirinnovationsgoverningrisk.AprominentexampleofthelatteristhetodevelopanovelvaccineinrecordtimewasformationoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimatecrucialtoloweringdeathrates,demonstratingChange(IPCC)bytheUnitedNationsEnvironmenttheimmensepotentialofscientificbreakthroughsProgrammeandtheWorldMeteorologicalAssociationonreducingtheimpactofhealth-relatedriskslikein1988,endorsedbytheUNthesameyear.ThereInfectiousdiseases.arealsoexamplesofindustrialtransformationsthatZhenyuLuo,UnsplashGlobalRisksReport202487FIGURE3.2TopglobalrisksaddressedbyResearchanddevelopment"Whichapproach(es)doyouexpecttohavethemostpotentialfordrivingactiononriskreductionandpreparednessoverthenext10years?"Research&development(e.g.newtechnologies,early-warningsystems,globalriskresearch)Infectiousdiseases81%Adverseoutcomes58%offrontiertechnologies56%ExtremeweathereventsCyberinsecurity55%Non-weatherrelatednaturaldisasters55%Chronichealthconditions55%Pollution51%CriticalchangetoEarthsystems51%AdverseoutcomesofAItechnologies51%Naturalresourceshortages49%0255075100Shareofrespondents(%)RiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalSourceNoteWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksRespondentscouldselectuptothreeresponsesfromthefollowingnineoptions:FinancialPerceptionSurvey2023-2024.instruments,Nationalandlocalregulations,Minilateraltreatiesandagreements,Globaltreatiesandagreements,Developmentassistance,corporatestrategies,Research&development,Publicawarenessandeducation,Multi-stakeholderengagement.R&Dcanboostpreparednessforinevitablesolutions,theinstitutionsinvolvedoftenlacktheenvironmentalriskssuchasExtremeweatherfundsorpoliticalmightneededtotranslateintoeventsandNon-weatherrelatednaturalimpact.Withcarboncaptureandstorage(CCS)fordisasters,aswellasallowingustoreducetheexample,thesheerscaleofthecostsassociatedlikelihoodofCriticalchangestoEarthsystemswithdeploymentactasbarriers,alongsidelimitedandNaturalresourcesshortages.Asignificantconfidenceinthesuccessoftheoutcomes.leapforwardinresearchleadingtoviablenuclearfusionpowergenerationforexample,couldTechnologyisseenasbothasourceofriskandrepresentaturningpoint,providingcleanenergyaspartofthesolution.AdverseoutcomesofAIandacceleratingthetransitiontoNetZero,atthetechnologiesisviewedasatopriskthatcanbesametimeasreducingtheriskofPollution.6AsaddressedbyR&D.However,AImayalsoprovetodiscussedinChapter2.3:A3°Cworld,however,bethekeytounlockingamultitudeoftheworld’stheunilateralapplicationofclimatemitigationproblems.Recentresearch,forexample,suggeststechnologiesalsocarryrisks.thatitcouldrevolutionizematerialsscience,allowingustomakeleapsforwardintermsofThereareotherhurdlestoovercome.Despitebatteries,solarpanels,computerchipsandotherpotentiallybeingontheprecipiceofa“goldenage”vitaltechnologiesthatwillberequiredineffortstoofscientificdiscovery,thestrategicimportanceofaddressamultitudeofrisks.7emergingtechnologies,suchasAIandquantumcomputing,isresultinginafragmentationofR&DStrengtheningglobalresearchnetworksthatconnectinitiatives,withsomeoptingforpoliticalisolationismresearchers,institutionsandindustriesworldwidecantosafeguardtechnologicaladvancements.Thefacilitatecommunicationandthesharingofresources.formationofanewbodyequivalenttotheIPCCPublic-sectorsupportremainscrucial.HealthcaretosynthesizekeyperspectivesrelatingtoAIriskcompaniesalonewouldnothavebeenabletorollhasbeenmooted;tobeeffective,itwouldneedoutaneffectivevaccineforCOVID-19insuchashorttoovercomethechallengesofensuringbalancetimeframehadtheynotbeenco-funded,andthisofrepresentationandofbeingnimbleenoughtomodelofgovernmentsde-riskingliabilitytofast-trackaddressrapidlyemergingscientificdevelopments.deploymentcouldbeextendedtootherchallenges,AndwhileR&Dcanresultingame-changingpotentiallycoupledwithenhancedconditionalitiesGlobalRisksReport202488toensurereturnsaremoreequallyshared.FiscalPolicy-makersneedtoadoptadualvision,incentivescanbedeployedtoencouragefurtherharnessingthepowerofinnovationtoaddressinnovationwithintheprivatesector,whileacceptancepresentchallenges,whilekeepinganeyeontheofnewtechnologiesandapproacheswouldbefuture.Investinginbreakthroughendeavorsisoftenbolsteredbygovernanceandoversight.Theroleofalong-termbet,involvingsomedegreeofrisk-takingphilanthropy,shouldalsonotbeoverlookedasakeyandfailure,butcoupledwithwinsthatboostoursourceoffundingforambitiousprojectstoeradicateabilitytomitigateoradaptinthefaceofglobalrisks.diseaseandboostclimateresilience,forexample.83.3CollectiveactionsWhenthesumofindividualactionsaredirectedThesameistrueforbusinessactions.Ifacriticaltowardsacommongoal,changecanbeeffectedonnumberofcompaniescommittobuildingethicalaglobalscale.Collectiveactionisnottheresultofsupplychains,respectforhumanrightsandlabourcollaboration,butoftheaggregateandindependentstandardswillimproveworldwide.effortofsinglecitizens,companiesandcountries.CollectiveactioncanalsoplayaroleintermsofExamplesincludeexpandingtheadoptionofapreparingforglobalrisks.Japan’sCommunity-vegetariandietorreducingcombustion-engineBasedDisasterRiskManagement9andcarsandairtraveltoslashcarbonemissions.Bangladesh’sCyclonePreparednessProgram10Thesechangesinlifestyleorconsumptionbothdemonstratethepowerofcollectivepatternsareinsignificantwhenpursuedbyasinglepreparednesstoaddressinevitableenvironmentalindividual.Butifamaterialnumberofpeoplerisksandhowcommunitiescanbemobilizedtotakesuchactionsconcurrently,suchaggregatemitigatetheirimpacts.Borneoutofthenecessityeffortshavethepowertoaltermarketdynamicstoprepareforenvironmentalrisksinoneoftheandmovethedialonclimate-changemitigation.mostseismicallyactiveregionsintheworld,aFIGURE3.3TopglobalrisksadressedbyCorporatestrategies"Whichapproach(es)doyouexpecttohavethemostpotentialfordrivingactiononriskreductionandpreparednessoverthenext10years?"Corporatestrategies(e.g.ESGreporting,resilientsupplychains,socialinitiatives,PPPs)Labourshortages53%Unemployment52%50%Disruptionstoasystemicallyimportantsupplychain38%EconomicdownturnLackofeconomicopportunity37%Assetbubblebursts34%Cyberinsecurity33%Concentrationofstrategicresources30%Pollution30%Technologicalpowerconcentration29%0255075100Shareofrespondents(%)RiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalSourceNoteWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksRespondentscouldselectuptothreeresponsesfromthefollowingnineoptions:FinancialPerceptionSurvey2023-2024.instruments,Nationalandlocalregulations,Minilateraltreatiesandagreements,Globaltreatiesandagreements,Developmentassistance,corporatestrategies,Research&development,Publicawarenessandeducation,Multi-stakeholderengagement.GlobalRisksReport202489OCGSavingtheOcean,UnsplashcorecomponentofJapan’spreparednessstrategy3.3).Ifcompaniesadoptresponsiblebusinesscentresonbuildingmomentumforanationwidepracticesandinvestmentdecisions,theywillreapmovementfromlocalpreparednessandresiliencereputationalandperformancebenefits12whilemakingmeasures.Likewise,ensuringrapiddisseminationofthewidereconomicandfinancialsystemmoreofficialcyclonewarningsignalsacrosscommunitiesresilientandpreparedtofacetheriskofEconomicencouragescollectivepreparednessmeasurestobedownturn.BusinessescanalsocontributetoimplementedalongBangladesh’scoast.Technologyshoringupthelabourmarket,bothlocallyandcanactasanenablerforcollectiveaction.globally,byaddressingLabourshortagesandInformationandcommunicationtechnologies,Unemploymentrisksthroughinvestinginskillsincludingsocialmedia,havetransformedthespeeddevelopment,upholdingworkers’rightsandgrantingandthewayinwhichinformationisshared,andcontractsecurity.whiletherearerisksassociatedwiththis(Chapter1.3:Falseinformation),therearealsobenefitsinInorderforcollectiveactiontobesufficientlytermsofmassmobilizationforpublicgood.effective,theremustbesomedegreeofconsensusonthenatureandurgencyoftherisk,thetypeThereareseveralriskgovernanceapproachesofactionrequiredtoaddressitandtheintendedidentifiedwithintheGRPSthatwouldfallunderoutcome.Thisisnosmallfeatinaworldincreasinglycollectiveaction:Publicawarenessandsubjecttosocietalpolarizationandwhereshort-termeducation,Multistakeholderengagement,andcost-of-livingpressurescontinuetobite.Corporatestrategies.Publicawarenessandeducationcampaignsamplify(grassroot)initiativesItiscrucialthereforetobuildplatformsthatthathaveyettoreachacriticalmassinordertosetstandardsandfavourknowledge-sharing,makeanimpact.Insomecases,governmentshavechannelingindividualeffortstowardsacommonestablishedspecificunitstoeffectchangethroughgoal.Taxincentivescanstrengthencollectiveactionencouragingcollectivebehaviours,suchasthosebybusinessandindividuals.Policy-makerscanalsotopreventthespreadofdisease.11Multistakeholderstrengthenregulationonenvironmental,socialandengagementplatformsfavourknowledgeandbestcorporategovernance(ESG)reportingtoensurepracticesharingtosupportandguideindividualtransparencyoncorporatesocialresponsibilityeffortstowardsacommongoal.strategies.ThiscontributestocreatingapositivecyclewhereinvestorscanrecognizeandrewardGRPSrespondentsrecognizeCorporatestrategiesthebusinessesthatact,whichinturnsincentivizesashavingthemostpotentialtoreduceeconomicmoreandmorecompaniestoalign.risksrelatingtofinancialandlabourmarkets(Figure3.4Cross-bordercoordinationCooperationmaybeconstrainedinanincreasinglycapabilitiestorefrainfromusingthem),tofragmentedworld,butitremainsimperativetosolveaddressingtheweakestlinkinasystem(enforcingthebiggest,mostexistentialrisks.Cross-bordercommitmenttominimumstandardsandguardrailscoordinationforriskreductiontakesmanyformsorbyinvestinginacountrythathasthepotentialandistypicallycentredonmitigatinglikelihood.Ittodestabilizeothers),tointernationalagreementsrangesfrommutualrestraint(agreementbetween(suchasthosethataimtolimitglobalwarming,twoormorepartiesthatpossessdangerousmaintainsecurityandensurefreetrade).GlobalRisksReport202490FIGURE3.4TopglobalrisksaddressedbyGlobaltreatiesandagreements"Whichapproach(es)doyouexpecttohavethemostpotentialfordrivingactiononriskreductionandpreparednessoverthenext10years?"Globaltreatiesandagreements(e.g.UNFCC,Paris,Montreal,NPT,WTO)Biological,chemicalornuclearhazards84%79%Geoeconomicconfrontation78%InterstatearmedconflictCriticalchangetoEarthsystems65%Concentrationofstrategicresources64%64%Terroristattacks58%Biodiversitylossandecosystemcollapse56%56%Involuntarymigration55%AdverseoutcomesoffrontiertechnologiesErosionofhumanrights0255075100Shareofrespondents(%)RiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalSourceNoteWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksRespondentscouldselectuptothreeresponsesfromthefollowingnineoptions:FinancialPerceptionSurvey2023-2024.instruments,Nationalandlocalregulations,Minilateraltreatiesandagreements,Globaltreatiesandagreements,Developmentassistance,corporatestrategies,Research&development,Publicawarenessandeducation,Multi-stakeholderengagement.PressingrisksrequiringmutualrestraintoftenGlobaltreatiesandagreements,theresultofinvolvetheproliferationandmalignuseofconstructivedialogue,negotiationandcompromise,advancedandpotentiallydestructivetechnologies.arefundamentaltomitigatingandpreparingforRestrainingtheuseofweaponsofmassdestructionmanyglobalrisks.TheyenableinvolvedpartiestoorrestrictingtheincorporationofAIintolethalidentifycommongroundandcooperatetowardsweaponsandnucleardecision-makingsystemssharedobjectives.GRPSrespondentsrecognizeareneededtoavoidtheriskofinadvertentconflictsuchtreatiesasthemostappropriatelevertoescalation(Chapter2.4:AIincharge).managekeygeopoliticalriskssuchasInterstatearmedconflict;Geoeconomicconfrontation;andWhenitcomestoglobalriskssuchasterrorismBiological,chemicalornuclearhazards;aswellorpandemicoutbreaks,itisoftentheweakestasinherentlyglobalizedenvironmentalriskssuchaslinkthatdictatestherisk.TechnologicaladvancesCriticalchangestoEarthsystems(Figure3.4).inAImeanthatbio-engineeredpathogenshavebecomeareality,andasecuritybreachofahigh-Amidgrowinggeopoliticalrifts,globaltreatiesandcontainmentbio-laboratoryorbio-foundry,foragreementsfacenumerouschallenges.Agreementsexample,isaglobalconcern.regardingglobaltradeandfinancialintegrationareunderpressurefromtradeconflictsbetweenChinaGRPSrespondentshighlightMinilateraltreatiesandtheUnitedStates,Brexitandnationalpost-andagreementsandGlobaltreatiesandCOVID-19economicrecoveryefforts.Whilethereagreementsasriskgovernanceapproachesisemergingconsensusontheneedforauniversalwithinthecategoryofcross-bordercoordination.regulatoryframeworkforAItoaddressconcernsMinilateraltreaties–oragreementsinvolvingasurroundingethicalstandards,dataprivacyandsmallernumberofpartiesandoftenbackedbypotentialmisuse,thefirststepsinthisarenaseemregionalfinancing–representafeasiblesolutiontobefaltering,withtheEU’slandmarkAIActtomanyglobalrisksfacedbyafragmentedworld,comingunderpressurefromgovernments13andwhereitisdifficulttohavealargenumberoftechnologycompanies14alike.Strikingabalancecountriesendorsingthesamecause.betweenfosteringinnovationandaddressingGlobalRisksReport202491ethicalconcernswithinaninternationalframeworkConference(COP28)approvedforthefirsttimeaisprovingcomplicated,givenvaryingperspectivesroadmapfor“transitioningawayfromfossilfuels”andeconomicinterests.–butthedealstoppedshortofalong-demandedcallfora“phaseout”ofoil,coalandgas.15“ClimateYetcross-bordercoordinationremainsanecessaryClubs”,orcoalitionsofthewilling,16representa–and,insomecases,theonly–pathtoaddresspracticalpathforprogressgiventhechallengestheglobalrisksthatthreatenhumanprosperityandoftraditionalmultilateralism.Thesecoalitionsofsecurity.Minilateraltreatiesandagreementsmaycountriescommittoambitiousclimategoalsandbeincreasinglyappropriatetoresolveconflictandadoptmeasurestoenforcecompliance,whileensureeconomicprosperityataregionallevel;butofferingincentivesformembership.theyareunlikelytoreplacewideragreementsinmaintainingglobalsecurity.Whenitcomestosecurity,muchmomentumiswiththeprivatesector,whereapplicationswithProgresshasbeenmadethroughinternationaldualusepotentialarebeingdeveloped.17Ascollaborationinaddressingclimatechange;buttechnologyevolvesfasterthanregulation,privateactionneedstobedeepened,widenedand,mostproducersmusttakeresponsibilitytonotonlybecrucially,spedup.Nationalrepresentativesthattransparent,buttoshowrestraintwhenreleasingattendedthe2023UnitedNationsClimateChangenewfrontiermodels.MarkusSpiske,Unsplash3.5ConclusionTheworldisundergoingmultiplelong-termLocalizedstrategies,leveraginginvestmentandstructuraltransformations:theriseofAI,climateregulation,arecriticalforreducingtheimpactchange,ashiftinthegeopoliticaldistributionofglobalrisks,andboththepublicandprivateofpower,anddemographictransitions.Thesesectorcanplayakeyroleinextendingbenefitsstructuralforcesareglobal,pervasiveandchargedtoall.Throughprioritizingthefutureandfocusingwithmomentum.Againstthisbackdrop,knownonbreakthroughresearchanddevelopment,theandnewlyemergingrisksneedpreparationandeffortsofsingleentitiescanmaketheworldasafermitigation(seeFigure3.5forthefullpictureofplace.Theactionsofindividualcitizens,companiesGRPSresponsesregardingdriversofriskreductionandcountries–whileperhapsinsignificantontheirandpreparedness).own–canmovetheneedleonglobalriskreductioniftheyreachacriticalmass.Finally,cross-borderLocalizedstrategies,breakthroughendeavours,coordinationremainstheonlyviablepathwayforthecollectiveactionsandcross-bordercoordinationallmostcriticalriskstohumansecurityandprosperity.playapartinaddressingtheserisks.GlobalRisksReport202492FIGURE3.5Riskgovernance“Whichapproach(es)doyouexpecttohavethemostpotentialfordrivingactiononriskreductionandpreparednessoverthenext10years?”AdverseoutcomesofAItechnologiesAdverseoutcomesoffrontiertechnologiesAssetbubbleburstsBiodiversitylossandecosystemcollapseBiological,chemicalornuclearhazardsCensorshipandsurveillanceChronichealthconditionsConcentrationofstrategicresourcesCriticalchangetoEarthsystemsCyberinsecurityDebtDisruptionstoasystemicallyimportantsupplychainDisruptionstocriticalinfrastructureEconomicdownturnErosionofhumanrightsExtremeweathereventsGeoeconomicconfrontationIlliciteconomicactivityInequalityorlackofeconomicopportunityInfectiousdiseasesInflationInsufficientpublicinfrastructureandservicesInterstatearmedconflictIntrastateviolenceInvoluntarymigrationLabourshortagesMisinformationanddisinformationNaturalresourceshortagesNon-weatherrelatednaturaldisastersPollutionSocietalpolarizationTechnologicalpowerconcentrationTerroristattacksUnemployment020406080100Shareofresponses(%)FinancialinstrumentsNationalandlocalregulationsMinilateraltreatiesandagreementsGlobaltreatiesandagreementsDevelopmentassistanceCorporatestrategiesResearchanddevelopmentPublicawarenessandeducationMulti-stakeholderengagementSourceNoteWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksRespondentscouldselectuptothreeresponsesfromthefollowingnineoptions:FinancialPerceptionSurvey2023-2024.instruments,Nationalandlocalregulations,Minilateraltreatiesandagreements,Globaltreatiesandagreements,Developmentassistance,corporatestrategies,Research&development,Publicawarenessandeducation,Multi-stakeholderengagement.GlobalRisksReport202493Endnotes1.Bostrom,Nick,“ExistentialRiskPreventionasGlobalPriority”,GlobalPolicy,vol.1,iss.2,2013,pp.,15-31,https://existential-risk.com/concept.pdf.2.Barrett,Scott,“WhyCooperate?TheIncentivetoSupplyPublicGood”,InternationalJournalofSocialEconomics,vol.31,no.11,2009,pp.1113-1115,https://philarchive.org/archive/ANOWC.3.Ibid.4.Denkenberger,David,andJoshuaPearce,Feedingeveryonenomatterwhat:Managingfoodsecurityafterglobalcatastrophe,Cambridge,MA:AcademicPress,2014.5.TheFloodHub,CommunityFloodActionGroups,https://thefloodhub.co.uk/community/,accessed12December2023.6.Elton,Charlotte,“World-firstnuclearfusionplantcouldgeneratecarbonfreeenergyby2040,UKgovernmentclaims”,Euronews,4October2022,https://www.euronews.com/green/2022/10/04/world-first-nuclear-fusion-plant-could-generate-carbon-free-energy-by-2040-uk-government-c.7.Wilkins,Alex,“Crystal-huntingDeepMindAIcouldhelpdiscovernewwondermaterial”,NewScientist,29November2023,https://www.newscientist.com/article/2404929-crystal-hunting-deepmind-ai-could-help-discover-new-wonder-materials/.8.Bill&MelindaGatesFoundation,Polio:Ataglance,https://www.gatesfoundation.org/our-work/programs/global-development/polio,accessed12December2023.9.Shaw,Rajib,MikioIshiwatariandMargaretArnold,KnowledgeNote2.1,Cluster2:Nonconstructionalmeasures:Community-basedDisasterRiskManagement,WorldBank,https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/78ba6020-8714-5e9c-85cf-192438a55422/content,accessed12December2023.10.BangladeshRedCrescentSociety(BDRS),CyclonePreparednessProgram(CPP),https://bdrcs.org/cyclone-preparedness-programm-cpp/,accessed12December2023.11.Rutter,Jill,“NudgeUnit”,InstituteforGovernment,11March2020,https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/article/explainer/nudge-unit.12.McKinsey&Company,Thetripleplay:Growth,profit,andsustainability,9August2023,https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/the-triple-play-growth-profit-and-sustainability.13.Henshall,Will,“E.U.’sAIRegulationCouldBeSoftenedAfterPushbackFromBiggestMembers”,Time,22November2023,https://time.com/6338602/eu-ai-regulation-foundation-models/.14.AssociatedPress,“TheEU'sAIAct:CouldEurope'slandmarkbidtoregulateAIfallatthelasthurdle?“,Euronews,4December2023,https://www.euronews.com/next/2023/12/04/the-eus-ai-act-could-europes-landmark-bid-to-regulate-ai-fall-at-the-last-hurdle.15.UnitedNations,COP28endswithcallto‘transitionaway’fromfossilfuels;UN’sGuterressaysphaseoutisinevitable[Pressrelease],13December2023,https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/12/1144742.16.GovernmentofGermanyFederalMinistryforEconomicAffairsandClimateAction,G7establishesClimateClub[Pressrelease],12December2022,https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2022/12/20221212-g7-establishes-climate-club.html.17.OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment(OECD)OECD.stats,GrossdomesticexpenditureonR&Dbysectorofperformanceandsourceoffund,https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=GERD_SOF,accessed12December2023.GlobalRisksReport202494AppendixADefinitionsandGlobalRisksListDefinitionsarenotrisksinandofthemselves,buthavethepotentialtomateriallyinfluencethespeed,spreadForthepurposesofthisreport,“Climateandscopeofglobalrisks.Theseincludebutarechange”isastructuralforcethatencompassesnotlimitedto:geostrategicshifts,technologicalthetrajectoriesofglobalwarmingandpossibleacceleration,climatechangeanddemographicconsequencestoEarthsystems,reflectingbifurcation.anthropogenicactionsandenvironmentalchanges.“Technologicalacceleration”isastructuralforce“Demographicbifurcation”isastructuralforcethatreferstotechnologicaldevelopmentsenabledthatreferstochangestothesize,growthandbyexponentialgrowthincomputingpowerandstructureofnational,regionalorglobalpopulations,analysis.Ithasthepotentialtoblurboundariesandtheresultingimpactonsocioeconomicandbetweentechnologyandhumanity,andrapidlygivepoliticalstructures.Itincludes,butisnotlimitedto,risetonovelandunpredictableglobalrisks.migration,fertilityandageingrates.“Under-the-radarrisk”isaglobalriskwherenew“Geostrategicshifts”isastructuralforcethatintelligence,amarkeddeterioration,keydecisionreferstochanginggeopoliticalpowerdynamics.pointorsimilarsuggeststhattheseverityoftheriskItencompassesglobalandregionalalliancesand(likelihoodorimpact)isincreasingand/orishigherrelations,theoffensiveanddefensiveprojectionofthanindicatedbyglobalriskperceptions.differentsourcesofpower(includingeconomic),andnationalattitudesrelatingtokeyactors,Globalrisklistgovernancemechanismsandstrategicgoals.TableA.1presentsthelistof34globalrisksand“Globalrisk”isthepossibilityoftheoccurrencedefinitionsadoptedintheGlobalRisksPerceptionofaneventorconditionwhich,ifitoccurs,wouldSurvey2023-2024.negativelyimpactasignificantproportionofglobalGDP,populationornaturalresources.Toensurelegibility,thenamesofsomeoftheglobalriskshavebeenabbreviatedinthefigures“Structuralforce”isthelong-termshiftinthethroughoutthereport.TheportionofthefullnamearrangementofandrelationbetweenthesystemicusedintheabbreviationisinboldinTableA.1.elementsofthegloballandscape.TheseshiftsTABLEA.1DefinitionsofglobalrisksECONOMICPricesforhousing,investmentfunds,sharesandotherassetsbecomeincreasinglydisconnectedfromtherealeconomy,leadingtoaAssetbubbleburstsseveredropindemandandprices.Includes,butisnotlimitedto:cryptocurrencies;housingprices;andstockmarkets.ConcentrationofConcentrationofstrategicallyimportantresourcesandmaterialsamongasmallnumberofindividuals,businessesorstatesthatcanstrategicresourcescontrolaccessanddictatediscretionarypricing.