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STATE OF CLIMATE

ACTION 2023

About the Authors

Lead Authors: Sophie Boehm, Louise Jeffery, Judit Hecke, Clea Schumer, Joel Jaeger, Claire Fyson, and Kelly Levin

Chapter Authors:

• Methodology: Joel Jaeger, Sophie Boehm, Judit Hecke, Clea Schumer, and Louise Jeffery

• Power: Jason Collis, Marie-Charlotte Geffray, Clea Schumer, Joel Jaeger, and Claire Fyson

• Buildings: Emily Daly and Louise Jeffery

• Industry: Anna Nilsson, Neelam Singh, and Maeve Masterson

• Transport: Stephen Naimoli, Sebastian Castellanos, Judit Hecke, Michael Petroni, and Joel Jaeger

• Forests and Land: Sophie Boehm, Michelle Sims, and Emma Grier

• Food and Agriculture: Richard Waite, Raychel Santo, and Mulubrhan Balehegn

• Technological Carbon Removal: Katie Lebling and Claire Fyson

• Finance: Joe Thwaites and Anderson Lee

GHG Emissions Dataset: William Lamb

SUGGESTED CITATION

Boehm, S., L. Jeffery, J. Hecke, C. Schumer, J. Jaeger, C. Fyson, K. Levin, A. Nilsson, S. Naimoli, E. Daly, J. Thwaites, K. Lebling, R.

Waite, J. Collis, M. Sims, N. Singh, E. Grier, W. Lamb, S. Castellanos, A. Lee, M. Geffray, R. Santo, M. Balehegn, M. Petroni, and

M. Masterson. 2023. State of Climate Action 2023. Berlin and Cologne, Germany, San Francisco, CA, and Washington, DC:

Bezos Earth Fund, Climate Action Tracker, Climate Analytics, ClimateWorks Foundation, NewClimate Institute, the United

Nations Climate Change High-Level Champions, and World Resources Institute. https://doi.org/10.46830/wrirpt.23.00010.

DESIGN

Jenna Park

STATE OF CLIMATE ACTION 2023 | II

Acknowledgments

This report was made possible by the generous nancial contributions and thought leadership from the Bezos Earth

Fund, the Center for Global Commons, ClimateWorks Foundation, the Global Commons Alliance, and the Global

Environment Facility.

Published under Systems Change Lab, this report is a joint effort between the Bezos Earth Fund, Climate Action Tracker,

Climate Analytics, ClimateWorks Foundation, NewClimate Institute, the United Nations Climate Change High-Level

Champions, and World Resources Institute.

The authors would like to acknowledge the following for their guidance, critical reviews, and research support:

• The report beneted not only from ClimateWorks Foundation’s nancial support but also from the work of the

Foundation’s Global Intelligence team, particularly Dan Plechaty and Surabi Menon, who played pivotal roles in

conceiving the idea for the analysis and providing technical support throughout the research, writing, and peer

review process.

• Bill Hare from Climate Analytics, Niklas Höhne, Hanna Fekete, and Takeshi Kuramochi from NewClimate Institute, and

Laura Malaguzzi Valeri, Taryn Fransen, and Rachel Jetel from WRI all provided valuable conceptual inputs, review, and

strategic guidance.

• Members of the United Nations Climate Change High-Level Champions team, including Frances Way, Jen Austin, and

Emmanuelle Pinault provided critical thought leadership and insights.

• Nigel Topping, Yuke Kirana, Sarah Cassius, Thet Hen Tun, Chris Malins, and Liz Goldman all made substantive contri-

butions to the report.

We would also like to thank the report’s reviewers who have shared their time, expertise, and insights:

Aki Kachi, Alessia Mortara, Alex Perera, Andrew Steer, Andy Jarvis, Anjali Mahendra, Ankita Gangotra, Anna Stratton,

Arief Wijaya, Arijit Sen, Åsa Ekdahl, Audrey Nugent, Baysa Naran, Beatriz Granziera, Benjamin Wagenvoort, Bradford Willis,

Caitlin Swalec, Carolina Herrera, Catherine Mcfarlane, Chhavi Maggu, Christa Anderson, Clara Cho, Clare Broadbent,

Claudia Adriazola-Steil, Claudio Lubis, Clay Nesler, Dan Lashof, Dan Plechaty, Daniel Firth, Daniel Moser, Daniel Rath,

Dave Jones, David Gibbs, Dede Sulaeman, Deepak Krishnan, Eileen Torres, Ekin Birol, Emmanuelle Pinault, Frances Way,

Francesco Pavan, Franziska Schreiber, Franziska Tanneberger, Fred Stolle, Frederic Hans, Fridolin Krausmann, Gaia Larsen,

Guncha Munjal, Haldane Dodd, Hanna Fekete, Ignace Beguin Billecocq, Ilmi Granoff, Jacob Teter, Jennifer Skene,

STATE OF CLIMATE ACTION 2023 | III

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STATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023AbouttheAuthorsLeadAuthors:SophieBoehm,LouiseJeffery,JuditHecke,CleaSchumer,JoelJaeger,ClaireFyson,andKellyLevinChapterAuthors:•Methodology:JoelJaeger,SophieBoehm,JuditHecke,CleaSchumer,andLouiseJeffery•Power:JasonCollis,Marie-CharlotteGeffray,CleaSchumer,JoelJaeger,andClaireFyson•Buildings:EmilyDalyandLouiseJeffery•Industry:AnnaNilsson,NeelamSingh,andMaeveMasterson•Transport:StephenNaimoli,SebastianCastellanos,JuditHecke,MichaelPetroni,andJoelJaeger•ForestsandLand:SophieBoehm,MichelleSims,andEmmaGrier•FoodandAgriculture:RichardWaite,RaychelSanto,andMulubrhanBalehegn•TechnologicalCarbonRemoval:KatieLeblingandClaireFyson•Finance:JoeThwaitesandAndersonLeeGHGEmissionsDataset:WilliamLambSUGGESTEDCITATIONBoehm,S.,L.Jeffery,J.Hecke,C.Schumer,J.Jaeger,C.Fyson,K.Levin,A.Nilsson,S.Naimoli,E.Daly,J.Thwaites,K.Lebling,R.Waite,J.Collis,M.Sims,N.Singh,E.Grier,W.Lamb,S.Castellanos,A.Lee,M.Geffray,R.Santo,M.Balehegn,M.Petroni,andM.Masterson.2023.StateofClimateAction2023.BerlinandCologne,Germany,SanFrancisco,CA,andWashington,DC:BezosEarthFund,ClimateActionTracker,ClimateAnalytics,ClimateWorksFoundation,NewClimateInstitute,theUnitedNationsClimateChangeHigh-LevelChampions,andWorldResourcesInstitute.https://doi.org/10.46830/wrirpt.23.00010.DESIGNJennaParkSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023iiAcknowledgmentsThisreportwasmadepossiblebythegenerousfinancialcontributionsandthoughtleadershipfromtheBezosEarthFund,theCenterforGlobalCommons,ClimateWorksFoundation,theGlobalCommonsAlliance,andtheGlobalEnvironmentFacility.PublishedunderSystemsChangeLab,thisreportisajointeffortbetweentheBezosEarthFund,ClimateActionTracker,ClimateAnalytics,ClimateWorksFoundation,NewClimateInstitute,theUnitedNationsClimateChangeHigh-LevelChampions,andWorldResourcesInstitute.Theauthorswouldliketoacknowledgethefollowingfortheirguidance,criticalreviews,andresearchsupport:•ThereportbenefitednotonlyfromClimateWorksFoundation’sfinancialsupportbutalsofromtheworkoftheFoundation’sGlobalIntelligenceteam,particularlyDanPlechatyandSurabiMenon,whoplayedpivotalrolesinconceivingtheideafortheanalysisandprovidingtechnicalsupportthroughouttheresearch,writing,andpeerreviewprocess.•BillHarefromClimateAnalytics,NiklasHöhne,HannaFekete,andTakeshiKuramochifromNewClimateInstitute,andLauraMalaguzziValeri,TarynFransen,andRachelJetelfromWRIallprovidedvaluableconceptualinputs,review,andstrategicguidance.•MembersoftheUnitedNationsClimateChangeHigh-LevelChampionsteam,includingFrancesWay,JenAustin,andEmmanuellePinaultprovidedcriticalthoughtleadershipandinsights.•NigelTopping,YukeKirana,SarahCassius,ThetHenTun,ChrisMalins,andLizGoldmanallmadesubstantivecontri-butionstothereport.Wewouldalsoliketothankthereport’sreviewerswhohavesharedtheirtime,expertise,andinsights:AkiKachi,AlessiaMortara,AlexPerera,AndrewSteer,AndyJarvis,AnjaliMahendra,AnkitaGangotra,AnnaStratton,AriefWijaya,ArijitSen,ÅsaEkdahl,AudreyNugent,BaysaNaran,BeatrizGranziera,BenjaminWagenvoort,BradfordWillis,CaitlinSwalec,CarolinaHerrera,CatherineMcfarlane,ChhaviMaggu,ChristaAnderson,ClaraCho,ClareBroadbent,ClaudiaAdriazola-Steil,ClaudioLubis,ClayNesler,DanLashof,DanPlechaty,DanielFirth,DanielMoser,DanielRath,DaveJones,DavidGibbs,DedeSulaeman,DeepakKrishnan,EileenTorres,EkinBirol,EmmanuellePinault,FrancesWay,FrancescoPavan,FranziskaSchreiber,FranziskaTanneberger,FredStolle,FredericHans,FridolinKrausmann,GaiaLarsen,GunchaMunjal,HaldaneDodd,HannaFekete,IgnaceBeguinBillecocq,IlmiGranoff,JacobTeter,JenniferSkene,STATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023iiiAcknowledgments(CONTINUED)JinleiFeng,JonBaines,JorenVerschaeve,JoshMiller,KaranKochhar,KarlHausker,KateMackenzie,KatharinePalmer,KatieO’Gara,KatieReytar,KellyCarlin,KemenAustin,LaurenUrbanek,LaurensSpeelman,LenaBrook,LeonardoCollina,LindseySloat,LoriBird,LucianoCaratori,LuisMartinez,MatthewBlack,MattIves,MaxÅhman,MelanieBrusseler,MikaelaWeisse,MohamedHegazy,NandiniDas,NataliaAlayza,NataliePelekh,NathandeArriba-Sellier,NickMurray,NicoleIseppi,NigelTopping,NikolaMedimorec,NoëlBakhtian,OlafErenstein,OliviaWessendorff,PaigeLanger,PaulBodnar,PaulineGuerecheau,PeteBunting,PrashanthGururaja,RebeccaBrooks,RexDeighton-Smith,RobinChase,SagarikaChatterjee,SameenKhan,ShivakumarKuppuswamy,SiddharthJoshi,SoojinKim,StephenRichardson,SwatiHegde,TakeshiKuramochi,TarynFransen,TeodylNkuintchua,TristanSmith,ValentinVogl,VéroniqueFeypell,WillWild,WilliamLamb,YukiNumata,ZacharyByrum,andZarrarKhan.TheauthorsaregratefultoWRIcolleaguesfortheirsupportintheproductionofthereport,includingadministrativeassistance,editing,graphicdesign,andlayout:RomainWarnault,CathlineNagel,MaryLevine,ReneePineda,andKathySchalch.IreneBerman-Vaporis,BrynneWilcox,RhysGerholdt,VictoriaFischdick,CindyBaxter,PaulMay,ClairePfitzinger,RocíoLower,StaciePaxtonCobos,AliciaCypress,SaraStaedicke,SarahParsons,AlisonCinnamond,NateShelter,CaseySkeens,TimLau,andFabioScaffidi-Argentinaalsoprovidedinvaluablecommunicationsandoutreachsupport.WRIisalsopleasedtoacknowledgetheinstitutionalstrategicpartners,whoprovidecorefundingtotheInstitute:theNetherlandsMinistryofForeignAffairs,theRoyalDanishMinistryofForeignAffairs,andtheSwedishInternationalDevelopmentCooperationAgency.STATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023ivContentsACKNOWLEDGMENTS..............................................iiiFOREWORD.......................................................viEXECUTIVESUMMARY..............................................11.METHODOLOGYFORASSESSINGPROGRESS........................182.POWER........................................................263.BUILDINGS.....................................................414.INDUSTRY.....................................................585.TRANSPORT....................................................756.FORESTSANDLAND............................................997.FOODANDAGRICULTURE.......................................1228.TECHNOLOGICALCARBONREMOVAL.............................1419.FINANCE......................................................15010.CONCLUSION.................................................171APPENDICES.....................................................175ENDNOTES......................................................190REFERENCES.....................................................197STATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023vForewordWefacetwoseeminglyirreconcilabletruthsThisyear’sreportseekstoanswerthreequestions.Whatintoday’sbattleagainstclimatechange.doesthelatestclimatescienceindicateisrequiredforeachsectoroftheeconomy?Howisourcollectiveperfor-First,wearedeepintheclimateemergency.Thismancestackingupagainstthese1.5°C-alignedtargets?year’sStateofClimateActionfindsthatonlyoneoftheAndwhereareweseeingpositiveexponentialchangethat42indicatorsofsectoralclimateactionassessed—thewecanbuildon?shareofelectricvehiclesinpassengercarsales—isontracktomeetits2030target.ProgressfallswoefullyThesefindingsontheStateofClimateActioncomeatshortacrosstheboard.Forexample,coalneedstobeapivotalmoment.Thisyear,asthefirstGlobalStocktakephasedoutofelectricitygenerationseventimesfasterundertheParisAgreementculminatesatCOP28,worldthanrecentrates,andtheannualrateofdeforestationleadersmustrecognizetheinsufficientprogresstodate–equivalentto15footballfieldsperminutein2022-andchartapathforwardthatbuildsonthesuccessesneedstobereducedfourtimesfaster.It’snosurprisewe’reseeing.ThismomentshouldserveasaspringboardthatJuly’sglobaltemperaturewasthehighestmonthlyforacceleratedactionstomitigateclimatechange,temperaturein120,000yearsasaresult.Orthatwildfires,includingforequitablyphasingoutfossilfuelsandscalingtorrentialrainandmarineheatwavesarebecomingrenewableenergy,transformingfoodsystemswhilehaltingmorevisible,withvulnerablecommunitiesandGlobalandreversingdeforestation,enhancingadaptationandSouthcountriesdisproportionatelyaffected.Overall,therespondingtolossesanddamages,andscalingandclimateimpactsandtrendswe’vewitnessedin2023shiftingfinance.havebeenawake-upcall—evenmorealarmingthanmanyclimatescientistspreviouslyforecasted.AndTransformationalchangecantakeoffbutwillnotearlyindicationsarethatcarbondioxidelevelsin2023happenautomatically,especiallyincountriesandwillbeatrecordlevels,attheverytimetheyshouldbecommunitiesthatlackenoughresourcesandtechnicalsteeplydeclining.capacity.Suchtransitionsmustbenurturedbyleadership,smartpoliciesandincentives,innovation,stronginstitu-Second,weareseeingspectaculargainsthataresur-tions,andchangesinbehaviorandvalues.Whiledifficult,prisingevenoptimists.Justinthelasttwelvemonths,newacceleratingthesechanges—anddoingsoequitably—isdevelopmentshavebeenoutstrippingtheexpectationsnotimpossible.Andalthoughtheclimatecrisiscontinuesofexpertsfromevenafewyearsago.Today,utility-scaletointensify,thefuturewillbedecidedbyus.solarphotovoltaicsandonshorewindarethecheapestoptionsforelectricitygenerationinthelargemajorityofIt’snottoolate.countries.Andglobalrenewablecapacityadditionsarelikelytoincreasebyathirdthisyear–thelargestannualH.E.RazanAlMubarakincreaseever.ElectriccarmarketsareseeingexponentialUNClimateChangeHigh-LevelChampionfromthegrowth,comprising10%ofallnewcarssoldbeingin2022,COP28Presidencyupfrom1.6%in2018.PreliminarysatellitedatafromBrazil’snationalspaceagencyindicatethatdeforestationfellAniDasguptabyover30percentduringPresidentLula’sfirstsixmonthsPresidentandCEO,WorldResourcesInstituteinoffice.Globalsalesofheatpumpswitnessedanotheryearofdouble-digitgrowth,withsalesinEuropegrowingBillHarebyalmost40%.AndthankstothepassageoftheInfla-CEO,ClimateAnalyticstionReductionActintheUnitedStates,companiesareannouncinghundredsofcleanenergymanufacturingNiklasHöhnefacilities,turbochargingbatteryandelectricvehiclepro-NewClimateInstituteductionandcreatingtensofthousandsofnewjobs.TheseexamplesshowthatrapidchangetoaddressclimateRachelJetelchangeispossible.Co-Director,SystemsChangeLab,WorldResourcesInstituteWemustfacetheseseeminglyinconsistenttruthstogether.BothrealitiesexplainwhypeoplecanfindKellyLevinthemselvesfeelingradicallyoptimisticorpessimistic.ButCo-Director,SystemsChangeLab,BezosEarthFundwemustembraceboth:ourcollectivefailuretoaddressclimatechangethusfar,aswellasourexponentialMahmoudMohieldinprogressinsomesectors.ThewindowtoreachourclimateUNClimateChangeHigh-LevelChampionfromthegoalsisrapidlyclosing,butwehavelearnedthatmanyofCOP27Presidencythesolutionsweneedcanspreadevenmorequicklythanwepreviouslyimagined.Ofcourse,thisisonlytrueifweHelenMountfordfullydedicateourselvestothechallengeathand.PresidentandCEO,ClimateWorksFoundationAndrewSteerPresidentandCEO,BezosEarthFundSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023viiExecutiveSummaryAtthe28thConferenceoftheParties(COP28),Highlightstheworldcanjump-startanurgentlyneededcoursecorrectiononclimatechangeasParties•TosupporttheGlobalStocktake,thisreporttrans-respondtofindingsfromthefirstGlobalStocktake.AsthecruxoftheParisAgreement’smechanismforlatestheParisAgreement’stemperaturelimitintoratchetingupambition,thisprocessoffersleaders1.5°C-alignedtargetsacrosssectorsandoffersafrankacrossgovernment,civilsociety,andtheprivatesectorassessmentofrecentprogresstowardthem.thechancenotonlytoissueareportcardonimplemen-tationoftheParisAgreementthusfar,includingprogress•Thissectoralreportcardshowsthattransformationsmadeinlimitingglobalwarmingto1.5°C,butalsotoprovidearoadmapforcombattingthiscrisis.Thesearenotoccurringattherequiredpaceandscale.sameleaderscanthenresponddecisivelytotheGlobalOnly1of42indicatorsassessed—theshareofelectricStocktake’sfindingsbymakingconcretecommitmentsvehiclesinpassengercarsales—isontracktoreachatCOP28that,together,serveasapowerfulspringboardits2030target.Andwhilechangeisheadingintheforgreaterambitionandmoreimmediateclimaterightdirectionfornearlythree-quartersoftheindica-action.Governments,forexample,canstartbynegotiat-tors,thepaceremainspromisingbutinsufficientforingadecisionthatprioritizescriticalmitigationactions6andatwellbelowtherequiredspeedforanotherthisdecade,suchasphasingoutunabatedfossilfuelsin24.For6,recenttrendsareheadinginthewrongelectricitygeneration,haltingdeforestationanddeg-directionentirely,anddataareinsufficienttoevaluateradation,andshiftingtozero-carbontransportation.Atheremaining5.successfulStocktakeshouldalsoinformthenextroundofnationallydeterminedcontributions(NDCs)in2025,•Butevenwhenchangeisheadingintherightdirec-promptingcountriestostrengthenexistingeconomy-wideandsector-specifictargetsfor2030,aswellassettion,gettingontrackfor2030willrequireanenormousnewonesfor2035andbeyond.accelerationineffort.Coal-firedpower,forexample,needstobephasedoutseventimesfaster.Defor-Failuretoseizethismomentanddramaticallyaccel-estationratesmustdeclinefourtimesfaster.Anderateambitiousclimateactionacrossallsectorswillincreasesintheratioofinvestmentinlow-carbonexactahighprice,withfar-reachingconsequencesfortofossilfuelenergysupplyneedtooccurmorethanalllifeonEarth.Inmodeledpathwaysthatlimitglobaltentimesfaster.temperatureriseto1.5°Cwithnoorlimitedovershoot,greenhousegas(GHG)emissionspeakimmediately•Progressmadeinadoptingzero-carbontechnolo-andby2025atthelatest,andthendeclinebyamedianof43percentby2030and60percentby2035,relativegies—solarandwindpower,heatpumps,andelectricto2019.Carbondioxide(CO2)emissions,specifically,vehicles,forexample—showsthat,fortunately,rapid,reachnetzerobymidcentury(IPCC2022b,2023).Yet,nonlinearchangeisnotonlypossiblebutalreadyinpractice,human-causedGHGemissionscontinueunderwayinsomesectors.Andthisassessmenttorise,increasingnearly10percentrelativeto2010andaccountsforsuchchange.50percentrelativeto1990(Minxetal.2021;EuropeanCommissionandJRC2022).In2019,theyreachedan•Nearlyhalfwaythroughthisdecisivedecade,leadersall-timehigh,withtheconsumptionpatternsoftheworld’shighest-earninghouseholdsaccountingformustpickupthepaceandshiftintoemergencyadisproportionatelylargeshareofemissions(IPCCmode.Theymustnurturerapid,nonlineargrowth,2022b).Andwiththecurrent1.1°Cofglobaltemperatureaccelerateprogress,andexpandmuch-neededrise,climatechangeisalreadywreakinghavocacrosssupporttoallsectors,especiallythoselaggingtheplanet—drivingtemperaturestoextremes,rapidlyfurthestbehind.meltingglaciersandicesheets,fuelingrecord-breakingwarmingintheocean,andsuperchargingdroughts,Changingcoursetolimitwarmingto1.5°Cwillrequirefloods,wildfires,andcyclones.Thesechangeshavetheworldtoovercomebarriersthatstillstandinbroughtdevastatingimpactstocommunitiesaroundthewayoftransitioningtoanet-zerofutureamidatheworld,oftenundermininghard-wondevelopmentrapidlychanginggeopoliticallandscape.Powerfulgains,andeveryfractionofadegreeofwarmingwillvestedinterests—fromfossilfuelindustrylobbyiststointensifythesethreats,particularlytothemorethanmultinationalagriculturalcorporations—stilldefend3billionpeoplelivinginhighlyvulnerablecountries.theemissions-intensivestatusquo.InvestmentsinEventemporarilyovershootingtheParisAgreement’stheresearchanddevelopmentofmorenascent1.5°Climit,forexample,willleadtomuchmoresevere,zero-carbontechnologiesremainfartoolow.Andmanyoftentimesirreversible,impacts(IPCC2022a).countrieshaveyettoadoptthesupportivepoliciesneededtoacceleratesectoraltransformations(BoehmExecutiveSummarySTATEOFCLIMATEACTION20232etal.2022).Atthesametime,Russia’sinvasionofUkraineglobally,withworldwideinvestmentsinlow-carboncontinuestochallengediplomacy,reshapegeopolitics,energysupplyexceedingthoseinfossilfuelsforthefirstandcomplicatemultilateraleffortstomitigateclimatetimein2022(IEA2023m).2change(IEA2023p).ThewarhasalsointensifiedtheglobalfoodcrisisbydisruptingagriculturalproductionAgrowingbodyofevidencealsoshowsthat,withacrosstheworld’sbreadbasket,Ukrainiangrainexports,supportivepolicies,rapid,nonlinearchangeisalreadyandfertilizertrade.Subsequentrisesinfoodpriceshaveoccurringinsomesectorsandregions.Overthelasthithardestthoselivinginpoverty,particularlyinlow-fiveyears,theshareofelectricvehicles(EVs)inlight-dutyandmiddle-incomecountries(GlauberandLabordevehiclesaleshasgrownexponentiallyatanaverage2023).CoupledwiththeburdenofacostlyCOVID-19annualrateof65percent—upfrom1.6percentofsalesrecovery,thiscataclysmofrecenteventsposessignif-in2018to10percentofsalesin2022(IEA2023e).Intheicantobstaclestoclimateaction,effectivelysappingpastdecade,powergenerationcostshavedeclined80governmentspendingandsaddlingmanycountriespercentforsolarphotovoltaics(PV)and65percentforwithrecord-highdebt,inflation,andinterestratesonshorewind(IRENA2023b),makingthesetechnologies(Wheatley2023).thecheapestsourcesofnew-buildelectricitygener-ationforatleasttwo-thirdsoftheglobalpopulationFortunately,theseobstaclesaresurmountable,and(BloombergNEF2020).Andthepriceofbatterystorage,recentyearshavewitnessedsignificantaction,partic-atechnologythatenablesgreateradoptionofmanyularlyamongmajoremitters.Althoughsomecountriesrenewablepowersources,alsodroppedby89percenthavereopenedfossilfuelplantsfollowingRussia’sinva-between2010and2021(BloombergNEF2022a).ThesesionofUkraine,othershaveusedthisexogenousshockbrightspotsshowthat,undertherightconditions,asajustificationtoincreaseinvestmentsinzero-carbonchangecantakeoff.Expandingsuchprogresstoalltechnologiesinpursuitofenergy-independentfutures.1sectorswillrequireleaderstoprioritizesupportiveTheEuropeanUnion,forexample,installedrecordregulationsandincentives,investmentsininnovationamountsofwindandsolarin2022andacceleratedandinscalingexistingsolutions,courageousleadership,efficiencyimprovementsandheatpumpinstallations,institutionalstrengthening,andbehaviorchangeandallofwhichhavecontributedtorapiddeclinesinfossilshiftsinsocialnorms.fueldemand(EwenandBrown2023;Zeniewskietal.2023).ChinaispoisedtomeetitsrenewableenergyAlthoughthewindowofopportunitytolimitwarmingcapacitytargetsfor2030,asmuchasfiveyearsearlyto1.5°Cisnarrowing,achievingthisParisAgreement(GEM2023c);in2022,itspentnearlyUS$550billionongoalisstilltechnicallyfeasible—andthebenefitszero-andlow-carbontechnologies—almostasmuchasofsecuringthisfutureareenormous.CuttingGHGthecombinedinvestmentsmadebyallothercountriesemissionscanserveasafirstlineofdefensebyhelp-inthatsameyear(BloombergNEF2023b).AndtheUnitedingtoreducethefrequencyandseverityofimpactsStatesrecentlypassedtheInflationReductionAct,whichtowhichvulnerablecommunitiesaroundtheworldwillprovidemorethan$370billion(andupto$1.2trillion,mustadapt,aswellasminimizingsome(thoughnotwiththerangedrivenbyuncertaintyoverhowmuchall)lossesanddamages.Mitigatingclimatechange,ataxcreditswillbeclaimed)over10yearstoprojectsthatdirectdriverofbiodiversityloss,canalsolowertheriskofreduceGHGemissionsandenhancecarbonremoval—irreversibleecosystemlossanddegradation.Andwhenthelargestinvestmentinclimateandenergyintheimplementedappropriately,thesesamemeasurescountry’shistory(WhiteHouse2023;Jiangetal.2022;cangenerateawiderangeofbenefitstosustainableGoldmanSachs2023).Suchmomentumisalsogrowingdevelopment,suchasimprovedairquality,increasedExecutiveSummarySTATEOFCLIMATEACTION20233accesstocleanenergy,diversifiedlivelihoods,andlivelihoods,intensifyfoodinsecurity,andundermineenhancedfoodsecurity(IPCC2022b).Whenconsideringeffortstoeliminatepovertyifimplementedinappro-thealternative,thesebenefitsofclimateactioncannotpriately.Andsomeclimatepolicies,suchascarbonbeoverstated.taxes,canberegressiveiftheydon’tincludeprovisionstooffsetincreasedcostsforlow-incomecommunities.JusticeandequitymusttakecenterstageinglobalFortunately,manymeasuresexisttosupportajusteffortstoacceleratesectoraltransformations.Thetransitionandhelpensurethatnooneisleftbehindasbenefitsreapedfromlimitingwarmingto1.5°Cmusttheworldmovestowardafutureofnet-zeroemissions.besharedequitably,andachievingthisgoal,inlargepart,willrequirethatthoseimpactedbythesechangesAboutthisreporthavethepowertoshapedecision-makingprocesses.Itwillalsodependontherapidscale-upofclimateTosupporttheGlobalStocktakeprocess,theStateoffinance,particularlyfundingfordevelopingcountries.ClimateActionseriestranslatestheParisAgreement’sWithoutadditional,accessible,andhigh-qualityfinance,1.5°Ctemperaturelimitintosectoraltargetsandthesecountrieswilllikelystruggletoimplementmiti-providesaroadmapthatleaderscanfollowtohelpgationmeasuresandsecurethebenefits—bothlocalclosetheGHGemissionsgap.BuildingonCAT(2020a,andglobal—oflimitingwarmingto1.5°C.Yetwealthy2020b,2023a),Leblingetal.(2020),Boehmetal.(2021,countries’deliveryoninternationalclimatefinancecom-2022),andClimateAnalytics(2023),thisfourthinstall-mitmentsremainsfarbehind(OECD2022a;Songweetal.mentfeatures1.5°C-alignedtargetsprimarilyfor20302022).Effortstomitigateclimatechangewillalsocreateand2050,aswellasassociatedindicators,forpower,newchallenges(IPCC2022b).Retiringcoal-firedpowerbuildings,industry,transport,forestsandland,andfoodplants,forexample,risksdisplacingworkers,disruptingandagriculturethattheliteraturesuggestsareamonglocaleconomies,andreconfiguringthesocialfabricofthebestavailabletomonitorsectoralclimatemitiga-communities.ReforestationeffortsmayalsoharmlocalFIGUREES-1GlobalnetanthropogenicGHGemissionsbysectorin2021ElectricityandheatOilandgas14.4fugitiveemissions2.5Other1.6Coalminingfugitiveemissions1.5EnergyPetroleumrefining20.70.7Non-CO2(allbuildings)WasteLanduse,0.04land-use2.4change,Nonresidentialandforestry0.8GlobalGHGAgriculture,Emissionsforestry,4.0Rail56.8GtCO2eandother0.1ResidentialBuildingslandusesEnteric2.33.2fermentationInlandshipping10.40.2Transport3.0Managed8.1DomesticaviationManagedsoilsand0.3soilsandpasturepastureInternational1.4aviation1.40.4Industry12.0Other0.5RoadOtherRicecultivationTransport4.41.0Internationalshipping5.9Manuremanagement0.70.4ChemicalsMetals2.63.4Syntheticfertilizerapplication0.4Cement1.6Biomassburning0.1Notes:CO2=carbondioxide;GHG=greenhousegas;GtCO2e=gigatonnesofcarbondioxideequivalent.Notethatsectorsingreyareexcludedfromthisreport.Sources:Minxetal.(2021);EuropeanCommissionandJRC(2022).ExecutiveSummarySTATEOFCLIMATEACTION20234tionpathways.Together,thesesectorsaccountedforFinally,wealsohighlightrecentdevelopments—fromroughly85percentofnetanthropogenicGHGemissionsadoptingnewpoliciestoinvestinginthedevelopmentgloballyin2021(FigureES-1),withwasteandupstreamofmorenascentzero-carbontechnologiestodisburs-energyemissions,suchasfugitiveemissionsfromfossilingfinancialpledges—thathaveoccurredprimarilyfuelextractionandpetroleumrefining,accountingsincethe26thConferenceoftheParties(COP26)infortheremaining15percent.Additionally,thisreportGlasgow.Formanyofour42indicators,itcantaketimeincludestargetsandindicatorstotrackprogressmadeforactionsundertakenbygovernments,civilsociety,inscalingupcarbonremovaltechnologiesandclimateandtheprivatesectortospurglobalchange.Yetthesefinance,bothofwhichwillbeneededtoachievetheadvancesstillrepresentmeaningfulprogressmadeinParisAgreement’s1.5°Climitonglobaltemperaturerise.thereal-worldeconomy,andtheycanofferinsightsintoWhileasimilareffortiswarrantedforadaptation,thiswheremomentumforpositivechangemaybegainingreport’sscopeislimitedtomitigation,thoughachiev-traction,aswellaswhereconsiderablymoreeffortwillingsometargetswoulddeliverconsiderablebenefitsbeneededthisdecadetoachieve1.5°C-alignedtargets.toadaptation.Thus,foreachsector,wehighlightrecentdevelop-mentsacrossenablingconditionsoutlinedinBoehmTheseriesalsoprovidesareportcardoncollectiveetal.(2022)—innovationsintechnologies,supportiveeffortstomitigateclimatechangebyevaluatingpolicies,institutionalstrengthening,leadership,andrecentprogressmadetoward(orawayfrom)2030shiftsinbehaviorandsocialnorms—toprovideamoretargets.Toassessglobalprogressformostindicators,comprehensivesnapshotofclimateaction.Wefocusweusedthepast5yearsofhistoricaldata(or10yearsprimarilyonthosethatareglobalinscope,thoughforforestsandlandindicatorswherepossible)toprojectwealsoincludethosethatareeitherfromparticularlyalineartrendlinefromthemostrecentyearofdatatoimportantgeographiesorthatrepresentpromising(or2030andthencomparedthistrendlinetotherateofworrying)developments.changeneededtoreach1.5°C-alignedtargetsforthesameyear.Withthesedata,wecalculatedaccelerationKeyfindingsacrossfactorstoquantifyhowmuchthepaceofrecentchangesectorsneedstoincreaseoverthisdecadeandthenusedtheseaccelerationfactorstoclassifyindicatorsintooneoffiveHeadingintothefirstGlobalStocktake,theworldmustcategories:headingintherightdirectionandontrack,facethehardtruththat,whilemeaningfulprogressheadingintherightdirectionbutofftrack,headinghasbeenmadeacrosssomesectors,collectiveeffortsintherightdirectionbutwellofftrack,headinginthetofirstpeakandthennearlyhalveGHGemissionswrongdirectionentirely,orinsufficientdata.Butforathisdecadestillfallwoefullyshort.Recentratesofhandfulofindicators,namelythosethatdirectlytrackchangefor41ofthe42indicatorsacrosspower,build-theadoptionofinnovativetechnologies,futurechangeings,industrytransport,forestsandland,foodandwilllikelyfollowanS-curveratherthanapurelylinearagriculture,technologicalcarbonremoval,andclimatetrajectory.Toaccountforthisrapid,nonlineargrowth,financearenotontracktoreachtheir1.5°C-alignedwefirstconsideredthelikelihoodthatfuturechangeintargetsfor2030(FigureES-2).Worryingly,24ofthoseindicatorswillfollowanS-curveandclassifiedindicatorsindicatorsarewellofftrack,suchthatatleastatwofoldasS-curveunlikely,S-curvepossible,andS-curvelikely.accelerationinrecentratesofchangewillberequiredFor“S-curvelikely”indicators,weadjustedourmeth-toachievetheir2030targets.Another6indicatorsodsforassessingprogressmadetowardnear-termareheadinginthewrongdirectionentirely.Withinthistargets.Morespecifically,weconsideredmultiplelinessubsetoflaggingindicators,themostrecentyearofofevidence,includingtheshapeandstageofeachdatarepresentsaconcerningworseningrelativetoindicator’sS-curve,areviewoftheliterature,andcon-recenttrendsfor3indicators,withsignificantsetbackssultationswithsectoralexperts.WealsofittedS-curvesineffortstoeliminatepublicfinancingforfossilfuels,tohistoricaldata,whereappropriate.Ininstanceswheredramaticallyreducedeforestation,andexpandcarbonwefoundcompellingevidenceofS-curvedynamics,pricingsystems.In2021,forexample,publicfinancingforweupgradedourassessmentofprogressfromwhatfossilfuelsincreasedsharply,withgovernmentsubsidies,itwouldhavebeenbasedonapurelylineartrend-specifically,nearlydoublingfrom2020toreachtheline.Inthisinstallment,forexample,weupgradedthehighestlevelsseeninalmostadecade(OECDandIISDshareofEVsinlight-dutysalesfrom“wellofftrack”2023).Andin2022,deforestationincreasedslightlyto(theresultsofapurelylinearassessment)to“ontrack,”5.8millionhectares(Mha)worldwide,losinganareaofgivenongoingexponentialgrowthandprojectionsofforestsgreaterthanthesizeofCroatiainasingleyear.near-termchange.Approximately60percentofthesepermanentlossesoccurredacrosshumidtropicalprimaryforests,amongtheworld’smostimportantlandscapesforcarbonExecutiveSummarySTATEOFCLIMATEACTION20235sequestrationandstorage,aswellasbiodiversity(Han-•Dramaticallyincreasegrowthinsolarandwindsenetal.2013;Curtisetal.2018;Turubanovaetal.2018;Tyukavinaetal.2022).power—theshareofthesetwotechnologiesinelectricitygenerationhasbeengrowingbyanannualAmidthisbadnews,therearebrightspotsthataverageof14percentinrecentyears,butthisneedsunderscorethepossibilityofrapidchange.Therecenttoreach24percenttogetontrackfor2030.rateofchangeforoneindicator—theshareofEVsinlight-dutyvehiclesales—isontracktoachieveits2030•Phaseoutcoalinelectricitygenerationseventimestarget.BecauseEVsemitmuchlessthanfossil-fueledvehiclesevenwhenpoweredbydirtygrids,achievingfaster—whichisequivalenttoretiringroughly240thistargetcouldgoalongwaytowarddecarbonizingaverage-sizedcoal-firedpowerplantseachyearroadtransport,whichcurrentlyaccountsfor11percentofthrough2030.Andascountriescontinuetobuildcoal-globalGHGemissions.Foranothersixindicators,globalfiredpowerplants,thenumberthatmustberetiredeffortsareheadingintherightdirectionatapromising,eachyearwillrise.yetstillinsufficientpace.Butwithappropriatesupportandconcertedactions,someoftheseindicatorscould•Increasethecoverageofrapidtransitsixtimesfaster,experiencerapid,nonlinearchangeinthecomingyears.Finally,ofallindicatorsheadingintherightdirection,withthetop50highest-emittingcitiescollectivelysixindicators’mostrecentyearofdatarepresentsaaddingabout1,300kilometersofmetrorails,light-railmeaningfulimprovementovertheprevioushistoricaltraintracks,and/orbuslanesperyearthrough-trendline,withthegreatestgainsseenineffortstoman-outthisdecade.datecorporateclimateriskdisclosure,increaseuptakeofelectrictrucks,andexpandtheadoptionoflight-duty•Reducetheannualrateofdeforestation—equivalentelectricvehicles.todeforesting15football(soccer)fieldsperminuteinStill,anenormousaccelerationineffortwillbe2022—fourtimesfaster.requiredacrossallsectorstogetontrackfor2030.Ashiftfrombusiness-as-usual,incrementalchangeinto•Shifttohealthier,moresustainabledietseighttimesemergencymodeisnowneededtodeliverthislevelofrequiredacceleration.Theworld,forexample,needstofasterbyloweringpercapitaconsumptionofrumi-takethefollowingsteps:nantmeat(e.g.,beef)toapproximatelytwoservingsperweekacrosshigh-consumingregions(Europe,theAmericas,andOceania).Thisshiftdoesnotrequirereducingconsumptionforpopulationswhoalreadyconsumebelowthistargetlevel,especiallyinlow-incomecountrieswheremodestincreasesinconsumptioncanboostnutrition.•Scaleupglobalclimatefinancebynearly$500billionperyearthroughouttheremainderofthisdecade.FIGUREES-2Assessmentofglobalprogresstoward2030targetsOneindicatorassessedexhibitsarecenthistoricalrateofchangethatisatorabovethepacerequiredtoachieveits2030target.For6indicators,therateofchangeisheadingintherightdirectionatapromisingbutinsufficientpacetobeontrackfortheir2030targets.For24indicators,therateofchangeisheadingintherightdirectionataratewellbelowtherequiredpacetoachievetheir2030targets.For6indicators,therateofchangeisheadinginthewrongdirectionentirely.For5indicators,dataareinsufficienttoassesstherateofchangerelativetotherequiredaction.ExecutiveSummarySTATEOFCLIMATEACTION20236FIGUREES-2Assessmentofglobalprogresstoward2030targets(continued)LIKELIHOODOFFOLLOWINGANS-CURVEACCELERATIONFACTORaN/AS-curveLikely5xS-curveUnlikely5xS-curvePossibleTheseindicatorstracktechnologyadoptionTheseindicatorsarenotcloselyrelatedtoTheseindicatorsindirectlyorpartiallytrackdirectly.TheyareeitherfollowinganS-curvetechnologyadoptionsoareunlikelytofollowantechnologyadoptionsocouldexperiencenon-linearorarelikelytodosointhefuture.ForthoseS-curve.Ourassessmentofprogressreliesonchange,althoughlikelyinadifferentformthananinearlystagesofanS-curve,ameaningfulaccelerationfactors—calculationsofhowmuchS-curve.Ourassessmentofprogressreliesonincreasemaynotoccurimmediately.Ourrecentratesofchange(asestimatedbylinearaccelerationfactors—calculationsofhowmuchassessmentreliesonauthorjudgementoftrendlines)needtoacceleratetoachievetherecentratesofchange(asestimatedbylinearmultiplelinesofevidence.2030targets.trendlines)needtoacceleratetoachievethe2030targets.Changemayoccurfasterthanexpected.RIGHTDIRECTION,ONTRACKTRANSPORTN/AbIncreasetheshareofEVsto75–95%oftotalannualLDVsales.75–95100%HISTORICAL102030DATA20222010RIGHTDIRECTION,OFFTRACKPOWERN/AbTRANSPORTN/AbTRANSPORTN/AbIncreasetheshareofzero-carbonExpandtheshareofEVstoaccountIncreasetheshareofEVsto85%for20–40%oftotalLDVfleet.oftotalannualtwo-andthree-sourcesinelectricitygenerationtowheelersales.88-91%.100%88–91100%100%853920–4049HISTORICAL20222030HISTORICAL1.520302010HISTORICAL2030DATADATADATA2022201020102022FORESTSANDLAND1.5xFOODANDAGRICULTURE1.2xFINANCE1.5xReforest100Mha.IncreaseruminantmeatIncreasetheshareofGHGemissionsproductivityperhectareby27%,subjecttomandatorycorporaterelativeto2017.climateriskdisclosuresto75%.500totalMha45kg/ha100%753329130100HISTORICAL2020–2030HISTORICAL20212030HISTORICAL202030DATADATADATA20222000–202020102010ExecutiveSummarySTATEOFCLIMATEACTION20237FIGUREES-2Assessmentofglobalprogresstoward2030targets(continued)RIGHTDIRECTION,WELLOFFTRACKPOWER7xPOWER>10xPOWER9xLowertheshareofcoalinelectricityLowertheshareofunabatedfossilReducethecarbonintensityofgenerationto4%.gasinelectricitygenerationtoelectricitygenerationto48-805-7%.gCO2/kWh.45%25%23600gCO2/kWh36440HISTORICAL4HISTORICAL5–7HISTORICAL48–80DATADATADATA202220302022203020222030201020102010BUILDINGS3xBUILDINGS4xINDUSTRY4xDecreasetheenergyintensityofReducethecarbonintensityofIncreasetheshareofelectricityinbuildingoperationsto85-120buildingoperationsto13-16theindustrysector'sfinalenergykWh/m2.kgCO2/m2.demandto35-43%.180kWh/m250kgCO2/m280%1403835–432985–120HISTORICAL20222030HISTORICAL202213–16HISTORICAL20212030DATADATADATA2030201020102010INDUSTRY>10xINDUSTRYN/AbTRANSPORT6xLowerthecarbonintensityofglobalIncreasegreenhydrogenDoublethecoverageofpubliccementproductionto360–70productioncapacityto58Mt.transportinfrastructureacrosskgCO2/tcementby2030.urbanareas,relativeto2020.700kgCO2/tcement100Mt40km/1Minhabitants3866058192010HISTORICAL360–370HISTORICAL0.0272030HISTORICAL20202030DATADATADATA20302021202020102010ExecutiveSummarySTATEOFCLIMATEACTION20238FIGUREES-2Assessmentofglobalprogresstoward2030targets(continued)RIGHTDIRECTION,WELLOFFTRACKTRANSPORT>10xTRANSPORTN/AbTRANSPORTN/AbReach2kmofhigh-qualitybikeIncreasetheshareofBEVsandIncreasetheshareofsustainablelanesper1,000inhabitantsacrossFCEVsto30%oftotalannualMHDVaviationfuelsinglobalaviationfuelurbanareas.sales.supplyto13%.2.5km/1,000inhabitants50%25%230130.0044HISTORICAL2.7HISTORICAL0.1DATADATA201020202030202220302022203020102010TRANSPORTN/AbFORESTSANDLAND4xFORESTSANDLAND>10xIncreasetheshareofzero-ReducetheannualrateofgrossRestore240,000haofmangroves.emissionsfuelinmaritimeshippingdeforestationto1.9Mha/yr.fuelsupplyto5%.8Mha/yr300,000totalha10%5.85240,000HISTORICAL0HISTORICAL1.9HISTORICALDATADATADATA201820302010201015,000203020221999–20192020–2030FOODANDAGRICULTURE3xFOODANDAGRICULTURE>10xFOODANDAGRICULTURE8xReducetheGHGemissionsintensityIncreasecropyieldsby18%,relativeReduceruminantmeatofagriculturalproductionby31%,to2017.consumptioninhigh-consumingrelativeto2017.regionsto79kcal/capita/day.1000gCO2e/1,000kcal12t/ha120kcal/capita/day700917.86.679HISTORICAL2020500HISTORICAL20212030HISTORICAL20202030DATADATADATA2030201020102010ExecutiveSummarySTATEOFCLIMATEACTION20239RIGHTDIRECTION,WELLOFFTRACKTECHNOLOGICAL>10xFINANCE8xFINANCE8xCARBONREMOVALScaleuptheannualrateofIncreaseglobalclimatefinanceIncreaseglobalpublicclimatetechnologicalcarbonremovaltoflowstoUS$5.2trillion/yr.financeflowsto$1.31–2.61trillion/yr.30-690MtCO2/yr.$6trillion/yr5.2$3trillion/yr1.31–2.611500MtCO2/yr30–6900.85HISTORICAL0.332DATAHISTORICAL0.57HISTORICALDATADATA202220102030201020212030201020202030FINANCE>10xFINANCE>10xFINANCE>10xIncreaseglobalprivateclimateIncreasetheratioofinvestmentinRaisetheweightedaveragecarbonfinanceflowsto$2.61–3.92trillion/yr.low-carbontofossilfuelenergypriceto$170-290/tCO2e.supplyto7:1.$4.5trillion/yr2.61–3.92$600/tCO2e12:1ratio7:1170–290HISTORICAL0.333HISTORICAL1:1HISTORICAL23DATADATADATA202320232010201020102020203020302030WRONGDIRECTION,U-TURNNEEDEDINDUSTRYU-turnneededTRANSPORTU-turnneededTRANSPORTU-turnneededbLowerthecarbonintensityofglobalReducethepercentageoftripsIncreasetheshareofBEVsandsteelproductionto1,340–50madeinpassengercarsto35-43%.FCEVsto60%oftotalannualbuskgCO2/tcrudesteel.sales.2,500kgCO2/tcrudesteel60%ofpassenger-km100%1,89045601,340–5035–43HISTORICAL202020302010HISTORICAL2030HISTORICAL3.82030DATADATADATA2022201020192010ExecutiveSummarySTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202310WRONGDIRECTION,U-TURNNEEDEDFORESTSANDU-turnneededFOODANDU-turnneededFINANCEU-turnneededLANDAGRICULTUREReducetheannualrateofgrossReducetheshareoffoodproductionPhaseoutpublicfinancingforfossilmangrovelossto4,900ha/yr.lostby50%,relativeto2016.fuels,includingsubsidies.45,500ha/yr16%13$1400billion/yr1,10032,000HISTORICAL4,900HISTORICAL6.5HISTORICAL0DATADATADATA20302030203020102017-192010202120102021ANNUALAVERAGEINSUFFICIENTDATABUILDINGSIns.dataBUILDINGSIns.dataFORESTSANDLANDIns.dataIncreasetheannualretrofittingrateEnsureallnewbuildingsareReducetheannualrateofpeatlandofbuildingsto2.5-3.5%/yr.zero-carboninoperation.degradationto0Mha/yr.4%/yr2.5–3.5100%1000.07Mha/yrHISTORICAL0.06DATA<1HISTORICALHISTORICAL50DATA20302010201920302010DATA2020203020101993-2018ANNUALAVERAGEFORESTSANDLANDIns.dataFOODANDAGRICULTUREIns.dataRestore15MhaofdegradedReducepercapitafoodwastebypeatlands.50%,relativeto2019.35totalMha140kg/capita120HISTORICALDATA1561HISTORICAL2020–2030201020192030DATA0ASOF2015ExecutiveSummarySTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202311Notes:BEV=batteryelectricvehicle;EV=electricvehicle;FCEV=fuelcellelectricvehicle;gCO2/kWh=gramsofcarbondioxideperkilowatt-hour;gCO2e/1,000kcal=gramsofcarbondioxideequivalentper1,000kilocalories;GHG=greenhousegas;ha/yr=hectaresperyear;kcal/capita/day=kilocaloriespercapitaperday;kg/capita=kilogramspercapita;kgCO2/m2=kilogramofcarbondioxidepersquaremeter;kgCO2/t=kilogramsofcarbondioxidepertonne;kg/ha=kilogramsperhectare;km/1Minhabitants=kilometersper1millioninhabitants;km/1,000inhab-itants=kilometersper1,000inhabitants;kWh/m2=kilowatt-hourpersquaremeter;LDV=light-dutyvehicle;Mha/yr=millionhectaresperyear;MHDV=medium-andheavy-dutycommericalvehicle;Mt=milliontonnes;MtCO2/yr=milliontonnesofcarbondioxideperyear;passenger-km=passenger-kilometers;tCO2e=tonneofcarbondioxideequivalent;t/ha=tonnesperhectare;yr=year.Formoreinformationonindicators’definitions,deviationsfromourmethodologytoassessprogress,anddatalimitations,seecorrespondingindicatorfiguresineachsection.aForaccelerationfactorsbetween1and2,weroundtothe10thplace(e.g.,1.2times);foraccelerationfactorsbetween2and3,weroundtothenearesthalfnumber(e.g.,2.5times);foraccelerationfactorsbetween3and10,weroundtothenearestwholenumber(e.g.,7times);andacceler-ationfactorshigherthan10,wenoteas>10.SeedataunderlyingthesecalculationsinAppendixA.bForindicatorscategorizedasS-curvelikely,accelerationfactorscalculatedusingalineartrendlinearenotpresented,astheywouldnotaccu-ratelyreflectanS-curvetrajectory.Thecategoryofprogresswasdeterminedbasedonauthorjudgment,usingmultiplelinesofevidence.Seecorrespondingindicatorfiguresineachsection,AppendixC,andJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformation.Source:Authors’analysisbasedondatasourceslistedineachsection.Keyfindingsbysectorgrowthinadoptionofthesetechnologies,withstrongevidenceofongoingexponentialgrowthforsolar.InPower2022,forexample,growthinwindandsolargeneration(+560TWh)alonemet80percentofallglobalelec-Shareofzero-carbonsourcesinelectricitygeneration(%)tricitydemandgrowth(+690TWh)(Wiatros-Motykaetal.2023).SomeofthefastestgrowthintheshareofShareofcoalinelectricitygeneration(%)renewablepowergenerationhasbeenseenindevel-opingcountriessuchasNamibia,Uruguay,Palestine,Shareofunabatedfossilgasinelectricitygeneration(%)andJordan,wherewindandsolarscale-upisalsohelpingtoincreaseenergysecurityandaccess(JaegerCarbonintensityofelectricitygeneration(gCO2/kWh)2023).However,achievingsuchsuccessesacrossallcountries,andparticularlylower-incomenations,willIn2022,CO2emissionsfromelectricitygenerationrequireadramaticscale-upinfinance,asinvestmentsreachedarecordhigh,butrapidgrowthinbothinzero-carbonpowerlagfarbehindneeds.renewableenergyinstallationandgenerationsuggeststhatpowersectoremissionsmayhaveDecarbonizingpowerwillalsorequirerapiddeclinesinpeaked(Wiatros-Motykaetal.2023).Theserecentfossilfuelgeneration.Ascountriesdebatewhethertochangessuggestthatthetransformationalchangesphasecoal“down”or“out,”roughly2,100GWofcoal-neededtodecarbonizethepowersectorglobally—firedpowerstationsareinoperation,andapproximatelyincludingshiftingtozero-carbonpowersources,aswell560GWofnewcoal-firedpowerstationsareinthepipe-asphasingoutcoalandunabatedfossilgasinline,withmostnewcoalprojectsplannedfordevelopingelectricitygeneration—aretakingoff.Still,thisprogresscountrieslikeChina,India,Indonesia,andBangladeshmustaccelerateevenfastertokeeptheParis(GEM2023a;2023b).TheseplantswillneedtoberetiredAgreement’s1.5°Climitwithinreach,asnoneoftheearlytophaseoutcoalgloballyby2040,withaphase-powersectorindicatorsareyetontracktoachievetheiroutofunabatedfossilgasfollowingverysoonafterward2030targets.toavoidlockingtheworldintohighGHGemissionsfordecades.Whileprogressislagging,promisingexam-Recenteffortsmadeinscalinguprenewablepowerplesdemonstratethepotentialtodrasticallyreducesourceshaveprogressedfarfasterthanthosededi-fossilfuelpowerusage.In2012,about40percentofthecatedtophasingoutfossilfuelelectricitygeneration.electricitygeneratedintheUnitedKingdomcamefromZero-carbontechnologies,suchassolarandwindcoal.Today,thatfigureisjust2percent(Ember2023).Aspower,arewidelymatureandcommercialized,withcountriesfollowsuitandworktoweanthemselvesfrommanufacturingcapacityincreasingasthecostofcoal,aswellasfromfossilgas,retrainingandcompen-renewableenergyandcomplementaryenergystoragesatingworkerswillprovecriticaltoensuringamorejusttechnologiescontinuetoplummetatunprecedentedandequitabletransition(WorldBankn.d.).rates.Solarphotovoltaicsandonshorewindarenowthecheapestsourcesofnew-buildgenerationforatleasttwo-thirdsoftheglobalpopulation(BloombergNEF2020),andrecentyearshavewitnessedrecord-breakingExecutiveSummarySTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202312BuildingsIndustryEnergyintensityofbuildingoperations(kWh/m2)Shareofelectricityintheindustrysector’sfinalenergydemand(%)Carbonintensityofbuildingoperations(kgCO2/m2)CarbonintensityofglobalcementproductionRetrofittingrateofbuildings(%/yr)(kgCO2/tcement)Shareofnewbuildingsthatarezero-carboninoperation(%)Greenhydrogenproduction(Mt)Afterrisingsteadilyoverthepastthreedecades,Carbonintensityofglobalsteelproductionglobalemissionsfrombuildingshaveroughlystabi-(kgCO2/tcrudesteel)lizedsince2018(IEA2023j).FurtherdecarbonizationofthebuildingssectorgloballywillrequireamultiprongedSince2000,totalGHGemissionsfromindustryhavestrategyfocusedonimprovingtheenergyefficiencyincreasedfasterthaninanyothersector(Minxetal.withinbuildings,decarbonizingtheremainingenergy2021).Buttransformingtheglobalindustrialsystemfromused,retrofittingtheexistingbuildingstock,andensuringonewhereemissionsarestillgrowingtoonealignedthatnewbuildingsareconstructedtobezero-carboninwithlimitingwarmingto1.5°Cwithnoorlimitedover-operation.Additionally,emissionsgeneratedduringtheshootispossible.Suchatransitionwillfirstrequireconstructionofbuildingsneedtoberapidlyreducedreducingtheneedfornewindustrialproductsbyandtheuseoffluorinatedgaseswithhighglobalincreasingcircularityandloweringconsumption.warmingpotentialforcoolingsystems,whichhasbeenImprovingenergyefficiencyacrossindustrialprocesses,increasing,needstoreversecourseentirely(UNEPandaswellaselectrifyingthosethatrelyonlow-andIEA2020;Veldersetal.2022).medium-temperatureheat,willalsoproveinstrumentaltodecarbonizingthesector.Yetnotallindustrialpro-Althoughpubliclyavailabledataindicatetheworldiscessescanbeeasilyelectrified,andnewsolutionswillnotyetontracktodeliveranyofthesemuch-neededlikelybeneededtoreduceGHGemissionsfromchemi-changesby2030,arecentuptickinbuildingregula-calreactionsandhigh-heatindustrialprocesses,tions,especiallyintheEuropeanUnion,suggeststhatparticularlyforsteelandcement.Additionally,combin-someprogressisunderway.Regulationremainsaningconventionaltechnologieswithcarboncaptureandeffectivetoolforaligningthebuildingssectorwiththeutilization(CCU)andcarboncaptureandstorage(CCS)ParisAgreement’s1.5°Ctemperaturelimit(Boehmetal.willalsoplayasmallroleinbalancingremaining2022;IEA2021d;Economidouetal.2020),andinsomeprocessandhigh-temperatureheatemissionscountriestheongoingenergycrisishaspromptedmorefromthesector.robustregulationsaimedatphasingoutfossilfuelcon-sumptioninthebuildingssector.Thisyear,forexample,Whilenoneoftheindustryindicatorsareontrack,theEuropeanUnionproposedupdatestoitsEnergyrecentdevelopments—fromincreasedinvestmentinPerformanceofBuildingsDirective,whichincludeban-industrialdecarbonizationtonewsupportivepoliciesningtheuseoffossilfuelsforheatinginnewbuildingstorecentlyannouncedprojects—inviteoptimism.Forandthoseundergoingrenovation,aswellasrequiringexample,in2022,theInternationalFinanceCorporation,acompletephaseoutofthesefossilfuelsforheatingthelargestglobaldevelopmentinstitutionfocusedby2035(EuropeanParliament2023a).Thoughnotyetontheprivatesectorinemergingmarkets,madeitsadopted,thisproposalrepresentsasignificantstepfirstgreenloanformaterialmanufacturinginAfricatoforward,asitisraisingtheambitionofmitigationintheSenegal’sleadingcementmanufacturer(IFC2023a),buildingssectorinakeygeography.Similarly,salesofandIndia,hometooneoftheworld’sfastest-growingheatpumps—atechnologythatenablesthedecarbon-industrysectors,announcedtheestablishmentofaizationofheatinginbuildings—continuedtoincrease,carbonmarketschemeforaluminumandcementman-risingby120percentinPoland,38percentinEurope,ufacturers,petroleumrefineries,andsteel(Munjal2022;and11percentgloballyin2022(RosenowandGibb2023;IEA2021e),whichcanhelpacceleratedecarbonizationMonschaueretal.2023).Suchprogressnowneedsofthoseindustries.Recentyearshavealsowitnessedtospreadglobally,withmorenationalgovernments,theglobalsteelcapacitypipelineshiftfromproductioncities,andbusinessessettingtargetsfordecarbonizingtechnologiesthatrelyoncoaltolessemissions-inten-buildingsandestablishingrobustimplementationplanssiveplants,with28newgreenhydrogen–relateddirectthatputthosetargetsingoodstead.reducedironsteelprojectsannouncedbetween2021and2022alone(authors’calculationsbasedondatafromtheGreenSteelTracker2023).AndaccordingtotheInternationalEnergyAgency(IEA2022h),globalinstalledelectrolyzercapacitygrewby23percentfrom2021toExecutiveSummarySTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023132022,reachingroughly690megawatts(MW).Thesetheseindicators.Butshiftingtomoresustainablemodespromisingdevelopmentsnowneedtobesignificantlyoftransitanddecarbonizinglonger-haultransportscaledandacceleratedaroundtheglobetomeetliketrucking,shipping,andaviationhaveprovenmoreindustrialdecarbonizationtargetsthisdecade.difficult,withallindicatorseitherwellofftrackorheadinginthewrongdirectionentirely.TransportInonebrightspotthisyear,theshareofelectricvehi-Shareofelectricvehiclesinlight-dutyvehiclesales(%)clesinlight-dutyvehiclesalesisontrackforthefirsttime.The2030targetiswellinsightasthesevehiclesShareofelectricvehiclesinthelight-dutyvehiclefleet(%)becomecheaper,rangesimprove,andcharginginfra-structureisbuiltout.InadditiontocontinuedtechnologyShareofelectricvehiclesintwo-andthree-wheelersales(%)costdeclines,majorpolicyupdates,includingtheInflationReductionActintheUnitedStatesandupdatesNumberofkilometersofrapidtransitper1milliontotheEuropeanUnionGreenDeal,areaimedathelpinginhabitants(km/1Minhabitants)pushEVsalesintooverdrive.ThisgrowthislargelylimitedtoChina,Europe,andtheUnitedStates,withadditionalNumberofkilometersofhigh-qualitybikelanesper1,000effortsneededtoextendthisopportunitytodevel-inhabitants(km/1,000inhabitants)opingcountries.ShareofbatteryelectricvehiclesandfuelcellelectricRecentprogressmadeinscalinguptwo-andvehiclesinmedium-andheavy-dutycommercialthree-wheelers,bicycles,andmaritimeshippingvehiclesales(%)alsosuggeststhattransformationalchangesbeyondcarsalesmaybeonthehorizon.TheshareofelectricShareofsustainableaviationfuelsinglobalaviationvehiclesintwo-andthree-wheelersalesincreasedfromfuelsupply(%)34percentin2015to49percentin2022(BloombergNEF2023a)—thanksinlargeparttosubsidiesanddemandShareofzero-emissionsfuelsinmaritimeshippingincentivesforthree-wheelersinIndia(IEA2023e)—andfuelsupply(%)thatglobalsharecouldhit85percentin2030ifmoregrowthoccursoutsideofChinaandIndia.Somejurisdic-Shareofkilometerstraveledbypassengercars(%tionsarealsoscalingeffortstoavoidmotorizedtravel.ofpassenger-km)Bogotá,Colombia,forexample,added84kilometersofnew,permanentbikelanesduringtheCOVID-19pan-Shareofbatteryelectricvehiclesandfuelcellelectricdemictoitsmorethan547existingkilometerstoprovidevehiclesinbussales(%)safeandnonpollutingwaystogetaroundthecity(Ramírez2021).And,attheInternationalMaritimeOrga-Afterindustry,transport—includingroad,rail,sea,andnization,countriesagreedtoanewGHGstrategythatairtravel—remainstheworld’ssecond-fastest-grow-aimstocutemissionsfrommaritimeshippingby20–30ingsourceofGHGemissions(Minxetal.2021;Europeanpercentin2030and70–80percentin2040(SmithandCommissionandJRC2022;IEA2022i).TransformingShaw2023).Thisincludesatargettoreach5percentthissectortomitigateclimatechangewillrequirea“zeroornearzeroGHGemissiontechnologies”by2030,anumberofinterconnectedshifts.First,bringingjobs,targettrackedinthisreport(IMO2023).services,andgoodsclosertowherepeoplelivecanhelpavoidsomemotorizedtravelaltogether.Atthesametime,theworldmustshiftawayfromvehicletripstoshared,collective,oractivetransportmodesincludingpublictransportation,walking,andcycling.Crucially,electricvehiclesmustquicklyreplacetheinternalcombustionengine,andforthosemodesoftransportthatcannoteasilybeelectrified,suchasshippingandaviation,meetingParis-alignedtargetsrequiresthescale-upofzero-emissionsfuelswheremodalshiftsarenotpossible.Yetprogressinacceleratingthesetransformationalchangesremainsuneven.Globaleffortstoelectrifycommonmodesofroadtransport,suchaslight-dutyvehiclesandtwo-andthree-wheelers,areheadingintherightdirection,withrecentratesofchangeunfoldingeitheratthepacerequiredtoachievenear-termtargetsoratapromising,thoughstill,insufficientspeedforExecutiveSummarySTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202314Forestsandlanddegrading,andthattheworld’sshorelineshavelost560,000hectaresofmangrovessince1999(Hansenetal.Reforestation(totalMha)2013;Curtisetal.2018;Turubanovaetal.2018;Tyukavinaetal.2022;UNEP2022b;Murrayetal.2022).Deforestation(Mha/yr)Limitingglobalwarmingto1.5°CwillalsorequireMangroverestoration(totalha)large-scalerestoration,but,heretoo,globaleffortsmustacceleratesignificantly.GettingontrackforMangroveloss(ha/yr)2030willrequiretheworldtoreforestanother100Mha,aswellasrestore15MhaofdegradedpeatlandsandPeatlanddegradation(Mha/yr)240,000hectaresofmangroves.Critically,appropriatelyimplementedrestorationcancomplement,butnotPeatlandrestoration(totalMha)replace,effortstoprotecttheworld’sremainingforests,peatlands,andmangroves.3NotonlyisrecoveringtheseAccountingfornearlyafifthofnetanthropogenicGHGecosystemsoftenmorecostlythansafeguardingthem,emissionsgloballyin2021,agriculture,forestry,andbutitmayalsotakedecades(ifnotlonger)fortheseotherlandusesistheonlysectorthatservesasbothecosystemstoregainspeciesdiversity,ecosystemasourceandasinkofGHGs(Minxetal.2021;Europeanstructure,andecologicalfunctions,allofwhichmayCommissionandJRC2022).ThelossanddegradationimpactcarboncyclingandGHGfluxeswithintheseofecosystems—particularlyforests,peatlands,andecosystems(Sasmitoetal.2019;Poorteretal.2021;mangroves—releaseGHGsintotheatmosphere,whileKreylingetal.2021;Suetal.2021;Cook-Pattonetal.2021;protecting,restoring,andsustainablymanagingtheseLoiselandGallego-Sala2022).Restoringecosystems,sameecosystemscanlowerGHGemissions,enhancewhileneededtomitigateclimatechange,doesnotoffercarbonsequestration,andbuildresiliencetoclimateaone-to-onetradewithprotectingthem.impacts(IPCC2019,2022b).Ifimplementedappropri-ately,theseland-basedmitigationmeasurescannotHowever,aslateofrecentdevelopments—fromnewonlyhelplimitwarmingto1.5°C(Roeetal.2019,2021)butmultilateralcommitmentsonconservingecosystemsalsodeliversubstantialbenefitstosustainabledevel-tomajorpolicyshiftsinkeycountries—offerssomeopment,adaptation,andbiodiversity—fromregulatinggoodnews,particularlyfortheworld’sforests.SincewaterqualitytoprovisioningfoodtosustainingcleanairCOP26,forexample,morethan140countrieshave(IPCC2019,2022b;IPBES2019;UNCCD2017).Butdespitepledgedtohaltandreverseforestlossanddegradationtheclearbenefitsofaction,globaleffortstoscaleupundertheGlasgowLeaders’DeclarationonForestsandland-basedmitigationmeasuresfallwellshortoftheLandUse;nearly190PartiesadoptedtheKunming-Mon-requiredambitionfor2030and2050.trealBiodiversityFramework,whichcommitssignatoriestoprotecting30percentoftheplanetandrestoringProtectingthesehigh-carbonecosystemscandeliveranother30percentofdegradedecosystemsby2030;thelion’sshareofmitigationacrossland-basedmea-withindaysofhisinauguration,PresidentLuizInáciosures,butcollectiveprogressmadeinvirtuallyhaltingLuladaSilvaundertookarangeofactionstocombatlossanddegradationremainsfarfrompromising.deforestationacrosstheBrazilianAmazon;inlightofTogether,theworld’sforests,peatlands,andmangrovesIndonesia’ssuccessinmaintaininghistoricallylowholdwellover1,000GtC(Panetal.2011;Temminketal.levelsofdeforestation,theSoutheastAsiannationand2022),andbyoneestimate,roughlyathirdorlessofNorwaysignedanotherREDD+deal;andtheEuropeanthesecarbonstocks(~340GtC)arevulnerabletohumanUnionrecentlyadoptedanewregulationtocombatdisturbances,suchthattheywouldbereleasedintothedeforestationandforestdegradationassociatedwithatmospherefollowingconversionordegradation(Noonforestcommodities.Whilethesesignalsofchangeareetal.2021).Someofthesecarbonlossescanoccurquitepromising,historymustnotrepeatitself.Interimtargetsrapidly,andifreleased,muchofthiscarbonwouldbemadeundercommitmentstoprotectandrestorethedifficultforecosystemstorecoverontimescalesrele-world’shigh-carbonecosystems,suchastheNewYorkvanttoreachingnet-zeroCO2emissionsbymidcenturyDeclarationonForestsandtheBonnChallenge,have(Goldsteinetal.2020;Cook-Pattonetal.2021;Noonetal.beenmissed,whilepromisedfunds,includinginterna-2021).Instead,fullyrebuildinglostcarbonstockswouldtionalREDD+finance,haveyettofullymaterialize.take6to10decadesforforests,welloveracenturyformangroves,andcenturiestomillenniaforpeatlands(Goldsteinetal.2020;Temminketal.2022).Itisalarm-ing,then,thatdeforestationhasoccurredacross48Mhasince2015,that57MhaofpeatlandsarecurrentlyExecutiveSummarySTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202315FoodandagriculturepasturelandscontinuetoexpandintotropicalforestsandpeatlandsandGHGemissionsfromfoodproduc-Ruminantmeatproductivity(kg/ha)tioncontinuetogrow,theglobalgoalsofeliminatingdeforestationandpeatlanddegradation,restoringGHGemissionsintensityofagriculturalproductionhundredsofmillionsofhectaresofdeforestedand(gCO2e/1,000kcal)degradedlands,andlimitingglobalwarmingto1.5°Cwillbecomeevenhardertoreach.TheworldurgentlyneedsCropyields(t/ha)toaccelerateeffortstocreateasustainablefoodfuture.Ruminantmeatconsumption(kcal/capita/day)AlthougheffortstomitigateGHGemissionsacrossthefoodandagriculturesectorarewellbehindtheShareoffoodproductionlost(%)paceandscaleneededtokeepwarmingbelow1.5°C,therearesignsofpositivechangesonboththesupplyFoodwaste(kg/capita)anddemandsides.Forexample,dozensofcountrieshavecommittedtoacceleratingagriculturalinno-GHGemissionsfromagriculturalproductionacrossvationthroughtheAgricultureInnovationMissionforbothcroplandsandpasturesremainasignificant,Climate,citieshavecommittedtosupportingdietarystill-growingcontributortoglobalGHGemissionsshiftsandreductionsinfoodlossandwastethrough(Minxetal.2021;EuropeanCommissionandJRC2022).avarietyofinitiativesliketheC40Cities’GoodFoodAstheworld’spopulationclimbsfromroughly8bil-CitiesAccelerator,andmajorfoodserviceproviderslionin2023tonearly10billionby2050(UNDESA2022),havemademeasurableprogressservingmorecli-feedingmorepeoplemorenutritiously,whileadvancingmate-friendlymealsthroughtheCoolfoodPledge.socioeconomicdevelopment,conservingnaturalSimultaneously,theBreakthroughAgenda,theGlasgowecosystems,andreducingagriculturalemissionswillLeaders’DeclarationonForestsandLandUse,andtheproveenormouslydifficult.Transformingtheworld’sfoodGlobalMethanePledge—allannouncedatCOP26—andandagriculturesectortoaddressthesechallengeswilltheKunming-MontrealGlobalBiodiversityFrameworkrequireacombinationofsupply-anddemand-sideadoptedinDecember2022reflectgrowingpoliticalshifts.Halvingfoodlossandwasteinallregions,aswellattentiontothecrucialrolethatthefoodandagricultureasreducingconsumptionofruminantmeat(e.g.,beef)sectorhastoplayincombattingtheclimatecrisis.Butinhigh-consumingregions,canhelpcurbGHGemis-theresourcesandenablingconditionsneededtofollowsionsfrombothagriculturalproductionandassociatedthroughontheseglobalpledges,fromfinancetopolicyland-usechangeslikedeforestation.Shiftsinon-farmtotechnologies,haveyettofullymaterialize.practices,aswellastheresearch,development,anddeploymentofnewfoodandagriculturetechnologies,Technologicalcarbonwillalsobeneededtosustainablyproducemorefoodremovalonexistingagriculturallands—therebyhaltingfarms’expansionintohigh-carbon,biodiverseecosystemsTechnologicalcarbonremoval(MtCO2/yr)likeforestsandpeatlands—andtoensurelong-termproductivityaswell.Thesechangestoagriculturalpro-InadditiontodeepandrapidGHGemissionsreduc-ductionmustsimultaneouslylowertheamountofGHGstions,allpathwaysthatlimitwarmingto1.5°Calsorelyemittedperkilocalorieoffood,safeguardsoilandwateroncarbondioxideremoval(IPCC2022b).Referredtoasresources,andbuildresiliencetoclimatechange.“carbonremoval”inthisreport,thisincludesbothland-basedapproaches(ForestsandLandIndicators4–6)Globaleffortstoreduceemissionsfromfoodproduc-andtechnologicalapproaches.Buteffortstorapidlytionandconsumption,whiletacklingfoodinsecurity,scaleupthesecarbonremovaltechnologiesremainmalnutrition,andhunger,haveyettoprogressatawellofftrack,withlessthan1milliontonnesofcarbonpaceandscalecommensuratewiththesechallenges.dioxide(MtCO2)removedandpermanentlystoredeachWiththemostrecentyearofCOVID-eradataavailableyear.Thisisequivalenttolessthan1percentofthe(2020or2021dependingontheindicator),theoverallamountoftechnologicalcarbonremovallikelyneededglobalpictureshowsthatprogressinthefoodandannuallyby2030.agriculturesectorremainsfartooslow.ImprovementsinagriculturalGHGemissionsintensity,livestockproduc-Overthelastfiveyears,technologicalcarbonremovaltionefficiency,andcropyields—whileencouraging—areapproacheshaveshiftedfromanicheconcepttonotyetkeepingpacewithcontinuedglobalgrowthinacommoncomponentofclimateactionportfolios,demandforfood.Theglobalrateoffoodlossslightlysupportedbybillionsofdollarsinpublicandprivatedecreasedbetween2020and2021butremainshigherfunding(Frontier2023;U.S.Congress2021).IntheUnitedthanthebaselineyearof2016(FAOSTAT2023).AndStates,forexample,the2021BipartisanInfrastructureLawdemand-sidechangestoconsumptionpatterns,par-provided$3.5billiontobuildfourdirectaircapture(DAC)ticularlyamongthehighest-consumingregions,needtoaccelerateaswell.IfthefootprintofcroplandsandExecutiveSummarySTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202316hubseachwithcapacitytoremove1MtCO2/year,andtheParisAgreement’sgoals.Suchalignmentincludesthe2022InflationReductionActmorethantripledthetaxensuringamuchhigherratioofinvestmentinlow-car-creditthatDACreceives(U.S.Congress2021;U.S.Senatebonenergycomparedtofossilfuels;moretransparently2022b).In2022,theEuropeanCommissionlauncheditsmeasuring,reporting,andmanagingclimaterisks;proposalforaCarbonRemovalCertificationFramework,accountingforthefullclimatecostsofGHGemissionsthefirstpublicsectorvoluntarycertificationframeworkthroughcarbonpricingmechanisms;andendingpublicforhigh-qualitycarbonremoval.Momentumisalsofinancingforfossilfuels.buildingintheprivatesectortoscaleupdevelopmentanddeploymentoftechnologicalcarbonremoval.AEffortstodramaticallyincreaseclimateinvestmentcoalitionofcompanies,includingStripeandShopify,remainfartooslow,withtheneedforincreasedlaunchedFrontierin2022,acommitmenttobuy$925fundingparticularlyacuteindevelopingcountries.millionworthofcarbonpermanentlycapturedandGlobalclimatefinanceflowsreachedanall-timehighinremovedfromtheatmospherebetween2022and2030.2021of$850billionto$940billion,representingatleastIn2023,morecompaniesjoinedthecommitment,bring-a27percentincreasefrom2020(Naranetal.2022).Butingthetotaltomorethan$1billioninpledgedfuturegrowthinclimateinvestmentremainswellofftrackfromcarbonremovalpurchases(Frontier2023).reachingthe$5.2trillionperyearneededgloballyby2030.Afterthisreportwentthroughpeerreview,Buch-But,alongsidethismomentum,challengesinscal-neretal.(2023)publisheddatathatshowsignificantinguptechnologicalremovalapproachesrapidlyincreasesintotalglobalclimatefinance.Flowsreachedandresponsiblyremain.Morepublicfundingfor$1.1trillionin2021and$1.4trillionin2022.Butevenwithresearch,development,anddemonstrationisneededthesegains,substantialincreaseswillberequiredbytohelpdevelopabroadportfolioofcarbonremoval2030.Fordevelopingcountries,specifically(excludingapproachestobalancetherisksandtrade-offsofeach;China),theIndependentHigh-LevelExpertGroupongreaterdeploymentsupportisneeded;greaterdemandClimateFinanceestimatesthattheyneed$2trilliontofromcarbonremovalpurchasersisneededtospur$2.8trillionininvestmentinmitigationandadaptationmarketgrowth;attentiontomeasurement,reporting,peryearby2030,andthat$1trillionofthiswouldneedtoandverificationisneededtoensurecredibilityandcon-comefromexternalsources(Songweetal.2022).Yetatsistencyintrackingremovals;andgovernancegapsatpresent,climateinvestmentindevelopingcountriesisalllevelsneedtobeaddressedtoensurethatscale-uparounda10thofthis(Naranetal.2022;OECD2022a).happenssustainablyandequitably.FailuretosimultaneouslyphaseoutinvestmentsinFinancehigh-emissionsactivitieswilllikelyplacethe1.5°Climitoutofreach—and,heretoo,progressremainsShareofglobalGHGemissionsundermandatorycorporateinadequate.Whilethecleanenergyeconomyisbegin-climateriskdisclosure(%)ningtoreplacethefossileconomy,thistransitionisnotoccurringrapidlyenough.ThewarinUkrainehascausedGlobaltotalclimatefinance(trillion$/yr)oilandgaspricestospike,andinresponsefossilfuelconsumptionsubsidiesreached$1trillionin2022—theGlobalpublicclimatefinance(trillion$/yr)highestlevelever(IEA2023c).Effortstoexpandcarbonpricingsystemsalsoappearstalled,withnosignificantGlobalprivateclimatefinance(trillion$/yr)increaseinglobalGHGemissionscoveredsince2021(WorldBank2023d).ThepoliticalbacklashintheUnitedRatioofinvestmentinlow-carbontofossilfuelenergyStatesagainstsustainablefinanceandtheallocationofsupplyinvestmentsbasedonclimateconsiderationsposesathreattoaligningprivateclimatefinancewiththeParisWeightedaveragecarbonpriceinjurisdictionswithAgreement’sgoals.Nonetheless,onebrightspotistheemissionspricingsystems(2015$/tCO2e)growingtrendofgovernmentsmandatingcorporatedisclosureofclimaterisks,withcountriesrepresentingTotalpublicfinancingforfossilfuels(billion$/yr)about20percentofglobalGHGemissionshavingdonesoasof2022(TCFD2022;WuandUddin2022;Naik2021).Financeisavitalenablerofclimateaction,butcurrentArecentmajordevelopmentwastheapprovaloftheinvestmentpatternsarehinderingthepaceandscaleEuropeanUnion’sCorporateSustainabilityReportingofthetransitiontonet-zeroeconomies.TransformingDirectivethatwillrequirereportingonawiderangeoftheglobalfinancialsystemtosupportambitiousclimatesustainabilitydisclosures(EuropeanParliament2022).actionwillrequirescalingupclimatefinanceinallcoun-Failuretoalignfinancewithclimategoalsrisksdelayingtriesandfrombothpublicandprivateactors,aswellactionacrossallothersectors.asensuringthatallfinancialflowsareconsistentwithExecutiveSummarySTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202317SECTION1MethodologyforAssessingProgressThissectionprovidesasummaryofthisreport’sForeachshiftfeaturedinthisreport,weestablishedmethodology.PleaseseeJaegeretal.(2023),theglobalnear-termandlong-termtargets—typicallyaccompanyingtechnicalnote,foramoredetailedfor2030and2050,respectively—thatarealignedwithexplanationofourselectionofsectors,targets,indica-pathwayslimitingglobaltemperatureriseto1.5°Cwithtors,anddatasets,aswellasourmethodsforassessingnoorlimitedovershoot.Wealsoidentifiedinterimtargetsprogresstoward1.5°C-alignedtargets.for2035and2040wherepossible.AlthoughwedonotsystematicallyconsiderequityorbiodiversityimpactsSelectionofsectors,inourtargetselection,7wedoapplyadditionalcriteriatargets,andindicatorswhereverfeasibleandappropriate,suchascost-effec-tivenessorenvironmentalandsocialsafeguards.ForInmodeledpathwaysthatlimitglobaltemperatureeachsetofnear-termandlong-termtargets,wethenriseto1.5°Cabovepreindustriallevelswithnoorlimitedselectedcorrespondingindicatorswithhistoricaldataovershoot,4greenhousegas(GHG)emissionspeaktoassessglobalprogressmadetowardthesesectoralimmediatelyorbefore2025atthelatest,andthenfallbymitigationgoals.Anexampleofanear-termtargetamedianof43percentby2030and60percentby2035,wouldbehalvingfoodwasteby2030,relativeto2019,relativeto2019(IPCC2022b,2023).Byaroundmidcentury,whileitscorrespondingindicatorwouldbekilogramsofcarbondioxide(CO2)emissionsreachnetzerointhesefoodwastepercapitaperyear.Methodsforselectingallpathways.AchievingsuchdeepGHGemissionsreduc-indicatorsandtargetsaredescribedfurtherinJaegertions,theIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChangeetal.(2023).(IPCC)finds,willrequirerapidtransformationsacrossallmajorsectors—power,buildings,industry,transport,Assessmentofglobalforestsandland,andfoodandagriculture5—aswellprogressastheimmediatescale-upofclimatefinanceandofcarbonremovaltechnologiestocompensatefortheWeprovideasnapshotofglobalprogressmadetowardresidualGHGemissionsthatwilllikelyprovedifficulttolimitingwarmingto1.5°Cbyassessingwhethereacheliminate(IPCC2022b).indicatorisontracktoreachitsnear-termtarget.Todoso,wecollectedhistoricaldataforeachindicator,relyingIntheStateofClimateActionseries,wetranslatetheondatasetsthatareopen,independentofbias,reliable,far-reachingtransformationsneededtoachievetheandconsistent.Westrovetousethemostrecentdata,ParisAgreement’s1.5°Cglobaltemperaturelimitintobutthereisoftenatimelagbeforedatabecomeavail-amoremanageablesetofshiftsforeachsectorthat,able(betweenoneandthreeyearsformostindicators,takentogether,canhelpovercomethedeep-seatedbutroughlyfiveyearsforsome).Asaresult,theyearcarbonlock-incommontothemall(Setoetal.2016).ofmostrecentdatavariesamongindicators.InsomeWealsoidentifychangesthatmustoccurtosupporttherapidscale-upofcarbonremovaltechnologiesandclimatefinance.Theglobalfoodandagriculturesector,forexample,needstotransformfromitscurrentstateintoonethatcannutritiouslyfeednearly10billionpeoplewhileloweringGHGemissions,safeguardingbiodiversity,andhaltingtheexpansionofagriculturalproduction,particularlyacrosshigh-carbonecosystems.Toachievethissectoraltransformation,multipleshiftsmustoccur—theworldmustachievesignificantgainsincroplandandlivestockproductivity,dramaticallyreducefoodlossandwaste,limittheoverconsumptionofruminantmeat,andacceleratedeclinesintheGHGemissionsintensityofagriculturalproductionprocesses,suchasricecultivation,entericfermentation,andchemicalfertilizerapplication.Almostalloftheseshiftsmusthappensimultaneouslytosecureasustainablefoodfuture.However,thesectoralshiftsweidentifyinthisreport,includingthosebeyondthefoodandagriculturalsector,donotprovideacomprehensiveroadmaptolim-itingwarmingto1.5°C;rather,theyformasetofpriorityactionsneededtoachievethistemperaturegoal.6MethodologyforAssessingProgressSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202319FIGURE1IllustrationofanS-curve%100EmergenceBreakthroughDiffusionReconfiguration806040Annualgrowthrate20S-curveofTimetechnologyadoption0ExponentialgrowthExponentialgrowthLogarithmicgrowthtransitioningintoExponentialgrowthTheS-curvelogarithmicgrowthGrowthratesgraduallybecomesevident.approachzerountiltheAlthoughannualgrowthTheabsoluteAbsolutegrowthS-curveonceagainratesarehigh,theamountofgrowthincreases,andtheappearsflat.S-curveappearsflateachyearincreases,S-curvereachesitssinceitsstartingpointforbutthegrowthratemaximumsteepness.technologyadoptionisstartstodecay.Thegrowthratesolow.continuestodecay.Source:Authors.cases,datalimitationspreventedusfromevaluatingthebeginstodecay.Finally,associetyreconfiguresaroundcurrentlevelofeffortmadetowardaparticulartarget,thenewtechnology,adoptionreachesasaturationpointandwenotethisaccordingly.andgrowthratesapproachzero.Theexactshapeofsuchacurveishighlyuncertain,andtechnologiesmayAssessingthegapbetweenrecentprogressandfutureencounterobstaclesthatmayalterorlimittheirgrowth.actionneededtomeet1.5°C-compatibletargetsButgiventherightconditions(e.g.,supportivepoliciesrequiresprojectingatrajectoryoffuturechangeforandinvestments),adoptionofnewtechnologiescaneachindicator.Thesimplestapproachistoassumethatreachpositivetippingpoints,afterwhichself-amplifyinggrowthcontinuesatitscurrentrateofchangefollowingfeedbackskickintospurrapid,far-reachingchangesapurelylineartrajectory,and,indeed,thiswasaneffec-thatcancascadefromonesystemtoanotherorfromtivemethodformanyindicators.However,itisunlikelyonegeographytoanother(Box1).thatallindicatorswillfollowalinearpath.Forexample,theadoptionofnewtechnologieshasoftenfollowedanItisalsoimportanttonotethat,inadditiontotechnologyS-curvetrajectory(Figure1).Attheemergencestageofadoption,socialandpoliticalforcescanalsocontributeanS-curve,annualgrowthratesarehighaspromisingtoorhindernonlinearchange(Mooreetal.2022).Ourresearch,development,anddemonstrationprojectsareassessmentofrecentprogressmadetowardnear-termunderway,butadoptionofthenewtechnologyremainstargetsdoesnotconsiderthesefactorsfully,givenquitelow.Then,inthebreakthroughstage,adoptionofthechallengesofmodelingtheseeffectsanddatathetechnologybendsupward,withsustainedexponen-limitations.However,abodyofresearchisemergingtialgrowthrates.Oncethetechnologybeginstodiffuseonthistopic,andfurtherconsiderationiswarrantedinmorewidely,therateofadoptionofthetechnologyfutureresearch.reachesitssteepestslopeandexponentialgrowthMethodologyforAssessingProgressSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202320BOX1Tippingpointsandself-amplifyingfeedbacksThepointatwhichanS-curvereachesthebreak-available,theycanboostfunctionalityandacceleratethroughstagecanalsobeconceptualizedasatippinguptakeofnewinnovations(e.g.,electricvehicles)point—definedbroadlyasacriticalthresholdbeyond(SharpeandLenton2021).Thesegainsallowcompanieswhichasystemreorganizesoftenabruptlyorirreversiblythatadoptnewtechnologiestoexpandtheirmarket(IPCC2022b).Inthiscontext,tippingpointsgenerallyshares,deepentheirpoliticalinfluence,andamasstheoccurwhenthecostofanewtechnologyfallsbelowresourcesneededtopetitionformorefavorablepoli-thatoftheincumbent,suchthatthevalueofswitchingcies.Moresupportivepolicies,inturn,canreshapethetothenewtechnologyisgreaterthanitscost.Factorsfinanciallandscapeinwaysthatincentivizeinvestorstobeyondmonetarycost,suchasanimprovementinthechannelmorecapitalintothesenewtechnologies(But-technologyoranincreaseinthevalueofthetechnol-ler-Slossetal.2021).aSuchreinforcingfeedbacks,then,ogyasmorepeopleadoptit,canalsopushtechnologycanspuradoptionandhelpnewinnovationssupplantadoptionpastatippingpoint.Oftentimes,seeminglyexistingtechnologies(Victoretal.2019).smallchangesinthesefactorscantriggerthesedisproportionatelylargeresponseswithinsystemsthatWidespreadadoptionofnewtechnologies,inturn,cancatalyzethetransitiontoadifferentstate(Lentonetal.alsohavecascadingeffects,requiringthedevelopment2008;Lenton2020).ofcomplementaryinnovations,theconstructionofsupportiveinfrastructure,theadoptionofnewpolicies,Crossingtippingpointscantriggerself-amplifyingandthecreationofregulatoryinstitutions.Itcanalsofeedbacksthathelpacceleratethediffusionofnewpromptchangesinbusinessmodels,jobavailability,technologiesbypushingdowncosts,enhancingbehaviors,andsocialnorms,therebycreatinganewperformance,andincreasingsocialacceptance(Arthurcommunityofpeoplewhosupport(orsometimes1989;Lenton2020;Lentonetal.2008).Learningbydoingoppose)furtherchanges(Victoretal.2019).Meanwhile,inmanufacturing,forexample,cangenerateprogres-incumbenttechnologiesmaybecomecaughtinasiveadvancesthatleadtomoreefficientproductionviciousspiral,asdecreasesindemandcauseoverca-processes,whilereachingeconomiesofscalecanpacityandleadtolowerutilizationrates.Theselowerprogressivelylowerunitcosts.Similarly,ascomplemen-utilizationrates,inturn,canincreaseunitcostsandleadtarytechnologies(e.g.,batteries)becomeincreasinglytostrandedassets.Note:aWhilediscussedinthecontextoflow-carbontechnologies,thisself-amplifyingfeedbackloopisnotinherentlypositive.Privatesectorinstitutionsthatexpandtheirmarketshare,deepentheirpoliticalinfluence,andamasstheresourcesneededtopetitionformoresupportivepoliciesdonotalwaysusetheirpowerforthepublicgood.Somemayleveragetheirinfluencetoadvancetheirownintereststhatareatoddswithsocietalgoals(e.g.,hamperinginnovationofotherlow-carbontechnologies,advocatingforlessrestrictiveregulationsacrossotherenvironmentalharms,petitioningforpoliciesthatprotecttheirprofitmargins).Critically,governmentshavearoletoplayineffectivelyregulatingtheprivatesectoronbehalfofthepublicandinservicetosocietalgoals.Toassessglobalprogressmadetoward1.5°C-compat-technologydiffusion,giventhattheydonotdirectlytrackibletargets,wefirstevaluatedthelikelihoodthateachtechnologyadoption.TheseoccurredprimarilywithinindicatorwillfollowanS-curveinthefuture,placingthesectionsonForestsandLand,FoodandAgriculture,themintooneofthreecategoriesbasedonourunder-andFinance(e.g.,reforestation,reducingfoodwaste,standingoftheliteratureandconsultationswithexperts:andincreasingclimatefinance).“S-curvelikely,”“S-curvepossible,”and“S-curveunlikely.”WethenemployeddifferentmethodstoassessprogressForthose“S-curveunlikely”indicatorswithsufficientmadeforeachclassofindicators.historicaldata,wecalculatedalineartrendlinebasedonthemostrecent5yearsofhistoricaldata.Forseveral“S-curveunlikely”indicators,mostnotablythoseintheforestsandlandindicators:Assessmentofsector,weconstructedalineartrendlinebasedon10progressbasedonlinearyearsofhistoricaldatatoaccountfornaturalinter-trendlineannualvariability,wherepossible.8Wethenextendedthistrendlineoutto2030andcomparedthisprojectedWeclassifiedmorethanhalfofourindicatorsasvaluetotheindicator’stargetforthesameyear.Doing“S-curveunlikely.”Morespecifically,wedonotexpectsoenabledustoassesswhetherrecentprogressmadetheseindicatorstofollowtheS-curvedynamicsseenintowardthetargetwasontrack.MethodologyforAssessingProgressSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202321Next,wecalculatedan“accelerationfactor”foreachciency.Thus,althoughtheseindicatorshavegenerallyindicatorwithsufficienthistoricaldatabydividingtheexperiencedlinearchangeinthepast,theycouldexpe-averageannualrateofchangeneededtoachievetheriencesomeunknownformofrapid,nonlinearchangeindicator’s2030target9bytheaverageannualrateofinthecomingdecadesifthenonlinearaspectsbegintochangederivedfromthehistorical5-year(or10-year)outweighthelinearones.Forexample,reducingcarbontrendline(AppendixA).Theseaccelerationfactorsquan-intensityinthepowersectorisdependentonmultipletifythegapinglobalactionbetweencurrenteffortstrends:anincreaseintheefficiencyoffossilfuelpower,andthoserequiredtolimitglobalwarmingto1.5°C.whichislinear;switchesbetweenhigher-emittingandTheyindicatewhetherrecenthistoricalratesofchangelower-emittingfossilfuelpowersources,whicharegen-needtoincrease2-fold,5-fold,or10-fold,forexample,erallynonlinear;andaswitchfromalltypesoffossilfueltomeet2030targets(AppendixB).10Wethenusedthesepowertozero-carbonpower,whichisexpectedtobeaccelerationfactorstoassignourindicatorsoneoffivenonlinear.Ifthenonlineargrowthinzero-carbonpowercategoriesofprogress:overtakesthelineargrowthinefficiency,thetrajectoryofcarbonintensitycouldfollowaninvertedS-curve.Rightdirection,ontrack.Thehistoricalrateofchangeisequaltoorabovetherateofchangeneeded.Forthese“S-curvepossible”indicators,wefollowedtheIndicatorswithaccelerationfactorsbetween0and1samemethodsasaboveandusedalineartrendlinetofallintothiscategory.However,wedonotpresentthesecalculateaccelerationfactorsandcategorizeprogress,accelerationfactorssincetheindicatorsareontrack.asrecenthistoricaldatafortheseindicatorshavebeenfollowingroughlylineartrajectories(AppendixA).Rightdirection,offtrack.ThehistoricalrateofHowever,wenotedinouranalysisthat,shouldnonlinearchangeisheadingintherightdirectionatapromisingchangebegin,progresscouldunfoldatsignificantlyyetinsufficientpace.Extendingthehistoricallinearfasterratesthanexpected,andthegapbetweenthetrendlinewouldgettheindicatorsmorethanhalfwaytoexistingrateofchangeandrequiredactionwouldshrink.theirnear-termtargets,andsoindicatorswithaccelera-tionfactorsbetween1and2fallintothiscategory.“S-curvelikely”indicators:AssessmentofRightdirection,wellofftrack.Thehistoricalrateofprogressaccountingforchangeisheadingintherightdirectionbutwellbelownonlinearchangethepacerequiredtoachievethe2030target.ExtendingthehistoricallineartrendlinewouldgetthemlessthanWeclassifiedtheremainingnineindicatorsas“S-curvehalfwaytotheirnear-termtargets,andsoindicatorslikely,”asweconsideredthosethatdirectlytrackthewithaccelerationfactorsofgreaterthanorequalto2adoptionofspecifictechnologies—or,insomeinstances,fallintothiscategory.11asetofcloselyrelatedtechnologies(e.g.,solarandwindpower)—tobeprimecandidatesforexperiencingWrongdirection,U-turnneeded.ThehistoricalrateS-curvedynamicsinthefuture.Thesetechnologiesareofchangeisheadinginthewrongdirectionentirely.innovative,oftendisplacingincumbenttechnologiesIndicatorswithnegativeaccelerationfactorsfallintothis(e.g.,renewableenergy,electricvehicles,greenhydro-category.However,wedonotpresenttheseaccelerationgen).Critically,categorizinganindicatoras“S-curvefactorssinceareversalinthecurrenttrend,ratherthanlikely”doesnotguaranteethatitwillexperiencerapid,anaccelerationofrecentchange,isneededforindica-nonlinearchangeoverthecomingyears;rather,ittorsinthiscategory.signifiesthat,ifandwhenadoptionratesofthesetechnologiesbegintoincrease,suchgrowthwilllikelyInsufficientdata.LimiteddatamakeitdifficulttofollowanS-curve.estimatethehistoricalrateofchangerelativetotherequiredaction.Still,forsuchtechnologiesitisunrealistictoassumethatfutureuptakewillfollowalineartrajectory(Abramczyket“S-curvepossible”al.2017;Mersmannetal.2014;Trancik2014);and,conse-indicators:Assessmentofquently,itisinappropriatetorelyonaccelerationfactorsprogressbasedonlineartoevaluatemitigationefforts.Instead,webasedourtrendlineassessmentofprogressonmultiplelinesofevidence,includingliteraturereviews,expertconsultations,andWeclassifiedanothernineindicatorsas“S-curvepos-fittingS-curvestothehistoricaldatawhereappropriatesible,”whichdonotfallneatlywithineithertheS-curve(AppendixC).Inassessingprogress,akeystepwaslikelyortheS-curveunlikelyclasses.Theseindicatorstoidentifywhichofthefollowingstagesofadoptiondonottrackzero-orlow-emissiontechnologyadoptionappliestoeachtechnology:directly,butadoptionofnewtechnologieswilllikelyhavesomeimpactontheirfuturetrajectories,alongsidemanyotherfactors,suchasincreasesinresourceeffi-MethodologyforAssessingProgressSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202322•Emergence.Withinthisstage,theindicator’scurrentdata,andwethenconsideredthisfittedS-curveasonelineofevidenceinourassessmentofrecentvalueislessthan5percentofitssaturationlevel,progress(Box2).whichweassumedtobethemoreambitiousboundoftheindicator’slong-termtarget.FittinganS-curve•Reconfiguration.Inthisfinalstage,theindicator’stohistoricaldataishighlyuncertaininsuchanearlystage(KucharavyandDeGuio2011;Crozier2020;currentvalueisgreaterthan50percentofitssatu-Cherpetal.2021).So,fortheseindicators,wepresentrationlevel,andalogarithmictrendlineisthebestanillustrativeS-curveextrapolatingthecurrenttrend,fitforthepastfiveyearsofdata.Adoptionratesbutwedefaultedto“wellofftrack”inourassessmentwilllikelystabilizeandgrowthrateswilldeclineasitoftheseindicators’recentprogress.Ifwefoundapproachesthesaturationpoint.WefitanS-curvetocompellingevidencethatabreakthroughisnear,wethehistoricaldata,andwethenconsideredthisfittedupgradedtheindicatortoahighercategory.S-curveasonelineofevidenceinourassessmentofrecentprogress(Box2).•Breakthrough.DuringthisstageofanS-curve,theWealsodeterminedinstancesinwhichanindicatorisindicator’scurrentvalueisbetween5and50percentnotfollowingasmoothS-curve,becausenoneoftheseofitssaturationlevel,andanexponentialtrendlinecriteriaweremet.Manytechnologiesrunintoobstaclesisthebestfitforthepastfiveyearsofdata.Expo-orbarriers,whichcouldpreventthemfromfollowinganentialgrowthwilllikelycontinueinthenearfuture,smoothS-curve.and,accordingly,wefitanS-curvetothehistoricaldata.WethenconsideredthisfittedS-curveasonelineofevidenceinourassessmentofrecentprogress(Box2).•Diffusion.Technologieseventuallybegintodiffusewidelyacrosssociety,andatthisstage,theindica-tor’scurrentvalueisbetween5and80percentofitssaturationlevel.Itsadoptionrateismovingupward,andalineartrendlineisthebestfitforthepastfiveyearsofdata.Futureuptakewilllikelycontinueonaroughlylineartrajectoryinthenearfuturebeforeeventuallydeclining.WefitanS-curvetothehistoricalBOX2MethodsforfittinganS-curvetohistoricaldataTofitanS-curvetothehistoricaldata,weuseda“wellofftrack.”ForthefewindicatorsforwhichthisstandardlogisticS-curvefunction,whichisbasedanalysisisappropriate,wepresentthefullresultsonthreemaininputs:thesaturationlevel,whichoftheS-curvefittinginAppendixC.weassumedtobethemoreambitiousboundoftheindicator’slong-termtarget;themaximumGiventheuncertaintyofS-curveprojections,thisgrowthrate;andthemidpointoftheS-curve.Wecurvefittingrepresentsjustonelineofevidencethenadjustedthegrowthrateandthemidpointthatweconsidered,alongsidealiteraturereviewofthefunctionuntiltheS-curvemostcloselyfitallandconsultationwithexperts.Ifwefoundrelativehistoricaldata.consensusamongthisS-curvefittingexercise,theliterature,andconsultationwithexperts,thenWethencomparedtheS-curve’sprojectedvaluedeterminingtheindicator’scategoryofprogressfor2030toournear-termtargetforeachindicator.wasstraightforward.IfwefounddisagreementAnS-curveextrapolationabovethetargetsug-amongtheselinesofevidence,wehadtomakegeststhattheindicatoris“ontrack.”AnS-curveajudgmentcallbyidentifyingthemostcom-thatgetsmorethanhalfofthewayfromthepellinglinesofevidence.Wediscusstheselinescurrentvaluetothe2030targetindicatesthattheofevidenceinthisreportinAppendixC.Moreindicatorislikelytobe“offtrack,”andiftheextrap-informationonourmethodsforassessingprogressolationislessthanhalfofthewayfromthecurrentcanbefoundinJaegeretal.(2023),thetechnicalvaluetothe2030target,theindicatorislikelytobenotethataccompaniesthisreport.MethodologyforAssessingProgressSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202323Analysisofmostrecentimprovementrelativetothehistoricaltrendline.Butifthedatapointmostrecentdatapointfallsmorethan5percentbelowtheprojectedvalueontheextendedhistoricaltrendlineInadditiontoassessingprogressmadetoward2030forthesameindicator,wenotedthatthemostrecenttargets,wealsoanalyzedwhetheranindicator’smostyearofdataforthisindicatorrepresentsaworseningrecentdatapointrepresentsameaningfulimprovementrelativetothehistoricaltrendline.Determiningtheextentorworsening,relativetoitshistoricaltrendlineifsufficienttowhichanimprovementorworseningiseithertempo-dataareavailable.Essentially,weextendedthehistoricalraryorpartofalonger-termtrend,however,willonlybetrendlinefromtheprevious5yearsofdata(or10yearspossibleinfutureyears.forforestsandlandindicatorswherepossible)toprojectadatapointforthemostrecentyearforwhichwehaveSelectionofrecentdata(Figure2).Forexample,ifourmostrecentdatadevelopmentspointis2022,weuseddatafrom2017to2021toconstructahistoricaltrendlineandthenextendedthattrendlinetoForeachsector,wealsohighlightrecentdevelop-projectadatapointfor2022.ments—fromadoptingnewpoliciestoinvestinginthedevelopmentofmorenascenttechnologiestodisburs-Wethencomparedourmostrecentdatapointtothisingfinancialpledges—thathaveoccurredprimarilyprojecteddatapointontheextendedhistoricaltrend-sincethe26thConferenceoftheParties(COP26)inline.Ifthemostrecentdatapoint,forexample,wasGlasgow.Formanyofourindicators,itcantaketimemorethan5percenthigherthantheprojectedvalueforactionsundertakenbygovernments,civilsociety,ontheextendedtrendlineforanindicatorthatneedstoincreasetoachieveits2030target,wenotedthatthemostrecentyearofdataforthisindicatorrepresentsanFIGURE2MethodsforcomparingmostrecentyearofdatatoextendedhistoricaltrendlineHypotheticalIndicatorValue1008060402002019202220252016Mostrecenthistoricaldatapoint(e.g.,2022)Currenttrajectorybasedonfiveyearsofdatapriortothemostrecenthistoricaldatapoint(e.g.,2017-21)Historicaldatafromfiveyearspriortothemostrecentdatapoint(e.g.,2017-21)Source:Authors.MethodologyforAssessingProgressSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202324andtheprivatesectortospurglobalchange.YettheseinBoehmetal.(2022)whenidentifyingrecentdevelop-advancesstillrepresentimportantshiftsmadeinthements.Finally,wefocusedprimarilyondevelopmentsreal-worldeconomy.Accordingly,amorecomprehen-thatareglobalinscope,thoughwealsoincludedthosesivesnapshotofthestateofclimateactionrequiresthatarefromparticularlyimportantgeographies(e.g.,bothanalysisofprogressmadetowardoursectoralmajoremitters,largeeconomiesthatcanshapeglobal1.5°C-alignedtargets,andasummaryofthemeasurestrends,countriesthatcontaindisproportionateamountsthatmaysupport(orhinder)achievingthemby2030.ofhigh-carbonecosystems,primaryproducersofanemissions-intensivegood,countriesthathaveyettoToidentifytherecentdevelopmentsmostrelevanttoadoptaparticularzero-carbontechnology,etc.).eachsector,werestrictedoursearchtothosethatfallintooneofthecategoriesofenablingconditionsout-Morespecifically,weprimarilyreliedonsearchesofgraylinedinBoehmetal.(2022)—innovationsintechnologies,literature,newsletters,andpolicytrackersfromleadingsupportivepolicies,institutionalstrengthening,leader-organizationswithinthesesectors(e.g.,theInternationalship,andshiftsinbehaviorandsocialnorms.NotethatEnergyAgency,InternationalRenewableEnergyAgency,thesignificanceofenablingconditionsdiffersbysector.C40,WorldGreenBuildingCouncil,MissionPossibleInpower,forexample,manyofthetechnologiesneededPartnership,WorldSteelAssociation,BloombergNewtodecarbonizethesectorarematureandcommer-EnergyFinance,InstituteforTransportationandDevelop-cialized,whileinindustryorfoodandagriculture,thesementPolicy,InternationalTransportForum,Internationalinnovationsremainfarmorenascent,suchthatachiev-CouncilonCleanTransportation,NewYorkDeclarationingthesesectoraltargetswilllikelyrequireconsiderableonForests,FoodandAgricultureOrganizationoftheinvestmentinresearch,development,anddeployment.UnitedNations,andClimatePolicyInitiative),newspaperSimilarly,whilemanycountrieshavesettargetsandarticlesfrommajoroutlets(e.g.,Reuters,theAssociatedannouncednationalstrategiesfocusedonelectrifyingPress,theNewYorkTimes,theGuardian),andnationallytransportorconservingecosystems,farfewerhaveputdeterminedcontributions(NDCs).WerestrictedourinplacesimilargoalsorplanstodecarbonizebuildingssearchestotheperiodfromNovember2021toAugustorshiftconsumptionpatterns.Thus,wehewedcloselyto2023,thoughweincludedsomerecentdevelopmentsthespecificenablingconditionsoutlinedforeachsectorthatpredatedthisperiodwhererelevant.MethodologyforAssessingProgressSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202325SECTION2PowerAroundtheworld,accesstoaffordableandin2020duetoresponsestotheCOVID-19pandemicreliablepowerunderpinsmodernsociety(UNSD(e.g.,reductionofindustrialandcommercialelectricity2023),enablingpeopletowork,cook,learn,takedemand[Bertrametal.2021]),theyreboundedtoacareofeachother,andmore.Yetnearly10percentofrecordhighofabout15gigatonnesofcarbondioxidetheworld’spopulation—some680millionpeople—doequivalent(GtCO2e)in2022(IEA2023o).nothaveaccesstoelectricity,withmanystillusingfirewoodfortheirmostbasicenergyneeds(IEA2023p).Tomeettheselargegapsinaccesstoelectricityandimprovelivingstandards,demandforpowerisrisingrapidly(IEA2022t).Today’sgrowingpowersectorishighlyemissions-inten-sive.Becausesomuchelectricitycomesfromburningcoalandfossilgas,electricitygenerationaccountedforaround25percentofglobalgreenhousegas(GHG)emissionsin2021(Figure3)andhaslongremainedthesingle-largestsourceofcarbondioxide(CO2)emissionsglobally(Figure4).Indeed,overthelasttwodecades,CO2emissionsfromelectricityproductionhaveincreasedby0.25gigatonnes(billionmetrictons)ofcarbondioxide(GtCO2)eachyear(IEA2021f,2022g).And,whiletheseemissionscontractedbyaround3.5percentFIGURE3Power’scontributiontoglobalnetanthropogenicGHGemissionsin2021ElectricityandheatOilandgas14.4fugitiveemissions2.5Other1.6Coalminingfugitiveemissions1.5EnergyPetroleumrefining20.70.7Non-CO2(allbuildings)WasteLanduse,0.04land-use2.4change,Nonresidentialandforestry0.8GlobalGHGAgriculture,Emissionsforestry,4.0Rail56.8GtCO2eandother0.1ResidentialBuildingslandusesEnteric2.33.2fermentationInlandshipping10.40.2Transport3.0Managed8.1soilsandDomesticaviationManagedpasture0.3soilsandIndustrypastureInternational12.0aviation1.40.4RoadOtherRicecultivationOtherTransport4.41.00.55.9ManuremanagementInternational0.4shippingChemicalsMetals0.72.63.4Syntheticfertilizerapplication0.4Cement1.6Biomassburning0.1Notes:CO2=carbondioxide;GHG=greenhousegas;GtCO2e=gigatonnesofcarbondioxideequivalent.AlthoughthisfigurehighlightsGHGemissionsfromelectricityandheat,thischapteronpowerfocusesprimarilyonelectricitygeneration,whichaccountsformorethan90%ofCO2emissionsfromthepowersector.The“heat”componentofthissectoraccountsforGHGemissionsfromtheburningoffossilfuelstoprovideheattoindustrialprocesses,suchassteelproduction.Sources:Minxetal.(2021);EuropeanCommissionandJRC(2022).PowerSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202327FIGURE4GlobalCO2emissionsfrompowerbyThegrowingdemandforpower,andourcurrentrelianceonfossilfuelstocreateit,makestransformingtoday’send-usesectorsglobalpowersectorurgentforlimitingglobaltempera-tureriseto1.5°C.DecarbonizingthepowersectorisalsoGtCO2/yrTransportvitalbecausedecarbonizationpathwaysacrossother14majorsectors(e.g.,buildings,industry,andtransport)willbecontingentonadecarbonizedpowersector’sability12toprovideabundantaccesstozero-carbonelectricityformanyenduses.1210Fortunately,thereareencouragingsignsthattheIndustrystructuraltransformationsneededacrosstheglobal8powersectorhavealreadybegun.Cleanpowertech-nologieslikesolarandwindarewidelymature,andthe6costofrenewableenergyandstoragetechnologiesBuildingshascontinuedtoplummetatratesunprecedentedintheenergysector,leadingtorecord-breakinggrowth4inadoptionin2022(IRENA2023b).Solarphotovoltaics(PV)andonshorewindarenowthecheapestsources2ofnew-buildgenerationforatleasttwo-thirdsoftheglobalpopulation(BloombergNEF2020),and,between0Otherelectricity2015and2022,solarandwindincreasedfrom5percent1990ofglobalelectricitygenerationto12percentofglobal200020102020electricitygeneration(Ember2023).In2022,thenetgrowthofwindandsolargenerationalone(+560TWh)Notes:CO2=carbondioxide;GtCO2/yr=gigatonnesofcarbonmet80percentofallglobalelectricitydemandgrowthdioxideperyear.CO2emissionspresentedinthistimeseriesare(+690TWh)(Wiatros-Motykaetal.2023)(seeFigure5).Infromelectricityonlyanddonotcovertheheatcomponentofpowerfact,someexpertspredictthat2022representsthepeakemissionsshowninFigure3.Also,todisaggregateCO2emissionsbyoftotalemissionsinthepowersector(Wiatros-Motykaetend-usesectors,werelyonadifferentdatasourcethanMinxetal.al.2023),positioningtheglobaleconomytoenteranew(2021)andEuropeanCommissionandJRC(2022).Thesedisaggre-eraoffallingpowersectoremissions.gateddataareavailablethrough2020only.Source:IEA(2023l).FIGURE5Roleofzero-carbonversusfossilpowersourcesinmeetingriseinelectricitydemandin2022TWh739GasNuclear80086OtherRES–12600108Hydro694–129Otherfossil245Coal80%ofdemandrise400312Solar2000DemandWindNotes:RES=renewableenergysources;TWh=terawatthours.Source:Wiatros-Motykaetal.(2023).PowerSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202328Russia’sinvasionofUkrainehaspushedtheworldtonuclearpowerfromsomecountries,with270GWinacriticaljunctureinthistransformation.Ascountriesthepipeline,comparedto410GWcurrentlyoperatingseektosecuretheirenergyfutureinaworldwithout(IEA2022u;GEM2023b).ContinuedinvestmentintheseRussian-suppliedoilandgas,theyfaceastarkchoicezero-carbonpowersources,particularlyinlightofthebetweendoublingdownonfossilfuelsorrapidlyRussian-causedenergycrisis,willberequiredforaccel-expandingzero-carbonpower.And,whilesomeeratingthetransformationtoadecarbonizedpowercountrieshaveindeedreopenedshutteredfossilfuelsectorforall.infrastructureduringthistimeofcrisis,investmentsinzero-carbonenergytechnologies(almostallofwhichGlobalassessmentofproduceoruseelectricity)surpassed$1trillionin2022,progressforpowermatchinginvestmentinfossilfuelsforthefirsttimeinhistory(Wiatros-Motykaetal.2023).ThecrisishasalsoElectricitygenerationmustbedecarbonized,primarilydrivennewinvestmentsinimprovingenergyefficiency,throughshiftingtozero-carbonpowerandphasingoneofthelargestuntappedresourcesfordecarbonizingoutfossilfuelslikecoalandgas.Simultaneously,wewillthesector(Bondetal.2023).needtoclosegapsinenergyaccess,useenergymoreefficiently,expandgridcapacity,andprioritizeenergyParticularlypromisingsignsofthistransformationstorageandflexibility.13Theseshiftswillbekeytoensur-areinthebuildupofsolarandwindpower.Currently,ingthatglobalwarmingislimitedto1.5°C.moresolarandwindpowerisintheglobalpipeline(1,200GWand1,800GW,respectively)thanallsolarThesechangesmustoccurinamannerthatisequitableandwindpowercurrentlyoperating(1,000GWandandsustainable.Historically,ahandfulofcountriesinthe900GW,respectively)(GEM2023b;IRENA2023a).Whiledevelopedworldhavebeenresponsibleforgeneratingthisprogressiscompelling,italsohighlightstheslowavastproportionofemissions.Thesenationswillneedpermittingandconstructiontimesinmanycountries,toleadthewayindeliveringcleanenergytransitionswhichoftenimpedeanddelayconstructionofplannedbyphasingoutfossilfuelsanddemonstratinghowtoprojects.Streamliningtheseprocesseswouldallowconstructlarge-scalezero-carbonpowergenerationforfasterdeploymentofzero-carbonpowersolutions.TherehasadditionallybeenarenewedincreaseinTABLE1SummaryofglobalprogresstowardpowertargetsINDICATORMOSTRECENT203020352050LIKELIHOODACCELERATIONSTATUSDATAPOINTTARGETTARGETTARGETOFFACTORShareofzero-carbon(YEAR)FOLLOWINGsourcesinelectricityANS-CURVEgeneration(%)aShareofcoalin3988–9198–9999–100N/A;electricitygeneration(%)(2022)(2040)authorjudgmentbShareofunabated3640–107xfossilgasinelectricitygeneration(%)(2022)(2040)Carbonintensityofelectricity235–710>10xgeneration(gCO2/kWh)(2022)(2040)44048–802–6<0c9x(2022)(2040)Notes:gCO2/kWh=gramsofcarbondioxideperkilowatt-hour.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.aZero-carbonsourcesincludesolar,wind,hydropower,geothermal,nuclear,marine,andbiomasstechnologies.bForindicatorscategorizedasS-curvelikely,accelerationfactorscalculatedusingalineartrendlinearenotpresented,astheywouldnotaccuratelyreflectanS-curvetrajectory.Thecategoryofprogresswasdeterminedbasedonauthorjudgment,usingmultiplelinesofevidence.SeeAppendixCandJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformation.cAchievingbelowzero–carbonintensityimpliesbiomasspowergenerationwithcarboncaptureandstorage.Thesetargetslimitbioenergywithcarboncaptureandstorageuseto5GtCO2peryearin2050.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationaboutthesustainabilitycriteriausedintarget-setting.Sources:HistoricaldatafromEmber(2023);targetsfromCAT(2023a).PowerSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202329capabilitydomestically,14whilesimultaneouslyhelpingPOWERINDICATOR1:developingcountriestodecarbonizetheirpowersectorsandofferingneweconomicdevelopmentopportunities.Shareofzero-carbonsourcesinelectricitygeneration(%)Thissectionexaminestheprogressoftheglobalpowertransitionbyanalyzingfourindicatorsrelated•Targets:Theshareofzero-carbonsourcesinelectric-toelectricitygeneration:shareofzero-carbonsourcesinelectricitygeneration;shareofcoalinelectricityitygenerationreaches88–91percentby2030,98–99generation;shareofunabatedfossilgasinelectricitypercentby2040,and99–100percentby2050.generation;andcarbonintensityofelectricitygenera-tion(Table1).AllindicatorsshowthatchangeisheadedTheshareofzero-carbonsourcesinglobalelectricityintherightdirection,butataninsufficientrate.grewslightlyin2022toreach39percent,acontinuationofrecenttrends.However,theworldneedstoincreaseShifttozero-carbonpowertheshareofzero-carbonsourcesinglobalelectricityto88–91percentby2030(atargetthathelpsaligntheScalingupzero-carbonpowertechnologieswillhelppowersectorwith1.5°C-compatiblepathways).Differentdecarbonizethepowersector(IPCC2022b).Thesezero-carbontechnologiesareondifferenttrajectories.technologies,whichgeneratelittletonoCO2duringtheirSolarpowerisinthebreakthroughstageofanS-curve,operationalcycles,includesolar,wind,hydropower,bio-growingexponentiallyoverthepastfiveyears,whilemass,nuclear,geothermal,andmarinetechnologies.15windpowerisinthediffusionstageofanS-curve,havingByprovidingzero-carbonpower,suchtechnologiescangrownexponentiallyinthepastbutgrowinglinearlyhelpmeetglobalenergyneedswithoutincreasingGHGoverthelastfiveyears(seeBox3).Nuclearpower,emissionsandlocalairpollutants.Outofallzero-carbonhydropower,andotherzero-carbonpowersourceslikepowersources,hydropowercontributedthelargestbioenergyhavebeenchanginglinearly(orplateauinginshareofglobalelectricitygeneration,at15percentthecaseofnuclear).Ifthetrajectoriesofeachofthese(4,300TWh)in2022(Ember2023).Nuclearpoweroutput,technologiesareextrapolated,theshareofzero-carbondespitehavingplateauedsince2006(WNA2022),powersourcesinelectricitygenerationismakingprom-maintainsitsplaceasthesecond-largestzero-carbonisingprogress,but,thoughheadingintherightdirection,contributortototalgenerationataround9percentrecentratesofchangeremainofftrack.(2,600TWh).Solarandwindarethefastest-growingsourcesofelectricitygeneration(IRENA2022a;IEA2023n)andtogetheraccountedfor12percentoftotalgeneration(3,400TWh)in2022.Meanwhile,allotherzero-carbonsources,includingbioenergy,accountedfor3percentoftotalgeneration(780TWh)in2022(Ember2023).Itisimportanttonotethatmorethan90percentofinvestmentinzero-carbonenergyhasoccurredinadvancedeconomiesandChina(IEA2023m).Asgrowthofthesepowersourcescontinues,itwillbeimportanttoensuremoreeveninvestmentsinzero-carbonenergy;indeed,mobilizinggreaterfinancingforemerginganddevelopingeconomiesiscriticaltoavoidcleanenergyimbalancesbetweendevelopedanddevel-opingcountries.Despitefastandcontinuedgrowthinzero-carbonpowertechnologydeployment,theshareofzero-car-bonpowersourcesinelectricitygenerationshowedonlyslowgrowthbetween2000(36percent)and2022(39percent)(Figure6).Thisisbecausethegrowthinzero-carbonpowerhasproceededinlinewithtotalpowergenerationduetoincreasedelectrificationandimprovedenergyaccess.Accordingly,toclearlytracktheshifttozero-carbonpowerthatisrequiredforkeeping1.5°Cinsight,wetracktheshareofzero-carbonsourcesintotalglobalelectricitygeneration,ratherthangrowthoftechnologydeploymentalone.PowerSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202330FIGURE6Historicalprogresstoward2030,2040,and2050targetsforshareofzero-carbonsourcesinelectricitygenerationRightDirection,OffTrackS-CurveLikely%HistoricalCurrentPaceneededtodatatrendreachtargets10098–9999–1002040target2050target8088–912030target602022data3940200201020202030204020502000Note:Zero-carbonsourcesincludesolar,wind,hydropower,geothermal,nuclear,marine,andbiomasstechnologies.ForindicatorscategorizedasS-curvelikely,accelerationfactorscalculatedusingalineartrendlinearenotpresented,astheywouldnotaccuratelyreflectanS-curvetrajec-tory.ThiscurrenttrendarrowisextrapolatedbasedonanS-curvetrendlineforsolarandforwindandalineartrendlinefortheothertechnologies.Thecategoryofprogresswasdeterminedbasedonauthorjudgment,usingmultiplelinesofevidence.SeeAppendixCandJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromEmber(2023);targetsfromCAT(2023a).PowerSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202331BOX3ShareofwindandsolarsourcesinelectricitygenerationSolarandwindpowerhavebeenthemaincontributorsreach57–78percentby2030,and79–96percentbytogrowthintheoverallshareofzero-carbonsources2050.aThesetargetsarecalculatedusingmethodsfrominelectricitygenerationinrecentyears.HydropowerCAT(2023a),whicharedescribedfurtherinthisreport’sandnuclearhavetraditionallybeenthelargestsourcesaccompanyingtechnicalnote(Jaegeretal.2023).ofzero-carbonelectricity,buttheyhavebeenslowlydeclininginrecentyears(Ember2023).CostsofsolarTheshareofelectricityproducedfromsolarandwindandwindhavebeenfalling,withadditionaldeploymenthasbeengrowing14percentperyearonaverageforspurringadditionalcostdeclines.thepastfiveyears,animpressiverateofgrowth.How-ever,itwouldhavetoincreaseby24percentperyearinToachievetargetsforzero-carbonpoweralignedwiththefuturetomeetthe2030target,requiringcontinuedtrajectoriesthatlimitwarmingto1.5°C,theshareofwindaccelerationthroughthisdecade(FigureB3.1).andsolarsourcesinelectricitygenerationwillneedtoFIGUREB3.1Historicalprogresstoward2030,2040,and2050targetsforshareofwindandsolarsourcesinelectricitygeneration%HistoricalCurrentPaceneededtodatatrendreachtargets1002030target57–788075–9179–962050target2040target60402022data20120201020202030204020502000Note:ThecurrenttrendarrowisextrapolatedbasedonanS-curvetrendlineforeachtechnology.Sources:HistoricaldatafromEmber(2023);targetsfromCAT(2023a).Note:aOtheranalysisfromRMIfindsthatifsolarandwindfollowafastS-curve,theywouldreach33percentofelectricitygenerationin2030;iftheyfollowpureexponentialgrowth,theywouldreach39percentofelectricitygenerationin2030(Bondetal.2023).ThisiswithinstrikingdistanceoftheIEA’sNetZeroEmissions(NZE)Scenario(IEA2022t),whichshowsa41percentshareofsolarandwindinelectricitygenerationby2030,butwellbelowthisreport’stargetof53–78percentin2030.Thescenariosandliteraturethatunderpinthisreport’stargetsshowahighershareoftotalzero-carbonpowerandahighershareofwindandsolarwithinzero-carbonpowerthantheIEA’sNZE.ThisisbecausetheIEANZEshowsstronggrowthinnuclear,fossilgaswithcarboncaptureandstorage,biomass,andhydropowergeneration.Additionally,theNZEhasahigheroverallcarbonintensityofpowergenerationthantheaverage1.5°C-compatiblescenariosusedinthisreport,whichmeansthatothersectorsdecarbonizefasterintheNZE.PowerSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202332ManybrightspotsinviteoptimismaboutrealprogressFIGURE7Weightedaveragelevelizedcostoftowardthe2030targetforshareofzero-carbonpowerinelectricitygeneration.Between2019and2022,powerelectricityforselectedrenewablegenerationfromzero-carbontechnologiesgrewsig-energytechnologiesandfossilnificantly:mostnotablysolarby600TWh(+86percent)fuelcomparisonandwindby680TWh(+48percent)(Ember2023).Inrecentyears,severalcountrieshavescaledupwindandUS$/kWhsolarpoweratrapidrates(formoreinformationabout0.50national-levelprogress,seeBox4).Indeed,solarmanu-facturingthroughput(theamountthatgetsproducedby0.40manufacturingplants)forsolarPVmodulesgrewfrom190GWin2021to260GWin2022,thelatterrepresenting0.30about40percentoftotalmanufacturingcapacity(IEA2023i).Betweennowand2030,newannouncedcapacity0.20impliesanadditional1.1TWofthroughputin2030ifitisallultimatelybuilt.FossilfuelOffshorecostrangewindMeanwhile,thecostsofthesetechnologieshavecontinuedtoplummetbeyondexpectations.Overthe0.10pastdecade,costshaveplunged80percentforsolar,54percentforoffshorewind,and65percentforonshore0201220142016SolarPVwind(Figure7).Thepriceofbatterystorage—atechnol-2010Onshoreogythatenablesvariablerenewables—hasalsofallenwindsubstantially,byaround89percentbetween2010and2021(BloombergNEF2022a).16Itisimportanttonotehere,201820202022however,thatsupply-chainissuesforselectzero-carbonpowertechnologies(e.g.,batterysupplyshortagesNotes:$/kWh=dollarsperkilowatt-hour;PV=photovoltaics.causedbylithiumshortages)canslowgrowth.Source:IRENA(2023b).BOX4Wherearethemostrapidratesofchange?Windandsolarpowerhaveemergedasprimarydriversachieveditsrapidgrowthaheadofmostothercoun-ofthetransitiontorenewableenergy,offeringclean,tries.From1999,itsgovernmentintroducedafeed-inabundant,andcost-effectiverenewablepowerwithtariff,aguaranteedpaymentforsurplusrenewablesmallerenvironmentaldrawbacksthanthoseassoci-electricitythathomeownersandothergeneratorsatedwithbiomassorhydropower.Whilemanycountriesproduce.Thegovernmentalsoprovidedusereplace-areinvestinginrenewableenergy,thepaceofthistran-mentcertificatestoencourageupgradesforwindsitionvarieswidely.Acloserlookatcountriesleadingturbines(CookandLinLawell2020).BecauseDenmarkthechargerevealshowtheyareprogressingalongtheirwasinvestinginrenewablesinatimeperiodbeforetransitionsandwhatlessonsothercountriescanlearncostshadfallensubstantially,bottom-upmodelsshowandapply.FigureB4.1listscountriesthathavescaledthatDenmark’srapidshifttomorewindandsolarupsolarandwind’sshareoftotalpowergenerationthepowergenerationstemmeddirectlyfromthesepolicyfastest.Thejurisdictionsarequitegeographicallyvariedchanges,ratherthanfromtechnologicaladvancesanddemonstratethataquickscale-upispossiblein(CookandLinLawell2020).Uruguayhashadsimilarmostregionsoftheworld.successwithfeed-intariffs,andalsoimplementedareverse-auctionsystemtoencouragewindpowerThesejurisdictionshavereliedonavarietyofpoliciesinvestment(WestphalandThwaites2016).aHowever,itisandregulationstoachievetheirsuccess.Forexam-imperativetoensurethatfeed-intariffsdecreaseastheple,Denmark,whichmostlydependsonwindpower,costofthetechnologiesdrop,toavoidoverspending.PowerSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202333BOX4Wherearethemostrapidratesofchange?(continued)FIGUREB4.1Thefastestfive-yearperiodsofgrowthofsolaranetenergyimportertoanetexporter.ElSalvadorandwindasashareoftotalelectricitygenerationisalsohopingtoswitchfromimportedfossilfuelstohome-grownrenewables(IRENA2022b),building%ofelectricitygenerationonalong-term2010–24energysectorplan,which70incentivizesrenewableenergyprojects.Inducementsincludeincometaxexemptionsforthefirst5–10years60Denmarkofaproject’slifeandduty-freeimportsonelectricitygenerationequipment(IRENA2020).InPalestine,the50LithuaniaincreaseinsolarPVenergyhascomefromaneedforenergyself-sufficiency;electricityisimportedfrom40Israelandisheavilycontrolled(Khatibetal.2021).Small-scalePVallowshouseholdsandbusinessesUruguaytousetheelectricitytheygeneratedirectlyanddecreasesrelianceongrid-suppliedpower.PalestineNetherlandshasalsointroducedincentivesintheformofreduced30incometaxesforutility-scalePV,whicharesettoincreasewithtime(Khatibetal.2021).NamibiaPalestineAswellasbuildingupwindandsolarcapacity,improvinggridinfrastructureandefficiencyisrequired20tomakebestuseofvariablerenewables.Manyofthesejurisdictionshavefolloweduptheirbuildupof10windandsolarwithlargeinvestmentsingridinfra-structureandexpansion;forinstance,Uruguayhas02006201120172022investedUS$1billion,whileDenmarkhasinvestedjust2000over€1,30million(EuropaWirePR2023;UruguayXXI2022).Itisalsoimportanttonotethatassomecoun-Fastestfive-yearperiodsofgrowthtrieshavescaleduprenewableenergy,theyhavehadtorelyonimportingenergyduringsomeperiodsoflowSource:Jaeger(2023).generation,andbeenabletoexportitatothertimes.Therefore,gridinterconnectivityishighlyimportantasNamibiahasbuiltupanimpressiveshareofsolarrenewablescontinuetoscaleup.powerbyenactinglong-terminfrastructureandeconomicplans,suchasdirectinvestmentinsolarWhiletheabovejurisdictionshavethehighestratesplants(WorldEconomicForum2021;NamibiaMinistryofsolarandwindscale-upasashareoftotalpowerofMinesandEnergy2017).Italsoopenedupthegeneration,creditshouldalsobegiventocountrieselectricitymarketin2015toallownonstatepartiestoinstallingthelargesttotalamountsofwindandsolar,purchaseelectricitydirectlyfromindependentpowerincludingChina,theUnitedStates,Germany,andIndiaproducers,encouragingprivateforeigninvestment(togethermakingup54percentofglobalpowersectorinbothenduseandgeneration(GIZ2022).Thispolicygeneration).Thelargecapacitiesinstalledbytheseisintendedtohelpthecountryswitchfrombeingcountriesalsohelptodrivedownpricesworldwideasthetechnologycontinuestoscale.Note:aInareverse-auctionsystem,sellersordevelopersbidforpricesatwhichtheycanselltheirgoodsorservices,asopposedtoaregularauctionwherebuyersbidatincreasingcostsforasoldgoodorservice(Chen2022)..PowerSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202334PhaseoutfossilfueluseininallregionsexceptEuropesince2011(Ember2023).Fos-powergenerationsilgasusageispredictedtocontinuegrowingstronglyinthenearfutureundercurrentpolicies,especiallyinAcrosstheworld,coaliscurrentlyresponsibleforalmostemergingeconomies(BloombergNEF2022c).70percentoftotalpowersectorCO2emissions,andgasmakesuparound25percent(Ember2023).PhasingoutInadditiontotheirclimateimpacts,fineparticulatethesepowersources,then,willdirectlydecreaseoverallmatter(PM2.5)andotherpollutants,suchassulfurpowersectoremissionsandemissionsintensity,andisdioxideandnitrogenoxides,emittedbyfossilfuel–firedcrucialforlimitingglobaltemperatureriseto1.5°C.powerplants(particularlycoal)alsohaveadirectimpactoncommunityhealth.SuchpollutantscanEmissionsfrombothcoalandgasarescatteredaroundexacerbaterespiratoryconditionssuchasasthmaandtheworld,thoughmostareconcentratedinseveralincreasetheriskofheartdiseaseandlungcancer(U.S.largeeconomies.Chinawasresponsibleforaround53EPA2011).Coal-firedpowerplants,inparticular,alsogen-percentofcoalusagein2022,withIndia(14percent)eratelargeamountsofwastewater,whichcancontainandtheUnitedStates(8percent)beingthesecond-andheavymetals,toxicchemicals,andotherpollutantsthird-biggestusers,respectively(Figure8)(Ember2023).andcontaminatelocalwatersources,damageaquaticAlthoughtheshareofcoalasapowersourcehasbeenecosystems,andharmhumanhealth.CommunitiesedgingdownwardinChina,totalcoalusageforpowerlivingnearfossilfuel–firedpowerplantsareoftensocio-hasbeensteadilyrising.CoalusageinIndiahasalsoeconomicallydisadvantaged(Kopasetal.2020),whichincreasedsubstantiallyinthelastdecade(BP2022).furtherexacerbatesvulnerabilitytothesehealthrisks.AlthoughemissionsfromburningfossilgasdroppedAddressingthehealthimpactsoffossilfuel–firedpowerslightlyin2020duetotheCOVID-19pandemic,theyplantsandprotectingpublichealththusrequiresurgentreboundedin2021(IEA2022t).Fossilgasusageforpoweractiontoregulateandphaseouttheseenergysources.generationislargestintheUnitedStates,whichburns26percentoftheworld’sgasusedforpowergeneration,POWERINDICATOR2:followedbytheEuropeanUnion(20percent),andRussia(8percent),althoughgasusagehasincreasedsteadilyShareofcoalinelectricitygeneration(%)FIGURE8ShareofglobalcoalconsumptionforTargets:TheshareofcoalinelectricitygenerationfallspowergenerationinChina,Unitedto4percentby2030,0–1percentby2040,andthento0States,India,andtherestoftheworldpercentby2050.17%oftotalconsumptionThepercentageofpowergeneratedfromcoal100increaseduntil2007.Itthenslowlybegandeclining,fallingby4percentduringtheCOVID-19pandemic,butRestoftheworldthenreboundedby3percentin2021beforemarginally80decreasingin2022incontinuationofrecenttrends(BP2022;Ember2023).WhilerecentratesofchangehaveIndiathusbeenheadingintherightdirection,progressstill60fallsshortofthe2030target(Figure9),andtheindicatoriswellofftrack.ToreducetheshareofcoalinelectricityUnitedStatesgenerationto4percentby2030,therecentspeedofdeclinemustacceleratebyseventimes.However,with40therapidbuildupofrenewablesandtheirdecreasingcosts,itispossiblethattheshareofcoalinpowergen-Chinaerationcoulddecreaserapidlyandnonlinearly.20Wealthiercountriesthathavehistoricallygenerated0200720152022themostemissionsandhavethegreatestcapacityto2000cutthemsharplyneedtodemonstratetotherestoftheworldhowtophaseoutcoal-firedpower,includingSource:Ember(2023).byphasingoutfossilfuelsubsidies.Thesecountriesalsobeararesponsibilitytomobilizesignificantlymoreclimatefinancetosupportothercountries’transitionsandtoreducemisalignedfinanceflows(e.g.,financingforfossilfuelprojectsabroadandfossilfuelsubsidies).However,cleanenergyfinancefromdevelopedcoun-triestodevelopingcountrieswaslowerin2021thaninPowerSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202335FIGURE9Historicalprogresstoward2030,2040,and2050targetsforshareofcoalinelectricitygenerationRightDirection,WellOffTrackS-CurvePossible%HistoricalCurrentPaceneededtodatatrendreachtargets452022data403635Acceleration30requiredtoreach2030target7x252015102030target2040target2050target540–100200020102020203020402050Notes:SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromEmber(2023);targetsfromCAT(2023a).2010($10.8billionin2021comparedto$12billionin2010employment,andcontributetothedevelopmentof(IEA2023p).In2022,theG7ministersofclimate,energy,asustainableenergyfuture,whilecompensationcanandtheenvironmentagreedtoendgovernmentfinanc-alsobeofferedtoworkersaffectedbythetransition.ingforinternationalcoal-firedpowergeneration(G7Therearemanyexamplesofthisinpractice;SlovakiaGermany2022).Butthispromisedoesnotaffectthetypehasprovidededucation,retraining,andcoachingofpowergenerationthatcountriesfinancedomestically.tocoalindustryworkersintheUpperNitraregion,CommitmentsmustsimultaneouslybemadetophasewhileformercoalminessuchasAnselminCzechiaoutdomesticcoalandgasuse.Indeed,around$1trillionhavebeenconvertedintomuseumsthatdrawtour-isstillbeinginvestedannuallyinfossilfuelexploration,ists,preservingthetown’scharacterandeconomicextraction,andtransport(LazarusandVanAsselt2018),development(Szőke2022).Currently,about8.4millionwiththemajorityofinvestmentscomingfromdevel-peopleworldwideworkinthecoalvaluechain,afigureopedcountries.expectedtodroptoabout6.1millionby2030(IEA2022x).However,renewableenergyjobshitaround13millioninAscoalpowerisphasedout,itisimportanttoretrain2022,andareexpectedtogrowfurther(IRENA2022c),orcompensatecoalplantworkersandtoincreasethedemonstratingopportunitiestoretraintraditionallyresilienceoflocalcommunities’economicactivitiestocoal-focusedworkforces.ensureajusttransition(Box5).Retrainingprogramscanhelptheseworkersacquirenewskills,findnewqualityPowerSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202336FIGURE10ShareofcoalinelectricitygenerationBOX5DefiningajusttransitionfortheUnitedKingdomandtheworldAtitscore,ajusttransitionelevatesconcernsaboutsocialjusticeinthetransitiontonet-zero%ofelectricitygenerationGHGemissionsinpursuitofasustainableecon-45omyandsociety.Althoughcountriesandregionsconceptualizetheirownvisionsanddefinitions,40atitsbroadestlevel,ajusttransitionaimstoGlobalensurethatimpactedgroups(oftentimeswithlimitedresources)areprotectedandempowered,35socialandeconomicopportunitiesaremaxi-mized,andanychallengesareminimizedand30managed(ILOn.d.).TheInternationalTradeUnionConfederation(ITUC)definesthejusttransition25asaneconomy-wideprocessthatproducestheplans,policies,andinvestmentsthatleadtoaUnitedfuturewherealljobsaregreenanddecent,GHGKingdomemissionsareatnetzero,povertyiseradicated,20andcommunitiesarethrivingandresilient.TheITUCpresentsajusttransitionasbeinginformed15bysocialdialoguebetweenworkersandtheirunions,employers,andoftengovernments(ITUC102017).TheSharmel-SheikhImplementationPlan(UNFCCC2022a)reiterates“thatsustainableandWhat’sjustsolutionstotheclimatecrisismustbefoundedneededonmeaningfulandeffectivesocialdialogueand5participationofallstakeholders.”02007201520232030Note:GHG=greenhousegas.200023percent.Unabatedfossilgas’ssharemustbebroughtSources:HistoricaldatafromEmber(2023);targetsfromCAT(2023a).downto5–7percentby2030toalignwith1.5°C-com-patiblepathways,whichrequiresanaccelerationmoreFortunately,recentencouragingsignsofprogressinvitethan10timesfasterthanthecurrentslightlydecreasingoptimismthatchangeispossible.India,forexample,haslineartrend(Figure11).18Butwiththerapidbuildupofannouncedplanstohaltnewcoalplantconstructionrenewables,theshareoffossilgasinpowergenerationforfiveyearsfrom2024,withmanyotherSouthAsiancoulddecreaserapidlyandnonlinearly.countriesfollowingsuitandannouncingcoalphase-outdatesormoratoriums(Abrasu2023).Meanwhile,theTophaseoutfossilgaspowerattheneededpace,19UnitedKingdomreduceditsshareofcoalforelectricityzero-carbonenergysourcesneedtobebuiltupquickly,generationfromahighofabout40percentin2012towhiletheconstructionofnewfossilgaspowerplantsjust2percentin2021(Ember2023),thefastestfallofneedstobehalted.Currently,over73percentofpoweranycountry(Figure10).Denmark,theNetherlands,andgenerationfromfossilgasisfromthedevelopedworld.GreecehavealsoachievedreductionsincoaluseatThisrapidreductioninfossilgaspowergenerationshouldspeedsalmostasfastastheUnitedKingdom(Wiatros-thenbedrivenparticularlybyphasingoutfossilgasinMotykaetal.2023).Fromnowto2030,therestofthedevelopedcountries.Aswiththecoalphase-out,gasworldneedstophasedowncoalelectricitygenerationplantworkersshouldberetrainedorcompensatedtonearlyasfast.makesuretheenergytransitionisfairandjust(seeBox5).POWERINDICATOR3:Shareofunabatedfossilgasinelectricitygeneration(%)•Targets:Theshareofunabatedfossilgasinelectricitygenerationfallsto5–7percentby2030,1percentby2040,andthento0percentby2050.Theshareoffossilgasgrewfrom18tojustover23percentoftotalelectricitygenerationfrom2000to2019(Ember2023).However,ithasslightlydecreasedeachyearsincethen,includingadecreasein2022toreachPowerSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202337FIGURE11Historicalprogresstoward2030,2040,and2050targetsforshareofunabatedfossilgasinelectricitygenerationRightDirection,WellOffTrackS-CurvePossible%HistoricalCurrentPaceneededtodatatrendreachtargets252022data2320Accelerationrequiredtoreach>10x152030target102030target5–752010202020302040target2050target010200020402050Note:SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromEmber(2023);targetsfromCAT(2023a).Decarbonizeelectricitysuchasaddedcapacityorvaryingdemand.20Inordergenerationtoreducethecarbonintensityofelectricitygeneration,topprioritiesshouldbethephase-outofcoalandgasThecarbonintensityofglobalpowergenerationpowergenerationandthesimultaneousbuildupofprovidesanoverallmeasureofprogressondecarbon-zero-carbonpower,particularlysolarandwind,allofizationofthesectorbydescribingtheemissionsperwhicharetrackedbythepriorindicators.Simultaneously,unitofelectricitygenerated,unaffectedbychangesenergywillneedtobeusedmoreefficientlyandenergystoragesolutionsscaledup,particularlyasthedemandforelectricityincreasesasaresultofincreasingelectrifi-cationinothersectors.POWERINDICATOR4:Carbonintensityofelectricitygeneration(gCO2/kWh)•Targets:Thecarbonintensityofelectricitygenerationgloballyfallsto48–80gramsofcarbondioxideperkilowatt-hour(gCO2/kWh)by2030,2–6gCO2/kWhby2040,andthentobelowzeroby2050.PowerSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202338From2000to2010,thecarbonintensityofglobalpowerITA2022).Thecountry’ssuccesscanbeattributedtogenerationgraduallyincreasedfrom470gCO2/kWhseveralfactors,includingstrongpoliticalcommitment,to480gCO2/kWh.Althoughithasstartedtodecreaseasupportiveframeworkoflawsandregulations,andslightlysincethen,reaching440gCO2/kWhin2022,favorableconditionsforrenewables,includingregu-recenttrendshaveroughlycontinued.Therecentratelatoryreformssuchasacompetitivereverse-auctionofdecreaseneedstoberoughlyninetimesasfastifthesystemforlarge-scaledevelopment,afeed-intarifffor2030target(48–80gCO2/kWh)istobemet.Recentratessmall-scaleprojects,21andincreasedjobtrainingandofchangearethuswellofftrack(Figure12).However,itisuniversitycoursesinrenewableenergy(WestphalandpossiblethatprogressonthisindicatorcoulddecreaseThwaites2016;Elliottetal.2023).Havinghydropowernonlinearlyaszero-carbonpowersourcesdropevenreservesalsohelpedUruguaytomeetelectricityfurtherincostandcontinuetogainmomentum.demandduringperiodsoflowwindpowerasfossilfuelswerephasedout.ThesemeasureshaveresultedinaSomecountrieshaveachievedsignificantreductionsin32percentreductioninUruguay’selectricitypricefromcarbonintensityofelectricitygeneration.Oneexample2010to2021(CEICDatan.d.).WhileUruguayisarelativelyisUruguay,whichproducesover80percentofitselec-smallcountry,itssuccessandhowitwasachievedtricityfromrenewablesources(Ember2023),increasingcouldbereplicatedinothercountrieswithsimilartheshareofwindgenerationinthenationalgridfromrenewableenergypotential.1percentin2013to33percentby2022(Ember2023;FIGURE12Historicalprogresstoward2030,2040,and2050targetsforcarbonintensityofelectricitygenerationRightDirection,WellOffTrackS-CurvePossiblegCO2/kWhHistoricalCurrentPaceneededtodatatrendreachtargets6002022data500440400Accelerationrequiredtoreach2030target9x3002001002030target2040target2050target048–802–6<0200020102020203020402050Notes:gCO2/kWh=gramsofcarbondioxideperkilowatt-hour.Achievingbelowzero-carbonintensityimpliesbiomasspowergenerationwithcar-boncaptureandstorage.Thesetargetslimitbioenergywithcarboncaptureandstorageuseto5GtCO2peryearin2050.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets(includingoursustainabilitycriteria),indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromEmber(2023);targetsfromCAT(2023a).PowerSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202339Thelastseveralyearshavealsoseenimportantcountriescombined(Schonhardt2023).Additionally,developmentsinenergystorage,whereadvancesareIndiahasallocatedmorethan$8billionforcleanenergyrequiredtocontinuetolowerthecarbonintensityofin2023–24(CAT2023b).Thoughthesebrightspotsareelectricitygeneration.Thecostoflithium-ionbatteriessignificant,moreconcertedactionisneededtomeetneededforstoragehasplummetedinrecentyearstargetsforzero-carbonpoweruptake.(BloombergNEF2022a),asdescribedabove.Mean-while,ChinaandtheUnitedStatesareleadingtheAtthesametime,approximately560GWofnewcoal-installationofpumpedhydropowerstoragesolutionsfiredpowerstationsareinthepipeline,withmost(IEA2022y,2022v),22andanumberofothercountriesplannedindevelopingcountrieslikeChina,Indonesia,areimplementingtargets,researchanddevelopmentandBangladesh(GEM2023a;2023b).Policymakersin(R&D)support,andregulatoryreformsforenergytheseregionsmustprioritizedevelopmentofzero-car-storage.Spainisaimingfor20GWofenergystoragebybonpowerovernewfossilfuelpowerplants,halting2030,andGermanyisincentivizingthecombinationofapprovalsfornewconstruction.Appropriatefundingrenewablesandstorage(IEA2022v).Theseinstallationsshouldbesuppliedfromdevelopedcountriestosupportandtargetshavedrivenglobalinvestmentsinbatterythistransition.Fortunately,recentencouragingsignsstoragetogrowbyanaverageof67percentperyearsuggestthattrendsmaybeshifting.since2019,reaching$37billionin2023(IEA2023m).Meanwhile,between2019and2021,morethan8,000Russia’sinvasionofUkrainehasgreatlyimpactedgaspatentapplicationsforenergystoragetechnologiesmarkets,particularlyinEurope,whichnowreliesmoreweresubmittedacrosstheglobe—aneightfoldincreaseheavilyongasimportsfromtheUnitedStatesandfrom2000andapromisingsignalofinnovationintheMiddleEast,butalsogloballyasrichcountriesbuygassector(IEA2022w).Despitetheseencouragingadvances,reservesthatotherwisewouldhavebeenpurchasedatonly16GWofstoragearecurrentlydeployedongridsalowerpricebycountriessuchasPakistan,India,andaroundtheworld(IEA2022v).ModelresultsfromtheIEABrazil(Ahmed2022).Thishascausedthesecountriestosuggestthatanover10,000percentincreaseinbatteryswitchtoburningmorecoalforpowergeneration(BPstoragecapacityisneededbymidcentury(IEA2021b).2022),whichleadstoevenworsehealthandclimateAdditionally,toallowthegridtohandlelargeloadsofimpactsthangas.Ithasalsocontributedtopowervariablerenewables,mostcountrieswillhavetosignifi-rationingandoutagesduetouncertaintyandfluctua-cantlyexpandtransmissionanddistribution,aswellastionsincoalsupply(Singh2022).Itisimportanttonotedemand-responseprograms.thatifaccesstonaturalgasislimitedduetohigherprices,coalmightbeperceivedasamoreaccessibleRecentdevelopmentsoptiontomeetenergyneedsincountriesgrapplingwithacrosspowerenergyaccesschallenges.SafeguardsmustbebuilttopreventthisandencouragecountriestomeetaccessAcrosstheglobalpowersector,thispastyearhasgapsbyscalingzero-carbonalternatives.witnessedmanydevelopmentsaimedatboostingzero-carbonpowergenerationandphasingoutfossilAszero-carbonpowerisscaledupandfossilfuelusagefuelstoultimatelydrivedecarbonizationofelectricityisphasedout,innovativecoalitionsestablishedoverthegeneration.Amajorexampleisthe2022InflationReduc-lastyearwillbecriticalfordrivingcontinueddeclinesintionAct,thelargestinvestmentinclimateandenergyinthecarbonintensityofpowergeneration.In2022,theU.S.history(U.S.DOE2022b).Itauthorizesover$390billionUnitedNationsestablishedtheEnergyCompactActioninsupportforprojectsthatavoidGHGemissions,suchNetworktomatchgovernmentsseekingsupportforasconstructionofzero-carbonpowerorenergystoragereachingtheircleanenergygoalswithgovernmentsandsystems.Theannouncementofthispolicyhashadbusinessesthathavepledgedtoofferfinancingofoverdramaticknock-oneffects,withothercountriesfeeling$600billionbytheendofthedecade,alongwithinfor-pressuretomatchU.S.incentivesorrisklosinggreenmationandcapacitysharing(UnitedNations2022).LaterinvestmentstotheUnitedStates(EuropeanInvestmentintheyear,atCOP27,theEgyptianPresidencylaunchedBank2023).InFebruary2023,theEuropeanUniontheAfricaJustandAffordableEnergyTransitionInitiative,announceditsunofficialanswertotheInflationReduc-whichaimstoprovideatleast300millionpeoplewithtionAct,the“GreenDealIndustrialPlan,”whichaimstomoreaccesstoaffordableenergytechnologiesandreduceredtapeandincreasetradeandfundingforincreaseAfrica’srenewableelectricitygeneration.Insustainabletechnologiessuchaswind,solar,hydrogen,2022,too,philanthropicfundersandtheU.S.governmentandenergystorage.ChinaisalsomassivelyincreasingpartneredtolaunchtheEnergyTransitionAcceleratoritsgreeninvestments,spendingnearly$550billionintomobilizeprivatecapitalforcleanenergytransitions2022onlow-carbontechnologies,morethanallotherindevelopingcountries(McGinnetal.2022).Meanwhile,theAsianCleanEnergyCoalitionwaslaunchedtomobilizeprivateinvestmentandsupportforstrongerrenewableenergypoliciesinAsia.PowerSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202340SECTION3BuildingsBuildingsarethespaceswheremanycarryoutincarbondioxide(CO2)emissionsfrombuildingsintheactivitiesofdailylife,buttheseactivities,2020comparedwiththeyearbefore,lessthanthe10andthebuildingsthemselves,oftenrelyonfossilpercentdropinitiallyestimated(IEA2021d;UNEP2021a;fuelsandareasignificantsourceofGHGemissions.IEA2023d).CO2emissionsfrombuildingoperationshaveDirectGHGemissionsfromburningfuelforcookingandsincereboundedtoprepandemiclevels(IEA2022c).Inheatingon-siteaccountedforanestimated6percent2022,globalenergy-relatedCO2emissionsrosealmostofGHGsgloballyin2021(Figure13).Whenconsidering1percentcomparedtothepreviousyearbut,otherindirectGHGemissionsreleasedoff-sitefromthepro-than2020,operationalemissionsfrombuildingshaveductionofelectricityandheatthatisusedforheating,remainedsimilaroverthelastfiveyears(IEA2023o).cooling,cooking,lighting,electronics,andotheractivi-Underlyingthispatternare,however,geographicaltiesinbuildings,theseGHGemissionsroughlytriplefromdifferences.In2022,buildings-relatedemissionsgrewabout3GtCO2to9GtCO2(Figure14)(IEA2022c).Con-significantlyinAsiaandNorthAmerica,partlydrivenstructingandfurnishingbuildingsgeneratesadditionalbyhightemperaturesdrivingincreaseddemandforemissions,knownasembodiedemissions(IPCC2022b).coolingaswellasrelianceongasandcoal.InEurope,emissionsdroppedin2022becauseofacombinationOperationalemissionsfrombuildingshaverisensteadilyofwarmwinterweatherandtheresponsetofossilfuelsince1990,drivenpredominantlybyelectricitycon-supplydisruptionscausedbyRussia’sillegalinvasionsumptionandfloorareagrowth(Figure14)(IEA2022c).ofUkraine.EuropeangovernmentsarenowprioritizingChangingbehaviorsduringtheCOVID-19pandemic—ashifttowardrenewableenergyandothercleanfuels,namely,teleworkingfollowingofficesclosingduringespeciallyforheating(IEA2023o).lockdowns,aswellasthedeclineinhoteloccupancyandrestaurantdining—ledtoadropofabout3percentFIGURE13Buildings’contributiontoglobalnetanthropogenicGHGemissionsin2021ElectricityandheatOilandgas14.4fugitiveemissions2.5Other1.6Coalminingfugitiveemissions1.5EnergyPetroleumrefining20.70.7Non-CO2(allbuildings)WasteLanduse,0.04land-use2.4change,Nonresidentialandforestry0.8GlobalGHGAgriculture,Emissionsforestry,4.0Rail56.8GtCO2eandother0.1ResidentialBuildingslandusesEnteric2.33.2fermentationInlandshipping10.40.2Transport3.0Managed8.1soilsandDomesticaviationManagedpasture0.3soilsandIndustrypastureInternational12.0aviation1.40.4RoadOtherRicecultivationOtherTransport4.41.00.55.9ManuremanagementInternational0.4shippingChemicalsMetals0.72.63.4Syntheticfertilizerapplication0.4Cement1.6Biomassburning0.1Notes:CO2=carbondioxide;GHG=greenhousegas;GtCO2e=gigatonnesofcarbondioxideequivalent.Sources:Minxetal.(2021);EuropeanCommissionandJRC(2022).BuildingsSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202342FIGURE14GlobaldirectandindirectCO2FIGURE15GlobalfloorareagrowthprojectionsemissionsfrombuildingsfromselectedmodelsfromtheIPCCAR6scenariosdatabaseGtCO2/yr10Billionm2700Indirect8nonresidential600Maximumemissions5006400IndirectMinimumresidentialemissions3004Directnonresidentialemissions200IEAnetzero2by2050scenarioDirectresidential100emissions0201020142018202202010Notes:CO2=carbondioxide;GtCO2/yr=gigatonnesofcarbon204020702100dioxideperyear.Minxetal.(2021)andEuropeanCommissionandJRC(2022)provideanestimateofdirectandindirectGHGemissionsNote:AR6=SixthAssessmentReport;IEA=InternationalEnergyfrombuildingsthrough2020.DataonindirectGHGemissionsfromAgency;IPCC=IntergovernmentPanelonClimateChange;buildings,specifically,arenotyetavailablefor2021.Butbecausetheym2=squaremeter.ThedataaretakenfromtheIPCCAR6scenariorepresentsuchasignificantshareofthissector’stotalemissionsdatabase,usingscenariosthatarecompatiblewith1.5°Candfit(67%in2020),thisfigurereliesonadifferentdatasetthanFigure13.additionalsustainabilitycriteria(CAT2023a),aswellasmodelsthatThisIEA(2023d)datasetincludesdataonbothindirectanddirectspecificallyfocusonthebuildingssector;floorareadatafromtheemissionsfrom2010to2022butexcludesnon-CO2emissions.MoreIEANZE2050scenarioarealsoincluded(IEA2021b).Thisfigureshowsspecifically,thesedataexcludeF-gasemissionsfromtherefrigerantstherangeoffloorareapredictionsfromtheselectedAR6scenariosusedforrefrigerationorinairconditionersandheatpumps.RecentalongwiththefloorareavaluesfromtheIEANetZeroby2050dataarenotavailable,butemissionsofF-gasesfromtheseactivitiesscenario,thelatterofwhichtracksthelowerboundoftherangefromareestimatedatjustover500MtCO2ein2016(GreenCoolingtheAR6scenarios.Eventhoughitisnowhistoric,2020hasmultipleInitiative2023a).estimatesoffloorarea.Thisisbecausethemodelrunswereinitiatedinearlieryearsandmakepredictionsfor2020usingasetofinputsSource:IEA(2023d).andassumptions(relatingtotechnologyavailability,energysupply,climateconditions,andpolicydecisions,tonameafew)(EvansandUndercurrenttrajectories,emissionsfrombuildingswillHausfather2018).continuetogrow.TotalfloorareaisaprimarydriverofemissionsandisexpectedtokeepexpandingintheSources:DatafromIPCCAR6scenariosdatabase(Byersetal.2022)comingdecades(Figure15).By2060,floorareacouldbeandIEANZE2050(IEA2021b).doublewhatitwasin2020(UNEP2017;IEA2017a).Spaceheatingandcoolingaremajorcomponentsofbuildingcomfort(UNEP2022a).Substantialimprovementsacrossenergyconsumptionandemissions,andthemorefloorbuildingsareneededtomeettheParisAgreement’sareathereis,themoreheatingandcoolingisneeded.goaloflimitingtheriseinglobaltemperatureto1.5°C.Asbuildingsgrowinnumberandsize,theywillalsoThedatathatarepubliclyavailableindicatethatnoneproducehigherembodiedemissionsduetothegreateroftheindicatorsassessedareontrack.volumeofconstructionmaterialsused.TheamountoffloorareaandenergyusedpercapitadiffersvastlyGlobalassessmentofamongandwithincountries,oftendependingontheprogressforbuildingscountry’slevelofwealthanditsclimaticzone.MuchofthegrowthinfloorareaisexpectedtooccurinAsiaandBecausebuildingsvarysomuchacrosstheglobeandAfricaasstandardsoflivingimprove.Stepscanbetakendependingontheirintendeduse,pathwaysfordecar-nowtoensurethatnewbuildingconstructiongoeshandbonizationandthetechnologiesandstrategiesusedinhandwithminimizingCO2emissionsfromconstruc-willdiffersignificantlybygeographyandbuildingtype.tionandwithmeetingadditionaldemandforthermalDifferentclimaticzones,forexample,requiredifferentapproachestomeetheatingandcoolingneeds.BuildingsSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202343TABLE2SummaryofglobalprogresstowardbuildingstargetsINDICATORMOSTRECENT203020352050LIKELIHOODACCELERATIONSTATUSDATAPOINTTARGETTARGETTARGETOFFACTOR(YEAR)FOLLOWINGANS-CURVEEnergyintensityofbuilding14085–120N/A55–803xoperations(kWh/m2)(2022)4xInsufficientdataCarbonintensityofbuilding3813–16N/A0–2Insufficientdataoperations(kgCO2/m2)(2022)2.5–3.53.5N/ARetrofittingrateof<1buildings(%/yr)(2019)(2040)Shareofnewbuildings5100100100thatarezero-carbon(2020)inoperation(%)Notes:kgCO2/m2=kilogramofcarbondioxidepersquaremeter;kWh/m2=kilowatt-hourpersquaremeter;yr=year.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsselectingfortargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromIEA(2020c,2021c,2021b,2023g,2023d);targetsfromCAT(2020b,2023a).Mitigationstrategiescandependonthetypeofbuildingzero-carboninoperation.Giventheurgencyofreducing(residentialorcommercial),whetheritexistsorisyetemissions,allnewbuildingsshouldbezero-carbonintobebuilt,whatinfrastructure(suchasgasconnec-operation(energyefficientandnotreliantonfossilfuel–tions)areavailable,andwhattypeoffuelsareusedpoweredtechnology)whileminimizingemissionsfromtopowerit.Still,acrossthesecontexts,decarbonizingconstructionandfurnishing(WorldGBC2019).Decarbon-thebuildingssectoratthegloballevelwillrequirefourizingexistingbuildingswillrequireahighannualrateofinterrelatedshifts(Table2):improvingtheefficiencydeepretrofitsofbuildingenvelopesusingmaterialswithofenergyuseinbuildings,decarbonizingenergyuse,lowembodiedcarbonandheatingsystemsthatdrasti-retrofittingtheexistingbuildingstock,andensuringthatcallyimproveenergyefficiencyandreplaceequipmentnewbuildingsareconstructedtobezero-carboninwithzero-carbonoptions.operation.Newbuildingsneedtobedesignednotonlytooperatewithzerocarbonemissionsbutalsotomini-Whilethisreportfocusesonmitigation,buildingsalsomizetheirembodiedcarbon;forexample,byswitchingplayafundamentalroleinadaptationtoclimatetolow-andzero-carbonmaterialsandconstructionchange,whereaffordableandresilienthousingwillprocesses,andrecyclingmaterialsafterdemolition.Anhelpcommunitiesfacingtheimpactsofclimateindicatortotrackembodiedemissionsisnotincludedchange(WorldGBC2023d).Additionally,thissectioninthisreportduetoalackofdata,buteffortstocollectdoesnotaddressurbanplanningandthewiderbuiltmoredataonembodiedcarbonwillhelpmaketrackingenvironment,thoughchangesinthesecontextsimpactthisfundamentaltransitioneasierinthefuture.buildings,suchascreatingmoregreenspaces,whichloweroveralltemperaturesincitiesandreducetheUnderpinningalloftheseshiftsissufficiency,usedbyneedforactivecooling.theIPCCtomeanreducingdemandalongsidechang-ingthewayweuseexistingspace(e.g.,byensuringImproveenergyefficiencymoreevenlydistributedfloorareapercapita,usingemptybuildingsfornewpurposes,andmakingbuild-Reducingtheenergyintensityofbuildings,definedastheingsmultifunctionaltoincreasebuildingoccupancyamountofenergyusedpersquaremeter(m2)offlooranduseovertime)andprioritizingretrofittingandrepur-area,helpstominimizeoverallenergydemandfromtheposingoverconstructingnewspacewhereverpossiblesectorand,asaresult,makesiteasiertodecarbonize(IPCC2022b).Achievingsufficiencywillmakeiteasiertheenergysupplybymeetingremainingenergyneedstodecarbonizethebuildingssector(Bernhardt2023).Inwithrenewables.Theseaimscanbeachievedthroughkeepingwiththis,improvingbuildings’energyefficiencyefficiencyimprovements,includingchangingusepat-anddecarbonizingenergyusearetwoofthemainterns,alteringthebuildingenvelope(suchasbyaddingmitigationgoalstodrivedecarbonizationofbuildinginsulation)toreduceactiveheatingandcoolingneeds,operations;thesewillneedtobeachievedbyretrofittingandupgradingtomoreefficienttechnologies(suchasexistingbuildingsandconstructingnewbuildingstobeelectricalappliancesandlighting)(IPCC2022b).BuildingsSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202344AdoptingstrategiestoimproveenergyefficiencyhastheBUILDINGSINDICATOR1:potentialtodelivera42percentemissionsreductioninthebuildingssector,whilealsosupportingdecarbonizationEnergyintensityofbuildingduetodecreasedenergydemandperunitoffloorareaoperations(kWh/m2)orenduse;sufficiency,whichincludesreducingenergyandmaterialdemand,candelivera10percentemissions•Targets:Theenergyintensityofbuildingoperationsreduction(IPCC2022c).Theenergyintensityindicatorthatwetrackincludesenergyefficiencyaswellasotherdropsto85–120kilowatt-hourspersquaremeter(kWh/improvements,suchasbehavioralchangearoundm2)by2030andto55–80kWh/m2by2050.energyuse(e.g.,comforttemperaturesandratiooffloorareapercapita).Thezero-carbonandenergy-efficientGlobally,theenergyintensityofbuildingoperationstechnologiesneededalreadyexistandarefairlymaturedeclinedby20percentfrom2000to2015,butthisprogress(IEA2019;Ürge-Vorsatzetal.2020),thoughadoptionofhasrecentlyslowedandremainswellofftrack(IEA2020a).theseinnovationsneedstobetailoredtoeachbuildingThesectorsawonlyanadditional2.5percentdeclineanditslocation.Suchreadilyavailablemeasuresincludeinenergyintensityfrom2015to2019,butoverallenergyimprovingthermalefficiencybyinstallingdouble-ordemandgrowthslowedoverthelastthreeyearsofavail-triple-glazedwindows,upgradingroofandwallinsulation,abledata(2020–22),whichtranslatesintoanimprovedorientingnewbuildingstomaximizeshadeandreduceenergyintensity(IEA2022c).Multiplecompetingfactorsthermalheatgain,installingshuttersandblinds,puttingaredrivingthesetrends,includingtherecentCOVID-19incoolorgreenroofs,andventilatingproperly.Digitalandenergycrises,interannualvariabilityinweatherpat-sensorsandcontrolscanfurtheroptimizeenergyusebyternschangingheatingandcoolingneeds,andchangingmonitoringandregulatingtemperature(IEA2019).behaviors,suchasincreaseduptakeofdigitaldevices.Toachievethe2030target,gainsmadefrom2018to2022wouldneedtoacceleratebyafactorof3(Figure16).FIGURE16Historicalprogresstoward2030and2050targetsforenergyintensityofbuildingoperationsRightDirection,WellOffTrackS-CurveUnlikelykWh/m2HistoricalCurrentPaceneededtodatatrendreachtargets1801602022data2050target14012014055–8010080Acceleration60requiredtoreach2030target3x85–1202030target4020020202030204020502010Note:kWh/m2=kilowatt-hourpersquaremeter.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromIEA(2023g);targetsfromCAT(2023a).BuildingsSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202345EnergyintensitiesinEurope,NorthAmerica,andotherenergyefficiencyimprovementsarebroadlyaccessible.developedregionsareimprovingataratesimilartotheItisimportanttosetupguidanceandfinancialsupportglobalaveragetrend.SomedevelopingAsiancountriesforbetterenergyefficiencyimprovements,energyareloweringenergyintensitymorequickly,whilemosttransitions,anddecarbonizationtomeetenergyneedsotherregions,includingChina,havemanagedonlywithcleanfuelsbutwithoutfurtherburdeningvulner-smallimprovements(IEA2020a).Spaceandwaterablehouseholds.heatingdominateenergydemandfrombuildingsatthegloballevel,togetheraccountingforclosetohalfofDecarbonizebuildingdemandin2022(IEA2023i).However,energydemandoperationshasgrownmorequicklyforotherendusesinbuildingssince1990,especiallyconnectedandsmallappliancesEffectivelyimplementedandwidespreadenergy(up280percent),cooking(up89percent),andcoolingefficiencyimprovementscangreatlyreduceenergy(up75percent)(IPCC2022b).demandandglobalemissionsfrombuildings(IPCC2022b,2022c).However,energyefficiencyimprovementsSomefutureincreasesinenergyusefromthebuild-alonewillnotachievetheParisAgreementlimitandingssectorwillbedrivenbyimprovementsinenergyneedtobeaccompaniedbyglobaleffortstodecarbon-access.SustainableDevelopmentGoal7(SDG7)callsizetheremainingenergyusedinbuildings.Energyusefor“ensuringaccesstoaffordable,reliable,sustainablecanbedecarbonizedbyswitchingtheenergysourceandmodernenergyforall”by2030.Itaimsforuniversalforheatingandcookingequipment(i.e.,fromfossilfuelsenergyaccessthroughwidespreadelectrification,toelectricpower)anddecarbonizingthepowersupplypoweredasmuchaspossiblebyzero-carbonenergy(seethePowersection).Electrificationisanimportantsourcesandcleanfuelsourcesforcooking(UNDESAn.d.;steptodecarbonizeenergyuseinbuildings(BernhardtIPCC2022b).Asitstands,680millionpeopleglobally(the2023),anddecarbonizationofthepowersectorwillbemajorityofthemlivinginAfrica)donothaveelectricitynecessaryfordecarbonizationinbuildings.Incorpo-(downfrom733millionin2020),and2.4billionpeopleratingrenewableenergyinfrastructureinbuildingswillarenotusingcleanfuelsforcooking(IEAetal.2022b;IEAadditionallyhelptoprovidecleanpowerandenergy;2023p;UNEP2022a).Between2018and2020,57millionthisincludessolarpanelsforon-sitepowergenerationpeoplegainedaccesstoelectricity,butprogressneedsandsolarthermalcollectorsthatcanbeusedtoheattoacceleratesubstantiallyinordertoreachuniversalwater(IPCC2022b,2022c;IEA2022e).access(SystemsChangeLab2022).AddressingequityinenergyaccessgoeshandinhandwithensuringthatBuildingsSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202346BUILDINGSINDICATOR2:recentdeclinesincarbonintensityremainwellofftrackandhavebeenmorethanoffsetbyincreasesCarbonintensityofbuildinginfloorarea,whichroseonaverageby2percentperoperations(kgCO2/m2)yearbetween2010and2020.Asaresult,CO2emissionsfrombuildingshaveremainedrelativelylevelsince2010•Targets:Thecarbonintensityofbuildingoper-(Figure14)(IEA2023d,2023j).Toachievethe2030target,gainsmadefrom2018to2022wouldneedtoaccelerateationsfallsto13–16kilogramsofcarbondioxidebyafactorofroughly4.persquaremeter(kgCO2/m2)by2030andto0–2kgCO2/m2by2050.Currently,spaceheatingisthegreatestcontributortoemissionsintensityfrombuildings,butspacecoolingThecarbonintensityofbuildingsiscalculatedbyneedsarequicklygrowinginmanyplacesaspeopledividingtotalCO2emittedfromenergyuse,includinggainaccesstocoolingserviceswhodidnothaveelectricity,byglobaltotalfloorarea.Thisindicatordiffersthempreviously.Astemperaturesrise,spacecoolingfromtheenergyintensityofbuildingsinthatitreflectswilllikelycontributeagreatershareofemissionsinthenotjusthowmuchenergytheyuse,relativetotheirsize,future(IEA2019,2022k,2022r).Greaterelectrificationofbutalsowherethatenergycomesfromandhowmuchbuildingenergyenduses,especiallyheatingsystems,iscarbonisemittedfromproducingandconsumingthatapromisingdevelopment,butthesourceofelectricityenergy.Forallbuildings(residentialandcommercialalsoneedstobedecarbonizedtoreduceemissions.floorareacombined),averageglobalcarbonintensityhassteadilydecreasedsince2000(Figure17).However,FIGURE17Historicalprogresstoward2030and2050targetsforcarbonintensityofbuildingoperationsRightDirection,WellOffTrackHistoricalCurrentS-CurvePossibledatatrendPaceneededtokgCO2/m2reachtargets502022data4038Accelerationrequiredtoreach2030target4x302030target2013–16102050target0–2020202030204020502010Note:kgCO2/m2=kilogramofcarbondioxidepersquaremeter.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromIEA(2023g,2023d);targetsfromCAT(2023a).BuildingsSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202347Retrofitexistingbuildingsin2050hasalreadybeenbuilt—asisthecaseinAustra-lia,Canada,Europe,theUnitedStates,andincreasinglyReducingexistingbuildings’energyandemissionsChina(Liuetal.2020;IEA2019).Around85–95percentintensitywillrequiredeepretrofits.RetrofittingincludesofEurope’sbuildingstockfor2050alreadyexiststodayenergyefficiencyimprovements,suchastheinstallation(EuropeanCommission2020).ofdouble-glazedwindowstoimproveheatretention,orupgradinginsulation,anddecarbonizationmeasures,BUILDINGSINDICATOR3:suchasreplacingfossilfuel–basedheatingsystemswithelectricsystems,primarilyheatpumps.ItalsoRetrofittingrateofbuildingsmeansupgradingenergy-consumingdevicessuchas(%/yr)appliancestomoreefficientversionsandswitchingtolight-emittingdiode(LED)lightingsystems(IEA2022a,•Targets:Theannualglobaldeepretrofittingrateof2022n).Alteringthebuildingenvelope(meaningitsstructuralelements,suchaswallsandwindows)andbuildingsreaches2.5–3.5percentby2030and3.5upgradingsystems(suchasheatingorcooling)havepercentby2040;allbuildingsarewellinsulatedandhighup-frontcoststhatareoftenabarriertotheirfittedwithzero-carbontechnologiesby2050.implementation.However,makingthesechangestotheenvelopeofbuildingshasalarge,directimpactontheMeetingthe1.5°Ctemperaturelimitmeansthatallenergyefficiencyandemissionsofbuildings,conse-buildingstockwillneedtobenet-zerocarboninopera-quentlyreducingutilitybills,andcanmakeretrofittingtionby2050atthelatest,whichmeansthatallexistingprojectsworththeinitialinvestment(LETI2021;IEA2022p;buildingsthatarenotnetzeroneedtoundergoadeepWorldGBC2022a).Retrofittingwillbemostapplicableinretrofittothatstandardbeforethen.Doingsorequirescountrieswheremostofthebuildingstockthatwillexistaretrofittingrateof2.5–3.5percentofexistingbuildingseachyear,withhigherratesrequiredindevelopedcountrieswithsubstantialexistingstock(CAT2020b).FIGURE18Historicalprogresstoward2030and2040targetsforretrofittingrateofbuildingsInsufficientDataS-CurveUnlikely%/yrHistoricalPaceneededtodatareachtargets42030target2.5–3.53.532040target22019data<11020202030204020502010Note:yr=year.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromIEA(2020c,2021c);targetsfromCAT(2020b).BuildingsSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202348Currently,accordingtotheIEA,lessthan1percentofbuildingsareretrofittedeveryyear(EuropeanCommis-sion2022c;IEA2020c,2021c),whichiswellbelowwhatisrequiredtomeetthetargetsfordeepretrofitting(Figure18).Dataondeepretrofittingratesdonotexistformanycountries,and,wheredataareavailable,theinforma-tionisusuallyforsingleyears(EuropeanCommission2022c).Duetoinsufficientdata,itisnotpossibletogiveaquantitativeestimateofhowmuchdeepretrofittingneedstoacceleratetomeetthe2030target,butitisclearthatthepaceneedstoincreasedrasticallyinthecomingdecade.Constructzero-carbonnewbuildingsNewbuildingscanhelpmitigateemissions,becausedecisionsmadeduringthedesignprocesswillimpactabuilding’semissionsoveritslifetime.Emissionsreleasedduringtheprocessofmakingabuilding,replacingcomponentsandretrofitting,anddemolishingabuildingattheendofitslifetimeareknownasembodiedemissions(seeBox6).Constructingnewbuildingsisemissions-intensivebecauseoftheenergyneededforconstruction,includingtransportationofmaterials,poweringofconstructionmachinery,productionofthematerialsused,andgenerationofwasteduringtheconstructionprocess.Mostoftheemissionsfromconstructioncomefromonlysixmaterialsbutcanmakeupalmost50percentoftheentirelife-cycleemissionsofabuilding(WBCSD2021).Accesstoadequatehousingisafundamentalhumanright(UNOHCHR2014)butremainsachallengeformany,withclimatechangeimpactsposinggrowingthreatstothisright.Itisnecessarytobuildnew,zero-carbonhousingthatisalsosafe,affordable,andresilienttotheimpactsofclimatechange,particularlyforthemostvulnerablecommunities,suchasthosewholiveininformalhousing.CampaignssuchasRoofoverOurHeads,whichwaslaunchedatCOP27withsupportfromtheHigh-LevelChampions(2022a)oftheUNFrameworkConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC),seekstohelppeoplelivingininformalhousing,involvingwomenandlocalcommunitiesfromthestartinshapingthestrategyanditsimplementation.BuildingsSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202349BOX6TacklingembodiedemissionsWealreadypossesstheknowledgeandtechnologiesin2040isexpectedtobeconstructedinthecomingtwoneededtoconstructbuildingsthatoperatewithzerodecades(UNEP2022a).Thisrapidgrowthindevelopingemissions,whereasembodiedemissionsfromconstruct-countrieswillrequireparticularattentiontothedesigningthosebuildingscanbemorechallengingtoeliminate.andconstructionofnewbuildings,includingtheirchoiceTheprincipleof“Avoid,Shift,Improve”canbeappliedtoofmaterials,materialefficiency,andreuseofmaterialstoembodiedemissions,whereAvoidmeansbuildlessandminimizeembodiedcarbon(WorldGBC2020).Onefactorbetter;Shiftmeansusingalternativebuildingmaterials;thatwilldriveconstructionindevelopingcountriesisanandImprovemeansdecarbonizingconventionalmate-acuteneedforadequatehousing.rials(PEEB2021).AvoidingemissionsthroughbuildinglessandbettermeansrepurposingexistingbuildingsItiscurrentlydifficulttotrackprogressinreducingwhereverpossible,adheringtosufficiencyprinciples,andembodiedemissionsatthegloballevelbecausefewdatadesigningbuildingsinamaterial-efficientmanner,suchhavebeencollated,evenforindividualbuildings(UNEPasrectangulargeometriesinsteadofcircles(WBCSDand2022a).Morerecently,initiatives,regions,andcompaniesArup2023).Manyalternativeconstructionmaterialshavearestartingtotrackwhole-lifecarbonemissions—mean-alreadyexistedforalongtime(forexample,wood,bam-ingtheemissionsfromabuilding’sentirelifecycle,boo,orclay),whileothersarebeingnewly(re)developedincludingconstruction,operation,anddemolition—andformodernbuildings(forexample,straw,hemp,recycledmoreinformationisbecomingavailableforindividualplastic,orevenfungi).Manyofthesematerialsarebio-buildingsorneighborhoods(WBCSD2021;UNEP2022a).basedandnotonlyhaveloweremissionsthantraditionalImprovingdataavailabilityforbuildings,andharmonizingconstructionmaterialsbutmayevenactasanetcarbonapproachestobuildinglife-cycleassessments,wouldsinkoverthebuilding’slifetime(Churkinaetal.2020).bothhelpinformandimprovebestpracticesanddecar-However,afulllife-cycleanalysisisneededtoensurebonizationstrategiesandenableprogresstrackinginthethattheuseofbio-basedmaterials,particularlytimber,future;moreover,itisavitalsteppingstonetowardpolicydoesnotactuallyleadtonetemissionsorhaveotherandregulationofwholelife-cyclecarbon(WorldGBCnegativeenvironmentalconsequences,suchaslossof2022d;Astleetal.2023).AnewinitiativeinEuropeispilotingbiodiversity(Searchingeretal.2023).Finally,theemissionsapproachesthatbringindustry,researchers,andlaw-intensityofconventionalconstructionmaterialscanbemakerstogethertocodevelopnationalbenchmarksforimproved.Twoofthesecorebuildingmaterials—cementpolicymakingonwholelife-cyclecarbonwherethesedoandsteel—arecoveredintheIndustrysection.Applyingnotyetexist(SmithInnovation2022).Buildingpassports—“circulareconomy”principlescanalsohelpreducerepositoriesthatcontainalllife-cycledataofindividualembodiedemissions.Thismeansplanning,constructing,buildings—areanotherwaytobuildknowledgeonwholeandfurnishingbuildingstoallowthemtoberepurposedlife-cyclecarbonandexamplesofsuccess(Tonks2023;fordifferentusesatalaterdate,orensuringthattheirGlobalABCetal.2021).Theyareatooltocollectandstorematerialscanberecycledorreusedattheendoftheirinformationfromandforavarietyofstakeholdersaboutlifetimes(UNEP2022a;Naden2020).abuildingfromitswholelifecycle,meaningthroughouttheconstructionandoperationphases(GlobalABCetMuchwillhingeonhownewbuildingsindevelopingcoun-al.2021).Theyareusefulfordevelopingunderstanding,triesareconstructed.Inmanyofthesecountries,floorincreasingtransparency,andsupportingstakeholders’areapercapitaisstilllow,butrapidurbanization,risingdecision-makingaboutagivenbuilding.Despitedatapopulations,economicgrowth,andaccesstoadequategaps,therisingproductionofsteelandcementtobuildhousingwillfueldemandfornewfloorspace(Figure15)additionalfloorareacontinuestodriveemissions,and(UNDESA2022).Eightypercentoffloorareagrowthto2030manyoftheprinciplesoflow-carbondesignremaintoisanticipatedinemergingmarketanddevelopingecon-bemandatedorbecomecommonpracticeinmanyomies,withbuildingboomsexpectedinAsia,Africa,andcountries.MuchthereforeremainstobedoneinreducingLatinAmerica(IPCC2022b;UNEP2022a;IEA2023j).InAfrica,embodiedemissionsinbuildings.anestimated70percentofthebuildingstockthatwillexistBuildingsSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202350BUILDINGSINDICATOR4:Medellíntocollectinformationonfloorarea,emissions,andbuildingprojects,alongsidepoliciesonsustainableShareofnewbuildingsthatconstructionandretrofitting(C402022).arezero-carboninoperation(%)However,manynewbuildings,includingthosebeingconstructedindevelopedcountries,arestillbuiltwith•Targets:Allnewbuildingsarezero-carboninfossilfuel–basedheatingsystems,suchasgasboilers,andlackon-siterenewables,suchassolarpanels.Foroperationby2030,withtheworldsustainingthisexample,inGermany,wheretheshareoffossilfueltargetthrough2050.23heatinginnewbuildingsisdecreasing,16percentofnewresidentialbuildingsapprovedinearly2022stillhadgasTolimitwarmingto1.5°C,allnewbuildingsmustbeastheprimaryheatingsource(FederalStatisticalOfficenet-zerocarboninoperation—eitherfromthestartor2022).Insufficientdatameansitisnotpossibletoassessfollowingdecarbonizationofthepowersector(IEA2021b;whetherornotthisindicatorisontrack.However,givenUNEP2022a;CAT2020b).Buildingtozero-carbonspecifi-theavailableevidencethatfossilfuel–basedheatingcationsismuchlessexpensivethanretrofittingovertheinstallationscontinue,itisclearthatsubstantialchangenexttwotothreedecades(Currie&BrownandAECOMandprogressisneededtomeetthe2030and20502019;IEA2020c).Nodatasetiscurrentlyavailablefortargets(Figure19).trackingtheshareofnewbuildingsthatarezerocarboninoperation.Progressindatacollectionhasbeenmade,though.Forexample,asustainableconstructiondatabasewasestablishedintheColombiancityofFIGURE19Historicalprogresstoward2030,2035,and2050targetsforshareofnewbuildingsthatarezero-carboninoperationInsufficientDataS-CurvePossible%2030targetHistoricalPaceneededtodatareachtargets1001001001002035target2050target806040202020data5020202030204020502010Note:SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromIEA(2021b);targetsfromCAT(2020b).BuildingsSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202351Recentdevelopmentstext-specificregulationisneededatthenationallevel,acrossbuildingsinternationalstandardssetglobal,commonprinciples.ThesecanformabasisfordesigningpoliciesandThoughprogressonindicatorsinthebuildingsectorstrategies.Theyofferawaytoassessboththecurrenthasbeenslow,somepositivesignalsareemerging.Instatusofbuildingpractices,policiesandregulations,particular,somerecentdevelopmentsareoverarchingandprogresstowardimplementingmoresustainableacrossalloftheneededshifts,invitingoptimismaboutstandards(Naden2020).progressonall.ChangewillhingeonachievingtheenablingfactorsoutlinedinStateofClimateActionAdequatefinancingisalsoneededtoovercome2022(Boehmetal.2022),whichdescribethekindseconomicbarrierstodecarbonizingthebuildingssectorofactionsneededtoimproveenergyefficiencyandandimplementingroadmaps(Oheneetal.2022).In2021,decarbonizebuildingoperationacrossexistingandnewinvestmentsinbuildingefficiencyjumped21percentasbuildings.Theseenablingconditionsrelatetotech-theconstructionsectorreboundedfromtheCOVID-19nologyandotherinnovations,increasedregulationtopandemic,afteryearsofslowfinancingmobilizationdeliverongoalsandhelpbridgegapsbetweenactors,(IEA2022c).However,asconstructionmarketsgrowinstrengthenedinstitutions,andstrongleadershipindifferentpartsoftheworld,continuedhighratesofmakingchange.investmentinzero-carbonoptionswillbeimportant.TheIPCChighlightsthatinvestmentsinenergyefficiencyDecarbonizationroadmapsareanessentialtoolandrenewableheattotaling$711billionwillberequiredfordevelopingandimplementingcontext-specificannuallyfrom2026to2030todecarbonizethebuildingsstrategiestodecarbonizethebuildingssector.Whilesector,comparedto$250billioninvestedin2022(IPCCdecarbonizationroadmapsarenotspecifictothe2022c;IEA2023j).Acceleratingthetransitionwillalsobuildingssector,theyareespeciallyimportantforbuild-requireinvestmentsindevelopinginstitutionalcapacity.ingsinbothsignifyingandspurringgreateractiononSomeprogresshasbeenmadeinthisregard.TheBuild-mitigation.RoadmapsareincreasinglybeingdevelopedingEfficiencyAccelerator(BEA2023),launchedin2015atcity,regional(theGlobalABChasregionalroadmapsbyWorldResourcesInstitute,seekstobuildinstitutionalforAfrica,Asia,andLatinAmerica),andnationallevelscapacityatthelocalandregionallevelinpartnercities(WorldGBC’s2023AdvancingNetZeroStatusReportaroundtheworld,tacklinginstitutionalandeconomicmapstheexistingwholelife-cyclecarbonroadmapsbarriersthatpreventthescale-upofenergyefficiencyaroundtheworld)(GlobalABC,IEA,andUNEP2020;improvements.TheprogramdoesthisbysupportingWorldGBC2023a).Thesestrategiestacklebothspecificpublic-privatepartnerships.WorldResourcesInstituteandsector-widechallengesindecarbonizingbuildings,establishedtheZeroCarbonBuildingAccelerator(ZCBA)bothintermsofembodiedandoperationalemissions,inTurkeyandColombiain2021tofollowontheworkfromthatarevitalfortransformingthissector.TheyidentifytheBEAandprovideaplatformforknowledge-sharingpossiblepathways,guidepolicymakers,andlocatetodriveroadmapdevelopmentandpolicyimplementa-synergiesbetweendifferentactors(UNEP2022a).InJunetiontailoredtolocalcontexts(Rakes2022a).2022,ColombiareleaseditsNationalRoadmapforNetZeroCarbonBuildings,whichexplainsspecificactionsWhiletherehasnotbeenmuchvisibleprogressonthearangeofactorsneedtotaketoachievethecountry’shigh-levelindicatorsfordecarbonizingthebuildingsgoalofensuringthatby2030allnewbuildings,andbysectortrackedinthisreport,buildingsarebecominga2050allbuildings,arenetzero–alignedinbothformalgreaterpartoftheconversationonsectoralmitigationandinformalconstruction(Rakes2022b).Throughoutatthegloballevel.The2022GlobalStatusReportfor2021and2022,10GreenBuildingCouncilsinEuropeBuildingsandConstructionfromtheGlobalAllianceforlaunchedsimilarnet-zerowholelife-cyclecarbonBuildingsandConstructionhighlightedthatthenumberroadmaps(WorldGBC2022c).However,theexistenceoftimescountriesmentionbuildingsintheirNDCsshotofaroadmapdoesnotalwaysmeanthatithasbeenupfrom88in2015to158,whichisabout80percentoftranslatedintoactionablepoliciesthatcanbemoni-countries,in2021(UNEP2022a).WhileNDCsmaynotbetoredandenforced(Mataetal.2020).thebestmeasureofactiontaken,andtheirlevelofdetailvaries,theyareawayforgovernmentstodemonstrateOnewaytoensurethatstrategiestranslateintoactiontheirintentionsandcommitments,andtheyalsoserveistoestablishstrongregulatoryframeworks,suchasasaguideforlocalgovernmentonnationalpriorities.Atthoseregulatingwholelife-cyclecarboninDenmark,COP26in2021,theUnitedNationsClimateChangeHigh-France,Finland,theNetherlands,andNorway(WorldGBCLevelChampionslaunchedthe2030Breakthroughs,2019).Legislativebarriers,includinglackofregulationaninitiativethatpresentssectoraltargetstoalignandorsupportfromgovernments,aresomeofthebiggestraisebothambitionandactionofnonstateactors.Ahurdlestoovercome(Oheneetal.2022).Whilecon-“BuildingsBreakthrough”issettobelaunchedaheadofBuildingsSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202352COP28thisyearandwillformanewpartoftheexistingthefollowingparagraphs(IEA2022k).Recentprogress“BreakthroughAgenda,”alsoinitiatedatCOP26.Thetowardthephase-outoffossilfuelsforheatinghasBuildingsBreakthrough,ledbyFranceandMorocco,mostlyoccurredintheUnitedStatesandEurope(IEAwillprovideaplatformforinternationalcollaboration2022k).IntheEuropeanUnion,theEnergyPerformancebetweennationalgovernmentstounlockactionintheofBuildingsDirective(EPBD)ispartofasuiteofpoliciessector.Boththe2030BreakthroughsandtheBuildingsaimedatreducingemissionsintheEuropeanUnionandBreakthroughindicatetheraisingofbuildings’profiletransitioningthebloctowardasustainablefuture.Theontheglobalagenda,whichisfundamentaltoensurelatestproposedchangestotheEPBD,whicharenotyetthatthesectorreceivesappropriateattentiontodrivefinalizedbutcouldbesignificantifpassed,wouldbanforwardmitigationaction.theuseoffossilfuelsforheatinginnewbuildingsandrenovationprojectsimmediatelyandalsorequireaRecentdevelopmentscompletephase-outoffossilfuelsforheatingby2035inimprovingenergy(EuropeanParliament2023d).Regulationaimedatphas-efficiencyingoutfossilfuelsgoeshandinhandwithpromotionofalternativetechnologies.TheREPowerEUplansetsoutRegulationisafundamentaltoolforreducingbuildings’apathtowardenergyindependenceandthetransitionenergyintensityandpushingthesectortowardalign-toacleanenergysystem.ItsetsthegoalofinstallingmentwiththeParisAgreementlimitof1.5°C(Boehmet10millionheatpumpsoverfiveyears,whichwouldal.2022;IEA2021d;Economidouetal.2020),andbuild-meanadoublingintherateofheatpumpinstallationsingenergycodesandMinimumEnergyPerformance(EuropeanCommission2022b).TheREPowerEUplanStandardsareimportantregulatoryinstrumentstodrivewasintroducedfollowingRussia’sinvasionofUkrainechangesinenergyuse.Currently,79countries,whichandaimstodecreasedependenceonfossilfuelsfromarehometo60percentoftheworld’spopulation,haveRussiaandtosupportthedevelopmentofrenewableadoptedtheseenergycodes,thoughonly26percentenergyinEurope.Alongsidesupportingheatingdecar-ofthesecodesincludemandatoryregulations,andnotbonization,REPowerEUincludesaroutetoensureajustalloftheseregulationsarestronglyenforced.Recenttransitionforthoseworkinginthesector.Underits“Pactprogressinexpandingcoverageremainsslow,withonlyforSkills,”theplancontainsrequirementsforjobcre-sixadditionalcountriesimplementingthesestandardsation,withafocusonretraining,forexamplebyreskillingsince2018(CAT2022c;UNEP2022a,2020a).Toolkits,peoplewhoperformgasboilerinstallationssotheycanlikethosehostedbytheGettingtoZeroForum(2023),continuetobeemployedinstallingheatpumpsandcanhelprelevantactorsdevelopcodesbyprovidingotherrenewableenergytechnologies(DGEnergy2023).guidelinesandexamples,aswellasbyconnectinguserswithresourcesandorganizationsthatcansupportthisThesekindsofgovernmentpoliciesandprogramsprocess.TheWorldGBC’s“GlobalPolicyPrinciplesforahavealreadyencouragedanuptakeinadoptionofSustainableBuiltEnvironment”outlineshowregulationsnewtechnologies.Inthepastyearalone,salesofheatcanbesupportedbyinformationandincentivestonotpumpsrose38percentinEuropeand11percentgloballyonlymeetclimatetargetsbutsimultaneouslyaddress(RosenowandGibb2023;Monschaueretal.2023).Onesustainabledevelopmentgoalsbyfocusingonsevencountrywheretheimpactofregulationsisalreadycoreprinciples,includingcarbon,health,resilience,beingseenisPoland,whichhasexperiencedamassiveandbiodiversity(WorldGBC2023c).Developingandscale-upofsolarPVandheatpumpinstallationsinimplementingregulationsrequiresinstitutionalcapacityrecentyears(seeBox7).Heatpumpsareafundamental(CAT2022c).IntheUnitedStates,theInflationReductiontechnologyforenablingthedecarbonizationofheating,Actincludes$90millioninfundingforaNationalEnergyaswellascooling,inthebuildingssector.TheyareanCodesCollaborativetosupportjurisdictionsindevelop-efficient,electric-poweredtechnologythatcapturesingup-to-datebuildingenergycodes(U.S.DOE2023).existingheatfromtheair,water,orgroundtoheatabuildingwhentheweatheriscold.ThegrowthofheatRecentdevelopmentsinpumps,whichwouldlikelyfollowanS-curve,couldhelpdecarbonizingbuildingthecarbonintensityofbuildingoperationsdecreaseinoperationsanonlinearfashion.Someheatpumpsystemscanworkinreverseandpumpheatoutwhenitishot;however,Asheatingandcoolingaremajordriversofemissions,thisisnotpossiblewithallmodels(IEA2022j;Energyandthereforecarbonintensity,fromthebuildingsSavingTrust2022).sector,thesecomponentswillbethemainfocusofBuildingsSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202353BOX7Rapidscale-upofsolarPVandheatpumpinstallationsinPoland’sresidentialsectorIn2020,77percentofthecoalburnedforheatinghouseholdswithsubsidiestoreplacetheirheatinginEuropewasusedinPoland(Kuzminskietal.2023;systemswithmoreefficienttechnologiestohelptackleCAT2022b).Heatingaccountsforthelargestshareofairpollution;itadditionallyincludesoptionalprovi-Poland’senergydemand,butthecountryisworkingsionsforbuildingefficiencyimprovements,suchastowardtransitioningfromacoal-dominatedsystemtoupgradinginsulation.Theamountofmoneygrantedonethatispoweredbyrenewables.Atthesametime,tohouseholdsisproportionaltohouseholdincometoitisreducingenergyneedsbyimprovingtheefficiencyensurethatlower-incomehouseholdsreceiveade-ofbuildings(IEA2022o).Recentyearshavewitnessedquatesupport,andtheprogramhelpsreduceenergyrapidprogresstowarddecarbonizingheating,thankspoverty.Thisprogramisagoodfirststep,butitcouldtoaconstellationofgovernmentprogramsthatbestrengthened.Currently,householdscanusethesubsidizetechnologyinstallationsforgeneratingmoneytoinstallawiderangeofheatingtechnologies,renewableenergyandhelpconsumersreplacetheirincludingfossil-poweredheatingsystems,suchasgashomeheatingsystemswithnewertechnology,suchboilersiftheyaremoreefficientthantheirexistingsys-asheatpumps.Polandwashighlydependentoncoaltems.PhasingoutcoalandgasboilersandsubsidizingfromRussia,soRussia’sinvasionofUkrainehasaddedonlynonfossilfuel–basedheatingwillbenecessarymomentumtothetransitiontoalternativeheatingfordecarbonization.Theprogramcouldalsorequiresystems(IEA2022o).In2022,heatpumpsalesinPolandstepstoimprovethermalefficiencythatarenowonlyincreasedby120percentfrom2021(FigureB7.1),whichoptionalbyrequiringthatpoorlyinsulatedhousingalthoughfromasmallstartingpointwasthegreat-stockberetrofittedwithinsulation.estincreaseseenofcountriesassessed(RosenowandGibb2023).Polandisalsoboostingtheprovisionofrenewableelectricitythroughanotherkeymechanism—the“MyThefirstPolishgovernmentprogramtoinitiatetheseElectricity”program—inwhichthePolishgovernmentchangesistheCleanAirProgramme,runningfromsubsidizesthecostofinstallingsolarphotovoltaics(PV)2018to2029(IEA2022o).Since2019,theprogramoffersinhomesbyprovidinghouseholdswithpaymentstohouseholdsataxdeductiontoincentivizeimprove-coverupto50percentofthecosts(MinistryofClimatementstotheirhomes’thermalefficiency.ItprovidesandEnvironment2019).Ithashelpedpropela25-foldFIGUREB7.1IncreaseinheatpumpsalesinEurope,showinga120percentincreaseinPolandfrom2021to2022Italy+37%France+30%Germany+58%Sweden+61%Poland+120%Finland+52%Norway+25%Netherlands+52%Denmark+20%CzechRepublic+99%UnitedKingdom+40%Austria+59%Switzerland+23%Portugal+17%Belgium+100%Slovakia+88%050100150200250300350400450500Totalsalesfor2021and2022(thousands)Source:RosenowandGibb(2023).BuildingsSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202354BOX7Rapidscale-upofsolarPVandheatpumpinstallationsinPoland’sresidentialsector(continued)FIGUREB7.2Annualincreaseinthenumberofmicro-in-increaseintheinstalledcapacityofsolarPVfromstallations,includingsolarPV,andinstalledpowercapacity2017to2021(FigureB7.2)(Olczaketal.2021).StartedininPolandfrom2016to20232019,theschemeisnowinitsfifthiteration,integratingadditionalprovisionsforheatpumpsandenergyNumberofinstallations(thousands)GWstorageduringthistime(Santos2022).Italsoincludes140010anetbillingcomponent:producerswhosellelectricityCapacitytothegridgettheirelectricbillreducedthefollowing1200Installationsmonth(Kuzminskietal.2023;Kulpaetal.2021).Combin-ingheatingsystemsthatarepoweredusingelectricity10008(heatpumps)withon-siterenewableelectricitygenerationtechnologies(solarPV)isakeystrategyfor6decarbonizingbuildingoperationsandcanreduce800bothgasandheatingcosts(SolarPowerEurope2023).However,theMyElectricityprogramdoesfacesome600obstacles.Mostofthoseinstallingthesesystemshave4beenattheupperendoftheincomescale,because,evenwiththegrant,theup-frontcostofinstallation400remainsrelativelyhigh(Kuzminskietal.2023;Zdonek2etal.2022).Additionally,thisprogramiscurrentlysettoendin2025,meaningthatalonger-termsolutionis200needed(Zdoneketal.2022).020182020020162023Notes:GW=gigawatt;PV=photovoltaics.ThedataaretakenfromPTPiREE,whichtracksthenumberofmicroinstallationsthatareconnectedtopowernetworksandtheirinstalledcapacity.SolarPVinstallationsformthemajorityofthesemicroinstallations.Source:DatafromPTPiREE(2023).Positivesignalsrelatedtoheatingdecarbonizationareincreasepeakelectricityload,whichneedstobemetalsoemerginginothergeographies.Forexample,inbydispatchableenergysources.AlternativerefrigerantstheUnitedStates,localgovernments(thoseofcitieswithloworzeroglobalwarmingpotentialareavailableandcounties)aredrivingthephase-outoffossilfuelsonthemarketbutcurrentlyfacefinancialandtechnicalfromheating,with106oftheseintroducingpoliciesthatchallengestorapiduptake(GreenCoolingInitiativeencourage,ifnotmandate,suchatransition(Lou-2023b).Emissionsfromcoolingcanalsobereducedbyis-PrescottandGolden2022).reducingactivecoolingneeds,andconsequentlyemis-sions,throughchangingbuildingdesignandretrofittingAstheworldcontinuestoexperiencehighertempera-existingstructures;forexample,byaddingshadingtotures,activecoolingisbecomingincreasinglynecessary,windows,improvingsealings,andincreasingventilationmakingup20percentofelectricityconsumptionby(UNEP2021c).TheProgrammeforEnergyEfficiencyinbuildingglobally(IEA2022r,2018).Increasedaircondi-Buildings(PEEB)wasestablishedatCOP22tohelpdelivertionerusewilldriveupcarbonemissionstotheextentontheGlobalAllianceforBuildingsandConstruction’stowhichtheelectricityforitisprovidedbyfossilfuels.“TowardsLowGHGandResilientBuildings”roadmap.TheIncreasingcoolingisalsocurrentlydrivinganincreasePEEBCoolprojectaimstoimprovetheenergyefficiencyinthereleaseofhydrofluorocarbons(HFCs)withahighandresiliencyofbuildingsinAfrican,Asian,Easternglobalwarmingpotential,asHFCsarecommonlyusedEuropean,andSouthAmericanpartnercountrieswhereasarefrigerant(UNEPandIEA2020;Veldersetal.2022).energyuseforspacecoolingislikelytoincreaseintheDecarbonizingtheelectricitysupplyisparticularlycomingdecades.Itwillhelpbothbyprovidingfinancechallengingforairconditioning,ascoolingtendstoBuildingsSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202355andofferingtechnicalassistanceindevelopingregula-(EuropeanCommissionn.d.c,2020).Thisnewpushtions(PEEB2022);ifsuccessful,itcouldprovideamodelwasintroducedundertheEuropeanUnion’s“Renova-forfuturepartnerships.tionWave”strategyin2020aspartoftheEuropeanGreenDeal,asuiteofpoliciestoachieveajust,greenLikeheatingandcooling,cooking,whichaccountedfortransitiontonetzeroinEuropeandsupporteconomicalmost8percentoffinalenergydemandfrombuildingsrecoveryfollowingtheCOVID-19pandemic(Europeanin2020,contributestoGHGemissions,andthereforeCommission2023a,2019).Additionally,theEuropeancarbonintensity,fromthebuildingssector,particularlyUnion’sEnergyPerformanceofBuildingsDirectiveisinAfricaandAsia(IEA2020c,2021b).Cookingusingcurrentlyundergoingrevisions,withproposedmeasuresbiomassasfuelbothcontributestobuildingsemissionstoincreaseretrofittingrates,requireminimumenergyandcreatesairpollutionthatcanposeserioushealthperformance,andencouragewidespreadsolartech-risks(IPCC2022b).Ensuringaccesstobettercookingnologyinstallation,amongotherprovisions(EuropeantechnologiesandcleanfuelsourcesisakeypartofParliament2023d;CAT2022b).SDG7(UNDESAn.d.)andwillbeparticularlyimportantinsub-SaharanAfrica,wherethestructureofenergyOthercountriesarealsoseeingincreasedattentiondemandinbuildingsdifferssubstantiallyfromothertoretrofitting.IntheUnitedStates,therecentInflationregionsduetohighrelianceontraditionalbiomassforReductionActtargetsincreasingretrofittingthroughcookingandheating(IEA2022q).Fossilgasisoftenusedtaxcreditsanddeductionsthatwillhelphomeownersasabridgefuelinreplacingtraditionalbiomass,whichupgradeandelectrifytheirappliances,installheatcancreatenewlock-in;therefore,itisimportantthatinpumpsandon-siterenewables,andreplaceinsulation,thelongtermthetransitionbemadetocleancookingdoors,andwindows(WhiteHouse2023).Thereisalsoatechnologiesusingrenewables(NewClimateandEEDAdvisory2021).TheWorldBankhasmobilizedfundingtosupportcleancooking,mostrecentlyseekingtohelp100millionpeoplegainaccesstocleancookingtechnolo-giesthisdecadethroughtheCleanCookingFund(WorldBank2023f;ESMAP2022).RecentdevelopmentsinretrofittingexistingbuildingsTherearepositiveexamplesofretrofittingpolicymovingintherightdirectioninsomeregionsandcountries,includingEurope,theUnitedStates,andChina.Becausethehighcostsandlogisticschallengesofretrofittingprojectsarebarrierstotakingthemon,moreincentivesareneededtoincreaseretrofittingrates.Theseincluderegulationsmandatingminimumretrofittingrequire-mentsorperformancestandardsforexistingbuildings(IEA2022p)butalsofinancialsupportforimplemen-tation.Financialsupportisparticularlyimportantforlow-incomehouseholdstoensureadecentqualityofhousingandaffordableenergycosts.Thereisariskoflower-incomehouseholdslosingoutfurtherinthetechnologytransitionandbeingleftwithhigh-costfossilheatingandcookinginlow-efficiencyhomes.Despitelong-standinglegislationonenergyefficiencyinthebuildingssector,retrofittingratesintheEuropeanUnionhaveremainedataround1percentperyear(CAT2022b).However,theEuropeanUnionnowseekstodou-bletherateofrenovationsby2030withdeepretrofitsfor35millionresidentialandcommercialbuildings,withafocusonpublicbuildings,worst-performingbuildings,andheatingandcoolingdecarbonization,thatwillalsohelpdeliveronmultiplegoalsofjobcreation,improve-mentstolivingconditions,andemissionsreductionsBuildingsSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202356specificfundtosupportlow-incomehouseholdstocarryCommitmentstoconstructnet-zerocarbonbuildingsoutretrofitstoimproveenergyefficiency.Chinahasbothhavemultipliedinrecentyears.Forexample,partici-alargeexistingbuildingstockandneedfornewcon-pationhasincreasedindeclarationslikethe“NetZerostruction.Its14thFive-YearPlan,coveringtheyearsfromCarbonBuildingsDeclaration”fromC40Cities(which2021to2025,seekstoretrofit350millionsquaremetersofhas29signatorycities)andthe“NetZeroCarbonexistingbuildingsaspartofitsinvestmentininfrastruc-BuildingsCommitment”fromtheWorldGreenBuildingtureandgreenconstruction,covering0.15percentofCouncil(with172signatoriesfrombusinesses,cities,gov-currentglobalfloorarea(ITA2023).ernments,andotherorganizations).OtherincreasinglyprominentinitiativesdirectedtowardnonstateactorsRecentdevelopmentsinandlocalgovernmentsincludeRacetoZero,CitiesRaceconstructingzero-carbontoZero,andCitiesRacetoResilience(C402018,2023a;newbuildingsWorldGBC2021,2023b).Publiccommitmentssuchastheseareimportant,butensuringimplementationwillEmissionsfromtheprocessofconstructingbuildingsbeneededtogetthesectorontrack,meaningthathavebeengarneringgrowingattentionrecently,greateractionisrequiredtoensurethatdecarbonizationincludinginregionsprojectedtoexperiencelarge-scalegoalsaremet(WorldGBC2023b).development.OneexampleisC40Cities’announce-ment,atCOP27,oftheCleanConstructionAccelerator,Ensuringimplementationinthebuildingssectorimplieswhichincludestargetsforachievingadecarbonizedaneedforclear,enforcedregulationthroughupdatedconstructionsector(C402023b).COP27alsosawthebuildingcodes.AneffectivebuildingcodeneedstohavepublicationoftheAfricaManifestoforSustainableCitiesaclearcycleofstrengtheningtowardahighlyenergyandtheBuiltEnvironment,acollaborationbyGreenefficient,zero-carbonstandardovertime.Perfor-BuildingCouncilsfrom15Africancountries,callingformance-basedbuildingcodesfocusontheoutcomeincreasedaccesstowaterandenergy,implementationandaremoreadaptabletolocalcircumstances.Toofregulationssuchasbuildingcodes,andapplicationdate,manybuildingcodesfocusonoperationalemis-ofcirculareconomypracticestobuildingmaterials,tosionsonlybutwillneedtoaddressbothoperationalandensuresustainable,net-zerocompatibledevelopmentembodiedemissionsfornewbuildings.InFrance,thethatmeetspeople’sneeds(AfricaRegionalNetworkRE2020regulationsseektoreduceembodiedemissionsofGBCs2022;WorldGBC2022b).Local,sustainablethroughabuilding’swholelifecyclethroughacapmaterialsandconstructionmethodsareakeypartonemissionsthatdecreasesovertime(AgoraEner-ofcommunities’culturalheritagewhilealsobeinggiewende2022).Inadditionaltonationalregulations,low-emission(UNEP2022a).subnationalauthoritiessuchascityandlocaljurisdic-tionsarewell-positionedtomandatewholelife-cyclecarbonassessmentsinpolicies.BuildingsSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202357SECTION4IndustryIndustry—asectorthatencompassestheproductionrisingincome,populationgrowth,urbanization,andofgoodsandmaterialslikecement,steel,andchem-infrastructuredevelopment,hasfueledsignificanticals,aswellastheconstructionofbuildings,roads,growthintheextractionandproductionofmateri-bridges,andotherinfrastructure—representsamajoralsaroundtheworld.Indeed,industrialexpansionandgrowingsourceofGHGemissions.Thisencom-accountedforabout45percentofworldwidegrowthpassesbothdirectGHGemissionsfromfuelcombustioninGHGemissionsoverthelasttwodecades(Lambetandindustrialprocesses(e.g.,thechemicalreactionsal.2021;IPCC2022b).AnnualgrowthinindustrialGHGinvolvedincreatingcement)acrosstheindustrialemissionshasmirroredperiodsofglobaleconomicsubsectors,aswellasindirectGHGemissionsfromtheexpansion(until2008)andrecessionandrecovery(Minxgenerationofpowerandheatthatarepurchasedtoetal.2021).Itslowedfrom4percentbetween2000anddrivetheseprocesses.DirectGHGemissionsreached2010to1.8percentbetween2011and2020.Moreover,12GtCO2ein2021,representingroughlyafifthofglobalin2020,CO2emissionsfromtheindustrysectorfellbyemissions(Figure20)(Minxetal.2021;EuropeanCom-another179milliontonnesasgovernmentsaroundmissionandJRC2022).WhenaccountingforindirecttheworldadoptedmeasurestoreducethespreadofGHGemissions,thisfigurerisesfromroughly12GtCO2etoCOVID-19(Sikarwaretal.2021).Newdataindicatethat17GtCO2e(Figure21)(Minxetal.2021;EuropeanCommis-industryemissionshaverebounded,increasingby5.7sionandJRC2022;IEA2022i).percentin2021,withgrowthslowingtoabout1.1percentin2022(Liuetal.2023).Decarbonizingindustry,then,Together,bothdirectandindirectGHGemissionsfrommustplayaroleinlimitingwarmingto1.5°C.industryhavegrownquicklysince2000(Figure21).Increasingdemandforindustrialproducts,drivenbyFIGURE20Industry’scontributiontoglobalnetanthropogenicGHGemissionsin2021ElectricityandheatOilandgas14.4fugitiveemissions2.5Other1.6Coalminingfugitiveemissions1.5EnergyPetroleumrefining20.70.7Non-CO2(allbuildings)WasteLanduse,0.04land-use2.4change,Nonresidentialandforestry0.8GlobalGHGAgriculture,Emissionsforestry,4.0Rail56.8GtCO2eandother0.1ResidentialBuildingslandusesEnteric2.33.2fermentationInlandshipping10.40.2Transport3.0Managed8.1soilsandDomesticaviationManagedpasture0.3soilsandIndustrypastureInternational12.0aviation1.40.4RoadOtherRicecultivationOtherTransport4.41.00.55.9ManuremanagementInternational0.4shippingChemicalsMetals0.72.63.4Syntheticfertilizerapplication0.4Cement1.6Biomassburning0.1Notes:CO2=carbondioxide;GHG=greenhousegas;GtCO2e=gigatonnesofcarbondioxideequivalent.Sources:Minxetal.(2021);EuropeanCommissionandJRC(2022).IndustrySTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202359FIGURE21GlobaldirectandindirectGHGtheotherharmfulimpactstopeopleandtheenviron-mentcausedbyindustrialproducts,suchashazardousemissionsfromindustrychemicalsandplastics.ImprovingenergyefficiencycanhelpreduceGHGemissionsbycuttingoverallenergyGtCO2e/yruse.Itcanalsoreducethetotalamountofenergythatotherwisewouldneedtobedecarbonizedthroughother20means.Electrificationwithazero-carbonpowersupplyoffersanotherstrategyforcurbingreleasesofGHGs,18Indirectemissionsparticularlyforlow-andmedium-heatprocessesthatcurrentlyrelyonfossilfuels.However,notallindustrial16processescanbeeasilyelectrified.Decarbonizingindustrywillrequireadditionalsolutions,suchas14switchingtonewzero-carbonfuelstodeliverhighheat,developingtechnologiesthatdonotdependonhigh12heatorcanachieveitthroughelectrification,andelimi-natingorcapturingprocessemissions—thoseemissions10Directemissionsfromchemicalreactionsinherenttoproductionpro-cesses,notfromfossilfuelcombustion—tothegreatestOtherextentpossible.Combiningconventionaltechnologieswithcarboncapture,utilization,and/orstorage(CCU/S)8willthereforealsoplayacriticalroleinthedecarboniza-tionofindustry.6CementAlternativestogeneratingheatfromfossilfuelstorun4Chemicalsindustrialprocessesarebeginningtoemerge.Monitor-ingtheshareofelectricityinindustry,specifically,helps220002010Metalstrackprogresstowardindependencefromfossilfuelsasthesourceofheatforindustrialprocesses.Changes02020inthecarbonintensityofcementandsteelproduction1990overtimereflectsimprovementsinenergyefficiency,progressinelectrification,andadoptionoflow-carbonNotes:GHG=greenhousegas;GtCO2e/yr=gigatonnesofcarbontechnologiesforprocessesthatcannotbeelectrified.24dioxideequivalentperyear.ThedataexcludeGHGemissionsfromThedevelopmentanddeploymentofnewtechnologieswastemanagement(exceptfromcircularitysuchasproductionofiskeygiventheinherentprocessemissionsinconven-scrapinsteelmaking).“Other”includesarangeofmanufacturingtionalcement-makingandthesignificantrelianceonprocesses,suchasthoseforpulpandpaper,foodandtobacco,coke—amaterialderivedfromcoal—duringsteelmanu-andglassandceramics.Finally,Minxetal.(2021)andEuropeanfacturing.Together,cementandsteelareresponsibleforCommissionandJRC(2022)provideanestimateofdirectandabout40percentofdirectGHGemissionsfromindustry,indirectGHGemissionsfromindustrythrough2020.DataonindirectandthedecarbonizationofthesesectorsisbeginningGHGemissionsfromindustry,specifically,arenotyetavailablefortogetmoreattention(Deloitte2021).Productionofgreen2021.Butbecausetheyrepresentsuchasignificantshareofthishydrogenisalsotrackedinthisreport,asitiscriticaltosector’stotalemissions(34%in2020),thisfigureincludesindirectthedecarbonizationofsteelandotherindustries.TheGHGemissionsandexcludesdatafrom2021.needforandstatusoftheseeffortsaredetailedbelowandsummarizedinTable3.Itisimportanttonotethat,Sources:Minxetal.(2021);EuropeanCommissionandJRCwhileotherindustriessuchasfoodandbeverages,(2022);IEA(2022i).glass,andaluminumarenottrackedinthisreport,addressingemissionsfromthoseindustriesisneededtoGlobalassessmentoffullydecarbonizethesector.progressforindustryTransformingindustrytoachievethesedeepGHGemis-sionsreductionsispossible,butitwillrequiresignificantinterventions,aswellastheparticipationofawiderangeofactors,acrossthesector.Reducingdemandforindustrialproductsthroughavoidingoverconsumption,materialsubstitution,materialefficiency,andincreasedcircularitywillbeessentialtomakenet-zeroemissionsmoreattainableintheindustrysector.SucheffortscanalsohelpminimizeIndustrySTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202360TABLE3SummaryofglobalprogresstowardindustrytargetsINDICATORMOSTRECENT203020352050LIKELIHOODACCELERATIONSTATUSDATAPOINTTARGETTARGETTARGETOFFACTORShareofelectricityinthe(YEAR)FOLLOWINGindustrysector’sfinalANS-CURVEenergydemand(%)Carbonintensityofglobal2935–4351–5460–694xcementproduction(kgCO2/tcement)(2021)a(2040)Carbonintensityofglobalsteelproduction660360–70bN/A55–90b>10x(kgCO2/tcrudesteel)cGreenhydrogen(2020)bproduction(Mt)1,8901,340–50bN/A0–130bN/A;(2020)b,dU-turnneeded0.02758eN/A330eN/A;(2021)authorjudgmentfNotes:kgCO2/t=kilogramsofcarbondioxidepertonne;Mt=milliontonnes.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.aHistoricaldatafromIEA(2023l)accessedwithapaidlicensetotheIEA’sdatasets.bTargetsandhistoricalemissionsdataincludedirectandindirectGHGemissions.cThecarbonintensityofsteelproductionaccountsforbothprimaryandsecondarysteel.dThe2021datapointfromtheWorldSteelAssociationisexcludedduetoachangeinthemethodologytoderivethedata.eThetargetsrefertowhatisneededforthewholeeconomytodecarbonizeandthusnotonlyfortheindustrysector.fForindicatorscategorizedasS-curvelikely,accelerationfactorscalculatedusingalineartrendlinearenotpresented,astheywouldnotaccuratelyreflectanS-curvetrajectory.Thecategoryofprogresswasdeterminedbasedonauthorjudgment,usingmultiplelinesofevidence.SeeAppendixCandJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformation.Sources:HistoricaldatafromIEA(2023l);GCCA(2023);WSA(2022);andIEA(2022l);targetsfromCAT(2020b,2023a);andIEA(2022t).ElectrifyindustryBellevratandWest2018).Differentindustrialprocessesrequireheatatdifferenttemperatures,andabouthalfTheindustrialsectorconsumes37percentofallfinalofindustrialheatdemandisforhigh-temperatureheat,energyuse(i.e.,energyconsumedbyend-usesectorsat400°Corabove.Theotherhalfisevenlysplitbetweensuchasindustry,transport,andbuildings),withheatmedium-temperatureheat(100–400°C),neededtoaccountingfortwo-thirdsofindustrialenergydemandmanufactureitemslikeplastics,textiles,andpaper,(IEA2022m;BellevratandWest2018).Besidesusingandlow-temperatureheat(below100°C),neededforenergytoprovideheat,industryusesittooperatefoodandbeverageprocessingandmining(IEA2017b).motorsandmachinery,andasindustrialfeedstockManytechnologiesthatcanincreaseelectrificationof(carbon-basedrawmaterialusedtomakeproducts).low-andmedium-heatprocessesarealreadycommer-Electrifyingindustrymeansusingelectricity,ratherthancializedandreadilyavailableforadoption(Roelofsencarbon-intensivefossilfuels,torunmotorsandmachin-etal.2020;BellevratandWest2018).However,barrierstoeryandtoprovideheat.Replacingfossilfuelswithindustrialelectrificationincludethehighcapitalcosts,zero-carbonelectricitytogenerateheatwillthusreducethepriceofelectricityrelativetothatofheatingfuels,theemissionsintensityofindustrialproduction.process-andtemperature-specificsynergiesandcustomizationsthatlimittheabilitytomassproduceHistorically,industrialcompanieshavefocusedonelec-equipmentforelectrification,alackofpolicysupport,trifyingindustrialoperationsthatdonotinvolveheat,andthelonglifetimeofexistingcapitalinvestmentsincludingmachinerylikepumps,roboticarms,andcon-relyingonheatfromfossilfuels(ThielandStark2021;IEAveyorbelts.Theseeffortshavehelpedtheglobalrateof2022s;BellevratandWest2018).electrificationtogrowatasteadypaceinrecentyears,butthereisroomtoelectrifyawiderrangeofindustrialprocessesinvolvingheatinthenearterm(e.g.,drying,evaporation,distillation,etc.)(Roelofsenetal.2020;IndustrySTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202361INDUSTRYINDICATOR1:decliningpricesofelectricitywillsupportelectrification(seebelow),thediverserangeofindustrialprocessesShareofelectricityintheandproductsacrossseveralsubsectors,withtheirindustrysector’sfinalenergyspecificrequirementsfortemperatures,willrequiredemand(%)customizedtechnologicalsolutions(Deasonetal.2018).Policysupportisneededfordirectelectrificationusing•Targets:Theshareofelectricityintheindustrytechnologiessuchasindustrialheatpumps—whichextractandtransferheatfromthepump’ssurroundingssector’sfinalenergydemandincreasesto35–43ratherthangeneratingitandaresignificantlymorepercentby2030,51–54percentby2040,and60–69efficientthancombustiontechnologies—toprovidepercentby2050.low-temperatureheatinindustriessuchaspaper,food,andchemicals.Theshareofelectricityintheindustrysectorrosefromabout28percentofthesector’sfinalenergydemandtoEffortstoelectrifyindustrycanbringnewbenefitsto29percentfrom2017to2021.Itsaverageannualgrowthcommunities.Replacingfossilfuelcombustioninindus-rateduringthisperiodwas1.6percent.Althoughthistrialplantswithelectricitycanreducelocalairpollutionrateofchangeisheadingintherightdirection,itiswellandassociatedhealthimpacts.Industrialelectrificationofftrackandneedstoacceleratefourfoldtoreachthepoliciesshouldensurethatfacilitieslocatedinminority1.5°C-alignednear-termtargetfor2030.andlow-incomecommunities—whichareoftendis-proportionatelyaffectedbyindustrialactivities—areNarrowingthedifferenceinoperationalcostsbetweenprioritizedforelectrificationwhilealsoaddressingotherprovidingheatwithelectricityandwithfossilfuels—harmfulimpacts.Thiswillensurethatimprovedairthroughtaxexemptionsandcrosssubsidies—iscriticalqualityandhealthbenefitsareequallyrealizedacrosstomakingtheelectrificationofheateconomical.communities(Hasanbeigietal.2023).WhilebroadersolutionssuchascarbonpricingandFIGURE22Historicalprogresstoward2030,2040,and2050targetsforshareofelectricityintheindustrysector’sfinalenergydemandRightDirection,WellOffTrackS-CurvePossible%HistoricalCurrentPaceneededtodatatrendreachtargets802040target6051–542030target2050target35–4360–69402021data29Accelerationrequiredtoreach202030target4x0201020202030204020502000Notes:SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromIEA(2023l),accessedwithapaidlicensetotheIEA’sdatasets;targetsfromCAT(2023a).IndustrySTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202362IndustrieswillneedqualifiedpersonneltoimplementINDUSTRYINDICATOR2:electrificationtechnologies(IEA2022s).ThisrequiresgreaterinvestmentineducationandworkforceCarbonintensityofglobalcertificationandtrainingprograms—suchasoninstal-cementproduction(kgCO2/tlation,operation,andmaintenanceofindustrialheatcement)pumps—aswellastrainingopportunitiesaccessibletolow-incomeandunderservedcommunities(HasanbeigiTargets:Thecarbonintensityofglobalcementproduc-etal.2023;IEA2022s).Overtime,apoolofskilledprofes-tiondeclinesto360–70kilogramsofcarbondioxidepersionalscanbedevelopedasnewjobsarecreatedtotonne(kgCO2/t)ofcementby2030and55–90kgCO2/tofintegrateelectrificationtechnologiesinindustry.cementby2050,withanaspirationaltargettoachieve0kgCO2/tofcementby2050.25Toreduceemissions,industrialprocessesmustbeelec-trifiedwithzero-carbonelectricity,eithergridoroff-grid.Notably,whiletotalCO2emissionsfromglobalcementAsindustrialdemandforzero-carbonelectricitygrows,productionincreasedinrecentdecades,itscarbonpoliciesmustfacilitateadditionaldeploymentofcleanintensitydecreased,dueprimarilytoefficiencyimprove-electricitytomeetthegrowingneedsofbothindustryments.However,thesedeclineshaveleveledoffinandpopulationsalreadystrugglingwithfrequentblack-recentyearsastheenergyefficiencyimprovementsoutsandrisingelectricitycosts(TobiasandMakomahavenearedthelimitofwhatistechnologicallypossible.2023).Further,planningdecisionsrelatedtothelocationReductionsintheclinker-to-cementratio,withclinkerofnewpowerplantsandtransmissionanddistributionbeingthe“glue”thatbindstherawmaterialsofcementlinesshouldconsidertheirimpactoncommunities(seetogether,canlowertheemissionsintensityintheshortPowersection)(Hasanbeigietal.2023).term.Usingnovelmaterialsandmethods,about40–50percentofcementemissionscouldbeavoidedthroughCommercializenewclinkersubstitution(IPCC2022b).Inthelast10years,thesolutionsforcementandglobalaverageclinker-to-cementratiohasfluctuatedsteelbetween75and78percent,andisoneofthemaindriversofchangeincementemissionsintensity(GCCAForhigh-temperatureprocessesthatcannotbeelectri-2023).Whiletheaveragetrendoverthelastfiveyearsfied,zero-carbonfuelsorshiftstonewtechnologiesthatisdecreasing,therateofchangeiswellofftracktodonotrequirehightemperatureswillberequired,aswillmeetthe2030target(Figure23).Tomeetthetarget,thedevelopingnewtechnologiesandzero-carbonfeed-currentrateofchangeneedstoacceleratebyafactorstockstoreduceindustry’snonenergy-relatedemissionsofmorethan10.fromchemicalprocesses(i.e.,processemissions).Forexample,shiftingprimarysteelproductionfromblastfurnacestogreenhydrogen–basedsteelproductioncaneliminateprocessemissionsfromtheconsumptionofcoal,andreducetheneedforhightemperatures.Acceleratingthisshiftacrossindustriessuchascementandsteelwillproveespeciallycritical,notbecausethetechnologiesdonotexistbutratherbecausethedecarbonizationoftheindustrysectorstartedsignifi-cantlylaterthanothersectors.Majorbarrierstothecommercializationofnewsolutionsforreducingprocessemissionsandemissionsfromhigh-temperatureheatincludealackofdemandfornear-zerocarbonindustrialproducts;inadequatepolicyandregulations,researchanddevelopment,andaccesstofinance;andhighupfrontcapitalcosts(Boehmetal.2022).IndustrySTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202363FIGURE23Historicalprogresstoward2030and2050targetsforcarbonintensityofglobalcementproductionRightDirection,WellOffTrackS-CurvePossiblekgCO2/tcementHistoricalCurrentPaceneededtodatatrendreachtargets700660Acceleration600requiredtoreach2020data2030target>10x5002030target400360–3703002002050target55–901000201020202030204020502000Note:kgCO2/t=kilogramsofcarbondioxidepertonne.Targetsandhistoricalemissionsdataincludedirectandindirectemissions.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldataderivedbyauthorsusingdatafromGCCA(2023);targetsfromCAT(2020b).INDUSTRYINDICATOR3:andreliesonthesamedataasthe2022report(WSA2022).ThestatusoftheindicatoristhusnotupdatedandCarbonintensityofglobalisgoinginthewrongdirection.steelproduction(kgCO2/tcrudesteel)Primarysteelmakinginvolvesthereductionofironoreintopigiron,whichisfurtherprocessedintosteel,•Targets:Thecarbonintensityofglobalsteelproduc-whilesecondarysteelmakinginvolvesrecyclingandprocessingofscrapsteel,whichisdoneinanelectrictiondeclinesto1,340–50kilogramsofcarbondioxidearcfurnace(EAF)thatrunsonelectricity.Changingthepertonne(kgCO2/t)ofcrudesteelby2030and0–130trajectoryofsteelsectoremissionsintensitywillrequirekgCO2/tofcrudesteelby2050.26anincreaseinsecondarysteelproduction,andafargreatershareofprimarysteelproductionwillneedOverall,thecarbonintensityofglobalsteelproductiontorelyonnewtechnologies.Theseincludethegreenhasremainedlargelystableoverthepastdecade,27hydrogen–baseddirectreducedirontoelectricarcalthoughthelastfiveyearshavewitnessedaslightfurnace(H2DRI-EAF),usingDRIwiththesubmergedarcincrease,meaningthattheindicatorismovinginthefurnace(SAF)toreplacetheblastfurnaceandusingwrongdirectiontomeetthe2030and2050targetsexistingthebasicoxygenfurnace(DRI-SAF-BOF),iron(Figure24).28Sincelastyear’sreport,theWorldSteeloreelectrolysis,andcarboncaptureandusageorAssociation(WSA)hasupdateditsmethodologytostorage(CCU/S)(IEA2021b;NicholasandBasirat2022).29calculatethecarbonintensityofsteelproduction,whichItisimportanttonotethatnotallofthesetechnologiesresultsinslightlyhigherfigures(WSA2023).Toavoidarenear-zerocompatible.Carboncaptureonblastmixingdataresultingfromdifferentmethodologies,thisyear’sreportdoesnotprovideanyupdatedinformationIndustrySTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202364FIGURE24Historicalprogresstoward2030and2050targetsforcarbonintensityofglobalsteelproductionWrongDirection,U-turnNeededHistoricalCurrentS-CurvePossibledatatrendPaceneededtokgCO2/tcrudesteelreachtargets2,5002020data1,8902,0001,5002030target1,340–501,0005002050target0–1300201020202030204020502000Note:kgCO2/t=kilogramsofcarbondioxidepertonne.TargetsandhistoricalemissionsdataincludedirectandindirectGHGemissions,andthecarbonintensityofsteelproductionaccountsforbothprimaryandsecondarysteel.The2021datapointfromtheWorldSteelAssociationisexcludedduetoachangeinthemethodologytoderivethedata.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromWSA(2022);targetsfromCAT(2020b).furnaces,forinstance,isnotcompatiblewithnear-zero,Secondarysteelmakingistheleastenergy-intensivewaywhilesomeoptionsforcarboncaptureonDRIcouldbe.toproducesteelandcanbedecarbonizedbyensuringAchievingnet-zeroemissionsthroughcarboncapturethatthepowersupplyiszero-carbon.Whilesecondaryonblastfurnaceswillrequireaddressingresidualsteelmakingcouldberampedup,therewillnotbeemissions,asitdoesnotcapture100percentofCO2enoughscrapsteeltosatisfythefulldemandforsteelinemissions.Thesuitabilityofcarboncaptureandstoragetheforeseeablefuture.Therefore,primarysteelmaking(CCS)alsodependsontheavailabilityofsuitablesitesinwillstillbeneeded,andmethodstodecarbonizeitwillproximitytoCO2storagelocations.Forcarboncaptureneedtobedeveloped.Today,mostprimarysteelispro-andutilization(CCU)tobeconsideredcarbon-neutral,ducedusingblastfurnaces(BF),whichinherentlyrelyonthecapturedcarbonmustbeusedinmaterialswherecoal.Theonlywaytosignificantlyreduceemissionsfromthecarbonisnotreleasedintotheatmosphere.TherolethisproductionrouteisthroughCCU/S,whichhasnotyetofthesedifferenttechnologiesvariesacrossdifferentbeenprovenatscale.Incontrast,theDRIroutecanusestudies,butthereisanincreasingconsensusonthehydrogeninsteadoffossilfuelsandisthusnotreliantonlimitedrolecarboncapturewillhaveinaParis-com-CCU/Sastheonlydecarbonizationalternative.30patiblescenarioforthesteelsector,whiletheroleforgreenhydrogen–basedsteelhasstronglyincreasedcomparedtothatinolderstudies(AgoraIndustryandWuppertalInstitute2023;MPP2022b).IndustrySTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202365INDUSTRYINDICATOR4:petrochemicals,carboncapturedfromtheatmosphereusingdirectaircaptureisneededinadditiontogreenGreenhydrogenproductionhydrogen.Thesedecarbonizedfeedstockshavetheir(Mt)ownsuiteofhealthandenvironmentalrisksandshouldonlybeusedtotransitiontoproductsthatarenottoxic.•Targets:Greenhydrogenproductioncapac-Inadditiontoanincreaseddemandforgreenhydrogenresultingfromtheapplicationofnewtechnologiessuchityreaches58milliontonnes(Mt)by2030andashydrogen-basedDRIsteelmaking,existinghydrogen330Mtby2050.productionfromfossilfuelsalsoneedstobereplacedwithgreenandzero-carbonhydrogen.Thephase-outElectrifyinghigh-temperatureprocessesischallenging,offossilfuelproduction,suchasoilrefiningthatusesandmanyindustriesalsorelyoncarbon-basedfeed-methanol,willalsoreducetheexistingdemandforstocks.Directelectrificationcoupledwithzero-carbonhydrogen.Asanemergingtechnology,greenhydrogenelectricitycannotovercomeallofthesechallenges.cannotyetmeetglobaldemandforhydrogen,31par-Instead,greenhydrogen—producedwithzero-carbonticularlyinindustry.Greenhydrogenaccountedforjustelectricitybysplittingwaterintohydrogenandoxygen0.03percent(0.027Mt)ofhydrogenproductionin2021byanelectrolyzer—canbeusedbothtogeneratebasedondatafromtheIEA’sHydrogenProjectsData-high-temperatureheatandasafeedstockdirectly,base(IEA2022l).oritcanproducefeedstocksusedinindustry.Fortheproductionofcleanfeedstocks,suchassyntheticFIGURE25Historicalprogresstoward2030and2050targetsforgreenhydrogenproductionRightDirection,WellOffTrackS-CurveLikelyPaceneededtoMtHistoricalCurrentreachtargetsdatatrend35033020210.032050target300HISTORICALDATA250200020151501002030target585020102021data20302040205000.02720002020Note:Mt=milliontonnes.Thetargetsrefertowhatisneededforthewholeeconomytodecarbonizeandthusnotonlyfortheindustrysector.Also,forindicatorscategorizedasS-curvelikely,accelerationfactorscalculatedusingalineartrendlinearenotpresented,astheywouldnotaccuratelyreflectanS-curvetrajectory.Thecategoryofprogresswasdeterminedbasedonauthorjudgment,usingmultiplelinesofevidence.Morespecifically,thisindicatoriscategorizedaswellofftrack,becauseitisanewtechnologythatisstillintheemergencestageofanS-curve.ThecurrenttrendarrowassumesthatthecurrentrateofexponentialgrowthingreenhydrogencontinuesalonganS-curve,butbecausegreenhydrogenproductionisatsuchalowstartingpointtoday,evenexponentialgrowthappearsflat.SeeAppendixCandJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromIEA(2022l);targetsfromIEA(2022t).IndustrySTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202366Transitioningtoa1.5°Cpathwaywillrequiregreenhydro-genusetogrowrapidly,reaching58Mtin2030and329Mtin2050(Figure25).Withsupportivepolicies,suchascarbonpricingorpublicprocurementoflow-carbonindustrialproducts,greenhydrogencapacitycouldincreaserapidlyandnonlinearly,withadoptionratesfollowinganS-curvetrajectoryofchange.However,thistechnologyisrelativelynascentandremainsintheemergencephaseofanS-curve,soglobalprogresstowardthisnear-termtargetremainswellofftrack.Greenhydrogenproductionincreased38percentperyearonaverageoverthepastfiveyears,butitisstartingfromsuchalowlevelthatevenifexponentialgrowthcontinuesatthisrate,productionstillwouldnotreacheven1Mtby2030.RecentdevelopmentswithlowerconcentrationsofCO2intheexhaustgas,asacrossindustryisthecaseinmanyindustrialprocesses.However,theactalsoincludesmeasuresthatcouldfurtherdelaySeveraladvanceshavebeenmadeinthepastyearwithindustrialdecarbonization.Forinstance,itprovides$60regardstopolicy-,technology-,andinvestment-relatedpertonneofcapturedCO2forenhancedoilrecovery,enablerstocommercializeindustrialdecarbonization.whichusescapturedcarbontoproduceadditionaloil.CarbonpricingcanbeanimportantandpowerfulToensurethatlegislationliketheInflationReductioninstrumenttoincentivizetheadoptionofnovellow-car-Actisefficientlyappliedandtrulysupportsindustrialbontechnologies.Thoughtherewasnosignificantdecarbonization,itisalsoimportantthatrobustmoni-increaseinglobalGHGemissionscoveredbycarbontoring,reporting,andverificationsystemsforemissionspricingsystemssince2021,India,withoneoftheworld’sbycompaniesreceivingthesubsidiesbeinplace.fastest-growingindustrialsectors,releasedthedraftframeworkforacarbonmarketschemeinMarch2023LegislationliketheInflationReductionActcanhave(Ghosh2023;WorldBank2023d).Thiscarbonmarketacascadingeffect,asothercountriesandregionswilllikelytarget11sectors,includingpower,aluminum,bumpuptheirownsupportforalow-carbonindustrytocement,petroleumrefineries,andsteel(Singh2023b).Inavoidlosingtheircompetitiveedgeinglobalmarkets.May2023,theEuropeanUnion’sCarbonBorderAdjust-Forexample,theEuropeanCommission(EC)releasedmentMechanism(CBAM)wasofficiallyadopted,anditsNet-ZeroIndustryActasaresponsetotheInflationitstransitionalapplicationwillstartinOctober2023.TheReductionActinMarch2023.TheECactsetstargetsformechanismaimstoavoidcarbonleakagebysettingspecifictechnologiesconsideredessentialfordecar-apriceoncarbonforimportedindustrialproductsandbonizingtheEuropeanUnion’seconomyandaimstowillbealignedwiththephase-outoffreeallowancesdomesticallyproducecleantechnology(suchasCCU/SundertheEUemissionstradingscheme(Europeanandelectrolyzers)tomeet40percentofthedemandinCommissionn.d.a).2030(diSario2023).Italsosetsa2030targetfor50MtofcapturedCO2tobeinjectedintopermanentstorageNewpolicypackageswereannouncedin2022tosites(EuropeanCommission2023f).Tomeetthetarget,itcommercializedeepemissionreductiontechnologiesasksEU-basedoilandgasproducerstocontributetothebyincentivizingnewinvestmentsandfacilitatingaccessdevelopmentofcapturedCO2storagesitesproportionaltofinance.TheU.S.governmentpassedtheInflationtotheiroilandgasproduction(EuropeanCommissionReductionActinAugust2022,whichincludeda$6billion2023f).Thiswillcontributetothedecarbonizationofgrantprogramaimedattechnologydevelopers,indus-theindustrysector,asCCU/Sisoneofthemeasurestotryactors,universities,andotherstodecarbonizeheavyachievethat(ConleyandBotwright2023).industry(Gardner2023;U.S.Government2022).Theactalsoincludesgreenhydrogen–relatedmeasuresthatWhilesubsidiescanadvancethelow-carbontransitioncouldbenefitindustrialdecarbonizationefforts.Italsoinindustry,theyalsoriskdisruptinginternationaltradeincreasedthesubsidypertonneofcapturedCO2fromflowsandleavingbehinddevelopingandemerging$50to$85aspartofanupdatetotheexistingtaxcrediteconomiesthatcannotaffordlargesubsidyprogramsthatincentivizesindustries,investors,anddevelopersto(ConleyandBotwright2023).InternationalclimatesupportCCS(CATF2022b).SuchanincreasecanmakeitfinanciallyviabletocapturecarbonfromprocessesIndustrySTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202367financeandtechnologytransfersupportingcleanalsoincreasinglypopularintheEuropeanUnionastheyindustriesindevelopingcountrieshasanimportantrolebecomemorecost-competitiveduetorisingnaturalgastoplayinensuringajusttransition(seefurtherdiscus-pricesinthewakeofRussia’sinvasionofUkraine(Hock-sionofequityandjusttransitionsinBox8).InDecemberenos2023).Europe’sNet-ZeroIndustryActalsoincludes2022,theG7initiatedtheClimateClubtoacceleratetheheatpumps,amongothertechnologies,thatshouldimplementationoftheParisAgreementandhelpresolvebepromoted(HPTMagazine2023).In2023,GermanychallengesarisingfrominstrumentssuchasCBAMandstartedaprogramtocatalyzeinvestmentsinlow-car-theInflationReductionAct(EuropeanParliament2023c).bonproductiontechnologiesthroughtargetedsubsidiesAvailabilityoffinancialsupportcanfurtherincentivizeestimatedtobearound$50billion(Segal2023).countriesfromtheGlobalSouthtojointheclubandfacilitatecooperationwiththeGlobalNorth(UngerandForhigh-temperatureprocesses,suchassteelandThielges2023).cementproduction,thatrequiretemperaturesofmorethan1,000°C,electrificationistechnicallypossibleRecentdevelopmentsinbutrequiresfurtherR&D,pilots,anddemonstrationtoelectrifyingindustrybecomeeconomicallyfeasible.32Somerecentpromisingdevelopmentsforelectrifyinghigh-temperaturepro-KeyrecentpositivedevelopmentsrelatedtoelectrifyingcessesincluderesearchersatMassachusettsInstituteindustryincludepoliciestoincentivizetheadoptionofofTechnology(MIT)carryingoutpilotdemonstrationstoavailabletechnologyforelectrifyinglow-temperatureproducecementusingelectricityatlowtemperatures;heat.Forexample,theU.S.InflationReductionActapatentawardedtoSaltXinMarch2023forelectricarcauthorizedover$15billiontohelpmanufacturersswitchcalcinertechnology,whichuseszero-carbonelectric-toheatpumpsandothercleanindustrialheatingitytoproducecementbutatveryhightemperature,technology(Rissman2022).Industrialheatpumpsarewithademonstrationplantexpectedtobebuiltthisyear;andBostonMetal’sdevelopmentofmoltenoxideBOX8EquityandjusttransitionintheindustrysectorThedecarbonizationoftheindustrysectorwillbonizeorrequiregreenhydrogentoareasrichincomewithchallengesrelatedtoequityandjustrenewableenergyresourcescanhelpensurethattransitions.Theproductionofmanyindustrialtheywillbeeconomicallyviable.Relocationcanproductsrequiresminingofrawmaterialssuchintroducearangeofjustice-relatedimplications.asironoreforsteelmakingandlimestoneforItcanburdensomeregionsdisproportionately,cement-making.Anincreaseddemandforironstrandassets,causeunemployment,haveenvi-oretomeetrisingprimarysteeldemandrisksronmentalimplicationsrelatedtotheavailabilityofincreasingthehumanandenvironmentalbur-freshwaterandland-userequirements,andrequireden.Environmentalandhumanrightsabusesrelocationofjobsandfamilies,reskillingofworkers,havebeenreportedinregionsandcommunitiesandre-sitingofotherinfrastructure(Vogletal.surroundinglargeironoreminingoperations(e.g.,2019;Swennenhuisetal.2022).Inthesteelsector,miners’exposuretounsafeandunhealthyworkingsplittingironmakingfromsteelmakingandmovingconditions,laborandagrarianconflicts,localandtheenergy-intensiveironmakingtolocationsIndigenouscommunitieslosingtheirhomes,live-withrichrenewableresourceswhileretainingthelihoods,andaccesstocleanairandwater)(FIDHsteelmakingattheoriginallocationcouldlimitthe2022).Althoughironoreminingactivitiesmayslownumberofjoblosses(AgoraIndustryandWupper-downwithhigherratesofsecondarysteelmakingtalInstitute2023).andreduceddemandforsteel,miningactivitiesleaveanirreversibleimpactonlocaleconomiesTransitioningfromonekindofindustrytoanotherandcommunitiesiftheseactivitiesdonotfollowcanalsoputatriskworkers’gainsbuiltthroughthroughwithduecompensationorenvironmentalyearsofactivismbyunionsinsomeindustriesrehabilitation.Itiscriticaltoensurethatenviron-andneedtobesafeguarded.TheU.S.Inflationmentalhazardsarefullyidentified,prevented,andReductionAct,forexample,includesaprogramtoremedied,andthataffectedworkersandfamiliessupportfairlypaidjobsandprotectunionworkers’receivejustcompensationforresettlementcosts.gainsinenergyconstructionjobs,butitdoesnotextendsimilarprotectiontojobsinmanufacturingLocatingorrelocatingindustrialplantsthatrequireindustries(Swalec2023).largeamountsofzero-carbonenergytodecar-IndustrySTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202368electrolysistechnologytoproducemoltenironusingmodelsetsabenchmarkformaximumcarbonintensityelectricity,whichhasattractedinvestmentfromIFCofmaterialsrequiredinpubliclyfundedprojects.TheandArcelorMittal,thesecond-largeststeelproducerNewJerseylawhasanadditionaltaxcreditforcon-lookingtodecarbonizeitsproduction(Crownhart2023;creteproducersthatisevenlowerthanthemaximumSaltXTechnology2023;Cemnet2023a;Gleeson2022;IFCcarbonintensitybenchmarksetbytheBuyClean2023b;ArcelorMittal2023).model(Neidl2023).RecentdevelopmentsInadditiontopublicprocurement,theprivatesectorcaninloweringthecarbonalsosupportsecuringademandforlow-carboncementintensityofcementthroughinitiativessuchasConcreteZeroandtheFirstMoversCoalition.TheIndustrialDeepDecarbonizationThereareseveralwaystoreducethecarbonintensityofInitiative,ledbytheUNIndustrialDevelopmentOrgani-cementproduction(e.g.,loweringtheclinker-to-cementzation,isanotherleadingprogramfordemandcreation,ratiobyusingsupplementarycementitiousmaterialswhichnowincludesthecementsectorasannouncedat[SCMs],switchingtoalternativematerialstoproduceCOP27(High-LevelChampions2022b).cementaltogether,andapplyingCCU/S),withsomepromisingdevelopmentsinrecentyears.AchievingCementdecarbonizationtechnologiesalsorequireade-deepdecarbonizationwillrequirefurtherdevelopmentquateaccesstofinancetocounterhighupfrontcosts,andcommercializationofnewtechnologies,enabledbyparticularlyindevelopingcountries,whichfacegrowingpolicieslinkedtoimprovedincentivestructuresandthedemandforinfrastructuredevelopmentbuthaveavailabilityoffinance.limitedfinancialresourcesforlow-carboninvestments.InFebruary2023,theInternationalFinanceCorporationCreatingdemandforlow-carboncementthroughmea-(IFC)andSococimIndustries,Senegal’sleadingcementsuressuchaspublicprocurementandprivatesectormanufacturer,announcedanalmost$264million(€242purchasecommitmentscanhelpderiskinvestmentsinmillion)financingpackagetodecarbonizeSococim’snewtechnologies(Lewisetal.2023;TorresMoralesetal.cementproduction(IFC2023a).33ItisIFC’sfirstgreen2023).CanadaandtheUnitedStateshavebeenleadersloanformaterialmanufacturinginAfricaandwillbeinthisspace.InDecember2022,CanadaannouncedusedtoimproveenergyefficiencyandincreasethetwostandardsunderitsGreenProcurementpolicyforshareofalternativefuels.WhilecementproductionembodiedcarboninconcreteandcarbondisclosureinAfricatodayonlymakesupasmallshareofglobalandreductionrequirements,thusimposingspecificproduction,thedemandisprojectedtoincreaseobligationsoncontractingauthoritiesandvendorsrapidlywithgreaterdevelopmentandindustrialization(O’Brienetal.2023).IntheUnitedStates,anationalgreen(Chenetal.2022).procurementinitiativewaslaunched,withseveralstatespassingtheirowngreenprocurementpolicies(Gan-Thisyear,theU.S.DepartmentofEnergy(DOE)awardedgotraetal.2023).Earlythisyear,theU.S.stateofNew$3.2milliontotheSolarMEADproject,whichaimstofullyJerseyadoptedapublicprocurementlawforconcrete.replacefossilfuel–basedheatgenerationforcementThelawbuildsontheBuyCleanmodelspearheadedinproductionwithconcentratedsolarthermalheatCaliforniaandnowadoptedbyseveralotherstates.The(RenewableEnergyWorld2023).Thiscouldeliminateabout40percentofdirectemissionsfromthestandardcementproductionprocess(CAT2023a).Thetechnologywassuccessfullypilotedatlaboratoryscalein2022byCEMEXandSynhelion,andthefundingwillhelpadvancethistoanindustrial-scaleplant.Anotherimportantmitigationoptioninthecementindustryisthereductionoftheclinker-to-cementratio,sinceclinkerproductionisresponsibleforabout90–95percentofcementemissions.Clinkercanbepartlyreplacedwithsupplementarycementitiousmaterials,suchasindustrialwastesandclays,buttheavailabilityofindustrialwastesthatcanbeusedasSCMsisdeclin-ing.UsingcalcinedclayasanSCMispromisingbecauseitcanreduceprocessemissionsbyabout50percentinthenearterm(ScrivenerandShell2023).34Interestincalcinedclayispickingupglobally,withAfricanprojectsclearlyinthelead.CalcinedclayprojectshavebeenannouncedinseveralAfricancountries,includingGhana,Malawi,Cameroon,Côted’Ivoire,andEgypt.LikelyreasonscouldbetheavailabilityofrawIndustrySTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202369FIGURE26Cumulativenumberofannouncedcommerical-scaleCCU/Splantsoperationalby2030increasinglychallenging(MPP2022c).AccordingtotheCCUSprojectsintheglobalcurrentpipeline,only13full-scaleplantsareplannedtobecomeoperationalbythen(Loreaetal.2022).Further,cementsectorthefactthattheGlobalNorthisleadingthedevelop-mentofCCU/Sinthecementindustry,whilethemajorityNumberofCCUSprojectsAsiaofexistingcementcapacityisinAsiaandnewcement40AustraliacapacityisexpectedtobebuiltinAsiaandAfrica,thiscreatesamismatchbetweenwherethemitigation30NorthtechnologyisbeingdevelopedandwhereitisneededAmerica(Chenetal.2022).However,somerecentpositivedevel-opmentshavebeenobservedinChina—responsiblefor20morethanhalfoftheworld’sannualcementproduc-tion—wherethelargestcementCCU/SplanttodatewasEuropeannouncedinJuly2023(Cemnet2023b).10Recentdevelopments0201720192022inloweringthecarbon2015intensityofsteelNote:CCUS=carboncaptureutilizationandstorage.Decarbonizingprimarysteelmakingwillinvolveacom-Source:Loreaetal.(2022).binationofdecarbonizationtechnologies,allatdifferentstagesofcommercialization.Theunderstandingofmaterials,populationgrowth,increasedindustrializationhowprimarysteelproductioncanbedecarbonizedandurbanization,andthechancetorelylessoncostlyhasadvanceddramaticallyinrecentyears,andsteelimportedclinker(Cemnet2022;ScrivenerandShell2023;companiesareincreasinglypublishingdecarboniza-Perilli2022).ThefirstEuropeanplantlaunchedopera-tiontargetsandengaginginpilotanddemonstrationtionsinearly2023inFrance(Cemnet2022;Perilli2023).projects.BasedondatafromtheGreenSteelTracker,thetotalnumberoflow-carbonsteelprojectsisincreasing,35Amajorbarriertowideradoptionofalternativecementalbeitatasignificantlylowerratethanin2021(Figurematerialsisslowdevelopmentandadoptionofupdated27).36AccordingtoMissionPossiblePartnership,aboutcementandconcretestandards.Manycementand70low-carbonsteelplantsneedtobeoperationalbyconcretestandardstodayareprescriptiveratherthan2030inordertostayona1.5°C-compatiblepathwayperformance-basedandthusdonotallowforthe(MPP2022c).TheGreenSteelTrackerdatashowthat29introductionofnewmaterials.InMay2023,theAlliancefull-scaleplantsareplannedtobeoperationalbythen,forLowCarbonCementandConcretewaslaunched,signalingastrongneedforaccelerateddeploymentoffocusingonlow-carboncementdevelopmentandlow-carbonsteelprojects.37Ofallannouncedprojects,callingonpolicymakerstoimprovestandards,amongthree-fourthsareinEurope,NorthAmerica,andAustralia,otherthings(GlobalCement2023).withEuropeaccountingforalmost60percentofthem(Figure27).WhileAsiahasthesecond-largestshareofWhilechallengesrelatedtothedevelopmentandprojectsatroughly20percent,SouthAmericaandAfricadeploymentofcarboncapturetechnologyraisedinthisaccountforjust3percentand2percent,respectively.38reportarealsorelevantforcement,itisoneofthefewThisfurtherhighlightsaneedforincreasedtechnologysectorswhereachievingnear-zeroemissionsislikelytotransfer(Batailleetal.2023).requireasubstantialbuild-outofCCU/S.ThisisreflectedinthenumberofannouncedcarboncaptureprojectsAmonglow-carbonsteelprojects,theleadingchoiceinthecementsector—39bytheendof2022—comparedhasbeengreenhydrogen–basedDRI-EAFsteelproduc-to4projectsinthesteelsector(Figure26).TheNorcemtion.In2021,thefirstsuccessfulshipmentofsuchsteel,plantinNorway,expectedtobethefirstCCU/SplantproducedbytheHYBRITprojectpilotplantinSweden,tobecomeoperationalinthecementindustryin2024,wasdeliveredtoVolvoAB,whichwillbethefirstmanu-wasfirstshortlistedforanindustrial-scaletrialin2018facturertoproducevehiclesfromfossil-freesteel(Vetter(HeidelbergMaterials2023).Thetimerequiredtobring2019).Suchcommitments,fromboththeprivateandaplantfromtheinitialplanningstagetofullcommer-publicsectors,helptoensuredemandforlow-carboncialoperationmakesthetimewindowtoachievethesteel.Between2021and2022,28newgreenhydrogen–MissionPossiblePartnership’sgoalofmorethan20IndustrySTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202370FIGURE27NumberofcumulativegreenhydrogenDRI-EAFproductionroute.Recently,Thys-senKrupp,amajorsteelcompanyglobally,announcedannouncedlow-carbonsteelreplacingblastfurnaceswithhydrogen-basedDRI-EAFasitsmajorcarbon-neutralstrategy(Batailleetal.projectsbycontinent2023;Maddy2023;ThyssenKruppn.d.).Baowu,China’slargeststeelmaker,hassetacarbonneutralitytargetforNumberoflow-carbonsteelprojectsAfrica2050—10yearsaheadofthenationalcarbonneutrality60Australiatarget(BloombergNEF2021ba).In2023,Baowuand50FortescueenteredamemorandumofunderstandingAsiatoexplorelow-carbonsteelmaking,includinggreen40hydrogen–basedsteelmaking(Xin2023).Thefocusonhydrogen-basedsteelmakingiscurrentlystrongestin30Europe,NorthAmerica,anddevelopedAsia,whileotherregionsaremorelikelytouseothertechnologies,suchasEuropeBFwithCCU/S.ArcelorMittal,thesecond-biggeststeelpro-20ducerglobally,hassetatargetofnetzeroby2050andisalsoplanningtoshiftfromblastfurnacestogreenhydro-10Northgen–basedDRI-EAFinitsEuropeanandNorthAmericanoperations.However,thecompanyplanstosignificantly0AmericaexpanditsblastfurnacecapacityinIndia,whichisnow2010thenumberonecountryindevelopingnewcoal-basedSouthsteelproductionglobally(NicholasandBasirat2023;ZhiandAn2023).ThisrevealstwosubstantiallydifferentAmericaapproachesindifferentgeographies.Consideringthelongeconomiclifetimeofsteelplants(about40years),2013201620192022buildingmoreblastfurnacesaswellasretrofittingexistingonesheightenscarbonlock-inrisks(seeBox9).IncreasingNote:Low-carbonsteeltechnologiesincludelow-carbonhydrogen–GHG-producingassetsinoneregionwhileinvestinginbaseddirectreducediron,scrap-basedelectricarcfurnace,carboncleanassetsinothersalsoraisesquestionsofenviron-captureandusageorstorage,moltenoxideelectrolysis,biomass-mentalinjustice.Avoidingthisrequiresastrongerroleforbasedsteelproduction,andsmeltingreduction.globalstandardsacrossareasofoperations.Source:Authors’analysisofdatafromGreenSteelTracker(2023).Whilelessadvancedthanhydrogen-basedDRI,directelectrificationofsteelmakingisalsoattractinggrow-relatedsteelprojectswereannounced,39accountingforingattention.Inearly2023,twonewprojectswereover70percentofthetotalnumberoflow-carbonsteelprojectannouncementsduringthisperiod(authors’cal-culationsbasedondatafromGreenSteelTracker2023).Thisemphasisonhydrogenappearslikelytocontinue.SeveralmajorsteelmakershaveunveiledemissionreductionordecarbonizationplanslargelybasedontheIndustrySTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202371BOX9NewresearchshowshighrisksofstrandedassetsresultingfromnewblastfurnacedevelopmentsDespitepledgestoloweremissionsandinsomerespectivelyin2022,accordingtotheGlobalplacestoexplorenewhydrogenandelectricityEnergyMonitor(SwalecandGrigsby-Schulte2023).technologies,thebuild-outofcoal-reliantblastButthisprogressisfarfromsufficientandstayingfurnacescontinuesglobally.SinceblastfurnacesalignedwiththeParisAgreementwouldrequireareinherentlyreliantoncoal,theirdecarbonizationabout347MtperyearofblastfurnacecapacitywillrequireCCU/S.Butitisbecomingclearerthat,toberetiredorcancelledby2050;thatis,alreadywhilepossiblysuitableandneededforalimitedexistingblastfurnacecapacityneedstoberetiredshareofglobalsteelmaking,CCU/Swillnotbeaandplannedcapacitycancelled.viablesolutionforthemajorityoftheindustry.Inrecentyears,studieshavehighlightedthelackThecountriesmostexposedtostrandedassetofCCU/Sprojectscomparedtootherdecarbon-risksarealsothecountrieswiththelargestblastizationtechnologies,especiallyconsideringthatfurnacesteelcapacitypipeline.Agoraestimatesnewblastfurnacecapacitiesarestillbeingaddedthat315Mtofadditionalcoal-basedblastfurnace(deVillafrancaCasasetal.2022).AccordingtocapacityiscurrentlyinthepipelineinemergingtheIEA’sCCU/Sprojectsdatabase,onlyoneneweconomies,correspondingtoabout13percentcarboncaptureprojectforsteelwasannouncedinofcurrentinstalledsteelcapacity(primaryand2022(IEA2023a).Similarly,Agorafindsthatonlyasecondary)(AgoraIndustryandWuppertalsingleCCSprojectforcoal-basedsteelproductionInstitute2023).Indiacurrentlyhasthelargestisplannedtocomeonlinebefore2030(Agorapipelinewithabout113Mt,followedbyASEAN26IndustryandWuppertalInstitute2023).Inadditionwith99Mt,andChinawith94Mt(AgoraIndustrytoitsslowcommercialization,CCU/StechnologyandWuppertalInstitute2023).About97percentforsteelmakingcomeswithotherexternalities,ofthecurrentblastfurnacepipelinethusisledbysuchasonlypartialcaptureofCO2emissions,theemerginganddevelopingcountriesinAsia,wherecontinuedreleaseofmethaneemissionsfromcoaldemandforprimarysteelisrapidlygrowing.Alongmining,andmore,whichisfurtherdiscussedinwiththis,existingblastfurnacecapacityneedstoJaegeretal.(2023).besignificantlyphaseddown.China,accountingformorethanhalfofglobalsteelproduction,outArecentParis-compatiblescenarioanalysisbyofwhichmorethan70percentisblastfurnace–Agoraevensuggeststhatallblastfurnacecapac-based,ishometoamajorpartofthat.Asaresultitycanbephasedoutby2050,thuseliminatingtheoftheChinesecapacityswapmechanism,whichneedforCCU/Sforthattechnology(Witeckaetal.requiresnewsteelplantstobesmallerthanthe2023).Overall,thebalancebetweennewBF-basedplantbeingreplaced,moreblastfurnacecapacityandDRI-basedprojectsinthepipelinehashasbeenretiredcomparedtonewblastfurnacechangedinapositivedirectiononlyinthelastyear.capacitythathasbeenbuiltinrecentyearsintheAnestimated43percentofplannedprojectswerecountry(AgoraIndustryandWuppertalInstituteDRI-basedand57percentwereblastfurnace–2023;Ranjan2023).basedin2023,comparedto33and67percentNotes:BF=blastfurnace;CCS=carboncaptureandstorage;CCU/S=carboncapture,utilization,and/orstorage;DRI=directreducediron;Mt=milliontonnes.announcedinAustraliaandsimilarprojectsexistinotherRecentdevelopmentsincountries(e.g.,BostonMetalsandSiderwinprojectsingreenhydrogentheUnitedStatesandFrance,respectively)(Hart2023;Vorrath2023).DirectelectrificationcouldeliminateGreenhydrogenisproducedbysplittingwaterintotheneedforhydrogenand,whilenotyetproven,mayhydrogenandoxygenusinganelectrolyzer.Dataonbecomemoreenergyefficient.plannednewelectrolyzercapacitycanthereforegiveanindicationofthepotentialincreaseingreenhydro-genproductioninthenearfuture.AccordingtotheIEA,whileglobalinstalledelectrolyzercapacitygrewby23percentfrom2021to2022,reaching690MW,thatlevelIndustrySTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202372FIGURE28GloballyinstalledelectrolyzerNationalGreenHydrogenMissionandallocated$36millionforthefirstyear,withatotalof$2.3billionovercapacityforhydrogenproductionsevenyears(Kumar2023;GovernmentofIndia2023).Throughthe2022InflationReductionActandthe2021MW560,000Infrastructure,Investment,andJobsAct,theUnitedStateshaschanneled$9.5billioninfundingforhydrogen600,0002030benchmark(over80percentbeingforhydrogenhubs)andhasintroducedproductiontaxcreditsforcleanhydrogen500,000(KrupnickandBergman2022).ItalsoreleaseditsdraftNationalCleanHydrogenStrategyandRoadmapin2022400,000(U.S.DOE2022a).Australiaplanstosupportdomesticmanufacturingandboostinvestmentinhydrogen800MWelectrolyzersthroughtheNationalReconstructionFundpassedin2023(Singh2023a).China,whichproduces30300,000HISTORICALpercentofglobalhydrogensupply,releasedaHydrogenDATAIndustryDevelopmentPlanin2022andsetshort-termtargets(IEA2022h).41Chile,whichpublisheditsnational200,00002022:687MWgreenhydrogenstrategyin2020,recentlysecureda100,0002021:559MW$150millionWorldBankloantopromoteinvestmentindomesticgreenhydrogenprojectsaimingtosupport0Endoflocalcommunities(WorldBank2023b).EndofEndof203020212022TheRussianinvasionofUkraineinFebruary2022isdrivingcountries—particularlythoseinEuropedepen-Note:MW=megawatt.dentonRussiangas—tobecomemoreambitiouswithSource:IEA(2022h).regardtogreenhydrogendevelopmentandusage.Anincreasingnumberofcountriesalsoseektoachieveisstillinsufficienttopoweramedium-sizedDRIsteelgreaterenergysecurity,partlythroughthedevelopmentplant(Vogletal.2018;Bhaskaretal.2020;IEA2023b)ofdomesticgreenhydrogenproduction.TheEuropean(Figure28).Themajorityofthe70percentincreaseCommission’sREPowerEUplanpublishedinMay2022between2020and2021camefromoneprojectinChina,(aftertheEUhydrogenstrategy)aimstoeliminatetheand,asoflate2022,about40percentand30percentEuropeanUnion’sdependenceonRussianfossilfuelsofplannedcapacityexpansionwasinChinaandbefore2030.ItincludeshydrogentargetsthataremoreEurope,respectively.ambitiousthanthoseintheEUhydrogenstrategy,aswellasanonbindingtargettoimport10milliontonnesLookingahead,plannedprojectsinthepipelinewouldofgreenhydrogenby2030.TheEuropeanHydrogenamountto134GWin2030,correspondingtoanannualBankwasalsoestablishedtoboostrenewablehydrogenhydrogenproductioncapacityofabout10Mt/year.40productionandimports(EuropeanCommission2023e).Thatisanincreaseofalmost150percentcomparedtothecorrespondingestimatebasedontheprojectpipe-TheEuropeanUnionhasalsobeenparticularlyactivelinein2021;however,itisstillfarfromsufficienttomeetinestablishinginternationalpartnershipsforgreenthe2030target.Oftheplannedelectrolyzercapacity,32hydrogenimports.Forexample,anagreementbetweenpercentwillbeinEurope,28percentinAustralia,and12theEuropeanUnionandEgyptwassignedin2022forpercentinLatinAmerica(IEA2022h).Electrolyzerman-astrategicgreenhydrogenpartnership(EuropeanCom-ufacturingcapacitygrewfrom8GWin2021to11GWinmission2022d).TheAfricanGreenHydrogenAlliance,2022,andabout125GWofadditionalcapacitycouldbecurrentlymadeupofEgypt,Kenya,Mauritania,Morocco,inthepipelinethrough2030(IEA2023i).Namibia,andSouthAfrica,wasalsolaunchedin2022todevelopgreenhydrogen–relatedprojectsinAfricaThegreenhydrogensectorcontinuestoreceivepolitical(GreenHydrogenOrganisationandRacetoZeron.d.).attentionglobally,providingapositivesignaltotheOthersimilaralliancesincludeH2LAC,withafocusonprivatesector.BetweenOctober2021andSeptemberLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean;theIndiaHydrogen2022,9countriesreleasednationalhydrogenstrat-Alliance;theJapanHydrogenAssociation;andtheMid-egies,bringingthetotalto25nations,aswellasthedleEastNorthAfricaHydrogenAlliance.TowhatextentEuropeanUnion(IEA2022h).In2023,Indiarolledoutitssuchpartnershipscontributepositivelytoexportingcountries’developmentandsupporttheirdecarboniza-tiontoowilldependonthedesignofthepartnershipsandthelocalcircumstances(Box10).IndustrySTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202373BOX10PotentialrisksandbenefitsofaglobalgreenhydrogentradetosustainabledevelopmentintheGlobalSouthIndustriessuchassteelmayneedtorelocateamongmanysub-Saharanpopulations.Intoregionswhereitischeapertoproducegreencountrieswithanelectricitysupplydeficit,greenhydrogentoavoidimportinghydrogenfortheirhydrogentradeandmechanismsforexportingdecarbonizationgoals,sincehydrogenisexpen-cleanenergyshouldalsobenefitlocalcommu-sivetotransport.Butpoliticalorstrategicreasonsnitiesthroughimprovedaccesstoelectricity.InmaydictatethatsteelindustryandassociatedNamibia,witha56percentelectricityaccessjobsareretaineddomesticallyandhydrogenratein2020,thegovernmentisdevelopingwithaneedsaremetthroughimports.However,theGermanventureagreenhydrogenexportprojecthydrogen-exportingcountrymayriskjeopardizingexpectedtogenerateexcesselectricitythatcandomesticdecarbonizationunlessadequatesafe-beusedtoimprovedomesticaccesstoelectricityguardsareensured.Whilescalinguprenewable(WorldBank2021b;Elston2022).Standardsshouldenergycapacityforproducinggreenhydrogenbedevelopedtoholdinvestorsandgovernmentscoulddrivelocalknowledge,marketdevelopment,accountableinthisregard.PowerShiftAfrica,aanduptakeofrenewableenergyelsewhereintheKenya-basedthinktank,hassuggestedasetofcountry,thereisalsoariskthateffortstobuildsuchstandardstoensurethatenergyforgreenrenewablesremainlimitedtogreenhydrogenhydrogenprojectsisadditional(Adowetal.2022).plantsmeantforexport,orevenpullresourcesawayfromdecarbonizingthedomesticenergyWithadequatesafeguardsinplace,greenhydro-system(FeketeandOutlaw2023).gendevelopmentcanbenefitlocalcommunitiesbyenhancinglocalvaluechainsandspurringUncertaintiesindeterminingthelong-termgloballocalrenewableenergydeployment.Supportingneedforgreenhydrogenmeanthatinvestmentsthedevelopmentofupstreamanddownstreaminitslarge-scaleproductioncarrysignificantcomponentsalongthegreenhydrogenproductionfinancialrisks.ForcountriesintheGlobalSouth,valuechainlocallycangeneratejobsdomesticallyborrowingmoneyforcapital-intensiveinvestmentsandbettersupportlocalcommunities.Includingcouldincreasedebt.Buttheseinvestmentscouldstakeholdersfromallpartsofsociety(theprivatebeusedtodrivedownthecostofwindandsolar,sector,investors,academia,civilsociety,andlocaldecarbonizepowergeneration,andsupportlocalcommunities)inplanninganddecision-mak-valuecreationthroughhydrogenexportindus-ingcanbringsuchissuestotheforeandhelptry—atrendalreadyemerginginOman(MiningnegotiateoutcomesthatdonotshortchangeTechnology2022;Klevstrand2023).localcommunities.Greenhydrogenexportprojectsshouldprioritize.countries’basicdevelopmentneeds.Forinstance,universalaccesstoelectricityremainsunachievedDefiningwhatqualifiesasgreenhydrogenisanDemandforgreenhydrogencanincentivizenewinvest-importantaspectofhydrogenstrategydevelopment,mentsinexpandedproductioncapacity.Inadditiontotargetsetting,trade,andpolicydevelopment.Inearlyincreasingdemandfromthesteelsector(see“Recent2023,theEuropeanParliamentadoptedadefinitiondevelopmentsinloweringthecarbonintensityofsteel”forrenewablehydrogenthatcouldserveasastartingabove),greenammoniaproduction—aderivativeofpointfordevelopingconsistentnationalorinternationalgreenhydrogenthatcanbeusedasazero-carbonstandards(Day2023).Itincludesawiderangeofrulesfeedstockinchemicalsproduction—isgainingmomen-linkedtodifferentlow-carbonhydrogentechnologies,tum,withover60greenammoniaplants,withcombinedsuchasnaturalgaswithCCS,nuclear-basedelectricityproductionof34.1Mt/yearby2030,announcedasofandelectrolysis,andrenewable-basedelectrolysis.ItMay2022(Sayginetal.2023).Companiesinalmostalsohasrenewableenergyadditionalityrulestoensureallpartsoftheworldareinvestingingreenammoniathatexistingcapacitiesarenotusedtoproducegreenplants(StateofGreen2022;HydrogenCentral2023b;PRhydrogeninsteadofdecarbonizingthegrid(EuropeanNewswire2023;Collins2022a;Outlook2023;Prisco2022;Parliament2023b).HydrogenCentral2023a;Sayginetal.2023).IndustrySTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202374SECTION5TransportTransportationnetworksconnectpeopletoonecontributed11percentofemissions,whileaviationfol-another,aswellastoeverythingtheyneedtolowedat9percent.Railonlycontributedabout1percentleadfulfillinglives:education,jobs,goods,andofemissions,andtheremaining6percentareattrib-services.Yetmostcurrenttransportparadigmsremainutabletomiscellaneoustransportemissions.Althoughinaccessibletomany,whilealsocontributingsignifi-indirectemissionsarenotavailablefor2021,historicallycantcarbonpollutiontotheatmosphere.Since1990,theyhaverepresentednomorethan0.2GtCO2eeachforexample,increasedcarownershipandtraveldueyear(IEA2022i).torisingincomeshasdrivensteadyincreasesinGHGemissionsfromtransport(IEA2020b).Theglobalmotor-Emissionsincreasedsteadilyinrecentyearssaveforaizationrategrewfrom243vehiclesper1,000peopleinbriefdipin2020duringearlylockdownscausedbythe2015to277vehiclesper1,000peoplein2020,42althoughCOVIDpandemic(Figure30)(Minxetal.2021;EuropeanthisdiffersgreatlybetweendevelopedanddevelopingCommissionandJRC2022;IEA2022i).Directandindirectcountries.Additionally,vehiclesarebecomingbiggerGHGemissionsreachedapproximately8.9GtCO2eininplaceswherecardependencyishigh,suchasthe2019andtemporarilyfellto7.6GtCO2ein2020(FigureUnitedStates(Meyer2023).Infact,emissionsaresetto30).Althoughindirectemissionsarenotavailableforatbeststagnatethrough2050iffurtheractionisnot2021,directemissionsexceededthecombineddirecttaken,duetoincreasingtransportdemand(ITF2023a).andindirectemissionsin2020.TransportexperiencedSystemwide,transportemittedapproximately8.1GtCO2ethegreatestemissionsdeclinefrom2019to2020andin2021,accountingforabout14percentofdirectglobalthestrongestreboundofanysectorin2021(CardamaetGHGemissions(Figure29)(Minxetal.2021;Europeanal.2023).Andoverthissameperiod,therisingubiquityCommissionandJRC2022).Roadtransportisthelargestanddominanceofpersonalcarsandtheirinfrastruc-sourceofdirectemissionsinthesector,makingup73turehavedramaticallyreducedtheabilityofpeoplepercentoftransportemissionsin2021(Minxetal.2021;withoutdriver’slicensesorhighincomestomovesafelyEuropeanCommissionandJRC2022).Marineshippingandaffordably.FIGURE29Transport’scontributiontoglobalnetanthropogenicGHGemissionsin2021ElectricityandheatOilandgas14.4fugitiveemissions2.5Other1.6Coalminingfugitiveemissions1.5EnergyPetroleumrefining20.70.7Non-CO2(allbuildings)WasteLanduse,0.04land-use2.4change,Nonresidentialandforestry0.8GlobalGHGAgriculture,Emissionsforestry,4.0Rail56.8GtCO2eandother0.1ResidentialBuildingslandusesEnteric2.33.2fermentationInlandshipping10.40.2Transport3.0Managed8.1DomesticaviationManagedsoilsand0.3soilsandpasturepastureInternational1.4aviation1.40.4Industry12.0Other0.5RoadOtherRicecultivationTransport4.41.0Internationalshipping5.9Manuremanagement0.70.4ChemicalsMetals2.63.4Syntheticfertilizerapplication0.4Cement1.6Biomassburning0.1Notes:CO2=carbondioxide;GHG=greenhousegas;GtCO2e=gigatonnesofcarbondioxideequivalent.Sources:Minxetal.(2021);EuropeanCommissionandJRC(2022).TransportSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202376FIGURE30GlobaldirectGHGemissionsGlobalassessmentofprogressfortransportfromtransportTransformingtheglobaltransportationsectorwillrequireGtCO2e/yrOtherfair,equitable,andrapidchangeontheroads,inthe10sea,andintheair.Ontheroads,fossil-fueledvehicleswillneedtobeelectrified,andfossil-fueledcarswill9needbetobereplaced,right-sized,anddiminishedinnumber.Manymorepeoplewillneedtouseactive8modes(includingwalkingandbicycling)andsharedpublictransport.Theywillneedtoreduceboththeirreli-7anceoncarsandtheirdistancestraveled,particularlyinregionswherecardependencyishigh.CitieswillneedtoRoadbuildmorerapidtransit,bikelanes,andfacilitiesforsafe,6comfortablewalking,aswellasimplementmeasurestorestrictpollutingmotorvehicles.Beyondroadtransport,5shippingandaviationmustdecarbonizethroughacombinationofdemand-reductionstrategiesandclean4fuels.Regionsandcountrieswillneedtoidentifysuitableapproachesandpathwaysbasedontheirdemographic3Railbackground,economicdynamics,andfinancialandinstitutionalcapacity.Accesstomobilitymustbe2Shippingincreasedwhereitislow,whereactivemodesorpublictransitarenotavailableduetopoorinfrastructureor120002010Aviationinsufficientsafety,andwheredevelopmentpatterns02021requirecardependency(Table4).1990Notes:GHG=greenhousegas;GtCO2e/yr=gigatonnesofcarbondioxideequivalentperyear.Minxetal.(2021)andEuropeanCommis-sionandJRC(2022)provideanestimateofdirectandindirectGHGemissionsfromtransportthrough2020.DataonindirectGHGemis-sionsfromtransport,specifically,arenotyetavailablefor2021.Butbecausetheyrepresentarelativelysmallshareofthissector’stotalemissions(2.7%in2020),thisfigureexcludesindirectGHGemissionsandincludesdatafrom2021.Sources:Minxetal.(2021);EuropeanCommissionandJRC(2022);IEA(2022i).TABLE4SummaryofglobalprogresstowardtransporttargetsINDICATORMOST203020352050LIKELIHOODACCELERATIONSTATUSRECENTTARGETTARGETTARGETOFFACTORDATAPOINTFOLLOWING(YEAR)ANS-CURVENumberofkilometersofrapid1938N/AN/A6xatransitper1millioninhabitants(2020)(km/1Minhabitants)>10xaNumberofkilometersof0.00442N/AN/AN/A;high-qualitybikelanes(2020)U-turnneededaper1,000inhabitants(km/1,000inhabitants)N/A;authorjudgmentdShareofkilometerstraveledby4535–43N/AN/AN/A;passengercars(2019)authorjudgmentd(%ofpassenger-km)bShareofelectricvehiclesin1075–95100N/Alight-dutyvehiclesales(%)(2022)c85–100Shareofelectricvehiclesinthe1.520–40N/Alight-dutyvehiclefleet(%)(2022)cTransportSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202377TABLE4Summaryofglobalprogresstowardtransporttargets(continued)INDICATORMOST203020352050LIKELIHOODACCELERATIONSTATUSRECENTTARGETTARGETTARGETOFFACTORShareofelectricvehiclesDATAPOINTFOLLOWINGintwo-andthree-(YEAR)ANS-CURVEwheelersales(%)Shareofbatteryelectric4985N/A100N/A;vehiclesandfuelcellelectric(2022)eauthorjudgmentdvehiclesinbussales(%)3.860N/A100N/A;(2022)fU-turnneededdShareofbatteryelectric2.730N/A99N/A;authorjudgmentdvehiclesandfuelcellelectric(2022)fN/A;vehiclesinmedium-andauthorjudgmentdheavy-dutycommercialN/A;authorjudgmentdvehiclesales(%)Shareofsustainableaviation0.113N/A100fuelsinglobalaviation(2022)fuelsupply(%)Shareofzero-emissions05N/A93fuelsinmaritimeshipping(2018)fuelsupply(%)Notes:km/1Minhabitants=kilometersper1millioninhabitants;km/1,000inhabitants=kilometersper1,000inhabitants;passenger-km=passen-ger-kilometers.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.aDuetodatalimitations,anaccelerationfactorwascalculatedforthisindicatorusingmethodsfromBoehmetal.(2021).bWecalculatedthisnumberusingtheshareofpassenger-kilometerstraveledinlight-dutyvehicles.cThesedatadifferfromthoseinpreviousinstallmentsoftheStateofClimateActioninthattheyshowonlybatteryelectricvehiclesandexcludeplug-inhybridvehiclestoalignhistoricaldatawiththe2030,2035,and2050targets.WenowusedatafromIEA(2023e).dForindicatorscategorizedasS-curvelikely,accelerationfactorscalculatedusingalineartrendlinearenotpresented,astheywouldnotaccu-ratelyreflectanS-curvetrajectory.Thecategoryofprogresswasdeterminedbasedonauthorjudgment,usingmultiplelinesofevidence.SeeAppendixCandJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformation.eHistoricaldatafromBloombergNEF(2023),accessedwithpermissionfromBloombergNewEnergyFinance.fThesedatadifferfromthoseinpreviousinstallmentsoftheStateofClimateAction.WenowusedatafromIEA(2023e)toalignhistoricaldatawiththe2030and2050targets.Sources:Historicaldatafromauthors’analysisofITDP(2021);authors’analysisofOpenStreetMapcontributors(2021);ITF(2023a);IEA(2023e);BloombergNEF(2023);AirTransportActionGroup(2021);Mistry(2022);IATA(2022);andIMO(2020).TargetsfromTeskeetal.(2021);Moranetal.(2018);ITDP(2021);UnitedNations(2019);MoserandWagner(2021);Muelleretal.(2018);BloombergNEF(2021b);CAT(2020b);IEA(2021b);MPP(2022d);andUMAS(2021).Theconsensusintheliterature(e.g.,BloombergNEFAvoidtheneedfor2022a;ICCT2020;andIEA2021b)pointstoamixofmotorizedtravelsupportivepolicymeasurestotransformthetransportsector.ItindicatestheneedtoavoidmotorizedtravelAvoidingmotorizedtravel(includingairtravel)isoneofbyplanningcitiesinsuchawaythatmotorizedtravelthemostimportantwaystoreduceCO2emissions.Theisnotneeded,andshiftingtowardmorespace-andCOVID-19pandemicofferedaglimpseintothetypesfuel-efficient,lesscarbon-intensivemodes,suchasoftripsthatcouldbeavoidedbyusingtechnologytopublictransport(TransportIndicator1)andwalkingandworkfromhome.Itrevealedhowmanydesktopjobscycling(TransportIndicator2).Italsostressestheneedandevenservicessuchasdoctor’sappointmentscouldtoimprovethespace-,material-,andfuel-efficiencybeheldvirtually.Betterlanduseplanningisanotherofvehiclesifwearetoreducethecarbonintensityofpowerfultoolforcuttingdownontransportemissions.carbon-intensivetravel(TransportIndicators4–10).Makingdestinationsclosertowherepeopleliveby,forTransportSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202378example,changingplanningandzoningregulationstomotorizedtraveltootherright-sizedorshared-passen-allowfordenser,mixed-useareas,canenablepeoplegermodescanhelpusstaywithinourCO2budgettotowalkorcycle,ratherthandrive.Unfortunately,thereremainbelow1.5°C.arenotargetsthatwecanrefertoforthisindicatorandwehavethereforenotincludeditinthisreport,buttheMakingthischangehasprovendifficult,partlybecauseinternationalcommunitywouldbenefitfromindicatorsgovernmentshaveprioritizedinvestmentsininfrastruc-andtargetsfordeclininghouseholdcardependenceor,tureandotherpolicydecisionsforprivateautomobiles,inareaswherepersonalcarownershipishigh,decliningmakingdriving,whichgeneratesmultipleexternalities,carownership.aneasychoice(Santosetal.2010).Multiplesupply-and-demand-sidemeasuresareneededtoreduceThishighlightsaninfluentialdata-policyfeedbackloop:dependenceonanduseofcars.TheliteratureshowsTheabsenceofpubliclyavailable,standardized,andthat“softer”demand-sidemeasures,suchasprovidingcomparabledataimpedestheformulationofeffectivebetterinformationabouttransportexternalitiesandtargets,indicators,andpolicies,whichinturnstiflestherunningcampaignstotrytochangebehavior,haveresourcesnecessaryforthegenerationoffurtherdata.yieldedmodestresults(HreljaandRye2022).TheseThiscyclicaldynamicunderscorestheurgentneedthereforeneedtobecomplementedbybothsup-forcomprehensivedatacollectionandtransparency,ply-sidemeasuresthatimprovethesafetyandqualityfundamentalforeffectivetargetsetting,policydevelop-ofnonpersonal-cartravelalternatives—improvingment,andtrackingofthetravelavoidancerequired.transitfrequency,installingseparatedcycleinfrastruc-ture,improvingsidewalksandcrosswalks—and“push”Shifttoshared,collective,measuresthatmakedrivingprivateautomobilesmoreoractivetransport43expensiveorlessconvenient,andthathaveproventobemoreeffective.ThesemeasurescanincludeCars,whetherpaid-per-use(e.g.,taxisorridehailing)orcongestionpricing,fuelandvehicletaxation(whichprivatelyused,emitmoreCO2perpassenger-kilometercanalsosupport“improve”measures),reallocatingtraveledthanallotherurbanlandtransportmodesurbanspaceawayfromcarstowardothermodes,and(CazzolaandCrist2020).Therefore,shiftinglargerreducingtheavailabilityofstreetparking(HreljaandRye2022;ITF2023b).TransportSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202379TRANSPORTINDICATOR1:lanes,removingfuelsubsidies,orlevyingtaxestoraisefuelprices(Battyetal.2015).Busesandtrains(includingNumberofkilometersofmetrosystems)areparticularlycrucialfordecarbonizingrapidtransitper1millionthetransportsector.Theyreleaseaslittleasafifthofinhabitants(km/1Mtheemissionsofride-hailing,andaboutathirdoftheinhabitants)emissionsofprivatevehiclesperpassenger-kilometertraveled(ITF2020).Thenumberofkilometersofrapid•Target:Acrosstheworld’s50highest-emittingtransitinfrastructureper1millioninhabitantsinthetop50emittingcitieshasincreasedovertime,from16in2010cities,rapidtransitinfrastructure,specificallymetro,to19in2020(Figure31).Europeoutpacestherestofthelight-rail,andbusrapidtransitasmeasuredinworldintermsofitsrapid-transit-to-residentratio,withkilometersper1millioninhabitants,doublesby2030,Chile,Ecuador,SouthKorea,andTunisiafollowing(ITDPrelativeto2020.2021).44Duetotheslowgrowth,theindicatorisheadingintherightdirectionbutwellofftrack.AnaccelerationofMakinghigh-qualitytransitavailableinurbanareassixtimestherateofrecentchangeisneeded.isaneffectivetooltopropelmodal-shift,andagoodcomplementtootherpolicyandtaxationmeasuressuchasreducingfreeparkingavailability,reducingcarNFIuGUmREb31erHoistfokricilaolmproegtreesrsstoowfarrda2p03id0ttarrgaentfsoirtn(ummbeetrroofk,illoigmhette-rsraofilraapniddtrabnusitsprearpidtransit)1pmeilrlio1Mninihnahbiatabntista(tonpts50(einmittthinegctiotieps)50emittingcities)RightDirection,WellOffTrackS-CurveUnlikelykm/1MinhabitantsHistoricalCurrentPaceneededtodatatrendreachtargets4038352030target30252020Data19Accelerationrequiredtoreach202030target6x15105020202030204020502010Notes:km/1Minhabitants=kilometersper1millioninhabitants.Duetodatalimitations,anaccelerationfactorwascalculatedforthisindicatorusingmethodsfromBoehmetal.(2021).SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:Historicaldatafromauthors’analysisofITDP(2021).TargetderivedfromTeskeetal.(2021);Moranetal.(2018);ITDP(2021);andUnitedNations(2019).TransportSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202380TRANSPORTINDICATOR2:othertransportinfrastructuresuchasmasstransit,makingbikenetworksahighlycost-effectivepolicytoNumberofkilometersofmitigateCO2emissions(Reichetal.2022).high-qualitybikelanesper1,000inhabitants(km/1,000In2020,therewereapproximately0.0044kilometersofinhabitants)high-qualitybikelanesper1,000inhabitantsinthetop50emittingcities.45BikeusesurgedduringtheCOVID-•Target:Acrosstheworld’s50highest-emittingcities,19pandemic.Forexample,Bogotá(althoughnotoneofthetop-50emittingcities)expandeditsnetworkofurbanareascontaintwokilometersofhigh-quality,bikelanesduringthepandemictoencouragesocialsafebikelanesper1,000inhabitantsby2030.distancingwhiletraveling(Box11).EuropeancountrieslikeDenmark,theNetherlands,andGermanyareleadinginCreatinghigh-qualitybikenetworkshelpsreducecreatingsafe,convenient,andaccessiblecyclingcon-CO2emissionsbymakingitpossibletoavoidcartripsditionswithbikenetworksthatextendthroughoutcities(PrasaraandBridhikitti2022).Cyclinginfrastructurehasandacrosstheirentirecountries.CitieslikeParis(atop-beenshowntosignificantlyincreaseuptakeofcycling,50emittingcity)havesetboldaspirationstoconstructbecauseitpromotesactualandperceivedsafetysafebikinginfrastructurethatprovidesaccessbybicycle(Reynoldsetal.2009).Cyclinginfrastructurehasalsotoallareasofthecityandhavealsoreducedthenum-beenshowntoimprovehealthoutcomesthroughlowerberofon-streetparkingspacesandlanesavailabletoratesofdiseaseandfewerinjuries(Maizlishetal.2017).cartravel,aswellasthepostedspeedlimit(CityofParisFurthermore,bikinginfrastructurecostsmuchlessthan2021;PucherandBuehler2008),ParisnowhasmorethanNFIuGUmREb32erHoisftokriicloalmproegtreesrsstoowfahrdig20h30-qtaurgaetliftoyrnbumikbee-rloafknileomsepteersro1f,0hi0gh0-qinuahliatybbiiktealnantess(inthetopepr15,0000einmhaibtittianngts(ctoitpie50se)mittingcities)RightDirection,WellOffTrackS-CurveUnlikelykm/1,000inhabitantsHistoricalCurrentPaceneededtodatatrendreachtargets2.52030target221.510.52020DataAcceleration20402050requiredtoreach00.004420102030target2020>10x2030Notes:km/1,000inhabitants=kilometersper1,000inhabitants.Duetodatalimitations,anaccelerationfactorwascalculatedforthisindicatorusingmethodsfromBoehmetal.(2021).SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:Historicaldatafromauthors’analysisofOpenStreetMapcontributors(2021).TargetderivedfromMoserandWagner(2021);Muelleretal.(2018);andMoranetal.(2018).TransportSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202381150kilometersofbikelanes,with52oftheseaddedsincemakingiteasiertogetaroundwithoutacarwouldthepandemic;amongothermeasures,thishashelpedbemoreequitablethanmicrotargetingsubsidiesforleadtoa60percentreductionincartripswithintheelectriccarssince,intheUnitedStates,theseincentivescitybetween2011and2018(AtelierParisiend’Urbanismehavebeenshowntoberegressive,disproportionately2021).Anotherimportantdevelopmentmakingcyclingbenefitinghigher-incomehouseholds(CongressionalmoreaccessibletomanyisthegrowingavailabilityofResearchService2019).Inexistingurbandevelopments,affordableelectricbikes(seeIndicator6).theadditionofbikelanescanreplaceon-streetparkingorcarlanes,makingcaruselessconvenient.BikelanesTherecentrateofchangeremainswellofftrackandcanalsoavoidconflictsbetweencyclistsandbothwillneedtoincreasemorethan10-foldby2030tobemotorizedvehiclesandpedestrians(and,inparticular,alignedwitha1.5°Cpathway(Figure32).Walkingandpeoplewithdisabilitieswhoneedunencumberedbicyclingaresignificantlylessexpensivethanbuyingasidewalks)(ShomanandImine2023).neworusedmotorizedpassengervehicle(ITDP2022).Arguably,investinginactivetransportationmodesandBOX11LessonslearnedfrombikelanesinBogotáTheColombiancapital,Bogotá,representsanimpres-streetsfortheenjoymentof1.5millionpedestriansandsivestoryinpopularizingcycling.Startinginthe1970s,cyclists,withmultipleeventsalongtheroutesuchaspushedbycyclingadvocates,thecityestablisheditsZumbaclasses,foodvendors,andentertainment.openstreetsevent(Ciclovía),currentlythelargestandmostfrequenteventofthistypeintheworld.EveryInadditiontothisevent,startinginthe1990s,thecitySunday,thecityopens128kilometers(80miles)ofhasbeenbuildingbikelanesandmakingiteasiertogetaroundbybicycle,constructing550kilometers(342miles)ofdedicatedbikelanesby2019.In2020,FIGUREB11.1MapoftheoriginalandnewtemporarybikelanesCalle161Av.Carrera7Carrera11Calle94Carrera7Calle92Carrera9Calle85Carrera9Calle147Carrera5Calle140Calle116Carrera15Carrera7Av.delosCerrosCarrera5Carrera3Carrera8Carrera10Carrera13Carrera7Calle11SurCalle183Calle170Carrera19Carrera15CanalR.ArzoCalle163aAutopistaNorteCarrera20CbispoCalle76AutopistaNorteCalle100Carrera24Calle68Calle57Calle39Carrera14Carrera10Carrera6Carrera7Av.Calle68Calle28Carrera24Carrera24Carrera50Carrera53Av.CalleCalle19Carrera1980XAv.Calle13Calle175Av.CórdobaCalle80NQSCentralCalleAv.AmNQSCentralCalle6Av.NQSCalle170a26éricasXNQSCalle8SurAv.PrimerodeMayoCalle167Calle127CalleCallecasCarrera36Av.PCarrera5Calle15368Av.Boyacá25rimeroCalle138CalleAv.AmérideMCarrerCalle134Carrera58Calle24ayoa14Av.Suba63Calle27SurAv.BoyacáAv.BoyacálSalitreAv.Calle80XCarrera60Calle53aracaCanaCarrera68Av.CCarrera76Av.68Av.SubaTranilSurCarrera27CarrerrocarrsversCalle72Av.feCarresal94ra30Carrera90Calle139Av.SubaAv.Calle80XAv.Av.BoyacáCarrera56Av.delasAméricasAv.AméricasCarXreraA50v.50NQSSurra24CanalTunjuelitoCarrera92Av.Calle132Carrera68dCarrera52Carrera91Calle90Av.CiudadCarrera77aCarreraCalleCarrera60Calle80deCali26Calle153Boyacá70Carrera68ra19cra52CarreCarreAv.CiudaddeCaliCalleAv.Calle63bAv.Prim52aSurCarrera11580Calle53ra69erodeCarreraCarreMayooyacánal86aCalle72Av.Calle72Av.BDiagoCarrera51Av.BoyacáCanalSTv.93alitreAv.AméricasXAv.BoyacáCalle24Calle83aCalle63CarreraCalle26SurCarreraAutopistaSurvicencioCalle26100Av.Call73Av.Villae13Av.CiuNQSSurCalle57bSurCarrera111cdaddeCarrera78kCaliCarrera79AutopCalle22nal16istaMCalle17DiagoedellínCalleCalle6446SurAv.Calle17rvenir2aSurCarrera13Av.AElPoalle4gobeedaCrtoMAlamejíaAv.BosaCPiecrlmorarunteanstSurpbeicrmycalinnegnltaensesNQSCToemrrepdoorarersydeCaliCbiicclyocvlíiansgtleamnepsoralesddeiudaAv.Cra89bCarre54SurCalle63SurCalleSource:Ramírez(2021).TransportSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202382BOX11LessonslearnedfrombikelanesinBogotá(continued)followingtravelpatternchangesduetotheCOVID-helpedgrowthedailytripsto650,000byDecember19pandemic,andtogivepeoplealternativestothe2020(Ramírez2021).Thisshowsthattheconstantcrowdedpublictransportsystem,themayorstartedinvestmentincreatingandexpandingthebikenetworkaddinganother49kilometers(30miles)oftemporaryhashaditsintendedeffect,givingBogotanosmore(or“pop-up”)bikelanes,laterexpandedto84kilometerschoicestoaccesstheirdailyneedsinasustainableand(52miles).Initially,thesetemporarybikelanesconsistedhealthymanner.ofnothingmorethantrafficconesorplasticbollardsalongmajortrafficcorridorsthatgavepeopleasafeThistransformationhasbeenmadepossiblebyamixwaytotravelbetweendestinations(FigureB11.1).Afteroffactors.Thecityhasactiveadvocacygroupsthatthehealthemergencyhadended,thecitykeptsomeofhavepushedforpro-biketransformationsatleastsincethetemporarybikelanesandmadethempermanent,the1970s.Thiswasthelikelyresultofanalreadyestab-bringingitstotalnetworkto593kilometers(368miles)—lishedbikecultureinthecountrysincethe1950s(Welchorapproximately0.08km/1,000inhabitants.2021).Theseempoweredactivistcircles,supportedbyBogotá’smayorsinthe1990s,pushedforthecreationThesystematicconstructionofbikelanesthatstartedofover70percentofthenetworkweseetoday.Otherinthe1990shaspaidoff.In1996,only0.68percentofcontributingfactorsincludepoliciessuchastheannualdailytripsinthecityweredonebybicycle(Cervero“car-free”day,whichdemonstratethatthecitycanetal.2009).Justbeforethepandemic,bicycletripsinfunctionwithoutcars,thecity’sextensivebusnetwork,thecitytotaledover800,000trips(or6.6percentofallitslicenseplate-baseddecongestionpricing,andtripsdoneinthecity).WhiletheCOVID-19pandemicrestrictionsonwhatdaysandhourscarscancirculate.lockdownmadeadentinthegrowth,astripsinAprilThesepoliciesarenowbeingcomplementedbythe2020morethanhalvedto360,000dailybiketrips,therecentlyinauguratedpublicbikesharenetwork.city’squickthinkingwiththetemporarybikelanesTRANSPORTINDICATOR3:carsincreasedfrom39percentin2015to45percentin2019(themostrecentdatapoint),indicatingthatchangeShareofkilometerstraveledisheadinginthewrongdirectionentirely(Figure33)(ITFbypassengercars(%of2023a).Thecauseofthisincreaseisunderstandable:passenger-kilometers)aspopulationandgrossdomesticproduct(GDP)havegrown,sohasthenumberofpeoplewhoowncars,and•Target:Peoplearoundtheworldreducetheper-thereforetheshareoftripsmadebyprivatelyownedcars(WorldBank2014).Furthermore,theCOVID-19pan-centageoftripsmadeinpassengercarsto35–43demicledtoadropindemandforpublictransportandpercentby2030.therateofrecoveryofthedemandforthesesystemspost-COVIDhasvariedwidely,withsomesystemsseeingWhileextensivehistoricaldataarenotavailableonthepatronagereturntoprepandemiclevelsorabove,whileshareofpassenger-kilometerstraveledinpassengerothershavenot.Thetrendincarownershipisexpectedcars,thedatathatdoexistshowaworryingtrend.Theshareofpassenger-kilometerstraveledinpassengerTransportSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202383Numberofkilometersofhigh-qualitybike-lanesper1,000inhabitants(FiInGUtRhEe33toHpisto5ri0caelpmroigtrteisnsgtowcaitrdie2s0)30targetforshareofkilometerstraveledbypassengercarsWrongDirection,U-turnNeededS-CurveUnlikely%ofpassenger-kmHistoricalCurrentPaceneededtodatatrendreachtargets602019data50452030target35–4340302010020202030204020502010Notes:passenger-km=passenger-kilometers.Wecalculatedthisnumberusingtheshareofpassenger-kilometerstraveledinlight-dutyvehicles.Duetodatalimitations,anaccelerationfactorwascalculatedforthisindicatorusingmethodsfromBoehmetal.