(minerals,materials)Corporate,householdorpublicfinancesstruggletoservicedebtaccumulation,resultinginmassbankruptciesorinsolvencies,liquidityDebt(public,corporate,crisesordefaultsandsovereigndebtcrises.household)DisruptionstoaMajordisruptionorcollapseofasystemicallyimportantglobalsupplychainorindustrywithanimpactontheglobaleconomy,financialsystemicallyimportantmarketsorsocietyleadingtoanabruptshocktothesupplyanddemandofsystemicallyimportantgoodsandservicesataglobalscale.supplychainIncludes,butisnotlimitedto:energy;technologicalhardware;medicalsupplies;andfast-movingconsumergoods.GlobalRisksReport202495TABLEA.1DefinitionsofglobalrisksDisruptionstocriticalOverloadorshutdownofphysicalanddigitalinfrastructure(includingsatellites)orservicesunderpinningcriticalsystems,includingtheinfrastructureinternet,telecommunications,publicutilities,financialsystemorenergy.Stemmingfrom,butnotlimitedto:cyberattacks;intentionalorunintentionalphysicaldamage;extremeweatherevents;andnaturaldisasters.Economicdownturn(recession,stagnation)Near-zeroorslowglobalgrowthlastingforseveralyearsoraglobalcontraction(recessionordepression).IlliciteconomicactivityGlobalproliferationoforganizedcrimeortheillicitactivitiesofbusinessesthatundermineeconomicadvancementandgrowth.Includes,butisnotlimitedto:illicitfinancialflows(e.g.taxevasion,sanctionsevasion,moneylaundering)andillicittradeandtrafficking(e.g.counterfeiting,humantrafficking,wildlifetrade,weapons).InflationSustainedincreasesinthepriceofgoodsandservices.Includesthepotentialforbroadsectionsofthepopulationbeingunabletomaintaincurrentlifestylewithdecliningpurchasingpower.Talentand/orlabourGlobal,geographicalorindustrymismatchesbetweenlabourandskillssupplyanddemand.shortagesSevereconsequencesfortheenvironment,humankindandeconomicactivityduetodestructionofnaturalcapitalstemmingfromaresultENVIRONMENTALofspeciesextinctionorreduction,spanningbothterrestrialandmarineecosystems.BiodiversitylossandecosystemcollapseCriticalchangetoLong-term,potentiallyirreversibleandself-perpetuatingchangestocriticalplanetarysystems,asaresultofbreachingacriticalthresholdEarthsystemsor‘tippingpoint’,ataregionalorgloballevel,thathaveabruptandsevereimpactsonplanethealthorhumanwelfare.Includes,butisnot(climatetippingpoints)limitedto:sealevelrisefromcollapsingicesheets;carbonreleasefromthawingpermafrost;anddisruptionofoceanoratmosphericcurrents.ExtremeweatherLossofhumanlife,damagetoecosystems,destructionofpropertyand/orfinanciallossduetoextremeweatherevents.Inclusiveofeventsland-based(e.g.wildfires),water-based(e.g.floods),andatmosphericandtemperature-related(e.g.heat-waves)events,includingthoseexacerbatedbyclimatechange.NaturalresourceSupplyshortagesoffoodorwaterforhuman,industryorecosystemuse.Manifestingasfoodandwaterinsecurityatalocal,regionalorshortages(food,globallevelasaresultofhumanoverexploitationandmismanagementofcriticalnaturalresources,climatechange(includingdrought,water)desertification),and/oralackofsuitableinfrastructure.Non-weather-relatedLossofhumanlife,damagetoecosystems,destructionofpropertyand/orfinanciallossduetonon-weather-relatednaturaldisasters.naturaldisastersInclusiveofland-based(e.g.earthquakes,volcanos),water-based(e.g.tsunamis),andextra-terrestrialbased(e.g.asteroidstrikesandgeomagneticstorms).PollutionIntroductionofharmfulmaterialsintotheair,waterandsoilstemmingfromhumanactivity,resultinginimpactstoandlossofhumanlife,(air,soil,water)financiallossand/ordamagetoecosystems.Inclusiveofhouseholdandindustrialactivitiesandaccidents,oilspillsandradioactivecontamination.GEOPOLITICALIntentionaloraccidentalreleaseofbiological,chemical,nuclearorradiologicalhazards,resultinginlossoflife,destructionand/orBiological,chemicalinternationalcrises.Includesaccidentsatorsabotageofbiolaboratories,chemicalplantsandnuclearpowerplants,aswellastheornuclearhazardsintentionaloraccidentalreleaseofbiological,chemicalandnuclearweapons.GeoeconomicDeploymentofeconomicleversbyglobalorregionalpowerstoreshapeeconomicinteractionsbetweennations,restrictinggoods,confrontationknowledge,servicesortechnologywiththeintentofbuildingself-sufficiency,constraininggeopoliticalrivalsand/orconsolidatingspheres(sanctions,tariffs,ofinfluence.Includes,butisnotlimitedto:currencymeasures;investmentcontrols;sanctions;stateaidandsubsidies;andtradecontrols.investmentscreening)GlobalRisksReport202496TABLEA.1DefinitionsofglobalrisksInterstatearmedconflictBilateralormultilateraluseofforcebetweenstates,manifestingasproxywaroropen,hotwar.(hotwar,proxywars)IntrastateviolenceDestructivebehaviour,interpersonalviolenceand/oruseofforcethattakesplacewithinacountryorcommunity,bystateornon-state(civilstrikes,riots,actors.Includes,butisnotlimitedto:internalcivilunrestmanifestingasviolentriotsandstrikes;gangviolence;massshootings;civilwars;coups)guerrillawarfare;genocide;assassinations;andcoups.TerroristattacksUseofforcebynon-stateactorswithideological,politicalorreligiousgoals,resultinginlossoflife,severeinjuryormaterialdamagecausedSOCIETALbyconventionalandnon-conventionalweaponsorothermeans.InflationChronicphysicalandmentalhealthconditionsthatlastoneyearormoreandrequireongoingmedicalattentionand/orlimitactivitiesofdailyliving.Includes,butisnotlimitedto:conditionslinkedtoageing;excessiveconsumptionhabits;andclimatechangeandpollution.ErosionofhumanrightsLossofprotectionsforrightsinherenttoallhumanbeings,regardlessofindividualstatus,and/orthefreedomsthatunderpincivicspace.and/orcivicfreedomsIncludes,butisnotlimitedtotherightto:lifeandliberty;workandeducation;freedomofexpression;peacefulassembly;discriminationbasedongender,raceethnicityandothercharacteristics;andprivacy.InequalityorlackofPersistentbarrierstotherealizationofeconomicpotentialandsecurity.Includes,butisnotlimitedto:growingorpersistentpoverty;economicopportunitypresentorperceivedincomeandwealthinequality;andunequalaccesstoeducational,technologicalandeconomicopportunities.InfectiousdiseasesSpreadofviruses,parasites,fungiorbacterialeadingtoawidespreadlossoflifeandeconomicdisruption.Includes,butisnotlimitedto:zoonoticdiseases;releasesofnaturalorman-madepathogens;theresurgenceofpre-existingdiseasesduetolowerlevelsofimmunity;theriseofantimicrobialresistance;andtheimpactofclimatechangeandenvironmentaldegradationonpathogensandtheirvectors.InsufficientpublicNon-existent,inadequateorinequitablepublicinfrastructureandservices.Includes,butisnotlimitedto:unaffordableorinadequatesocialinfrastructureandsecurityandbenefits;housing;publiceducation;childandelderlycare;healthcare;andsanitationandtransportationsystems.servicesForcedmovementordisplacementacrossorwithinborders.Driversinclude,butarenotlimitedto:persistentdiscriminationandInvoluntarymigrationpersecution;lackofeconomicadvancementopportunities;human-madedisasters;naturaldisastersandextremeweatherevents,includingtheimpactsofclimatechange;andinternalorinterstateconflict.SocietalpolarizationIdeologicalandculturaldivisionswithinandacrosscommunitiesleadingtodecliningsocialstability,gridlocksindecision-making,economicdisruption,andincreasedpoliticalpolarization.UnemploymentStructuraldeteriorationofworkprospectsorstandardsofwork.Includes,butisnotlimitedto:erosionofworkers'rights;stagnatingwages;risingunemploymentandunderemployment;displacementduetoautomationorthegreentransition;andstagnantsocialmobility.TECHNOLOGICALIntendedorunintendednegativeconsequencesofadvancesinAIandrelatedtechnologicalcapabilities(includinggenerativeAI)onAdverseoutcomesindividuals,businesses,ecosystemsand/oreconomies.ofAItechnologiesIntendedorunintendednegativeconsequencesofadvancesinfrontiertechnologiesonindividuals,businesses,ecosystemsand/orAdverseoutcomesofeconomies.Includes,butisnotlimitedto:brain-computerinterfaces;biotechnology;geo-engineering;andquantumcomputing.frontiertechnologies(quantum,biotech,Broadandpervasiveobservationofaplaceorpersonand/orsuppressionofcommunication,informationandideas,physicallyordigitally,geoengineering)totheextentthatitsignificantlyinfringesonhumanandcivilrights(e.g.privacy,freedomofspeechandfreedomofexpression).CensorshipandsurveillanceGlobalRisksReport202497TABLEA.1DefinitionsofglobalrisksCyberinsecurityUseofcyberweaponsandtoolstoconductcyberwarfare,cyberespionageandcybercrimetogaincontroloveradigitalpresenceand/orcauseoperationaldisruption.Includes:ransomware,datafraudortheft.MisinformationanddisinformationPersistentfalseinformation(deliberateorotherwise)widelyspreadthroughmedianetworks,shiftingpublicopinioninasignificantwaytowardsdistrustinfactsandauthority.Includes,butisnotlimitedto:false,imposter,manipulatedandfabricatedcontent.TechnologicalpowerconcentrationConcentrationofcriticaltechnologicalassets,capabilitiesorknowledgeamongasmallnumberofindividuals,businessesorstatesthat(digitalassets,cancontrolaccesstokeytechnologies.Stemmingfrom,butnotlimitedto:thefailureofanti-trustregulation;inadequateinvestmentintheknowledge,strategicinnovationecosystem;orstatecontroloverkeytechnologies.technologies)SourceWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey2023-2024.GlobalRisksReport202498AppendixBGlobalRiskPerceptionSurvey2023-2024TheGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey(GRPS)isthe“IneffectivenessofmultilateralinstitutionsandWorldEconomicForum’ssourceoforiginalrisksinternationalcooperation”,aswellas“Failureofdata,harnessingtheexpertiseoftheForum’sclimate-changeadaptation”and“Failuretomitigateextensivenetworkofacademic,business,climatechange”.Theseupdatesweremadetogovernment,civilsocietyandthoughtleaders.ensuretheglobalriskslistfocusedonthecoreriskSurveyresponseswerecollectedfrom4Septemberitself,ratherthanarelatedexposureorvulnerabilityto9October2023fromtheWorldEconomictothatriskthroughin/action.Forum’smultistakeholdercommunities.ThenamesanddefinitionsoftheremainingUpdatestotheGRPS2023-2024riskshavebeenrevisedand,whereapplicable,merged,modifiedand/orexpandedtoreflectThelistof34globalrisksincludedinthesurveywasnewwaysinwhichtherisksmaymaterializeandupdatedin2023asfollows.thepotentialadverseoutcomestheymaycause.However,toensurecomparabilityovertime,theSevennewriskswereaddedinresponsetofundamentalconceptofeachriskhasremainedobservedtrendsacrossallfivecategoriesbroadlyconsistentwiththatofpreviousversionsof(economic,environmental,geopolitical,societalandthesurvey,althoughnamesanddefinitionsweretechnological):modified.1.CensorshipandsurveillanceMethodology2.CriticalchangetoEarthsystems(climatetippingTheGRPS2023–2024wasfurtherrefinedthisyearpoints)togathermoregranularperceptionsofriskandtoincorporatenewapproachestoriskmanagement3.Concentrationofstrategicresources(minerals,andanalysis.Tothatend,theGRPS2023–2024materials)wascomprisedofsevensections:4.Erosionofhumanrightsand/orcivicfreedoms–Currentrisklandscapeaskedrespondentstoselectuptofiverisksamong20pre-selected5.Inequalityorlackofeconomicopportunityrisksthattheybelievearethemostlikelytopresentamaterialcrisisonaglobalscalein6.Intrastateviolence(civilstrikes,riots,coups)2024.Thefinalrankisbasedontheshareofrespondentswhoselectedtheparticular7.Talentand/orlabourshortagesrisk.The20optionsincluded:Accidentalorintentionalnuclearevent;AccidentalorInaddition:intentionalreleaseofbiologicalagents;AI-generatedmisinformationanddisinformation;“Misinformationanddisinformation”wasAttacksoncriticalinfrastructure;Censorshiprecategorizedfromasocietaltoatechnologicalanderosionoffreespeech;Costoflivingcrisis;risk,while“Disruptionstocriticalinfrastructure”wasCyberattacks;Disruptedsupplychainsforrecategorizedfromatechnologicaltoaneconomiccriticalgoodsorresources;Disruptedsupplyrisk.chainsforenergy;Disruptedsupplychainsforfood;Economicdownturn;Escalation“AdverseoutcomesofAItechnologies”wasoroutbreakofinterstatearmedconflict(s);splitoutfrom“AdverseoutcomesfromfrontierExtremeweatherevents;Housing-bubbletechnologies(quantum,biotech,geoengineering)”,burst;Institutionalcollapsewithinthefinancialwhile“Naturaldisastersandextremeweathersector;Public-debtdistress;Skillsorlabourevents”wasdelineatedintotwoseparatecategoriesshortages;Societaland/orpoliticalpolarization;(“Extremeweatherevents”and“Non-weather-Techbubbleburst;andViolentcivilstrikesandrelatednaturaldisasters”).riots.RespondentswerealsoabletowriteinadditionalriskstoOther,afree-textfield.ResultsGlobalriskcategoriesrelatingtoafailureinareillustratedinFigure1.2.governancewereremoved.ThisincludesGlobalRisksReport202499–Short-andlong-termriskslandscapeaskednamesofsomeoftheglobalriskshavebeenrespondentstoestimatethelikelyimpactabbreviatedinthefigures.Theportionofthefull(severity)ofeachofthe34globalrisks,ona1-7nameusedintheabbreviationisinbold.scale[1–Lowseverity,7–Highseverity],overbothtwo-yearand10-yearperiods.“Severity”–Riskoutlookaskedrespondentstoismeanttotakeintoconsiderationtheimpactcharacterizetheevolutionoftheglobalrisksonpopulations,theeconomyorenvironmentallandscapebasedonanumberoffactors.resourcesonaglobalscale.RespondentsItfirstaskedrespondentstoindicatewhichwerealsoallowedtonominateanyotherriskstatementbestcharacterizescurrentandconsideredmissingfromthe34globalrisks.AfutureglobaleffortstomanagetheEarth’ssimpleaveragebasedonthescoresselectedresources.Respondentswereprovidedwithwascalculatedandtheresultsareillustratedinthesame7-pointLikertscaleforboththeFigures1.3and2.2.Inaddition,ifarespondentcurrentandfuturetimescales,rangingfrom“Weselectedthehighestseverityscore(7)foranyneedtorespectEarth’slimitsandrestricttheofthe34risks,theywereaskedafollow-upconsumptionofnaturalresourcestomakeourquestiontoidentifyareasofparticularconcernlifestylessustainable”(1)to“Weneedtochangewithrespecttotheidentifiedrisk.Earth’slimitsusingscienceandtechnologytoincreasethesupplyofgoodstocreate–Consequencesseekstounderstandtheabundance”(7).Asimpletallyforeachofthepotentialconsequencesofrisks,tocreateasevenoptionswascalculated.networkmapoftheglobalrisklandscape.Respondentswereprovided10randomly–Respondentswerethenaskedtoselectaselectedglobalrisks(fromthefulllistof34statementthattheybelievebestcharacterizesglobalrisks)andwerethenaskedtoselecttheglobalpoliticalenvironmentforuptofiveglobalrisks(fromthefulllist)likelycooperationonglobalrisksin10years.tobetriggeredbyeachofthe10randomlyRespondentswereprovidedwithfouroptions:selectedrisks.ResultsareillustratedinFigure(1)ContinuationorreinvigorationoftheUS-led,1.7.Invisualresults,“Nodes:Riskinfluence”rules-basedinternationalorder;(2)Multipolarisbasedonasimpletallyofallbidirectionalorfragmentedorderinwhichmiddleandgreatrelationshipsidentifiedbyrespondents.“Edges:powerscontest,setandenforceregionalrulesRelativeinfluence”isbasedonasimpletallyandnorms;(3)Bipolarorbifurcatedorderofthenumberoftimestheriskwasidentifiedshapedbystrategiccompetitionbetweenasaconsequence.However,visualresultsdotwosuperpowers;(4)Realignmenttowardsanotshowallconnections:weakerrelationshipsnewinternationalorderledbyanalternativeidentifiedbylessthan25%ofrespondentsweresuperpower.Asimpletallyforeachofthefournotincludedasedges.optionswascalculated.ResultsareillustratedinFigure2.31.–Riskgovernanceaskedrespondentstoidentifyapproach(es)thattheyexpecttohavethemost–Finally,respondentswereaskedtoselectpotentialfordrivingactiononriskreductionastatementwhichbestcharacterizestheirandpreparednessoverthenext10years,outlookfortheworldoverthenexttwoandwithrespecttothemostsevererisks(severity10years.Respondentswereprovidedwithscoreof6or7overthe10-yeartimeframe).thesamefiveoptionsforbothtimeperiods:(1)RespondentscouldchooseuptothreeanswersCalm:negligibleriskofglobalcatastrophes;(2)fromthefollowingnineapproaches:FinancialStable:isolateddisruptions,lowriskofglobalinstruments(e.g.insurance,catastrophecatastrophes;(3)Unsettled:someinstability,bonds,publicriskpools);Nationalandlocalmoderateriskofglobalcatastrophes;(4)regulations(e.g.environmental,operational,Turbulent:upheavalsandelevatedriskofglobalfinancialregulationsandincentives);Minilateralcatastrophes;(5)Stormy:globalcatastrophictreatiesandagreements(e.g.Basel,Wassenaar,riskslooming.Asimpletallyforeachofthefiveregionalfreetradeagreements);Globaltreatiesoptionswascalculated.Resultsareillustratedinandagreements(e.g.UNFCC,Paris,Montreal,Figure1.1.NPT,WTO);Developmentassistance(e.g.internationalaidfordisasterriskresponseCompletionthresholdsandreduction);Corporatestrategies(e.g.ESGreporting,resilientsupplychains,socialAtotalof1,852responsestotheGRPSwereinitiatives,PPPs);Researchanddevelopmentreceived.Fromthese,1,490werekept,basedon(e.g.newtechnologies,early-warningsystems,thethresholdatleastonenon-demographicanswer,globalriskresearch);Publicawarenessandaminimumanswertimeof2minutes,andtheeducation(e.g.campaigns,schoolcurricula,filteringofmultiplesubmissionsbasedonbrowsermediaproducts);Multistakeholderengagementcookiesaswellaspartialresponses(>40%)that(e.g.platformsforexchangingknowledge,haveoverlappingIP-numbersanddemographicbestpractices,alignment).Asimpletallyoftheanswerswithafullyrecordedresponse(100%).numberoftimesanapproachwasidentifiedwascalculatedforeachrisk.ResultsareillustratedinFigure3.5.Toensurelegibility,theGlobalRisksReport2024100–Currentrisklandscape:1,490respondents–Globalefforts:984respondentsansweredselectedatleastonerisk.overatleastonetimeframe.–Short-andlong-termriskslandscape:1,312–Globalpoliticalenvironmentforcooperation:respondentsevaluatedtheseverityofatleast981respondentsanswered.oneriskinonetimeframe.–Outlookfortheworld:992respondents–Short-termseverity:1,312respondentsansweredoveratleastonetimeframe.evaluatedtheseverityofatleastonerisk.–Sampledistribution:1,490respondents–Long-termseverity:1,311respondentswhoansweredatleastonenon-demographicevaluatedtheseverityofatleastonerisk.questionwereusedtocalculatethesampledistributionbyplaceofresidence(region),–Consequences:1,049respondentspairedatgender,age,areaofexpertiseandorganizationleastoneriskwithoneconsequence.type.–Riskgovernance:952respondentsselectedatFigureB.1presentssomekeydescriptiveleastoneapproachforatleastonerisk.statisticsandinformationabouttheprofilesoftherespondents.–Riskoutlook:1,001respondentsansweredatleastonequestion.TABLEB.1SurveysamplecompositionGenderAgegroupOther,1%27%27%Female,17%38%12%12%5%Male,61%<3030-3940-4950-5960-6970+OrganizationRegionInternationalSouthernAsia,7%CentralAsia,<1%organization9%Oceania,3%Sub-SaharanAfrica,8%South-easternAsia,5%Civilsociety,10%Privatesector,48%Academia,Europe,38%Northern19%America,18%Government,Notfilled,2%12%MiddleEastandOther2%NorthernAfrica,7%EasternAsia,5%LatinAmericaandSourcetheCaribbean,9%WorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey2023-2024.GlobalRisksReport2024101AppendixCExecutiveOpinionSurvey:NationalRiskPerceptionsTableC.1presentsthelistof36risksthatwereToensurelegibility,thenamesofsomeoftheglobalincorporatedintotheWorldEconomicForum’sriskshavebeenabbreviatedinthefigures.The2023ExecutiveOpinionSurvey(EOS),whichwasportionofthefullnameusedintheabbreviationisadministeredbetweenAprilandAugust2023.Theinbold.risksarecomparabletothoseintheGRPS(GlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey)butareappliedatamoregranularleveltoreflectthepossibleshort-termandcountry-levelmanifestationsofglobalrisks.TABLEC.1NationalrisklistAssetbubbleburstWater-supplyshortageCorporatedebtCriticalmineralsshortageAccidentalorintentionaluseofbiological,chemicalorEconomicdownturn(e.g.recession,stagnation)nuclearweaponsEnergy-supplyshortageAttacksoncriticalinfrastructureHouseholddebtIlliciteconomicactivityGeoeconomicconfrontation(sanctions,tariffs,Inequality(wealth,income)investmentscreening)InflationInterstatearmedconflictLabourand/ortalentshortagePublicdebtStatefragilityandfailureofpublicservicesBiodiversityloss(marine,freshwater,terrestrial)Extremeweatherevents(floods,storms,etc.)TerrorismFailureofclimate-changeadaptationFailureofclimate-changemitigationCensorshipandlimitationstocivillibertiesFood-supplyshortageNon-weatherrelatednaturaldisastersChronicdiseasesandhealthconditions(earthquakes,volcanoes,etc.)(heart,cancer,diabetes)Pollution(air,water,soil)ErosionofsocialcohesionandwellbeingInfectiousdiseases(COVID-19,influenza,tuberculosis,malaria,etc.)InvoluntarymigrationUnemploymentAdverseoutcomesofartificialintelligencetechnologiesAdverseoutcomesofbioengineeringtechnologiesCybercrimeandcyberinsecurityDigitalinequalityMisinformationanddisinformationRiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalSourceWorldEconomicForumExecutiveOpinionSurvey2023.GlobalRisksReport2024102Over11,000respondentswerepresentedwiththeForthepurposesofmoreintuitivevisualfollowingquestion:“Whichfiverisksarethemostrepresentationofresultsinthereport,riskswhichlikelytoposethebiggestthreattoyourcountrywereselectedbyzerorespondentswithinacountryinthenexttwoyears?”andwereaskedtoselecttielastat#36.Further,toanalysetheresultsofthesefromthelistof36riskslistedinTableC.1.countryoreconomygroups(suchastheG20orEU),country-levelresultsareaggregatedbytaking“Risk1”indicatesthemostfrequentlyselectedasimpleaverageoftherankingoftherisk(fromriskineacheconomy.Tiedrisksarepresented1-36)bythecountriesoreconomiesincludedintheinalphabeticalorder,withthetieindicatedbygroup.numbering.Forexample,inTürkiye,tworisks(“Inequality(wealth,income)”and“Erosionofsocialcohesionandwellbeing”)aretiedforthirdplaceandthereis,therefore,norisklistedinfourthplace.TABLEC.2TopfiverisksidentifiedbytheExecutiveOpinionSurvey(EOS)AlgeriaArmeniaBahamas1stInflation1stInterstatearmedconflict1stEconomicdownturn2ndInfectiousdiseases2ndLabourshortage2ndExtremeweatherevents3rdInvoluntarymigration3rdGeoeconomicconfrontation3rdEnergysupplyshortage4thUnemployment4thInvoluntarymigration4thUnemployment5thEnergysupplyshortage5thEconomicdownturn5thFailureofclimate-changeadaptionAngolaAustraliaBahrain1stEconomicdownturn1stEconomicdownturn1stInflation2ndInflation2ndInflation2ndEconomicdownturn3rdUnemployment3rdHouseholddebt3rdPublicdebt4thInequality(wealth,income)4thEnergysupplyshortage4thLabourshortage5thLabourshortage5thExtremeweatherevents5thUnemploymentArgentinaAustriaBangladesh1stInflation1stLabourshortage1stEnergysupplyshortage2ndEconomicdownturn2ndEconomicdownturn2ndInflation3rdPublicdebt3rdInflation3rdEconomicdownturn4thErosionofsocialcohesion4thCybercrimeandcyberinsecurity4thInequality(wealth,income)5thInequality(wealth,income)5thErosionofsocialcohesion5thPublicdebt5thUnemploymentRiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalGlobalRisksReport2024103TABLEC.2TopfiverisksidentifiedbytheExecutiveOpinionSurvey(EOS)BelgiumBrazilChile1stEconomicdownturn1stEconomicdownturn1stEconomicdownturn2ndInflation2ndErosionofsocialcohesion2ndEnergysupplyshortage3rdPublicdebt3rdStatefragility4thCensorship4thInvoluntarymigration3rdInflation5thInequality(wealth,income)5thInflation4thUseofbiological,chemicalornuclearweapons5thInfectiousdiseasesBeninBulgariaColombia1stUseofbiological,chemicalornuclear1stEconomicdownturn1stEconomicdownturnweapons2ndInflation2ndInflation2ndErosionofsocialcohesion3rdEnergysupplyshortage3rdUnemployment4thLabourshortage4thPublicdebt3rdEconomicdownturn5thPublicdebt5thInterstatearmedconflict4thEnergysupplyshortage5thAdverseoutcomesofartificialintelligenceBolivia(PlurinationalStateof)CameroonCostaRica1stEconomicdownturn1stUnemployment1stEconomicdownturn2ndPublicdebt2ndIlliciteconomicactivity2ndPublicdebt3rdCensorship3rdCybercrimeandcyberinsecurity3rdErosionofsocialcohesion4thInflation4thChronicdiseasesandhealthconditions4thUnemployment5thErosionofsocialcohesion5thInequality(wealth,income)5thExtremeweathereventsBosniaandHerzegovinaCanadaCôteD'Ivoire1stEconomicdownturn1stEconomicdownturn1stUnemployment2ndLabourshortage2ndLabourshortage2ndInflation3rdInflation3rdExtremeweatherevents3rdEconomicdownturn4thStatefragility4thInflation4thErosionofsocialcohesion5thErosionofsocialcohesion5thInfectiousdiseases5thCybercrimeandcyberinsecurityBotswanaChadCroatia1stUnemployment1stEnergysupplyshortage1stLabourshortage2ndInflation2ndEconomicdownturn2ndEconomicdownturn3rdInequality(wealth,income)3rdErosionofsocialcohesion3rdInflation4thHouseholddebt4thInfectiousdiseases4thAssetbubbleburst5thDigitalinequality5thFailureofclimate-changeadaption5thExtremeweathereventsRiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalGlobalRisksReport2024104TABLEC.2TopfiverisksidentifiedbytheExecutiveOpinionSurvey(EOS)CyprusEcuadorFrance1stEconomicdownturn1stEconomicdownturn1stEconomicdownturn2ndLabourshortage2ndTerrorism2ndErosionofsocialcohesion3rdInflation3rdStatefragility3rdPublicdebt4thCybercrimeandcyberinsecurity4thIlliciteconomicactivity4thLabourshortage5thHouseholddebt5thExtremeweatherevents5thEnergysupplyshortageCzechiaEgyptGeorgia1stEconomicdownturn1stEconomicdownturn1stInterstatearmedconflict2ndLabourshortage2ndInflation3rdPublicdebt3rdUnemployment2ndUseofbiological,chemicalornuclear4thInflation4thPublicdebtweapons5thMisinformationanddisinformation5thInterstatearmedconflict3rdInvoluntarymigration4thCybercrimeandcyberinsecurity5thEnergysupplyshortageDemocraticRepublicoftheCongoElSalvadorGermany1stInterstatearmedconflict1stEconomicdownturn1stEconomicdownturn2ndUnemployment2ndPublicdebt2ndLabourshortage3rdInflation3rdCensorship3rdEnergysupplyshortage4thStatefragility4thMisinformationanddisinformation4thInflation5thInequality(wealth,income)5thInflation5thErosionofsocialcohesionDenmarkEstoniaGhana1stEconomicdownturn1stEconomicdownturn1stUnemployment2ndLabourshortage2ndInterstatearmedconflict2ndPublicdebt3rdCybercrimeandcyberinsecurity3rdInflation3rdInflation4thInflation4thLabourshortage4thCybercrimeandcyberinsecurity5thAttacksoncriticalinfrastructure5thEnergysupplyshortage5thEconomicdownturnDominicanRepublicFinlandGreece1stExtremeweatherevents1stEconomicdownturn1stEconomicdownturn2ndPublicdebt2ndLabourshortage2ndLabourshortage3rdEconomicdownturn3rdPublicdebt3rdInflation4thInflation4thInflation4thPublicdebt5thInvoluntarymigration5thErosionofsocialcohesion5thInterstatearmedconflictRiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalGlobalRisksReport2024105TABLEC.2TopfiverisksidentifiedbytheExecutiveOpinionSurvey(EOS)GuatemalaIndiaIreland1stStatefragility1stMisinformationanddisinformation1stLabourshortage2ndLabourshortage2ndInfectiousdiseases2ndEconomicdownturn3rdErosionofsocialcohesion3rdIlliciteconomicactivity3rdEnergysupplyshortage4thExtremeweatherevents4thInequality(wealth,income)4thInflation5thIlliciteconomicactivity5thLabourshortage5thCybercrimeandcyberinsecurity5thMisinformationanddisinformationHonduras1stEnergysupplyshortageIndonesiaItalyEconomicdownturn2ndEconomicdownturn1stEconomicdownturn1st3rdExtremeweatherevents2ndExtremeweatherevents4thStatefragility3rdInfectiousdiseases2ndEnergysupplyshortage5thUnemployment4thEnergysupplyshortage5thUnemployment3rdExtremeweathereventsHongKongSAR,China1stLabourshortage4thInterstatearmedconflict2ndEconomicdownturn3rdGeoeconomicconfrontation5thFailureofclimate-changeadaption4thInfectiousdiseases5thAssetbubbleburstIran(IslamicRepublicof)Jamaica1stInflation1stEconomicdownturnHungary2ndWater-supplyshortage2ndLabourshortage1stEconomicdownturn3rdErosionofsocialcohesion3rdExtremeweatherevents2ndEnergysupplyshortage4thInequality(wealth,income)4thInflation3rdInflation5thEconomicdownturn5thErosionofsocialcohesion4thLabourshortage5thInterstatearmedconflictIraqEconomicdownturn1stIceland1stEconomicdownturn2ndWater-supplyshortageJapan2ndInflation1stInterstatearmedconflict3rdLabourshortage3rdEnergysupplyshortage2ndLabourshortage4thNon-weather-relatednaturaldisasters3rdEconomicdownturn5thExtremeweatherevents3rdStatefragility4thNon-weather-relatednaturaldisasters5thExtremeweatherevents5thInterstatearmedconflictRiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalGlobalRisksReport2024106TABLEC.2TopfiverisksidentifiedbytheExecutiveOpinionSurvey(EOS)JordanLaoPDRMalawi1stUnemployment1stInfectiousdiseases1stEconomicdownturn2ndPublicdebt2ndInflation2ndPublicdebt3rdInflation3rdEconomicdownturn3rdInflation4thEconomicdownturn4thEnergysupplyshortage4thUnemployment5thInfectiousdiseases5thLabourshortage5thExtremeweathereventsKazakhstanLatviaMalaysia1stInflation1stUseofbiological,chemicalornuclear1stEconomicdownturn2ndEconomicdownturnweapons2ndLabourshortage3rdErosionofsocialcohesion2ndFailureofclimate-changemitigation3rdFood-supplyshortage4thWater-supplyshortage3rdPollution(air,water,soil)4thInflation5thInterstatearmedconflict4thTerrorism5thErosionofsocialcohesion5thStatefragility5thInfectiousdiseasesKenya1stEconomicdownturnLesothoMaliTerrorism2ndPublicdebt1stEconomicdownturn1st3rdUnemployment2ndInfectiousdiseases4thInflation3rdFailureofclimate-changeadaption2ndUnemployment5thFood-supplyshortage4thExtremeweatherevents5thFailureofclimate-changemitigation3rdCybercrimeandcyberinsecurityKuwait1stEconomicdownturnLithuania4thInterstatearmedconflict2ndLabourshortage1stEconomicdownturn3rdStatefragility2ndInterstatearmedconflict5thEnergysupplyshortage4thInflation3rdInflation5thErosionofsocialcohesion4thLabourshortageMalta5thUseofbiological,chemicalornuclear1stEconomicdownturnKyrgyzstanweapons2ndInflation1stInterstatearmedconflict3rdLabourshortage2ndEconomicdownturnLuxembourg4thAssetbubbleburst3rdInvoluntarymigration1stEconomicdownturn5thPublicdebt4thPublicdebt2ndLabourshortage5thInflation3rdInflation4thEnergysupplyshortage5thAssetbubbleburstRiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalGlobalRisksReport2024107TABLEC.2TopfiverisksidentifiedbytheExecutiveOpinionSurvey(EOS)MauritiusNepalOman1stLabourshortage1stEconomicdownturn1stEconomicdownturn2ndEconomicdownturn2ndUnemployment2ndUnemployment3rdPublicdebt3rdInequality(wealth,income)3rdInflation4thInflation4thInflation4thPublicdebt5thExtremeweatherevents5thLabourshortage5thInfectiousdiseasesMexicoNetherlandsPakistan1stEconomicdownturn1stLabourshortage1stEconomicdownturn2ndStatefragility2ndEconomicdownturn2ndEnergysupplyshortage3rdEnergysupplyshortage3rdEnergysupplyshortage3rdExtremeweatherevents4thInequality(wealth,income)4thErosionofsocialcohesion4thInflation5thIlliciteconomicactivity5thCybercrimeandcyberinsecurity5thMisinformationanddisinformation5thErosionofsocialcohesionNewZealandPanamaMongolia1stEconomicdownturn1stPublicdebt1stEconomicdownturn2ndExtremeweatherevents2ndLabourshortage2ndLabourshortage3rdInflation3rdErosionofsocialcohesion3rdInflation4thEnergysupplyshortage4thEconomicdownturn4thPollution(air,water,soil)5thLabourshortage5thInequality(wealth,income)5thEnergysupplyshortageNigeriaParaguayMorocco1stEconomicdownturn1stStatefragility1stEconomicdownturn2ndEnergysupplyshortage2ndIlliciteconomicactivity2ndInflation3rdUnemployment3rdPublicdebt3rdWater-supplyshortage4thPublicdebt4thEconomicdownturn4thInequality(wealth,income)5thInflation5thInequality(wealth,income)5thUnemploymentNorthMacedoniaPeru1stEconomicdownturn1stEconomicdownturn2ndInflation2ndExtremeweatherevents3rdPollution(air,water,soil)3rdStatefragility4thPublicdebt4thErosionofsocialcohesion5thUnemployment5thIlliciteconomicactivityRiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalGlobalRisksReport2024108TABLEC.2TopfiverisksidentifiedbytheExecutiveOpinionSurvey(EOS)PhilippinesRwandaSingapore1stExtremeweatherevents1stInflation1stEconomicdownturn2ndEconomicdownturn2ndExtremeweatherevents2ndLabourshortage3rdEnergysupplyshortage3rdUnemployment3rdInflation4thInflation4thFood-supplyshortage4thGeoeconomicconfrontation5thInfectiousdiseases5thEconomicdownturn5thCybercrimeandcyberinsecurityPolandSaudiArabiaSlovenia1stInflation1stInfectiousdiseases1stEconomicdownturn2ndInflation2ndLabourshortage2ndEconomicdownturn3rdAdverseoutcomesofartificialintelligence3rdEnergysupplyshortage4thEconomicdownturn4thInflation3rdInterstatearmedconflict5thMisinformationanddisinformation5thPublicdebt4thUseofbiological,chemicalornuclearweapons5thPublicdebtPortugalSenegalSouthAfrica1stEconomicdownturn1stEconomicdownturn1stEnergysupplyshortage2ndLabourshortage2ndUnemployment2ndEconomicdownturn3rdInflation3rdInflation3rdUnemployment4thErosionofsocialcohesion4thStatefragility4thStatefragility5thPublicdebt5thCensorship5thWater-supplyshortageQatarSerbiaSouthKorea1stInflation1stLabourshortage1stEconomicdownturn2ndDigitalinequality2ndInflation2ndHouseholddebt3rdTerrorism3rdEconomicdownturn3rdAssetbubbleburst4thEconomicdownturn4thInterstatearmedconflict4thLabourshortage5thLabourshortage5thCensorship5thInequality(wealth,income)5thInflationRomaniaSierraLeone5thUseofbiological,chemicalornuclear1stEconomicdownturn1stEconomicdownturnweapons2ndInflation2ndEnergysupplyshortage3rdLabourshortage3rdInflation4thInterstatearmedconflict4thErosionofsocialcohesion5thMisinformationanddisinformation5thExtremeweathereventsRiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalGlobalRisksReport2024109TABLEC.2TopfiverisksidentifiedbytheExecutiveOpinionSurvey(EOS)SpainTaiwan,ChinaUnitedArabEmirates1stEconomicdownturn1stEconomicdownturn1stEconomicdownturn2ndPublicdebt2ndEnergysupplyshortage2ndInflation3rdErosionofsocialcohesion3rdGeoeconomicconfrontation3rdAdverseoutcomesofartificialintelligence4thLabourshortage4thLabourshortage4thInfectiousdiseases5thInflation5thInflation5thCybercrimeandcyberinsecuritySriLankaThailandUnitedKingdom1stEconomicdownturn1stEconomicdownturn1stEconomicdownturn2ndLabourshortage2ndPollution(air,water,soil)2ndInflation3rdEnergysupplyshortage3rdLabourshortage3rdEnergysupplyshortage4thInflation4thHouseholddebt4thHouseholddebt5thPublicdebt5thInequality(wealth,income)5thLabourshortageSwedenTunisiaUnitedRepublicofTanzania1stEconomicdownturn1stEconomicdownturn1stUnemployment2ndEnergysupplyshortage2ndPublicdebt2ndChronicdiseasesandhealthconditions3rdInflation3rdWater-supplyshortage3rdFailureofclimate-changeadaption4thInvoluntarymigration4thStatefragility4thInequality(wealth,income)5thFailureofclimate-changeadaption5thInflation5thCybercrimeandcyberinsecuritySwitzerlandTürkiyeUnitedStatesofAmerica1stLabourshortage1stEconomicdownturn1stEconomicdownturn2ndEnergysupplyshortage2ndInvoluntarymigration2ndInfectiousdiseases3rdEconomicdownturn3rdInequality(wealth,income)3rdInflation4thCybercrimeandcyberinsecurity3rdErosionofsocialcohesion4thUseofbiological,chemicalornuclear5thErosionofsocialcohesion5thCensorshipweapons5thInvoluntarymigration5thEnergysupplyshortageUkraine1stInterstatearmedconflictUruguay2ndInvoluntarymigration1stLabourshortage3rdUseofbiological,chemicalornuclear2ndEconomicdownturnweapons3rdExtremeweatherevents4thPublicdebt4thErosionofsocialcohesion5thInflation5thInequality(wealth,income)RiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalGlobalRisksReport2024110TABLEC.2TopfiverisksidentifiedbytheExecutiveOpinionSurvey(EOS)UzbekistanVietNamZimbabwe1stEnergysupplyshortage1stEconomicdownturn1stEconomicdownturn2ndPollution(air,water,soil)2ndInfectiousdiseases2ndEnergysupplyshortage3rdInflation3rdInflation3rdInflation4thWater-supplyshortage4thPollution(air,water,soil)4thUnemployment5thEconomicdownturn5thLabourshortage5thInvoluntarymigrationVenezuela,BolivarianRepublicofYemen1stEconomicdownturn1stInterstatearmedconflict2ndEnergysupplyshortage2ndStatefragility3rdInflation3rdUnemployment4thStatefragility4thEnergysupplyshortage5thLabourshortage5thEconomicdownturnRiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalSourceWorldEconomicForumExecutiveOpinionSurvey2023.GlobalRisksReport2024111AppendixDRiskgovernanceRespondentswereaskedtoidentifyapproach(es)thetopglobalrisksaddressedbyselectedriskthattheyexpecttohavethemostpotentialforreductionandpreparednessapproachesthatweredrivingactiononriskreductionandpreparednessnototherwisefeaturedinChapter3:Respondingoverthenext10years.Thefollowingfigurespresenttoglobalrisks.FIGURED.1TopglobalrisksaddressedbyFinancialinstruments"Whichapproach(es)doyouexpecttohavethemostpotentialfordrivingactiononriskreductionandpreparednessoverthenext10years?"Financialinstruments(e.g.insurance,catastrophebonds,publicriskpools)Debt79%Inflation70%69%Economicdownturn69%Assetbubblebursts53%Insufficientpublicinfrastructure40%andservices38%Unemployment37%35%Disruptionstocriticalinfrastructure33%LackofeconomicopportunityChronichealthconditionsDisruptionstoasystemicallyimportantsupplychain0255075100Shareofrespondents(%)RiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalSourceNoteWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksRespondentscouldselectuptothreeresponsesfromthefollowingnineoptions:FinancialPerceptionSurvey2023-2024.instruments,Nationalandlocalregulations,Minilateraltreatiesandagreements,Globaltreatiesandagreements,Developmentassistance,corporatestrategies,Research&development,Publicawarenessandeducation,Multi-stakeholderengagement.GlobalRisksReport2024112FIGURED.2TopglobalrisksaddressedbyMinilateraltreatiesandagreements"Whichapproach(es)doyouexpecttohavethemostpotentialfordrivingactiononriskreductionandpreparednessoverthenext10years?"Minilateraltreatiesandagreements(e.g.Basel,Wassenaar,regionalfreetradeagreements)Interstatearmedconflict53%Geoeconomicconfrontation53%ConcentrationofstrategicresourcesDisruptionstoasystemically43%43%importantsupplychainBiological,chemicalornuclearhazards36%31%Involuntarymigration29%Terroristattacks27%24%Intrastateviolence24%EconomicdownturnTechnologicalpowerconcentration0255075100Shareofrespondents(%)RiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalSourceNoteWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksRespondentscouldselectuptothreeresponsesfromthefollowingnineoptions:FinancialPerceptionSurvey2023-2024.instruments,Nationalandlocalregulations,Minilateraltreatiesandagreements,Globaltreatiesandagreements,Developmentassistance,corporatestrategies,Research&development,Publicawarenessandeducation,Multi-stakeholderengagement.FIGURED.3TopglobalrisksaddressedbyDevelopmentassistance"Whichapproach(es)doyouexpecttohavethemostpotentialfordrivingactiononriskreductionandpreparednessoverthenext10years?"Developmentassistance(e.g.internationalaidfordisasterriskresponseandreduction)Involuntarymigration66%Insufficientpublic57%infrastructureandservices53%Lackofeconomicopportunity52%Non-weatherrelatednaturaldisasters52%Naturalresourceshortages46%Infectiousdiseases45%44%Chronichealthconditions43%Disruptionstocriticalinfrastructure42%ExtremeweathereventsUnemployment0255075100Shareofrespondents(%)RiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalSourceNoteWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksRespondentscouldselectuptothreeresponsesfromthefollowingnineoptions:FinancialPerceptionSurvey2023-2024.instruments,Nationalandlocalregulations,Minilateraltreatiesandagreements,Globaltreatiesandagreements,Developmentassistance,corporatestrategies,Research&development,Publicawarenessandeducation,Multi-stakeholderengagement.GlobalRisksReport2024113FIGURED.4TopglobalrisksaddressedbyPublicawarenessandeducation"Whichapproach(es)doyouexpecttohavethemostpotentialfordrivingactiononriskreductionandpreparednessoverthenext10years?"Publicawarenessandeducation(e.g.campaigns,schoolcurricula,mediaproducts)Misinformationanddisinformation86%Societalpolarization83%Erosionofhumanrights70%Chronichealthconditions61%Infectiousdiseases60%Censorshipandsurveillance60%AdverseoutcomesofAItechnologies58%54%Intrastateviolence50%Labourshortages49%Pollution0255075100Shareofrespondents(%)RiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalSourceNoteWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksRespondentscouldselectuptothreeresponsesfromthefollowingnineoptions:FinancialPerceptionSurvey2023-2024.instruments,Nationalandlocalregulations,Minilateraltreatiesandagreements,Globaltreatiesandagreements,Developmentassistance,corporatestrategies,Research&development,Publicawarenessandeducation,Multi-stakeholderengagement.FIGURED.5TopglobalrisksaddressedbyMulti-stakeholderengagement"Whichapproach(es)doyouexpecttohavethemostpotentialfordrivingactiononriskreductionandpreparednessoverthenext10years?"Multi-stakeholderengagement(e.g.platformsforexchangingknowledge,bestpractices,alignmentSocietalpolarization66%Misinformationanddisinformation54%Labourshortages53%Intrastateviolence53%Chronichealthconditions52%Biological,chemicalornuclearhazards48%Erosionofhumanrights47%AdverseoutcomesofAItechnologies46%Technologicalpowerconcentration46%Adverseoutcomesoffrontiertechnologies45%0255075100Shareofrespondents(%)RiskcategoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalSourceNoteWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksRespondentscouldselectuptothreeresponsesfromthefollowingnineoptions:FinancialPerceptionSurvey2023-2024.instruments,Nationalandlocalregulations,Minilateraltreatiesandagreements,Globaltreatiesandagreements,Developmentassistance,corporatestrategies,Research&development,Publicawarenessandeducation,Multi-stakeholderengagement.GlobalRisksReport2024114January2024GlobalRisksReport2024PartnerInstitutesTheWorldEconomicForum’sCentrefortheNewEconomyandSocietyispleasedtoacknowledgeandthankthefollowingorganizationsasitsvaluedPartnerInstitutes:AlbaniaBahrainInstituteforContemporaryStudies,TiranaBahrainEconomicDevelopmentBoardBusinessUniversityandCollegeKhalidHumaidan,ChiefExecutiveHeltonCevi,ProjectCoordinatorNadaAl-Saeed,ExecutiveDirectorArtanHoxha,PresidentofISBandAdministratorofRimaAlKilani,ExecutiveDirectorTBUFatemaAlatbi,SeniorExecutiveOltjonValisi,AssistantProjectCoordinatorSaraIshaq,SeniorExecutiveAlgeriaBangladeshCentredeRechercheEnEconomieAppliquéeCentreforPolicyDialogue-CPDPourLeDéveloppement-CREADDrFahmidaKhatun,ExecutiveDirectorYacineBelarbi,DirectorDrKhondakerGolamMoazzem,ResearchDirectorKhaledMenna,DirectorofMacroeconomicsandMsJebunnesa,ProgrammeAssociateEconomicIntegrationNishatTasnimAnika,ProgrammeAssociateAngolaBarbadosJobartisUniversityofWestIndiesJoãoFreitas,CountryManagerJonathanG.Lashley,SeniorFellowLuisVerdeja,DirectorDonMarshall,ProfessorKenishaChase,ResearchAssistantArgentinaIAEBusinessSchool,UniversidadAustralBeninEduardoFracchia,DirectorofAcademicInstitutdeRechercheEmpiriqueenEconomieDepartmentofEconomicsPolitique-IREEPMartinCalveira,ResearchEconomistLeonardWantchekon,PresidentStéphaniaHoungan,ResearchAssociateArmeniaEconomyandValuesResearchCenterBolivia(PlurinationalStateof),CostaRica,SevakHovhannisyan,BoardMemberandSeniorDominicanRepublic,ElSalvador,Honduras,AssociatePanamaINCAEBusinessSchoolAustralia,Belgium,Canada,Indonesia,Italy,RonaldArce,DirectorSweden,UnitedKingdom,UnitedStatesofEnriqueBolaños,PresidentAmericaDynataBosniaandHerzegovinaThomasHuff,SeniorProjectManagerSchoolofEconomicsandBusiness,UniversitySteffenBott,VicePresident,SalesofSarajevoValentynaChuikina,AssociateAccountDirectorJasminaSelimovic,DeanZlatkoLagumdzija,ProfessorAustriaAmraKapo,AssociateProfessorAustrianInstituteofEconomicResearch-WIFOGabrielFelbermayr,DirectorBotswanaMichaelPeneder,ProjectLeadBotswanaNationalProductivityCentreAlexandrosCharos,SurveyExpertLetsogileBatsetswe,ResearchConsultantandStatisticianBahamasZeldaOkatch,InformationandResearchServicesTheGovernmentandPublicPolicyInstitute,ManagerUniversityoftheBahamasJacobMmola,ExecutiveDirectorZhivargoLaing,ExecutiveDirectorJeannieD.Gibson,PolicyAssistantGlobalRisksReport2024115BrazilSimonMeledje,HeadofPlanningandMonitoringFundaçãoDomCabralBernadineYebleN’Guessan,ResearchofficerCarlosArruda,ProfessorofInnovationandCompetitivenessCyprusHugoTadeu,ProfessorofInnovationCyprusEmployersandIndustryConfederationMiguelCosta,ResearchAssistant-OEBRodrigoMorado,ResearchAssistantAntonisFrangoudis,DirectorBusinessDevelopmentandEconomicAffairsDepartmentBulgariaBankofCyprusCenterforEconomicDevelopmentKyriacosAntoniou,GovernanceOfficerMariaProhaska,DirectorAndreasAlexandrou,ManagerStrategyandIvalinaSimeonova,ProjectManagerCustomerInsightsCameroonCzechiaCompétitivitéCameroonCMCGraduateSchoolofBusinessHermannFotieIi,PermanentSecretaryTomášJanča,ExecutiveDirectorTanankemBelmondoVoufo,ExpertInvestmentClimateDenmarkJeanBaptisteNsoeNkouli,CompetitivenessDanishTechnologicalInstituteObservatoryExpertStigYdingSørensen,SeniorSpecialistAndreasBjerreLunkeit,ConsultantCapeVerdeINOVEResearchEcuadorFrantzTavares,ChiefExecutiveOfficerESPAEGraduateSchoolofManagement-JerónimoFreire,ProjectManagerESPOLJúlioDelgado,DirectorSaraWong,ProfessorTaniaTenesaca,ProjectCoordinatorChadXavierOrdeñana,DeanGroupedeRecherchesAlternativesEtdeMonitoringDuProjetPétrole-Tchad-CamerounEgyptSimaelMbairassem,EconomistinchargeofEgyptianCenterforEconomicStudies-ECESResearchandPublicPoliciesAblaAbdelLatif,ExecutiveDirector,andDirectorofMaoundonodjiGilbert,ManagingDirectorResearchSalmaBahaaElDin,SeniorEconomistChileAhmedMaged,ResearchAssistantUniversityAdolfoIbañezBusinessSchoolHossamKhater,ResearchAssistantRodrigoWagner,AssociateProfessorofFinanceMohamedKhater,ResearchAssistantChinaEstoniaDatawayHorizonEstonianInstituteofEconomicResearch-EKILinglingQiao,GeneralManagerMarjeJosing,DirectorYumingZhi,ResearchDirectorZhuyuYao,SeniorProjectManagerFinlandETLAResearchInstituteoftheFinnishColombiaEconomyNationalPlanningDepartmentofColombiaAkiKangasharju,ManagingDirectorJorgeIvanGonzalez,GeneralDirector,DepartmentPäiviPuonti,HeadofForecastingofNationalPlanningVilleKaitila,ResearcherMonicaLorenaOrtizMedina,TechnicalDirector,InnovationandPrivateSectorDevelopmentFranceSaraPatriciaRivera,Adviser,InnovationandPrivateBusinessFranceSectorDevelopmentCassagnesLouise,EconomistMarciasManuel,HeadofService:EconomicstudiesCongo,DemocraticRepublicoftheCongo-InvestConsultingGeorgiaTezaBilaMinlangu,AdministratorGrigolRobakidzeUniversityFailaTabuNgandi,ManagingDirectorVakhtangCharaia,DeputyRectorBertinMuderhwa,HeadofServiceinchargeTengizTaktakishvili,ExpertofStudiesandStatisticsattheFederationofGiorgiTsutskiridze,ExpertBusinessesofCongoMariamLashkhi,ProjectManagerTSUCenterforAnalysisandForecastingCôted’IvoireOtarAnguridze,HeadoftheBoardCentredePromotiondesInvestissementsenCôteD’ivoire-CEPICISolangeAmichia,CEORamatouFall,DirectorofBusinessClimateGlobalRisksReport2024116GermanyIsraelInstituteforInnovationandTechnologywithinManufacturers’AssociationofIsrael-MAItheVDI/VDEInnovation+TechnikGmbHRonTomer,PresidentMichaelNerger,ProjectLeaderRubyGinel,CEODanCatarivas,GeneralManager,ForeignTradeandGhanaInternationalRelationsDivisionAssociationofGhanaIndustriesItaiNakash,DeputyGeneralManager,ForeignYawAdu-Gyamfi,PresidentTradeandInternationalRelationsDivisionSethTwum-Akwaboah,ChiefExecutiveOfficerJohnDefor,Direcctor,PolicyandResearchJamaicaMonaSchoolofBusinessandManagement-GreeceMSBM,TheUniversityoftheWestIndies,MonaSEVHellenicFederationofEnterprisesDavidMcBean,ExecutiveDirectorMichaelMitsopoulos,Director-BusinessFranklinJohnston,DirectorEnvironmentandRegulatoryAffairsYvetteCameron-Harris,ProjectAdministratorAthanasiosPrintsipas,SeniorAdvisor-SEVJamaicaPromotionsCorporation-JAMPROBusinessCouncilforSustainableDevelopmentShuletteCox,VicePresident,Research,Advocacy,andProjectImplementationGuatemalaNationalCompetitivenessCouncilJamaicaFUNDESASharifaPowell,ConsultantProjectManagerJuanCarlosPaiz,PresidentoftheBoardofDirectorsJapanJuanCarlosZapata,ChiefExecutiveOfficerWasedaUniversityFernandoSpross,AssociateResearcherJusukeIkegami,ProfessorPriscillaGonzález,CorporateAffairsCoordinatorMitsuyoTsubayama,CoordinatorShokoMiya,CoordinatorHongKongSAR,ChinaHongKongGeneralChamberofCommerceJordanSimonNgan,Director,PolicyandResearchMinistryofPlanningandInternationalWilsonChong,SeniorEconomistCooperationHadramAlFayez,DirectorHungaryMiraMango,HeadofCompetitivenessandKOPINT-TÁRKIEconomicResearchLtdBusinessEnvironmentDivisionPeterVakhal,SeniorResearchAssociateÉvaPalócz,CEOKazakhstanCenterforStrategicInitiativesLPPIcelandOlzhasKhudaibergenov,SeniorPartnerTheIcelandicCentreforFutureStudiesYerbolTulegenov,AssociatePartnerKarlFriðriksson,ManagerDirectorSymbatAliaskarova,ConsultantIndiaKenyaLeadCapKnowledgeSolutionsPvtLtd-UniversityofNairobiLeadCapVenturesKarutiKanyinga,ResearchProfessorandDirector,SangeethVarghese,ManagingDirectorandCEOIDSVidyadharPrabhudesai,DirectorandCOOVincentMugo,ProjectAssistantIDSPaulKamau,AssociateResearchProfessor,IDSIran(IslamicRepublicof)IranChamberofCommerce,Industries,MinesKosovo,NorthMacedoniaandAgriculture-DeputyofEconomicAffairsEconomicChamberofNorth-WestMacedoniaZahraNaseri,DirectorofStatistics&EconomicalDrilonIseni,ExecutiveDirectorinformationCentreDurimZekiri,OperationsManagerHanieZiadlou,SeniorResearchAnalystMirandaAjdini,LegalassociateIraqKuwaitBaghdadEconomicForumKuwaitUniversityFarisRaheemAal-Salman,ChairmanoftheBoardFahadAl-Rashid,CommitteeChairofDirectorsAdelAl-Husainan,CommitteeMemberThabitKadhimKhudhur,ViceChairmanoftheMajedJamalAl-Deen,CommitteeMemberBoardofDirectorsKyrgyzstanIrelandEconomicPolicyInstituteIrishBusinessandEmployersConfederation-MaratTazabekov,ChairmanIBECGeraldineAnderson,HeadofResearchGlobalRisksReport2024117LaoPDRDooshalaRamjutun-Ramlaul,ManagerEnterpriseandDevelopmentConsultantsCo.Ltd-EDCMexicoBuakhaiPhimmavong,ManagingPartnerInstitutoMexicanoparalaCompetitividad-ThipphasoneInthachack,OfficeadministratorIMCOValeriaMoy,GeneralDirectorLatviaIvaniaMazari,ProgramManagerStockholmSchoolofEconomicsinRigaMinistryoftheEconomyArnisSauka,HeadoftheCentreforSustainableJorgeEduardoArreolaCavazos,GeneralDirectorDevelopmentforCompetitivenessandCompetitionCarlosRubénAltamiranoMárquez,DirectorLesothoFernandoTonatiuhParraCalvo,UnderdirectorforPrivateSectorFoundationofLesotho-PSFLCompetitivenessThaboQhesi,CEOBokangTsoanamatsie,PublicRelationsOfficerMongoliaQothoaseKhofane,ResearcherOpenSocietyForum-OSFErdenejargalPerenlei,ExecutiveDirectorLiberia,SierraLeoneOyunbadamDavaakhuu,ProgramManagerGQRDOTCOMLimited-GQROmodeleJones,ChiefExecutiveOfficerMontenegroTheInstituteforStrategicStudiesandLithuaniaPrognoses-ISSPInnovationAgencyLithuaniaMajaDrakicGrgur,ProjectCoordinatorJoneKalendiene,HeadofResearchandAnalysisVeselinVukotic,PresidentDivisionIrenaKarelina,AnalystMoroccoThePolicyCentrefortheNewSouthLuxembourgDrKarimElAynaoui,ExecutivePresidentLuxembourgChamberofCommerceAsmaaTahraoui,SeniorKnoweldgeManagerChristelChatelain,HeadofEconomicAffairsAbdelaazizAitAli,HeadEconomicsResearchSidonieParis,EconomistDepartmentAnthonyVilleneuve,EconomistNamibiaMalawiInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch-IPPRMalawiConfederationofChambersofNdapunikwaFikameni,ResearchAssociateCommerceandIndustrySalmiShigwedha,ResearchAssociateChancellorKaferapanjira,ChiefExecutiveGrahamHopwood,DirectorMadalitsoKazembe,Director,BusinessEnvironmentandPolicyAdvocacyNepalManfredMaguru,EconomicAnalystCompetitivenessandDevelopmentInstitute-ChancyMkandawire,EconomicAnalystCODEDrRameshC.Chitrakar,ProjectDirector/CountryMalaysiaCoordinatorMalaysiaProductivityCorporationAbhinandanBaniya,AssociateTeamMemberZahidIsmail,DirectorGeneralMenakaShrestha,TeamMemberWanFazlinNadiaWanOsman,DirectorProductivity&CompetitivenessDevelopmentDivisionNetherlandsAmsterdamCentreforBusinessInnovation,MaliUniversityofAmsterdamMaliAppliedandTheoreticalEconomicsHenkVolberda,DirectorandProfessorResearchGroup-GREATRickHollen,SeniorResearchAssociateMassaCoulibaly,ExecutiveDirectorRoosExterkate,ResearchAssistantWéléFatoumataBintaSow,ResearcherBadiéguéDiallo,AdministrativeandFinancialNigeriaAssistantNigerianEconomicSummitGroup-NESGLaoyeJaiyeola,ChiefExecutiveOfficerMaltaDrOlusegunOmisakin,DirectorofResearchandCompetitiveMalta-FoundationforNationalDevelopmentCompetitivenessSodikOlofin,EconomistAdrianSaid,AssociateMatthewCastillo,AssociateOmanNationalCompetitivenessOffice-NCOMauritiusDrSalimAbdullahAlShaikh,ActingChiefofNCOEconomicDevelopmentBoardJuhainaSalehAlBalushi,EconomicResearcherSanroySeechurn,HeadofDepartmentJawaherSultanAlHabsi,BusinessAnalystKenPoonoosamy,CEOGlobalRisksReport2024118PakistanSaudiArabiaMishalPakistanAlfaisalUniversityAmirJahangir,ChiefExecutiveOfficerMohammedKafaji,ViceDeanforQualityAssurancePurueshChaudhary,DirectorandAccreditationAmnaSabahatBhutta,DirectorNationalCompetitivenessCentreEimanHabbasAl-Mutairi,CEOoftheNationalParaguayCompetitivenessCentreParaguayanFoundationforCooperationandWaleedAl-Rudaian,DeputyCEOoftheNationalDevelopmentCompetitivenessCentreMartinBurt,CEOSalmanAl-Tukhaifi,GeneralmanagerLuisFernandoSanabria,CEOAbdulrahmanM.Al-Ghamdi,ProjectManagerSolUrbieta,ManagementAssistantSenegalPeruUniversitéCheikhAntaDiopofDakarIndustrialDevelopmentCenteroftheNationalThiernoThioune,DirecteurduCentredeSocietyofIndustriesRecherchesEconomiquesAppliquéesLuisTenorio,ExecutiveDirectorMariaElenaBaraybar,ProjectAssistantSerbiaBenoniSanchez,HeadofSystemsFoundationfortheAdvancementofEconomics-FRENPhilippinesAleksandarRadivojević,CoordinatorMakatiBusinessClub-MBCDejanMolnar,DirectorRoxanneLu,ProgramsDirectorTrishaTeope,ForeignProgramsOfficerSingaporeSingaporeEconomicDevelopmentBoardPolandChengWaiSan,DirectorandHeadNationalBankofPolandTeoXinyu,ExecutiveOfficer,SeniorPiotrBoguszewski,EconomicAdvisorPiotrSzpunar,DirectorSlovakiaBusinessAllianceofSlovakia-PASPortugalPeterSerina,ExecutiveDirectorBusinessAdministratorsForum-FAERobertKičina,MemberoftheBoardPauloCarmona,PresidentMarianaMarquesdosSantos,MemberoftheSloveniaBoardInstituteforEconomicResearchPROFORUMAssociationfortheDevelopmentPeterStanovnik,ProfessorofEngineeringSonjaUršič,SeniorResearchAssistantIlidioDeAyalaSerôdio,Vice-PresidentUniversityofLjubljana,FacultyofEconomicsHelenaRoquette,SecretaryMatejaDrnovšek,FullProfessorQatarSouthAfricaQatariBusinessmenAssociation-QBABusinessUnitySouthAfricaFaisalBinQassimAlThani,ChairmanTysonThamsanqaSibanda,EconomicPolicyIssaAbdullSalamAbuIssa,SecretaryGeneralManagerSarahAbdallah,DeputyGeneralManagerOlivierSerrao,EconomicPolicyExecutiveDirectorMariaJusay,ExecutiveSecretaryCasCoovadia,ChiefExecutiveOfficerRomaniaSouthKoreaAssociationforWomenEntrepreneurshipKoreaDevelopmentInstituteDevelopment-ADAFInhoSong,ExecutiveDirector,EconomicTheChamberofCommerceandIndustryofInformationandEducationCenterRomaniaJooheeCho,Head,PublicOpinionAnalysisUnitRotaruCornelia,PresidentBoyoungHan,SeniorReseachAssociate,PublicRotaruGela,BusinessAnalystOpinionAnalysisUnitSavuCristina,CommunicationExpertSpainRwandaIESEBusinessSchoolRwandaDevelopmentBoardPascualBerrone,Professor,DirectoroftheDelphineUwase,Ag.HeadofStrategyandInternationalCenterforCompetitivenessCompetitivenessDepartmentMaríaLuisaBlázquez,ResearchAssociateKennedyKalisa,StrategyAnalystRichardKayibanda,Ag.ChiefStrategyandSriLankaComplianceOfficerInstituteofPolicyStudiesofSriLanka-IPSKithminaHewage,ResearchEconomistTharinduUdayanga,ResearchAssistantGlobalRisksReport2024119SwitzerlandUnitedArabEmiratesUniversityofSt.Gallen,CenterforFinancialFederalCompetitivenessandStatisticsCentreServicesInnovationHananAhli,DirectorGeneralofFederalTobiasTrütsch,ManagingDirectorCompetitivenessandStatisticsCentreRashedAbdulkarimAlBlooshi,UndersecretaryofTaiwan,ChinaDepartmentofEconomicDevelopment,AbuDhabiTaiwanInstituteofEconomicResearchChen,Yi-Man,ResearchFellowUruguayTsuo,I-Chun,AssistantResearchFellowUniversidadORTUruguayIsidoroHodara,ProfessorTanzania,UnitedRepublicofBrunoGili,ProfessorREPOALtdFedericoMonetti,ProfessorDonaldMmari,ExecutiveDirectorLucasKatera,DirectorofCollaborationsandVenezuela,BolivarianRepublicofCapacityBuildingVenezuelanCouncilforInvestmentPromotionCornelJahari,ResearcherandFieldManagerJennynOsorio,EconomicsAffairsManagerJorgeGarcía,BusinessIntelligenceManagerThailandChulalongkornBusinessSchoolVietNamKanyarat(Lek)Sanoran,AssociateProfessorandHoChiMinhCityInstituteforDevelopmentAssistantDeanforAdministrationofDean’sOfficeStudies-HIDSWilertPuriwat,ProfessorandDeanTranHoangNgan,DirectorNatKulvanich,AssistantProfessorandAssistantTrieuThanhSon,HeadofResearchManagementDeanforPlanning&DevelopmentAffairsNguyenManhQuan,ResearcherTrinidadandTobagoYemenArthurLokJackGlobalSchoolofBusinessYemeniBusinessClub-YBCRaynardoHassanally,AlumniRelationsCoordinatorFathiAbdulwaseHayelSaeed,ChairmanBalrajKistow,ProgrammeDirectorGhadeerAhmedAlmaqhafi,ExecutiveDirectorRonSookram,AcademicCoordinatorSafaAbdullahAlsayaghi,ProjectsManagerTunisiaZambiaInstitutArabedesChefsd’EntreprisesUniversityofZambiaMajdiHassen,ExecutiveDirectorJosephSimbaya,DirectorHagerKARAA,HeadofStudiesDepartmentChitaluChamaChiliba,AssistantDirectorandSeniorResearchFellowTürkiyePatriciaFunjika,ResearchFellowTÜSIAD,SabanciUniversityCompetitivnessForum-REFZimbabweEsraDurceylanKaygusuz,DirectorNationalCompetitivenessCommissionSezenUğurluSum,ProjectSpecialistPhillipPhiri,ExecutiveDirectorBrightonShayanewako,Director,CompetitivenessUkraineDouglasMuzimba,ChiefEconomist,InternationalCASEUkraine,CenterforSocialandEconomicCompetitivenessResearchElizabethMagwaza,EconomistDmytroBoyarchuk,ExecutiveDirectorVladimirDubrovskiy,LeadingEconomistOksanaKuziakiv,SeniorAdviserGlobalRisksReport2024120AcknowledgementsContributorsEllissaCavaciuti-WishartHead,GlobalRisksSophieHeadingLead,GlobalRisksKevinKohlerSpecialist,GlobalRisksSaadiaZahidiManagingDirector,WorldEconomicForumAttheWorldEconomicForum,adebtofgratitudeisowedtoProfessorKlausSchwab(FounderandExecutiveChairman)andBørgeBrende(President),underwhoseguidancethisreporthasbeenproduced.ThisreporthasreliedheavilyonthededicationandexpertiseofWorldEconomicForumcolleagues:AttiliodiBattista,RickyLi,GayleMarkovitz,CamPowers,SamuelWerthmüller,andYannZopf.WewouldliketothankourStrategicPartners,MarshMcLennan,andZurichInsuranceGroup,andparticularlyJohnDoyle(PresidentandChiefExecutiveOfficer,MarshMcLennan)andMarioGreco(ChiefExecutiveOfficer,ZurichInsuranceGroup).ThanksalsotoPeterGiger(GroupChiefRiskOfficer,ZurichInsuranceGroup)andCarolinaKlint(ManagingDirector,RiskManagementLeaderContinentalEurope,Marsh).SpecialgratitudeisduetoJohnScott(HeadofSustainabilityRisk,ZurichInsuranceGroup)andRichardSmith-Bingham(ExecutiveDirector,MarshMcLennanAdvantage)fortheircontributionsthroughouttheplanninganddraftingofthereport.ThereporthasgreatlybenefitedfromtheinsightandexpertiseofthemembersoftheGlobalRisksReportAdvisoryBoard:RolfAlter(HertieSchoolofGovernance),AzeemAzhar(ExponentialView),AmitabhBehar(Oxfam),WinnieByanyima(UNAIDS),NitaFarahany(DukeUniversity),NiallFerguson(StanfordUniversity),Marie-ValentineFlorin(InternationalRiskGovernanceCenter),CharlesGodfray(OxfordMartinSchool),JimLeape(StanfordUniversity),RobertMuggah(IgarapéInstitute),JonathanD.Ostry(GeorgetownUniversity),CarolOuko-Misiko(InstituteofRiskManagement),EduardoPedrosa(PacificEconomicCooperationCouncil),DannyQuah(NationalUniversityofSingapore),DanielRalph(CambridgeCentreforRisksStudies),PardisSabeti(HarvardUniversity),SamirSaran(ObserverResearchFoundation),JohnScott(ZurichInsuranceGroup),RichardSmith-Bingham(MarshMcLennan),EffyVayena(SwissFederalInstituteofTechnologyZurich),CharlotteWarakaulle(CERN),AmyWebb(FutureTodayInstitute),BeatriceWederdiMauro(GraduateInstituteGeneva),NgaireWoods(UniversityofOxford),andAlexandraZapataHojel(FutureTenseNow).WewouldalsoliketothankSalesForce(JustineMoscatello,DirectorofCustomer&ExecutiveEngagement)andLovelyticsforthedesignoftheinteractiveglobalrisksdatavisualization.GlobalRisksReport2024121WearegratefultothefollowingindividualsfromourStrategicPartnersandRiskCommunities.MarshMcLennan:AmyBarnes,HelgaBirgden,KateBravery,KateBrett,StephanieBrunermer,AnthonyCharrie,JonathanCross,BrunoDotti,AngelaDuca,NicholasFaull,LornaFriedman,JasonGroves,ErickGustafson,VanessaHodge,JayminKim,AmyLaverock,MarshallLee,PaulMee,MaurizioQuintavalle,ThomasReagan,NickRobson,ReidSawyer,BenSimpfendorfer,StevenSowden,SwenjaSurminski,DanielTannebaum,RobertoVariniandRupertWatson.ZurichInsuranceGroup:PaigeAdams,ElisabethBechtold,InesBourbon,LauraCastellano,MattHolmes,GuyMiller,PavelOsipyants,DarrenRichardson,andIwanStalder.ChiefRiskOfficersCommunity:CherieAxelrod(WesternUnion),BarbaraBadoino(NovartisInternationalAG),AlisonBewick(Nestle),ChristianBluhm(UBSAG),BrendaBoultwood(InternationalMonetaryFund),VanessaCandela(Celonis),ManojChawla(EmiratesNBD),JamesCashmore(OakNorthBank),DavidCrofts(MubadalaInvestmentCompany),SusanDaniel(AbuDhabiDevelopmentalHoldingCompany),DianeDoering(TakedaPharmaceuticalCompany),MohamedDukandar(e&),AndressaDuran(Vale),AdamFarber(BostonConsultingGroup),EdFishwick(BlackRock),François-MarieGardet(Holcim),PeterGiger(ZurichInsuranceGroup),AmyGradnik(S&PGlobal),BobGraham(Deloitte),KarenGriffin(Mastercard),ArunHari(GulfInternationalBank),ErinHarris(Accenture),BahareHeywood(CliffordChanceLLP),EnricaMarra(Mundys),EugenioMontrucchio(ENEL),JodyMyers(USInternationalDevelopmentFinanceCorporation),HeikeNiebergall-Lackner(InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross),FiachreO'Neil(PayPal),SriramRamchandran(MahindraGroup),HanneRaatikainen(OfficeoftheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees),PradeepRana(FirstAbuDhabiBank),SenemRena(AydemEnerji),AndreasSchuler(Vattenfall),LakshmiShyam-Sunder(WorldBank),RichardSmith-Bingham(MarshMcLennan),IliyanaTsanova(EuropeanCommission),GaryTurner(Bain&CompanyInc),YoshihiroUotani(SOMPOHoldings),AlexVallejo(PG&E),andJacobvanderBlij(UNICEF).GlobalFutureCouncilonComplexRisks:AzeemAzhar(ExponentialView),AntoniusAlijoyo(CenterforRiskManagementandSustainability),SaifAl-Dhaheri(UAENationalEmergencyandCrisisManagementAuthority),NayefAl-Rodhan(OxfordUniversity),AbdullahiAlim(InternationalChamberofCommerce),AltaCharo(UniversityofWisconsin),LisaDonahue(AlixPartners),PeterEngelke(AtlanticCouncil),RoyaEnsafi(UniversityofMichigan),FlorenceGaub(NATODefenceCollege),MahaHosainAziz(NewYorkUniversity),VikramMansharamani(IndependentThinker),NasserbinNasser(AmbitAdvisory),MwandaPhiri(CharterCitiesInstitute),FridaPolli(Alethia)MaximeStauffer(SimonInstituteforLongtermGovernance),ArazTaeihagh(NationalUniversityofSingapore),AnnaTunkel(DPWorld),NgaireWoods(UniversityofOxford),Ya-QinZhang(TsinghuaUniversity),andMarijaZima-Bockarjova(ABB).WeextendourthankstotheInstituteofRiskManagement(IRM)(CarolOuko-MisikoandVictoriaRobinson)forsupportindisseminatingtheGRPS.Aspecialthankstoexpertswhocontributedtoourthematicconsultations:AsangaAbeyagoonasekera(TheMillenniumProject),VictoriaAlexeeva(WMO),RolfAlter(HertieSchool),LauraH.AtuestaBecerra(CentrodeInvestigaciónyDocenciaEconómica),EddaSifPindAradóttir(Carbfix),GovindasamyBala(IndianInstituteofScience),AmitabhBehar(Oxfam),RobBeyer(IOM),JanaBirner(UNHCR),ChristelleCastet(AXA),PamelaChan(BlackRock),AltaCharo(UniversityofWisconsin),PedroConceição(UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme),JaradDaniels(GlobalCCSInstitute),ReenaDayal(QuantumEcosystemsandTechnologyCouncilofIndia),GabrielDemombynes(WorldBank),SteveDurbin(InformationSecurityForum),JibuElias(INDIAai),CathyFoley(AustralianGovernment),ChristineEriksen(UniversityofBerne),KevinEsvelt(MIT),PaulFreemont(ImperialCollege),CarlFrey(UniversityofOxford),UmbertoFugiglando(MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology),PascaleFungGlobalRisksReport2024122(HongKongUniversityofScienceandTechnology),AlexisGoosdeel(EuropeanMonitoringCentreforDrugsandDrugAddiction),TobiasGrimm(MunichRe),JoyeetaGupta(UniversityofAmsterdam),GonzaloGuzman(Unilever),KarenHarris(Bain&Company),KatharineHayhoe(TexasTechUniversity),PerHeggenes(IKEAFoundation),LennartHeim(CentrefortheGovernanceofAI),JackHidary(SandboxAQ),ClementJeanjean(SandboxAQ),BryanJones(BaruchCollege),AlexKjaerum(DanishRefugeeCouncil),AndrewLenton(CSIRO),TimLenton(UniversityofExeter),JürgLuterbacher(WMO),KeerthanaMainkar(Infosys),OttiliaAnnaMaunganidze(InstituteforSecurityStudies),JamesMcMahon(TheClimateService),RemiMeynadier(AXA),PiersMillett(NuclearThreatInitiative),RobertMuggah(IgarapéInstitute),NasserbinNasser(AmbitAdvisory),GeorgePerkovich(CarnegieEndowmentforPeace),HughPossingham(UniversityofQueensland),EdsonPresteseSilvaJúnior(FederalUniversityofRioGrandedoSul),DanielRalph(UniversityofCambridge),PeterReuter(UniversityofMaryland),JohanRockström(PotsdamInstituteforClimateImpactResearch),PardisSabeti(HarvardUniversity),SamirSaran(ObserverResearchFoundation),AndreasSchaal(OECD),RodSchoonover(EcologicalFuturesGroup),AnishShah(MahindraGroup),HershShah(InstituteofRiskManagement,India),AsmaaShalabi(UnitedNations),AlexdeSherbinin(ColumbiaUniversity),CheSidanius(Refinitiv),MaxSmeets(ETHZurich),DanSmith(StockholmInternationalPeaceResearchInstitute),RobertSpeight(CSIRO),RistoUuk(FutureofLifeInstitute)KarinvonHippel(RoyalUnitedServicesInstitute),GailWhiteman(UniversityofExeter),MicheleWucker(GrayRhino&Company),SamYarosh(SandboxAQ).Thisreporthasreliedontheexpertiseofourcolleagueswhocontributedtoourthematicconsultations:TatianaAguilar,KhalidAlaamer,ThomAlmeida,SiljaBaller,DerekBaraldi,ShyamBishen,MatthewBlake,JoannaBouckaert,ShreyaBose,CharlotteBoutboul,SebastianBuckup,HelenBurdett,MarioCanales,AndrewCaruanaGalizia,LimingChen,AengusCollins,RobertoCrotti,DanielDobrygowski,SeanDoherty,SeánDoyle,GenesisElhussein,TariniFernando,TalGoldstein,PedroGomez,JackHurd,DavidHyde,AkshayJoshi,ArielKastner,NikolaiKhylstov,AoifeKirk,AndrejKirn,ConnieKuang,SimonLacey,BenjaminLarsen,CathyLi,EneidaLicaj,SriharshaMasabathula,JeffMerritt,HelenMillman,HalehNazeri,GimHuayNeo,DerekO’Halloran,KirstyPaine,NatašaPerucica,VanessaRacloz,NicolaiRuge,ArunimaSakar,SupheakmungkolSarin,TaniaStrauss,KyriakosTriantafyllidis,ReneeVanHeusden,LuciaVelasco,JoeWegener,RoddyWeller,andEricWhite.Wearegratefultothefollowingcolleaguesfortheirtimeandhelpinreview:AgustinaCallegari,GillEinhorn,SamGrayling,ElselotHasselaar,SeanDoyle,AkshayJoshi,KaterynaKarunska,BenjaminLarsen,IsabelleLeliaert,AndrewSilva,andStefficaWarwick.Inadditiontothosementionedabove,weextendourthankstothefollowingcolleagues:CharlotteBeale,SakshiBhatnagar,AnnaBruce-Lockhart,BeatriceDiCaro,KaterynaGordiychuk,JamieMathewJohn,EoinÓCathasaigh,RobinPomeroy,JuliaRignot,andKirstenSalyer.DesignandProduction:Thankyoutoallthoseinvolvedinthedesignandproductionofthisyear’sreportandrelatedassets:DavideBruno,MikeFisher,FlorisLandi,PietroGuineaMontalvo,JacopoPoletto,andJean-PhilippeStanway.Coverimage:TomBarrett,Unsplash.GlobalRisksReport2024123
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