(2021).SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromITF(2023a);2030targetderivedfromauthors’analysisofBloombergNEF(2021b),accessedwithpermissionfromBloombergNewEnergyFinance.tobeexacerbatedmostlybyincreasesindevelopingefficiencyisnotenoughtotrulytransformthesector,countriesasGDPcontinuestogrow.Inwealthycountriesandalternativesareemergingthatmakeitpossiblewithsignificantpersonalcaruse,thegoalshouldbetotoprovideasimilarexperiencewithoutcontributingreducecardependency.Incountrieswithlowperson-planet-warminggasestotheatmosphere.Electrical-carownership,thegoalshouldbetoslowdowntheversionsofroadvehicleshaveproliferatedasbatteryembraceofcarownership.InAsia,forexample,privatepriceshavefallenandelectricvehicleshavebecomeautomobilesmakeup33percentofpassenger-kilome-cheapertoownandoperate.46Light-dutyvehiclesandterstraveled,whereasintheUnitedStatesandCanadatwo-andthree-wheelershavebeenelectrifyingthetheirshareis77percent(ITF2021).fastest,butmedium-andheavy-dutyvehiclesandbusesarebeginningtoemergeinmajormarkets.AcrossImprovecarbon-intensiveallvehiclesegments,charginginfrastructure—bothmodesoftransportprivateandpublic—willbekeytoincreasinguptakeofelectricvehicles.Solutionsforaviationandmarineship-Roadtransport,aviation,andmaritimeshippinghaveping,includingthosepoweredbyzero-emissionsliquidlongbeenpoweredbycars,trucks,planes,andshipsfuelsorevenelectricity,areindevelopmentbutareonlythatrunonfossilfuels.Regulationstoincreasetherecentlybeginningtobedeployed.Asthesesolutionsfuelefficiencyofthesevehicleshavebeeneffectiveatbegintocometomarket,itwillbecomeclearerwhatmixreducingtheirGHGemissions—intheUnitedStates,theyoftechnologieswillultimatelywinoutandsucceedathaveprevented14gigatonnesofCO2frombeingemitteddecarbonizingthesector.since1975(Greeneetal.2020).ButsimplyincreasingTransportSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202384TRANSPORTINDICATOR4:EVsalesareinthebreakthroughstageofanS-curveandwilllikelycontinuetoaccelerateinthecomingyears.ShareofelectricvehiclesinGiventhehighlikelihoodforcontinuedrapidexponentiallight-dutyvehiclesales(%)changeduetofavorablelong-termcosttrendsandimprovementsinrangeandtheavailabilityofcharging•Targets:Electricvehicles(EVs)accountfor75–95infrastructure,progressmadetowardreachingthisnear-termtargetiscategorizedasontrack(BloombergNEFpercentofthetotalannuallight-dutyvehicle(LDV)salesby2030and100percentby2035.47TheshareofbatteryEVsinglobalLDVsaleshasbeguntotakeoffrecently,reaching10percentin2022(Figure34)(IEA2023e).Thisrepresentsover7millionelectriccarssold.Overthepastfiveyears,light-dutyEVsaleshavegrownatanaverageof65percentperyear.In2022,theshareofelectricvehiclesinlight-dutyvehiclesalesincreased63percent—ameaningfulimprovementrela-tivetorecenttrends.Muchmoreprogresswillbeneededtoreach75–95percentoflight-dutyvehiclesalesby2030,especiallyindevelopingeconomies,wheresalesaresignificantlylowerthanindevelopedcountries,butFIGURE34Historicalprogresstoward2030and2035targetsforshareofelectricvehiclesinlight-dutyvehiclesalesRightDirection,OnTrackS-CurveLikely%HistoricalCurrentPaceneededtodatatrendreachtargets100101002035target80HISTORICAL75–95DATA2030target6002015202240202022data10020202030204020502010Note:ThesedatadifferfromthoseincludedinpreviousinstallmentsoftheStateofClimateActioninthattheyshowonlybatteryelectricvehiclesandexcludeplug-inhybridvehiclestoalignhistoricaldatawiththe2030and2035targets.WenowusedatafromIEA(2023e).ForindicatorscategorizedasS-curvelikely,accelerationfactorscalculatedusingalineartrendlinearenotpresented,astheywouldnotaccuratelyreflectanS-curvetrajectory.Thecategoryofprogresswasdeterminedbasedonauthorjudgment,usingmultiplelinesofevidence.Morespecifically,giventhatthisindicatorisinthebreakthroughstageofanS-curve,ourcurrenttrendarrowisanS-curvefittothehistoricaldata.Ourassessmentofprogresswasmadebasedonthisextrapolation,aswellasareviewoftheliteratureandconsultationswithexperts.SeeAppendixCandJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromIEA(2023e);targetsfromCAT(2020b).TransportSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023852022a;Grubbetal.2021;IEA2023e).Batterymanufac-FIGURE35Shareofelectricvehiclesinlight-dutyturingthroughput(theamountthatgetsproducedbymanufacturingplants)almostdoubledfrom340GWhinvehiclesalesinNorwayandtheworld2021to660GWhin2022,with90percentofnewmanu-facturingcapacitydedicatedtoEVbatteries(IEA2023i).%oflight-dutyvehiclesalesWhenitcomestodeliveringcompletedvehicles,how-100ever,itwillbeimportanttowatchwhetherautomakersincreasetheirpledgestoproduceenoughEVstokeep80upwithsales.Asofearly2023,automakers’pledgesforfuturemanufacturingwerenotenoughtomeetEVsalesWhat’stargets(Punte2023).needed60Salesarenotevenacrossallgeographies.EVsalesinChinareached22percentoftotalnewcarsalesin2022,40whiletheEuropeanUnionsawa12percentshareandNorwaytheUnitedStatessawan6percentshare(IEA2023f).Inothercountries,salesremainlow.Toavoidatwo-tiered20globalmarket,itisimportantthatdevelopedmarketsanddevelopmentbanksprovideassistancetodevel-GlobalopingcountriestogrowtheirEVmarketsandcharginginfrastructure.Historically,Chinahasdrivenmuchof02015202020252030thegrowthofEVs,dueinparttoitsgeneroussubsidy2010providedbybothnationalandlocalgovernmentsforthepurchaseofelectriccars.Atitspeak,thesubsidyNote:Thesedataonlyincludebatteryelectricvehicles.couldbeashighas10,000yuan(theequivalentofabout$11,000in2023U.S.dollars)(GIZ2014),dependingSources:HistoricalglobaldatafromIEA(2023e);targetsonrangeanddrivetrain.BusescouldreceiveasmuchfromCAT(2020b).as500,000yuan(theequivalentofabout$90,000in2023U.S.dollars).Thesubsidyhasexpiredasof2023top10percentofhouseholdsfilingtaxesclaimed60(althoughthereisstillapurchasetaxexemptionforpercentofplug-inEVtaxcredits(BorensteinandDavisEVs),anditappearsthatEVsarecontinuingtosellwell2016;MuehleggerandRapson2019).Itisfairtoassumewithoutthesubsidy(LiandKim2023).Othercountriesthatasthesevehiclesageandaresoldonthesecond-haveseensignificantgrowthaswell.Norwayhasbeenhandmarket,theprofileofthepurchaserswillchange.attheforefrontofpromotingEVs.In2009,EVsmadeAdditionally,morerecentanalysisintheUnitedStatesup0.3percentofitsnewcarregistrations(Europeanhasfoundthatbecauselow-incomehouseholdsspendCommission2023c).ThenNorwayimplementedaraftalargershareoftheirincomeondrivingcosts,EVswillofincentives,includingexemptionsfrompurchaseandprovidegreatercostsavingsasashareofincometovalue-addedtaxesandaccesstobuslanes(Richardsonlow-incomehouseholdsby2030(Baueretal.2021).2020).EVs’shareofnewcarregistrationsinNorwaysoaredto80percentin2022(IEA2023f).NorwaybeganAdditionally,itisimportanttonotethatincreasingscalingbackitsEVincentivessomewhatin2022andlithiumminingforEVbatteriescouldfurtherharmthehasbeenencouragingashiftawayfromdrivingtowardenvironmentswhereitismined,withthepotentialtoothermodesoftransportation(Mossalgue2022).Whilecontaminategroundwaterandworsenlocalairpollutiondifferencesinpercapitaincomeandotherfactorsifminingprocessesarenotimproved(PennandLiptonmaymakeithardertoreplicateNorway’sstrategy2021).EffortssuchastheInitiativeforResponsibleMiningeverywhere,itssuccessshowsthatrapidchangeisAssurance—whichbringstogetherminingcompanies,possibleandthatthesepoliciescanhelpdriverapidmineralpurchasers,humanrightsgroups,laborgroups,transformation.Fromnowto2030,theworldneedstoandothercivilsocietyorganizations—areattemptingtoscaleupelectricvehiclesatthesamepaceasNorwayfindconsensusonimprovingtheseprocesses(IRMAn.d.).did(Figure35).ImprovementsinalternativebatterychemistriesthatusedifferentcombinationsofmineralscouldalsohelpTherelativelyhigherpurchasepriceofEVsraisesalleviatesomeofthesesupplychainconstraints.concernsoverhowaccessibleEVsaretolower-incomeconsumers(Caulfieldetal.2022).IntheUnitedStates,56percentofEVsboughtbetween2011and2015wenttopurchasersmakingover$100,000peryear,andtheTransportSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202386TRANSPORTINDICATOR5:majormarketsrisingfromalittleunder1millionontheroadin2016,to16millionontheroadby2022(IEA2023e).ShareofelectricvehiclesStill,theactualshareofEVsisquitelow:1.5percentininthelight-dutyvehicle2022(Figure36),whichaddsupto18millionelectriccarsfleet(%)onroadsaroundtheworld(IEA2023e).Continuedexpo-nentialchangewillbeneededtoreach20–40percent•Targets:Electricvehicles(EVs)accountfor20–40by2030.Aswithlight-dutyEVsales,theshareofEVsinthelight-dutyfleetwilllikelyfollowanS-curve,especiallypercentofthetotallight-dutyvehicle(LDV)fleetbyastheeconomicsandrangeofEVsimproveandas2030and85–100percentby2050.chargingbecomesmoreavailable.ButbecausenewcarsalesdonotnecessarilycorrespondwithequalremovalExponentialchangeisoccurringinthedeploymentofofoldcarsfromthemarket,theshareofEVsontheroadbatteryelectriclight-dutyvehiclesontheroad.48Overmaylagwellbehindincreasesinsales(Keithetal.2019).thelastfiveyearstheshareofEVsintheglobalLDVfleetAsofnowtheindicatorremainsintheemergencephaserosebyanaverageof54percentperyear.Between2021ofanS-curve,anditisdifficulttodeterminethetrajec-and2022italmostdoubled—ameaningfulimprovementtoryofchangeatsuchanearlypoint.Globalprogressrelativetorecenttrends.Rapidlygrowingsalesvolumesmadetowardthisnear-termtargetisofftrackbasedoninthekeymarketsofChina,theEuropeanUnion,andourassessmentoftheliteratureandconsultationswithnowtheUnitedStates,haveledtogreateroverallEVexperts(seeMethodssectionandAppendixC).numbers,withcombinedtotalEVnumbersinthesethreeFIGURE36Historicalprogresstoward2030and2050targetsforshareofelectricvehiclesinthelight-dutyvehiclefleetRightDirection,OffTrackS-CurveLikely%HistoricalCurrentPaceneededtodatatrendreachtargets1001.68085–100HISTORICAL2050targetDATA600201520224020–402030target202022data1.5020202030204020502010Notes:ThesedatadifferfromthoseincludedinpreviousinstallmentsoftheStateofClimateActioninthattheyshowonlybatteryelectricvehiclesandexcludeplug-inhybridvehiclestoalignhistoricaldatawiththe2030and2050targets.WenowusedatafromIEA(2023e).ForindicatorscategorizedasS-curvelikely,accelerationfactorscalculatedusingalineartrendlinearenotpresented,astheywouldnotaccuratelyreflectanS-curvetrajectory.Thecategoryofprogresswasdeterminedbasedonauthorjudgment,usingmultiplelinesofevidence.Morespecifically,ourcurrenttrendarrowisbasedonanS-curvefittothehistoricaldata,butsuchanextrapolationishighlyuncertainwhenanindicatorisintheemergencestageofanS-curveandisincludedforillustrativepurposesonly.Ourcategorizationofprogressforthisindicatorisbasedonareviewoftheliteratureandconsultationswithexperts.SeeAppendixCandJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromIEA(2023e);targetsfromCAT(2020b).TransportSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202387AnequityconcernemergingasEVfleetsgrowisthepicture.Althoughjobsmaydecreaseinmanufacturingcontrastbetweendevelopedcountries,wherenewcarcars,manynewopportunitiesmayariseinprovidingsalesarecommon,anddevelopingcountries,whereelectricityand/orhydrogenforzero-emissionsvehiclesusedcarsarefrequentlyimportedfromdevelopedaswellasEVchargingandbatterymanufacturing.countries.From2015to2020,theEuropeanUnion,Japan,Forexample,inEurope,whichmanufacturedabout22SouthKorea,andtheUnitedStatesexported23millionpercentoftheworld’spassengercarsin2022(OICAusedlight-dutyvehicles(LDVs)(UNEP2021g).Ofexported2023),onerecentstudyestimatesthattighteningfuelLDVs,70percentwenttodevelopingcountries,mostofeconomystandardswoulddriveanetincreaseof43,000whichdonothavestrongemissionsstandards.Asaautosectorjobsby2030(CambridgeEconometricsandresult,developedeconomiesareexportinghigh-emit-ElementEnergy2018).Thoseemploymentgainswouldtingandunsafesecondhandvehiclestodevelopingsubsideafter2035aslesscomplexbatteryelectriccountries,shiftingthetransitionburdentothem.Strongvehicleswouldincreasinglytakemarketshare.But,atexportstandardsinexportingcountriescanhelpreducethesametime,jobswouldsoarinelectricalequipmenttheburdenonimportingcountries,butimportstandardsandhydrogenforelectricandhydrogenvehiclesinthiscanalsohelppreventmajoremittersfromexportingscenario.IntheUnitedStates,whichproduced3percentdirtycarstolow-incomecountriesthatneedgreateroftheworld’spassengercarsin2022,anotherstudyaccesstomobility.Theimplicationofthesestandardsestimatesthatnewjobsinthecountryinelectricitywithoutotherdomesticmarketchanges,however,wouldinfrastructurebuild-outandsteadyemploymentinautobeaslowerrateofmotorization,whichisnotnecessarilymanufacturingemploymentwouldoffsetjoblossesinpositiveforsocialwelfare,socaremustbetakentovehiclerepairduetoEVsbeingcheaperandeasiertobalancetheseconcerns.maintain.Thus,itenvisionsatransitiontoEVsleadingtoanetincreaseofabout300,000newjobsinelectricityInadditiontoshiftingsomeofthetransitionburdentoandfuelsupplyby2035(GoldmanSchoolofPubliclow-incomecountries,thegrowthoftheEVmarketcouldPolicy2021).Regardless,transitioningworkersfromautochangethelaborlandscapeintheautomotiveindustry.manufacturingandcomponentmanufacturingjobstoThereisevidencethatelectrificationwilldrivechangesopportunitiesingrowthsectorslikeelectricalequipmentinmanufacturing—especiallyofcomponents,sinceandhydrogenwouldrequireretrainingandeconomicelectricdrivetrainsrequirefewerofthese(Fraunhofersupportforworkers.IAO2020).However,lookingattheentiremanufacturinganddeploymentprocessprovidesamorecomplicatedTransportSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202388TRANSPORTINDICATOR6:numbers,moretwo-andthree-wheelersaresoldeachyearthanotherpassengerandcommercialvehiclesShareofelectricvehiclescombined,withmarketsinChinamakingupmorethanintwo-andthree-wheelerhalfofglobalsales,andsubstantialsharesalsocomingsales(%)fromIndiaandSoutheastAsia,particularlyVietnam(BloombergNEF2022a).•Targets:Electricvehicles(EVs)accountfor85percentAlthoughtheycontributedlessthan5percentofCO2ofthetotalannualtwo-andthree-wheelersalesbyemissionsfromroadtransportinthelastdecade2030and100percentby2050.(BloombergNEF2022d),two-andthree-wheelersmakeup25percentofthetotaldistancetraveledbyvehi-In2022,acombined1.2billiontwo-andthree-wheelersclesontheroad(BloombergNEF2022a).Therefore,to(motorizedvehicleswithtwoandthreewheelssuchavoidrisingemissions,regionsdominatedbytwo-andasmotorcycles,rickshaws,tricycles,etc.)wereonthethree-wheelerswillneedtopromotezero-carbonroad.Thisrivalsthenumberofpassengercarsandversions.Thiswouldcutdownonpollutionandfossilfueltrucks(1.26billion).Incertainregions,suchasSoutheastconsumptionaswell.Two-andthree-wheelersaccountAsiaandIndia,motorcyclesandmotorizedscootersforaroundhalfofgasolineconsumptioninIndiaandarethedominantmodeoftransport,accountingforsomeSoutheastAsianregions(IEA2022f).83percentand80percent,respectively,ofvehicle-ki-lometerstraveled(BloombergNEF2022a).InabsoluteFIGURE37Historicalprogresstoward2030and2050targetsforshareofelectricvehiclesintwo-andthree-wheelersalesRightDirection,OffTrackS-CurveLikely%HistoricalCurrentPaceneededtodatatrendreachtargets1001002050target80852030target602022data494020020202030204020502010Note:ForindicatorscategorizedasS-curvelikely,accelerationfactorscalculatedusingalineartrendlinearenotpresented,astheywouldnotaccuratelyreflectanS-curvetrajectory.Thecategoryofprogresswasdeterminedbasedonauthorjudgment,usingmultiplelinesofevidence.Morespecifically,wedonothavesufficienthistoricaldatatofitanS-curvetothedata,soourcurrenttrendisbasedonthelineartrendlinefromthepastfiveyears.Thisisappropriatebecausetwo-andthree-wheelersalesareinthediffusionstageofanS-curve,duringwhichgrowthusuallyfollowsanapproximatelylinearpath.OurassessmentofprogressisbasedonthestageoftheS-curve,areviewoftheliterature,andexpertjudgment.SeeAppendixCandJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromBloombergNEF(2023),accessedwithpermissionfromBloombergNewEnergyFinance;targetsfromIEA(2021b).TransportSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202389Electrificationofthesevehiclesisalreadyunderway,andsharesofelectrictwo-andthree-wheelersaresub-stantiallyhigherthansharesofzero-carboncars,vans,andtrucks.Theshareofelectricvehiclesintwo-andthree-wheelersalesincreasedfrom36percentin2019to49percentin2022(Figure37).InChina,two-thirdsofnewtwo-wheelersand80percentofthree-wheelerswerealreadyelectricin2021(BloombergNEF2022a).49Inmanyplaces,electrictwo-andthree-wheelershavealreadyreachedcostparitywiththeirfossil-fueledcounterparts.Theyareinfactsometimescheaper—inIndia,byasmuchas70percent(IEA2023e,2022f),andregionswithhighsharessuchasIndiaandIndonesiahavepurchaseincentivesinplace(IEA2023e;Rokadiya2021).Onerea-sonformorerapiduptakeofEVtwo-andthree-wheelersisthelackofrangeanxiety—theconcernthatanelectricvehiclewillrunoutofchargeduringalongjourney,whichisasmallerproblemfortwo-andthree-wheelers,astheyaregenerallyusedforshort,dailycommutes.Givenregionaldevelopmentsandtheadvantagesthatelectrictwo-andthree-wheelershaveaccrued,thereisahighlikelihoodofcontinueddiffusionincountriesinadditiontoIndiaandChina(IEA2023e).Electrictwo-andthree-wheelersarethetypesofinnovativetechnologiesthatgenerallyfollowanS-curve.Butunlikemostoftheotherindicatorsinthisreportthatareclassifiedas“S-curvelikely,”salesofelectrictwo-andthree-wheelersareinalaterstageofanS-curve,duringwhichfurtheraccelerationislesslikely.InthediffusionstageofanS-curve,accelerationhasalreadyoccurred,sotheslopeofthecurvegenerallyproceedsinalinearfashionbeforeeventuallyslowingdown.Indeed,thebestfitforthepastfiveyearsofdataforthisindicatorisalineartrendline.Forthisreason,weassessprogresstakingintoaccountthelineartrendline,whichshowsthattheindicatorismakingpromisingprogressbutofftrack.ThisassessmentiscorroboratedbyBNEF’sassessmentofprogress,whichfindsthatelectrictwo-andthree-wheelersarealmostbutnotyetontrackforanet-zeroemissionstrajectory(BloombergNEF2023a).TRANSPORTINDICATOR7:Shareofbatteryelectricvehiclesandfuelcellelectricvehiclesinbussales(%)•Targets:Batteryelectricvehicles(BEVs)andfuelcellelectricvehicles(FCEVs)accountfor60per-centofthetotalannualbussalesby2030and100percentby2050.Theglobalshareofzero-carbonbussaleshasfluctu-ated,upfromjust0.11percentin2010to3.8percentin2022.ThiswasalmostentirelyduetoChinesedemand,whichmadeup80percentofzero-carbonbussalesin2022(Figure38)(IEA2023e).However,thisisdownfrom95percentin2010duetoincreasingsalesinEuropeandTransportSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202390FIGURE38Historicalprogresstoward2030and2050targetsforshareofbatteryelectricvehiclesandfuelcellelectricvehiclesinbussalesWrongDirection,U-turnNeededHistoricalCurrentS-CurveLikely%datatrendPaceneededto100reachtargets2030target8010060602050target40202022data3.8020202030204020502010Note:ThesedatadifferfromthoseincludedinpreviousinstallmentsoftheStateofClimateAction.WenowusedatafromIEA(2023e)toalignhistoricaldatawiththe2030and2050targets.ForindicatorscategorizedasS-curvelikely,accelerationfactorscalculatedusingalineartrendlinearenotpresented,astheywouldnotaccuratelyreflectanS-curvetrajectory.Thecategoryofprogresswasdeterminedbasedonauthorjudg-ment,usingmultiplelinesofevidence.Morespecifically,thisindicatorappearedtoapproachthebreakthroughstageofanS-curvein2015,butithassincebeentrendinginthewrongdirection.So,werevertedtousingalineartrendlineforthecurrenttrendarrow.SeeAppendixCandJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromIEA(2023e);targetsfromIEA(2021b).theUnitedStates.Globally,totalsalesrocketedfrombuseselsewhere.Additionally,increasingelectricbus2,000in2010to63,000in2022.Therewasadipfrom2018salesinChinain2022despitedecreasingsubsidiesto2021duetodecreasedsalesinChinabeforeprogressoverthepastfewyearsshowsthatelectricbusesarepickedupagainin2022.Beforethisdip,thetotalglobalnolongerentirelydependentonsubsidies(IEA2023e).fleetincreasedmorethan10-foldbetween2014andSomeothercountrieshaveseenlargeelectricbussales2018duetostrongChinesedemandstimulatedbyearlyshares—includingFinland,where75percentofbussalesandcontinuedsupport,includingsubstantialpurchas-in2022wereelectric(IEA2023e).Therefore,althoughingandoperationsubsidies(GIZ2020).In2022salestheshareofbussalesisheadedinthewrongdirectionsawmeaningfulimprovementrelativetotherecentbasedontheaveragerateofchangeoverthelastfivedip.Butconsiderablymoreprogresswillbeneededyears,50itispossibleconcertedeffortscouldturnthistoreach60percentofbussalesby2030tomeetthetrendaroundandaccelerateprogresstomeetthe20301.5°Climit.PastexponentialgrowthinChina,along-goalof60percent.sideincreasingsalesinEuropeandtheUnitedStates,suggeststhatrapidprogressispossibleforzero-carbonTransportSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202391TRANSPORTINDICATOR8:energy.Largerbatteriesareheavier,however,andthereisatrade-offbetweentheweightofthebatteryandtheShareofbatteryelectricweightthetruckcanhaul(Gross2020).Inaddition,long-vehiclesandfuelcellelectrichaultruckshavedifferentrequirementsforrangeandvehiclesinmedium-andchargingspeedthanpassengercars.Increasingbatteryheavy-dutycommercialdensityisexpectedtoalleviatesomeoftheseissuesvehiclesales(%)(McKerracher2021),andfuelcellsarealsoconsideredtoelectrifyheavy-dutytransportduetotheirhigher•Targets:BEVsandFCEVsaccountfor30percentoftheenergydensities.However,duetotheseobstaclestoelectrification,globalGHGemissionsfromtheHDVfleettotalannualmedium-andheavy-dutycommercialareprojectedtobelargerthanthoseofthelight-dutyvehicle(MHDV)salesby2030and99percentby2050.vehiclefleetby2025(KhanandYang2022).GHGemissionsfromheavy-dutyvehicles(HDVs)areGlobalsalesofzero-carbonmedium-andheavy-dutyexpectedtotaperoffmoreslowlythanthosefromvehicles(MHDVs)haverisento2.7percentoftotalsaleslight-dutyvehicles(LDVs).Thisismainlybecausemostin2022—morethandoubletheamountofcombinedbigtruckscontinuetousedieselfuelaselectrifyingHDVssalesin2021andameaningfulimprovementrelativeismoredifficultthanelectrifyingLDVs.Movinglargetorecenttrends(Figure39).Butstill,theyremainlowvehiclesrequiresmuchmoreenergythansmallvehicles,relativetoothercategories.Oftotalelectricheavy-dutyandbatteriesmustthereforebelargertosupplythisFIGURE39Historicalprogresstoward2030and2050targetsforshareofbatteryelectricvehiclesandfuelcellelectricvehiclesinmedium-andheavy-dutycommercialvehiclesalesRightDirection,WellOffTrackS-CurveLikely%HistoricalCurrentPaceneededtodatatrendreachtargets1009932050target80HISTORICALDATA060201520222030target4030202022data2.7020202030204020502010Note:ThesedatadifferfromthoseincludedinpreviousinstallmentsoftheStateofClimateAction.WenowusedatafromIEA(2023e)toalignhistoricaldatawiththe2030and2050targets.ForindicatorscategorizedasS-curvelikely,accelerationfactorscalculatedusingalineartrendlinearenotpresented,astheywouldnotaccuratelyreflectanS-curvetrajectory.Thecategoryofprogresswasdeterminedbasedonauthorjudg-ment,usingmultiplelinesofevidence.Morespecifically,thisindicatoriscategorizedaswellofftrack,becauseitisanewtechnologythatisstillintheemergencestageofanS-curve.ThecurrenttrendarrowisbasedonanS-curvefittothehistoricaldata,butsuchanextrapolationishighlyuncertainwhenanindicatorisinthisearlystageandisincludedforillustrativepurposesonly.Ourcategorizationofprogressforthisindicatorisbasedonareviewoftheliteratureandconsultationswithexperts.SeeAppendixCandJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromIEA(2023e);targetsfromIEA(2021b).TransportSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202392vehiclesales,85percenthappenedinChinaaloneaspublicprocurementofmunicipalMHDVsandsales(IEA2023e).However,Europeansalesincreasedbyamandatesformanufacturers,theshareofzero-carbonremarkable80percentfrom2021to2022(EAFO2023),asMHDVscouldreachabreakthroughandincreaserapidlyautomakersbeganrollingoutnewmodelsandmajorandnonlinearly,withadoptionratesfollowinganS-curvelogisticscompaniesbeganpurchasingelectricheavy-trajectoryofchange,especiallygivenincreasingmodeldutytrucks.Europenowaccountsfor25percentofavailabilityandthesignsofexponentialgrowthinotherglobalsales(IEA2023e).EVclassesandacrossvariouscountriesandregions(BloombergNEF2021b).Europeisdrivingthetransitionbypassingmorestrin-gentheavy-dutyvehiclestandards.Earlierin2023,forTRANSPORTINDICATOR9:example,theEuropeanCommissionproposedarevisionofitsregulationonemissionsstandardsforHDVs.ItaimsShareofsustainableaviationtostrengthenthestandardsfor2030froma30percentfuelsinglobalaviationfuelreductionofemissionstoa45percentreduction(fromsupply(%)2019levels)andwouldintroducenewemissionsstan-dardsforlateryears,culminatingatareductionby2040•Targets:Sustainableaviationfuels(SAFs)comprise13ofupto95percentfrom2019levels(EuropeanCommis-sion2023d).Whilethisisaremarkablestepintherightpercentofglobalaviationfuelsupplyby2030and100direction,leadingtoanestimated550,000electrictruckpercentby2050.fleetinEuropeby2030(Krug2023),evenitfallsshortofwhatisneeded.BecauseemissionshavesurgedsharplyAviationisresponsiblefor2percentofglobalGHGemis-since1990,bringingthemdown95percentfrom2019sions(Minxetal.2021;EuropeanCommissionandJRClevelsimpliesonlya56percentreductionfrom1990to2022;IEA2022i),andthisshareisprojectedtogrowover2050,farshortofthe100percentrequired(Transportandthenextdecadeunderthecurrentglobalpolicyframe-Environment2023).Effortsinotherregionsshowsimilarwork(IEA2022b).Decarbonizingaviationwillbeheavilytrendsintherightdirection—California,forexample,dependentonatransitiontosustainableaviationfuelsrecentlydeclareditwouldendallsalesofinternalcom-(SAFs),whichincludepower-to-liquidsyntheticfuelsandbustionenginetrucksby2036(StateofCalifornia2023b).biofuels(CAT2022d;MPP2022a).InadditiontocuttingGHGemissions,switchingtoSAFscanalsoenableTheshareofzero-carbonvehiclesinMHDVsaleshasreductionofairpollutantssuchassulfuremissionsandbeengrowingerratically,includingadecreasefromparticulatematter.Alternativestodrop-infuels,suchas2017to2019,buttheoverallshapeofchangeoverthepoweringplaneswithbatteriesorhydrogen,mayalsopastdecadehasbeenroughlyexponential.Growthinplaysomepartindecarbonizingaviation.Thequality2022wasameaningfulaccelerationrelativetorecentofSAFswillbeimportant,especiallywhenconsideringtrends.Futuregrowthwilllikelybenonlinearaswell.Butindirectimpacts.Inparticular,itisimportanttonoteconsiderablymoreprogresswillbeneededtoreach30thatbiofuels(particularlycrop-derivedfuels)canbepercentin2030.ThistechnologyisrelativelynascentandunsustainablebecausetheycancompetewithfoodremainsintheemergencephaseofanS-curve.Globalproductionforwaterandland,leadtofurtherchal-progressmadetowardthisnear-termtargetiscate-lengesaroundfoodsecurityandalterlocalecosystemsgorizedaswellofftrack.Withsupportivepolicies,suchassociatedwithhighriskofland-usechangethrough,TransportSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202393forexample,deforestation(Searchingeretal.2019).areneededtoprovidetheenergyneededtomoveBecauseofthis,biofuelsareunlikelytoplayalargeroleaplanelongdistances(Grayetal.2021).OverthoseasSAFs.Alongtheselines,advancedbiofuelsproducedshortdistances,thesustainablealternativemaybefromnonfoodornonfeedalternatives,suchasnonfoodtravelingbytrainwherethisinfrastructureexists(Graveralgaeororganicwastesandresidues,donotcompeteetal.2022).Forexample,inChina,thegrowthofhigh-withfoodproductionand,ifdevelopedsustainably,speedrailenabledamodalshiftawayfromshort-haulcouldcontributetothetransitiontolow-carbonaviation.domesticflights,resultinginan18percentreductioninFindingaroleforadvancedbiofuelsindecarbonizationCO2emissionsinrecentyears(Straussetal.2021).Thewillrequiresignificant,ongoinginvestmentinresearchshareofSAFsintheaviationindustryremainedlowinanddevelopmenttoreducetheircost,bringthemto2022,accountingfor0.1percentofthetotalaviationscale,andensurethattheyareproducedresponsiblyfuelconsumption(Figure40).Whiletherearenoguar-andsustainably(IRENA2019).Comparatively,syntheticantees,therateofchangewilllikelybenonlinearinthefuelshaveahigherscaling-uppotentialandgreaterfuture.Globalprogressmadetowardthisnear-termsustainabilitywhenproducedwithrenewableenergytargetiswellofftrack.Thetechnologyisnascentandsources(Michelietal.2022).remainsintheemergencestageofanS-curve,sothesharewouldhavetodoubleeveryyearinordertomeetBatteryelectricplanesarealsoindevelopment,butthe2030target.batteriesarecurrentlyonlysuitableforveryshort-haulflightsbecausetheyareheavyandmanybatteriesFIGURE40Historicalprogresstoward2030and2050targetsforshareofsustainableaviationfuelsinglobalaviationfuelsupplyRightDirection,WellOffTrackS-CurveLikely%HistoricalCurrentPaceneededtodatatrendreachtargets1001000.122050target80HISTORICALDATA6002020202240202022data2030target2040205000.113201020202030Note:ForindicatorscategorizedasS-curvelikely,accelerationfactorscalculatedusingalineartrendlinearenotpresented,astheywouldnotaccuratelyreflectanS-curvetrajectory.Thecategoryofprogresswasdeterminedbasedonauthorjudgment,usingmultiplelinesofevidence,includingareviewoftheliteratureandconsultationswithexperts.Morespecifically,thisindicatoriscategorizedaswellofftrackbecauseitisanewtechnologythatisstillintheemergencestageofanS-curve.WedonothavesufficienthistoricaldatatofitanS-curvetothedatatocreatethecurrenttrendline,sowerevertedtoalineartrendline.Duetodatalimitations,thelineartrendlinewasestimatedusingdatapointsfromonlythreeyears.Thiscurrenttrendlineislikelytooconservative,giventhatitdoesnotaccountforthepossibilityofnonlineargrowth.SeeAppendixCandJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromAirTransportActionGroup(2021);Mistry(2022);andIATA(2022).TargetsfromMPP(2022d).TransportSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202394BarrierscurrentlylimitingtheuptakeofSAFsinvolvebiofuels),and70percentby2050.Additionally,thereisproduction,infrastructure,policy,andtheavailabilityamandatethatpower-to-liquidande-fuelsmakeupofdifferentfueltechnologiesonaircraft.Thecostsof1.2percentoffueluseby2030and35percentby2050developingandproducingSAFsarehighintheearly(EASA2022;IATA2023).Whilethisisastepintherightstages,whichcanbethreetosixtimesmoreexpen-direction,strongercommitmentsarestillneeded.sivethanconventionaljetfuel(IRENA2021a).MajorinvestmentswillneedtobemadeininfrastructureandTRANSPORTINDICATOR10:trainingtohandleandstorethesenewfuels.Atthesametime,policymechanismsareneededtofurtherShareofzero-emissionsfuelsaidinremovingbarrierstoSAFscale-up.Market-basedinmaritimeshippingfuelmeasureswouldbeanimportanttooltomakeSAFssupply(%)cost-competitivewithconventionalhigh-emissionjetfuelsifthepriceofcarbonisappropriatelyset.Whilethe•Targets:Theshareofzero-emissionsfuels(ZEFs)inEuropeanUnionhasalreadyintroducedaviationinitsemissionstradingschemesince2012,thishasdonelittlemaritimeshippingfuelsupplyreaches5percentbytocutemissionsbecauseofpoordesignthatallowed2030and93percentby2050.freeallocationofcarboncreditsandmadecreditscheapforairlinecompaniestopurchase(TransportandInternationalanddomesticmaritimeshippingEnvironmentn.d.).accountsfor2percentofglobalGHGemissions,roughlyequivalenttoGermany’stotalemissions(Minxetal.Fromthepolicyside,acentralchallengeisthatavi-2021;EuropeanCommissionandJRC2022;IEA2022i).ationislargelyaninternationalindustrywithnooneTransitioningtheglobalmaritimesectorwillrequiregovernmentabletoinfluencetheentiresector.Instead,newzero-emissionsfuels,aswellasotherinvestmentsgovernmentsmustbuildconsensusthroughthebeyondthefuelsthemselves,includingnewtechnol-InternationalCivilAviationOrganization(ICAO).ThisisogiestoretrofitvesselstorunonZEFs.Alsoneededwillalengthyandslowprocess,whichtodatehasfailedbeeffortstomaximizeenergyefficiency,adaptporttosetconcreteSAFtargetsandpoliciestopromoteinfrastructuretosupplyZEFstofleets,anddevelopnewdemandforSAFsininternationalaviation.Inadditiontopolicymeasurestosupportthisshift(GMF2022).increasingtheshareofSAFsinthefuelmix,governmentsshouldreduceshort-haulflightsandfacilitateashifttoZEFsincludegreenammonia,greenhydrogen,e-meth-othermodesoftransport,suchaslow-orzero-emis-anol,andsynthetice-fuelsproducedfromrenewablesionshigh-speedrail.Whilethismayalsoincreaseroadsourcesofenergy.51E-methanolandsyntheticfuelstransport,thistransitionmusthappenalongsidethemadewithrenewableelectricitystillreleasesomeCO2electrificationofvehiclefleets(CAT2022d).Theemissionwhencombusted,so,toproducenet-zeroemissions,intensityperpassenger-kilometer(pkm)ofrailtravelsomeCO2usedtosynthesizethesefuelswillalsoneedis22.35g/CO2e/pkm,almostsixtimeslowerthanthetobecapturedfromtheatmosphere(GMF2022).While123gCO2e/pkmemittedbyplanetravel(IEA2023h).batteriesarealsoazero-emissionsoption,theirrela-tivelylowenergydensitymakesthemunsuitableforLately,privateaviation,anditsuncontrolledemissions,long-distanceshippingbutcancontributetodecarbon-hasbeengarneringmoreattention.Perpassenger,izingshorterdomesticvoyages(Kerseyetal.2022).Theprivatejetsare14timesmorepollutingthancommercialtransitionoftheshippingsectorwillrelyheavilyontheplanes,andshortflightsarelessfuelefficient.Yetasmallgroupofindividualscontinuetotravelshortdistancesbyprivatejetwhenlower-carbonoptionsareeasilyavailable(Saner2023).Theincreaseduseofhigh-emis-sionprivateaviationwillmakedecarbonizationmoredifficultandbringequityandfairnessconcernsintosharperrelief.Inorder,thelargestshareofaviation-relatedemissions(basedondepartingpassengerflights)comefromtheUnitedStates,theEuropeanUnion,China,andtheUnitedKingdom(Graveretal.2020).ApartfromChina,allofthesetopfouremittershavepledgedtoreducetheiraviationemissions.TheUnitedKingdom,forexample,hascommittedtoaquotaof10percentSAFby2030,whiletheEuropeanUnion’snewReFuelEUregulationsetsapreliminarytargetof6percentby2030(inwhichbiofuelsareincludedwithlimitationsoncrop-basedTransportSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202395FIGURE41Historicalprogresstoward2030and2050targetsforshareofzero-emissionsfuelsinmaritimeshippingfuelsupplyRightDirection,WellOffTrackS-CurveLikely%HistoricalCurrentPaceneededtodatatrendreachtargets10093802050target6040202018data2030target20402050005201020202030Note:ForindicatorscategorizedasS-curvelikely,accelerationfactorscalculatedusingalineartrendlinearenotpresented,astheywouldnotaccuratelyreflectanS-curvetrajectory.Thecategoryofprogresswasdeterminedbasedonauthorjudgment,usingmultiplelinesofevidence.Morespecifically,thisindicatoriscategorizedaswellofftrack,becauseitisanewtechnologythatisstillintheemergencestageofanS-curve.Ourcategorizationofprogressforthisindicatorisbasedonareviewoftheliteratureandconsultationswithexperts.SeeAppendixCandJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromIMO(2020);targetsfromUMAS(2021).progressmadeinothersectors—primarilythescalingupmarket-basedmeasurethatputsapriceonGHGemis-ofrenewableenergythatwilldrivetheuptakeofgreensionsfrominternationalshipping,itwouldbebeneficialhydrogenandammonia(Camesetal.2021).todistributerevenuestovulnerableanddisproportion-atelyimpactedcountriestosupportaglobalequitableTheinitialhighcostofalternativefuelscoulddispro-transition(Baresicetal.2022;Psaraftisetal.2021).portionatelyaffectlower-incomedevelopingcountrieswithhighclimaterisk.ManycountriesthatfacefoodAsof2021theglobalshareofZEFsinshippingremainedinsecurity,sealevelrise,andextremeweathereventscloseto0percent.Theuptakeofgreenammoniaandalsodependonshippingforkeyimports.Andmanyofgreenhydrogen,andconstructionofzero-emissionsthemlackthefinancesandcapacitytotransitiontheirshipscapableofrunningonsuchfuels,remainedininfrastructure,fuelsupply,logistics,andlaborforcefortheirinfancy(Figure41).Currently,ammoniaenginesnewzero-emissionsfuels.Ensuringajustandequitableareexpectedtobecommerciallyreadyby2025,whiletransitioninthemaritimespacewillrevolvearoundhydrogenenginesalreadyexistandotherdemonstra-internationalcooperationonfinanceandcapacitytionprojectsareunderway,withanoticeableuptickbuilding.Ajusttransitioninshippingwouldsupportofthelatterappearingontoday’sorderbooksfornewseafarerswiththenecessaryskills,employment,andships.Tokeeptheworldinlinewitha1.5-degreesce-safetyaroundnewzero-emissionsfuelsandtechnolo-nario,theshareofthesefuelsshouldreach5percentgies,whileanequitabletransitionwouldensurethattheby2030.Itshouldbenotedthatthe5percenttargetburdenofclimateimpactsandcostsofdecarbonizing(UMAS2021)considersonlyZEFsandnotbiofuels(foratheshippingsectorwerenotdisproportionallyexacer-discussionofthesustainabilityofbiofuels,seeIndicatorbatedforvulnerablecountries.Withaglobalmaritime9).Toputthe5percentZEFtargetincontext,5percentofTransportSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202396thefuelmixcouldbeequivalenttoavolumeof29.8MttheaverageEVcostcloserto$40,000(Slowiketal.2022).ofammoniaor28.1MtofmethanolderivedfromgreenOncethedeclineinbatterypricesresumes,EVcostshydrogensources(DNV2022).shouldalsofallfurther,reachingpurchasepriceparitywithgasoline-poweredcounterpartsaround2030–35Withsupportivepolicies,suchascarbonpricingor(Slowiketal.2022).ZEFusemandates,ZEFs’shareinshippingfuelscouldincreaserapidlyandnonlinearly,withadoptionratesIntheUnitedStates,theInflationReductionActprovidesfollowinganS-curvetrajectoryofchange.Butbecauserevampedsubsidiesforlight-dutyelectricvehiclesinhydrogenandammoniatechnologyarenascentandwaysthatexcludeluxuryEVsandthehighest-incomeremainatnearlyzero,globalprogressmadetowardearners.Thelawprovideda$7,500taxcreditforthepur-thisnear-termtargetremainswellofftrack.ItshouldbechaseofnewEVs(cars,vans,andsportutilityvehicles)notedthattherearesignsthatthemarketforthesefuelsand$4,000forusedEVs(Hawkins2022).Togetthiscredit,isdeveloping,includingordersforshipstorunoncar-thevehiclemustbeassembledinNorthAmerica,thebon-neutralmethanolandpartnershipstodesignshipsmineralsforthebatterymusthavebeenatleastpar-thatrunonammonia(High-LevelChampions2023).tiallyextractedinNorthAmerica,thebatterymusthavebeenatleastpartiallyassembledinNorthAmerica,theTheInternationalMaritimeOrganization(IMO)isthevehiclemustcostlessthan$80,000,andthepurchaserregulatorybodythatwouldneedtocreatethepol-mustmakelessthan$150,000–$300,000dependingonicyframeworkfordecarbonizingmaritimeshipping.howtheyfiletheirtaxes(IRS2023;U.S.DepartmentofHistorically,thepaceatwhichtheIMOhasbeenmovingTreasury2022).Becauseoftheserules,only33ofthetowardaglobalconsensusoneffectivedecarbonization73availablebatteryelectricvehicleorplug-inhybridhasbeenfarslowerthanneededtoachievea1.5°CelectricvehiclemodelsavailableintheUnitedStatesscenario.However,arecentdecisionfromthebodyhasqualifyforatleastpartialcredit(EVAdoption2023;U.S.significantlyacceleratedprogress(seemorein“RecentDOEandU.S.EPA2023).developmentsacrossthetransportsector”below).Toaccomplishthatgoal,countrieswillneedtoestablishaAtCOP27in2022,10countries(Aruba,Belgium,Croatia,global,market-basedmechanismforimposingapriceCuraçao,DominicanRepublic,Ireland,Liechtenstein,onconventionalcarbon-intensivefossilfuelsandmakeLithuania,Ukraine,andtheUnitedStates)signedaZEFscost-competitivewiththem(DominioniandEnglertnonbindingagreementthattheywouldaimtosellonly2022;Psaraftisetal.2021;Smithetal.2022).zero-emissionsmedium-andheavy-dutyvehiclesby2040(DrivetoZero2022).Morerecently,theUnitedStatesRecentdevelopmentsproposedstringentnewemissionsstandardsforcarsacrosstransportandtrucksthataredesignedtoensurethattwo-thirdsofpassengercarsalesandaquarterofheavy-dutyTherehavenotbeenanylarge-scalerecentdevel-trucksalesintheUnitedStatesareelectricby2032opmentsinshiftingtoshared,collective,oractive(Davenport2023).transport.Becauseofthesmallgeographicscaleatwhichinvestmentsinshared,collective,oractiveInadditiontoEVs,therehasbeenrecentprogressintransportaretypicallymade(e.g.,atthecitylevel),anyeffortstodecarbonizeaviation.InOctober2022,atitsrecentdevelopmentsidentifiedhavelargelybeenlocal41stAssembly,theInternationalCivilAviationOrganiza-inscale(see,forexample,thebuild-outofbikelanesintionadoptedalong-termaspirationalgoalofreachingBogotáinBox11).Therehave,however,beenquiteafewnet-zerocarbonemissionsby2050.Thisdoesnot,how-recentdevelopmentsinelectriclight-andheavy-dutyever,subjectstatestoanylegallybindingcommitmentsvehicles,aswellasnewpolicytoolstodecarbonize(ICAO2023).Additionally,ICAO’sscenariosdonotreachaviationandshipping.net-zeroemissionsin2050anddonotcoveraviation’scrucialnon-CO2emissions(Cardamaetal.2023).AtIn2022,thepriceofthelithium-ionbatterythataregionallevel(EASA2022),theEuropeanUnionhasmakesup30–60percentofanEV’sprice(Jones2022)concludednegotiatingtheReFuelEUregulation,whichincreasedforthefirsttimesince2010(BloombergNEFsetsapreliminarytargetof6percentby2030(inwhich2022b).Thisincreaseisexpectedtobeshort-lived.Itwasbiofuelsareincludedwithlimitationsoncrop-basedduetosupplychainconstraints,especiallyinlithium,biofuels),and70percentby2050.Additionally,itsetswhichareexpectedtoeasein2024(BloombergNEFafuelmandateof1.2percentby2030and35percent2022b).CheaperbatteriesaremakingEVsmoreafford-by2050forpowertoliquidande-fuels(EASA2022;IATAable:asof2022,aconventionalgasoline-poweredcar2023).Whilethisisastepintherightdirection,strongerintheUnitedStatescostapproximately$30,000,whilecommitmentsarestillneeded.TransportSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202397IntheUnitedStates,therecentadoptionoftheInflationsupportiveconditionsforzero-emissionsshipping.ReductionActintroducedtaxcreditsforSAFproducersMorethan20initiativesareunderwaytodevelopthesetoincentivizemoreproduction.Unfortunately,thesetaxcorridors(GMF2022).creditsrewardfuelswith50percentemissionreduc-tionsagainstconventionaljetfuels,whichfallsshortofIn2023,theEuropeanUnionunveiledseveralsweepingthekindsoftransformativefuelsultimatelyneededtoproposalstoincludemaritimeshippinginitsEmissionsdecarbonizeaviation(Sullivan2023).TradingSystemandputinplaceregulationscalledFuelEUMaritimeandtheRevisedRenewableEnergySeveralairlineshaveannouncednewSAFpurchaseDirectivetoacceleratetheuptakeof“zero-andlow-car-agreementsandsettargetstouseSAFsby2030andbon”fuels.Unfortunately,theseregulationsallowforbeyond.In2022,42SAFofftakeagreementsweresigned,biofuels(fromunsustainablefeedstocks)andLNG,amountingtoalmost22,000millionlitersperyear(ICAOwhichwillmakeclimatetargetsmoredifficulttoreach.2022).Becausethesearefuturecommitments,thesePolicymakersandindustrystakeholdershavesoughtvolumesarenotyetreflectedinthehistoricaldata.theincrementalapproachofencouragingfuelsthatarelower-carbonbutstillcarbon-intensive,suchasLNG,asFinally,inmaritimeshipping,amajorpolicydevelopmentpartofthetransitionawayfromoilproducts.However,hasthepotentialtoaccelerateprogress.InJuly2023,thiswouldrepresentamajorlock-inofinvestmentinatthe80thsessionoftheIMO’sMarineEnvironmentfossilfuels(UMAS2021).ProtectionCommittee,membergovernmentsagreedtoarevisedGHGreductionstrategythatupdatedthebody’stargets,includinganet-zerotarget“byoraround”2050.IthasexpandedthecoverageofemissionstoallGHGs(notonlyCO2)andcoversthefulllife-cycle(“welltowake”)emissions.ItalsosetsanewSAFshareman-dateof5percentwhilestrivingfor10percentzero-or“near-zero-”emissionsfuelsandtechnologyby2030.Whilethisisastepintherightdirectionandinlinewithwhatbenchmarksstatedinthisreportrequire,the“near-zero”emissionsfuelscanincludeliquefiednaturalgas(LNG),whichisstillafossilfuelthatcouldpersistinthefuelmixbeyond2050(SmithandShaw2023).Giventhelonglifespanofvessels(approximately30years),widespreadLNGuseasashippingfuelwouldtakemarketshareforacarbon-emittingfuelanddelaythepenetrationofzero-emissionsfuels.Avoidingcontinuedinvestments,policies,andplanningaroundtheuptakeoffossilfuels,especiallyavoidingLNGandalternativefuelsnotsourcedfromrenewableenergyand/orcapturedCO2,willbecrucialinthisdecade.TheIMO’sEnergyEfficiencyExistingShipIndexandCarbonIntensityIndexalsocameintoforceonJanuary1,2023.TheseIMOmeasureswillaimtotrackandrateenergyefficiencyandcarbonintensity,respectively,andrequirethemtoimproveovertime.Anotherstepforwardwouldbetosetupgreenshippingcorridors,internationalprojectsinwhichseveralstake-holdersfromindustryandgovernmentworktogetheracrosscontinentstodevelopspecificrouteswiththeTransportSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202398SECTION6ForestsandLandNaturecontributesvital,sometimesirreplace-40–45percentofallnetanthropogenicGHGemissionsableservicestohumanitythatrangewidely,fromAFOLUduringthisdecade,54whilemethane(CH4)fromregulatingwaterqualitytoprovisioningandnitrousoxide(N2O)emissions,drivenpredominatelyfoodtosustainingcleanair(IPCC2019,2022b;IPBES2019;byagriculture,comprisedtheremaining55–60percentUNCCD2017).52Yethowpeopleinteractwiththenaturalofthesesectoralemissions(Minxetal.2021;Europeanworldalsoinfluencestheclimatesystem.ThelossCommissionandJRC2022).anddegradationofecosystems—particularlyforests,peatlands,coastalwetlands,andgrasslands—releaseDeterminingspecifictrendsinnetanthropogenicCO2GHGsintotheatmosphere,whileprotecting,restoring,emissionsfromlanduse,land-use,change,andforestryandsustainablymanagingthesesamehigh-carbonwithconfidence,however,remainschallengingdueecosystemscanlowerGHGemissions,enhancecarbontolimitationsinnationallyreporteddata,incompletesequestration,andbuildresiliencetoclimateimpactsrepresentationsoflandmanagementpracticesacross(IPCC2019,2022b).globalmodels,anddifferencesinhowmethodscon-ceptualizethe“anthropogenic”CO2fluxoccurringacrossAgriculture,forestry,andotherlanduses(AFOLU)land.Untilrecently,someapproaches,suchastheaccountedfornearlyone-fifthofnetanthropogenicaveragefromthreeglobalbookkeepingmodelsusedinGHGemissionsgloballyin2021(Figure42),53withthesethe“GlobalCarbonBudget,”indicatedaslightincreaseemissionsremainingrelativelyconstantatanaverageinnetCO2emissionssince2000,whileothersthatrelyonofabout11GtCO2eperyearoverthispastdecade(Minxnationallyreporteddata,suchasNationalGreenhouseetal.2021;EuropeanCommissionandJRC2022).NetGasInventoriesandFAOSTAT,suggestedtheoppositeCO2emissions,whichprimarilystemfromlanduse,trend(IPCC2022b).Butfollowingsignificantupdatesland-usechange,andforestry,accountedforroughlytothedataunderpinningtheseglobalbookkeepingFIGURE42AFOLU’scontributiontoglobalnetanthropogenicGHGemissionsin2021ElectricityandheatOilandgas14.4fugitiveemissions2.5Other1.6Coalminingfugitiveemissions1.5Petroleumrefining0.7EnergyNetCO2GrossCO220.7emissionsemissionsNon-CO2(allbuildings)WasteLanduse,4.07.70.042.4land-usechange,GrossCO2NonresidentialResidentialBuildingsGlobalGHGAgriculture,andforestryremovals0.82.33.2Emissionsforestry,56.8GtCO2eandother4.0-3.7Raillanduses0.1Enteric10.4fermentationInlandshipping0.23.0DomesticaviationTransportManaged0.38.1soilsandInternationalIndustryaviation12.0pasture0.41.4OtherRoadOtherRicecultivation0.5Transport4.41.0International5.9Manuremanagementshipping0.40.7ChemicalsMetals2.63.4Syntheticfertilizerapplication0.4Cement1.6Biomassburning0.1Notes:AFOLU=agriculture,forestry,andotherlanduses;CO2=carbondioxide;GHG=greenhousegas;GtCO2e=gigatonnesofcarbondioxideequivalent.Sources:Minxetal.(2021);EuropeanCommissionandJRC(2022),usingCO2emissionsdataforlanduse,land-usechange,andforestryfromthethreebookkeepingmodelsinthe“GlobalCarbonBudget2022”(Friedlingsteinetal.2022b).ForestsandLandSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023100FIGURE43GlobalnetanthropogenicCO2models,whichoccurredaftertheliteraturecut-offdateofIPCC(2022b),the“GlobalCarbonBudget”reviseditsemissionsfromlanduse,land-useestimatesofnetanthropogenicCO2emissionsfromlandchange,andforestryuse,land-usechange,andforestrydownward(Friedling-steinetal.2022a),andallthreeglobalbookkeepingGtCO2/yrmodelsnowshowsmalldecreasesinnetanthropogenic9CO2emissionsfromlanduse,land-usechange,andfor-estrysincethe1990s(Friedlingsteinetal.2022b)(Figure843).Althoughnearlyallapproaches—globalbookkeep-7ingmodels,NationalGreenhouseGasInventories,andFAOSTAT—nowsuggestadeclineinthesenetanthropo-6genicCO2emissionsinrecentdecades,uncertaintyinboththemagnitudeofthistrendandthetotaldecreaseBlueinCO2emissionsremains.5Butwhenconsideringbothanthropogenicandnonan-OscarthropogenicCO2fluxesfromland,includingthoseassociatedwithdirect,human-causedchange(e.g.,4Meandeforestation),indirect,human-causedchange(e.g.,climatechange),andnaturaleffects(e.g.,climatevari-3abilityassociatedwithElNiñoandLaNiña),thescienceisHoughtonmuchclearer—landremainsacarbonsinkglobally(IPCC2022b),sequesteringanet7GtCO2peryearandagross211GtCO2peryeargloballyfrom2012to2021(Friedling-steinetal.2022b).Andsince1850,thelandsink,which1iscomprisedprimarilyofstandingforests,hashelpedslowclimatechangebysequesteringroughlyone-third020002021ofCO2emissionsfromallhumanactivities(Friedling-1990steinetal.2022b).Theeffectivenessofthesecarbonsinksandstores,however,maydeclinewithadditionalNotes:CO2=carbondioxide;GtCO2/yr=gigatonnesofcarbonwarming(Box12).dioxideperyear.Blue,Houghton,andOscararethreeseparatebook-keepingmodelsthathavebeenaveragedtoprovideaglobalmeanestimate.Sources:Minxetal.(2021);andEuropeanCommissionandJRC(2022),usingCO2emissionsdataforlanduse,land-usechange,andforestryfromthethreebookkeepingmodelsinthe“GlobalCarbonBudget2022”(Friedlingsteinetal.2022b).BOX12ThevulnerabilityofnaturalcarbonsinksandstorestoclimatechangeOverthepastsixdecades,theworld’soceanandlongeddroughtsmaylimitcarbonuptake(IPCClandsinkshaveslowedgrowthinatmospheric2022a),withseveralobservationalstudiesofintactconcentrationsofCO2byabsorbingincreasingtropicalforestplotsalreadyindicatingaweaken-absoluteamountsoftheseemissionseveryyear.ingofthelandsinkacrosstheAmazonfromtheScientistslargelyattributethisrecentstrength-mid-1980stotheearly2010s(Brienenetal.2015;eningofthegloballandsink,specifically,toCO2Hubauetal.2020).Hubauetal.(2020),specifically,fertilization—definedastheincreaseinplantattributethesedeclinestogreatertreemortalityphotosynthesisandwater-useefficiencyinfromrisingtemperaturesanddrought,whichresponsetorisingatmosphericconcentrationsoffsetgainsinproductivityfromCO2fertilizationofCO2.Whilethisglobaltrendwilllikelycontinueduringthisperiod.through2100,theproportionofCO2emissionsthattheworld’slandsinktakesupwilllikelydeclineGlobaltemperaturerisethreatensnotonlytounderahigh-emissionspathway(IPCC2021),anddampenthestrengthofsomelandsinksbutfuturedisturbances,includingclimateimpacts,alsotoincreasecarbonlossesfromecosystems,mayalsoreducesomelands’capacitytoseques-withrecurrent,moreintensewildfires,enhancedterandstorecarbon(IPCC2022a).Acrossforeststreemortalityfromdroughtandpestoutbreaks,andpeatlands,forexample,risingtemperaturespermafrostthaw,andpeatlanddryingprojectedcoupledwithmorefrequent,severe,andpro-todrivefuturedeclinesinterrestrialcarbonstocksForestsandLandSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023101BOX12Thevulnerabilityofnaturalcarbonsinksandstorestoclimatechange(continued)(IPCC2022a).Underscenarioswithmoderateabruptlyandsometimesirreversibly(IPCC2021).tohighlevelsofwarming,forexample,regionalAnumberofstudiessuggestthatsuchanabruptclimatesacrossEuropeandWesternSiberiacouldchangecouldoccurwithintheAmazon(e.g.,becomeunsuitablywarmformaintainingalmostLentonetal.2008;Steffenetal.2018;Lovejoyandallpermafrostpeatlands,whichcontainnearly40Nobre2019;Lentonetal.2019),andasynthesisofGtC,bythe2090s,withconsiderablelossesbegin-recentlypublishedpapersfindsthatinitialprojec-ningdecadesearlier(Fewsteretal.2022).Similarly,tionsindicatedthatthishumidtropicalprimaryintheAmazonbasin,thecombinedeffectsofanforestcouldhavetwotippingpoints—either3–4°Cintensifyingdryseasonanddeforestationhaveofwarmingordeforestingroughly40percentalreadyincreasedCO2emissions,withthesouth-oftheAmazon—that,ifreached,couldcauseeasternregionoftheforestreleasingmorecarbonsubstantialforestdieback(McKayetal.2022).Butthanitsequesteredoverthispastdecade(Gattietwhenaccountingforinteractionsbetweenclimateal.2021).Shouldcarbonlossesfromtheseeco-changeandpermanentforestloss,thesethresh-systemsincrease,sowilltheriskofexacerbatingoldslikelyfalltolowerlevels(McKayetal.2022).self-reinforcingfeedbacks—complexprocessesCrossingtheglobalwarmingtippingpoint(nowthat,essentially,spurrisesinatmosphericcon-estimatedat3.5°C),specifically,riskstriggeringcentrationsofCO2thatwouldfurtheramplifyacascadeofeventsthatcouldleadtodiebackglobalwarmingandintensifythesameclimateacrossroughly40percentofworld’slargesthumidimpactstowhichtheseecosystems’carbonstockstropicalprimaryforestandreleaseabout110GtCO2arevulnerable(IPCC2022a).However,boththe(McKayetal.2022).Althoughscientistshavemademagnitudeandtimingofthesefeedbacksremainadvancesinclimatemodeling,paleoclimatology,highlyuncertain(IPCC2021,2022a).andobservationalanalysisofnonlinearchangeintheclimatesystem,confidenceinthesethresh-Inadditiontospurringlossesofterrestrialcarbonolds,aswellastheseverityofsubsequentimpacts,stocks,continuedwarmingmayalsopushsomeislowtomedium,giventhecomplexinteractionsecosystemsclosertotippingpoints—thresholdsbetweenclimatechange,land-usechange,andthat,oncecrossed,triggerthereorganizationofotherfactors(IPCC2021,2022b;McKayetal.2022).ecosystemsintoqualitativelydifferentones,oftenNotes:CO2=carbondioxide;GtC=gigatonnesofcarbon.Globalassessmentofinlinewithpathwaysthatlimitwarmingto1.5°C(Roeprogressforforestsetal.2019).55Whenimplementedappropriately,theseandlandsamestrategiescanalsodeliversubstantialbenefitstoadaptation,sustainabledevelopment,andbiodiver-DeliveringtheParisAgreement’smitigationgoalssity(Figure44)(Roeetal.2021).Yetrecentprogressinrequiresimmediateactiontoprotecttheworld’sdeployingland-basedmitigationremainsinadequate.terrestrialcarbonsinksandstores,aswellasarapidNoneoftheindicatorsassessedforforests,peatlands,scale-upineffortstorestoreandsustainablymanageandmangroves,56specifically,areontracktoachievetheseecosystems.Overthenextthreedecades,thesetheir2030targets(Table5).Andduetodatalimitations,land-basedmeasuresacrossforests,peatlands,coastalthisglobalassessmentexcludestargetsandindicatorswetlands,andgrasslandscollectivelycanmitigateforimprovedforestmanagementpracticesthatcanbetween4.2GtCO2eand7.3GtCO2eannuallyatuptohelpreducedegradationandgrasslandfireman-$100/tCO2e(IPCC2022b)—arangethatisalsoroughlyagementpractices.ForestsandLandSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023102TABLE5SummaryofglobalprogresstowardforestsandlandtargetsINDICATORMOSTRECENT203020352050LIKELIHOODACCELERATIONSTATUSDATAPOINTTARGETTARGETTARGETOFFACTOR(YEAR)FOLLOWINGANS-CURVEDeforestation(Mha/yr)5.81.9N/A0.314xb(2022)aPeatland0.06000Insufficientdatadegradation(Mha/yr)(annualaverage,1993–2018)Mangroveloss(ha/yr)32,0004,900N/AN/AN/A;U-turnneededdReforestation(totalMha)(annualaverage,1.5xfPeatland2017–19)cInsufficientdatarestoration(totalMha)130100150300(totalgain,(2020–30)e(2020–35)e(2020–50)e2000–2020)015N/A20–29(asof2015)g(2020–50)e(2020–30)eMangrove15,000240,000N/AN/A>10xirestoration(totalha)(totaldirectgain,(2020–30)e1999–2019)hNotes:ha/yr=hectaresperyear;Mha/yr=millionhectaresperyear.Historicaldataforforestsandlandindicatorswereestimatedusingmapsderivedfromremotelysenseddata,andaccordingly,theycontainadegreeofuncertainty.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators(includingtheknownlimitationsofeach),anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.aSeeJaegeretal.(2023)andBox5inBoehmetal.(2022)foradescriptionofmethodsusedtoestimatedeforestation.bIndicatorsforforestsandlandexperiencehighinterannualvariabilityinhistoricaldataduetobothanthropogenicandnaturalcauses.Accord-ingly,10yearsinsteadof5yearswasusedtocalculatethelineartrendlinewherepossible.Forthisindicator,however,an8-yeartrendlinewascalculated,usingdatafrom2015to2022duetotemporalinconsistenciesinthedatabeforeandafter2015(WeisseandPotapov2021).cHistoricaldatafromMurrayetal.(2022),whichestimatedgrossmangrovearealostfrom1999to2019,wasbrokenintothree-yearepochs.Lossforeachepochwasdividedbythenumberofyearsintheepochtodeterminetheaverageannuallossrate.dIndicatorsforforestsandlandexperiencehighinterannualvariabilityinhistoricaldataduetobothanthropogenicandnaturalcauses.Accord-ingly,10yearsinsteadof5yearswasusedtocalculatethelineartrendlinewherepossible.Forthisindicator,however,a12-yeartrendlinewascalculated,usingdatafrom2008to2019toaccountforthefullrangeofyearsincludedinfour3-yearepochsfromMurrayetal.(2022).Toestimatetheaverageannuallossratefrom2008to2019,grosslosswasdividedbythenumberofyearsineachepoch.eReforestation,peatlandrestoration,andmangroverestorationtargetsareadditionaltoanyreforestationandrestorationthatoccurredpriorto2020,andthesetargetsarecumulativefromeither2020to2030or2020to2050.fFollowingBoehmetal.(2021)andduetodatalimitations,theaverageannualrateofchangeacrossthemostrecentlyavailabletimeperiod(2000–2020)wasusedtoestimatethehistoricalrateofchange,ratherthanalineartrendline.gPeatlandrestorationtargetswereadaptedfromHumpenöderetal.(2020)andRoeetal.(2021),whichassumethat0Mhaofpeatlandsgloballywererewettedasof2015.Thisassumption,however,doesnotsuggestthatpeatlandrestorationhasnotoccurred,asthereisevidenceofrewetting,forexample,inCanada,Indonesia,andRussia(UNEP2022b;Sirin2022;BRGM2023),butratherspeakstothelackofglobaldataonpeatlandrestoration.hMurrayetal.(2022)estimatedthatagrossareaof180,000ha(95percentconfidenceintervalof0.09to0.30Mha)ofmangrovegainoccurredfrom1999to2019,only8percentofwhichcanbeattributedtodirecthumanactivities,suchasmangroverestorationorplanting.Weestimatedthemostrecentdatapointformangroverestorationbytaking8percentofthetotalmangrovegainfrom1999to2019(15,000ha).SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformation.iFollowingBoehmetal.(2021)andduetodatalimitations,theaverageannualrateofchangeacrossthemostrecentlyavailabletimeperiod(1999–2019)wasusedtoestimatethehistoricalrateofchange,ratherthanalineartrendline.Sources:HistoricaldatafromGlobalForestWatch,usingdatasetsupdatedto2022(Hansenetal.2013;Curtisetal.2018;Turubanovaetal.2018;Tyukavinaetal.2022),aswellasPotapovetal.(2022a);ConcheddaandTubiello(2020);Murrayetal.(2022);andHumpenöderetal.(2020);targetsderivedfromRoeetal.(2019,2021);Humpenöderetal.(2020);andGriscometal.(2017).ForestsandLandSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023103Protectforests,peatlands,mitigationpotentialavailableatupto$100/tCO2efromandmangrovesland-basedactivitiesacrossecosystems(Figure44)(Roeetal.2021).Protectingforests,peatlands,andmangrovescangeneratemultipleclimatebenefitsbypreventingtheNotonlycanprotectingthesethreeecosystemsdeliverreleaseoftheirlargecarbonstoresintotheatmosphererelativelyhighcost-effectivemitigationbenefitsperandbymaintainingtheirabilitytocontinuesequesteringhectare(Figure44),buttheseland-basedmeasurescarbon(IPCC2022b).Safeguardingtropicalforests,alsowillprovecriticaltonear-termclimateactioninparticular,candeliveradditionalcontributionsto(Cook-Pattonetal.2021).Together,theworld’sforests,mitigationthatextendfarbeyondcarbon,asthesepeatlands,andmangrovesholdwellover1,000GtCinecosystemssustainarangeofbiophysicalmechanisms,theirabovegroundbiomassandsoils(Panetal.2011;suchasevapotranspiration,thatcoolEarth’ssurfaceTemminketal.2022),and,byoneestimate,roughlyandnear-surfaceair(Lawrenceetal.2022).Byoneathirdorlessofthesecarbonstocks(~340GtC)areestimate,accountingforthiscoolingeffectfrombio-vulnerabletohumandisturbances,suchthattheywouldphysicalprocesseswouldincreasetheclimatebenefitsbereleasedintotheatmospherefollowingconversionofavoidingtropicaldeforestationby50percent,relativeordegradationoftheseecosystems(Noonetal.2021).tothemitigationpotentialofreducingCO2emissionsSomeoftheselossesincarboncanoccurquiterapidly,alone(Seymouretal.2022).Accordingly,virtuallyhaltingsuchaswhenlarge-scalecommodityproducerscleardeforestation,peatlanddegradation,andmangroveforestedpeatlandswithfire;iflost,muchofthiscarbonlosscancontributethelion’sshareofland-basedwouldbedifficultforecosystemstorecoverontime-mitigationneededtolimitwarmingto1.5°C.Evenwhenscalesrelevanttoreachingnet-zeroCO2emissionsbyaccountingforGHGemissionsreductions,alone,thesemidcentury,effectivelycreatingapermanentdeficitinmeasurescontributemorethanhalfofthecost-effectivetheworld’sremainingcarbonbudgetfor1.5°C(Goldsteinetal.2020;Cook-Pattonetal.2021;Noonetal.2021).MoreFIGURE44Globalcost-effectivemitigationpotentialsforland-basedmeasuresacrossforests,peatlands,mangroves,andgrasslandsfrom2020to2050MitigationdensityCost-effectivemitigationpotential(GtCO2e/yr)(tCO2e/ha)01.02.03.04.0316ReduceddeforestationPROTECT1,232ReducedpeatlanddegradationRegions1,505ReducedmangrovelossAfricaandMiddleEastRESTOREAsiaanddevelopingPacific166AfforestationandreforestationDevelopedcountriesMANAGE857PeatlandrestorationEasternEuropeand704MangroverestorationWest-CentralAsiaLatinAmericaandCaribbean29Improvedforestmanagement10GrasslandandsavannaCo-benefitsBiodiversityfiremanagementSoilLivelihoodsWaterResilienceFoodsecurityAirqualityNotes:GtCO2e/yr=gigatonnesofcarbondioxideequivalentperyear;tCO2e/ha=tonnesofcarbondioxideequivalentperhectare.FollowingRoeetal.(2021),cost-effectivemitigationpotentialincludesreductionsinGHGemissionsandenhancedcarbonsequestrationavailableatcarbonpricesofupto$100/tCO2e.Source:Roeetal.(2021).ForestsandLandSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023104BOX13Howdoweestimatedeforestation?specifically,fullyrebuildingtheselostcarbonstocksToestimatehistoricaltrendsindeforestation,couldtake6to10decadesforforests,welloveracenturyweusedacombinationoffourdatasetsformangroves,andcenturiestomillenniaforpeatlandsavailableonGlobalForestWatch:annualtree(Goldsteinetal.2020;Temminketal.2022).Butdespitecoverloss(Hansenetal.2013)updatedto2022,thissignificantrolethatprotectingtheseecosystemstreecoverlossbydominantdriver(Curtisetal.canplayinavoidingGHGemissions,collectiveefforts2018)updatedto2022,humidtropicalprimarytovirtuallyhaltdeforestationremainwellofftrack,and,forestextent(Turubanovaetal.2018),andwhileglobaldataareinsufficienttoassessprogress,annualtreecoverlossduetofire(Tyukavinaavailableevidencesuggeststhatpeatlanddegradationetal.2022)updatedto2022.Theseestimatescontinuestooccur.Worsestill,thoughmangrovelossesincludetreecoverlossthatlikelyrepresentsremainsubstantiallylowerthanthoseobservedinthedeforestation,definedasthepermanentcon-late20thcentury,theyareonceagaintickingupward,versionofforestcovertonew,nonforestlandsuchthatastep-changeinactionisneeded.uses(WRI2023e).Consequently,theyincludealltreecoverloss(Hansenetal.2013)withinFORESTSANDLANDINDICATOR1:areaswhosedominantdriver,asdefinedbyCurtisetal.(2018),wasclassifiedascommod-Deforestation(Mha/yr)ity-drivendeforestationandurbanization,aswellashumidtropicalprimaryforestloss•Targets:Theannualrateofgrossdeforestation(Turubanovaetal.2018)duetotheexpansionofshiftingagriculture.Wealsoexcludedallgloballydeclinesto1.9millionhectaresperyear(Mha/treecoverlossduetofire(Tyukavinaetal.yr)by2030andto0.31Mha/yrby2050.2022),whichislikelytobemoretemporaryinnature,57tobetterestimatetrendsinperma-Althoughtheworld’sforestsremainanetcarbonsinknentforestconversionwithouttheinterannual(Harrisetal.2021;Friedlingsteinetal.2022b),deforesta-variabilitylinkedtoextremeweatherevents.tion—driven,inlargepart,byagriculturalexpansionFinally,weremovedanyareasofoverlapwith(Curtisetal.2018;Pendrilletal.2022)—remainsthedataonmangroveloss(Murrayetal.2022)toprimarydriverofemissionsfromlanduse,landuseavoiddouble-counting.SeeBox5inBoehmetchange,andforestry(Friedlingsteinetal.2022b).Limitingal.(2022)formoreinformation.globaltemperatureriseto1.5°C,then,willrequiredramaticdeclinesinpermanentforestlossoverthenextButglobaleffortstoachievethisnear-termtargetthreedecades.Morespecifically,annualdeforestationremainwellofftrack.From2015to2022,forexample,therates,aswellasassociatedGHGemissions,needtofallworldpermanentlylostatotalof48millionhectares70percentby2030and95percentby2050,relativeto(Mha)offorests,withgrossGHGemissionsfromdefor-2018levels(Roeetal.2019),tohelpachievethisParisestationamountingto28GtCO2eoverthistimeperiodAgreementtemperaturelimit.(seeBox13forhowweestimatedeforestation)(Hansenetal.2013;Curtisetal.2018;Turubanovaetal.2018;Tyu-kavinaetal.2022;Harrisetal.2021).Andwhiletheannualrateofdeforestationdeclinedfromarecenthighof7.2Mhain2016to5.4Mhain2021,itincreasedto5.8Mhain2022(Hansenetal.2013;Curtisetal.2018;Turubanovaetal.2018;Tyukavinaetal.2022)—aslightworseningrelativetorecenttrends.GrossGHGemissionsfrompermanentforestlossalsorosemarginallyfrom3.3in2021to3.6GtCO2ein2022(Harrisetal.2021)—roughlyequivalenttoIndia’sandSouthAfrica’scombinedGHGemissionsin2020(ClimateWatch2023).ButgettingontrackforForestsandLandSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023105FIGURE45Historicalprogresstoward2030and2050targetsfordeforestationRightDirection,WellOffTrackS-CurveUnlikelyPaceneededtoMha/yrHistoricalCurrentreachtargetsdatatrend872022data5.865Accelerationrequiredtoreach2030target44x32030target1.922050target10.310201020202030204020502000Notes:Mha/yr=millionhectaresperyear.Indicatorsforforestsandlandexperiencehighinterannualvariabilityinhistoricaldataduetobothanthropogenicandnaturalcauses.Accordingly,10yearsinsteadof5yearswasusedtocalculatethelineartrendlinewherepossible.Forthisindi-cator,however,an8-yeartrendlinewascalculated,usingdatafrom2015to2022duetotemporalinconsistenciesinthedatabeforeandafter2015(WeisseandPotapov2021).Also,historicaldataforforestsandlandindicatorswereestimatedusingmapsderivedfromremotelysenseddata,andaccordingly,theycontainadegreeofuncertainty.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators(includingtheknownlimitationsofeach),anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromGlobalForestWatch,calculatedfromdatasetsupdatedto2022.DataupdatesarebasedonmethodspublishedinHansenetal.(2013);Curtisetal.(2018);Turubanovaetal.(2018);andTyukavinaetal.(2022);targetsderivedfromRoeetal.(2019).SeeJaegeretal.(2023)andBox5inBoehmetal.(2022)foradescriptionofmethodsusedtoestimatedeforestation.2030willrequireannualdeforestationratestodeclineetal.2022).Elsewhereinthetropics,however,ahandfulmuchmorerapidly—roughlyfourtimesfasteroverthisofcountrieshavesucceededinprotectingtheirforests,decade(Figure45).maintainingdeforestationratesthatfallwellbelowthoseobservedforIndonesia,Brazil,andtheDemocraticNearly97percentofdeforestationfrom2001to2022RepublicoftheCongo(Box14).occurredinthetropics(WRI2023c),andsince2015justthreecountries—Indonesia,Brazil,andtheDemocraticImportantly,thisassessmentofprogressexcludesforestRepublicoftheCongo—haveaccountedforoverhalfdegradation,whichcanreduceforests’capacitytoofalldeforestationglobally.Trendswithinthesetrop-sequesterandstorecarbon,amongotherlife-sustainingicalcountries,however,varyconsiderably.Indonesia,ecosystemservices,withoutachangeinlandcoverorforexample,haswitnessedsubstantialdecreasesinuse.Butwhiledegradationmaynotleadtothecompletepermanentforestlosses,withtheannualrateofdefor-lossofforest,itremainsasignificantsourceofGHGestationdecliningbyanaverageof6percentperyearemissions.Byoneestimate,logging,drought,edgefrom2015to2022.ButinBrazil,deforestationrateshaveeffectsfromdeforestation,andfires,together,spurredincreasedbyanaverageof10percentperyearoverthisdegradationacrossnearly40percentoftheAmazonsameperiod,reversingdeclinesobservedintheprevi-from2001to2018,withannualcarbonlossesfromthisousdecade,andsimilarly,theDemocraticRepublicofdegradationcomparabletothoseassociatedwiththeCongosawaverageratesofpermanentforestlossesdeforestationacrossthebasinduringthesameperiodrisebyanaverageof7percentperyear(Hansenetal.(Lapolaetal.2023).Consequently,preventingforest2013;Curtisetal.2018;Turubanovaetal.2018;TyukavinaForestsandLandSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023106BOX14SpotlightonGabon:ProtectinghumidtropicalprimaryforestsintheCongoBasinGabonisoneofthemostforestedcountriesintheniesnotonlytosubmit30-yearforestmanagementworld,withhumidtropicalprimaryforestsstretchingplansfortheirconcessionsbutalsotoadoptmoreacrossmorethan85percentofitsland(Hansenetsustainablepracticeswithintheseforests,includingal.2013;Turubanovaetal.2018).Theseforestsremainlow-impactharvestingtechniquesandaharvestacarbonsink,sequesteringanannualaverageofrotationperiodofatleast20yearstoenableregrowthnet66MtCO2from2001to2022(Harrisetal.2021),and(ForestTrends2021;GaboneseRepublic2021).Justsixtheyalsoprovidehabitattomanyspecies,includingyearslater,Gabonestablished13nationalparksacrossapproximatelyhalfoftheremainingforestelephant3Mha,andprotectedterrestrialareasnowcoverpopulationinAfrica(Maiselsetal.2013).Fortunately,justover20percentofthecountry’sland(GaboneseGabonhasmaintainedthelowestrateofprimaryRepublic2021).Andin2018,then-presidentAliBongoforestloss(measuredasaproportionofcountries’Ondimbaannouncedthat,by2022(lateradjustedtoprimaryforestarea)intheCongoBasin,losingatotal2025),allforestconcessionsmustbecertifiedbytheofjust0.27MhaofhumidtropicalprimaryforestfromForestStewardshipCouncil(FSC2020;Collins2022b).2002to2022(Hansenetal.2013;Turubanovaetal.Additionaleffortsfromthegovernmenttoimprove2018)(FigureB14.1).Withthishistoricallylowleveloftraceabilityacrosstimbersupplychains—forexample,primaryforestloss,Gabonisamongtheworld’s“HighbydevelopingamonitoringsystemthatreliesonbarForest,LowDeforestation”(HFLD)countries,andin2021,codestotrackindividuallogs—mayalsohelpsupportitwasthefirstAfricannationtoreceivearesults-basedconservationandreduceillegallogging(Collins2022b;paymentforreducingemissionsfromdeforestationSearcey2022;Moballa-Mbunetal.2023).andforestdegradation(REDD+),withtheinitialtrancheof$17millioncomingfromNorwayaspartofits$150CivilsocietyhasalsohelpedprotectGabon’sforests.millioncommitmenttoGabonundertheCentralNongovernmentalorganizationslikeConservationAfricanForestInitiative(Tan2021).JusticeandBrainforest,forexample,havebeenconductingindependentforestmonitoring,aswellasTheGabonesegovernmenthastakenseveralstepsinvestigatinganddocumentingillegalactivities,fortoprotectitsforests,includingtherecentadoptionofalmostadecade.Notonlyhasthisworkledtomultiplealegislativeframeworkthatdemonstratesastrongarrests,butalsosomeoftheseorganizationshavepoliticalwilltoprioritizeforestprotection(Searceyhelpedprovidelegalassistancetocommunitiessuf-2022;Tan2021).In2001,forexample,Gabonreviseditsferingfromtheharmfulimpactsoflarge-scaleforestForestCode(Law016/2001)torequireloggingcompa-exploitation(NyirendaandMbzibain2020;Valléeetal.2022).Localcommunities,too,haveledeffortstocon-FIGUREB14.1PrimaryforestlossinGabonrelativeservethecountry’sforests.GabonrecentlywitnessedthefirstcaseofacommunityinitsnortheasternregiontootherCongoBasincountriesfrom2002to2022successfullyrequestingthegovernmenttodeclassifyaloggingconcessionontheirterritory,withtheformerDemocraticRepublicoftheCongoministerofwater,forests,thesea,andtheenvironmentCameroonorderingtheloggingcompanytoleave.TheMassaha,thelocalcommunitythatrequestedthisdeclassifi-EquatorialGuineacation,hassinceformallyaskedthegovernmenttoCentralAfricanRepublicestablishaprotectedareaacrosstheconcession,RepublicofCongowhichtheywouldmanage(Evine-Binet2022).GabonButdespitethisstrongregulatoryframeworkand01234567civilsociety’sefforts,challengespersist.WhileGabonrecentlyreceiveditsfirstresults-basedREDD+pay-Percentloss(%)ment,accessingclimatefinancehasproventobeespeciallydifficultforHFLDcountries(SchweikartetNote:Primaryforestlossfrom2002to2022isexpressedastheal.2022),andGabonwillneedconsiderablymorepercentageofeachcountry’s2001primaryforestarea.financialsupporttomaintainlowdeforestationrates(RepublicofGabon2022).Relatedly,effectiveenforce-Sources:HistoricaldatafromGlobalForestWatch,usingdatasetsmentalsoremainsdifficult,and,whileillegalloggingupdatedto2022(Hansenetal.2013;Turubanovaetal.2018).hasdeclined,itcontinuestothreatenGabon’sforestsForestsandLandSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023107BOX14SpotlightonGabon:ProtectinghumidtropicalprimaryforestsintheCongoBasin(ForestTrends2021;Searcey2022).Moreover,therehaspoverty(WorldBank2023c).Assub-SaharanAfrica’sbeencriticismthatGabon’sForestCodeandstrictpro-fourth-largestoilproducer,thecountry’seconomytectionstatusofnationalparksdoesnotadequatelyreliesheavilyonthisfossilfuel.In2020,forexample,considerlocalcommunities’rightsand,insomeoilproductionaccountedforalmost40percentofcases,threatensrurallivelihoods(YoboandIto2016;Gabon’sGDPandjustover70percentofitsexportsWily2012;Pyhäläetal.2016;WRM2020).Development(WorldBank2023e).Todiversifyitseconomyandsafe-andenvironmentalprojectshavestartedtodedicateguarditfromshocks,Gabonhaspledgedtoexpandfundingtosupportforest-dependentcommunities’otherindustries,includingtimberandpalmoilpro-income,livelihoods,andwell-being.Atthe2023Oneduction,sustainably.Thegovernment,forexample,hasForestSummit,forexample,50businessleaderscom-allocateddegradedlandstoindustrialpalmoilplan-mittedtocreating10millionjobsinsustainableforesttations,establishedrulesmandatingreduced-impactmanagementtobenefitlocalcommunitiesacrossloggingpractices,andbannedrawtimberexportstothetropics,includinginGabon(GEF2022;James2021;encourageproductionofmorevaluablewoodprod-OnePlanetSummit2023).WhilethesedevelopmentsuctsinGabon(Searcey2022;Prentice2021;Tan2021).representwelcomechanges,continuedconserva-WhileitisfartoosoontoevaluatetheenvironmentaltionofGabon’sforestswillrequiremoresystematicandclimateimpactsofthisstrategy,Gabondoesofferapproachestoaddressingthesechallenges.alitmustestforsynergizingeconomicdevelopmentandforestconservation.However,followingthemilitaryBeyondthesebarrierstoimplementation,Gabon’scoupinAugust2023,itremainsunclearifthenewgov-abilitytomaintaintheselowratesofdeforestationernmentwillcontinueimplementingformerpresidentmayalsoprovechallengingastheworldtransitionsAliBongo’sforestpolicies.awayfromfossilfuels,andthegovernmenttriestoliftroughlyathirdoftheGabonesepopulationoutofNotes:GDP=grossdomesticproduct;Mha=millionhectares;MtCO2=milliontonnesofcarbondioxide;REDD+=reducingemissionsfromdeforestationandforestdegradation.degradationrepresentsanimportantland-basedmiti-lateovermillennia.Butwhentheseecosystems’watergationmeasure,despitethechallengesassociatedwithtablesfall,oxygenenterstheupperlayersofpeat,spur-definingandmonitoringsuchdegradation(WRI2023a).ringdecompositionandsubsequentlossesofstoredcarbonandnitrogen(FAO2020;UNEP2022b).TheseFORESTSANDLANDINDICATOR2:degradedpeatlandscanemitCO2andN2OfordecadestocenturiesuntilallpeatisfullylostortheirsoilsarePeatlanddegradationrewetted(Wilsonetal.2016;LeifeldandMenichetti2018;(Mha/yr)FAO2020).Drainingpeatlands,inparticular,increasestheriskofpeatfires,whichcanleadtoadditionalGHG•Targets:Theannualrateofpeatlanddegradationemissions(FAO2020;UNEP2022b).globallydeclinesto0millionhectaresperyearAnestimated57Mha—nearly12percentoftheworld’s(Mha/yr)by2030,withnoadditionaldegradationpeatlands—aredegrading,suchthattheyarenolongerfrom2030to2050.activelyformingpeat,andpeataccumulatedovercenturiestomillenniaisnowdisappearing(UNEP2022b).Coveringjust3.8percentoftheplanet’sland(UNEPWhilewidespreadlandconversion,peatextraction,and2022b),peatlands—alsoknownasmires,bogs,fens,peatlanddrainagehistoricallyoccurredacrossborealandswampforests—areglobalhotspotsforcarbonandtemperateregions,peatlanddegradationisnowsequestrationandlong-termstorage.Theseecosystemsconcentratedprimarilywithinthetropics(Leifeldetal.containatleastafifthofsoilorganiccarbonstocks2019;Fluet-Chouinardetal.2023),wheretheexpansionglobally(Yuetal.2010;Pageetal.2011;Scharlemannetal.ofbothsmall-scalefarmingandlarge-scalecommodity2014;Dargieetal.2017)andstoreanorderofmagnitudeproductionincreasinglythreatenstheseecosystemsmorecarbonperhectarethanterrestrialforests(Tem-(Dohongetal.2017;Pageetal.2022).Morespecifically,minketal.2022).58Peatlandsalsoholdlargestoresoforganicnitrogen(LeifeldandMenichetti2018;Hugeliusetal.2020),astheirwaterloggedsoilsslowdecompositionandallowcarbon-andnitrogen-richpeattoaccumu-ForestsandLandSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023108justunder5percentoftheworld’sborealpeatlandsareofthecost-effectivemitigationpotentialisconcentrateddegrading,butinthetropicsthisfigurejumpstomoreamongjustthreenations:Canada,Indonesia,andthan40percent(LeifeldandMenichetti2018).theRepublicofCongo.ButdespiterecentadvancesinmappingpeatlandswithinsomeofthesecountriesCollectively,thesedegradedpeatlandsemitabout1.9andglobally,significantdatagaps,suchasincompleteGtCO2eeachyear(LeifeldandMenichetti2018;UNEPcoverage,inconsistentquality,andoutdateddata(UNEP2022b)—roughlyequivalenttoRussia’sGHGemissions2022b),inhibiteffortstomonitorprogresstowardthisin2020(ClimateWatch2023).Thisestimate,however,target.DataestimatingtheareaoforganicsoilsdrainedexcludesGHGemissionsfrompeatfiresthat,whilehighlyforagriculture,includingcropcultivationandgrazingvariableanddifficulttomeasure,likelyoccuronan(ConcheddaandTubiello2020),provideabestavail-orderofmagnitudefrom0.5to1.0GtCO2eannually(UNEPable,thoughstillimperfect,proxy(e.g.,someorganic2022b).Absentconcertedactiontoprotectpeatlands,soilsarenotpeat).59Thesedatashowthat,worldwide,theseGHGemissionscouldrisesignificantly,withrecent1.6Mhaoforganicsoilsweredrainedforagriculturalstudiesprojectingpeatlanddegradationacrossanotheractivitiesfrom1993to2018,withanaveragerateof0.0610to12Mha—areasroughlythesizeofSouthKoreaandMha/yroverthistimeperiod(ConcheddaandTubielloMalawi,respectively—by2100inbusiness-as-usual2020).Althoughtheseproxydataareinsufficienttoscenarios(Leifeldetal.2019;Humpenöderetal.2020).assessrecentprogresstowardthisnear-termtarget,theyindicatethatdegradationoftheworld’speatlandsHaltingworldwidepeatlanddegradationby2030,then,continues(Figure46).canhelplimitglobaltemperatureriseto1.5°C(Griscometal.2017).While177countriescontainpeatlands(UNEP2022b),Roeetal.(2021)estimatethatroughly90percentFIGURE46Historicalprogresstoward2030,2035,and2050targetsforpeatlanddegradationInsufficientDataS-CurveUnlikelyMha/yrHistoricalCurrentPaceneededtodatatrendreachtargets.07Annualaverage.06from1993-20180.06.05.04.03.02.012030target2035target2050target0000200020102020203020402050Notes:Mha/yr=millionhectaresperyear.Historicaldataforforestsandlandindicatorswereestimatedusingmapsderivedfromremotelysenseddata,andaccordingly,theycontainadegreeofuncertainty.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators(includingtheknownlimitationsofeach),anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromConcheddaandTubiello(2020);targetsderivedfromGriscometal.(2017).ForestsandLandSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023109Theseproxydata,however,mayunderestimatepeatFORESTSANDLANDINDICATOR3:degradationforseveralreasons.Thedatafocusondrainageoforganicsoilssolelyforagriculturalactivities,Mangroveloss(ha/yr)andalthoughagricultureremainsaprimarydriverofpeatlanddegradationglobally,othercausesofdegra-•Target:Theannualrateofgrossmangrovelossdation—includingroadandinfrastructuredevelopment,forestry,oilsandsmining,andpeatextraction,amonggloballydeclinesto4,900hectaresperyearothers—arenotincludedintheestimates(Conchedda(ha/yr)by2030.60andTubiello2020;UNEP2022b).Moreover,thethresh-oldofpeatdepthusedtodefinepeatlandsvariesbyStretchingacrossnearly15Mhaofshorelinegloballycountry.Innationswherethisthresholdislowerthan(Buntingetal.2022),mangroveforestsareamongthethedepthoforganicmaterialusedtodefineorganicworld’smostcarbon-denseecosystems(Alongi2014;soilinConcheddaandTubiello(2020),peatlanddeg-SpaldingandLeal2021),holdingatleasttwiceasmuchradationmaynotbeincludedintheseestimatesofcarbonperhectareasboreal,temperate,andtropicaldrainedorganicsoils.Asaresult,theglobalextentofforests(Goldsteinetal.2020;Temminketal.2022).61organicsoilsissignificantlylowerthanthemostrecentGlobally,mangrovesforestsstoreapproximately6.2toestimatesforpeatlandarea(Xuetal.2018;UNEP2022b),15.2GtC,withover80percentofthiscarboncontainedinandestimatesoftheareaoforganicsoilsdrainedfortheirsoils(Goldsteinetal.2020;LealandSpalding2022;agriculturalactivities(25Mha)aresubstantiallylowerTemminketal.2022).62Accumulationofcarboninthesethanthemostrecentestimateoftheglobalareaofcoastalwetlandsoilsoccursgraduallyoverhundredstodegradedpeatland(57Mha)(ConcheddaandTubiellothousandsofyears,asmangroverootstrapsuspended2020;UNEP2022b).organicmatterduringtidalfloodingandasdeadbio-massslowlydecomposesintheirwaterloggedsoils(LealandSpalding2022).Duetotheseecosystems’carbonFIGURE47Historicalprogresstoward2030targetformangrovelossWrongDirection,U-turnNeededS-CurveUnlikelyPaceneededtoha/yrHistoricalCurrentreachtargetsdatatrend45,50040,00035,00032,00030,00025,000Annualaveragefrom2017-1920,0002030target15,00010,0004,9005,0000201020202030204020502000Notes:ha/yr=hectaresperyear.Indicatorsforforestsandlandexperiencehighinterannualvariabilityinhistoricaldataduetobothanthropo-genicandnaturalcauses.Accordingly,10yearsinsteadof5yearswasusedtocalculatethelineartrendlinewherepossible.Forthisindicator,however,a12-yeartrendlinewascalculated,usingdatafrom2008to2019toaccountforthefullrangeofyearsincludedinfour3-yearepochsfromMurrayetal.(2022).Toestimatetheaverageannuallossratefrom2008to2019,grosslosswasdividedbythenumberofyearsineachepoch.Also,historicaldataforforestsandlandindicatorswereestimatedusingmapsderivedfromremotelysenseddata,and,accordingly,theycontainadegreeofuncertainty.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators(includingtheknownlimitationsofeach),anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromMurrayetal.(2022);2030targetderivedfromRoeetal.(2021).ForestsandLandSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023110density,thelossofevenasmallareaofmangroves,par-Restoreforests,peatlands,ticularlywhentheirsoilsaredisturbedordredged,canandmangrovesreleaseanoutsizedamountofGHGemissions,relativetootherecosystems.Limitingglobalwarmingto1.5°Cwillalsorequirelarge-scalerestorationofhigh-carbonecosystems(RoeetAlthoughaverageannualratesofglobalgrossman-al.2019).Reestablishingforests,peatlands,andman-grovelosshavesloweddramaticallysincethelate20thgroves,specifically,candeliveralmost30percentofcentury(Friessetal.2019),theyappeartoonceagainthecost-effectivemitigationpotentialfromland-basedbetickingupward.63From1999to2019,forexample,measuresacrossecosystems(Figure44)(Roeetal.2021).theworldlostanestimated560,000hectares(ha)ofAppropriatelyimplementedrestorationcancomple-mangroveforests,64withgrosslossesofthesecoastalment,butnotreplace,effortstoprotecttheworld’swetlandsincreasingbyanaverageofnearly950remainingforests,peatlands,andmangroves.65Notonlyhectaresperyear(ha/yr)since2008(Murrayetal.2022).isrecoveringtheseecosystemsoftenmorecostlythanAccordingly,globaleffortstovirtuallyhaltconversionsafeguardingthem,butitmayalsotakedecades(ifnotofmangroveforestshavefallenshort,suchthatrecentlonger)fortheseecosystemstoregainspeciesdiversity,ratesofchangeareheadinginthewrongdirectionecosystemstructure,andecologicalfunctions,allofentirely,andasharpreversalinactionisneededtowhichmayimpactcarboncyclingandGHGfluxeswithinreducetheselossestonomorethan4,900ha/yrby2030theseecosystems(Sasmitoetal.2019;Poorteretal.2021;tohelplimitwarmingto1.5°C(Figure47)(Roeetal.2021).Kreylingetal.2021;Suetal.2021;Cook-Pattonetal.2021;LoiselandGallego-Sala2022).Reforestation,aswellAsiahasexperiencedthelargestmangrovelossesoveraspeatlandandmangroverestoration,then,cannotthepastfewdecades(Buntingetal.2022;Murrayetal.cancelouttheimpactsoflosingtheseecosystems—they2022).Hometoroughly20percentoftheworld’sman-donotofferaone-to-onetrade.groveforests(Buntingetal.2022),IndonesialostmoreofthesecoastalwetlandsthananyothercountrybetweenFORESTSANDLANDINDICATOR4:1999and2019,accountingforroughlyathirdofman-grovelossesglobally(Murrayetal.2022).However,thereReforestation(totalMha)aresomesignsofprogressacrossthisSoutheastAsiannation.Annualratesofmangroveloss,forexample,•Targets:Reforestationoccursacrossatotalof300declinedfromanaverageofapproximately15,000ha/yrfrom2014to2016toanaverageof10,000ha/yrfrommillionhectares(Mha)between2020and2050,2017to2019.Still,thesemostrecentratesoflossremainreaching100Mhaby2030and150Mhaby2035.66wellabovethosefrom2005to2013,indicatingtheneedformorerapiddeclines(Murrayetal.2022).MyanmarAllmodeledpathwayslimitingglobaltemperatureandBrazilhavealsoexperiencedrelativelyhighratesriseto1.5°Cwithnoorlimitedovershootrelyoncar-ofmangroveloss;togetherwithIndonesia,thesethreebonremoval,andreforestationrepresentsarelativelycountriesaccountedforapproximatelyhalfofglobalcost-effective,readilyavailableapproachthat,whenmangrovelossesfrom1999to2019(Murrayetal.2022).Theseestimatesofmangrovelossincludethosedirectlyattributabletohumanactivities,suchasconversiontoaquacultureponds,ricepaddies,orpalmoilplan-tations,aswellasthoseduetoindirectanthropogeniccauseslikesealevelriseandmorenaturalprocesseslikecoastalerosionortropicalstorms(Murrayetal.2022).Globally,lossesstemmingfromthelatteraccount50percentofmangrovelosses,thoughthissharecanvarysignificantlybyregion.InAsia,forexample,man-grovelossesthataredirectlyattributabletohumanactivitiesaccountfor75percentoflosses(Murrayetal.2022).Ongoingchanges,includinglosses,then,canbeexpectedduetotheseecosystems’dynamicnature,andwhenconsideringbothlossesandgains—orthenetchangeinmangroveextent—globalestimatesindicatethattheannualrateofnetlosseshasdecreasedoverthepasttwodecades(Buntingetal.2022).ForestsandLandSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023111implementedappropriately(i.e.,byfocusingonrecov-100Mhaby2030(Roeetal.2021),however,willrequireaeringforests’ecologicalfunctions,ratherthansolelyon1.5-foldaccelerationintheaverageannualrateoftreereestablishingtrees),cangenerateadditionalbenefitstocovergainfrom2000to2020(6.5Mha/yr)(Figure48).adaptation,sustainabledevelopment,andbiodiversity(Figure44)(IPCC2022b).Yetdatalimitationsposesig-Althoughglobalprogressmadetowardthisnear-nificantchallengestomonitoringreforestationglobally,term,1.5°C-alignedtargetremainsofftrack,somewithremotelysenseddataonthegrossareaoftreecountrieshavereestablishedtreecoveratorabovecovergainofferingabestavailableproxy.67However,thepacerequiredtofulfilltheirnationalcontributionsthesedatamayincludetreecovergainsthat,althoughtoreforesting100Mhagloballyby2030.68Forexample,potentiallybeneficialtoclimatemitigation,donotmeetshouldRussia,theUnitedStates,andChina—countriescommondefinitionsofreforestationandwouldnotthatcollectivelyaccountforjustover15percentoftheconstituteprogresstowardthese2030and2050targets,cost-effectivemitigationpotentialforreforestationsuchasafforestationacrosshistoricallynonforestedestimatedbyRoeetal.(2021)—sustaintheirrecentrateslandsorregrowthafterharvestingwithinalreadyestab-oftreecovergainwithinhistoricallyforestedareaslishedplantations(WRI2023b).Also,increasesintreeandoutsideofcurrenttreeplantations,theywould,coveroccurgraduallyastheseplantsgrowand,there-together,increasetheirforestcoverbynearly30Mhabyfore,aremorechallengingtoreliablyestimateusing2030(Potapovetal.2022a).Another50countrieshavesatelliteremotesensingmethodsonshorttimescales.witnessedtreecovergainratesthat,ifmaintainedoverStill,historicalcumulativedatasuggestthat,worldwide,thisdecade,wouldalsoputthemontracktofulfilltheiratotalof130Mhaexperiencedtreecovergainfrom2000nationalcontributionstothisglobalreforestationtargetto2020(Potapovetal.2022a).Reforestinganadditional(Roeetal.2019,2021;Potapovetal.2022a).Thesegains,FIGURE48Historicalprogresstoward2030,2035,and2050targetsforreforestationRightDirection,OffTrackS-CurveUnlikelytotalMhaCumulativeCurrentCumulativefuturedataandhistoricaldatatrendpaceneededtoreachtargets500400Accelerationrequiredtoreach2050target3002030target3001.5xTotalgainfrom2035targetNEEDEDPACEFORTARGET1502002000-20202030target130NEEDEDPACE100NEEDEDPACEFORTARGETFORTARGET100HISTORICALDATA02020-20302020-20352020-20502000–2020Notes:Mha=millionhectares.Reforestationtargetsareadditionaltoanyreforestationthatoccurredpriorto2020,andthesetargetsarecumu-lativefrom2020to2050.FollowingBoehmetal.(2021)andduetodatalimitations,theaverageannualrateofchangeacrossthemostrecentlyavailabletimeperiod(2000–2020)wasusedtoestimatethehistoricalrateofchange,ratherthanalineartrendline.Also,historicaldataforforestsandlandindicatorswereestimatedusingmapsderivedfromremotelysenseddata,andaccordingly,theycontainadegreeofuncertainty.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators(includingtheknownlimitationsofeach),anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromPotapovetal.(2022a);2030and2050targetsadaptedfromRoeetal.(2021).ForestsandLandSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023112however,wouldtotaljust7Mhaand,therefore,wouldnotimmediateandcontinueuntilthesoilisrewetteddeliversmallerclimatebenefitsrelativetoRussia,theorallpeatislost(FAO2020;Temminketal.2022).TheUnitedStates,andChina.efficacyofrestoringpeatlandstoavoidtheseGHGemissions,however,willdepend,inpart,onwhatformFORESTSANDLANDINDICATOR5:ofdegradationthesewetlandecosystemsexperienced(e.g.,drainage,burning,orcutting).RewettingpeatlandsPeatlandrestoration(totaldrainedbyagriculture,forexample,cansignificantlyMha)reduceorevenhaltcarbonlosses,aswellasenablecarbonsequestration(Güntheretal.2020;Mrotzeketal.•Targets:Peatlandrestorationoccursacrossatotalof2020;Darusmanetal.2023).70Becausedrainedpeat-landswillemitCO2andN2Ofordecadestocenturies,20–29millionhectares(Mha)ofdegradedpeatlandsrestoringtheseecosystems’watertablesshouldoccurbetween2020and2050,reaching15Mhaby2030.69asquicklyaspossibletomaximizeavoidedGHGemis-sions(Güntheretal.2020;Temminketal.2022).PeatlandEvenifpeatlanddegradationendedtoday,degradedrewettingcanalsolowertheriskofpeatfires(FAO2020),peatlandscouldcontinueemittingroughly1.9GtCO2ewithonestudyestimatingthat,byrestoring2.5Mhaofperyearfordecadestocenturies(LeifeldandMenichettipeatlands,Indonesiacouldreducefireriskbyupto302018;UNEP2022b)because,unlikeforests,peatlandspercent(Tanetal.2022).storecarbonprimarilywithintheirwaterloggedsoilsratherthaninabovegroundvegetation.Carbonandnitrogenlossesfollowingland-usechanges,then,areFIGURE49Historicalprogresstoward2030and2050targetsforpeatlandrestorationInsufficientDataS-CurveUnlikelytotalMhaHistoricalCumulativefuturedataanddatapaceneededtoreachtargets352050target3020-2925202030target1515NEEDEDPACEFORTARGET10NEEDEDPACEDataasofFORTARGET520150020152020–20302020–2050Notes:Mha=millionhectares.Peatlandrestorationtargetsareadditionaltoanyrestorationthatoccurredpriorto2020,andthesetargetsarecumulativefrom2020to2050.PeatlandrestorationtargetswereadaptedfromHumpenöderetal.(2020)andRoeetal.(2021),whoassumethat0Mhaofpeatlandsgloballywererewettedasof2015.Thisassumption,however,doesnotsuggestthatpeatlandrestorationisnotoccurring,asthereisevidenceofrewetting,forexample,inCanada,Indonesia,andRussia(UNEP2022b;Sirin2022;BRGM2023),butratherspeakstothelackofglobaldataonpeatlandrestoration.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators(includingtheknownlimitationsofeach),anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromHumpenöderetal.(2020);targetsadaptedfromHumpenöderetal.(2020)andRoeetal.(2021),usingrecentestimatesofdegradedpeatlandsfromUNEP(2022b).ForestsandLandSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023113Restoring15Mhaofpeatland—morethanaquarterofallwatersheds,suchasincreasedsedimentation,orexac-degradedpeatlandsworldwide—by2030,then,canhelperbatedbyclimatechangeimpacts,suchasincreasinglimitingwarmingto1.5°C(Humpenöderetal.2020;Roetemperaturesandsealevelrise(Murrayetal.2022;etal.2021;UNEP2022b).AlthoughdataareinsufficientBuntingetal.2022;SpaldingandLeal2021).toassessprogresstowardthisglobaltarget(Figure49),availableevidencesuggeststhatcurrenteffortsStill,availableglobalestimatesindicatethattheworldtorestorepeatlandsareoccurring,butlikelynotatthegainedapproximately180,000hectaresofmangrovepaceandscalerequired(Stracketal.2022;UNEP2022b).forestsfrom1999to2019(Murrayetal.2022).73AsmallFrom2010to2013,forexample,theRussiangovern-percentage—8percentor15,000hectares—ofthismentimplementedoneofthelargest-scalepeatlandgrossgainareacanbeattributedtodirecthumanrewettingprojectsintheNorthernHemisphereacrossinterventions,suchasmangroveplantingorrestorationmorethan73,000hectaresnearMoscow(Sirin2022);activities,andalloccurredinAsiaandAfrica(Murrayetduringtheearly2000s,Germanyrewettedmorethanal.2022).Thevastmajorityofincreasesareinsteaddue20,000hectaresofpeatlandsinoneofitsnortheasterntoindirectdrivers,suchasthecolonizationofnewsedi-states(Zerbeetal.2013).Whilebothinitiativesrepresentmentsorinlandmigration(Murrayetal.2022).Althoughstepsforward,theserestoredareasaccountforasmallmangrovegainduetodirecthumaninterventionsdoesfractionofthedegradedpeatlandswithinRussiaandnotindicatewhetherestablishmentofthesemangrovesGermany(UNEP2022b).Indonesia,incontrast,hasmaderestoredtheecologicalfunctionoftheseecosystems,morerecentandsignificantprogressinrestoringitsitdoesprovidethebestavailableproxyformangrovedegradedpeatlands,withthegovernmentreportingrestoration.Thesedataindicatethatglobaleffortstothatitrestoredjustover300,000hectaresin2021andrestore240,000hectaresofmangroveforestsby2030morethan240,000hectaresin2022(BRGM2021,2023).remainwellofftrackandwillrequiregreaterthanaShouldIndonesiacontinuerestoringdegradedpeat-10-foldincreaseintheaverageannualrateofdirectlandsatthisrate,itwouldrestoremorethan2.4Mhamangrovegains(750ha/yrfrom1999to2019)(Figure50).by2030and,therefore,fulfillitsnationalcontributiontorestoring15Mhapeatlandgloballybytheendofthisdecade(Humpenöderetal.2020;Roeetal.2021).71FORESTSANDLANDINDICATOR6:Mangroverestoration(totalha)•Target:Mangroverestorationoccursacrossatotalof240,000hectaresby2030.72RestoringmangroveforestsnotonlyenhancestheirabilitytosequesterandstorecarbonbutmayalsoreduceGHGemissionsthatwouldhaveotherwisecontinuedfordecadesaftercertaindisturbances,suchasthelossofsoilorganiccarbonfollowingdrainageforaquacultureponds(Temminketal.2022).Monitoringmangroverestoration,however,remainschallenging.Aswithforests,mangrovesgrowgradually,andthere-forerestorationmaybemorechallengingtomonitoronshortertimescales,asgainmaynotbedetecteduntilmangrovetreesreachacertainlevelofmaturity.Moreover,theestablishmentofmangrovetreesdoesnotalwaysindicaterestorationoftheecologicalfunctionsoftheseecosystems,andinsomecases,thisadditionofmangrovescanleadtonegativeconsequences(e.g.,thelossofothercoastalecosystems)orshort-livedgainsiftree-plantingisnotimplementedappropriately(Leeetal.2019).Additionally,thesecoastalwetlandsarenaturallydynamicecosystems,withchangesalsooccurringduetolarge-scaleprocessesthatcanbeinfluencedindirectlybyhumanactivitiesinadjacentForestsandLandSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023114FIGURE50Historicalprogresstoward2030targetformangroverestorationRightDirection,WellOffTrackS-CurveUnlikelytotalhaCumulativeCumulativefuturedataandhistoricaldatapaceneededtoreachtargets300,000250,000Acceleration2030target200,000requiredtoreach150,000240,000100,0002030targetNEEDEDPACE50,000>10xFORTARGETTotaldirectgainfrom1999-201915,00001999-20192020-2030Notes:ha=hectares.Mangroverestorationtargetsareadditionaltoanyrestorationthatoccurredpriorto2020.Murrayetal.(2022)estimatedthatagrossareaof180,000ha(95percentconfidenceintervalof0.09to0.30Mha)ofmangrovegainoccurredfrom1999to2019,only8percentofwhichhasbeenattributedtodirecthumanactivities,suchasmangroveplantingandrestoration.Weestimatedthemostrecentdatapointformangroverestorationbytaking8percentofthetotalgrossmangroveareagainedfrom1999to2019(15,000ha).FollowingBoehmetal.(2021)andduetodatalimitations,theaverageannualrateofchangeacrossthemostrecentlyavailabletimeperiod(1999–2019)wasusedtoestimatethehistoricalrateofchange,ratherthanalineartrendline.Also,historicaldataforforestsandlandindicatorswereestimatedusingmapsderivedfromremotelysenseddataandaccordinglycontainadegreeofuncertainty.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselect-ingtargets,indicators(includingtheknownlimitationsofeach),anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromMurrayetal.(2022);2030targetfromRoeetal.(2021).Notethatthistargetisconservativeasitexcludesmangroveforestslostbefore1996,andpreviousstudiessuggestthatmangrovelossesinthe1980sand1990sweresignificant(Friessetal.2019),somuchsothat,byoneestimate,theworldmayhavelostasmuchas35percentofmangroveforestsgloballyduringthesetwodecades(Valielaetal.2001).Thistarget,therefore,likelyrepresentstheareaofmangrovesthat,ataminimum,needstoberestoredtoachieveclimatemitigationgoals.Thosedesignedtobuildresiliencewouldlikelycallformoreambitiousmangroverestoration(LealandSpalding2022),suchasthenearly410,000hatargetsetundertheMangroveBreakthrough(GlobalMangroveAllianceandHigh-LevelChampions2023).SustainablymanageforestsGriscometal.2020).Countriesintemperateandborealandgrasslandsregions,whereforestryactivitiesdrivethemajorityoftreecoverlosses(Curtisetal.2018),canmakeapartic-ImprovingecosystemmanagementcanalsohelpularlyimportantcontributiontomitigationbyimprovingreduceGHGemissionsandenhancecarbonsequestra-forestmanagement(Roeetal.2021).Ingrasslands,thesetion,thoughmanagementpracticesthatoptimizethesepracticesmayfocusonimprovingfiremanagement,mitigationbenefitswillvarybyecosystemandlocationforexample,byprescribingearlydryseasonburns(IPCC2019,2022b).Formanagednaturalorplantedthatcanhelpminimizemoreextensiveandsevereforests,suchpracticesgenerallyincludeimplementingfireslaterinthedryseason(Lipsett-Mooreetal.2018;reduced-impactlogging(e.g.,narrowerroadstohaulGriscometal.2020).timberandfellingstrategiesthatminimizewasteandavoiddamagetonearbytrees),extendingharvestCollectively,suchmanagementpracticesaccountforrotationstoincreasetheageatwhichtreesarefelled,justunder15percentofthecost-effectivemitigationandsettingasideareasprotectedfromloggingtohelppotentialassociatedwiththeseland-basedmeasuresconservebiodiversity(Ellisetal.2019;Austinetal.2020;acrossecosystems(Figure44)(Roeetal.2021).AndwhiletheirglobalcontributiontomitigationissmallrelativetoForestsandLandSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023115protectingandrestoringhigh-carbonecosystems,suchPartiestotheConventiononBiologicalDiversityadoptedactivitiesmayprovelesschallengingtoimplement,astheKunming-MontrealGlobalBiodiversityFramework,theyoftenentailfewerchangesinlanduseorinexistingwhichcommitssignatoriesbothtoprotectingatleastoperationalsystems(Ellisetal.2019;Cook-Pattonet30percentoftheplanetandtorestoringanother30al.2021).Butdespiterecentadvancesinmappingthepercentofdegradedecosystemsby2030(CBD2022a).spatialdistributionofforestmanagementglobally(LesivThoughthesenewpledgesreflectsustainedpoliticaletal.2022),detailedinformationonforestmanagementfocusonprotecting,restoring,andsustainablymanag-practicesataglobalscaleisnotavailable.Similarly,noingecosystems,theydonotguaranteeaction.Previoussuchdataexistsforgrasslands,thoughglobalmappingeffortstofollowthroughonsimilarcommitmentsandmonitoringeffortsareunderway.Duetothesedatahaveoftenfallenshort,withgovernments,companies,limitations,thisassessmentofglobalprogressexcludesandfinancialinstitutionscollectivelymissinginterimtargetsandindicatorsforimprovedmanagementofgoalsundertheBonnChallengeandtheNewYorkforestsandgrasslandsfromRoeetal.(2021).74DeclarationonForests(IUCN2020;NYDFAssessmentPartners2019,2022a).RecentdevelopmentsacrossforestsandlandAchievingthesemultilateralcommitmentswillrequireallcountriestostrengthentheirconservationWhileglobalprogressmadeinacceleratingland-policies.Toavoidadditionallosses,countriescanbasedmitigationmeasuresacrossforests,peatlands,consider,forexample,placingmoratoriaonconver-andmangrovescontinuestofallwoefullyshortofthesion,establishingandexpandingprotectedareas,75changesrequiredtohelplimitwarmingto1.5°C,mul-financiallyincentivizingconservation(e.g.,throughtilateralcommitmentstoconservetheseecosystemspayment-for-ecosystem-servicesschemes),encour-abound.AtCOP26,forexample,morethan140nationsagingcommunityforestmanagement,andlegallysignedtheGlasgowLeaders’DeclarationonForestsrecognizingIndigenousPeoples’landrights(Box15),andLandUse,agreeingtohaltandreverseforestlossamongothermeasures(Chaturvedietal.2019;NYDFandlanddegradationwithinthenextdecade(PrimeAssessmentPartners2021;Wolfetal.2021;IPCC2022b).Minister’sOffice2021a),andinDecember2022,nearly190Similarly,restorationeffortscanbenefitfromarangeofsupportivepolicies,fromincreasingpublicfinancefortheseprojects(e.g.,byintegratingrestorationcostsintoBOX15SecuringIndigenousPeoplesandlocalcommunities’landrightsunderpinseffectiveland-basedmitigationStrengtheningIndigenousPeoples’tenuresecuritypercentofthisland.Whilethetotalareaoflandlegallyoffersonehighlyeffective,relativelylow-coststrategydesignatedforandownedbythesegroupsincreasedtoprotecttheworld’sremainingintactforests(Stevensbyjustover100Mhafrom2015to2020,nearly1,400etal.2014;Dingetal.2016),atleast36percentofwhichMha—anarearoughlythesizeofAntarctica—hasnotstretchacrossthesecommunities’territories(Faetal.yetbeenrecognizedundernationallawsandregula-2020).Severalstudiesfindthat,inthetropics,defor-tions(RRI2023).estationacrossIndigenouslandsissignificantlylowerthaninnearbyforests,and,insomecases,compara-Clarifying,strengthening,andupholdinglandrightsbletoorlessthanlosseswithinstrictlyprotectedareasalsoplaysanessentialroleinenablingrestoration.(Nolteetal.2013;Schleicheretal.2017;Walkeretal.Communitiesneedassurancesthattheywillaccrue2020;Szeetal.2022).IntheAmazonbasin,forexample,thebenefitsofreestablishingtrees,rewettingpeat-forestsmanagedbyIndigenousPeoplesremovedlands,orrestoringmangroves.Withoutrightstoanet340MtCO2peryearfrom2001to2021,whilerestoredlands,theymayhavelittleincentivetodevoteforestsoutsideIndigenouslandswerecollectivelyatheirtime,labor,andresourcestosuchprojectsnetcarbonsourceduetosubstantiallossesinforest(Gregersenetal.2011;Hansonetal.2015;Barrowetal.cover(Veitetal.2023)(FigureB15.1).Yetananalysisof2016;Chazdonetal.2017;Djenontinetal.2018;Evanslegalframeworksinmorethan70countriescovering2018;Legesseetal.2018;LovelockandBrown2019;85percentofEarth’slandfindsthat,despiteholdingWainainaetal.2021;IPCC2022b).Yettenureinsecurityandusingatleasthalfoftheworld’sland,Indigenousremainsstubbornlyhigh.Nearly1billionpeoplebelievePeoplesandlocalcommunitieslegallyownjust11theycouldlosepartoftheirlandortherighttouseitForestsandLandSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023116BOX15SecuringIndigenousPeoplesandlocalcommunities’landrightsunderpinseffectiveland-basedmitigationFIGUREB15.1AnnualaverageCO2fluxinsideandoutsidetailoredtolocalcontexts;avoidexacerbatingIndigenouslandsacrossnineAmazoniancountriesinequalities(e.g.,byprovidingalternativelivelihoodsfrom2001to2021whereneeded);anddeliverimportantbenefitstocommunities(e.g.,improvinghealthoutcomesorMtCO2/yrAnnualgrossCO2emissionsprotectingculturallysignificantsites).Theseprocesses,1400AnnualgrossCO2removalsinturn,canboostlocalsupportforrestorationandwillingnesstocareforecosystemsafterprojectsend1200(Hansonetal.2015;Lazos-Chaveroetal.2016;Wylie1000etal.2016;LovelockandBrown2019;DiSaccoetal.2021;Indrajayaetal.2022;Phametal.2022).Inthelate8001970s,forexample,theNepalesegovernmentbegandevolvingforestmanagementtolocalcommunities600and,in1993,passedlegislationthatlegallyrecognizedcommunityforestusergroupsasindependent,400self-governinginstitutionsresponsibleforprotectingNetsourceandmanagingnationalforestlands.Indoingso,thegovernmentgrantedthesegroupsrights(i.e.,access,200use,exclusion,andmanagement)totheselands,enablinglocalcommunitiesnotonlytomakedecisions0abouttheseforestsbutalsotobenefitfromthem.Thesecommunityforestusergroupsnowmanageover-200Netsink1.2MhaofforestedlandsacrossNepal(Buckingham-400andEllersick2015);insomeareas,communityforestryprogramsrestoredforestsatanaveragerateof2-600percentperyearfrom1990to2010(Niraulaetal.2013).-800Indigenousandlocalcommunitiesarenotmonoliths,however,anddecision-makingprocessesshould-1000accountforexistinginequitiesbetweenandwithinthem.Women,forinstance,oftenencounterobstacles-1200toinfluencinglandgovernancethatrangefromgendereddivisionsoflaborthatassignmuchoftheForestsinsideForestsoutsideunpaid,caregivingresponsibilitiestothem,therebyIndigenouslandsIndigenouslandslimitingthetimetheycandevotetodecision-makingprocesses,toculturalnormsthateitherexcludeNote:CO2=carbondioxide;MtCO2/yr=milliontonnesofcarbonwomenfromtheseforumsentirelyorlimittheirdioxideperyear.activeparticipation(Salcedo-LaViñaandGiovarelli2021).Similarly,inNepal,socialnormsacrosssomeSources:Veitetal.(2023).communityforestusergroupsfavoredlocalelitesindecision-makingprocessesandexcludedthosefromwithinfiveyears(Feyertagetal.2020),withperceivedlow-incomehouseholdsorhistoricallymarginalizedtenureinsecurityabovetheglobalaverageincoun-castes,effectivelylimitingtheirabilitytoinfluence,astriesaccountingforjustoverhalfofthecost-effectivewellasbenefitfrom,forestrestoration(Buckinghammitigationpotentialforrestoration(Roeetal.2021;andEllersick2015).Feyertagetal.2020).MeaningfullyengagingIndigenousPeoplesandlocalcommunitiesasfullpartnersinthedesign,implementation,andmonitoringofrestorationalsounderpinssuccessfulprojects(Höhletal.2020).Donewell,inclusive,participatorydecision-makingprocessesenablecommunitieslivingwithinornearbyhigh-carbonecosystemstodeterminerestorationprojects’goals,ensuringthattheyareappropriatelyNotes:Mha=millionhectares;MtCO2=milliontonnesofcarbondioxide.ForestsandLandSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023117FIGURE51Globaldistributionofcost-effectivemitigationpotentialforforests,peatlands,mangroves,andgrasslandsbycountryTotalcost-effectivemitigationpotential(GtCO2e/yr)00.050.10.51Notes:GtCO2e/yr=gigatonnesofcarbondioxideequivalentperyear.Following(Roeetal.2021),cost-effectivemitigationpotentialincludesreductionsinGHGemissionsandenhancedcarbonsequestrationavailableatacarbonpriceofupto$100/tCO2e.Source:Roeetal.(2021).thebudgetsofwell-fundedministriesorissuinggreenortoalleviatepovertyandencouragesustainablelandbluebonds)andde-riskingprivatesectorinvestmentsinmanagement(Budimanetal.2021;Mursyidetal.2021;restoration(e.g.,first-losscapitalstructures)tosecur-WRI2023d).Together,theseactionshavecontributedtoinglandtenureandimplementingcomplementary,significantreductionsinprimaryforestloss,aswellasland-sparingstrategies(e.g.,thosethatsustainablytherestorationofover33,000hectaresofmangrovesboostagriculturalyieldstohelprelievecompetingin2021andmorethan240,000hectaresofpeatlandspressuresonecosystemsandfreefarmlandforresto-in2022(BRGM2022,2023;Weisseetal.2023).Followingration)(Hansonetal.2015;Dingetal.2017;Chaturvedietthissuccessinreducingdeforestation,Norwayandal.2019;LöfqvistandGhazoul2019;IPCC2022b).RecentIndonesiaannouncedaREDD+dealaheadofCOP27—aeffortstoadoptandimplementthesepolicies,however,breakthroughafterIndonesiaendedtheirinitialREDD+remainuneven.ThisisespeciallytrueacrossBrazil,theagreementin2021,citinga“lackofconcreteprogress”DemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,andIndonesia—threecountriesthat,together,candelivernearly40percentofcost-effectivemitigationpotentialassociatedwithland-basedmitigationmeasuresacrossecosystems(Figure51)(Roeetal.2021).Followingdevastatingfiresin2015,Indonesiahasadoptedseveralpoliciestoconserveitshigh-carbonecosystems.Theseeffortsincludedstrengtheningregulationstolimitpeatlanddrainageacrosscommer-cialplantations,issuingamoratoriumonnewpalmoilconcessions(thoughthisexpiredinSeptember2021),andmakingpermanentanothernationwidemoratoriumonnewconcessionsinprimaryforestsandpeatlands(Budimanetal.2021;NYDFAssessmentPartners2021;WRI2023d;MuntheandUngku2021).Thegovernmentalsoestablishedanagencydedicatedtorestoringpeat-landsandmangroves,aswellaspassedsocialreformsForestsandLandSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023118inreceivingpaymentsforresultsachievedin2016andtryofIndigenousPeoples,signingadecreetorejuvenate2017(NYDFAssessmentPartners2021).UnderthisnewtheAmazonFund,revokingalawthatallowedminingdeal,Norwayagreedtopay$56millionforverifiedinprotectedareasandonIndigenousPeoples’lands,GHGemissionsreductionsfrom2016to2017,aswellasandlaunchinganti-deforestationraids(MaisonnaveissuesubsequentpaymentsunderIndonesia’sexistingandJeantet2023;Spring2023).Healsorecentlyunveiledmeasurement,reporting,andverificationprotocol(Jonganewphaseofthe“ActionPlanforthePreventionand2022).In2022,IndonesiaalsoreceiveditsfirstREDD+ControlofDeforestationintheAmazon,”whichsetsoutpaymentofroughly$21millionfromtheWorldBank’safour-yearroadmapforhaltingillegaldeforestationForestCarbonPartnershipfacilityforreducingdefor-by2030,andannouncedthathisgovernmentwouldestation,forestdegradation,andrelatedGHGemissionsupdateBrazil’sNDCinlinewithpreviouspledgestointheEastKalimantanprovince(WorldBank2022b).reduceGHGemissions43percentby2030(AssociatedSustainingthesesuccessesoverthecomingdecadesPress2023).Together,thesemeasuresrepresentprom-willprovecriticaltodeliveringtheland-basedmitigationisingsignalsofchange—already,preliminarysatelliteneededtohelplimitwarmingto1.5°C.datafromBrazil’snationalspaceagencyindicatethatdeforestationfellbyover30percentduringPresidentInBrazil,theelectionofPresidentLuizInácioLuladaSilvaLula’sfirstsixmonthsinoffice(Maisonnave2023).signalsadramaticshiftineffortstoprotecttheAmazon,whichexperienceda15-yearhighinclear-cutdefor-ButintheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo(DRC),theestationunderthepreviousadministration(Roy2022).government’srecenteffortstoconservehigh-carbonCelebratedforapoliticaltrackrecordthatcontributedecosystemshavebeenmixed.InJuly2022,justmonthstoa70percentdeclineindeforestationbetween2005beforePresidentFélixAntoineTshisekedisignedintolawand2013(Nepstadetal.2014),PresidentLulapledgedtoahistoricbillrecognizingIndigenousPeoples’customaryhaltillegaldeforestation,land-grabbingandotherenvi-forestandlandrights(Gauthier2022;RRIandDGPAronmentalcrimesacrosstheAmazon,aswellasprotect2022),theDRCplacedoilandgasblocksacrossthetherightsofIndigenousPeoplesandlocalcommunitiescountry’shumidtropicalprimaryforestsandpeatlands(FundaçãoPerseuAbramo2022).Yethefacesanuphillupforauction(Dummett2022).Ifsold,thesepermitsbattle.NotonlydidformerpresidentJairBolsonarowouldallowdrillinginVirungaNationalPark,oneofeffectivelyweakenecologicalprotections,defundenvi-Africa’smostbiodiverselandscapesandasanctuaryronmentalagenciesandlawenforcement,andsupportforendangeredmountaingorillas(NyembaandRosslegislationtodismantleIndigenousPeoples’rightsand2022).Theywouldalsoenablefossilfuelextractionlegalizeland-grabbing(Roy2022),butalsohisright-wingacrossatleast1Mhaofpeatlands(Dummett2022)politicalalliescurrentlycontrolmanyofthestategov-withinthecentralCongobasin,aregionthat,intotal,ernmentsinAmazonia,aswellasasignificantnumbercontainsanestimated29GtC(Crezeeetal.2022).IntheofseatsinbothchambersofBrazil’sCongress(Maison-faceofpressurefromtheinternationalcommunity,thenaveandJeantet2023;Boadle2022).Still,Lulahastakenministerofhydrocarbonsrecentlydelayedthedeadlinestepsforwardtoundothisenvironmentalbackslidingforcompaniestosubmitapplicationsfortheoilblocksbyappointingwell-respectedenvironmentalistsandtobetweenAprilandOctober2023(Lo2023),buttheyIndigenousPeopletoleadershiproles,creatingaMinis-remainforsale.ForestsandLandSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023119Althoughjustahandfulofcountries,includingIndonesia,likelydependontheextenttowhichtheyareadoptedBrazil,andtheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,canacrossconsumercountrygovernments,particularlydeliverthemajorityoftheworld’scost-effective,land-inChina,theUnitedStates,andIndia—countriesthat,basedmitigationpotential(Roeetal.2021),muchofthealongsidetheEuropeanUnionandtheUnitedKingdom,demandtoproducecommoditiesthatdriveecosystemcollectivelyaccountedforover70percentofdeforesta-loss,spurdegradation,andimpederestorationorig-tionemissionsembodiedininternationaltradeflowsoninatesintheworld’swealthiestcountries.Between29averagebetween2010and2014(Pendrilletal.2019b).and39percentofGHGemissionsfromtropicaldefor-Complementarypoliciesfocusedonreducingdomesticestation,forexample,wereembodiedininternationallydemandforthesecommoditiesmayalsobeneeded,astradedcommoditiesfrom2010to2014(Pendrilletal.consumptionofbeef,soy,andpalmoilremainshighina2019b),withdevelopedcountriesandemergingecono-numberofproducercountries(Pendrilletal.2019a).mies,specifically,importinganincreasinglylargeshareofdeforestationembodiedincommodities(PendrillInadditiontoreducingdemandforcommoditieswhose2019a).Somegovernmentsarebeginningtoregulateproductiondrivesecosystemlossanddegradation,theseimportedcommodities.TheEuropeanUnion,forincreasingdedicatedfinancialflowstoland-basedexample,recentlyadoptedalandmarkregulationthatmitigationisvitaltoacceleratingthetransformationalmandatesallcompaniestoconductduediligencechangesrequiredforlimitingwarmingto1.5°C.Butonpalmoil,cattle,soy,coffee,cocoa,timber,rubber,despiteAFOLU’ssignificantpotentialtohelplimitwarm-charcoal,andwood,aswellasongoodsderivedfromingto1.5°C,aswellasthelowcostsandclearbenefitsthesecommodities(e.g.,chocolate,leather,orfurniture),ofaction,mitigationeffortsacrossthissectorattractedthattheysellwithinorexportfromtheEuropeanUniondisproportionatelyfewerinvestmentsthannearlyalltoensurethattheseproductsareproducedwithoutothersectorsoverthelastdecade(Figure52).PublicdeforestingordegradingforestsafterDecember31,andprivatefundsforland-basedmeasurescontinue2020.Thislawencompassesbothlegalandillegaldefor-tolagfarbehindestimatedneeds,whichtheIPCCestation,aswellasforestdegradation,andwillrequire(2022b)estimateswillreachnearly$100billionto$300companiestotracethesecommoditiesbacktowherebillionperyearby2030andover$400billionperyearbytheywerefirstproduced(EuropeanCommission2022e;2050.ButwhiletotaltrackedclimatemitigationfinanceEuropeanParliament2023e).earmarkedforAFOLUroughlydoubledoverthisdecade,itwasjustunder$10billionin2020(Buchneretal.2021).AhandfulofothercountrieshavealsopassedorareLimitingglobalwarmingtowellbelow2°Cwillrequireconsideringsimilarregulations.TheUnitedKingdom,fortheserecentmitigationinvestmentstoincreasemuchexample,recentlyadoptedtheEnvironmentAct2021,fasterthisdecade—byafactorof10to31by2030(seewhichincludesaprovisionrequiringcompaniesthatsellFinanceIndicators1–3)(IPCC2022b).forest-riskcommoditiestoensurethattheirproductsarefreefromillegaldeforestationbyconductingdueWorsestill,effortstoalignbroaderfinancialflowsacrossdiligence.However,enforcementcannotbeginuntilAFOLUwith1.5°Cpathwaysremaininadequate(NYDFtheBritishparliamentpassesadditionallegislationAssessmentPartners2022b).Forexample,just6percentthatclarifiesthescopeof“forest-riskcommodities(U.K.ofagriculturalsubsidiesacrossOrganisationforEco-Government2021;DEFRA2022).”In2021,abipartisannomicCo-operationandDevelopment(OECD)countriesgroupofpolicymakersintroducedasimilarpieceofand11majordevelopingnations,valuedatroughlylegislationintheUnitedStates,theFosteringOverseas$600billionperyearfrom2019to2021,supportclimateRuleofLawandEnvironmentallySoundTrade(FOREST)orconservationobjectives(Searchingeretal.2020;Act,thoughitneedstobereintroducedinthissessionOECD2022c),andmanystillincentivizeenvironmentallyofCongress(Schatz2021b).Eveniffullyadoptedandharmfulactions(e.g.,theEuropeanUnion’spaymentstoimplemented,bothpiecesoflegislationwouldapplytodrainage-basedpeatlandagriculture)(Tannebergeretillegaldeforestationonly(Neslen2023;U.K.Governmental.2021).Additionally,theworld’sleadingfinancialinstitu-2021;Schatz2021a)—adecisionthatnotonlymakestionschanneledsome$6.1trillionto350companieswiththeseproposedregulationslesscomprehensivethanthehighestexposuretotropicaldeforestationriskswithintheEuropeanUnion’sdirectivebutalsoincreasesthetheirsupplychainsin2022—upfrom$5.5trillionin2021difficultyofenforcement,asdefinitionsonthelegalityof(Forest5002022,2023).deforestationvarysignificantlybycountry.AtCOP26,manygovernments,companies,andfinan-Moreover,evidenceassessingtheimpactsofthesecialinstitutionsvowedtochangecourse.Morethanrelativelynewdeforestationpoliciesremainslimited,30financialinstitutionsmanagingassetsvaluedatwithonerecentanalysisfindingthatrestrictionsonover$8.7trillioncommittedtoeliminatingagriculturalpalmoilimports,alone,maynotsignificantlyreducecommodity-drivendeforestationrisksfromtheirlendingdeforestationduetoleakage(Buschetal.2022).Theandinvestmentportfoliosby2025(RacetoZero2021).efficacyofthesedemand-sideregulations,then,willGovernmentsalsopledged$12billioninsupportoftheForestsandLandSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023120FIGURE52TotaltrackedclimatefinanceformitigationbysolutionRenewableenergyBillionUS$generation600500400300200Low-carbontransportEnergyefficiencyOther/cross-sectoral100AFOLU0OtherGHGemissionsreductions2011Wasteandwater201220132014201520162017201820192020Notes:AFOLU=agriculture,forestry,andotherlanduses;GHG=greenhousegas.Source:Naranetal.(2022).GlasgowLeaders’DeclarationonForestsandLandUse,underthelandmarkKunming-MontrealGlobalBiodi-whileprivatesectorleaderspromisedtodeliveranotherversityFramework(CBD2022b).Althoughpromising,$7.2billion(PrimeMinister’sOffice2021b).Referencingthisparticularlythefinancialcommitmentmadeunderthedeclaration,governmentsandphilanthropiescommit-ConventiononBiologicalDiversity,thisrecentwaveofted$1.7billiontohelpsecuretheforesttenurerightsofpledgesmustmaterializequicklyandadditionalpledgesIndigenousPeoplesandlocalcommunities(“COP26IPLCwillbeneededafterthisdecadetodeliverthemorethanForestTenureJointDonorStatement”2021).$400billionneededperyearby2050(IPCC2022b).Oneyearlater,atCOP27inSharmel-Sheikh,26coun-triesandtheEuropeanUnionlaunchedtheForestsandClimateLeaders’PartnershipinsupportoftheGlasgowLeaders’DeclarationofForests.Theyreportedthatgovernmentshaddisbursednearly$2.7billionofthe$12billionpledgedatCOP26,aswellasannouncedcom-mitmentstochannelanother$4.5billioninpublicandprivatefundingtowardhaltingandreversingforestloss(CabinetOfficeandtheRtHonRishiSunakMP2022).AsofNovember2022,donorshadalsocontributedjustover$320milliontowardthe$1.7billionpledgedinsupportofIndigenousPeoplesandlocalcommunities,thoughjust7percentofthisfundingwentdirectlytoinstitutionsheadedbyIndigenousPeoplesandlocalcommunities(ForestTenureFundersGroup2022).AndjustweeksafterCOP27,nearly190countriesagreedtomobilizeatleast$200billionperyearby2030tosafeguardbiodiversity,includingwithinforests,peatlands,andmangroves,ForestsandLandSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023121SECTION7FoodandAgricultureAstheworld’spopulationclimbsfromroughly8foodpersist,growthinpercapitameatconsumption,billionin2023tonearly10billionby2050(UNDESAaswellastheexpansionofbioenergyproduction,add2022),feedingmorepeople,morenutritiously,toagriculture’salready-growinglanddemandsandwhileadvancingsocioeconomicdevelopmentandGHGemissions.reducingGHGemissionsfromagricultureandfoodsystemswillbeamajorchallenge.Worldwide,morethanTakentogether,recentresearchshowsthatachiev-one-quarterofemployedpeopleworkedinagricultureingglobalfoodandnutritionsecurityinthecomingin2019(WorldBank2021a).Becausesomanypeople’sdecades,whilelimitingwarmingto1.5°C,willonlybelivelihoodsdependonagriculture,andbecausethepossiblewithsignificantchangesinfoodproductionsectorisparticularlyvulnerabletoclimatechange,andconsumption(Clarketal.2020).Shiftingdemandforachievingajusttransitiontolower-emittingandmorefoodandagriculturalproducts,sustainablyincreasingresilientfoodsystemswillbecritical(Viglione2021).productivity,andchangingon-farmpracticesandGlobalfooddemandisontracktoriseby45percenttechnologies,combined,arenecessarytoreducetheormorebetween2017and2050basedonestimatesofsector’sglobalemissionsandlandfootprint.Ifimple-populationandincomegrowth,alongwithchangingmentedappropriately,thesechangesshouldalsohavedietarypatterns(Falconetal.2022;Searchingeretal.importantpositiveeffectsonbiodiversity,soilhealth,2021).Yet,asof2022,between691and783millionpeoplewaterquantityandquality,airquality,publichealth,wereaffectedbyhunger,anincreaseofmorethan100equity,andagriculturallivelihoods(Willettetal.2019;millionpeoplesincetheonsetofCOVID-19(FAO2023).IPCC2022b).Tofullyaddresshungerandfoodinsecurity,Furthermore,in2022,3.1billionpeoplecouldnotaffordchangestofoodproductionandconsumptionmustalsoahealthydiet,112millionmorepeoplethanin2019(FAObepairedwithbroaderinterventionstoaddresspoverty,2023).Whiletheseinequalitiesinpeople’saccesstogenderdisparities,andpoliticalinstabilities(FAO2023).FIGURE53AFOLU’scontributiontoglobalnetanthropogenicGHGemissionsin2021ElectricityandheatOilandgas14.4fugitiveemissions2.5Other1.6Coalminingfugitiveemissions1.5EnergyPetroleumrefining20.70.7Non-CO2(allbuildings)WasteLanduse,0.04land-use2.4change,Nonresidentialandforestry0.8GlobalGHGAgriculture,Emissionsforestry,4.0Rail56.8GtCO2eandother0.1ResidentialBuildingslandusesEnteric2.33.2fermentationInlandshipping10.40.2Transport3.0Managed8.1soilsandDomesticaviationManagedpasture0.3soilsandIndustrypastureInternational12.0aviation1.40.4RoadOtherRicecultivationOtherTransport4.41.00.55.9ManuremanagementInternational0.4shippingChemicalsMetals0.72.63.4Syntheticfertilizerapplication0.4Cement1.6Biomassburning0.1Notes:AFOLU=agriculture,forestry,andotherlanduses;CO2=carbondioxide;GHG=greenhousegas;GtCO2e=gigatonnesofcarbondioxideequivalent.Sources:Minxetal.(2021);EuropeanCommissionandJRC(2022),usingCO2emissionsdataforlanduse,land-usechange,andforestryfromthethreebookkeepingmodelsinthe“GlobalCarbonBudget2022”(Friedlingsteinetal.2022b).FoodandAgricultureSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023123FIGURE54GlobalGHGemissionsfromGlobalassessmentofprogressforfoodandagricultureagricultureGtCO2e/yrSavannafiresTransformingtheworld’sfoodandagriculturesys-7Burning—cropresiduestemstofeedagrowingpopulationsustainablyandnutritiously,whilelimitingglobalwarmingto1.5°Cand6Cropresiduesendingecosystemlossesanddegradation,willrequireseveralinterconnectedshifts.First,theworldwillneed5Synthetictoproducemorefoodandfeedonexistingagriculturalfertilizerslands,whilereducingagriculturalproductionemissions4andotherenvironmentalimpacts.ThisincludesbothRicecultivationloweringtheemissionsintensityofagriculturalproduc-3tionandsustainablyboostingcropyieldsandlivestockManuremanagementManureleftproductivity—allwhilesafeguardingsoilandwateronpastureresourcesandbuildingresiliencetoclimatechange.At2thesametime,reducingprojectedgrowthindemandManureappliedforland-intensivegoods,particularlybyhigh-incometosoilsconsumers,isalsoapriority.Thisincludesreducingfoodlossandwaste,aswellasreducingpercapitaruminant1meat(e.g.,beef)consumptioninhigh-consumingEntericfermentationregionsandavoidingbioenergyexpansion.Theseshiftsinfoodproductionandconsumption,inturn,canhelp0200020102020reducetheamountoflanddedicatedtoagricultureand1990therebyenabletheprotectionoftheworld’sremainingnaturalecosystemsfromagriculturalconversion,asNotes:GHG=greenhousegas;GtCO2e/yr=gigatonnesofcarbonwellastherestorationofdegradedecosystemsintodioxideequivalentperyear.ThisfigureonlyincludesGHGemissionsproductiveagricultureor(whereimprovementpotentialfromagriculturalproduction.islimited)backtonature.EcosystemprotectionandrestorationarecoveredinmoredepthinSection6,Source:FAOSTAT(2023).ForestsandLand.GHGemissionsfromagriculturalproduction,includingMajorchangesinpractices,technologies,andpoliciesthosefromcroplandandpastures,contributesig-willbeneededinthissectorbothtoadapttoclimatenificantlytoglobalGHGemissions,andin2021theychangeandtolimitwarmingto1.5ºC.ToensurethataccountedformorethanhalfofGHGemissionsfromfarmers,ranchers,andfarmworkersdonothavetoagriculture,forestry,andotherlanduses(AFOLU)(Figurebearthebruntofthesechanges,theymusthavethe53)(EuropeanCommissionandJRC2022;Minxetal.chancetomeaningfullyparticipateinthedesign,2021).Theseemissionshavebeengrowingatanaver-implementation,andgovernanceofadaptationandageannualrateof0.7percentsince2000(Figure54),76mitigationstrategies.Thisisespeciallytrueofsmallhold-reachingroughly6GtCO2ein2020(FAOSTAT2023).Anders,IndigenousPeople,women,andothervulnerablewhentheseproduction-relatedemissionsarecom-groups.ThisapproachisinlinewiththeParisAgreement,binedwiththosefromland-usechange,energy-relatedwhichencouragesnationalplansonclimatechangetoemissionsacrossfoodsupplychains(fromtheener-includejusttransitionmeasuresthatprioritizedecentgy-relatedsectorsinFigure53),andmethaneemittedworkandqualityjobs(UNFCCC2020).fromfoodwasteinlandfills(fromthewastesectorinFigure53),totalfoodsystememissionsaccountedforProgressinthefoodandagriculturesectorremainsabout16GtCO2eperyear—oralmost30percentofchallenging.EfficiencyimprovementsinagricultureandglobalGHGemissions(Tubielloetal.2022).77thewiderfoodsystem—whileencouraging—arenotyetkeepingpacewithcontinuedgrowthinglobaldemandforfoodandagriculturalproducts.Thisyear’ssnapshotFoodandAgricultureSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023124TABLE6SummaryofglobalprogresstowardfoodandagriculturetargetsINDICATORMOSTRECENT203020352050LIKELIHOODACCELERATIONSTATUSDATAPOINTTARGETTARGETTARGETOFFACTORGHGemissionsintensity(YEAR)FOLLOWINGofagriculturalproductionANS-CURVE(gCO2e/1,000kcal)Cropyields(t/ha)7005004503203x(2020)6.67.88.29.6>10x(2021)Ruminantmeat293335421.2xproductivity(kg/ha)(2021)6.56.56.5N/A;Shareoffood13U-turnneededbproductionlost(%)a(2021)616161InsufficientdataFoodwaste(kg/capita)c1207974608x(2019)Ruminantmeatconsumption91(kcal/capita/day)d(2020)eNotes:gCO2e/1,000kcal=gramsofcarbondioxideequivalentper1,000kilocalories;GHG=greenhousegas;kcal/capita/day=kilocaloriespercapitaperday;kg/capita=kilogramspercapita;kg/ha=kilogramsperhectare;t/ha=tonnesperhectare.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.aFoodlossoccursbeforefoodgetstomarket.bDuetodatalimitations,anaccelerationfactorwascalculatedforthisindicatorusingalineartrendlineestimatedwiththreedatapointsacrosssixyears.cFoodwasteoccursattheretaillevelandinhomesandrestaurants,amongotherlocations.dThisdietshiftappliesspecificallytothehigh-consumingregions(Americas,Europe,andOceania).ItdoesnotapplytopopulationswithintheAmericas,Europe,andOceaniathatalreadyconsumelessthan60kcal/capita/day,havemicronutrientdeficiencies,and/ordonothaveaccesstoaffordableandhealthyalternativestoruminantmeat.eConsumptiondataaregiveninavailability,whichisthepercapitaamountofruminantmeatavailableattheretaillevelandisaproxyforconsumption.Sources:HistoricaldatafromFAOSTAT(2023)andUNEP(2021e).TargetsderivedfromSearchingeretal.(2019,2021);andUnitedNations(2015).reflectsanotheryearofCOVID-eradata(from2020toGoldmanetal.2020).Ifthesetrendscontinue,global2021)andslowerprogressinthefoodandagriculturegoalstoeliminatedeforestationandpeatlanddegrada-sectorthannotedinStateofClimateAction2022.Astion(ForestsandLandIndicators1–3),achievehundredsshowninTable6,theaccelerationfactorsinthecate-ofmillionsofhectaresofecosystemrestoration(Forestsgoriesofagriculturalemissionsintensity,ruminantmeatandLandIndicators4–6),andlimitglobalwarmingtoconsumption,andcropyieldsactuallygrewlargersince1.5°Cwillbecomeincreasinglydifficulttoachieve.Boehmetal.(2022)andremainwellofftrack,indicatingthat2030targetsareslippingfurtheroutofreach.NewReduceGHGemissionsdataontherateoffoodlossbetween2016and2021fromagriculturalshowatrendmovinginthewrongdirectionattheglobalproductionlevel,althoughprogressacrossdifferentregionsismixed.OfalltheglobalfoodandagricultureindicatorsEmissionsfromagriculturalproductionareprimarilyinTable6,onlyruminantmeatproductivityhasaslightlyofmethaneandnitrousoxide,twopotentgreenhouselowerrateofchangeneeded(i.e.,accelerationfactor)gases(Figures53and54).Althoughglobalemissionsthaninlastyear’sreport,andeventhisindicatorremainsfrommethaneandnitrousoxide—includingthosefromofftrackfor2030.Furthermore,totalglobalemissionsagriculturalproduction—needtobegreatlyreducedfromfoodproductioncontinuetogrow,andcroplandstolimitwarmingto1.5°C,bothmodeledpathwaysfromandpasturecontinuetoexpandintonaturalecosystemsintegratedassessmentmodelsandthosefrombot-liketropicalforests(FAOSTAT2023;Potapovetal.2022b;FoodandAgricultureSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023125TABLE7ProjectedagriculturalproductionGHGemissionsbymajorsourceina1.5°C-alignedpathwayEMISSIONSSOURCERECENTCHANGE2030ABSOLUTE2035ABSOLUTE2050ABSOLUTEINABSOLUTEEMISSIONSEMISSIONSEMISSIONSEMISSIONSREDUCTIONFORREDUCTIONFORREDUCTIONFOR(2016–20)(%)1.5°CPATHWAY,1.5°CPATHWAY,1.5°CPATHWAY,RELATIVETO2017RELATIVETO2017RELATIVETO2017Entericfermentation+3(%)(%)(%)Manuremanagement+2-17-20-29Manureonpasture+5-21-26-39Soilfertilization+5-14-15-20Ricecultivation+1-23-27-39Total+3-23-29-45-22-26-39Note:GHG=greenhousegas.Sources:HistoricaldatafromFAOSTAT(2023);2030,2035,and20501.5°CpathwayestimatesderivedfromSearchingeretal.(2019).tom-up,sectoralstudiesindicatethattheydonotfalltopracticesisuncertain(FOLU2023;Hendersonetal.2015;zerobymidcenturythewaycarbondioxideemissionsPoultonetal.2018).Betterdatawillalsobeneededtodo.Methaneandnitrousoxideemissionsremainpositivetrackchangesinglobalagriculturalsoilcarbonstocksinallpathwaysthatlimitwarmingbelow2°Candevenovertime(IEAetal.2022a).below1.5°C(IPCC2022b).Thisreport’s1.5°C-alignedtargetforagriculturalproductionemissionsisa39per-FOODANDAGRICULTUREINDICATOR1:centabsolutereductionby2050relativeto2017(Table7).78BecauseglobalpopulationandfooddemandareGHGemissionsintensityofprojectedtocontinuegrowingthroughatleasttheyearagriculturalproduction2050,theemissionsintensityofagriculturalproduction(gCO2e/1,000kcal)percalorieoffoodproducedwillneedtofallevenfasterthanthis39percentabsolutetarget.•Targets:GlobalGHGemissionsintensityofagriculturalThereiscurrentlymuchinterestinthepotentialtoproductiondeclines31percentby2030,38percentbymitigateclimatechangeandreducenetagricultural2035,and56percentby2050,relativeto2017.emissionsthroughsoilcarbonsequestrationonworkingagricultural(cropandpasture)lands.SuchpracticesTheemissionsintensityofagriculturalproduction,asareoftencalled“regenerative”andincludeagroforestry,measuredingramsofCO2eper1,000kilocalories(kcal)silvopasture,rotationalgrazing,covercropping,cropintheglobalfoodsupply,hasbeenfallingfordecades,diversification,andno-tillorminimaltillage.Thesedrivenlargelybysteadygainsintheefficiencyofcroppractices,ingeneral,willbehelpfultoimprovesoilhealthandlivestockproduction.79Between2016and2020,forandwaterinfiltration,increaseon-farmbiodiversity,example,GHGemissionsintensitydeclinedby3percentreducesoilerosion,reducerelianceonchemicalinputs(FAOSTAT2023)(Figure55).Thatsaid,totalabsoluteandtheirassociatedemissions,improveresilience,agriculturalemissionshaveyettopeakglobally,increas-andmaintainagriculturalproductivityinachangingingbyabout3percentbetween2016and2020(FAOSTATclimate.Thesepracticeswillbeespeciallyimportantin2023).Buttofeedagrowingworldpopulationwhileresource-limitedproductionsystems,wheretheycanachievingnecessaryreductionsinabsoluteagriculturalsustainablyimproveproductivitywhileenhancingadap-emissionsby2030,agriculturalemissionsintensitywouldtivecapacity.Thatsaid,althoughthesepracticeshaveneedtodeclinethreetimesfasterthanitdidbetweenbeenshowntobuildcarbonatthefieldlevel(Minasny2016and2020.Changestofoodproductionpractices,etal.2017),andsomeresearchersextrapolatesuchaswellastoconsumptionpatterns(e.g.,amountofestimatesovermanyhectarestoestimatesubstantialfoodlossandwaste,shareofanimal-basedfoodspotentialreductionsinnetglobalagriculturalemissionsindiets,andshareofagriculturalproductsusedasthroughsoilcarbonsequestration(Roeetal.2021),othersbioenergy),willalsobenecessarytohelpachievethisarguethatthetrueglobalmitigationpotentialoftheserequireddeclineinemissionsintensity.Inparticular,a“proteintransition”isneededthatincludesbothshiftingFoodandAgricultureSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023126FIGURE55Historicalprogresstoward2030,2035,and2050targetsforGHGemissionsintensityofagriculturalproductionRightDirection,WellOffTrackS-CurveUnlikelygCO2e/1,000kcalHistoricalCurrentPaceneededtodatatrendreachtargets10002020data8007002030target6005002035target450Acceleration2050targetrequiredtoreach4002030target3203x2000201020202030204020502000Note:gCO2e/1,000kcal=gramsofcarbondioxideequivalentper1,000kilocalories;GHG=greenhousegas.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromFAOSTAT(2023);targetsderivedfromSearchingeretal.(2019).towardmoresustainablyproducedlivestockproducts,said,theneedtofeedagrowingpopulation—whileaswellasincreasedconsumptionofplantproteinsfinallyhaltingagriculturalexpansionintoforestsandandalternativeproteinswithlowerenvironmentalallowingsomeagriculturalareastoberestoredintoimpacts;strategiesrelyingonlyonproduction-sideornaturalecosystems—meansthatyieldgainswillneedconsumption-sidemeasuresarelikelytobeinsufficienttoaccelerateinthecomingdecadesrelativetorecent(Searchingeretal.2019;Roeetal.2019;IPCC2022b).years(Searchingeretal.2019).SustainablyincreasecropThischallengeiscompoundedbythefactthatfoodandlivestockproductivityproductionishighlyvulnerabletoclimatechange.onexistingagriculturallandTheIPCC’sSixthAssessmentReportfindsthatclimatechangeisalreadystressingagriculture,fisheries,andAgriculturalresearchhastraditionallyfocusedonaquaculture.Heatextremes,droughts,floods,andotherenhancingproductivity,and,asaresult,yieldsofclimate-relatedhazardshavereducedagriculturalbothcropsandlivestockproducts(meatandmilk)productivity,disruptingfoodsuppliesandlivelihoods.perhectarehaverisensteadilyfordecades.BoostingSince1961,productivitygrowthinAfricanagriculturehasproductivityallowsmorefoodtobeproducedonabeenone-thirdlowerthanitwouldhavebeenwithoutsmallerlandarea,whichcanavoidGHGemissionsfromclimatechange(Ortiz-Bobeaetal.2021),andcropyieldsland-usechange(e.g.,deforestation)and/orenableinAfricaremainfarbelowtheglobalaverage(FAOSTATcarbonremovalthroughecosystemrestoration.That2023).Risksandvulnerabilitiesinthesector—includinglossofincomeorlivelihoods,andrisingcompetitionoverFoodandAgricultureSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023127resources—areverylikelytoworseninawarmerclimate,Globalcropyields,expressedintonnesofcropspro-andarelikelytomostheavilyaffectvulnerablepopu-ducedperhectareofcropland,80remainedflatbetweenlationssuchaswomen,youth,small-scaleproducers,2020and2021andbelowahistoricalpeakin2019.In2021,farmworkers,low-incomehouseholds,andIndigenousyieldswereonly0.7percentabove2017levels(FAOSTATandothermarginalizedgroups(IPCC2022a).2023)(Figure56),representingaworryingcontinuationofrecenttrends.Becauseofthisrecentslowgrowth,Productivityincreaseswillneedtooccurinachangingcropyieldgrowthneedstoacceleratemorethan10-foldclimate;thus,itwillbenecessarytorelyonapproachestoreachthe2030target,meaningthatglobalprogressthatincreaseresilience,safeguardsoils,protectremainswellofftrack.freshwaterresources,minimizepollution,andavoida“reboundeffect.”ThiseffectcanoccurwheregainsinTheCOVID-19pandemicexacerbatedglobalfoodcroporlivestockproductivityleadtoincreasedprofitsinsecurityin2020and2021.Foodpricesrose,supplyfromfarming,fuelingadditionalexpansionofagriculturechainsweredisrupted,andsocialprotectionmeasuresintonaturalecosystems.Toavoidthisreboundeffect,wereinadequate(FAO2022b).Foodproductionitselfincentivesforproductivityimprovementswillneedtowashampered,aslockdownsandtravelbanslimitedbelinkedtonaturalecosystemprotection,equity,andaccesstofarminputs,inputcostsrose,andfarmersrestoration(Searchingeretal.2019).facedlaborshortages(Sridharetal.2023).Thatsaid,FAOSTATdatapaintalessclear-cutpictureoftheeffectsFOODANDAGRICULTUREINDICATOR2:ofCOVID-19oncropproduction.Forexample,despitetheseenormousdifficulties,globalcerealcropproduc-Cropyields(t/ha)tionreachedarecordhighin2020andagainin2021,at3.1billiontonnes.In2021,globalcerealyieldsreached•Targets:Cropyieldsincreaseby18percentbyarecordhighof4.15tonnes/ha/yr,afteraone-yeardeclinebetween2019and2020(FAOSTAT2023).The2030,25percentby2035,and45percentby2050,relativeto2017.FIGURE56Historicalprogresstoward2030,2035,and2050targetsforcropyieldsRightDirection,WellOffTrackS-CurveUnlikelyt/haHistoricalCurrentPaceneededtodatatrendreachtargets12102050target869.642021data2035target2030target6.68.27.8Accelerationrequiredtoreach2030target>10x20201020202030204020502000Note:t/ha=tonnesperhectare.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromFAOSTAT(2023);targetsderivedfromSearchingeretal.(2019,2021).FoodandAgricultureSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023128Ukraine-Russiawarhasalsoaffectedtwomajorcerealproducecrops,thecontinuedglobalgrowthinmeatandoilseedproducersandexporterssince2022,andtheandmilkdemandwillincreasepressuresontheworld’swar’simpactisnotyetreflectedintheglobalFAOSTATremainingnaturalecosystems.Meatproductionisdata.However,national-scaleestimatesarestark:cerealparticularlyresource-intensive.Therefore,sustainablyandoilseedcropproductionprojectionsforUkraine’sincreasingruminantmeatproductivity,reducingGHG2022–23growingseasonare30–40percentbelowtheemissionsfromitsproduction,andmoderatingrumi-2021–22level(Martyshevetal.2023).nantmeatconsumptioninhigh-consumingregionsaspartofa“proteintransition”willallbeessentialtoYieldsinAfricacontinuetostagnateatalowlevelasreduceemissionsfromlivestockwhilefeedingmoretheyhavefordecades;forexample,in2021,yieldsofpeople(Searchingeretal.2019).ThesechangescancerealcropsinAfrica,whichunderpinfoodsecurity,alsosupporteffortstoconservebiodiversity(Semen-wereonly42percentoftheworldaverageand30chuketal.2022).percentofcerealyieldsintheAmericas(FAOSTAT2023).ImprovingcropyieldsonsmallfarmsinAfricaisalsoRuminantmeatproductivitydescribestheamountofakeyleverforreducingpoverty(IFPRI2022).Improvedmeatfromruminantlivestockproducedperhectareseeds,soilfertilityimprovement,watermanagement,ofpastureland.In2021,ruminantmeatproductivityperextensionservices,accesstomarketsandcredit,andhectarewas6percenthigherthanin2017(Figure57),aimprovedweatherforecastingareallcriticallyimportantnewhistoricalhighandacontinuationofrecenttrends.tosustainablyboostingsmallholders’yieldsacrosstheThebasicmechanismsfortheseproductivitygainshaveAfricancontinent(JamaandPizarro2008)—thisinturnbeenimprovementsinfeedefficiency(e.g.,throughusewillbeimportantforlimitingagriculturalexpansionintoofmoredigestiblefeeds);plantingandfertilizingpas-naturalecosystems.tureswithimprovedgrasses,legumes,trees,andshrubs(Box16);moreintensivegrazingmanagement(e.g.,Recentsatellite-basedevidenceofongoingcroplandactivelyrotatingcattleherdsacrosspasturesinsteadexpansion(Potapovetal.2022b)suggeststhatyieldoflettingthemroamfreely);andincreasesinmeatgrowthhasnotkeptpacewithcropdemandgrowthproductionperanimal(e.g.,throughimprovedbreedsorinthe21stcentury,as102Mhaoflandwereconvertedbetterveterinarycare)(Searchingeretal.2019).Achiev-toannualcropsbetween2003and2019.MostoftheingtheseproductivitygainsdoesnotrequireashiftcroplandexpansionoccurredinAfrica(53Mha)andtofeedlotsystems,whichcanreduceGHGemissionsSouthAmerica(34Mha)(Potapovetal.2022b),drivenbyintensityperkilogramofbeefversusproductionsystemsgrowthinbothlocalfooddemandandglobaldemandwherecattlespendtheirentirelivesongrassbutalsoforcropcommoditiesgrowninthoseregions.Whilecomewithconcernsregardingimpactsonworkerandcommodity-drivenexpansion—suchasland-clearingforcommunityhealth(Chamanaraetal.2021),airandsoybeanproduction—isdominantinSouthAmerica,inwaterpollution(Chamanaraetal.2021),antimicrobialAfricacultivationofcropsfordomesticuseseemstoberesistance(CameronandMcAllister2016),andanimalthebiggestcontributortoexpansion(Curtisetal.2018).welfare(Salvinetal.2020).FOODANDAGRICULTUREINDICATOR3:Ruminantmeatproductivity(kg/ha)•Targets:Ruminantmeatproductivityperhectarerises27percentby2030,35percentby2035,and58percentby2050,relativeto2017.Thewaythatmeatandmilkfromruminantlivestock(e.g.,cattle,sheep,goats)areproducedandconsumedhasamajorbearingonthelandusedemandsandGHGemissionsofglobalagriculture.Ruminantlivestockusemorethantwo-thirdsofagriculturallandandaccountforabouthalfofagriculturalGHGemissions,evenwhenexcludingemissionsfromfeedproduction(FAOSTAT2023)(Figure54).Andwhileruminantlivestockproductionplaysakeyroleintheruraleconomiesandculturesofdevelopingcountries,provideslivelihoodsandhigh-qualityproteintomillionsofpastoralists,andmakesuseofaridlandsthatcouldnototherwiseFoodandAgricultureSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2022129BOX16SilvopastoralsystemsinEthiopiaboostproductivityandresilienceMuchresearchanddevelopmentonsilvopastoralothermultipurposebenefitsandqualitiessuchassystems—whichintegratetreesandshrubswithdroughttolerance,hascontributedtoyear-roundgrazinglivestock—hasfocusedontheuseoffodderavailabilityandimprovedanimalhealth,thesesystemsforclimatechangeadaptation.leadingtoincreasedmilkproductionandlive-Inresource-limitedareaswithahighlevelofstockweightgain,andpositivelyimpactinglocallanddegradation,suchsystemscanprovideafarmers’livelihoods(Balehegn2017).co-benefitofclimatechangemitigation,boththroughincreasedoutputofmeatandmilkperInadditiontothedirectbenefitstolivelihoodshectare(whichcanavoidadditionallandclearingandlivestock,theFicusthonningiisilvopasturesasdemandforlivestockproductsgrows)aswellplayanimportantroleinsoilconservationandasanincreaseincarbonstocksinplantsandecosystemrestoration.Studiesondegradedsoils.Theproductivityandenvironmentalbenefitspasturelandsandcroplandsindicateda40andtrade-offsofshiftingtosilvopastoralsystems,percentincreaseinsoilcarboncontentinareashowever,dependonspecificfactors,includingthewiththeintegrationofFicusthonningii,contrib-currentresourceavailability,thelevelofintensifi-utingtoenhancedsoilfertilityandreducedsoilcation,and/ortheproductionsystemused.erosion(Berheetal.2013),whilehabitatcreatedbytreesondegradedpasturelandsenabledResearchandextensionworkdevelopingalocalthereturnofbirdspecieshithertolocallyextincttreespecies–basedsilvopastoralsystemusinginnorthernEthiopia(Balehegnetal.2016).TheFicusthonningiihasproducedcompellingresultsmultipleadaptationandlivelihoodbenefitshaveintermsofproductivity,livelihoods,climateresultedinwidespreadadoptionwithinEthiopiachangeadaptation,andenvironmentalresil-andrecognitionoftheFicusthonningii–basedienceinEthiopia.IntroductionofFicusthonningiisilvopastoralsystem.Morethan25,000house-silvopasturesintodegradedpasturelandsinholdsinnorthernEthiopiaadoptedthispracticenorthernEthiopiahasenabledsmallholderbetween2010and2017,incorporatingFicusfarmerstoproduce500percentmorefodderperthonningiitreesintodegradedpasturelandsandhectareofland,reducecostsincurredforexpen-farmlands.Thepracticehasbeenidentifiedasasiveconcentratefeedsby50percent(BalehegnsuccessfulinnovationbytheFoodandAgricultureetal.2015,2012;MekuriawandAsmare2018),andOrganizationoftheUnitedNations,theEuropeanreducewateruserequiredforforageproductionCommission,andothers(AFSA2018;LD4D2021;by83percent(Balehegn2017,2012).TheficusFAO2021;MadsenandWezel2021).tree’sabilitytoprovideshadeandfodder,andTomeetthe2030target,ruminantmeatproductivityBecausemuchoftheworld’spasturelandisdry,sloped,mustimprovebyanother15percent,whichwillrequireorhashighlyvariablerainfall—whichalllimitproduc-recentgrowthratestoaccelerateby1.2times.So,whiletivity—achievingtheglobal2030productivitygoalwillprogressisheadingintherightdirection,itremainsoffrequireparticularattentiontoimprovementsonsuitabletrack.Satellite-basedevidenceofdeforestation(Gold-hectaresofwetterpastureland,especiallyinthetropics,manetal.2020)alsoshowsthat45Mhaofforestwerewhereproductivityisrelativelylow(Searchingeretal.replacedbypasturelandforcattlegrazingbetween20012019;Herreroetal.2013).ThereareranchesinBraziland2015,mainlyinSouthAmerica,suggestingthatgrossthatexemplifythetypesofproductivityimprovementspastureexpansiontomeetgrowingglobaldemandfordiscussedabove—includingincreasesinmeatproduc-ruminantmeathasyettostop.Andtotalglobalruminanttionperhectareof30to270percent(zuErmgassenetal.meatproductiondoescontinuetogrow;accordingto2018).Significantbarriers,suchasfinance,standintheFAOSTAT(2023),afterahistoricalhighin2019therewasawayofachievingsimilarlyhigh-productivityimprove-one-yeardipinproductionin2020,andthenanewhis-mentselsewhere(Grunwald2023).toricalhighin2021of93.1milliontonnesofbeef,buffalo,sheep,andgoatmeat.FoodandAgricultureSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023130FIGURE57Historicalprogresstoward2030,2035,and2050targetsforruminantmeatproductivityRightDirection,OffTrackS-CurveUnlikelykg/haHistoricalCurrentPaceneededtodatatrendreachtargets45402021data2035target423530292030target352050target253320Accelerationrequiredtoreach2030target1.2x151050201020202030204020502000Notes:kg/ha=kilogramsperhectare.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromFAOSTAT(2023);targetsderivedfromSearchingeretal.(2019).ReducegrowthinFOODANDAGRICULTUREINDICATOR4:demandforfoodShareoffoodproductionBeyondimprovementstoagriculture,keepingwarminglost(%)below1.5°Cwillrequirereducingtheprojectedgrowthindemandforland-intensivegoodsthroughboth•Targets:Theshareoffoodproductionlostdeclines50reducedfoodlossandwasteanddietaryshifts.Allcountriesshouldreducefoodlossandwaste,althoughpercentby2030,relativeto2016,andthesereductionsthemagnitudeandtypesofchangesrequiredvaryaremaintainedthrough2050.acrosscountries.Dietaryshiftsawayfromruminantmeatandotheranimal-basedfoodsandtowardplant-FOODANDAGRICULTUREINDICATOR5:basedfoods,incontrast,shouldbeconcentratedwithinhigh-consumingregionslikeNorthandSouthAmerica,Foodwaste(kg/capita)Europe,andOceania,wheresuchshiftsinconsumption(andtheirassociatedimpactsonglobalsupplychains)•Targets:Worldwidepercapitafoodwasteisreducedcanhavethelargestimpactsonreducingbothagricul-turallanddemandsandGHGemissions.by50percentby2030,relativeto2019,andthesereductionsaremaintainedthrough2050.Globally,aboutone-thirdoffoodislostorwastedbetweenthefarmandthefork(FAO2011).Foodlossoccursbeforefoodgetstomarket,duringharvest,81storage,andtransporttomarket;whereasfoodwasteoccursatretailmarkets,restaurants,orinhomes.Foodlossandwasteresultinhigheconomiclosses,contributetofoodinsecurityinlower-incomecountries,FoodandAgricultureSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023131andrepresenta“waste”ofagriculturalland,water,andthefoodsupplychainin2021(FAOSTAT2023)(Figuresotheragriculturalinputs.Notsurprisingly,thishighlevel58and59),andthat17percentoffoodattheretailofwasteresultsinsignificantGHGemissions.TheIPCClevel(or121kilogramsperpersonperyear)waswasted(2019)includedanestimatethatfoodlossandwasteinhouseholds,foodservice,andretailin2019(UNEPaccountedfor8–10percentofglobalhuman-caused2021e)(Figure60).emissionsin2011,includingGHGemissionsfromagricul-turalproduction,land-usechange,energyuseacrossAsforfoodlosses,thankstoanupdateinJuly2023,foodsupplychains,andwasteinlandfills.AndwhilefruitsFAOSTATnowreportsthreeyearsofdataontheshareofandvegetablesmakeupthelargestshareofglobalfoodproductionlost(2016,2020,and2021),providingthefoodlossandwastebyweight,animal-basedfoodsopportunitytobeginseeingtrends.Globally,therateofaccountforabouthalfoftheGHGemissionsassociatedfoodlossroseslightlyfrom13.0to13.3percentbetweenwithfoodlossandwaste(Guoetal.2020).Modelshave2016and2020andthendeclinedslightlyto13.2percentdemonstratedhowhalvingglobalfoodlossandwastein2021,meaningthatglobaltrendsarestillmovingintherateshassubstantialmitigationpotentialandcanhelpwrongdirectionforthistarget.bringfoodsystem–relatedGHGemissionsinlinewithpathwaysthatlimitwarmingto1.5°C(Clarketal.2020;IPCC2022b),inadditiontobeingalignedwithSustain-ableDevelopmentGoalTarget12.3(UnitedNations2015).GlobaltrenddatathroughtheFoodLossIndex(FAO2019)andFoodWasteIndex(UNEP2021e)arejuststartingtobecomeavailable.Themostrecentglobalestimatesarethat13.2percentofglobalfoodproductionwaslostbetweenthefarmgateandprocessingstagesofFIGURE58Historicalprogresstoward2030,2035,and2050targetsforshareoffoodproductionlostWrongDirection,U-turnNeededS-CurveUnlikely%HistoricalCurrentPaceneededtodatatrendreachtargets162021data141312102030target2050target86.56.566.52035target420201020202030204020502000Notes:Foodlossoccursbeforefoodgetstomarket.Also,duetodatalimitations,anaccelerationfactorwascalculatedforthisindicatorusingalineartrendlineestimatedwiththreedatapointsacrosssixyears.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromFAOSTAT(2023);targetsfromUnitedNations(2015).FoodandAgricultureSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023132Therateoffoodlossdiffersacrosssubregions(Figure59).Onapositivenote,subregionswithinsub-SaharanAfricahaveallmadeprogressinreducingfoodlossesbetween2016and2021.Bycontrast,NorthernAfrica,allsubregionsinEurope,andmostsubregionsintheAmer-icas(exceptNorthAmerica)sawincreasesintheshareoffoodproductionlostbetween2016and2021.Whiletheresultsacrossworldregionsaremixed,overall,adra-maticstepchangeisneededtomoveglobaltrendsinfoodlossesintherightdirectiontohalvethemby2030.Asfortrendsinfoodwaste,because2019isthefirstandonlyyearforwhichfoodwasteestimatesareavailableatthegloballevel,dataareinsufficienttomeasureprogresstowardthisindicator.Increasingtheavail-abilityofdatatomeasurefoodwasteatretail,foodservice,andhouseholdlevelsisalsonecessarytobetterdisaggregatedifferencesatregionalandcountrylevels.Availableevidence,however,suggeststhatsubstantialchangeswillbeneededtomeetthetargetofhalvingfoodwaste.Forexample,intheUnitedStates,althoughthefederalgovernmentsetagoalin2015toreducefoodlossandwasteby50percentby2030andseveralU.S.stateshaveadoptedlegislationaimedatreducingfoodwaste,U.S.percapitafoodwasteactuallyincreasedby6percentbetween2016and2019,from149to158kilogramsperpersonperyear.ThelatestU.S.governmentstatusreport(U.S.EPA2023a)notesthatsomeoftherecentstatefoodwastelawshaveyettobefullyimplemented.FIGURE59Shareoffoodproductionlostbysubregionin20215.0%–9.9%10.0%–14.9%15.0%–19.9%20.0%–25.0%Source:FAOSTAT2023.FoodandAgricultureSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023133FIGURE60Historicalprogresstoward2030,2035,and2050targetsforfoodwasteInsufficientDataS-CurveUnlikelykg/capitaHistoricalCurrentPaceneededtodatatrendreachtargets1402019data120120100802030target2050target61616061402035target200201020202030204020502000Note:kg/capita=kilogramspercapita.Foodwasteoccursattheretaillevelandinhomesandrestaurants,amongotherlocations.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromUNEP(2021e);targetsfromUnitedNations(2015).FOODANDAGRICULTUREINDICATOR6:production(e.g.,lambandgoat)isalsoroughlyseventimesasland-andGHG-intensiveaspoultryandporkRuminantmeatconsumptionproduction(Ranganathanetal.2016).(kcal/capita/day)Animal-basedfoodsareanimportantsourceof•Targets:Acrosshigh-consumingregionsofthehigh-quality,bioavailableproteinandmicronutrients,especiallyduringpregnancyandlactation,infancyandAmericas,Europe,andOceania,82dailypercapitaearlychildhood,andinsomecasesadolescenceandconsumptionofruminantmeats,includingbeef,aging(Bealetal.2023).Modestincreasesincon-lamb,andgoat,83decreasesto79kilocaloriesby2030,sumptionofanimal-basedfoodscanboostnutrition74kilocaloriesby2035,and60kilocaloriesby2050.inlow-incomecountrieswhilelimitingthegrowthofenvironmentalimpacts(Kimetal.2020;Willettetal.Asincomesriseandpeoplemovetocities,dietstendto2019).However,inhigh-incomecountries,whereproteinbecomemorevariedandhigherinresource-intensiveconsumptioniswellabovedietaryrequirementsandfoodslikemeatanddairy.Forthisreason,consumptionsubstitutesforanimalproteinarewidelyavailable,ofanimal-basedfoodsisprojectedtogrowbynearlyshiftingdietstowardplant-basedfoodsandespecially70percentbetween2010and2050(Searchingeretal.awayfromruminantmeatscanreduceagriculturalland2019),anestimateroughlyinlinewiththosefromseveraldemandandGHGemissions(Sunetal.2022).otherresearchers(e.g.,Springmannetal.2016;TilmanandClark2014;Willettetal.2019).ThisprojectedgrowthAfterdecliningforseveraldecades,percapitaruminantmakesachievingecosystemprotectionandclimatemeatconsumptionacrosshigh-consumingregions(themitigationgoalsmorechallenging:forinstance,beefAmericas,Europe,andOceania)84plateauedaroundrequires20timesmoreland,andleadsto20times2016,fallingbyonly0.8percentbetween2016and2020moreGHGemissionspergramofprotein,thanbeansandhoveringaround91kilocaloriesperdayduringthat(Ranganathanetal.2016).BeefandotherruminantmeatFoodandAgricultureSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023134FIGURE61Historicalprogresstoward2030,2035,and2050targetsforruminantmeatconsumptionRightDirection,WellOffTrackS-CurveUnlikelykcal/capita/dayHistoricalCurrentPaceneededtodatatrendreachtargets1202020data100912030target792035target74802050targetAcceleration60requiredtoreach602030target8x40200201020202030204020502000Notes:kcal/capita/day=kilocaloriespercapitaperday.Consumptiondataaregiveninavailability,whichisthepercapitaamountofruminantmeatavailableattheretaillevelandisaproxyforconsumption.Also,thisdietshiftappliesspecificallytothehigh-consumingregions(Americas,Europe,andOceania).ItdoesnotapplytopopulationswithintheAmericas,Europe,andOceaniathatalreadyconsumelessthan60kcal/capita/day,havemicronutrientdeficiencies,and/ordonothaveaccesstoaffordableandhealthyalternativestoruminantmeat.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromFAOSTAT(2023);targetsfromSearchingeretal.(2019).timeperiod(FAOSTAT2023).Thisveryslowrateofdeclineconsumptionistwiceashighinurbanareasasinruralwouldneedtoaccelerateeightfoldtohitthe2030targetareasandthatrisingincomesgenerallyleadtohigherof79kilocaloriesperday(theequivalentofabouttwodemandforalltypesofmeat(Maoetal.2016).Incasesservingsperpersonperweek),onthewaytothe2050wherepercapitaruminantmeatconsumptionisontargetof60kilocaloriesperday(about1.5servingspertherise,itwouldbeadvisabletotrytopeakitearlysopersonperweek)(Figure61).85asnottobreachthethreshold,andinsteadaimtoshiftdemandtolessGHG-intensiveproteinsources.Evenwithinthehigh-consumingregionsforwhichthistargetapplies,thereisconsiderabledifferenceinperRecentdevelopmentscapitaruminantmeatconsumption.Percapitacon-acrossfoodandsumptioninAustraliaandNewZealand(179kcalperagricultureday)andSouthAmerica(135kcalperday)weredoubletherateofconsumptioninEurope(67kcalperday)inRecentyearshavewitnessedawaveofnewmultilat-2020.LargerreductionswillalsobenecessaryinNortheralcommitmentsfocusedontransformingthefoodAmerica,whichstoodat107kcalperdayin2020.andagriculturalsectortomitigateclimatechange,safeguardbiodiversity,andensurefoodsecurityforWhileotherregionsremainedfarbelowthe60-kilocal-allinachangingclimate—apromisingsignthattheoriethresholdforruminantmeatconsumptionin2020,world’sleadersarestartingtorecognizethesignificantincludingAfricaat39andAsiaat37,certaincountriescontributionsthissectorcanandmustplayinaddress-(e.g.,China)areexperiencingsignificantincreasesandwilllikelyreachthe60-kilocaloriethresholdbetweennowand2050.DatafromChinashowthatbeefandlambFoodandAgricultureSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023135ingtheseglobalcrises.AtCOP26,forexample,over40Thefirstinvolvesdevelopingfeedadditivesthatreducecountriescommittedtomakingcleantechnologiestheemissionsbyinterferingintheprocessesthatgeneratemostaffordable,accessible,andattractiveoptionsbymethane,andthesecondaimstoselectivelybreedani-2030undertheBreakthroughAgenda,andahandfulofmalsthatgeneratelessmethaneduringtheirdigestion.thesenationsspecificallypledgedtomakeclimate-re-Manyadditivesarecurrentlybeingtested,astheprimarysilient,sustainableagriculturethemostattractiveandchallengeisthat,whilesomedeliverproductivityben-widelyadoptedoptionforfarmerseverywherebytheefits,othershavepotentialsideeffects(e.g.,onanimalendofthisdecade(IEAetal.2022a).Over140countrieshealth).ThemostapprovedandcommerciallyavailablealsosignedtheGlasgowLeaders’DeclarationonForestsadditiveis3-Nitrooxypropanol(3-NOP),whichprovidesandLandUse,pledgingtoimplementand,ifnecessary,averagereductionsofentericmethanereductionuptoredesignagriculturalpoliciesandprogramstoincen-30percentdependingonanimaltype,diet,anddosetivizesustainableagriculture,promotefoodsecurity,(Yuetal.2021;Mulhollem2023).In2021theEuropeanandbenefittheenvironment,amongothergoals(PrimeUnionapproveditforcommercialuseaspartofitsMinister’sOffice2021a).And150countriesjoinedtheFarmtoForkstrategy,joiningAustralia,Brazil,andChileGlobalMethanePledge,underwhichtheyagreedto(DSM2022).Whileitisnotyetapprovedforcommercialreducemethaneemissions30percentby2030—agoaluseintheUnitedStates,U.S.lawmakersintroducedthethatwillrequiresignificantchangesacrosstheagri-bipartisanInnovativeFeedEnhancementandEconomicculturalsector,whichcurrentlyaccountsfor40percentDevelopment(FEED)Actin2023,whichwouldcreateofhuman-causedmethaneemissions(UNEP2021h).anewfederalapprovalpathwayfornovelfeedaddi-Notably,however,somelargeagriculturaleconomiesliketivessuchas3-NOP(Reus2023).Additionallong-termIndiaandChinahaveyettosignthismethanepledge.researchisneededtofullyunderstandsideeffects,suit-Inaddition,inDecember2022,nearly190Partiestotheabilityfordifferentproductionsystems,andlong-termConventiononBiologicalDiversityadoptedtheKun-trade-offsinand/orco-benefitstolivestockproductivityming-MontrealGlobalBiodiversityFramework,agreeingbeforetheycanbewidelyutilized(Beaucheminetal.toseveraltargetsfocusedonreducingthefoodand2022;Hegartyetal.2021;Readfearn2023).Breedingagriculturesector’simpactsonbiodiversity(CBD2022a).animalsforreducedentericmethaneemissionshasWhilethisincreasingpoliticalattentiononfoodandalsoreceivedconsiderableresearchattentioninrecentagriculturerepresentsawelcomechange,immediateyears,butlow-emittingbreedswithequalorbetteractions,aswellassubstantialresources,willbeneededproductivityandresiliencethancurrentbreedsareyettodeliveronthesecommitmentsintime.tobedevelopedatscale.InNewZealand,forexample,researchershavebredlower-methanesheepthatemitRecentdevelopmentsinabout12percentlessmethanethantheirhigh-emittingsustainablyincreasingcounterparts,withnosignificantimpactonproductivityagriculturalproductivity(Roweetal.2019),andthefirstbreedingmaterialwithawhilereducingGHGlow-methanegenetictraitwentonthemarketin2023emissionsfromagricultural(Nickel2023).Ongoingresearchinitiativesarecollect-productioningandanalyzinggeneticdatarelatedtohigh-andlow-emittingcowstofacilitatefuturebreedingeffortsNosingletechnologyorpracticecanboostproductivity(Stepanchenkoetal.2023).whilereducingGHGemissionsacrossallagriculturallandscapes,whichproducearangeofcropsandlivestockproductsacrossdiversesocial,economic,andbiophysicalenvironments.Thisdiversitychallengeseffortstodevelopinnovationsforwide-scaleadoption.Newtechnologiesthatcouldplayanimportantroleinsustainablydeliveringtheproductivitygainsneeded,whileloweringGHGemissionsandminimizingotherenvironmentalharms,remainunderdevelopment.Considerableinvestmentsinresearch,development,anddeployment,then,areneededbothtobringnewtechnologiestomarketandtotransferagriculturalprac-ticesthathavebeensuccessfulinonecontexttoothers.Scientistsarecurrentlyexploringtwolinesofinnovationforreducingmethaneemissionsfromthedigestiveprocessofruminantanimals(e.g.,cattle,sheep,goats)—aprocessreferredtoas“entericfermentation.”FoodandAgricultureSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023136Mostmitigationpotentialfromriceproductionrestsinalternativeproteins,amongothers,eachwithbudgetsAsia,where90percentofglobalriceproductionoccursofbetween$1millionand$500million(AIMforClimate(FAOSTAT2023).Ricemethaneemissionsoccurinflooded2023).Anotherexamplegloballyrelevanttotheprivatericefieldswherewaterlimitsoxygenpenetrationintosectoristhe2022releaseofguidancebytheSciencethesoil,allowingmicroorganismscalledarchaeathatBasedTargetsinitiative(SBTi)detailinghowcompaniesproducemethanetothrive.Boostingriceyieldspershouldsetmitigationtargetstoreduceemissionsfromhectare(whichminimizestheneedtofloodadditionaltheforest,land,andagriculture(FLAG)sectors.Land-in-areas)andoptimizingwatermanagement(whichtensivecompaniesworkingwithSBTiwererequiredtoreducestheamountoftimeafieldisflooded)canbothstartsettingFLAGtargetsinlinewitha1.5°Cpathwayreduceemissions.Researchinthisareaisongoing;forbeginningin2023(Andersonetal.2022).Finally,totrulyexample,studiesinIndonesiafrom2020to2022foundscaleRD&D,finance,knowledge,andtechnologytransferthatimprovedwatermanagementwasabletoreducewillbeneeded.TheFoodandAgricultureforSustain-methaneemissionsby70percent,whileboostingableTransformationInitiative,launchedatCOP27andriceyieldsandreducingpesticideandfertilizerrunofffacilitatedbyFAO,aimstoincreasecountries’accessto(Turrell2023).climatefinanceandinvestmentrelatedtoagricultureandfoodsystems,improveknowledgeandcapacityNitrousoxideemissionsrelatedtosoilfertilizationrelatedtoclimate-smartfoodsystems,andstrengthen(includingbothnitrogenfertilizerandmanureapplica-theinclusionofagricultureandfoodsystemsacrosstion)canbesignificantlyreducedinmanyplacesbyclimatechangepolicies(FAO2022a).increasingnitrogen-useefficiencyandreducingoveruseofchemicalfertilizer.DoingsocanalsoreducewaterLinkingyieldimprovementswithecosystemprotectionpollution,sincelessnitrogenleachesintothewater(Gaoisaneffectivestrategytomaximizeland-basedcarbonandCabreraSerrenho2023),andcanalsoboostyields.stockswhilemeetinggrowingdemandforland-basedInnovationstoaddressthisincludeprecisionapplicationproducts(Williamsetal.2018).Theselinkscanbeinoffertilizers,whichusesfieldproductivitydatafromtheformofland-useplanningandzoning,financialdronesorsatellites.AnotherinnovationforreducingN2Oinstruments(e.g.,agriculturalloansorsubsidiesthatareemissionsiscontrolled-releasefertilizers,whichslowlyconditionedonachievingenvironmentalorconserva-releasenutrientsovertime.Thesefertilizershavebeentiongoals),andinitiativesorpolicieswhereagriculturalcommercializedbutcurrentlyrepresentonlyasmallcommoditypurchasersandtraderscommittosourcingshareofsyntheticfertilizersales.Recentinnovationsinproductsthataredeforestation-andconversion-freecontrolled-releasesystems,suchastheuseoflow-(Searchingeretal.2019).Onerecentexampleofsuchacostcoatings,demonstratethepotentialtoreducethepolicyistheEUregulationondeforestation-freeproductsenvironmentalimpactofconventionalfertilizersandthatenteredintoforceinJune2023(EuropeanCom-enhancenutrientuseefficiency.Thefindingsunderscoremissionn.d.b.).Whiledemand-sidedeforestation-freereducedenvironmentalharmandimprovednutrientcommitmentshavehadonlylimitedeffectivenessutilization,cropyields,andcost-effectiveness(Man-sofar,theyhaveledtoincreasedmonitoringandsourietal.2023;Liangetal.2023b).Uncertaintyamongtransparencyinsupplychains(LambinandFurumofarmersaboutthesefertilizers’benefits—whichcanvary2023).Tobesuccessful,avarietyofcomplementarydependingonproductformulation,soil,temperature,supply-anddemand-sideapproachesareneededandotherconditions—andlackofresearchintoscaling(LambinandFurumo2023),accompaniedbystrongupuseofthesefertilizersmaybeconstrainingfactorsgovernanceandenforcementofforestprotectionlaws(Searchingeretal.2019;Fergusonetal.2019).(Garrettetal.2019).Newinitiativesareaimingtoacceleratereductionofagriculturalproductionemissionsandbuildsustainableproductivitygains.Forexample,theAgricultureInno-vationMissionforClimate(AIMforClimate)isseekingtoincreaseinvestmentinresearch,development,anddemonstration(RD&D)toaccelerateinnovationthroughmanyofthepotentialmitigationpracticesdescribedaboveandhasgrowntobecomeacoalitionofover400partners,including47countries.Launchedbythegov-ernmentsoftheUnitedStatesandUnitedArabEmiratesatCOP26in2021,itsmembershaveraisedmorethan$8billionasofearly2023andhaveannounced30“innova-tionsprints.”These“sprints”focusonentericmethane,boostingproductivityandresilienceoncroplandandpastures,optimizationofnitrogenuse,smallholdersoilfertilitymanagement,agroforestry,riceproduction,andFoodandAgricultureSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2022137Recentdevelopmentsinsuchactionshasincreasedsubstantially,fromcountriesreducingfoodlossandrepresenting14percentoftheglobalpopulationatthewasteendof2018tocountriesrepresenting35percentoftheglobalpopulationbytheendof2021.AnencouragingThe“Target-Measure-Act”approachcanhelpguiderecentexampleofcountry-levelactionisinChina,whereeffortstoreducefoodlossandwaste.Despitebeingthegovernmentpassedawide-ranginglawin2021tohalfwaythroughtheimplementationoftheSustainablereducefoodwasteattheconsumerlevel,includingfinesDevelopmentGoalslaunchedin2015,withgoalssetforforfoodserviceestablishmentswithexcessivefood2030,progressislaggingontheadoptionoftarget-set-preparation,joiningthefewcountrieswithmeasurestinginboththepublicandprivatesector.Between2019toenforcefoodwastereduction(Shenetal.2023).Inand2021,justonenewcountry(Argentina)settargetsJuly2023,theEuropeanCommissionalsoproposedinlinewiththeSDGTarget12.3,meaningthatabout55legallybindingtargetsformemberstatestoachieveapercentoftheworld’spopulationisnowrepresentedby10percentreductioninfoodlossesinprocessingandgovernmentswithfoodlossandwastetargets(Lipinskimanufacturingand30percentpercapitareductionin2022).Anadditionalsevenoftheworld’s50largestfoodretailandhouseholdwasteby2030(EuropeanCom-companiessetfoodlossandwastetargetsduringthatmission2023g).AlthoughtheEuropeanCommission’speriod,bringingthetotalnumberofcompanieswithproposedtargetsarestillundernegotiationandarelessfoodlossandwastetargetsto39(includingalloftheambitiousthanSDGTarget12.3,theyillustrateprogressretailerswithinthe50largestcompanies)(Lipinski2022).towardlegallyrequiringfoodlossandwastereductions.CompanieshavealsobeenscalingupactionstoreduceWhilesettingtargetscanhelpestablishambitionandfoodlossandwaste,withthenumberofcompaniesguidesubsequentpoliciesandactions,measuringfoodwithestablishedfoodlossandwasteprogramshavinglossandwasteisnotonlycriticaltomonitorprogressgrownfrom11attheendof2018to29bytheendof2021.towardthesetargetsbutalsotohelpunderstandwhereNotably,IngkaGroup(IKEA’slargestretailer)wastheactionsareprovingeffective(ornot)inreducingfoodfirstcompanyintheworldtosuccessfullyhalvefoodlossandwaste.Unfortunately,fewcountriessystem-waste,achievingthisreductionbetween2017and2021aticallymeasurefoodlossandwastethroughoutthe(IngkaGroup2022).supplychainaccordingtothelatestavailabledata.Between2019and2021,onlysevengovernmentsbeganWhileitisencouragingthatbothpublicandprivatemeasuringtheirfoodlossandwaste,bringingthetotalsectordecision-makershavebegunmakingcom-to19countriesrepresenting12percentoftheglobalmitmentsandtakingactiontoreducefoodlossandpopulation(Lipinski2022).Thesecountriesincludedwaste,measurableglobaldecreasesinthenextfewArgentina,Australia,Canada,Colombia,Denmark,yearswillrequirerapidlyincreasingtheadoptionofnewIsrael,Italy,Japan,Finland,Mexico,theNetherlands,technologies,suchasinnovativestoragesystemsandNewZealand,Norway,SaudiArabia,Slovenia,Spain,technologytoslowtheripeningofproduce,andotherSweden,theUnitedKingdom,andtheUnitedStates.Theinterventions,suchaschangestodatelabels,reducedUNagencies’effortstomonitorprogressattheglobalportionsizes,facilitationofthedonationofunsoldfood,levelthroughtheFoodLossIndex(FAO2019)andFoodandfoodwastediversionlaws.IncreasedfinancialWasteIndex(UNEP2021e)providestandardmethodsforservices(e.g.,affordableaccesstocredit)forproducersgovernmentstomeasurefoodlossandwasteinorderintheGlobalSouth,aswellasmodifyingincentivestoincreasecountry-leveldataovertime.Comparedto(e.g.,subsidies)toreducefoodlossandwasteinthegovernments,ahigherproportionoftheworld’slargestGlobalNorth,arepotentialwaystoaccelerateprogresscompanieshavebeenmakingprogressintermsof(Cattaneoetal.2021;WorldBank2020).measuringandreportingtheirfoodlossandwaste;4moreofthe50largestfoodcompaniesbeganmeasur-Recentdevelopmentsiningandreportingbetween2019and2021,bringingtheadvancingdietaryshiftsintotalto19companies,10ofwhichareengagingwiththeirhigh-consumingregionssupplierstoreducewaste(Lipinski2022).TheimportanceofshiftingdietsasaclimatemitigationLastly,whilesettingtargetsandmeasuringprogresssolutionisalsobeginningtoenterinternationalclimateareessential,reducingfoodlossandwasteatamean-policyconversations.FortheirRacetoZeroandRaceingfulscalewillrequirenumerousactionsacrossfoodtoResiliencecampaigns,theUnitedNationsClimatesupplychains(Flanaganetal.2019).GovernmentsChangeHigh-LevelChampionshavesetanevenmoreandcompaniescanleadinmotivatingsuchactions,ambitioustargetthanthisreport,callingfor40percentthoughproducers,citizens,andotheractorswillalsooftheglobalpopulationtoshifttoculturallyappropri-playimportantrolesinadvancingprogress.OnaateversionsofthePlanetaryHealthDietby2030,aspromisingnote,thenumberofcountriesimplementingFoodandAgricultureSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023138describedbytheEAT-LancetCommission(Falketal.suchasnationaldietaryguidelines—thatinfluencefood2020;High-LevelChampionsn.d.;Willettetal.2019).productionandconsumptionpatternstomakethemThePlanetaryHealthDietfocusesonnumerouschangesmorecompatiblewithclimateandotherenvironmentaltocurrentdietarypatterns—inadditiontoreducinggoals(Springmannetal.2020).TheDanishgovernment,ruminantmeatconsumption—withagoaltooptimizeforexample,releasedupdateddietaryguidelinesinmultiplehealthandsustainabilityoutcomes(Willettetal.2021thatconsideredtheclimateimpactoffoodsforthe2019).WhiletheUnitedNationsClimateChangeHigh-firsttime;theguidelinesincludedrecommendationsLevelChampionsrepresentnonstatestakeholders,theirtoincreaselegumeandvegetableconsumptionandprioritiessignifyincreasingpressureongovernmentstotoreducemeatconsumption(FoodNationn.d.).Publicaddressthem.Thispressureisimportantgiventhat,asandprivateinstitutionscanalsousetheirpurchasingofSeptember2022,only5outof134countries’updatedpowertoprocurefoodthatisbothhealthierandlowerNDCsincludedmeasuresforshiftingtosustainableandinemissions(SwenssonandTartanac2020).Forexam-healthydiets,comparedto94countriesthatincludedple,acollectionofmorethan60leadingfoodservicemitigationmeasuresforagriculture(WWF2022).providersundertheCoolfoodinitiativehavemadesomepromisingprogressusingacombinationofcollectiveBoththepublicandprivatesectorhaveasignificanttarget-setting,monitoringofprogress,andapplicationpotentialtoshiftfoodconsumptionthroughinfluencingofbehavioralscience“nudges”(Box17).Andwhilepolicytheavailability,affordability,convenience,anddesir-effortsatthenationallevelhavebeenrelativelylimited,abilityofdifferentfoods(HerforthandAhmed2015).Governmentscanimprovepoliciesandregulations—BOX17ShiftingtomoresustainabledietsinfoodserviceTheCoolfoodPledge,launchedin2019,helpslargefoodTABLEB17.1CoolfoodPledgememberprogressbysec-providers(includingrestaurantchains,contractcaterers,torthrough2022citygovernments,universities,andhospitals)measureandreducetheclimateimpactofthefoodtheyserve.SECTORNUMBEROFCHANGEMembersofthepledgecommittocollectivelyreducingMEMBERSINGHGtheirfood-relatedGHGemissionsby25percentby2030.CitySUBMITTINGEMISSIONSEachyear,theyreporttheirannualfoodpurchasestoCompanyDATAPER1,000KCALtrackGHGemissionsovertime,andtheyusebehavioralHealthcareTHROUGH2022sciencetoshifttheirfoodofferingsinamoreplant-for-Restaurant5(%)ward,climate-friendlydirectionwhilemaintainingUniversity10customersatisfaction.MostmembersarebasedintheTotal23-24Americas,Europe,andOceania,wherepercapitameat4consumptionishigh,butseveralarebasedinAsiaas6-4well.Asof2023,theCoolfoodinitiativeincludesmore48than60members.-21TheCoolfoodPledge’searlyadopters,acohortofnearly-750membersincludinglargeorganizationslikeIKEAandservingnearlyabillionmealsperyear,havereduced-19theirfood-relatedGHGemissionsintensityper1,000kcalby10percentthrough2022,relativetoa2015–18baseline-10(ChoandWaite2023)(Table8).86City,university,andhealthcaremembershavereducedemissionsintensityNotes:GHG=greenhousegas;kcal=kilocalorie.Datashownforthefastest,aheadofthepaceneededtohitthe2030memberswhojoinedtheCoolfoodPledgepriorto2022.targetshowninIndicator1.RestaurantsandcorporatecampusesarealsomakingprogressbutataslowerSources:CoolfoodmemberfoodprocurementdatafromChopace.ThisprogresshascomeaboutthroughashiftandWaite(2023).GHGemissionscalculationsbasedonPooreandawayfromruminantmeats,andotheranimal-basedNemecek(2018);andSearchingeretal.(2018).foods,andtowardplant-basedfoods(TableB17.1).FoodandAgricultureSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023139BOX17Shiftingtomoresustainabledietsinfoodservice(continued)SeveralenablingconditionshavecontributedtoCool-andplanandtestinterventionsthroughastructuredfood’searlysuccess.Asatarget-settingandactionprocesseachyear.Somemembershaveseensuccessinitiative,Coolfoodreliesonleadershipfromprivateandincorporatinginnovativeplant-basedmeatanddairypublicsectorfoodproviders.Theseleaderscommittoalternativeingredientsintofavoritemeals.SomeCool-anambitiouscollectiveclimatetarget,andsome,likefoodmembers,likeU.S.-basedrestaurantchainPanera,NewYorkCitywitha33percentreductiontargetbyhaveincorporatedecolabelinganddirectconsumer2030,committoevenmoreambitiousindividualtargets.engagementintotheirstrategy,puttingaCoolfoodMembersthenthinkthroughmeasurestohelpshiftbadgesymbolindicatingwhichmealsarelow-carbonconsumerdemandtowardlow-carbonfoodswithintheirdirectlyonmenus,bothinstoresandintheironlinediningestablishments.Theydrawfromrecentbehavioralorderingapp.Overtime,theCoolfoodinitiativeaimstoresearch,suchasthePlaybookforGuidingDinerstowardshiftsocialnormsanddemonstratethatclimateactionPlant-RichDishesinFoodService(Attwoodetal.2020)canandmustbedelicious.Notes:GHG=greenhousegas;kcal=kilocalories.theriseoftheMilanUrbanFoodPolicyPactlaunchedseveralyears.Althoughtheirsaleshavebeengrowing,in2015andnowsignedbymorethan200cities(MUFPPmostremainmoreexpensivethantheiranimal-based2023)andtheC40CitiesGoodFoodCitiesAcceleratorcounterpartsandtheirmarketsharehasremainedlaunchedin2019andnowsignedby16cities(C40Citiesrelativelysmall;forexample,itincreasedfrom1percent2023)havedemonstratedtheleadershiprolethatin2019(GFI2020)to1.3percent2022intheUnitedStatesmunicipalitiescanplayinadvancingmoresustainable(GFI2023c).Cultivatedmeat,whichismeatproducedandclimate-friendlyfoodsystems.Morerecently,thebyinvitroculturesofanimalcells,isnowbeingsoldinFoodforthePlanetcampaignintheUnitedKingdomlimitedquantitiesintwocountries(Singaporeandthelaunchedin2021withatoolkitofsuggestedpolicies,UnitedStates),startingthefirstwaveofcommercial-planning,andotheractionsforlocalcouncilstodriveizedproductsfollowingregulatoryapprovalin2020actiononfood,climate,andnature;sincethen,moreand2023,respectively(GFI2023b;Huling2020).Itisnotthan50localitieshavecompletedactionsrecom-clear,however,howfinanciallyviablecultivatedmeatmendedinthetoolkit(SustainableFoodPlaces2023).willbeforwidespreadadoption.ThecostofproducingAndin2023,theU.S.ConferenceofMayorspassedacultivatedmeatiscurrentlyestimatedatbetweenresolutiontosupportashifttowardmoreplant-based$150and$22,423perkilogram(Vergeeretal.2021),withdietstoaddresschronicdisease,climatechange,anddifferentstudiesprojectingitspotentialtodecreasetofinancialsustainability(U.S.ConferenceofMayors2023).$6.43–$116(Vergeeretal.2021),$17–$35(Negulescuetal.2023),and$63(Garrisonetal.2022)perkilogramatWhilepoliciesandinterventionstoencourageconsum-thecommercialscale,comparedtoawholesalepriceerstoshifttowardmoreplant-richdietsareneededof$8.75perkilogramforconventionalbeefin2022toachieveclimategoalsandimprovehumanhealth,(USDA2023).Moreaffordablecellculturemediaandadvancing—andsustaining—dietarybehaviorchangesbioreactordesignarekeychallengestoovercometoischallenging,withlimitedprogressmadethusfar.achievethesepricereductions(Garrisonetal.2022;Replacingorreducingruminantmeatinpeople’sdietsNegulescuetal.2023).PublicspendingtosupportR&Dwithalternativeproteinsthatprovideasimilarexperi-andcommercializationforalternativeproteinshasencetomeatanddairybutaresourcedfromplants,beensteadilyincreasing—morethandoublingtoreachfungi,orthroughtissueculturerepresentonepromising$635millionin2022alone(GFI2023a).Atthesametime,routetoloweringruminantmeatconsumptionwhiletheseinvestmentswillneedtoscaleupsubstantiallyforreducingthebehavior-changechallenge.Comparedalternativeproteinstoreachtasteandpriceparitywithtoruminantmeat,plant-basedmeatsubstitutes,animal-basedmeatandachievewidespreadconsumerfermentation-derivedmicrobialproteins,and(whenacceptance,withoneanalysisestimatingthatglobalproducedusingrenewableenergy)cultivatedmeatspublicspendingwillneedtoincreaseto$10.1billionpercouldallcontributetosubstantialreductionsinGHGyear(VividEconomics2021).Interventionstoinfluenceemissionsandmostotherharmfulenvironmentalsocialnormsandincreasepositivefeelingsaboutdiffer-impacts(Bryant2022;Humpenöderetal.2022;Santoetentalternativeproteinsmayalsopromoteacceptanceal.2020;Sinkeetal.2023).Plant-basedmeatsubstitutes(Onwezenetal.2021).havebeenonthemarketinhigh-incomecountriesforFoodandAgricultureSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023140SECTION8TechnologicalCarbonRemovalAsacomplementtodeepandrapidemissions6,ForestsandLand.Notethat“technological”doesnotreductions,allpathwaysthatlimitwarmingtoperfectlydescribethetypesofcarbonremovalcovered1.5°Calsorelyoncarbondioxideremoval(CDR,inthissection,whichincludeapproachesthatarenovelalsohereafterreferredtoascarbonremoval),87includingandnotyetprovidinglarge-scaleremoval,andinsomenature-basedapproachesandtechnologicalcarboncasesarecombinationsoftechnologicalandbiologicalremovalmethods(IPCC2022b).Theseapproachesareornaturalapproaches.neededtoremoveexcessCO2intheatmospheretostaywithinthecarbonbudgetavailableforlimitingtempera-tureriseto1.5°C.Intheyearsleadinguptothemiddleofthecentury,carbonremovalcancounterbalanceGHGemissionsforwhichabatementtechnologiesdonotbecomeavailable(e.g.,someheavyindustry,non-CO2emissionsfromagriculture).88Inthelongerterm,carbonremovalcanhelpreduceatmosphericCO2concentra-tionsclosertopreindustriallevels(Honeggeretal.2021;BergmanandRinberg2021).Carbonremovalincludesarangeofactivities,fromnature-basedapproacheslikereforestation,peatlandrewetting,andmangroverestorationtomoretechno-logicalapproaches,suchasdirectaircapture(DAC),carbonmineralization,andbiomasscarbonremovalandsequestration(Figure62,Box18).Onlythesenewer,technologicalapproachesarecoveredinthissection,whilenature-basedapproachesarecoveredinSectionFIGURE62RangeofcarbonremovalapproachesonlandandintheoceanREMOVALREMOVALMETHODPROCESSLand-basedbiologicalChemicalGeochemicalOcean-basedbiologicalCARBONAfforestation,SoilcarbonBiomasscarbonDirectairEnhancedPeatlandOceanSeaweedOceanreforestation,sequestrationremovalandstoragecarboncaptureweatheringandcoastalalkalinitycultivationfertilizationImprovedforest(e.g.,biochar,BECCS)enchance-managementandstoragewetland(DACCS)restorationmentIMPLEMENTATIONAgroforestryAgriculturalCroppingandSolidsorbentSilicateRewettingCarbonateSinkingtoIronpracticesforestryresiduesLiquidsolventrocksRevegetationrocksthedeepfertilizationTreeplanting,silviculturePastureUrbanandindustrialSilicateoceanN&PmanagementorganicwasterocksfertilizationOPTIONSTimberinconstructionPurpose-grownbiomasscropsEnhancedBio-basedupwellingproductsEARTHLANDOCEANSYSTEMSSTORAGEBuildingsVegetation,soils,andsedimentsGeologicalformationsMineralsVegetations,soils,MineralsMarinesedimentMEDIUMandsedimentsTIMESCALEOFSTORAGEDecadestoCenturiesto10,000yearscenturiesmillenniaorlongerNotes:BECCS=bioenergywithcarboncaptureandsequestration;N&P=nitrogenandphosphorus.Approachesoutlinedinredareconsideredinthissection.ThosenotoutlinedinredareconsideredinSection6,ForestsandLand.Source:IPCC(2022b).TechnologicalCarbonRemovalSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023142Somecarbonremovaltechnologiesarereadyfordeployment,butmanyrequirefurtherdevelopmentordemonstrationtoimproveprocessesandreducecostsand/orresearchtoresolveuncertaintiesandpotentialrisks(Fussetal.2018;Smithetal.2023;NASEM2019).Andtheyallincludetrade-offsthatwillneedtobeevaluatedonacase-by-casebasis,takinglocalimpactsandconcernsintoaccount.Developingarobustportfolioofapproachescanhelpinreducingcosts,minimizingrisks,andbalancingthetrade-offsassociatedwithanyonesolution(Mulliganetal.2020;Ruedaetal.2021).Aportfoliothatincludesonlynature-basedapproaches,forinstance,facesconstraintsonlandareaavailabilityanduncertaintyaroundpermanence(i.e.,treessequesteringcarboncanbecutdownorburninawildfire).Atthesametime,atechnology-onlyportfoliowouldbemorecostlyandlackmanyoftheco-benefitsthatnaturalapproachesBOX18OptionsfortechnologicalcarbonremovalThefollowingtechnologicalcarbonremovalmochemicalorbiochemicalpathways.Scalingupapproachesareincludedinsome,butnotall,biomass-basedpathwaysfacesbarriersandchal-modelscenariosanalyzedbytheIPCC;somelenges,includingaccessingbiomassfeedstocks(e.g.,directaircaptureandbioenergywithcarbonthatavoidnegativeorunintendedimpactsonbio-captureandstorage)mustbecombinedwithper-diversity,agriculturalproduction,andlivelihoodsmanentsequestrationtoresultinremoval,whileandthatresultinoverallnetemissionsreductions.others,suchascarbonmineralization,includeBioenergywithcarboncaptureandsequestra-permanentsequestrationintheircaptureprocess.tion,atypeofBiCRS,showsupmostinclimatemodelscenariosamongtechnologicalcarbonDirectaircapture(DAC):Directaircaptureremovalmethods.Tonnesofbiomass-basedinvolvesmachinesthatusechemicalsthatcarbonremovalhavesoldforlessthan$100/tCO2selectivelyreactwithcarbondioxideintheair;thetomorethan$600/tCO2onvoluntarymarketscarbondioxidecanthenbestoredpermanently.(Höglund2022).AsofJuly2023,thereare27DACplantsglobally;thelargestonetodayremoves0.004MtCO2/yrandCarbonmineralization:CarbonmineralizationisispoweredbygeothermalenergyinIceland(IEAasetofapproachesthatacceleratethenatural2023q).Highcost,inpartduetoenergyneeds,isreactionsbetweensometypesofmineralsandamajorbarriertomorerapidscale-upofdirectcarbondioxide,resultinginsolidcarbonatesthataircapture,butcostisexpectedtodeclineaslockawaycarbon.Furtherresearchwillbeneededmoreprojectsprovidelearningandoptimizationtoidentifyoptimalapplicationparameters(e.g.,opportunities(NASEM2019;LacknerandAzarabadimineraltype,location,particlesize),understand2021).TonnesofCO2removedbyDAChavesoldecologicalandenvironmentalimpacts(especiallyforaround$300/tCO2tomorethan$2,000/tCO2onforocean-basedapproaches),anddeveloprobustvoluntarymarkets(Höglund2022).monitoringandverificationapproaches(Sandalowetal.2021).Tonnesofmineralization-basedcarbonBiomasscarbonremovalandstorage(BiCRS):removalhavesoldfor$75/tCO2uptomorethanBiCRSapproachesusebiomasstocapturecarbon$1,300/tCO2onvoluntarymarkets(Höglund2022).dioxidethroughphotosynthesisandthenstorethatbiomassunderground.Insomecases,thebiomassisconvertedbeforeitissequesteredusingther-Notes:IPCC=IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange;MtCO2/yr=milliontonnesofcarbondioxideperyear.TechnologicalCarbonRemovalSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023143canprovideforresilienceandbiodiversity.Forexample,Suchscale-upwillneedtobeimplementedinawayDACisenergy-intensivebutusescomparativelylittlethatprioritizesequityanddoesnotreplicatethepastlandand,whencoupledwithgeologicsequestration,harmsthatlarge-scaleinfrastructurebuild-outhasresultsinpermanentstorage;treeplantingprovidesinflictedoncommunities.Forinstance,intheUnitedmanyco-benefitsbutrequirescomparativelymorelandStates,environmentalburdenssuchaspollutionfromandcanbereversable(e.g.,throughwildfires);andsomeindustrialfacilitieshavelongfallendisproportionatelyocean-basedapproacheshavelargetheoreticalpoten-onlow-incomecommunitiesandcommunitiesofcolortialbutmanyecologicalandgovernanceuncertainties(SkeltonandMiller2016).Questionsthatneedtobe(Leblingetal.2022b).answeredincludehowtofairlysharetheresponsibilityofdeployingcarbonremovalamongcountriesandoverTheamountofcarbonremovalultimatelyrequiredtime(Fysonetal.2020;Leblingetal.2023);howtoidentifytoavoidintensifyingclimateimpactsisinverselycarbonremovalprojectsitesandconfigureprojectssoproportionaltothespeedandscaleofemissionsthattheydonotdisproportionatelyburdenvulnerablereduction—themoreemissionsreductionsthereareincommunitiesandcanprovidelocalbenefits;howtothenearterm,thelesscarbonremovalwillbeneededconsistencyandcrediblyquantify,transparentlyshare,toreachglobalclimategoals(Prützetal.2023).Climateandverifyinformationonremovals;andwhetherandmodelingscenariosanalyzedbytheIPCCshowawidehowcarbonremovalprojectscanleverageskillsandrangeofrelianceontechnologicalcarbonremovalexpertiseofjobslostinthefossilfuelsector(e.g.,frommethods(IPCC2018,2022b).However,theIPCC’scoalminingtominingrocksforcarbonmineralization).assessmentincludessomescenariosthatmayuseunsustainableamountsoflandforbiomassfeedstockGlobalassessmentproductionandnotesthatdependenceoncarbonofprogressforremovalcanbesignificantlyreducedwhereresourcetechnologicalcarbonefficiency,sustainabledevelopment,and/orlowfutureremovalenergydemandareprioritized(IPCC2022b).ThetargetslaidoutinthisreportusetheIPCC’sscenariosforhowAkeyindicatorfortrackingprogresstowardthescale-upmuchcarbonremovalisneededtostaybelow1.5°Coftechnologicalcarbonremovalisidentifyinghowwithnoorlowovershoot,withfilteringtoonlyincludemanytonnesofCO2havebeencapturedfromtheairscenariosthatmeetsustainabilityconstraints;namely,bycarbonremovaltechnologiesandsequesteredrestrictedrelianceonbioenergywithcarboncapturepermanently(Table8).Tomeetthisdefinitionoftech-andstorage(BECCS).Thetargetrangeisthensetbasednologicalcarbonremoval,CO2mustbecapturedonthe5thto95thpercentileoftherangeoftechnolog-fromtheatmosphereratherthanatapointsourceicalcarbonremovalneededinthesefilteredscenarios.likeacementplant.89ThenitmustbesequesteredCarbonremovaltechnologiesprovide30–690MtCO2ofpermanently90—forexample,throughstorageindeepremovalperyearby2030;by2050,rangesspanfrom740undergroundgeologicalformationsorthecreationofMtCO2peryearto5,500MtCO2peryear.Achievingevenstablecarbonateminerals—orstoredindurableprod-thelowerendofthe2030targetwouldrequirescalingucts,suchasconcrete.upmorethan65-foldfromtoday’slevelofremoval.TABLE8SummaryofglobalprogresstowardtechnologicalcarbonremovaltargetINDICATORMOSTRECENTDATA203020352050TRAJECTORYACCELERATIONSTATUSPOINT(YEAR)TARGETTARGETTARGETOFCHANGEFACTORTechnologicalcarbonremoval(MtCO2/yr)0.5730–690N/A740–5,500>10x(2022)Notes:MtCO2/yr=milliontonnesofcarbondioxideperyear.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromU.S.EPA(2023b);Climeworks(2021);andHöglund(2022);targetsderivedfromIPCC(2022c);andFussetal.(2018).TechnologicalCarbonRemovalSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023144TECHNOLOGICALCARBONREMOVAL•DACcapacityisaround0.008MtCO2/yr(IEA2022d),INDICATOR1:butonlyaroundhalfofthatcapturedCO2isstoredTechnologicalCarbonpermanently,namelythroughthe0.004MtCO2/yrRemoval(MtCO2/yr)OrcaDACplantinIcelandrunbytheSwisscompany•Targets:TheannualrateoftechnologicalcarbonClimeworks.OthersmallerDACprojectsmayberemovalreaches30–690milliontonnesofcarbonsequesteringCO2aswell,buttheydonotpubliclydioxideperyear(MtCO2/yr)by2030and740–5,500disclosehowmuchtheyhaveremoved.MtCO2/yrby2050.•Forbiomasscarbonremoval,oneethanolfacilitywithAssessingprogressofcarbonremovalscale-upisdifficult,asnocentralizedorcomprehensivedata-carboncaptureandstorage(whichisconsideredbasetracksremovalratesacrosstechnologiesandapproaches,andnotalldataarounddirectpurchasescarbonremovalsincetheCO2wasinitiallycapturedofcarbonremovalcreditsaremadepublic.Consideringfromtheairviaphotosynthesis),locatedintheU.S.progressforeachtechnologyandthenforpurchasesstateofIllinois,sequestered0.44MtCO2in2021,91theofcarbonremovalcreditswithinvoluntarymarketscanlatestyearforwhichdataareavailable(U.S.EPAhelpprovideasense—albeitanincompleteone—ofwheretechnologicalcarbonremovalscale-upstands.2023b).The2021numberisassumedfor2022intheTodaylessthan1MtCO2/yrcomesfromtechnologicalcarbonremoval.absenceofupdateddata.TheonlyotherfacilityofitskindpermanentlysequesteringCO2becameopera-tionalinJuly2022inNorthDakotaandcapturesandsequesters0.18MtCO2/yr(EERC2022).•Otherpurchasesthatweredeliveredthroughvoluntarymarketsadded0.044MtCO2in2022viapurchasesofcreditsfromDAC,mineralization,andbiomass-basedapproaches(Höglund2022).FIGURE63Historicalprogresstoward2030and2050targetsfortechnologicalcarbonremovalRightDirection,WellOffTrackS-CurvePossibleMtCO2/yrHistoricalCurrentPaceneededtodatatrendreachtargets60002050target0.6740–5,50050004000HISTORICAL3000DATA020222018Accelerationrequiredtoreach2030target>10x20002022data2030target2040205010000.5730–6900202020302010Notes:MtCO2/yr=milliontonnesofcarbondioxideperyear.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indica-tors,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromU.S.EPA(2023b);Climeworks(2021);andHöglund(2022).TargetsderivedfromIPCC(2022b);andFussetal.(2018).TechnologicalCarbonRemovalSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023145DataareincompleteandincludeonlywhatisreportedFIGURE64Totalsalesanddeliveriesofcarbonpublicly.Thiscomestoanestimated0.57MtCO2in2022,and,althoughthistotaldemonstratesameaningfulremovalcreditsimprovementfromrecenttrends,itstillamountstolessthan1percentofthemidpointofthetargetamountMtCO2ofcarbonremovalneededby2030(Figure63).The4historicalrateofchangewouldneedtoacceleratemorethan10-foldtomeetthe2030target.Reachingthelower3.5Totalboundtargetby2030wouldbeequivalenttobuildingmorethan3ofthelargestDACplantsinoperationtodaysales(4,000tCO2/yrscale)everydayuntil2030.Reachingtheupperboundwouldmeanbuilding73ofthisscale3projecteveryday.2.5Ifsomeofthecurrentbarrierstouptakeoftechnolog-icalcarbonremovalareovercome,anS-curvegrowth2trajectoryispossible.Eventhoughthenumberoftonnesremovedtodayissmallandallcarbonremovaltechnol-1.5ogiesremainintheemergencephase—suchthatglobalprogressmadetowardthisnear-termtargetiscatego-1rizedaswellofftrack—themomentumneededtodrivechangeisrapidlyacceleratingintermsofcommitments0.5October2020February2022Totalandinvestment.deliveries0RecentdevelopmentsJune2019April2023acrosstechnologicalcarbonremovalNote:MtCO2=milliontonnesofcarbondioxide.Includespurchasesoftonnesremovedbydirectaircapture,mineralization,Injustthelastfiveorsoyears,carbonremovaltech-electrochemicaloceancarbondioxideremoval(CDR),biomass-nologieshavetransformedfromanicheconcepttobasedCDR(biochar,bio-oilinjection),andmacroalgaecultivation.acommoncomponentofclimateactionportfolios,supportedbybillionsofdollarsinpublicfundingandSource:HöglundandNiparko(2023).hundredsofmillionsofdollarsofprivateinvestment(Frontier2023;U.S.Congress2021).Thetotalsalesof2022;Pontecorvo2023).Andinlate2022,theEuropeantechnologicalcarbonremovalcreditsonthevoluntaryCommissionlauncheditsproposalforaCarbonmarkethavegrownexponentially,providingsomeRemovalCertificationFramework(CRCF),thefirstpublicindicationofwherethesectorasawholeisheaded,andsectorvoluntarycertificationframeworkforhigh-qualityhighlightingthatmanypurchasesinthisnewindustrycarbonremoval.DevelopmentoftheCRCFisjustthefirstarebeingmadeinadvanceofprojectcompletionstepinthisprocess;bylate2023orearly2024itwillbe(Figure64).TheUnitedStates(Box19)andseveralotherdiscussedintheEuropeanParliamentandthentrans-countrieshavebeenearlyleadershere,andinterestformedintolegislationandcertificationmethodologiesisbeginningtobroaden.AccordingtothefirstStateoftailoredtoeachtypeofcarbonremoval.TheaimofthisCarbonDioxideRemovalreport,launchedinearly2023,frameworkistoimprovethecredibilityofCDRprojectspeer-reviewedscientificliteratureoncarbonremovalandhelpdrivescale-upaccordingly.92nowconsistsofnearly30,000English-languagestudies(Smithetal.2023).Eachofthepastseveralyearshasseenaflurryofannouncements,investments,supportivepolicies,andnewCDRcompanieslaunching(Figure65).Forexam-ple,inthespaceofayear,twotradeassociationsforcarbonremovalcompanieswerelaunched—theCarbonBusinessCouncilinmid-2022andtheCarbonRemovalAllianceinFebruary2023.Bothaimtoadvancepoliciestosupporttheplethoraoffast-growingCDRcompaniesindeliveringcarbonremoval(CarbonBusinessCouncilTechnologicalCarbonRemovalSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023146FIGURE65SelectedrecentactionssupportingdevelopmentanddeploymentofcarbonremovaltechnologiesActionbypublicandprivateentitiesUKlaunchesCalifornia’sLowMissionU.S.GovernmentCanadiangovernmentNextGenJPMorgan£8.6millionCarbonFuelInnovationaddsappropriates$4.6announcesinvestmentcommitstocommits$200GHGremovalstandardrevisedcarbonremovalbilliontoCO2taxcreditforDAC,buyingmilliontoresearchtoincludecreditmissiontransportandcarbonsequestration200,000tCO2carbonremovalprogramforDACstorage(andcarboncapture)removalprojectsinfrastructureprojectsU.S.GovernmentStripemakesfirst$100millionU.S.Government$925millionUSfirstinvestmentinprivatesectorcarboncarbonremovalappropriatesFrontierFundannouncescarbonremovalremovalinvestmentXPRIZEis$3.5billiontoannouncedfor$1.2billioninresearchofof$1millionannouncedDAChubsadvancedfundingforUS$60millioncarbonremovalDACpurchasesprojects2017201820192020202120222023EngineeringU.S.GovernmentTheWorldU.S.announcesEUproposesbeginsonMtCO2enactsenergybillEconomicForum’s“CarbonNegativeCarbonRemovalperyearscalewithhundredsofFirstMoversShot”todecreasetheCertificationDACplant,usingmillionsformulti-yearCoalitionincludescostofremovaltoFrameworkCarbonCDRprogramsandDACasakey$100pertCO2overEngineering’sincreasesannualtechnologythenextdecadetechnologyspendingonCDRU.S.45QtaxMicrosoftcreatesClimeworks’DACClimeworksU.S.InflationReductionFirstDACU.S.Governmentcreditis$1billionfundforplantinIceland,thereceivesActincreases45Qprototypeinfundingforcarbonincreasedtocarbonremoval,largestintheworld,record$650taxcredittoAfricaunveiled,removalRD&D$35–$50/tCO2reduction,andremoving4,000million$130–$180/tCO2withplanstoreaches$140sequesteredcapturetCO2peryearinvestmentcapturedviaDAC,buildDACmillion;includescomesonlineamongotherplantsby2025creationofpilotenhancementspurchasingfacilityNotes:CDR=carbondioxideremoval;CO2=carbondioxide;DAC=directaircapture;EU=EuropeanUnion;GHG=greenhousegas;MtCO2=milliontonnesofcarbondioxide;RD&D=research,development,anddemonstration;tCO2=tonnesofcarbondioxide;UK=UnitedKingdom;US=UnitedStates.Thisfigureshowsselectedhighlightsofactionsandactivitiestheauthorsidentifiedtobemostimportantinthecarbonremovalspace.Source:Authors.TechnologicalCarbonRemovalSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023147BOX19U.S.actiononcarbonremovalAsthelargestcumulativehistoricalGHGemitter,ProcurementofcarbonremovalisalsogainingtheUnitedStateshasaresponsibilitytoleadcar-interest.The2023appropriationsbilldirectedthebonremovaldevelopmentanddeploymenttohelpDepartmentofEnergytodevelopapilotprocure-cleanuptheseemissions(Fysonetal.2020).Thementprogram.AndlegislativeproposalshavealsoLong-TermStrategyoftheUnitedStatesoutlinesbeenintroducedthroughlarger-scaleprocure-theneedforaroundhalfabilliontonnesoftech-mentofanincreasingnumberoftonnesofcarbonnologicalcarbonremovalintheUnitedStatesbyremovalatdecliningpricesatthefederallevel(themidcentury,alongwithdeepdecarbonizationandFederalCDRLeadershipActandtheCRESTAct)andcarbonremovalfromnature-basedapproaches,inthestatesofCaliforniaandMassachusetts(U.S.likereforestation(U.S.DepartmentofState2021).HouseofRepresentatives2022;U.S.Senate2022c;CommonwealthofMassachusetts2023).ThestateU.S.governmentandprivatesectorinterestandofCaliforniahasalsointroducedabillthatwouldactionhasincreasedmassivelytohelpmeetthisrequirecompaniestopurchasecarbonremovaltostrategy.Federalinvestmentinresearchhasgrowncompensateforanincreasingpercentageoftheirfromnearzerobefore2020tomorethan$140remainingemissionsthrough2045,whenthestatemillionin2023(U.S.Senate2022a).Moreover,in2021hasanet-zerogreenhousegasemissionstargetamajorinfrastructurelawprovided$3.5billion—the(StateofCalifornia2023a).Thesepoliciescouldlargest-everinfluxoffundingforcarbonremovalallhelpcreatedemandandgreatercertaintyforanywhere—tobuildfour“DAChubs”thatcaneachsuppliersofcarbonremoval.captureandstoreoruse1MtCO2/yr,plusanaddi-tional$115millionforDACtechnologycompetitionAsmomentumaroundcarbonremovalintheprizes.Inthatsameyear,theDepartmentofEnergyUnitedStatesgrowsrapidly,theprivatesectorisannounceda“CarbonNegativeShot”initiativetoalsodemonstratingincreasedinterestinscalingreducethepriceofcarbonremovalto$100/tCO2upcarbonremovaltechnologies.CompaniesremovedoverthefollowingdecadeforpathwayslikeStripe,Microsoft,andShopifyhaveinvestedthatcanreachgigatonnescale(U.S.DOE2021).Inhundredsofmillionsofdollarsinearlypurchases2022,theInflationReductionActmorethantripledofcarbonremovaltonnesandhavemadeeffortsthelevelofsupportforCO2removalwithDAC,tomaketheirprocessestransparenttoprovidefrom$50/tCO2to$180/tCO2(U.S.Senate2022b).Aslearningforothers(Stripe2021;Microsoft2021).context,pricesforcarbonremovalpertonneofInmid-2022,acoalitionofcompanies,includingCO2varywidelytoday,withpurchasersofcarbonStripeandShopify,launchedFrontier,acom-removaltonnespayingontheorderof$100/tCO2mitmenttopurchase$925millioninpermanentforsomecarbonmineralizationapproachestocarbonremovalbetween2022and2030(Frontiermorethan$2,000/tCO2forsomeDACpurchases2023).Thiscommitmenthelpsprovidethedemand(Höglund2022).signalforcarbonremovalcompaniestomakeinvestmentstoincreasetheirsupply.Notes:DAC=directaircapture;GHG=greenhousegas;tCO2=tonnesofcarbondioxide.Atthesametime,thereissomeconcernandupcarbonpollution,theyalsohavelocalimpacts(e.g.,skepticismaboutthegrowingmomentumbehindland,energy,andwaterusage)thatmustbebettertechnologicalcarbonremoval.Somehighlighttheriskunderstoodandassessedonaproject-by-projectbasis.thatcarbonremovalcandistractfromtheneededfocusonandinvestmentinGHGemissionsreductionsRegulationsandgovernancestructureswillneedtobetoday(Grantetal.2021;Markussonetal.2018;Templecreatedandstrengthenedtoensurethattheindustry2021),whileotherscriticizethelackofactualremovalsisscaledinanequitable—andsustainable—manneraccountedfortodate(Temple2021).Somegroups(Maceetal.2021;Leblingetal.2023).Improvingexist-havealsoexpressedconcernthatwhiletheseproj-inggovernanceframeworkscouldincludearangeofectsprovidethedispersed,publicbenefitofcleaningpublicandprivatesectorinterventionsatmanylevelsTechnologicalCarbonRemovalSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023148(e.g.,international,national,state,project),whichcould(Fraser2022).Thirdpartiesthatapproveprivatesectorhelptoincreasepublicacceptanceandsupportforclimatecommitmentscanprovideguidanceonrelativethetechnologies.levelsofemissionsreductionandcarbonremovalwhenmeetingclimategoals.Atthegovernmentalscale,forexample,nationalgovernmentscanincluderequirementsforcommunityForexample,theUNhigh-levelexpertgroupontheengagementandconsiderationofenvironmentalandnet-zeroemissionscommitmentsofnonstateentitiessocialimpactsofcarbonremovalprojectsasprereq-hasrecommendedthatanet-zerotargetbebasedonuisitesforprojectdeveloperstoreceivefederalfundingapathwaytonetzerogroundedinarobustmethod(Allenetal.2022;Leblingetal.2022a).Nationalorstateconsistentwithlimitingwarmingto1.5°C,withemissionsgovernmentscanalsosetlegalminimumlimitsonthefallingasclosetozeroaspossibleandresidualemis-levelofemissionsreductionsinmeetingnationalorstatesionsbalancedbypermanentremovals,verifiedbyaclimategoals(e.g.,80–90percentemissionsreductionscredibleandindependentthirdparty.Thegrouphaswith10–20percentoftheoriginalemissionscounter-alsorecommendedthatregulatorsdevelopregulationsbalancedbycarbonremoval)tohelpavoidrelianceandstandardsfornet-zerotargetstoensuretheircredi-oncarbonremovalinplaceofemissionsreductions,abilityandpreventgreenwashing(UNHLEG2022).concernknownasmitigationdeterrence.Moreclearlydefiningwhatcountsas“hard-to-abate”andeligibletoTherearealsorolesforinternationalorganizationsandbecounterbalancedbycarbonremovalwouldhelpjus-civilsocietyorganizationstoplayinimprovinggover-tifythesedefinitions(Leblingetal.2023).Simultaneously,nanceoftechnologicalcarbonremoval.Forinstance,nationalandsubnationalgovernmentscanensurethatinternationalorganizationscanstrengthenexistingdataexistingzoningandinfrastructureplanningregulationsandinventorysystems,ensurethataccountingrulesaresufficienttoregulatenewcarbonremovalinfra-arerobust,andcreateincentivesforandengagewithstructureandthattheydonotconcentrateanylocallythecarbonremovalresearchcommunity(Maceetal.unwantedlandusesnearmarginalizedcommunities2021).Simultaneously,civilsocietyorganizationscanuse(Leblingetal.2022a).theirplatformsandresourcestoholdgovernmentandprivatesectoractorstoaccount,advocateformargin-Withintheprivatesector,governancestructurescanalizedcommunities,andemphasizetheimportanceofalsobeestablishedtoaiduptake.Privatesectorpur-transparencyindecision-makingprocesses.Ultimately,chasersofcarbonremoval,andplatformsthatcertifygovernments,theprivatesector,andcivilsocietywillallandsellcarbonremovalcreditsforvoluntarymarkets,needtoworktogethertostrengthenthesegovernanceforinstance,canincludesustainability,communityframeworksastheindustrycontinuestogrow.engagement,andotherrelevantstipulationsforcreditstobeboughtorsoldashigh-qualityoptions.Projectdeveloperscanalsousecommunitybenefitagreements(bindingcontractsbetweendevelopersoflarge-scaleprojectsandcommunitiesthatrepresentresidents’interests)orotherlegalinstrumentstoensurethatcom-munitiesreceivedesiredbenefitslikelocalemploymentopportunitiesorothertypesofcommunityinvestmentTechnologicalCarbonRemovalSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023149SECTION9FinanceFinanceisavitalenablerofclimateaction,butinvestmentinthezero-carboneconomyneedstobecurrentinvestmentpatternsarehinderingthemanytimesgreaterthanthelevelofinvestmentinfossilspeedandscaleofthetransitiontozero-carbonfuelsandotherhigh-emissionsactivities(IEA2023m).economies.Transformingpower,buildings,industry,Thedecisionspublicandprivateactorsmakeabouttransport,forestsandland,andfoodandagriculture,whattheyinvestinwilldeterminehowfastthetransitionaswellasscalingupcarbonremovaltechnologies,toanet-zeroworldtakesplace.willallrequiresignificantincreasesinclimatefinance,aswellasabroadertransformationofthefinancialGlobalassessmentofsystem(IPCC2022b).Continuedinvestmentinfossilprogressforfinancefuels,commoditiesthatdrivedeforestation,andotherhigh-emissionsactivitiesatcurrentlevelswillputtheTransformingtheglobalfinancialsystemtosupportParisAgreement’s1.5°Ctemperaturelimitoutofreach.ambitiousclimateactionentailsbothscalingupTherefore,atthesametimeasscalingupclimateclimatefinanceandaligningallfinancewiththeParisinvestment,itisessentialtophaseoutinvestmentsinAgreement’sgoals.Scalingupclimatefinanceincludeshigh-emissionsactivities.Doingonewithouttheotherwillbeinsufficienttomeetclimategoals;thelevelofTABLE9SummaryofglobalprogresstowardfinancetargetsINDICATORMOSTRECENT203020352050LIKELIHOODACCELERATIONSTATUSDATAPOINTTARGETTARGETTARGETOFFACTOR(YEAR)FOLLOWINGANS-CURVEGlobaltotalclimatefinance0.855.2N/A5.18x(trillionUS$/yr)a(2021)Globalpublicclimate0.3321.31–2.61N/A1.29–2.578xfinance(trillion$/yr)b(2020)Globalprivateclimate0.3332.61–3.92N/A2.57–3.86>10xfinance(trillion$/yr)b(2020)Ratioofinvestmentin1:17:110:110:1>10xlow-carbontofossil(2023)(2040)fuelenergysupplyShareofglobalGHG2075N/A1001.5xemissionsunder(2022)mandatorycorporateclimateriskdisclosure(%)cWeightedaveragecarbon23170–290N/A430–990>10xpriceinjurisdictions(2023)withemissionspricing000N/A;systems(2015$/tCO2e)1,100U-turnneeded(2021)dTotalpublicfinancingforfossilfuels(billion$/yr)Notes:GHG=greenhousegas;tCO2e=tonneofcarbondioxideequivalent;yr=year.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.aThisindicatorincludespublicandprivate,aswellasdomesticandinternational,flows.bTheseindicatorsincludedomesticandinternationalflows.cJurisdictionsincludedin2022areBrazil,Egypt,India,Japan,NewZealand,Singapore,Switzerland,theUnitedKingdom,andtheEuropeanUnion.Disclosurerequirementsarenotuniformamongcountriesandapplytodifferentorselecttypesoffirms(e.g.,financialinstitutionsorpubliclytradedfirms)withdiverseimplementationtimelines.Weconsiderjurisdictionsthatimplementedanyformofmandatoryrequirementduringtheyearitwasapproved,evenifitentersintoforceinphaseswithdifferenttimelines.Thisapproachcanresultinanoverestimationasimplementa-tiontimelinesareenforcedovertheyearsindifferentstages.dDataareacompilationofproductionandconsumptionsubsidies,G20state-ownedentityfossilfuelcapitalexpenditure,andinternationalpublicfossilfuelfinancefrommultilateraldevelopmentbanksandG20countries’developmentfinanceinstitutionsandexportcreditagencies.Sources:HistoricaldatafromNaranetal.(2022);IEA(2023m);TCFD(2022);WuandUddin(2022);Naik(2021);ClimateWatch(2023);WorldBank(2023a);OECDandIISD(2023);Laanetal.(2023);andOCI(2023).TargetsfromIPCC(2018,2022b);IEA(2021b);OECD(2017);UNEP(2021b,2021f);Lubisetal.(2022);ClimateAnalyticsandWorldResourcesInstitute(2021);G7(2016);G20(2009);andUNFCCC(2022a).FinanceSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023151rampingupfundinginallcountries,frombothpublictoworkinenablingthenet-zerotransformation.Gov-andprivateactors.AligningfinancewiththeParisernmentshavealarge,well-tested,andeffectivetoolkitAgreementincludesensuringthatamuchhigherratioforshiftingprivateinvestments.Thisincludestraditionalofinvestmentgoestolow-carbonenergycomparedsectoralenvironmentalregulationsthatcanforcetofossilfuels;measuring,reporting,andmanagingcompaniestoinvestincleanertechnologies,aswellasclimaterisks;accountingforthefullclimatecostsofGHGfinance-specificpolicies,suchasfinancialregulation,emissionsthroughcarbonpricingmechanisms;andfiscal,andmonetarypolicy(Whitleyetal.2018).Muchofendingpublicfinancingforfossilfuels.Whilerecentratesthediscussionaroundmobilizingprivateclimateinvest-ofchangeacrossallbutoneoftheseshiftsareheadingmenthasfocusedon“de-risking”incentivesintheformintherightdirection,theyremainwellbelowthepaceofsubsidiestoprivateactors.Theseproverbial“carrots”required(Table9).canplayanimportantrole,especiallywhendirectedatgettingfinancetoflowtounderservedcountries,com-Scaleupclimatefinancemunities,andpromisingnewtechnologies.Alongsidethis,governmentscanuse“sticks,”includingregulationAsignificantincreaseinclimateinvestmentwillbeandtaxation,toprovidemarketswithpolicycertaintyneededtosuccessfullylimitglobaltemperaturerisetothatthetransitiontonet-zeroeconomiesisinevitable1.5°C.Whileestimatesvary,manyconvergearound$4andirreversible,andtodirectprivatefinancewhereitistrillionto$5trillionperyeargloballybetween2030andneededtoenablethistransition(Gabor2021).2050toinvestintransformingenergy,transport,agricul-ture,andlandusetobenetzero(OECD2017;IEA2021b;AnydiscussionoffinancemustalsoconsiderissuesofNaranetal.2022;IPCC2022b).Thisfigure,$5trillionperequityandjustice(Robins2020).Bothgreenhousegasyear,amountstoaround5percentofglobalGDP(Naranemissionsandclimateresiliencearecloselyconnectedetal.2022),andbothpublicandprivateclimatefinancetowealth.Thepoorestcountriesandcommunitieswillneedtoincreasetomeetthesegoals.havedonelittletocausetheclimatecrisisbutaremostvulnerabletoitsimpacts(seeFigure66).ThisisadoubleScalinguppublicfinance,bothdomesticandinterna-injustice.Theincreasedcostsofdealingwithimpactsoftional,isvitaltoensuringarapidtransitiontonet-zeroclimatechangereducestheresourcesthepooresthaveandresilientsocieties.Thisisespeciallytrueforareastoinvestinmitigation.Providingadequatefinancingwheretheprivatesectorisnotwellsuitedtomeetingforthepoorestandmostvulnerablecommunities,andobjectivesatthespeedandscalenecessary.Thismakingsuretheyhaveasayinhowfinanceisused,isincludesfundingpublicservicesandinfrastructurethereforeimperativeforensuringanequitableandjust(e.g.,transportationandenergynetworks);research,transition.Theseequityprinciplesapplybothbetweendevelopment,anddeploymentofnewtechnologies;andwithincountries.jobtraining;andecosystemprotectionandrestoration.Publicfinancealsoplaysapivotalroleinsupporting,Lookingatequitybetweencountries,lower-incomecreating,andshapingmarkets,includingthroughpublicstatesfacegreaterbarrierstoclimateinvestmentthanprocurement,aswellasincatalyzingprivateinvestmentrichnations.Inlower-incomecountries,smallertaxinnewtechnologiesandregions(OECDetal.2018).Lastly,baseslimittheirfiscalpolicy,lackofforeignexchangepublicfinanceisimportantforensuringequitableout-reserveslimittheirmonetarypolicy,andthehighercostcomesandajusttransition.Itcanhelpensureaccesstoofcapitallimitstheirabilitytoborrowfrominternationalfinanceforindividualsandgovernmentswhomaynotcapitalmarkets.Theythereforeneedinternationalotherwisebeabletoraiseresourcesforclimateaction.Politicians,especiallyinrichercountries,frequentlyclaimthatinsufficientpublicfundsareavailable(Chemnick2022).Yetthelastfewyearshaveshownclearlythatgovernmentspendingbymajoreconomiesinthetrillionsofdollarsispossibletoaddressothercrises.G20governmentsmobilized$14trillioninfiscalspendingin2020–21todealwiththeCOVIDpandemic(Nahmetal.2022).Governmentmilitaryspendinghasexceeded$2.2trillionperyearsince2019(Liangetal.2023a).Itisclear,therefore,thatpublicspendingatthescaleoftrillionsofdollarsiseconomicallypossible.Itisjustnotyethap-peningforclimate.Itisalsovitaltoscaleupclimatefinancefromtheprivatesector.Assetoutabove,privatefinanceisnotasubstituteforpublicinvestment,butthevastamountofcapitalunderprivatecontrolcanandshouldbeputFinanceSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023152FIGURE66PercapitaandabsoluteCO2consumptionemissionsbyfourglobalincomegroupsin2015tCO2percapitain2015TotalCO2emissionspergroupin201580Emissions7%Emissions15%60PopulationPopulationbottom50%top1%incomeearnerincomeearner40Totalglobalemissions20Population35.5GtCO2top10%incomeearnerEmissions48%02.1tCO2Emissions44%Top1%Top10%MiddleBottomGlobalaveragePopulationpercapitabottom40%incomeincome40%50%consumptionincomeearneremissionstargetearnerearnerincomeincomeby2030for1.5°CearnerearnerNotes:CO2=carbondioxide;GtCO2=gigatonnesofcarbondioxide;tCO2=tonnesofcarbondioxide.PercapitaCO2consumptionemissions,andabsoluteCO2consumptionemissionsbyfourglobalincomegroupsin2015,comparedwithemissions-reductiontargetsfor2030forlimitingwarmingto1.5ºC.Incomethresholdsin2015areaccordingtoUS$purchasingpowerparityin2011:1percent>$109,000;10percent>$38,000;middle40percent>$6,000;poorest50percent<$6,000.Source:UNEP(2020b).supporttoenablethemtoequitablytransitiontoandadaptationinthepoorestcountries,whichhavenet-zeroeconomiesatthespeedandscalerequiredtohistoricallyemittedless,arehitfirstandworstbyclimatereachglobalnetzerobymidcentury.Inthepastcouplechange,andhavetheleastcapacitytorecoverfromofyears,variousassessmentshaveattemptedtobreakcrises.Tothisend,developedcountrieshavetakenondownhowmuchoftheexternalfinancingsupportdevel-obligationsundertheUNFCCCandtheParisAgreementopingcountriesneed.TheIPCCestimatesdevelopingtoprovideclimatefinancefordevelopingcountriescountrieswouldneed$1.4trillionto$2.8trillionperyear(UNFCCC1992,2015),buttheyhavenotyetfulfilledupuntil2030justtofinanceinvestmentsinmitigation,theircommitments.comparedtodevelopedcountries,whichneed$0.9tril-lionto$1.7trillionperyear(IPCC2022b).TheIndependentRegardingequitywithincountries,equityprinciplesHigh-LevelExpertGrouponClimateFinance,convenedsuggesttheeffortofraisingpublicfinanceshouldbebytheEgyptianPresidencyofCOP27,theUKPresidencysharedfairly,withtherichestindividualsandcompaniesofCOP26,andtheUnitedNationsClimateChangecontributingmoreintaxrevenues,andthebenefitsofHigh-LevelChampionsforCOP26andCOP27,estimatedclimateinvestmentsdirectedtowardthosemostinneed.thatinvestmentneedsforclimateaction(bothadapta-Thisisamatternotmerelyofmoralitybutalsoofeffec-tionandmitigation)indevelopingcountries,excludingtiveness:alarge-scalesurveyof40,000respondentsChina,wouldbebetween$2trillionto$2.8trillionperin20countriesfoundthatclimatepoliciesfinancedyearby2030,andthat$1trillionofthiswouldneedtothroughprogressivetaxationandwithprogressiveusecomefromexternalsources(Songweetal.2022).ofrevenuesgarnergreatersupport(Dechezleprêtreetal.2022).AnexampleofprogressivetaxationiswindfallGiventhis,governmentsagreedacoreprincipleofthetaxesonrecordprofitsbyfossilfuelcompanies,whichUNclimateconventionthatgovernstheinternationalhavebeenimplementedbytheEuropeanUnionandresponsetotheclimatecrisisof“commonbutdifferen-manyindividualEuropeangovernmentsduringthetiatedresponsibilitiesandrespectivecapabilities.”Thisenergycrisis(Reuters2022).Severalgovernmentsarerecognizesthatwhileallcountrieshavearesponsibilityalsomakingincreasedeffortstoensurethattheout-toaddressclimatechange,somecountrieshaveacomesofpublicclimateinvestmentsaddresstheneedslargerresponsibilityduetogreaterGHGemissionsandofcommunitiesthathavehistoricallybornethebruntmorecapabilitytoinvestinclimateaction.Furthermore,richercountriesshouldhelpsupportdecarbonizationFinanceSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023153ofpollutingactivities,andworkersinsectorsthatwillFINANCEINDICATOR1:beparticularlyaffectedbydecarbonization.Forexam-ple,theEuropeanUnion’sJustTransitionMechanismGlobaltotalclimatefinanceprovidesdedicatedfinancialresourcestoregionswith(trillion$/yr)theleastresourcesandfacingthegreatestchallengesinphasingouthigh-emissionsactivities(WRI2021),while•Targets:Globalclimatefinanceflows(publicandtheU.S.Justice40Initiativesetsagoalthat40percentofthebenefitsfromfederalinvestmentsinclimateandprivate,domesticandinternational)reach$5.2trillioncleanenergyflowtodisadvantagedcommunities(Whiteperyearby2030and$5.1trillionperyearby2050.House2021).Privateclimateinvestments,ataminimum,shouldaimtoavoidcausingharmtocommunitiesandQuantitativemeasuresofclimatefinanceflowsaretoredressanynegativeimpactsthatdooccur.Ideally,difficulttocaptureandestimategivenavailabledatatheseinvestmentsshouldalsoprioritizetheneedsofanddefinitionalchallenges.93ClimatePolicyInitiativethepoorestandmostvulnerablecommunitiesand(CPI)estimatesthatinthefiveyearspreceding2021,givethemasayinwherefinanceisdirectedandhowclimatefinanceincreasedbyanaverageof$61.6billionitisused.Governmentregulationandoversightwillbeperyear.94In2021,CPIestimatedthattotalglobalflowsofimportanttoensurethatpublicandprivateclimateclimatefinance,includingpublicandprivate,domesticinvestmentsrespecthumanrightsandenvironmentalandinternationalflows,reached$850billionto$940bil-standardsandthattheyarefocusedondeliveringalion,anall-timehigh(Naranetal.2022).Bycomparison,justtransition.thatsameyear,totalglobalinvestmentinfossilfuelswasestimatedat$915billion(IEA2023m).Climatefinancejumpedconsiderablybetween2020and2021—byatFIGURE67Historicalprogresstoward2030and2050targetsforglobaltotalclimatefinanceRightDirection,WellOffTrackS-CurveUnlikelytrillionUS$/yrHistoricalCurrentPaceneededtodatatrendreachtargets655.25.12030target2050target4322021dataAcceleration0.858xrequiredtoreach12030target020202030204020502010Note:yr=year.Thisindicatorincludespublicandprivate,aswellasdomesticandinternational,flows.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinforma-tiononmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromNaranetal.(2022).TargetsderivedfromIPCC(2018,2022b);IEA(2021b);OECD(2017);andUNEP(2021b,2021f).FinanceSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023154least$185billion,or27percent—ameaningfulimprove-excludingChina,by2030(Songweetal.2022).Ofclimatementrelativetorecenttrends,butprogressremainsfinanceinnon-OECDcountriesin2020,$171billion(44wellofftrack.Globalclimatefinancestillneedstomorepercent)wasinternationalclimatefinanceflows,andthanquintupletoreachthetargetof$5.2trillionperyearnearlyafifthoftheseinternationalflows,$31billion,by2030.Thisequatestoanaverageincreaseof$490camefromothernon-OECDcountries(Naranetal.2022).billionperyear—roughlyeighttimesfasterthanrecentincreases(Figure67).AfterthisreportwentthroughpeerFINANCEINDICATOR2:review,Buchneretal.(2023)publishednewdatathatindicatesignificantincreasesintrackedtotalglobalGlobalpublicclimatefinanceclimatefinance.Flowsreached$1.1trillionin2021and$1.4(trillion$/yr)trillionin2022.TheseincreaseswereconcentratedinChina,theUnitedStates,Europe,Brazil,Japan,andIndia,•Targets:Globalpublicclimatefinanceflows(domes-aswellasintherenewableenergyandtransportsec-tors.Butevenwhenconsideringthesegains,substantialticandinternational)reach$1.31trillionto$2.61trillionincreaseswillberequiredby2030.peryearby2030,and$1.29trillionto$2.57trillionperyearby2050.Theneedforsignificantlyincreasedclimateinvestmentisparticularlyacuteindevelopingcountries.In2020,Globalpublicclimatefinanceflowsamountedto$332totalclimatefinanceinnon-OECDcountrieswasjustbillionin2020,increasingby$19.2billionperyear,on$392billion,witharoundhalfofthisinChinaaloneaverage,between2016and2020.However,public(Naranetal.2022;Choietal.2021).Thisisthereforelessclimatefinancefellslightlyin2020fromanall-timehighthana10thoftheatleast$2trillionperyearinestimatedof$337billionin2019(Naranetal.2022)—aworseningclimateinvestmentneededindevelopingcountries,relativetorecenttrends.Basedonavailabledata,95recentincreasesinpublicclimatefinanceremainwellofftrack—totalfundswouldneedtoincreasemorethanFIGURE68Historicalprogresstoward2030and2050targetsforglobalpublicclimatefinanceRightDirection,WellOffTrackS-CurveUnlikelytrillionUS$/yrHistoricalCurrentPaceneededtodatatrendreachtargets32030target2050target2.51.31–2.611.29–2.572Accelerationrequiredtoreach1.52030target8x12020data0.50.332020202030204020502010Note:yr=year.Thisindicatorincludesdomesticandinternationalflows.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromNaranetal.(2022).TargetsderivedfromIPCC(2018,2022b);IEA(2021b);OECD(2017);andUNEP(2021b,2021f).FinanceSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023155sixfoldtoreachthe$2trillionperyearmidpointofthenationalsources)inabsolutetermswereinvestedinEasttargetrangeby2030.ThisrequiresanaveragegrowthAsiaandthePacific($180billion).Proportionately,publicof$162billionperyearbetween2020and2030—roughlyclimatefinanceisthemostimportantsourceoffinanceeighttimesfasterthanrecentincreases(Figure68).Newinsub-SaharanAfrica,makingupnearly90percent($17datafromBuchneretal.(2023),whichwerepublishedbillion)oftheregion’stotal(Buchneretal.2021).Climateafterthisreportwentthroughpeerreview,indicatefinanceisnotallocatedequitablyeitheramongorwithinsignificantincreasesinglobalpublicclimatefinance.regions,withsomecountriesreceivingfargreatersumsFlowsreached$549billionin2021and$730billioninthanothers(seeFigure69).Inadditiontoscalingup2022.Butevenwiththesegains,substantialincreaseswilloverallfinance,thereisaneedtoaddresstheinequityinberequiredby2030.wherefinanceflows.Onaveragebetween2019and2020,73percent($233FINANCEINDICATOR3:billion)ofglobalpublicclimatefinancewasprojectfinancing(54percentasmarketratedebt,15percentGlobalprivateclimatefinancelow-costdebt,and4percentequity),15percent($48(trillion$/yr)billion)wasbalancesheetfinancing(11percentasdebt,4percentequity),and11percent($35billion)wasgrants.•Targets:Globalprivateclimatefinanceflows(domes-Developmentfinanceinstitutions(DFIs)providedthemajorityofpublicfinancein2019–20(69percent,$220ticandinternational)reach$2.61trillionto$3.92trillionbillion),with$120billioncomingfromnationalDFIs,$65peryearby2030,and$2.57trillionto$3.86trillionbillionfrommultilateralDFIs,and$35billionfrombilat-peryearby2050.eralDFIs.Duringthesametimeperiod,anestimated37percentofpublicclimatefinanceflowedinternationally.Globalprivateclimatefinanceallocationsfromfinan-Publicfinancewasthelargestsourceofinternationalcialinstitutions,institutionalinvestors,corporations,climatefinance,accountingfor79percentoftotalandhouseholdsamountedto$333billionin2020,96aclimatefinanceflowingacrossborders.Thelargestflowscontinuationofrecenttrendsofanaverage$26.5billionofpublicclimatefinance(frombothdomesticandinter-growthperyearbetween2016and2020(Naranetal.2022).Althoughheadingintherightdirection,currentFIGURE69Destinationregionofclimatefinance,bypublicandprivatesources(billionU.S.dollars),2019–20annualaverageEasternEuropeandCentralAsiaWesternEurope$33bnUSandCanada$105bn$20bn$83bn$43bn$13bn$62bnPublic$4bnEastAsiaandPacificPrivate$79bnMiddleEastandNorthAfrica$292bnSouthAsia$16bn$180bn$113bn$9bn$30bn$7bn$19bn$11bnLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanTransregional$35bnSub-SaharanAfricaOtherOceania$11bn$18bn$19bn$9bn$17bn$11bn$17bn$1bn$2bn$8bnNote:bn=billion;US=UnitedStates.Source:Buchneretal.(2021).FinanceSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023156effortsremainwellofftrackfromthe2030and2050tar-privatesources.Onaveragebetween2019and2020,68gets.Totalprivateclimatefinancewillneedtoincreasepercent($212billion)ofglobalprivateclimatefinancemorethan10-foldby2030toreach$3.3trillionperyearwasbalancesheetfinancing(46percentasdebtand22(midpointforthetargetrangefor2030).Thisrequiresanpercentequity),and31percent($97billion)wasprojectaveragegrowthof$293billionmoreeachyearbetweenfinance(19percentasmarket-ratedebtand12percent2020and2030,over10timesfasterthanhistoricalgrowthequity)(Buchneretal.2021).rates(Figure70).NewdatafromBuchneretal.(2023),whichwerepublishedafterthisreportwentthroughAlargemajorityofclimatefinanceintheUnitedStatespeerreview,indicatesignificantincreasesinglobalandCanada(95percent)andOceania(88percent)privateclimatefinance.Flowsreached$565billionincamefromprivatesources(Figure71).InWesternEurope,2021and$685billionin2022.Butevenwiththesegains,privatesourcesaccountedfor60percent.Conversely,insubstantialincreaseswillberequiredby2030.sub-SaharanAfrica,privatefinanceaccountedforjust12percentoftheregion’stotalclimatefinance(BuchneretCorporationsaccountedforthelargestshareofprivateal.2021).Privateclimatefinanceindevelopingcountriesclimatefinancein2019–20,with$124billioninvested.Theymobilizedbydevelopedcountries’publicinterventionswerecloselyfollowedbycommercialfinancialinstitu-was$13.1billionin2020(OECD2022a),97accountingfortions,whichfinanced$122billionin2019–20—upfrom$48just3.9percentofglobalprivateclimatefinanceflows.billionin2017–18,representingthelargestgrowthamongFIGURE70Historicalprogresstoward2030and2050targetsforglobalprivateclimatefinanceRightDirection,WellOffTrackS-CurveUnlikelytrillionUS$/yrHistoricalCurrentPaceneededtodatatrendreachtargets4.52030target2050target42.61–3.922.57–3.863.532.5Accelerationrequiredtoreach22030target>10x1.512020data0.50.333020202030204020502010Notes:yr=year.Thisindicatorincludesdomesticandinternationalflows.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromNaranetal.(2022).TargetsderivedfromIPCC(2018,2022b);IEA(2021b);OECD(2017);andUNEP(2021b,2021f).FinanceSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023157FIGURE71Shareofclimatefinanceoriginatingneeds(UnitedNations2023).Avarietyofpoliciesandregulationscanalsohelpcurbfinancingforfossilfuelsfromprivatesources,annualandotheractivitiesincompatiblewitha1.5°Cpathway,average2019–20includingbetterclimateriskintegrationformarketpar-ticipantsthroughclimatedisclosures,policiestopriceinUnitedStatesandCanadathefullcostofgreenhousegasemissions,andanendtoOceaniasubsidiesandotherpublicfinancingforfossilfuels.WesternEuropeDisclosureofclimate-relatedriskscanhelpalignprivateLatinAmericaandtheCarribeansectorfinancialflowswith1.5°CpathwaysbyenablingMiddleEastandNorthAfricacorporations,investors,andregulatorstocorrectlyEasternEuropeandCentralAsiaassessandmanagethoserisks,factoringthemintoEastAsiaandPacifictheircapitalallocationandtransitionplans.ThegrowingSouthAsiaawarenessofclimate-relatedrisksintheprivatesectorSub-SaharanAfricaisalreadydrivingbusinessestoadoptnet-zerotransi-tionplansandadapttheirbusinesses.Butmandatory020406080100disclosurerequirementswillbeneededtostandardizeandmeasureriskacrosstheentireeconomy.RegulatorsPercent(%)alsoneedtoensurethatriskintegrationdoesnotleadtoinequitableoutcomessuchasreducingfinancingtoSource:Buchneretal.(2021).vulnerablecommunitiesaffectedbyclimateimpacts.AlignfinancewiththeParisClimatechangehasbeencalled“thegreatestandwid-Agreementest-rangingmarketfailureeverseen”(Stern2006),witheconomistsarguingthatmarketpricesdonotproperlyInadditiontoscalingupclimatefinance,thereisalsoaccountforthedamagesthatrisingGHGemissionsaneedtocurbfinancingofhigh-emissionsactivitiesinflictoncommunitiesandecosystems.Puttingasuf-thatareincompatiblewiththeParisAgreement’sgoals.ficientlyhighpriceoncarbon—throughexplicitcarbonIncreasingclimatefinancewithoutsimultaneouslypricingorpolicymeasuresthatimposeanimplicitpricephasingoutinvestmentsinhigh-emissionsactivities,onemissions—cansendamarketsignalthatcanhelpsuchasfossilfuelextraction,willnotreduceemissionsshiftinvestmentandconsumptiondecisionssotheyrapidlyenoughtolimittemperatureriseto1.5°C.Scalingcontributetoreducingemissionstoalevelcompat-upclimatefinanceandphasingoutinvestmentsintheiblewitha1.5°Cpathway(IPCC2018).Carbonpricingfossileconomyandotherhigh-emissionsactivitiesareprovided$95billioninrevenuesin2022(WorldBankthereforetwosidesofthesamecoin.2023d),andwideradoptionofcarbonpricinghasthepotentialtoincreasegovernmentrevenues,whichcanThereissomeprogresshere:investmentincleanenergybechanneledintopublicclimatefinance.nowexceedsthatoffossilfuels(IEA2023m).Thisreflectsnotonlythegrowingcommitmentofpublicandpri-Fossilfuelsarethebiggestsourceofgreenhousegasvateinstitutionstofinancethetransitionbutalsotheemissionsdrivingtheclimatecrisis.Phasingoutfossilacceleratingeconomicattractivenessofthezero-car-fuelsubsidiesandotherpublicfinancingforfossilfuelsboneconomyastechnologiesmovealongS-curvesnotonlyreducesadirectsourceoffundingbutalsoandoutcompetetheincumbentfossileconomy.Theprovidesasignaltoprivateinvestors,whomustalsocleanenergyeconomyhasbeguntoreplacethefossileventuallyphaseoutinvestmentinfossilfuels.Govern-economy,butitisnothappeningrapidlyenough.Globalmentsubsidiesreducethecostoffossilfuelsbelowtheinvestmentinfossilfuelsin2023isstillprojectedtoreachmarketprice,effectivelyactingasanegativecarbonover$1trillion(IEA2023m).Notonlyisthephase-downprice,counteractingtheeffectsofcarbonpricingoffossilfuelinvestmentsandretirementoffossilfueledmechanisms.Manyfossilfuelprojectsrelyongovern-assetsnecessaryforreducingemissions,butsomementsupporttobeeconomicallyviable—forexample,ofthesavingsfromdoingsocanbereallocatedtointheUnitedStates,itisestimatedthatproductionincreasingclimatefinance.subsidiesbringnearlyhalfofnew,yet-to-be-developedoilinvestmentsintoprofitability(Ericksonetal.2017)—soCatalyzingafasterfinancialtransitionrequiresreformevenwherepublicfundingconstitutesasmallportionoftheglobalfinancialarchitecturetomakeitmoreoftotalcosts,removingthissupportcaninfluencefarequitableandresponsivetoclimateanddevelopmentgreateramountsofprivateinvestment.TheIPCCfindsthatremovingfossilfuelsubsidiescouldreduceglobalemissionsbetween1percentand10percentby2030whileimprovingpublicrevenues(IPCC2022b).Govern-FinanceSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023158mentinvestmentsinfossilfuelsrepresentasignificantFINANCEINDICATOR4:opportunitycost,sincesuchpublicfundingcouldbedirectedtoclimateinvestmentsthatcouldensureRatioofinvestmentinlow-energyaccess,reduceemissions,andhelpsocietiescarbontofossilfuelenergyadapttoclimateimpacts.Inaddition,thereisevidencesupplythatrecentinflationisprimarilydrivenbyrisingfuelcosts,whichraisesthepriceofproductionandtranspor-•Targets:Theratioofinvestmentsinlow-carbontationofgoods,heatingandcooling,andtransportation.Climateinvestmentsthathelptransitiontocleanenergytofossilfuelenergysupplyincreasesto7:1byandreducedemandforfuelcanreduceinflationary2030andto10:1by2040,withthis10:1ratiosus-pressure(MelodiaandKarlsson2022).Whilenotcoveredtainedthrough2050.hereduetolackofcomprehensivedata,phasingoutsubsidiesforotherhigh-emissionsactivities,includingShiftingallinvestmentfromfossilfuelstolow-carbondeforestation,forestdegradation,andotherharmfulenergysupplyiscriticaltoholdingglobaltemperaturelandimpactsandrelatedcommoditiescouldalsoriseto1.5°C.BasedonananalysisofIPCC,IEA,andreduceemissionswhilepromotingnaturegoalsunderNetworkforGreeningtheFinancialSystemscenariosoftheKunming-MontrealGlobalBiodiversityFramework.long-terminvestmentrequirementsfor1.5°C-alignedpathways,BloombergNewEnergyFinance(BNEF)derivedtargetratiosforinvestmentinlow-carbontofossilenergysupplyof4:1for2021–30(range2:1to6:1),6:1for2031–40(rangeof5:1to9:1),and10:1for2041–50(rangeof6:1to16:1).Forthe2030target,weusethe7:1ratioBNEFcalculatedbasedonalineargrowthtrajectoryfromthecurrentratiotomeetthedecadalaveragetargets(Lubisetal.2022).FIGURE72Historicalprogresstoward2030,2040,and2050targetsforratioofinvestmentinlow-carbontofossilfuelenergysupplyRightDirection,WellOffTrackS-CurveUnlikelyratioHistoricalCurrentPaceneededtodatatrendreachtargets12:12040target2050target10:110:110:12030target8:17:16:14:1Acceleration2023datarequiredtoreach2030target>10x2:11:1020202030204020502010Note:SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromIEA(2023m);targetsfromLubisetal.(2022).FinanceSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023159Thisyear,2023,markedthefirsttimeeverthatandinconsistentqualitythatisnotfullyalignedwiththeinvestmentsinlow-carbonenergysupplyexceededTCFD’srecommendeddisclosures.Thishindersmobi-investmentsinfossilfuelenergysupply:98$1.1trilliontolizationofsufficientcapitalonanaggregatelevelto$1.05trillion(IEA2023m).Althoughinvestmentinlow-car-drivethesystemictransitionneeded(TCFD2022;Binglerbonenergysupplyhasbeenrisinginrecentyears,itetal.2022).Theframeworkhasalsofacedcriticismforisnotrisingfastenough,norisfossilfuelinvestmentitsnarrowfocusonfinancialrisksandopportunitiesdecliningrapidlyenoughtobeconsistentwithholdingthatconcernfinancialreturnswithoutconsideringtemperatureincreaseto1.5°C.Basedoncurrenttrends,otherstakeholdersandnonfinancialimpactsthatmaytheratioofinvestmentinlow-carbonenergysupplytoleadcorporationstoprioritizeriskreductioninsteadoffossilfuelsupply,currently1:1,wouldbeonly1.5:1by2030,buildingresilienceacrossmostvulnerablecommuni-wellofftrackfromthe7:1rationeededfor2030(Figuretiesandactivelycontributingtotheclimatetransition.72).Inadditiontoscalingupinvestmentinlow-carbonGovernmentscanplayacrucialroleinmandatingenergysupply,thereisalsoaneedtoelectrifyendstandardizedandhigh-qualitydisclosuressothereisusessuchastransportationandheatingthatcurrentlyuniversalcoverageanduniformityinreportingaswellasrequirefossilfuels.movingbeyondtheperspectiveoffinancialmateriality.GiventhattheseratiosarebasedonboththelevelofRegulatorsinmostoftheworld’slargesteconomiesandcleanenergyinvestmentincreasingandthelevelofcapitalmarketshavebeenconsideringmandatingsuchfossilfuelinvestmentdecreasing,thestateofplayanddisclosuresandincorporatingthemintothesupervi-driversofchangearesimilartothosesetoutforFinancesionofthecorporateandfinancialsector.In2022,theIndicators1,2,3,and7,namelypoliciesandmeasurestonumberofcountrieswithmandatoryclimate-relatedincreasepublicclimatefinanceandincentivizeprivatedisclosuresgrewto35,includingBrazil,Egypt,India,investmentincleanenergy,andtoreducepublicsup-Japan,NewZealand,Singapore,Switzerland,theUnitedportforfossilfuels.WhatthisindicatorcapturesthatisKingdom,andtheEuropeanUnioncountries(TCFD2022;notincludedinothersisglobaltotalinvestmentinfossilWuandUddin2022;Naik2021).99Theycorrespondtofuels,fromprivatesources,inadditiontopublicfinanceabout20percentofglobalemissions,ameaningfulcapturedinIndicator6.improvementcomparedtorecenttrendsandthepre-viousyear(about3percentin2021)thankstoregulatoryFINANCEINDICATOR5:requirementsinhigh-emittingnationssuchasIndia,Japan,andtheEUcountries.ShareofglobalGHGemissionsundermandatorycorporateAmajorreasonfortheincreaseincoveragewastheclimateriskdisclosure(%)approvaloftheEuropeanUnion’sCorporateSustain-abilityReportingDirective(CSRD),whichwillrequire•Targets:Shareofglobalgreenhousegas(GHG)reportingonawiderangeofsustainabilitydisclosures,includingclimate-relatedrisks,pollution,andtheemissionssubjecttomandatorydisclosuresofcirculareconomy(EuropeanParliament2022).ItwillcorporateclimaterisksalignedwiththeTaskForcealsoexpandthescopeofreportingtoabout50,000onClimate-RelatedFinancialDisclosures(TCFD)entities,includingmorethan10,000non-EUfirms,therebyrecommendationsreach75percentin2030and100effectivelyextendingitsrequirementsbeyondEUborderspercentin2050.(Holger2023).Disclosureofclimate-relatedriskscanhelpcorpora-AlthoughitbuildsontheTCFDframework,theCSRDtionsassesstherisksandopportunitiestheyfacewithgoesbeyonditbyincorporatingthe“doublemateriality”thetransitiontoazero-carboneconomyanddecideconcept,wherecorporationshavetodisclosenotonlywheretotargetinvestmentstoadapttheirbusinesses.howtheenvironmentimpactsthemfinancially(i.e.,Itisoneofthefirststepstheycantakeastheydevelopsinglemateriality)butalsothematerialimpactsoftheirtheirnet-zerotargetsandtransitionplans.Similarly,businessesontheclimateandsociety,includinginreliable,standardized,andcomparabledisclosuresnonfinancialaspects(Täger2021).Thisapproachaimstowillalsoallowfinancialinstitutionsandgovernmentsmakecorporatedisclosuresserveawidergoalofcorpo-todeploycapitalefficientlyandmonitorandmanagerateresponsibilitytosocietyat-largebeyondthenarrowrisksataportfolioandsystemiclevel,complementingfinancialperspective.AstheInternationalSustainabilityothertoolstoalignthemovementofcapitalwitha1.5°CStandardsBoard(ISSB)hasruledoutthedoublemate-pathway.Mostclimateriskdisclosureshavebeenbasedrialityapproachinitsframework,itisuptoregulatoryontheTaskForceonClimate-RelatedFinancialDisclo-bodiestoincludeitintheirmandatoryrequirements(desuresframework,whichhasbeenwidelyadoptedandArriba-Sellier2023;AlexanderandEnsign-Barstow2022).becomethestandardframeworkforclimate-relatedfinancialdisclosures(TCFD2022;KrönerandNewmanDespitetherecentpositivedevelopments,effortsremain2021).However,disclosureonclimaterisksisstillmostlyofftrackandprogresswillneedtooccurabout1.5timesdoneonavoluntarybasis,withincompleteinformationfastertoreachthethree-quarterstargetfor2030.ThereFinanceSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023160isalsoaneedtoensurethatthesedisclosurepoliciesincludeland-basedemissions.Ifafewlarge-emittingcountriesfollowtheexampleofothersinadoptingmandatorydisclosures,coverageofglobalemissionswouldexperiencerapid,nonlinearprogressandrisedra-matically(Figure73).Forexample,ChinaandtheUnitedStatesrepresentabout40percentofglobalemissionscombined(ClimateWatch2023),andbothcountriesarecontemplatingmandatorydisclosurerules,whichwouldgetcoverageontracktothetarget.Additionally,ifmajorcountrymembersoftheInternationalOrganiza-tionofSecuritiesCommissionsfollowtheorganization’sendorsementoftheISSBandcallforitsadoption,thencoveragewouldgrowsignificantlyandaccelerateadoptionacrosstherestoftheworld(IOSCO2023).FIGURE73Historicalprogresstoward2030and2050targetsforshareofglobalGHGemissionsundermandatorycorporateclimateriskdisclosureRightDirection,OffTrackS-CurveUnlikely%HistoricalCurrentPaceneededtodatatrendreachtargets1001002030target2050target80756040Accelerationrequiredtoreach2030target2022data1.5x2020020202030204020502010Notes:GHG=greenhousegas.Jurisdictionsincludedin2022areBrazil,Egypt,India,Japan,NewZealand,Singapore,Switzerland,theUnitedKingdom,andtheEuropeanUnion.Disclosurerequirementsarenotuniformamongcountriesandapplytodifferentorselecttypesoffirms(e.g.,financialinstitutionsorpubliclytradedfirms)withdiverseimplementationtimelines.Weconsiderjurisdictionsthatimplementedanyformofmandatoryrequirementduringtheyearitwasapproved,evenifitentersintoforceinphaseswithdifferenttimelines.Thisapproachcanresultinanoverestimation,asimplementationtimelinesareenforcedovertheyearsindifferentstages.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromTCFD(2022);WuandUddin(2022);Naik(2021);ClimateWatch(2023);andauthors’calculations.TargetsderivedfromClimateAnalyticsandWorldResourcesInstitute(2021).FinanceSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023161FINANCEINDICATOR6:mumendofthetargetrangeof$170/tCO2erequiredby2030tobeconsistentwitha1.5°Cpathway(IPCC2022b;WeightedaveragecarbonWorldBank2023d).Mostjurisdictionswithpricingatorpriceinjurisdictionswithabovethe$40–$80/tCO2erangeareinEurope,joinedemissionspricingsystemsbyonlyUruguayoutsidethecontinent.OnlyUruguay,(2015$/tCO2e)Liechtenstein,Switzerland,andSwedencurrentlyhavecarbonpricingabove$100/tCO2e.Uruguayisnotableas•Targets:Theweightedaveragecarbonpriceintheonlydevelopingcountrywithcarbonpricesabove$40/tCO2e(WorldBank2023a).jurisdictionswithpricingsystemsinplacereaches$170–$290pertonneofcarbondioxideequivalentTheaveragecarbonpriceglobally,weightedbyshareof(tCO2e)in2030and$430–$990/tCO2ein2050.100emissionsinterritoriescoveredbycarbonpricing,was$23.23/tCO2ein2023.AveragecarbonpriceincreasedWell-designedcarbonpricingsystemscouldplayaroleby$2.35peryearonaveragebetween2019and2023inhelpingaligneconomieswitha1.5°Ctrajectory.Butin(WorldBank2023a),andatthisrateofchange,globaljurisdictionswithcarbonpricingsystemsinplace,pricesaveragecarbonpriceswillbe$39.69/tCO2ein2030,areinsufficient—sometimesduetodesignissuessuchfarshortofthetargetrangeof$170–290/tCO2e.Globalasoverallocationofpermitsorinadequatecoverageprogressmadeinincreasingcarbonpricingandofhigh-emittingsectors—tofullyaccountforthecostscoveragethereforeremainswellofftrack,withthemostassociatedwithrisingGHGemissionsortosendastrongrecentyearofdatarepresentingworseningrelativetoenoughsignaltodriveshiftsinbehaviorandinvest-recenttrends.Instead,theaveragepricewouldneedmentsinlinewith1.5°C.Lessthan5percentofglobaltoincreaseby$29.54peryear—morethan10timestheemissionshavecarbonpricingatorabovethe$40–$80/historicalgrowthrate(seeFigure74).AsofApril2023,39tCO2erangethatisestimatedtobeconsistentwitha2°Cpathway,andnoareasarepricingcarbonatthemini-FIGURE74Historicalprogresstoward2030and2050targetsforweightedaveragecarbonpriceinjurisdictionswithemissionspricingsystemsRightDirection,OffTrackS-CurveUnlikely2015US$/tCO2eHistoricalCurrentPaceneededtodatatrendreachtargets12002050target1000430–990800600Accelerationrequiredtoreach2030target>10x2030target400170–2902002023data23020202030204020502010Notes:2015$/tCO2e=2015dollarspertonneofcarbondioxideequivalent.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldataadaptedfromWorldBank(2023a);targetsfromIPCC(2022b).FinanceSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023162countriesand33subnationaljurisdictionshavecarbonpricingthroughacarbontaxoranemissionstrad-ingsystem(ETS).Thereareequityconcernswithcarbonpricing,par-ticularlythatbusinesseswillpassthecostsontoconsumers,makingenergyandtransportationmoreexpensive.Althoughthepoorestemittheleast,theymayfeelagreaterburdenfromcarbonpricingandsubsidyremoval,astheyhavetheleastabilitytopay.Policiestoredistributetherevenuesraisedbycarbonpricingsystemsmoreequitably,suchasrebatesorearmarkedspendingonclimateinvestments,canhelpincreaseacceptabilityandminimizeregressiveimpacts(IPCC2022b).Wheregovernmentscontinuetoprovidefossilfuelsubsidies,thiscounteractsthepricesignalprovidedbycarbonpricingsystems,reducingtheeffectivecarbonprice;carbonpricingismosteffectivewhenpairedwithfossilfuelsubsidyreforms(UNDP2021).FINANCEINDICATOR7:Totalpublicfinancingforfossilfuels(billion$/yr)•Targets:Publicfinancingforfossilfuels,includingsubsidies,isphasedoutby2030,withGroupofSeven(G7)countriesandinternationalfinancialinstitutionsachievingthisby2025.Totalpublicfinancingforfossilfuelsisestimatedatover$1trillionin2021.Ofthistotal,themajority,$732billion,wasproductionandconsumptionsubsidies.101In2021thesesubsidiesincreasedforthefirsttimesince2018,nearlydoublingfrom2020levelsandreachingthehigh-estlevelseensince2014(OECDandIISD2023).Ofthisfossilfuelinvestment,$323billionwasbystate-ownedentitiesofG20countries,an8.5percentincreasefrom2019levels(Laanetal.2023).Anestimated$33billionininternationalpublicfinancingforfossilfuelprojectscamefrommultilateraldevelopmentbanks(MDBs),G20countries’exportcreditagencies,anddevelopmentfinanceinstitutions(DFIs)(OCI2023).Fossilfuelproduc-tionandconsumptionsubsidydataareonlyavailableforareducedsetof82economiesin2021,comparedto192economies(i.e.,near-globalcoverage)in2020andprioryears(OECDandIISD2023).Thefactthatsubsidiesnearlydoubled,evenwithdataavailablefromfewercountries,highlightshowprogresshasstoppedandgoneintoreverse.Thesharpincreasesinfossilfuelsubsidiesin2021alonehavemeantthatglobalpublicfinancingforfossilfuelsoverthelastfiveyearshasincreasedbyanaverageof$5.3billionperyear—acon-cerningworseningrelativetorecenttrends.Itneedstodecreasebyanaverageof$85billionperyearbetween2022and2030tomeetthe2030phaseouttargetdate.Asaresult,progresstowardphasingoutpublicfinancingFinanceSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023163offossilfuelsgloballyby2030haschangedfrombeingproductionsubsidiesawayfromfossilfuelsandtowardwellofftrackin2020tomovinginthewrongdirectioninrenewableenergycanstimulategreaterjobcreation.2021(Figure75).Box20looksinmoredetailatprogressAnanalysisof12studiesaroundtheworldfoundthatforinshiftinginternationalpublicfinanceforenergyoutofevery$1millionspent,1.2to2.8timesasmanyfull-timefossilfuelsandintocleanenergy.equivalent,near-termjobscouldbecreatedifinvestedintherenewableenergyorenergyefficiencysectorsThereareequityconcernsthatendingsubsidiescouldcomparedtothesamelevelofinvestmentinthefossilhurtthepoorestbyincreasingenergycosts.Consump-fuelsector(Jaegeretal.2021).tionsubsidyreformsneedtobewellmanagedandaddressconcernsaboutimpactsonthepoor.Studiesacrossmanycountrieshaveshownthattherichesthouseholdscapturemostofthebenefitsoffossilfuelconsumptionsubsidiesandhavethereforesuggestedthatdirectcashassistancetothepooresthouseholdswouldbeamoreeffectivewayofensuringenergyaccess(Coadyetal.2017).Endingsubsidiescanalsocarrysignificantpoliticalimplications,astheyaresome-timesusedtoshielddomesticconsumersfromexternalpriceshocks.Drasticdomesticenergypriceincreasescanleadtopriceinstabilitythatincreasesthelikeli-hoodofpopularunrestandprotests(McCullochetal.2022;Thöneetal.2010).ModelingsuggeststhatshiftingFIGURE75Historicalprogresstoward2030,2035,and2050targetsfortotalpublicfinancingforfossilfuelsWrongDirection,U-turnNeededS-CurveUnlikelybillionUS$/yrHistoricalCurrentPaceneededtodatatrendreachtargets14002021data12001,10010008006004002002030target2035target2050target000020102020203020402050Notes:yr=year.Thesedataareacompilationofproductionandconsumptionsubsidies,G20state-ownedentityfossilfuelcapitalexpenditure,andinternationalpublicfossilfuelfinancefrommultilateraldevelopmentbanksandG20countries’developmentfinanceinstitutionsandexportcreditagencies.Productionandconsumptionsubsidiesdatawereonlyavailablefor82economiesin2021,comparedto192economiesin2020andprioryears.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.Sources:HistoricaldatafromOECDandIISD(2023);Laanetal.(2023);andOCI(2023).TargetsderivedfromG7(2016);G20(2009);UNFCCC(2022a);IEA(2021b);andIPCC(2022b).FinanceSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023164BOX20ShiftinginternationalpublicenergyfinanceawayfromfossilfuelsandintocleanenergyToday,785millionpeoplelackaccesstoelectricity,energy,meaningtheoveralllevelofinternationalpublicand2.6billionpeopledonothaveaccesstocleanenergyfinanceshouldatminimumbemaintainedcooking(IEA2021a).SustainableDevelopmentGoal7,ifnotincreased.“Ensureaccesstoaffordable,reliable,sustainableandmodernenergyforall”(UNGeneralAssembly2015),ThecountriesandinstitutionsthatsignedtheGlasgowiscurrentlynotontracktobemet.Fossilfuel–basedpledgecurrentlyprovideanestimated$19.5billionapproachesarefailingtodeliverenergyaccessinaperyearininternationalpublicfossilfuelfinancetimelyorcost-effectiveway,withtheUnitedNations’(McGibbon2023).InMay2022,G7climate,energy,SustainableEnergyforAllconcludingthat“financingandenvironmentministersadoptedanear-identicaloffossilfuelprojectsasameansofclosingtheenergycommitment(G72022),whichbringsJapan,theonlyaccessgapshouldbeterminated”(SEforAllandCPIG7memberthathadnotsignedtheCOP26commit-2020).Toprovideuniversalenergyaccessandtoreachment,onboard.Japaneseinternationalfossilfuelnet-zeroemissionsby2050,developingcountriesneedfinanceisestimatedatafurther$11billionperyearover$1trillionperyearincleanenergyinvestment(Dufouretal.2022).by2030,102asevenfoldincreasefromthe$150billionaveragebetween2015and2020(IEA2021a).PublicAsoftheendof2022,thedeadlineformeetingthefinancecanhelpcatalyzecleanenergyinvestment,Glasgowpledge,8ofthe16signatorieswithsignificantbothbyallocatingsignificantsumsoffinanceitselfinternationalpublicfinanceforenergyhadputpoliciesandbyprovidingmarketsignalsforprivateinvestors,inplacethatwerepubliclyavailableandalignedwithwhooftenrelyonpublicfinancingtomakeprojectsintheGlasgowcommitment(Canada,Denmark,thedevelopingcountriesviable.EuropeanInvestmentBank,France,Finland,NewZea-land,Sweden,andtheUnitedKingdom).ThesepoliciesAtCOP26inGlasgow,34countriesand5financialareestimatedtoshift$5.7billionperyearoutoffossilinstitutionspledgedtoendnewpublicsupportforfuelsandintocleanenergy.Overalldataoninterna-internationalunabatedfossilfuelenergybytheendtionalpublicenergyfinancehasshownaconcertedof2022andtoprioritizesupportforthecleanenergydeclineinfossilfuelfinancing,andafterseveralyearstransition(COP26Presidency2021).Thecommitmentofparity,internationalcleanenergyfinanceisnowthewasdesignedwithequityconcernsinmind:ratherlargestshare(FigureB20.1).thansimplycommittingtoendfossilfuelfinancing,whichcouldleavecountrieswithoutfundingforenergyPreviously,actionstoshiftpublicfinancingfromaccess,theprovisiontoshiftfossilfundingintocleanfossilfuelsintocleanenergyweredisjointedanddidnotreceivethemediaattentionthathelpsensureaccountability.GovernmentsraisedconcernsthatFinanceSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023165BOX20Shiftinginternationalpublicenergyfinanceawayfromfossilfuelsandintocleanenergy(continued)unilateralactionwouldputtheirbusinessesataFIGUREB20.1InternationalpublicenergyfinancefromdisadvantagecomparedtoothercountriesthatwouldMDBsandG20countries’exportcreditagenciesandcontinuesubsidizingtheirfossilfuelindustries,partic-developmentfinanceinstitutionsularlythroughexportcreditagencies.ThecoordinatedpublicnatureoftheGlasgowdeclarationhasbeenkeyBillionUS$forgettingaction:governmentsfeltmorecomfortable120actingtogether,civilsocietyhashadacleardeclara-tiontoholdthemaccountableto,andthehigh-profile100collectivecommitmentsentastrongermarketsignaltoprivateinvestorsthangovernmentsactingalone.80NotallsignatoriestotheGlasgowdeclarationhave60implementedtheirpledges.Fourcountries(Germany,NonfossilItaly,Portugal,andtheUnitedStates)havefailedtofuelpublishpoliciesoncompliancewiththeGlasgowcommitment.Theymaybeshiftingwhattheyfinance,40butwithoutclearpoliciesitisdifficulttotellorholdFossilfuelthemaccountable.Fourcountrieshavepublishedpoliciesfallingshortofthecommitment(Belgium,the20Netherlands,Spain,andSwitzerland).Ifthesecountriesweretofulfillthecommitment,afurther$13.7billionper02015201720192021yearwouldbeshiftedfromfossilfuelstocleanenergy2013(McGibbon2023).IfallGlasgowpledgesignatoriesupholdtheircommitment,itwouldclosethegaptoNote:G20=GroupofTwenty;MDB=multilateraldevelopmentbank.meetingthe$100billionperyearclimatefinancegoal,Source:OCI(2023).whichstoodat$17billionasof2020(OECD2022a).RecentdevelopmentsefforttocatchupafterCongresspassedtheInflationacrossfinanceReductionAct.Whileitsheadlinespendinglevel,asassessedbytheCongressionalBudgetOffice,isaroundThelastfewyearshaveseenanumberofmajordevel-$400billion,manyofthetaxcreditsareuncapped,opmentsintheglobaleconomyandpoliticsthathavemeaningoverallspendingcouldbemuchhigher,withhadbothpositiveandnegativeeffectsonthescale-upfinancialanalystsatmajorbanksestimatingtotalofclimatefinanceflowsandalignmentoffinancewithfederalspendingcouldbedoubletotriplethisamountclimategoals.Recentdevelopmentsrelevanttoboth(Jiangetal.2022;GoldmanSachs2023).Theseinvest-shiftsareexploredhere,inturn.mentshavepromptedtheEuropeanUniontoconsiderfurtherpublicclimatespendingofitsown,suggestingRecentdevelopmentsinthepotentialforaracetothetopamongmajorpow-scalingupclimatefinanceersinclimate-focusedindustrialpolicy(HensleyandLappetelainen2023).DomesticclimateinvestmentsRecentdevelopmentsinmajoreconomieshavethebymajoreconomiescanhelpdrivedownthecostofpotentialtoboostclimatefinanceconsiderably.Chinacleanenergyglobally,ashasbeenthecasewithsolarhaslongledtheworldininvestmentinrenewableandwindinvestmentsbyGermanyandChina(Kavlakenergy(IEA2023m),withannualpublicgreenfinancingetal.2018;LacerdaandVanDenBergh2014),helpingestimatedatRMB1.1trillion($162billion)in2017–18(Choietspuremissionsreductionsbeyondthecountrywhereal.2021).TheEuropeanUnionhasatargetfor30percentinvestmenttakesplace(Larsenetal.2023).ofits2021–27budget,anestimated€578billion(around$633billion)togotoclimate(EuropeanCommissionHowever,thepicturefordevelopingcountriesisless2022a).In2022,theUnitedStatesshowedsignsofanpositive.Squeezedbymultiplerecentcrisesincludingtheongoingeffectsofthepandemic,foodandenergyFinanceSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023166pricespikesfollowingtheRussianinvasionofUkraine,Unlockinggreaterlevelsofclimatefinance,includingbroaderinflation,andunsustainabledebtburdens,throughreformingfinancialsystems,canenablemanydevelopingcountrygovernmentslackthefiscaldevelopingcountriestoinvestinclimateactionatthespacetoinvestinclimate(Songweetal.2022).Thecostscaleneeded,breakingoutoftheclimateinvestmentofcapitalfordevelopingcountriesishigher,withsometrap(Amelietal.2021).Supportingdevelopingcountries’facinginterestratesmorethandoublethoseofdevel-abilitytodothisyieldsbenefitsnotjustforrecipientsbutopedcountries,duetoinvestorsperceivingahigherriskalsoforrichercountries—firstandforemostbyhelpingoflending.Thisisaparticularchallengeforrenewableaccelerateactiontoaddresstheclimatecrisis(actionenergydevelopmentsinceithashigherupfrontcapitalthatbringsglobalbenefits),butalsobyboostingecon-costs(butloweroperatingcosts)comparedtofossilomies,developingexportmarkets,shoringupsupplyfuelgeneration(HirthandSteckel2016).Thisleadstochains,andaddressingtherootcausesofpoliticala“climateinvestmenttrap”(seeFigure76);thehigherinstabilityandconflict(Thwaites2017).borrowingcostsmakeithardertodevelopeconomi-callyviableprojects,leavingcountriesunabletoinvestYetrichercountriesarenotmeetingeventheirmodestintransitioningtheirenergysystemsorinresilience.commitmentstoprovideandmobilizeinternationalBeinglockedintotheexpensiveandinefficientfossilfuelclimatefinance.In2009atCOP15inCopenhagen,economyandleftvulnerabletoclimateimpactsleadsdevelopedcountriescommittedtomobilize$100billiontoincreasedcostsofdisasters,higherunemployment,peryearannuallyfordevelopingcountriesby2020,fromandgreaterpoliticalinstability,whichraisesperceivedawidevarietyofsources,publicandprivate,bilateralriskandborrowingcostsevenfurther(Amelietal.2021).andmultilateral(UNFCCC2009).In2015atCOP21inParis,Overthepastdecade,increasedclimatevulnerabilityisgovernmentsagreedtoextendthismobilizationgoalestimatedtohaveraisedtheaveragecostofsovereignthrough2025,andsetanewcollectivequantifiedgoaldebtforClimateVulnerableForumcountriesby117basisfromafloorof$100billionperyear(UNFCCC2015).Thepoints,equivalentto$40billioninadditionalinterestOECDestimatedthattotalclimatefinancefromdevel-paymentsongovernmentdebt(Buhretal.2018).opedtodevelopingcountriesreached$83.3billioninFIGURE76TheclimateinvestmenttrapatthemacroeconomiclevelHighcostofcapitalHighriskpremiumsLowinvestmentinlow-carbontechnologies•UnderdevelopedfinanicalmarketLowreduction•HighdomesticrisksinCO2emissions•LowproductionIntensified•Highunemploymentclimateimpacts•HighinstabilityNote:CO2=carbondioxide.Source:Amelietal.(2021).FinanceSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION20231672020(OECD2022a).Giventhis,anumberofdevelopingcountriesandcivilsocietyorganizationshavecalledfordevelopedcountriestoensurethattheirclimatefinancemobilizationinsubsequentyearsmakesupforanyshortfallinmeetingthe$100billioncommitmentfrom2020onward,suchthatthetotalprovisionaverages$100billionperyearbetween2020and2025,whichwouldbeinthespiritoftheCopenhagenandPariscommitments(V202021;Farand2021).Developed-coun-trygovernmentsprojectthattheywilldeliverthe$100billionin2023(Figure77),andthattheirclimatefinancemobilizationfordevelopingcountrieswillaverage$100billionperyearovertheperiod2021–25(CanadaandGermany2021).Doingsowillrequiregovernmentstocontinuetoscaleuptheirclimatefinanceinlinewiththeirpledges.Whilethe$100billionwasacollectivegoalbydevelopedcountries,notallcountrieshavebeenmakingcomparableeffortstomeetit.TheUnitedStates,forexample,hasbyfarthebiggestshortfall,over$20billionperyear,betweenwhatithasprovidedinclimatefinanceandassessmentsofitsfairshareoftheeffortbasedonobjectiveindicators,suchassizeofeconomy,cumulativeGHGemissions,andpopulation(BosandThwaites2021).FIGURE77Annualreportedclimatefinance(2013–20)andprojections(2021–25)towardthe$100billiongoalBillionUS$120100$100billionclimatefinancegoal80No60privatefinancedata402002013201420152016201720182019202020212022202320242025MobilizedprivatefinancePROJECTIONSExportcreditsMultilateralclimatefinanceProjectionscenario1BilateralclimatefinanceProjectionscenario2Note:Scenario1assumesthatdevelopedcountriesandinternationalfinancialinstitutionsfullydeliverontheirpublicclimatefinancecommit-mentsontime,andprojectsthatprivatefinanceismobilizedatthesameratiotopublicdollarsaswasobservedbetween2016and2019.Scenario2ismoreconservative,assumingdelaysinmeetingpublicclimatefinancecommitmentsandalowerratioofprivatefinancemobilizationthanin2016–19.Sources:OECD(2022a,2021a).FinanceSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023168RecentdevelopmentsinFIGURE78GlobalinvestmentincleanenergyaligningfinancewiththeParisAgreementandfossilfuelsupplyWhileinvestmentincleanenergyhasbeenrisingBillionUS$steadilyoverthelastdecade,investmentinfossilfuels1,400hadbeenonthedeclineuptoandincluding2020,butithasrisensteadilysincethen,ascountriesrecovered1,200CleanfromthepandemicandtheRussianinvasionofUkraine1,000energyledcountriestoinvestinincreasedoilandgassupply800supplyalongsidecontinuedeffortstobuildoutcleanenergy(seeFigure78).TheIEAprojectsinvestmentinunabatedFossilfossilfuelsupplyislikelytorisebymorethan6percentfuelin2023,withcurrentfossilfuelinvestmentsmorethansupplydoublethelevelintheIEA’sNetZeroby2050scenario.Investmentincleanenergysupplyisprojectedtorise600by9percentin2023,andcleanenergywillaccountfornearly90percentofallinvestmentinelectricitygener-400ation,yet,inamirrorimageoffossilfueloverinvestment,thisisstilllessthanhalfofcleanenergyinvestment200neededintheIEA’sNetZero2050scenario(IEA2023m).02017201920212023Amajordevelopmentin2023inclimateriskdisclosure2015wasthelaunchoftheInternationalSustainabilityStan-dardsBoardinauguralstandardsonsustainabilityandSource:IEA(2023m).climatedisclosures(IFRS2023).ThesestandardsbuildupontheTCFDrecommendations,withtherequirementFIGURE79ShareofglobalemissionscoveredtodiscloseScope3GHGemissionsconstitutinganimportantimprovement.TheISSBisexpectedtosetthebyacarbonpriceglobalbaselineforcorporateclimatedisclosuresasmajorcountriesandinternationalbodiessuchasthe%ofglobalemissionsInternationalOrganizationofSecuritiesCommissions100haveendorsedit(Toplensky2023;IOSCO2023).Startingin2024,itwillalsotakeoverthemonitoringresponsibil-80itiesfromtheTCFD,whichwillbedisbanded(FSB2023).TheISSBclimatestandardsarebroadlyalignedwiththe60proposedU.S.ruleofmandatoryclimateriskdisclosures,whichisexpectedtobefinalizeddespitesignificant40politicalopposition(Gensler2022).20Onlyonenewjurisdiction,Indonesia,hasimplementedacarbonpricingsystemsinceApril2022,withgrowth0200020102023incarbonpricingcomingthroughotherjurisdictions1990expandingcoverageorstrengtheningprices(WorldBank2023d).Carbonpricingsystemscovered23percentSource:Historicaldataadaptedfrom(WorldBank2023a).ofglobalGHGemissions,lessthana1percentincreaseincoveragefrom2022(Figure79).Growthintheshareofglobalemissionscoveredbycarbonpricinghasbeenlargelystagnantsince2021,whenChinalaunchedanationalETSthatcoversitspowerindustry,bringing4.5GtCO2e(8.8percentofglobalemissions)underapricingregime(WorldBank2022a).WhileglobalcarbonpricingcoverageexpandedduetoprogressinChina,theaveragecarbonpriceinthecountryremainsaround$8/tCO2e,exertingasignificantdownwardpressureontheglobalweightedaverageprice.Nonetheless,China’snewdevelopmentrepresentsanimportantsteptowardestablishingafoundationtoraisecarbonpricesovertime.FinanceSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023169RecentglobaleventshaveresultedinwideswingsinCOVID-19fiscalspendinginthe50largesteconomiesfossilfuelsubsidylevels.Thepandemicandsubsequenthasbeenlow-carbon,or31.2percentof$3.1trillioninoilpricecrashcausedfossilfuelconsumptionsubsidiesspecificrecoveryspending(OxfordUniversityEconomictodropby40percentin2020,butin2021theyincreasedRecoveryProject2022).BetweenJanuary2020andtoexceed2019levelsaseconomiesreboundedfromAugust2022,the38largesteconomiesand8multilateralthepandemicandoilpricesroseagain(OECD2022b).developmentbankshavecommitted$515billioninnewProductionsubsidieswerealreadyincreasingbeforethefinancingtofossilfuel–intensivesectors,comparedtopandemic,largelyduetodirectgovernmentspending$488billiontocleanenergysectors(IISD2022).Pro-byOECDcountriesonfossilfuelinfrastructureandductionsubsidiesrosein2021asgovernmentssoughtcorporatedebtrelief(OECD2021b).COVID-19stimulustoboostsupplytomeetrisingdemandaseconomiesandrecoveryspendinghasexacerbatedthesetrends,emergedfrompandemicslowdowns(OECD2022b).withmultipleanalysesfindingthatgreateramountsofpublicfundingaregoingtofossilfuelsandotherComprehensiveproductionandconsumptionfossilhigh-carbonsectorsthantolow-carbondevelopmentfuelsubsidydataarenotyetavailablefor2022,but(UNEP2021d).Just5.3percentofthe$18.2trillionintotalpreliminarydatafromtheIEAshowthatconsumptionsubsidiesroseabove$1trillionforthefirsttime,almostFIGURE80Breakdownofsourcesofpublicdoubletheiralreadyelevated2021levels,astheRussianinvasionofUkrainedisruptedenergymarkets,causingfinancingforfossilfuelspricestoincreaseandgovernmentstoraisespendinginanefforttoprotectconsumers(IEA2023c).ProductionBillionUS$subsidiesarealsoexpectedtoincreaseasgovernments1,400seekalternativesourcesofsupplytoRussianoilandgas.ThisrunscountertocommitmentsbytheG7,G20,1,200andalltheworld’sgovernmentsatCOP26tophaseoutfossilfuelsubsidies(G72016;G202009;UNFCCC2022a).1,000Datafor2022forG20state-ownedentities(SOEs)showtheircapitalexpenditureonfossilfuelshasremainedat800thesameelevatedpostpandemiclevelsas2021($322.6billion,downfrom$323.2billion).Nationaloilcompanies600ofG20countrieshaveannouncedplanstouserecord2022profitstoincreaseinvestmentsinupstreamoiland400gasin2023(Laanetal.2023).ThisisatoddswiththeIEA’snet-zeroroadmaptoachieve1.5ºC,whichfoundthat,200beyondprojectsalreadycommittedtoin2021,nonewinvestmentinfossilfuelsupplyisrequiredtomeetglobal02015201720192021energyneeds,afindingechoedbytheIPCC’sSixth2013AssessmentReport(IEA2021b;IPCC2022b).State-ownedentityfossilfuelUnlikedomesticsubsidiesandSOEinvestment,interna-capitalexpenditure,G20countries(IISD)tionalpublicfinancingforfossilfuelsbyMDBsandG20countries’internationalfinancialinstitutionshasshownPublicfossilfuelfinancefromMDBsaconsistentdecliningtrend,fallingbynearly60percentandG20countries'ECAsandDFIs(OCI)inthepastfiveyears(OCI2023).Ifthehistoricalrateofdeclineininternationalpublicfinancingforfossilfuelsbetween2017and2021continues,itcouldreachzerobythemiddleofthedecade(Figure80).Productionandconsumptionsubsidies,192economies2013-2020,82economiesin2021(IEA+OECD)Notes:DFI=developmentfinanceinstitution;ECA=exportcreditagency;G20=GroupofTwenty;IEA=InternationalEnergyAgency;IISD=InternationalInstituteforSustainableDevelopment;MDB=multilateraldevelopmentbank;OCI=OilChangeInternational;OECD=OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment.Thesedataareacompilationofproductionandconsumptionsubsidies,G20state-ownedentityfossilfuelcapitalexpenditure,andpublicfossilfuelfinancefrommultilateraldevelopmentbanksandG20countries’developmentfinanceinstitutionsandexportcreditagencies.Productionandconsumptionsubsidiesdatawereonlyavailablefor82economiesin2021,comparedto192economiesin2020andprioryears.Sources:OECDandIISD(2021);Laanet.al(2023);OCI(2023).FinanceSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023170SECTION10ConclusionThewindowtoavoidincreasinglydevastating,ments—theU.S.InflationReductionAct,India’supcomingoftentimesirreversibleclimateimpactsisrapidlynationalcarbonmarketscheme,Canada’sGreenclosing,withimmediateandambitiousactionnowProcurementpolicy,theEuropeanUnion’sDeforestationneededtolimitwarmingto1.5°C.TonearlyhalveGHGRegulation,andtheKunming-MontrealGlobalBiodiver-emissionsby2030andreachnet-zeroCO2emissionsbysityFramework,forexample—alsorepresentbrightspotsmidcentury,transformationalchangesmustaccelerateacrossthesectorsthatmusttransform.Ifsuccessful,theacrosstheworld’shighest-emittingsectors—power,upcomingGlobalStocktakeatCOP28canamplifythisbuildings,industry,transport,forestsandland,andfoodmomentumandserveasapowerfulspringboardforandagriculture.Therapidscale-upofcarbonremovalgreaterclimateactionby,forexample,informingecono-technologiesandclimatefinancewillalsoprovecriticalmy-wideandsectoraltargetscommunicatedwithinthetocombattingtheclimatecrisis.nextroundofNDCsandpromptinggovernmentstotakemuch-neededstepstowardphasingoutunabatedfossilRecentyearshavewitnessedmanygovernments,fuelsinelectricitygeneration,haltingdeforestationandcompanies,financialinstitutions,andcivilsocietyorga-degradation,andshiftingtozero-carbontransportation.nizationsshiftingintogeartocatalyzeanddeepenthesetransitions.ButwhilerecentratesofchangeareheadingHowever,allsectorsrequirefurtheractiontoaccelerateintherightdirectiontowardmosttargetsacrossthesetransformationalchange.Inparticular,afewindicatorsemission-intensivesectors,theworldisontracktohaveshownaconcerningslowdownofprogressorachievejust1of42targets—theshareofelectricvehiclesworseningoftrends,suchasinthecaseofdramaticallyinpassengercarsales.Changeisheadingintherightreducingdeforestation,eliminatingfossilfuelsubsidies,directionatapromisingbutstillinsufficientspeedfor6andincreasingpublicclimatefinance.Forexample,theindicators,and,foranother24indicators,itremainswelllevelofglobalcoalandgasuseisstillincompatiblewithbelowthepacerequiredtoachievenear-termtargets.a1.5°Cwarmingpathwayand,in2021,publicfinancingWorsestill,changefor6indicatorsisheadingintheforfossilfuelsincreasedsharply,withgovernmentsub-wrongdirectionentirely.Dataareinsufficienttoassesssidies,specifically,nearlydoublingfrom2020toreachprogressacrosstheremaining5indicatorswithconfi-thehighestlevelsseeninalmostadecade.Acceleratingdence(Figure81).progressandreversingtheseworseningtrendswillrequiresupportfromgovernments,theprivatesector,Althoughthevastmajorityofindicatorsarenotontrack,andcivilsociety.Intheyearahead,leadersacrossnotableprogresshasbeenmadeinsomesectors.Solarsectorswillneedtocapitalizeontheprogressseensobuildupincreasedexponentiallyin2022,powergenera-fartoworktowardlimitingwarmingto1.5°Candensuringtioncostsofsolarphotovoltaicsandonshorewindandthatjusticeandequityarecenteredinalleffortstowardbatterystoragecostshavedeclinedrapidlyinthepastthisgoal.Whilethepathforwardwillrequireanenor-decade,andsomeexpertsareprojectingthatemissionsmouseffort,theactionswetaketogettherecanhelpusfromthepowersectormayhavepeakedin2022.Thesedeliverdevelopmentalandsocietalbenefitsforall.examplesshowthatrapid,nonlinearchangeisnotonlypossiblebutalreadyunderway.Actionsbygovern-ConclusionSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023172FIGURE81Summaryofprogresstoward2030targetsLIKELIHOODOFFOLLOWINGANS-CURVEACCELERATIONFACTORa5xS-curvePossibleN/AS-curveLikely5xS-curveUnlikelyRIGHTDIRECTION,ONTRACKRIGHTDIRECTION,WELLOFFTRACKN/AbShareofelectricvehiclesinlight-duty>10xMangroverestoration(totalha)vehiclesales(%)RIGHTDIRECTION,OFFTRACK3xGHGemissionsintensityofagricultural>10xproduction(gCO2e/1,000kcal)Cropyields(t/ha)N/AbShareofzero-carbonsourcesinelectricity8xRuminantmeatconsumption(kcal/capita/day)N/Abgeneration(%)N/Ab>10xTechnologicalcarbonremoval(MtCO2/yr)1.5xShareofelectricvehiclesinthelight-dutyvehiclefleet(%)8xGlobaltotalclimatefinance(trillionUS$/yr)Shareofelectricvehiclesintwo-andthree-8xGlobalpublicclimatefinance(trillion$/yr)wheelersales(%)Reforestation(totalMha)1.2xRuminantmeatproductivity(kg/ha)>10xGlobalprivateclimatefinance(trillion$/yr)1.5xSmhaanredaotfogrlyocboarlpGoHraGteemcliismsiaotnesriusnkddeisrclosure(%)>10x>10xRatioofinvestmentinlow-carbontofossilfuelenergysupplyWeightedaveragecarbonpriceinjurisdictionswithemissionspricingsystems(2015$/tCO2e)RIGHTDIRECTION,WELLOFFTRACK7xShareofcoalinelectricitygeneration(%)WRONGDIRECTION,U-TURNNEEDED>10x9xShareofunabatedfossilgasinelectricityU-turnneededCarbonintensityofglobalsteel3xgeneration(%)U-turnneededproduction(kgCO2/tcrudesteel)CarbonintensityofelectricitygenerationU-turnneeded(gCO2/kWh)U-turnneededShareofkilometerstraveledbypassengercars(%ofpassenger-km)Energyintensityofbuildingoperations(kWh/m2)Shareofbatteryelectricvehicles4xCarbonintensityofbuildingoperations(kgCO2/m2)andfuelcellelectricvehiclesinbus4xsales(%)>10xShareofelectricityintheindustrysector’sN/Abfinalenergydemand(%)Mangroveloss(ha/yr)Carbonintensityofglobalcementproduction(kgCO2/tcement)U-turnneededShareoffoodproductionlost(%)Greenhydrogenproduction(Mt)U-turnneededTotalpublicfinancingforfossilfuels(billion$/yr)6xNumberofkilometersofrapidtransitperINSUFFICIENTDATA>10x1millioninhabitants(km/1Minhabitants)N/AbIns.dataRetrofittingrateofbuildings(%/yr)N/AbNumberofkilometersofhigh-qualitybikelanesIns.dataN/Abper1,000inhabitants(km/1,000inhabitants)Ins.dataShareofnewbuildingsthatarezero-carboninoperation(%)ShareofbatteryelectricvehiclesandfuelcellPeatlanddegradation(Mha/yr)electricvehiclesinmedium-andheavy-dutycommercialvehiclesales(%)Ins.dataPeatlandrestoration(totalMha)Shareofsustainableaviationfuelsinglobalaviationfuelsupply(%)Shareofzero-emissionsfuelsinmaritimeshippingfuelsupply(%)4xDeforestation(Mha/yr)Ins.dataFoodwaste(kg/capita)ConclusionSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023173FIGURE81Summaryofprogresstowards2030targets(continued)Notes:gCO2/kWh=gramsofcarbondioxideperkilowatt-hour;gCO2e/1,000kcal=gramsofcarbondioxideequivalentper1,000kilocalories;GHG=greenhousegas;ha/yr=hectaresperyear;kcal/capita/day=kilocaloriespercapitaperday;kg/capita=kilogramspercapita;kgCO2/m2=kilogramofcarbondioxidepersquaremeter;kgCO2/t=kilogramsofcarbondioxidepertonne;kg/ha=kilogramsperhectare;km/1Minhabitants=kilometersper1millioninhabitants;km/1,000inhabitants=kilometersper1,000inhabitants;kWh/m2=kilowatt-hourpersquaremeter;Mha/yr=millionhectaresperyear;Mt=milliontonnes;MtCO2/yr=milliontonnesofcarbondioxideperyear;passenger-km=passenger-kilometers;tCO2e=tonneofcarbondioxideequivalent;t/ha=tonnesperhectare;yr=year.Formoreinformationonindicators’definitions,deviationsfromourmethodologytoassessprogress,anddatalimitations,seecorrespondingindicatorfiguresineachsection.aForaccelerationfactorsbetween1and2,weroundtothe10thplace(e.g.,1.2times);foraccelerationfactorsbetween2and3,weroundtothenearesthalfnumber(e.g.,2.5times);foraccelerationfactorsbetween3and10,weroundtothenearestwholenumber(e.g.,7times);andaccelerationfactorshigherthan10,wenoteas>10.SeedataunderlyingthesecalculationsinAppendixA.bForindicatorscategorizedasS-curvelikely,accelerationfactorscalculatedusingalineartrendlinearenotpresented,astheywouldnotaccuratelyreflectanS-curvetrajectory.Thecategoryofprogresswasdeterminedbasedonauthorjudgment,usingmultiplelinesofevidence.SeeAppendixCandJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformation.Sources:Authors’analysisbasedondatasourceslistedineachsection.ConclusionSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023174AppendicesAppendixA.SummaryofAccelerationFactorsTABLEA-1SummaryofAccelerationFactorsINDICATORMOSTRECENT203020352050LIKELIHOODAVERAGEAVERAGEACCELERATIONSTATUSDATAPOINTTARGETTARGETTARGETOFANNUALANNUALRATEFACTORPower(year)FOLLOWINGRATEOFOFCHANGE(BasedonShareofzero-carbonANS-CURVEHISTORICALREQUIRED(HowmuchaccelerationsourcesinelectricityCHANGETOMEETthepaceoffactorsand,generation(%)b2030TARGETrecentaverageinsomeShareofcoalin(Mostrecentannualchangecases,electricitygeneration(%)fiveyears(Estimatedneedstoexpertofdatafromthemostacceleratetojudgment)formostrecentyearofachieveindicators)datato2030)2030targets)a3988–9198–9999–1000.816.38xc(2022)4(2040)0(2018–22)360–1(2022)(2040)-0.54-3.97x(2018–22)Shareofunabated235–710-0.20-2.1>10xfossilgasin(2022)48–80electricitygeneration(%)(2040)(2018–22)Carbonintensity4402–6<0d-5.4-479xofelectricity(2022)generation(gCO2/kWh)(2040)(2018–22)BuildingsEnergyintensityofbuilding14085–120N/A55–80-1.8-5.33xoperations(kWh/m2)(2022)(2018–22)Carbonintensityofbuilding3813–16N/A0–2-0.77-2.94xoperations(kgCO2/m2)(2022)(2018–22)InsufficientdataRetrofittingrateof<12.5–3.53.5N/AInsufficient0.18buildings(%/yr)(2019)(2040)fdataShareofnewbuildings5100100100Insufficient9.5Insufficientthatarezero-carbon(2020)datainoperation(%)data294xIndustry(2021)e35–4351–5460–690.271.1(2040)55–90f>10xShareofelectricityinthe660(2017–21)industrysector'sfinal(2020)fN/A;energydemand(%)360–370fN/A-1.4-29U-turn1890neededCarbonintensityofglobal(2020)f,h(2016–20)>10xccementproduction(kgCO2/tcement)0.0271340–50fN/A0–130f5-55(2021)Carbonintensityof(2016–20)globalsteelproduction(kgCO2/tcrudesteel)g58iN/A330i0.00526.4Greenhydrogen(2017–21)production(Mt)Transport1938N/AN/A0.341.96xj(2020)Numberofkilometers(2015–20)ofrapidtransitper1millioninhabitants(km/1Minhabitants)AppendicesSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023176TABLEA-1SummaryofAccelerationFactors(continued)INDICATORMOSTRECENT203020352050LIKELIHOODAVERAGEAVERAGEACCELERATIONSTATUSDATAPOINTTARGETTARGETTARGETOFANNUALANNUALRATEFACTOR(year)FOLLOWINGRATEOFOFCHANGE(BasedonN/AN/AANS-CURVEHISTORICALREQUIRED(HowmuchaccelerationCHANGETOMEETthepaceoffactorsand,2030TARGETrecentaverageinsome(Mostrecentannualchangecases,fiveyears(Estimatedneedstoexpertofdatafromthemostacceleratetojudgment)formostrecentyearofachieveindicators)datato2030)2030targets)aNumberofkilometersof0.004420.000720.2>10xjhigh-qualitybikelanes(2020)35–43per1,000inhabitants75–95(2015–20)(km/1,000inhabitants)Shareofkilometerstraveled45N/AN/A1.4-0.57N/A;bypassengercars(2019)(2015–19)U-turn(%ofpassenger-km)kneededjShareofelectricvehiclesin10100N/A2.19.44xclight-dutyvehiclesales(%)(2022)l(2018–22)Shareofelectric1.520–40N/A85–1000.283.6>10xcvehiclesinthelight-duty(2022)l100vehiclefleet(%)100(2018–22)1.3xc49Shareofelectricvehicles(2022)m85N/A3.64.6N/A;intwo-andthree-U-turnwheelersales(%)3.8(2018–22)neededc(2022)n8xcShareofbatteryelectric60N/A-0.537vehiclesandfuel2.7cellelectricvehicles(2022)n(2018–22)inbussales(%)30N/A990.433.4Shareofbatteryelectricvehiclesandfuelcell(2018–22)electricvehiclesinmedium-andheavy-0.113N/A1000.0351.6>10cdutycommercial(2022)vehiclesales(%)(2020–22)0Shareofsustainable(2018)5N/A9300.42>10caviationfuelsinglobalaviationfuelsupply(%)(2017–21)Shareofzero-emissions5.81.9N/A0.31-0.11-0.494xqfuelsinmaritimeshipping(2022)p(2014–22)-0.005fuelsupply(%)Insufficient0.06000InsufficientdataForestsandLandodata(annualaverage,N/A;Deforestation(Mha/yr)U-turn1993–2018)neededsPeatland1.5xudegradation(Mha/yr)32,0004,900N/AN/A950-2400(2008–19)InsufficientMangroveloss(ha/yr)(annualaverage,dataReforestation(totalMha)2017–19)rPeatland1301001503006.510restoration(totalMha)(totalgain,(2020–30)t(2020-35)t(2020–50)t2000–2020)015N/A20–29Insufficient1(asof2015)v(2020–50)t(2020–30)tdataMangrove15,000240,000N/AN/A75024,000>10xrestoration(totalha)(totaldirectgain,(2020–30)t1999–2019)wAppendicesSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023177TABLEA-1SummaryofAccelerationFactors(continued)INDICATORMOSTRECENT203020352050LIKELIHOODAVERAGEAVERAGEACCELERATIONSTATUSDATAPOINTTARGETTARGETTARGETOFANNUALANNUALRATEFACTOR(year)FOLLOWINGRATEOFOFCHANGE(BasedonANS-CURVEHISTORICALREQUIRED(HowmuchaccelerationCHANGETOMEETthepaceoffactorsand,2030TARGETrecentaverageinsome(Mostrecentannualchangecases,fiveyears(Estimatedneedstoexpertofdatafromthemostacceleratetojudgment)formostrecentyearofachieveindicators)datato2030)2030targets)aFoodandAgricultureGHGemissionsintensity700500450320-7.2-203xofagriculturalproduction(2020)7.8(gCO2e/1,000kcal)33(2016–20)>10x6.66.5Cropyields(t/ha)(2021)618.29.60.0090.131.2x79(2017–21)0.49Ruminantmeat293542-0.75N/A;productivity(kg/ha)(2021)30–6900.42U-turn(2017–21)neededzShareoffood135.26.56.5Insufficientproductionlost(%)y(2021)1.31–2.610.054data2.61–3.92(2016–21)8x7:1Foodwaste(kg/capita)aa120756161Insufficient-5.5(2019)170–2900dataRuminantmeat917460-0.15-1.2consumption(2020)cc(kcal/capita/day)bb(2016–20)TechnologicalCarbonRemovalTechnologicalcarbon0.57N/A740–5,5000.00245>10xremoval(MtCO2/yr)(2022)(2018-22)8x8xFinance>10x>10xGlobaltotalclimatefinance0.85N/A5.10.0620.491.5x(trillionUS$/yr)dd(2021)(2017–21)0.160.29>10xGlobalpublicclimate0.332N/A1.29–2.570.0190.85finance(trillion$/yr)ee(2020)(2016–20)6.8N/A;U-turnGlobalprivateclimate0.333N/A2.57–3.860.027neededfinance(trillion$/yr)ee(2020)(2016–20)Ratioofinvestmentin1:110:110:10.06low-carbontofossil(2023)(2019–23)fuelenergysupply(2040)204.4ShareofglobalGHG(2022)N/A100(2018–22)emissionsundermandatorycorporate23N/A430–9902.430climateriskdisclosure(%)ff(2023)(2019–23)Weightedaveragecarbon1,100priceinjurisdictions(2021)gg0044-120withemissionspricingsystems(2015$/tCO2e)(2017-21)Totalpublicfinancingforfossilfuels(billion$/yr)Notes:gCO2/kWh=gramsofcarbondioxideperkilowatt-hour;gCO2e/1,000kcal=gramsofcarbondioxideequivalentper1,000kilocalories;GHG=greenhousegas;ha/yr=hectaresperyear;kcal/capita/day=kilocaloriespercapitaperday;kg/capita=kilogramspercapita;kgCO2/m2=kilogramofcarbondioxidepersquaremeter;kgCO2/t=kilogramsofcarbondioxidepertonne;kg/ha=kilogramsperhectare;km/1Minhabitants=kilometersper1millioninhabitants;km/1,000inhabitants=kilometersper1,000inhabitants;kWh/m2=kilowatt-hourpersquaremeter;Mha/yr=millionhectaresperyear;Mt=milliontonnes;MtCO2/yr=milliontonnesofcarbondioxideperyear;passenger-km=passenger-kilometers;tCO2e=tonneofcarbondioxideequivalent;t/ha=tonnesperhectare;yr=year.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.AppendicesSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023178TABLEA-1SummaryofAccelerationFactors(continued)aForaccelerationfactorsbetween1and2,weroundtothe10thplace(e.g.,1.2times);foraccelerationfactorsbetween2and3,weroundtothenearesthalfnumber(e.g.,2.5times);foraccelerationfactorsbetween3and10,weroundtothenearestwholenumber(e.g.,7times);andaccel-erationfactorshigherthan10,wenoteas>10.bZero-carbonsourcesincludesolar,wind,hydropower,geothermal,nuclear,marine,andbiomasstechnologies.cForindicatorscategorizedasS-curvelikely,accelerationfactorscalculatedusingalineartrendlinearenotpresentedinthereport,astheywouldnotaccuratelyreflectanS-curvetrajectory.Thecategoryofprogresswasdeterminedbasedonauthorjudgment,usingmultiplelinesofevidence.SeeAppendixCandJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformation.dAchievingbelowzero–carbonintensityimpliesbiomasspowergenerationwithcarboncaptureandstorage.Thesetargetslimitbioenergywithcarboncaptureandstorageuseto5GtCO2peryearin2050.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationaboutthesustainabilitycriteriausedintarget-setting.eHistoricaldatafromIEA(2023l)accessedwithapaidlicensetotheIEA’sdatasets.fTargetsandhistoricalemissionsdataincludedirectandindirectGHGemissions.gThecarbonintensityofsteelproductionaccountsforbothprimaryandsecondarysteel.hThe2021datapointfromtheWorldSteelAssociationisnotincludedduetoachangeinthemethodologytoderivethedata.IThetargetsrefertowhatisneededforthewholeeconomytodecarbonizeandthusnotonlyfortheindustrysector.jDuetodatalimitations,anaccelerationfactorwascalculatedforthisindicatorusingmethodsfromBoehmetal.(2021).kWecalculatedthisnumberusingtheshareofpassenger-kilometerstraveledinlight-dutyvehicles.lThesedatadifferfromthoseofpreviousinstallmentsoftheStateofClimateActioninthattheyshowonlybatteryelectricvehiclesandexcludeplug-inhybridvehiclestoalignhistoricaldatawiththe2030,2035,and2050targets.WenowusedatafromIEA(2023e).mHistoricaldatafromBloombergNEF(2023),accessedwithpermissionfromBloombergNewEnergyFinance.nThesedatadifferfromthoseincludedinpreviousinstallmentsoftheStateofClimateAction.WenowusedatafromIEA(2023e)toalignhistoricaldatawiththe2030and2050targets.oHistoricaldataforforestsandlandindicatorswereestimatedusingmapsderivedfromremotelysenseddata,andaccordingly,theycontainadegreeofuncertainty.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationontheknownlimitationsofeach.pSeeJaegeretal.(2023)andBox5inBoehmetal.(2022)foradescriptionofmethodsusedtoestimatedeforestation.qIndicatorsforforestsandlandexperiencehighinterannualvariabilityinhistoricaldataduetobothanthropogenicandnaturalcauses.Accord-ingly,10yearsinsteadof5yearswasusedtocalculatethelineartrendlinewherepossible.Forthisindicator,however,an8-yeartrendlinewascalculated,usingdatafrom2015to2022duetotemporalinconsistenciesinthedatabeforeandafter2015(WeisseandPotapov2021).rHistoricaldatafromMurrayetal.(2022),whichestimatedgrossmangrovearealostfrom1999to2019,wasbrokenintothree-yearepochs.Lossforeachepochwasdividedbythenumberofyearsintheepochtodeterminetheaverageannuallossrate.sIndicatorsforforestsandlandexperiencehighinterannualvariabilityinhistoricaldataduetobothanthropogenicandnaturalcauses.Accordingly,10yearsinsteadof5yearswasusedtocalculatethelineartrendlinewherepossible.Forthisindicator,however,a12-yeartrendlinewascalculated,usingdatafrom2008to2019toaccountforthefullrangeofyearsincludedinfour3-yearepochsfromMurrayetal.(2022).Toestimatetheaverageannuallossratefrom2008to2019,grosslosswasdividedbythenumberofyearsineachepoch.tReforestation,peatlandrestoration,andmangroverestorationtargetsareadditionaltoanyreforestationandrestorationthatoccurredpriorto2020,andthesetargetsarecumulativefromeither2020to2030or2020to2050.uFollowingBoehmetal.(2021)andduetodatalimitations,theaverageannualrateofchangeacrossthemostrecentlyavailabletimeperiod(2000–2020)wasusedtoestimatethehistoricalrateofchange,ratherthanalineartrendline.vPeatlandrestorationtargetswereadaptedfromHumpenöderetal.(2020)andRoeetal.(2021),whichassumethat0Mhaofpeatlandsgloballywererewettedasof2015.Thisassumption,however,doesnotsuggestthatpeatlandrestorationhasnotoccurred,asthereisevidenceofrewetting,forexample,inCanada,Indonesia,andRussia(UNEP2022b;Sirin2022;BRGM2023),butratherspeakstothelackofglobaldataonpeatlandrestoration.wMurrayetal.(2022)estimatedthatagrossareaof180,000ha(95percentconfidenceintervalof0.09to0.30Mha)ofmangrovegainoccurredfrom1999to2019,only8percentofwhichcanbeattributedtodirecthumanactivities,suchasmangroverestorationorplanting.Weestimatedthemostrecentdatapointformangroverestorationbytaking8percentofthetotalmangrovegainfrom1999to2019(15,000ha).SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformation.xFollowingBoehmetal.(2021)andduetodatalimitations,theaverageannualrateofchangeacrossthemostrecentlyavailabletimeperiod(1999–2019)wasusedtoestimatethehistoricalrateofchange,ratherthanalineartrendline.yFoodlossoccursbeforefoodgetstomarket.zDuetodatalimitations,anaccelerationfactorwascalculatedforthisindicatorusingalineartrendlineestimatedwiththreedatapointsacrosssixyears.aaFoodwasteoccursattheretaillevelandinhomesandrestaurants,amongotherlocations.bbThisdietshiftappliesspecificallytothehigh-consumingregions(Americas,Europe,andOceania).ItdoesnotapplytopopulationswithintheAmericas,Europe,andOceaniathatalreadyconsumelessthan60kcal/capita/day,havemicronutrientdeficiencies,and/ordonothaveaccesstoaffordableandhealthyalternativestoruminantmeat.ccConsumptiondataaregiveninavailability,whichisthepercapitaamountofruminantmeatavailableattheretaillevelandisaproxyforconsumption.ddThisindicatorincludespublicandprivate,aswellasdomesticandinternational,flows.eeTheseindicatorsincludebothdomesticandinternationalflows.ffJurisdictionsincludedin2022areBrazil,Egypt,India,Japan,NewZealand,Singapore,Switzerland,theUnitedKingdom,andtheEuropeanUnion.Disclosurerequirementsarenotuniformamongcountriesandapplytodifferentorselecttypesoffirms(e.g.,financialinstitutionsorpubliclytradedfirms)withdiverseimplementationtimelines.Weconsiderjurisdictionsthatimplementedanyformofmandatoryrequirementduringtheyearitwasapproved,evenifitentersintoforceinphaseswithdifferenttimelines.Thisapproachcanresultinanoverestimation,asimplementa-tiontimelinesareenforcedovertheyearsindifferentstages.ggDataareacompilationofproductionandconsumptionsubsidies,G20state-ownedentityfossilfuelcapitalexpenditure,andinternationalpublicfossilfuelfinancefrommultilateraldevelopmentbanksandG20countries’developmentfinanceinstitutionsandexportcreditagencies.Source:Authors’analysisbasedondatasourceslistedineachsection.AppendicesSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023179AppendixB.ChangesinAccelerationFactorsandCategoriesofProgressbetweenStateofClimateAction2022andStateofClimateAction2023TableB-1indicatesifandwhyeachindicator’saccel-First,the5-year(or10-year)trendlinechangeswitherationfactorandcategoryofprogresschangedfromanewdatapointand/ordifferentdata.Second,thetheStateofClimateAction2022(Boehmetal.2022)toaverageannualrateofchangeneededtoreachthetheStateofClimateAction2023.Formostindicators,a2030targetchangesaswegetcloserto2030withancombinationofseveralfactors,suchastargetchanges,additionalyearofdata.Hence,everychangeindataanadditionalyearofdata,orchangesinunderlyingaffectstheaccelerationfactor.InTableB-1,weindicatedatasets,likelyspurredthesedifferences.Andwhileitiswhetherweswitchedtoanewdatasetorwhetheranewdifficulttodisentangletheseeffects,weidentifyseveraldatapointwasaddedforeachindicator.keyexplanationsforeachindicator.Finally,someindicatorsandtargetshavebeenestab-1.Targetchange.Forsomeindicators,thetargetitselflishedinthisreportthatwedidnottrackinprevioushaschanged.Thismeansthat,intheStateofClimateiterationsoftheseries.TheseindicatorsarelabeledasAction2023,thegoaltowardwhichprogressismea-newindicator.Forothers,weadjustedtheindicatorsureddiffersfromthegoalinlastyear’sreport.Assuch,tobetterreflectthelatest,bestavailablescienceortoaccelerationfactorsandcategoriesofprogressformatchanewlypublisheddatasource.Welabelthesetheseindicatorsarenotdirectlycomparabletolastindicatorsasupdatedindicator.Finally,forstillmoreyear’sreport.Thereasonsforchangingindividualtargetsindicators,weobservenochangebetweenthereports,aredescribedfurtherinourupdated,complementaryandaccordingly,welabeltheseasnodifference.technicalnote(Jaegeretal.2023).Whenthisreportfeaturesneworrevisedtargetsand2.Datachange.AchangeinhistoricaldatabetweenindicatorsrelativetotheStateofClimateAction2022,the2022and2023reports—eitherthroughtheadditionwenotethesechangesasafirst-orderexplanationofjustonenewdatapointorthroughswitchingthefullofdifferencesbetweentheassessmentsofprogresshistoricaldatasetduetonewavailabilityofanimprovedacrossbothpublications.However,insomeinstances,source—impactstheaccelerationfactorintwoways.underlyinghistoricaldatahavechangedaswell.TABLEB-1ChangesinaccelerationfactorandcategoryofprogressbetweenStateofClimateAction2022andStateofClimateAction20232023INDICATORSOCA2022SOCA2022SOCA2023SOCA2023EXPLANATIONACCELERATIONSTATUSACCELERATIONSTATUSOFFACTORFACTORaDIFFERENCESBETWEEN2022AND2023PowerShareofzero-carbonsources6x8xcTargetchangeinelectricitygeneration(%)bShareofcoalin6x7xTargetchangeelectricitygeneration(%)ShareofunabatedfossilgasinN/A;>10xTargetchangeelectricitygeneration(%)U-turnneededCarbonintensityofelectricity5x9xTargetchangegeneration(gCO2/kWh)7x/5x(residential/3xUpdatedindicatorBuildingscommercial)Energyintensityofbuildingoperations(kWh/m2)AppendicesSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023180TABLEB-1ChangesinaccelerationfactorandcategoryofprogressbetweenStateofClimateAction2022andStateofClimateAction2023(continued)2023INDICATORSOCA2022SOCA2022SOCA2023SOCA2023EXPLANATIONACCELERATIONSTATUSACCELERATIONSTATUSOFFACTORFACTORaDIFFERENCESBETWEEN2022CarbonintensityofbuildingInsufficientdata4xAND2023operations(kgCO2/m2)InsufficientdataUpdatedindicatorRetrofittingrateofbuildings(%/yr)InsufficientdataNodifferenceShareofnewbuildingsthatareN/AN/AInsufficientdataNewindicatorzero-carboninoperation(%)Industry1.7x4xTargetchangeNodifferenceShareofelectricityinthe>10x>10xNodifferenceindustrysector’sfinalTargetchangeenergydemand(%)N/A;N/A;U-turnneededU-turnneededCarbonintensityofglobal>10x>10xccementproduction(kgCO2/tcement)Carbonintensityofglobalsteelproduction(kgCO2/tcrudesteel)dGreenhydrogenproduction(Mt)TransportNumberofkilometersofrapid6x6xeNodifference>10xeNodifferencetransitper1millioninhabitants(km/1Minhabitants)Numberofkilometersof>10xhigh-qualitybikelanesper1,000inhabitants(km/1,000inhabitants)ShareofkilometerstraveledbyN/A;N/A;NodifferencepassengercarsU-turnneededU-turnneedede(%ofpassenger-km)fDatachange;5x4xcnewdatasetgShareofelectricvehiclesinDatachange;light-dutyvehiclesales(%)newdatasetgNewindicatorShareofelectricvehiclesinthe>10x>10xclight-dutyvehiclefleet(%)Datachange;newdatasethShareofelectricvehiclesN/AN/A1.3xcintwo-andthree-wheelersales(%)Shareofbatteryelectric>10xN/A;U-turnneededcvehiclesandfuelcellelectricvehiclesinbussales(%)AppendicesSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023181TABLEB-1ChangesinaccelerationfactorandcategoryofprogressbetweenStateofClimateAction2022andStateofClimateAction2023(continued)2023INDICATORSOCA2022SOCA2022SOCA2023SOCA2023EXPLANATIONACCELERATIONSTATUSACCELERATIONSTATUSOFFACTORFACTORaDIFFERENCESBETWEEN2022ShareofbatteryelectricInsufficientdata8xcAND2023vehiclesandfuelcellelectricInsufficientdatavehiclesinmedium-andInsufficientdataDatachange;heavy-dutycommercial2.5xnewdatasethvehiclesales(%)InsufficientdatacTargetchangeShareofsustainableaviationInsufficientdatacTargetchangefuelsinglobalaviationfuelsupply(%)4xiDatachange;InsufficientdataadditionalShareofzero-emissionsyear(s)ofdatafuelsinmaritimeshippingfuelsupply(%)NodifferenceForestsandLandDeforestation(Mha/yr)Peatlanddegradation(Mha/yr)InsufficientdataMangroveloss(ha/yr)N/A;N/A;NodifferenceReforestation(totalMha)U-turnneededU-turnneededjNodifference1.5x1.5xkPeatlandInsufficientdataInsufficientdataNodifferencerestoration(totalMha)>10xlDatachange;Mangroverestoration(totalha)InsufficientdatanewdatasetmFoodandAgricultureUpdatedindicatornGHGemissionsintensityN/AN/A3xDatachange;additionalofagriculturalproductionyear(s)ofdataDatachange;(gCO2e/1,000kcal)additionalyear(s)ofdataCropyields(t/ha)6x>10xDatachange;additionalRuminantmeat1.3x1.2xyear(s)ofdataproductivity(kg/ha)InsufficientdataNodifferenceInsufficientdataN/A;ShareoffoodU-turnneededpproductionlost(%)oInsufficientdataFoodwaste(kg/capita)qAppendicesSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023182TABLEB-1ChangesinaccelerationfactorandcategoryofprogressbetweenStateofClimateAction2022andStateofClimateAction2023(continued)2023INDICATORSOCA2022SOCA2022SOCA2023SOCA2023EXPLANATIONACCELERATIONSTATUSACCELERATIONSTATUSOFFACTORFACTORaDIFFERENCESBETWEEN2022Ruminantmeatconsumption5x8xAND2023(kcal/capita/day)rDatachange;additionalyear(s)ofdataTechnologicalCarbonRemovalTechnologicalcarbon>10x>10xTargetchangeremoval(MtCO2/yr)FinanceGlobaltotalclimatefinance>10x8xDatachange;additional(trillionUS$/yr)syear(s)ofdataDatachange;Globalpublicclimatefinance>10x8xadditionalyear(s)ofdata(trillion$/yr)tNodifferenceGlobalprivateclimatefinance>10x>10xNewindicator(trillion$/yr)tTargetchangeRatioofinvestmentinN/AN/A>10xUpdatedindicatorvlow-carbontofossilfuelenergysupplyShareofglobalGHGemissions>10x1.5xundermandatorycorporateclimateriskdisclosure(%)uWeightedaveragecarbon8x>10xpriceinjurisdictionswithemissionspricingsystems(2015$/tCO2e)Totalpublicfinancingforfossil5xN/A;Datachange;fuels(billion$/yr)U-turnneededadditionalyear(s)ofdataNotes:gCO2/kWh=gramsofcarbondioxideperkilowatt-hour;gCO2e/1,000kcal=gramsofcarbondioxideequivalentper1,000kilocalories;GHG=greenhousegas;ha/yr=hectaresperyear;kcal/capita/day=kilocaloriespercapitaperday;kg/capita=kilogramspercapita;kgCO2/m2=kilogramofcarbondioxidepersquaremeter;kgCO2/t=kilogramsofcarbondioxidepertonne;kg/ha=kilogramsperhectare;km/1Minhabitants=kilometersper1millioninhabitants;km/1,000inhabitants=kilometersper1,000inhabitants;kWh/m2=kilowatt-hourpersquaremeter;Mha/yr=millionhectaresperyear;Mt=milliontonnes;MtCO2/yr=milliontonnesofcarbondioxideperyear;passenger-km=passenger-kilometers;SoCA=StateofClimateAction;tCO2e=tonneofcarbondioxideequivalent;t/ha=tonnesperhectare;yr=year.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformationonmethodsforselectingtargets,indicators,anddatasets,aswellasourapproachforassessingprogress.aForaccelerationfactorsbetween1and2,weroundtothe10thplace(e.g.,1.2times);foraccelerationfactorsbetween2and3,weroundtothenearesthalfnumber(e.g.,2.5times);foraccelerationfactorsbetween3and10,weroundtothenearestwholenumber(e.g.,7times);andaccelera-tionfactorshigherthan10,wenoteas>10.bZero-carbonsourcesincludesolar,wind,hydropower,geothermal,nuclear,marine,andbiomasstechnologies.cForindicatorscategorizedasS-curvelikely,accelerationfactorscalculatedusingalineartrendlinearenotpresentedinthereport,astheywouldnotaccuratelyreflectanS-curvetrajectory.Thecategoryofprogresswasdeterminedbasedonauthorjudgment,usingmultiplelinesofevidence.SeeAppendixCandJaegeretal.(2023)formoreinformation.dThecarbonintensityofsteelproductionaccountsforbothprimaryandsecondarysteel.eDuetodatalimitations,anaccelerationfactorwascalculatedforthisindicatorusingmethodsfromBoehmetal.(2021).fWecalculatedthisnumberusingtheshareofpassenger-kilometerstraveledinlight-dutyvehicles.gThesedatadifferfromthoseofpreviousinstallmentsoftheStateofClimateActioninthattheyshowonlybatteryelectricvehiclesandexcludeplug-inhybridvehiclestoalignhistoricaldatawiththe2030,2035,and2050targets.WenowusedatafromIEA(2023e).AppendicesSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023183TABLEB-1ChangesinaccelerationfactorandcategoryofprogressbetweenStateofClimateAction2022andStateofClimateAction2023(continued)hThesedatadifferfromthoseinpreviousinstallmentsoftheStateofClimateAction.WenowusedatafromIEA(2023e)toalignhistoricaldatawiththe2030and2050targets.iIndicatorsforforestsandlandexperiencehighinterannualvariabilityinhistoricaldataduetobothanthropogenicandnaturalcauses.Accordingly,10yearsinsteadof5yearswasusedtocalculatethelineartrendlinewherepossible.Forthisindicator,however,an8-yeartrendlinewascalculated,usingdatafrom2015to2022duetotemporalinconsistenciesinthedatabeforeandafter2015(WeisseandPotapov2021).jIndicatorsforforestsandlandexperiencehighinterannualvariabilityinhistoricaldataduetobothanthropogenicandnaturalcauses.Accordingly,10yearsinsteadof5yearswasusedtocalculatethelineartrendlinewherepossible.Forthisindicator,however,a12-yeartrendlinewascalculated,usingdatafrom2008to2019toaccountforthefullrangeofyearsincludedinfour3-yearepochsfromMurrayetal.(2022).Toestimatetheaverageannuallossratefrom2008to2019,grosslosswasdividedbythenumberofyearsineachepoch.kFollowingBoehmetal.(2021)andduetodatalimitations,theaverageannualrateofchangeacrossthemostrecentlyavailabletimeperiod(2000–2020)wasusedtoestimatethehistoricalrateofchange,ratherthanalineartrendline.lFollowingBoehmetal.(2021)andduetodatalimitations,theaverageannualrateofchangeacrossthemostrecentlyavailabletimeperiod(1999–2019)wasusedtoestimatethehistoricalrateofchange,ratherthanalineartrendline.mMurrayetal.(2022)estimatedthatagrossareaof180,000ha(95percentconfidenceintervalof0.09to0.30Mha)ofmangrovegainoccurredfrom1999to2019,only8percentofwhichcanbeattributedtodirecthumanactivities,suchasmangroverestorationorplanting.Weestimatedthemostrecentdatapointformangroverestorationbytaking8percentofthetotalmangrovegainfrom1999to2019(15,000ha).Wenowusethesedatatocalculateanaccelerationfactor,whichBoehmetal.2022didnotdo.nWeconvertedourpriorindicatoronGHGemissionsfromagriculturalproductiontoanindicatoronGHGemissionsintensityofagriculturalproduc-tiontobettermatchtheotherfoodandagricultureindicators,whichareallintensitymetrics.oFoodlossoccursbeforefoodgetstomarket.pDuetodatalimitations,anaccelerationfactorwascalculatedforthisindicatorusingalineartrendlineestimatedwiththreedatapointsacrosssixyears.qFoodwasteoccursattheretaillevelandinhomesandrestaurants,amongotherlocations.rThisdietshiftappliesspecificallytothehigh-consumingregions(Americas,Europe,andOceania).ItdoesnotapplytopopulationswithintheAmericas,Europe,andOceaniathatalreadyconsumelessthan60kcal/capita/day,havemicronutrientdeficiencies,and/ordonothaveaccesstoaffordableandhealthyalternativestoruminantmeat.sThisindicatorincludespublicandprivate,aswellasdomesticandinternational,flows.tTheseindicatorsincludebothdomesticandinternationalflows.uJurisdictionsincludedin2022areBrazil,Egypt,India,Japan,NewZealand,Singapore,Switzerland,theUnitedKingdom,andtheEuropeanUnion.Disclosurerequirementsarenotuniformamongcountriesandapplytodifferentorselecttypesoffirms(e.g.,financialinstitutionsorpubliclytradedfirms)withdiverseimplementationtimelines.Weconsiderjurisdictionsthatimplementedanyformofmandatoryrequirementduringtheyearitwasapproved,evenifitentersintoforceinphaseswithdifferenttimelines.Thisapproachcanresultinanoverestimation,asimplementationtimelinesareenforcedovertheyearsindifferentstages.vWeconvertedourpriorindicatoronmediancarbonpriceinjurisdictionswithpricingsystemstoanindicatoronweightedaveragecarbonpriceinjurisdictionswithemissionswithpricingsystemstobetteraccountforthepercentageofglobalGHGemissionscoveredbyeachcarbonpriceforeachyear.Source:Authors’analysisbasedondatasourceslistedineachsection.AppendicesSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023184AppendixC.AssessmentofProgressfor“S-CurveLikely”IndicatorsTableC-1presentsouranalysisforthenineS-curvethenfittedanS-curvetothehistoricaldatatoinformlikelyindicators,followingthemethodologydescribedinauthorjudgmenttoidentifythecategoryorprogressJaegeretal.(2023).Morespecifically,toplaceeachindi-foreachindicator.Thiswaspossiblefortheshareofcatorintoeithertheemergence,breakthrough,diffusion,zero-carbonsourcesinelectricitygeneration(FigureC-1)orreconfigurationstageofanS-curve,wefitteddifferentandtheshareofelectricvehiclesinlight-dutyvehicletypesoftrendlinestohistoricaldatatodeterminethesales(FigureC-2).Forallindicators,wealsoreviewedbestfit,aswellasestimatedeachindicator’scurrenttheliterature,consultedwithexperts,andcalculatedvalueasapercentageofitstheoreticalsaturationthecategoryofprogressbasedonalineartrendlinetovalue.Forindicatorsinthebreakthrough,diffusion,orinformauthorjudgment.reconfigurationstagewithsufficientavailabledata,weFIGUREC-1Shareofzero-carbonsourcesinFIGUREC-2Electricvehiclesasshareoflight-electricitygeneration:S-curveanalysisfordutyvehiclesales:S-curveanalysissolarandwind%ofelectricitygenerationAll-electricvehiclesasshareoflight-dutyvehiclesales100100909080Midpointof802030target707060Combined6050zero-carbon50electricity4040302030Solar1020WindHydro02018202620351020100Nuclear200020102020S-curvetrajectorybasedonbestfitBioenergy+HistoricaldataotherTargets2030renewablesNotes:Forthepost-2022trajectory,weassumethatsolarandNotes:Forthepost-2022trajectory,weassumedthatEVsaleswindcontinuealongS-curvesfittothehistoricaldata.Forsolar,continuealonganS-curvefittothehistoricaldatawithasaturationweassumedthesaturationpointwas64percentoftheelectricityvalueof100percent.Wealsoshowthemidpointofthetargetmix,andforwindweassumedthesaturationpointwas32percentrangefor2030here.oftheelectricitymix.Collectively,theseaddupto96percent,whichistheupperboundofour2050targetforsolarandwind.Sources:HistoricaldatafromIEA(2023f).Extrapolationbyauthors.Forhydro,nuclear,bioenergy,andotherrenewables,weassumedtheycontinuealongalineartrajectory.Sources:HistoricaldatafromEmber(2023).Extrapolationbyauthors.AppendicesSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023185TABLEC-1Additionalanalysisfor“S-curvelikely”indicatorsWHICHWHATWHATSTAGEOFWHATWASWHATOTHERLINESWHATISWHATISTRENDLINEPERCENTAGEOFS-CURVEISTHEOURS-CURVEOFEVIDENCEWERETHESTATUSTHESTATUSREPRESENTSTHETHESATURATIONTECHNOLOGYANALYSIS?CONSIDERED?USINGAUSINGBESTFITFORTHEVALUEDOESTHEIN?LINEARAUTHORLASTFIVEYEARSMOSTRECENTTRENDLINE?JUDGMENT?OFDATA?DATAPOINTREPRESENT?Shareofzero-carbonsourcesinelectricitygeneration(%)BecausethisWeassumethatBreakthroughstageWefittedS-curvesArecentreportfromRMIfindsindicatordescribessolarandwindforsolarpower,tothehistoricalthatifsolarandwindfollowasetofrelatedtogetherhaveagiventhatthedataforsolarandafastS-curve,theywouldtechnologies,wesaturationvalueindicator’scurrentwindandusedreach33percentofelectricityexaminedtrendlinesof96percent(thevalueisgreaterlineartrendlinesforgenerationin2030;iftheyfollowforeachtechnologyupperboundofthan5percentnuclear,hydropower,pureexponentialgrowth,theyseparately.Forsolar,our2050target).Itofitssaturationandbioenergywouldreach39percentoftheexponentialisdifficulttoknowvalueandthepower.Thiselectricitygenerationin2030trendlinewasthehowmuchofthishistoricaltrendlinecombinedtrajectory(Bondetal.2023).Thisiswithinbestfit,whileforwouldbefromsolarisexponential.indicatesthatthestrikingdistanceoftheIEA’sNetwind,thelinearcomparedtowind,shareofzero-carbonZeroEmissions(NZE)ScenariotrendlinewasthebutweassumeDiffusionstagesourcesinelectricity(IEA2022t),whichshowsa41bestfit.Wedonotthatsolarmakesupforwindpower,generationwillreachpercentshareofsolarandexpectnuclear,two-thirdsandwindgiventhatthe59percentin2030.windinelectricitygenerationhydropower,andmakesupone-third.indicator’scurrentThisislessthanhalfby2030,butwellbelowthisbioenergytofollowvalueisgreaterofthewayfromreport’stargetof53–78percent.anS-curve,and,Inthiscase,solarthan5percentofthecurrentvalueThescenariosandliteratureaccordingly,thepowerhasaitssaturationvaluetothemidpointofthatunderpinthisreport’slineartrendlinesaturationvalueofandthehistoricalour2030target,targetsshowahighershareofwasthebestfit.64percent,andthetrendlineislinear.whichsuggeststotalzero-carbonpowerandacurrentvalueof4.6thattheindicatorishighershareofwindandsolarpercentis7percentwellofftrack.withinzero-carbonpowerthanofthesaturationtheIEA’sNZE.Thisisbecausethevalue.WindpowerIEANZEshowsstronggrowthinhasasaturationnuclear,fossilgaswithcarbonvalueof32percent,captureandstorage,biomass,andthecurrentandhydropowergeneration.valueof7.3percentAdditionally,theNZEhasais23percentofthehigheroverallcarbonintensitysaturationvalue.ofpowergenerationthantheaverage1.5°C-compatibleEvenifourscenariosusedinthisreport,assumptionsforwhichmeansthatothersectorstheshareofwinddecarbonizefasterintheNZE.comparedtotheshareofsolarwereIEA(2023i)findssolarpowerdifferent,bothis“ontrack”foritsnet-zerosolarandwindemissionsby2050scenario,areclearlygreaterbutotherzero-carbonthan5percentoftechnologiessuchaswindtheirrespectiveareclassifiedas“moreeffortssaturationvaluesneeded.”Overall,theelectricityand,thus,abovesystemisclassifiedas“morethecutoffoftheeffortsneeded.”emergencestage.Greenhydrogenproduction(Mt)AlineartrendlineAssumingEmergencestage,S-curvefittingisIEA(2023i)classifiesgreenisthebestfitgreenhydrogengiventhatthetoouncertaininhydrogenas“moreeffortforthepastfiveproductionhasaindicator’scurrenttheemergenceneeded”tobeconsistentyearsofdata,butsaturationvalueofvalueislessthanstage.Giventhesewithitsnet-zeroemissionsbyanexponential330Mt(our20505percentofitsuncertainties,we2050scenario.Thiscategorytrendlineisthetarget),thecurrentsaturationvalue.defaulttowelloffofprogressisonestepabovebestfitforthepastvalueof0.027MtistrackunlesstheretheIEA’s“wellofftrack”status.tenyearsofdata.only0.008percentofiscompellingevi-TheIEA’scategories,however,thesaturationvalue.dencetoupgradearenotidenticaltothosethisindicator’scate-inthisreport.goryofprogress.AppendicesSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023186TABLEC-1Additionalanalysisfor“S-curvelikely”indicators(continued)WHICHWHATWHATSTAGEOFWHATWASWHATOTHERLINESWHATISWHATISTRENDLINEPERCENTAGEOFS-CURVEISTHEOURS-CURVEOFEVIDENCEWERETHESTATUSTHESTATUSREPRESENTSTHETHESATURATIONTECHNOLOGYANALYSIS?CONSIDERED?USINGAUSINGBESTFITFORTHEVALUEDOESTHEIN?LINEARAUTHORLASTFIVEYEARSMOSTRECENTTRENDLINE?JUDGMENT?OFDATA?DATAPOINTREPRESENT?Shareofelectricvehiclesinlight-dutyvehiclesales(%)ExponentialAssumingtheshareBreakthroughstage,WefittedanS-curveIEA(2023i)classifiesEVsas“onofEVsinlight-dutygiventhatthetothehistoricaltrack”toachieveitsnet-zerovehiclesaleshasindicator’scurrentdata,andthisemissionsby2050scenario.asaturationvaluevalueisgreatertrajectoryindicatesButitdoesnotspecifywhetherof100percent(ourthan5percentthattheshareofEVsthisassessmentreferstosales,2035target),theofitssaturationinlight-dutyvehiclefleet,orsomeothermeasure.currentvalueisonlyvalueandthesaleswillreach93ProjectionsfromIEA(2022t)10percentofthehistoricaltrendlinepercentby2030.andBloombergNEF(2022a)saturationvalue.isexponential.ThissuggeststhatsuggestthatEVsaleswouldtheindicatorisonbe“offtrack”toreachtheirtracktoachieverespectivenet-zeroemissionsthemidpointofourscenarios,butbothforecasts2030target(seeuselinearprojections,sowedoFigure83,below).notconsiderthem.Shareofelectricvehiclesinthelight-dutyvehiclefleet(%)ExponentialAssumingtheshareEmergencestage,S-curvefittingisStronggrowthinEVsalesofEVsinthelight-giventhatthetoouncertaininsuggestsaforthcomingdutyvehiclefleetindicator’scurrenttheemergencebreakthroughinEVsasasharehasasaturationvalueislessthanstage.GiventheseoftheLDVfleet.IEA(2023i)valueof100percent5percentofitsuncertainties,weclassifiesEVsas“ontrack”to(theupperboundofsaturationvalue.defaulttowelloffachieveitsnet-zeroemissionsour2050target),thetrackunlessthereby2050scenario.Butitdoescurrentvalueisonlyiscompellingevi-notspecifywhetherthis1.5percentofthedencetoupgradeassessmentreferstosales,saturationvalue.thisindicator’scate-fleet,orsomeothermeasure.goryofprogress.ProjectionsfromIEA(2022t)andBloombergNEF(2022a)suggestthatEVfleetwouldbe“offtrack”toreachtheirrespectivenet-zeroemissionsscenarios,butbothforecastsuselinearprojections,sowedonotconsiderthem.AlthoughEVsalesareontrackfor2030targets,EVfleetisnotbecausenewcarsalesdonotnecessarilycorrespondwithequalremovalofoldcarsfromthemarket,andthereforetheshareofEVsontheroadmaylagwellbehindincreasesinsales(Keithetal.2019).Thereisnotenoughevidencethatthestockturnoverwilloccurquicklyenoughtomeet2030fleetgoals,sothisindicatorremainsofftrack.AppendicesSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023187TABLEC-1Additionalanalysisfor“S-curvelikely”indicators(continued)WHICHWHATWHATSTAGEOFWHATWASWHATOTHERLINESWHATISWHATISTRENDLINEPERCENTAGEOFS-CURVEISTHEOURS-CURVEOFEVIDENCEWERETHESTATUSTHESTATUSREPRESENTSTHETHESATURATIONTECHNOLOGYANALYSIS?CONSIDERED?USINGAUSINGBESTFITFORTHEVALUEDOESTHEIN?LINEARAUTHORLASTFIVEYEARSMOSTRECENTTRENDLINE?JUDGMENT?OFDATA?DATAPOINTREPRESENT?Shareofelectricvehiclesintwo-andthree-wheelersales(%)LinearAssumingtheshareDiffusionstage,N/A;datalimitationsBloombergNEF(2022a)ofEVsintwo-andgiventhatthepreventedusprojectstheshareofEVsthree-wheelersalesindicator’scurrentfromfittinganintwo-andthree-wheelerhasasaturationvalueisgreaterS-curve.Historicalsaleswillincreasefrom43valueof100percentthan5percentofdatabeginsat34percentin2021to54percent(our2050target),itssaturationvaluepercentin2015,soin2030,whichsuggeststhatthecurrentvalueisandthehistoricalwedon’tknowthetheindicatoriswellofftrack.49percentofthetrendlineislinear.shapeofthecurveTheseprojections,however,saturationvalue.from0percenttodonotaccountforthemost34percent.Butrecentdatapointof49giventhatthepercentin2022.indicatorisinthediffusionstage,inwhichchangeisroughlylinear,weusedthelineartrendlinetoinformthejudgment.Theaccelerationfactorcalculatedusingthistrendlinewas1.3x.Shareofbatteryelectricvehiclesandfuelcellelectricvehiclesinbussales(%)LinearAssumingtheshareEmergencestage,S-curvefittingisIEA(2023f)projectsthatEVsofbatteryelectricgiventhatthetoouncertaininwillaccountfor17percentvehiclesandfuelindicator’scurrenttheemergenceofbussalesin2030,whichcellelectricvehiclesvalueislessthanstage.Giventhesesuggeststhattheindicatorisinbussaleshasa5percentofitsuncertainties,wewellofftrack.saturationvaluesaturationvalue.defaulttowelloffof100percent(ourtrackunlessthere2050target),theFrom2015to2018,iscompellingcurrentvalueisonlythisindicatorwasevidenceto3.8percentoftheabove5percent,upgradethissaturationvalue.butithassinceindicator’scategorydecreased,ofprogress.Here,indicatingthatathedatashowbarriercameupthatrecentratesthatpreventedofchangehaveitfromreachingbeenheadingabreakthrough.inthewrongdirectionentirely.Shareofbatteryelectricvehiclesandfuelcellelectricvehiclesinmedium-andheavy-dutycommercialvehiclesales(%)ExponentialAssumingtheshareEmergencestage,S-curvefittingisBloombergNEF(2022a)projectsofbatteryelectricgiventhatthetoouncertaininthatbothmedium-andvehiclesandfuelindicator’scurrenttheemergenceheavy-dutyEVsaleswillreachcellelectricvehiclesvalueislessthanstage.Giventheseapproximately15percentinmedium-and5percentofitsuncertainties,wein2030,whichwouldbeheavy-dutysaturationvalue.defaulttowelloffapproximatelyhalfasmuchcommercialtrackunlessthereaswhatisneededtoachievevehiclesaleshasiscompellingevi-ourtargetof30percent.NoteasaturationvaluedencetoupgradethatBNEF’sprojectionsincludeof99percent(ourthisindicator’scate-plug-inhybridelectricvehicles2050target),thegoryofprogress.aswell,sowithoutincludingcurrentvalueisonlythosetheirprojectionswould2.7percentofthelikelybeevenlower.saturationvalue.AppendicesSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023188TABLEC-1Additionalanalysisfor“S-curvelikely”indicators(continued)WHICHWHATWHATSTAGEOFWHATWASWHATOTHERLINESWHATISWHATISTRENDLINEPERCENTAGEOFS-CURVEISTHEOURS-CURVEOFEVIDENCEWERETHESTATUSTHESTATUSREPRESENTSTHETHESATURATIONTECHNOLOGYANALYSIS?CONSIDERED?USINGAUSINGBESTFITFORTHEVALUEDOESTHEIN?LINEARAUTHORLASTFIVEYEARSMOSTRECENTTRENDLINE?JUDGMENT?OFDATA?DATAPOINTREPRESENT?Shareofsustainableaviationfuelsinglobalaviationfuelsupply(%)InsufficientdataAssumingtheshareEmergencestage,S-curvefittingisIEA(2023i)findsthataviationofsustainablegiventhatthetoouncertaininis“notontrack”toachieveaviationfuelsinindicator’scurrenttheemergenceitsnet-zeroemissionsbytheglobalaviationvalueislessthanstage.Giventhese2050scenario,althoughthisfuelsupplyhasa5percentofitsuncertainties,weassessmentdoesnotrefersaturationvaluesaturationvalue.defaulttowelloffspecificallytosustainableof100percent(ourtrackunlessthereaviationfuels.2050target),theiscompellingevi-currentvalueisonlydencetoupgrade0.1percentofthethisindicator’scat-saturationvalue.egoryofprogress.Shareofzero-emissionsfuelsinmaritimeshippingfuelsupply(%)InsufficientdataAssumingtheEmergencestage,S-curvefittingisIEA(2023i)findsthatshippingshareofzero-giventhatthetoouncertaininis“notontrack”toachieveemissionsfuelsinindicator’scurrenttheemergenceitsnet-zeroemissionsbymaritimeshippingvalueislessthanstage.Giventhese2050scenario,althoughfuelsupplyhasa5percentofitsuncertainties,wethisassessmentdoesnotsaturationvaluesaturationvalue.defaulttowelloffreferspecificallytozero-of93percent(ourtrackunlessthereemissionsfuels.2050target),theiscompellingevi-currentvalueisdencetoupgrade0percentofthethisindicator’scat-saturationvalue.egoryofprogress.Notes:EV=electricvehicle;IEA=InternationalEnergyAgency;LDV=light-dutyvehicle;Mt=milliontonnes.Source:Authors.AppendicesSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023189ENDNOTES5.Notethat,whiletheIPCCtreatsagriculture,forestry,andotherlandusesasonesector,thisreportsplitsitinto1.Wind,solar,nuclear,andsomebiomasselectricitytwosections:forestsandland,aswellasfoodandagri-generationtechnologiesarezero-carbontechnolo-culture,giventhenumberofindicatorsineachsection.giesintheiroperation,asarebatteryelectricvehicles,batteryelectricplanes,batteryelectricships,andgreen6.Identifyingshiftsforeachsector,aswellaskeyhydrogeniftheelectricitytheyuseisgeneratedfromchangesneededtosupportthescale-upofcarbonzero-carbonsources.Othertechnologiesthatcontributeremovaltechnologiesandclimatefinance,isaninher-toreducingemissions,suchasthosethathelpimproveentlysubjectiveexercise,astherearemanypossibleenergyefficiencyorfacilitateelectrification,aredescribedwaystotranslateaglobaltemperaturegoalintoasetaslow-carboninthisreport.Technologiesthatrelyonofindividualactions.SolongastheoverallGHGemis-carboncapture,utilization,andstorageforanyremainingsionsbudgetismaintained,arangeofstrategies(e.g.,emissionstoachievenetzero,suchasthoseusedinassigningmorerapidandambitiousemissions-reductioncementproduction,arealsodescribedaslow-carbon.targetstothepowersectorthantothetransportsectororviceversa)canbepursuedtolimitglobalwarmingto2.Notethatthisisdifferent,andlower,thantheratioof1.5°C.However,becausetheremainingGHGemissionstotalcleanenergyinvestmenttofossilfuelinvestment,budgetissmall,thedegreeoffreedomtoassigndifferentwhichalsoincludesinvestmentsinenergyefficiencyweightstodifferentsector-widetransformationsthatandotherend-useinvestments.Theratiooftotalcleanmustoccurisrelativelylimited,andtheIPCCmakesclearenergytofossilfuelinvestmentwas1.7:1in2023(IEAthat,together,allsectorswilleventuallyhavetodramat-2023m).Whileinvestmentsinefficiencyandelectrifyingicallyloweremissionstolimitglobalwarmingto1.5°Cenduseareimportant,thisindicatorfocusesonenergy(IPCC2022b).So,ifatransformationacrossonesectorsupplybecauseend-useinvestmentscanbeneutralisslowerthanthisglobalrequirement,anotherneedstotofuelsource.transitionproportionatelyfaster,oradditionalCO2mustberemovedfromtheatmosphere.Arguingthatasector3.Ifimplementedinappropriately,reforestation,peat-needsmoretimefordecarbonization,then,canonlybelandrestoration,andmangroverestorationcangeneratedoneincombinationwithassertingthatanothercanadverseecologicaleffects.Plantingalienspeciesand/transitionfaster.Agoodstartingpointintranslatingtheseormonocultures,forexample,threatensecosystemsector-widetransformationsneededtolimitglobaltem-integrity,whilereforestationathigherlatitudes,althoughperatureriseto1.5°Cintoasetofcriticalshiftsisaskingbeneficialforconservingbiodiversity,providesfew,ifany,whetherasectorcandecarbonizeby2050.Ifso,howandcontributionstoclimatemitigation,asaddingtreestohowquickly,and,ifnot,why(CAT2020a)?theselandscapescanalterthereflectivityoftheplanet’ssurfaceandproduceanetwarmingeffect(IPCC2022b).7.Acomprehensiveassessmentofequityandbiodi-ButwhenbroaderlandscaperestorationprinciplesareversityisbeyondthescopeoftheStateofClimateActionapplied(e.g.,byfocusingonrestoringentirelandscapes,series.See“KeyLimitations”fromJaegeretal.(2023)forrecoveringecologicalintegrity,deliveringmultiplebene-moreinformation.fits,etc.),theseharmfulimpactscanoftenbeprevented.Forexample,reestablishingnaturalhydrologicalregimes8.WhiletheotherForestsandLandindicatorsusedacrossmangroveforestsisoftenmoresuccessfulina10-yeartrendline,forourdeforestationindicatorwerestoringthesecoastalecosystemsthanplantingsap-calculatedan8-yeartrendlineusingdatafrom2015tolings,alone(Lewis2001,2005).2022duetotemporalinconsistenciesinthedatabeforeandafter2015(WeisseandPotapov2021).4.TheIPCCdevelopeditscategoryof“noandlimitedovershoot”pathwaysinitsSpecialReportonGlobal9.NotethatfortheindicatorswithtargetspresentedasWarmingof1.5°C.TheIPCC’srecentAR6WorkingGrouparange,weassessedprogressbasedonthemidpointIIIreportusesthesamedefinitionforitscategoryC1ofthatrange—thatis,wecomparedthehistoricalratespathways,whicharedefinedasfollows:“CategoryC1ofchangetotheratesofchangerequiredtoreachthecomprisesmodelledscenariosthatlimitwarmingto1.5°Cmidpoint.Oneexceptionisthemediancarbonpriceinin2100withalikelihoodofgreaterthan50%,andreachjurisdictionswithemissionswithapricingsystemsindica-orexceedwarmingof1.5°Cduringthe21stcenturywithator;here,wecalculatedtheaccelerationfactorrequiredlikelihoodof67%orless.Inthisreport,thesescenariosarefromamidpointof$220/tCO2ewithinthe2030range,asreferredtoasscenariosthatlimitwarmingto1.5°C(>50%)determinedbyIPCC(2022b).withnoorlimitedovershoot.Limitedovershootreferstoexceeding1.5°Cglobalwarmingbyuptoabout0.1°Cand10.Foraccelerationfactorsbetween1and2,weroundedforuptoseveraldecades”(IPCC2022b).Thereportalsotothe10thplace(e.g.,1.2times);foraccelerationfactorsnotesthat“scenariosinthiscategoryarefoundtohavebetween2and3,weroundedtothenearesthalfnumbersimultaneouslikelihoodtolimitpeakglobalwarmingto(e.g.,2.5times);foraccelerationfactorsbetween3and10,2°Cthroughoutthe21stcenturyofclosetoandmorethanweroundedtothenearestwholenumber(e.g.,7times);90%”(IPCC2022b).andwenotedaccelerationfactorshigherthan10as>10.STATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023190Inpreviousreports,allaccelerationfactorsunder10were20.Itisimportanttoalsocontinuetrackingtotalpowerroundedtothe10thplace(e.g.,7.4),whichwastoohighasectoremissionstomeasureifoverallelectricitydemandlevelofprecisionforthedataavailable.Roundingtotheisincreasingfasterthantheemissionsintensityisfalling.nearestwholenumberisclearerandprovidesequivalentinformationaboutthepaceofchangeneeded.21.Feed-intariffsarepaymentstoindividualhouse-holdsorbusinessesaddingelectricitytothegridfrom11.Inachangefromthe2021report,wenolongerhaverenewablesources.a“stagnant”category.Indicatorsthatwereclassifiedasstagnantinlastyear’sreportarenowplacedinthe“well22.Pumpedstoragehydropowerstoreshydroelectricofftrack”or“wrongdirection”categorybasedontheenergybypumpingwaterfromalowerreservoirtoalineartrendline.higherone,thenallowingittoflowbackdownthroughaturbinetogeneratepower.12.Zero-carbonpowerisdefinedaselectricitygenerationbysolar,wind,hydropower,nuclear,geothermal,marine,23.Achievingzero-carbonoperationalemissionsinbuild-andbiomasstechnologies,allofwhichgeneratenegligi-ingswillnotbefeasibleforallbuildingsuntilthepowerbleCO2duringtheiroperationalcycles.gridisfullydecarbonized.TheIEAreferstobuildingsthatwouldbedecarbonizedwithazero-emissionspowergrid13.Storageoptionssuchasbatteries,pumpedhydro-as“zerocarbonready,”whilewetermthesezero-carbonpower,orrenewablehydrogencanhelptosmoothoutbasedontheassumptionthatthepowersectortargetsfluctuationsintheelectricitysupply,improvegridsta-willbemetandthebuildingsdecarbonizedifnoon-sitebility,andreducetheneedforfossilfuelpowerplantstofossilfuelsareused.meetpeakdemand.24.Suchtechnologiesmayalsoincludechangesinraw14.InaMay2022communiqué,allG7environment,materials,suchastheincreaseduseofscrapsteelinclimate,andenergyministerscommittedtoachievingsteelmaking,andtheuseofsupplementarycementitious“predominatelydecarbonizedelectricitysectors”withinmaterialsincement-making.theircountriesby2035(CleanEnergyWire2022).However,thecommuniquéstoppedshortofsettingaconcrete25.Withcurrenttechnologies,zeroemissionsinthedateforexitingcoal.cementsectorarenotachievable,andtherelikelywillberesidualemissionsthatneedtobeaddressedtoachieve15.Adoptionofanyofthesetechnologiesentailsnet-zeroemissions.trade-offs.Generatingpowerfrombiomass,forexample,isnotinherentlyzero-carbonandrequires26.Achievingnet-zeroemissionsintheglobalsteelsectoradequatesafeguards.willlikelyrequireaddressingresidualemissions.16.Inadditiontothelevelizedcostofelectricity,which27.Includingbothprimaryandsecondarylooksatthecostsideofpowergeneration,excludingsteelproduction.factorssuchasgovernmentsubsidies,systembalancingcosts,andmarketdynamics,itisalsoimportanttolookat28.Recentdevelopmentssuggestthattheambitionlevelprojectrevenues.However,thesedependonarangeofofthetargetscouldbeevenfurtherincreased,partic-parametersthatvarybylocationandsector.ularlyinthenearterm(MPP2022b;Witeckaetal.2023;Batailleetal.2021).17.Notethatthisindicatortrackstotalcoaluse,irre-spectiveofwhetheritiscombinedwithcarboncapture29.Greenhydrogen–basedDRI-EAFusesgreenhydrogenandstorage(CCS).Thisisachangefrompreviousyears,asthereducingagent(insteadofcoke)andthereforewhenwetrackedonlyunabatedcoal(withoutCCS),doesnotgenerateprocessemissions.ItuseselectricitybecauseouranalysisshowsthatcoalwithCCSisnotaandcanthusalsobefullydecarbonizedbyensuringthatfeasiblesolutionfordecarbonizingthepowersectorforthepowersupplyisclean.Similarly,ironoreelectrolysisavarietyofreasons,andthereforewouldhaveanegligi-isafullyelectrifiedproductionroutewhereeventhebleroletoplay.reductionoftheironoreisdonewithelectricity.18.ThisindicatoronlytracksfossilgaswithCCS,butitis30.Switchingfromfossilfuel–basedDRItohydro-importanttonotethatthemodelsusedfordetermininggen-basedDRIrequiresrepurposingthetechnology.benchmarksinthisreportshowthatgaswithCCSonlyplaysaminorroleindecarbonizationofthepowersector,31.Hydrogencanbeproducedusingdifferenttypesofmakingup0.1percentofglobalpowergenerationin2030,fuelsandtechnologies.Greenhydrogenisproducedwith0.3percentin2040,and0.5percentin2050.SeeJaegerrenewablebasedelectricityfacilitatedbyanelectrolyzeretal.(2023)foramorecomprehensiveoverviewofhowandthusdoesnotgenerateCO2emissions.targetsforthisindicatorweredeveloped.32.Electrificationinsomeindustries,suchassteel,19.Thefugitiveemissionsassociatedwiththeproduc-isalreadycommerciallyavailableusingelectricarctionandvaluechainoffossilgasareoftennotproperlyfurnaces.Inothers,suchascement,furtherdevelop-accountedfor,andareyetanotherreasontophaseoutmentisneeded.gasasquicklyaspossible(Hendricketal.2016).33.TheIFCisaglobalfinancialinstitutionfocusingonprivatesectordevelopmentindevelopingcountries.STATEOFCLIMATEACTION202319134.Otherstudiessuggestthatevenlowerclinker-to-ce-49.Two-wheelersalesdatainChinashallbeviewedwithmentratiosarepossiblebyusingSCMs,downto40caution,asofficialdatatracksfactoryshipments(includ-percent(Dixitetal.2021).ingexports)andoftenincludespedal-electricbicyclesandothervehicleswithatopspeedoflessthan50km/35.Giventhevaryingdefinitionsoflow-carbonsteel,hour.Derivingdatausedherewithaminimumtopspeedthereisaneedforemissionsaccountingmethodologiesof50km/houristhereforechallenging(IEA2023e).toalignforadoptionofsteelstandards.ThisreportusesthedefinitionintheGreenSteelTrackertoestimatethe50.Thecategorizationofprogressforthisindicatordiffersnumberoflow-carbonsteelprojects.significantlyfromthecategorizationinBoehmetal.(2022)becausethedatasourcehasbeenupdatedtobetter36.Thesearepreliminarynumbers,asthelatestversionalignwiththe2030and2050targets.ofthedatasetwasupdatedbeforetheendof2022.51.Zero-emissionsfuelsarethosethatemitnet-zero37.WeusedtheApril2023versionoftheGreenSteelemissionsonalife-cyclebasis.TheseincludegreenTrackerdataset.Onlysteelmakingprojectsareconsid-ammonia,greenhydrogen,e-methanol,andsyntheticered,thusexcludinghydrogenproductionprojects.Thee-fuelsproducedfromrenewablesourcesofenergy.figureforoperationalfull-scaleplantsis48projectswhenalsoincludingpilot,demonstration,andresearchand52.AccordingtoIPBES(2019),naturerefersto“thenon-developmentprojects.humanworld,includingcoproducedfeatures,withparticularemphasisonlivingorganisms,theirdiversity,38.However,thedatasetmightnotfullyreflectrecenttheirinteractionsamongthemselvesandwiththeirdevelopmentsincertainpartsoftheworldwhereprojectsabioticenvironment,”anditincludes“alldimensionsofmaybereportedinlanguagesotherthanEnglish.biodiversity,species,genotypes,populations,ecosystems,communities,biomes,Earthlifesupport’ssystems,and39.Thesealsoincludecurrentlynaturalgas–fedDRItheirassociatedecological,evolutionaryandbiogeo-plantsthatareplannedtobeconvertedtogreenorchemicalprocesses.”low-carbonhydrogen.53.GHGemissionsfromAFOLUgenerallyincludethose40.Assumingacapacityfactorof0.08.fromagriculturalproduction,aswellaslanduse,land-usechange,andforestry.Boehmetal.(2022)reliedonthe41.0.1–0.2Mtannuallyby2025comparedtoabout0.009meanofthreebookkeepingmodelsfromIPCC(2022b),asMtin2021,basedondatafromIEA’sGlobalHydrogenpresentedinthe“GlobalCarbonBudget2020”(Friedling-Projectsdatabase.steinetal.2020),toestimatenetanthropogenicCO2emissionsfromlanduse,land-usechange,andforestry.42.StatisticsprovidedbytheInternationalEnergyAgency.ButtheseestimatesofnetanthropogenicCO2emissionsfromlanduse,land-usechange,andforestryhavebeen43.Theterms“shared,”“collective,”and“activetransport”reviseddownward(e.g.,from6.6GtCO2to4.5GtCO2inrefertomodesoftransportationwhereeitherpassen-2019)sincethepublicationofWorkingGroupIII’sContri-gersridewithothers,mobilityassetsaresharedamongbutiontoAR6,andthisupdatehasimpactedestimatesofmultipleusers(seeCastellanosetal.2021),orwhereGHGemissionsfromAFOLUmorebroadly(e.g.,estimatesnonmotorizedvehiclesareused.ofGHGemissionswerealsoreviseddownwardfromroughly13GtCO2eto11GtCO2ein2019).Morespecifically,44.Pleasenotethattheseconclusionsaredrawnfromboththe“GlobalCarbonBudget2021”and“GlobalCarbonthelimitednumberofcitiesthatweareaggregatingandBudget2022”featureimprovementsinland-useforcingmightnotreflecttheglobalstandings.data,aswellasupdatedestimatesofagriculturalareasandnewlyincorporatedland-covermapsfromsatellite45.Pleasenotethatlastyear’sreporthadanumberremotesensing,thatunderpintwoofthestudy’sthreeof0.0077fortheyear2020.Thisreflectschangesinthebookkeepingmodels(BlueandOscar).Together,thesequalityofthedatacomingfromOpenStreetMaps,notachangesresultedinrevisedannualestimatesofnetCO2changeindataormethodology.emissionsdownward,suchthatallbookkeepingmodelsnowshowadecreasingtrendinnetCO2emissionsfrom46.Onalife-cyclebasis,electricvehiclesalreadyemitlanduse,land-usechange,andforestrysincethe1990slessthaninternalcombustionenginevehicles,evenwhen(Friedlingsteinetal.2022a,2022b).Yetauthorsoftheaccountingforbatteryproductionandvehicleassem-“GlobalCarbonBudget2022”cautionthattheglobalbly(Bieker2021).Asthepowersectordecarbonizes,theland-usechangedatausedasamodelinginputdonotemissionsadvantageofelectricvehicleswillonlygrow.includeforestdegradation,whichposesanincreasingthreattotheseecosystems’carbonstocks,andtheynote47.Thistargetincludestwo-andthree-wheelersinthatCO2emissionsfromdegradationmaysoonsurpassChina,India,andIndonesiabecausetheymakeupathosefromdeforestation(e.g.,Matricardietal.2020;Qinetsubstantialportionofthelight-dutyvehiclefleetinthoseal.2021;Lapolaetal.2023).countries(CAT2020b).Two-andthree-wheelersalesarenotincludedinthehistoricaldataforthisindicatorduetodatalimitations.48.Inthisreport,“electriclight-dutyvehicles”referstobatteryelectricvehiclesonlyandexcludesplug-inhybridvehicles.STATEOFCLIMATEACTION202319254.Globaldatabases,aswellasmethodstoestimate61.Theseestimatesofboreal,temperate,andtropicalnetanthropogenicCO2emissions,differonwhichCO2forestcarbondensityincludecarbonstoredinabo-emissionsandremovalsoccurringonlandcanbevegroundandbelowgroundbiomass,aswellassoildefinedas“anthropogenic.”Thissectionreportsnetorganiccarbonwithinthetop30centimeters.TheyrangeanthropogenicCO2emissionsasestimatedbythemeanfrom166tonnesofcarbonperhectarewithintropicalofthreeglobalbookkeepingmodels,withsupplementarydryforeststo272tonnesofcarbonperhectarewithindataonemissionsfrompeatburninganddrainage(Minxtemperateconiferforests.Formangroveforests,soiletal.2021;EuropeanCommissionandJRC(2022),asusedorganiccarbonwithinthetop100centimetersisincluded,inthe“GlobalCarbonBudget2022”(Friedlingsteinetal.withtheestimatedcarbondensityoftheseecosystems2022b).Notethattheseglobalestimatesofnetanthropo-roughly500tonnesofcarbonperhectare(GoldsteinetgenicCO2emissionsarehigherthanthosefromNationalal.2020).WhenaccountingforcarbonstoredatgreaterGreenhouseGasInventoriesandFAOSTAT(Friedlingsteindepths(i.e.,downtoonemeterforforestsandtwometersetal.2022b).Whilenomethodisinherentlypreferableformangroves),mangrovecarbondensityisroughlyfouroveranother,thissectionfollowsthe“SummaryforPoli-tosixtimeshigherthanthatofterrestrialforests(Tem-cymakers”inIPCC(2022b)inreportingtheestimatefromminketal.2022).globalbookkeepingmodels.62.Thewiderangeinestimatesoftotalcarbonstored55.“Land-basedmitigationmeasures”or“land-basedinmangroveecosystemsisinpartduetovariabilityinmeasures”inSection6,ForestsandLand,focusonthesoildepthincludedintheseestimates.Theloweractivitiestoprotect,restore,andsustainablymanageendoftherangeaccountsforuptoonemeterofsoilforestsandotherecosystems.Land-basedmitigationdepth(LealandSpalding2022),whilethehigherendofmeasuresthatfocusonactionstoreduceGHGemissionstherangeaccountsforuptotwometersofsoildepthandenhancecarbonremovalsacrossagriculturallands(Temminketal.2022).arediscussedinSection7,FoodandAgriculture.TheIPCC(2022b)findsthatland-basedmitigationmeasuresfrom63.Estimatesofgrossmangrovelossvary.Forexample,forestsandotherecosystemsthatcostupto$100/tCO2eGoldbergetal.(2020)findthatratesofmangrovelosscandeliverbetween4.2and7.3GtCO2eperyearfromdeclinedfrom2000to2016.Suchdifferencesinestimates2020to2050,withthebottomendoftherangerepresent-canbeduetoseveralfactors,includinglackofalignmentingthemedianestimatefromintegratedassessmentinthetimeperiodassessedacrossstudies,differencesmodelsandthetopendoftherangerepresentingtheinmethodologyusedformapping,anddifferencesmedianestimatefromsectoralstudies.indefinitions.56.FollowingRoeetal.(2021),thisreportfocuses64.Murrayetal.(2022)reporta95percentconfidencesolelyonmangroveforests,ratherthancoastalwet-intervalof0.33to0.68Mhaforthisestimate.landsmorebroadly.65.Ifimplementedinappropriately,reforestation,peat-57.TheTyukavinaetal.(2022)dataidentifytreelosslandrewetting,andmangroverestorationcangeneratewherefirewasthedirectdriveroflossforeach30-meteradverseecologicaleffects.Plantingalienspeciesand/losspixelmappedbyHansenetal.(2013).Thisdoesnotormonocultures,forexample,threatensecosystemincludelosswheretreeswereremovedpriortoburningintegrity,whilereforestationathigherlatitudes,although(e.g.,burningfelledtreestoclearlandforagriculture).beneficialforconservingbiodiversity,providesfew,ifany,Itmayincludewildfires,escapedfiresfromhumancontributionstoclimatemitigation,asaddingtreestoactivities,andintentionallysetfires,amongothers(Tyu-theselandscapescanalterthereflectivityoftheplanet’skavinaetal.2022).surfaceandproduceanetwarmingeffect(IPCC2022b).Mangroverestorationprojects,forexample,oftenfocused58.FollowingLeifeldandMenichetti(2018),peatlands’soilonlarge-scaleplantingofasingle,sometimesnonnativecarbonstocksareestimatedtoberoughly640GtC(Yuspeciesacrossunsuitablelandscapes,andasurveyetal.2010;Pageetal.2011;Dargieetal.2017),andglobaloftheseinitiativesacross11countriesinSoutheastAsiacarbonstocksdowntodepthsof3metersareestimatedfoundthatfewtreessurvivedinthelongterm(Leeetal.tobeabout3,000GtCfromScharlemannetal.(2014).2019).InthePhilippines,plantingoccurredacrossintactseagrassmeadows,anotherimportantecosystemfor59.Therearefourcategoriesoforganicsoils,alsoknowncarbonstorage(Fourqureanetal.2012)andaninappro-ashistosols(Fibrists,Hemists,Saprists,andFolists),and,priatesiteformangroves,whileanoverrelianceonalienwhilepeatisanorganicsoil,notallofthesecategoriestreespeciesspurredlossesinecosystemfunctioningarepeat.Forexample,bothFibristsandHemistsincludeacrossChina’scoastline(Leeetal.2019).Butwhenpeat,butFolistsoilsdonot(IPSn.d.).broaderlandscaperestorationprinciplesareapplied(e.g.,byfocusingonrestoringentirelandscapes,recover-60.Thisglobalestimateofavoidedemissionsasso-ingecologicalintegrity,deliveringmultiplebenefits,etc.),ciatedwiththistargettoreducemangrovelossdoestheseharmfulimpactscanoftenbeprevented.Forexam-notaccountfornon-CO2fluxesthatmayoccurduringple,reestablishingnaturalhydrologicalregimesacrossconversion,representingonegapinthescientificcom-mangroveforestsisoftenmoresuccessfulinrestoringmunity’sunderstandingoftherolethatmangroveforeststhesecoastalecosystemsthanplantingsaplings,aloneplayinclimatechangemitigation(Macreadieetal.2019).(Lewis2001,2005).STATEOFCLIMATEACTION202319366.Althoughthesetargetsfallbelowthosesetbythe70.RewettedpeatlandsemitmoremethanethanintactBonnChallengeandtheNewYorkDeclarationonForestspeatlands,butnetGHGemissionsfromtheserewetted(350Mhaby2030),theyfocussolelyonreforestation,peatlands,onaggregate,arelowerthanGHGemissionswhilebothinternationalcommitmentsincludepledgestofromdrainedpeatlands(Humpenöderetal.2020;Gün-planttreesacrossabroaderrangeoflanduses,suchastheretal.2020).agroforestrysystems,andtorestoreabroaderrangeofdegradedecosystems.SeeJaegeretal.(2023)formore71.Nationalcontributionstothisglobalpeatlandresto-informationonhowthesetargetswereestablished.rationtargetwerederivedfromcountry-levelestimatesofcost-effectivemitigationpotentialforthiswedgefrom67.TreecovergainisdefinedastheestablishmentorRoeetal.(2021)and,therefore,donotaccountforequityrecoveryoftreecover(i.e.,woodyvegetationwithaconsiderations.Globalpeatlandrestorationtargetsheightofgreaterthanorequaltofivemeters)bytheyeardonotexceedtheareaassociatedwithGriscometal.2020inareasthatdidnothavetreecoverintheyear(2017)’sglobal“maximumadditionalmitigationpotential”2000(Potapovetal.2022a).SeeJaegeretal.(2023)forforpeatlandrestoration(46Mha),whichisatechnicalmoreinformation.estimateofmitigationpotentialconstrainedbysocialandenvironmentalsafeguards.Butdownscaled,country-level68.NationalcontributionstothisglobalreforestationmitigationpotentialsestimatedbyRoeetal.(2021)donottargetwerederivedfromcountry-levelestimatesofexplicitlyaccountforthesesamesafeguards.cost-effectivemitigationpotentialforthiswedgefromRoeetal.(2021)and,therefore,donotaccountforequity72.ThistargetisfromRoeetal.(2021),whoderivetheirconsiderations.GlobalreforestationtargetsdonotestimatesfromGriscometal.(2020).Inmeasuringprog-exceedtheareaassociatedwithGriscometal.’s(2017)resstowardthis2030target,wefocussolelyonmitigationglobal“maximumadditionalmitigationpotential”foroutcomesdirectlyattributedtohumanactivities(Murrayreforestation(678Mha),whichisatechnicalestimateetal.2022)andexcludegainsinmangroveforestareaofmitigationpotentialconstrainedbysocialandenvi-thatoccurfrominlandmigration,anatural,adaptiveronmentalsafeguards.Butdownscaled,country-levelresponsethatthisecosystemhastorelativesealevelmitigationpotentialsestimatedbyRoeetal.(2021)donotrise(Schuerchetal.2018).Also,themitigationpotentialexplicitlyaccountforthesesamesafeguards.associatedwiththismangroverestorationtargetfocusessolelyonenhancedcarbonsequestration(Griscomet69.Thisreportincludesamoreambitiouspeatlandal.2020)anddoesnotaccountformethanefluxesthatrestorationtargetthanRoeetal.(2021)becausesomeoccurnaturallywithintheseecosystemsandpartiallystudies(e.g.,Leifeldetal.2019;Kreylingetal.2021)argueoffsettheircarbonsequestrationrates(Rosentreteretthatrestoringnearlyalldegradedpeatlandsbyaroundal.2018,2021).midcenturywillberequiredtolimitwarmingto1.5°Corbelow,asemissionsfromdrainedpeatlandsmayother-73.Murrayetal.(2022)reporta95percentconfidencewiseconsumealargeshareoftheglobalcarbonbudgetintervalof0.09to0.30Mhaforthisestimate.associatedwiththistemperaturelimit.However,astheIPCC(2022b)notes,restoringalldegradedpeatlands74.AlthoughtheFoodandAgricultureOrganizationofmaynotbepossible(e.g.,thoseuponwhichcitieshavetheUnitedNationscollectsandpublishesnational-levelbeenconstructed,thosesubjecttosaltwaterintrusion,statisticsontheareaofmanagedforestseveryfiveyears,orthosealreadyconvertedintoplantationforests).globaldatasetsthatmapmanagedforestsareextremelyWhileitremainstobedeterminedwithcertaintywhatlimited.Similarly,nosuchdatasetsexistforgrasslands.percentagecanbefeasiblyrehabilitated,particularlyatcostsofupto$100/tCO2e(asnotedinGriscometal.2017,75.Globally,recentevidencesuggeststhatestablish-themarginalabatementcostliteraturelacksapreciseingprotectedareascangeneratesubstantialcarbonunderstandingofthecomplex,geographicallyvariablebenefits(Duncansonetal.2023).Butfindingsfromthecostsandbenefitsassociatedwithpeatlandrestorationliteratureontheeffectivenessofspecificprotectedand,therefore,estimatesofcost-effectivepeatlandresto-areasvarysignificantly,withstudiesdemonstratingbothrationvary),severalreportsfindthatrestoringroughly50reductionsindeforestationandincreaseddeforesta-percentofdegradedpeatlandsisneededtohelpdelivertionacrossprotectedareas.Localfactors,suchastheAFOLU’scontributiontolimitingglobaltemperaturerisetoqualityofmonitoringsystems,accesstofinance,orpoor1.5°C(e.g.,Searchingeretal.2019;Roeetal.2019).Wefol-enforcement,canimpactprotectedareas’effectivenesslowedthesestudiesandsetamoreambitioustargetthanandmayaccountforsomeofthesedifferences(WolfRoeetal.(2021).Our2050target,then,involvesrestoringetal.2021;IPCC2022b).Thissuggeststhatexpandingnearlyhalfofdegradedpeatlands(recentlyestimatedprotectedareasmayproveeffectiveinsomecontextsat46MhabyHumpenöderetal.2020to57MhabyUNEPbutnotothers,andwilllikelybemoreeffectiveincurbing2022b)bymidcentury.Thistarget,then,representsandeforestationwhenpursuedwithinabroaderportfolioofimportantstartingpointratherthanadefinitivegoalconservationpolicies.forpolicymakers.STATEOFCLIMATEACTION202319476.ThissectionusesFAOSTAT(2023)asitsdatasourceandhealthyalternativestoruminantmeat.FAOSTAT’sofagriculturalproductionemissions,becausethesedefinitionofOceaniaincludesAustralia,NewZealand,dataaremoredetailedforthissectorthanthoseofMinxMelanesia,Micronesia,andPolynesia.etal.(2021).Weacknowledgethemanylimitationsanduncertaintiesaroundmeasurementofagricultureand83.Inthissection,consumptiondataaregiveninland-sectoremissions,aswellasagriculturallanduse,availability,whichisdefinedinFAO’sFoodBalanceandtargetsshouldberefinedinthefutureasthedataSheets(FAOSTAT2023)asthepercapitaamountofcontinuetoimprove.Toavoiddoublecountingwithruminantmeatavailableattheretaillevelandisaproxyothersectionsofthisreport,wedonotcountcarbonforconsumption.dioxidefromon-farmenergyuse,orcarbondioxideandnitrousoxidefromdrainedorganicsoilsandpeatlands,84.Thisdietshiftdoesnotapplytopopulationswithininthissection.theAmericas,Europe,andOceaniathatalreadycon-sumelessthan60kcal/capita/day,havemicronutrient77.Severalotheremissionssourcesrelatedtofoodanddeficiencies,and/ordonothaveaccesstoaffordableagriculturearecoveredelsewhereinthisreport.Carbonandhealthyalternativestoruminantmeat.FAOSTAT’sdioxideemissionsfromfossilfuelcombustionoccurdefinitionofOceaniaincludesAustralia,NewZealand,duringtheproductionofagriculturalinputs,inconjunc-Melanesia,Micronesia,andPolynesia.tionwithon-farmenergyuse,andthroughoutthefoodsystem(e.g.,foodprocessing,transport,andpackaging),85.Thisequivalentisbasedona100-gramservingofbutthesefossilenergyemissionsarecoveredinthe80percentleanbeefthatcontains248kilocaloriesPower,Industry,andTransportsections.Similarly,carbon(USDA2019).FollowingSearchingeretal.(2019),wedioxideandotheremissionsfromland-usechangeandassumeactualconsumptionis87percentofretail-leveldrainedorganicsoils(orpeatlands)arecoveredinthefoodavailability.ForestsandLandsection.86.Differentmembersusedifferentbaseyearsdueto78.Thesesubtargetsbyemissionssourceillustratethedataconstraintsrelativeimportanceofeachactivitytoclimatechangemitigation,basedonthemodelingconductedby87.WefocusoncarbondioxideremovalratherthanSearchingeretal.(2019)thatunderliesmostofthetargetsgreenhousegasremovalasmanymethodsforremov-inthissection.ingCO2fromtheatmosphereareindevelopment,demonstration,andearlycommercialstagesofgrowth,79.Foodproductionprovidespeoplenotonlycalorieswhileremovalofnon-CO2gasessuchasmethaneisbutalsomanyothernutrients(e.g.,proteins,vitamins,muchmorenascent(e.g.,asproposedbyJacksonetal.fiber).Thereisnooneperfectnormalizationfactorforthis2021);andbecausecarbondioxidehasalongerlifetimeGHGintensitymetric.Forexample,becausesugarsandthanmethaneandexistsathigherconcentrationsinprocessedgrainsareveryGHG-efficient,theworldcouldtheatmosphere.improveperformanceonthismetricwhileworseningnutrition.Thismetricisusedbecausedataonproduction88.Whichemissionsareconsidered“hard-to-abate”andandconsumptionofcaloriesareavailableinFAOSTATappropriatetobecounterbalancedbycarbonremoval(2023)forallcountries.Thismetricshouldbeimprovedisnotclearandopinionsdiffer.Whatcountsas“hard-whileensuringhealthydietsforall.Thisindicatorincludesto-abate”dependsonthecostandfeasibilityofdeepkilocaloriesofbothplant-andanimal-basedfoodsinthedecarbonizationacrossallsectorsaswellasonpoliticalglobalfoodsupply,astrackedbyFAOSTAT.choices,suchaslevelsofdemandforcertainemis-sions-intensiveactivities.80.FAOcropyieldsareexpressedintermsoffreshweight,unlessotherwisespecifiedwithinthedatabase.89.Point-sourcecaptureisdefinedasanemissions-re-Yieldstrendsmaybedistortedbycropswithhighductionapproachratherthancarbonremovalsinceitmoisturecontent.preventsemissionsfromenteringtheatmosphere.81.Foodlossthatoccursonfarms(e.g.,unharvested90.Whatisconsidereddurableorpermanentseques-produce)istypicallyexcludedfromfoodlossandwastetrationisdefineddifferentlybydifferentgroups.Someinventories,includingthosereportedabove,duetomea-governmentsandcompanieshavesuggestedthatsurementchallengesaswellasunderlyingdifferencesstorageovertimescalesfrom10years(Norin.d.)to100inthenatureofthedata(Hansonetal.2017).Thatsaid,ayears(Weiss2022)couldbeconsideredas“permanent,”recentreportdrewattentiontothefactthatpreharvestbutthisisnotconsistentwiththecarboncycle.Fromafoodlossesrepresentasignificantadditionalsourceofscientificperspective,carbonwouldneedtobestoredemissionsthatcouldbemeasuredandreducedmovingovermorethan1,000yearsinordertofullycompensateforward(WWF-UK2021).forthewarmingeffectoftheequivalentamountofCO2emissions.Wherethethresholdforpermanenceissetwill82.ThisdietshiftdoesnotapplytopopulationswithindeterminewhichtechnologiesandapproachesmeetthetheAmericas,Europe,andOceaniathatalreadycon-definitionofpermanentCDR.sumelessthan60kcal/capita/day,havemicronutrientdeficiencies,and/ordonothaveaccesstoaffordableSTATEOFCLIMATEACTION202319591.Thisisagrossnumberanddoesnotfactorinlife-cy-98.Notethatthisisdifferent,andlower,thantheratioofcleemissionsassociatedwithethanolcombustion;totalcleanenergyinvestmenttofossilfuelinvestment,factoringintheseemissionswouldlowerthenetremoval.whichalsoincludesinvestmentsinenergyefficiencyandotherend-useinvestments.Theratiooftotalclean92.Whilestilladraftproposal,theCRCFhasbeencriti-energytofossilfuelinvestmentwas1.7:1in2023(IEAcizedforhowitdefinescarbonremovalandaddresses2023m).Whileinvestmentsinefficiencyandelectrifyingquestionsofpermanence.Therearealsoquestionsenduseareimportant,thisindicatorfocusesonenergyaroundhowitwouldinteractwithexistingpolicysupplybecauseend-useinvestmentscanbeneutral(CATF2022a;Harvey2022;Stoefs2022)thatshouldbetofuelsource.addressedinongoingconversationsandfinalization.99.Disclosurerequirementsarenotuniformamong93.Thereissubstantialdebateaboutwhatshouldandcountriesandapplytodifferentorselecttypesoffirmsshouldnotbecountedasclimatefinance,bothinterms(e.g.,financialinstitutionsorpubliclytradedfirms)ofsectorsandtypesoffinancialflows.Forthepurposesofwithdiverseimplementationtimelines.Weconsiderthissection,weusetheoperationaldefinitionofclimatejurisdictionsthatimplementedanyformofmandatoryfinancefromtheUNFCCC’sStandingCommitteeonrequirementduringtheyearitwasapproved,eveniftheFinance,whichhasalsobeenusedbytheIPCC:“Climaterequiremententersintoforceinphaseswithdifferentfinanceaimsatreducingemissions,andenhancingsinkstimelines.Governmentswillneedtoexpandthecoverageofgreenhousegasesandaimsatreducingvulnerabilityofregulatorydisclosurerulestoalltypesoffirmsandof,andmaintainingandincreasingtheresilienceof,sectorstoachievecomprehensivemeasurementandhumanandecologicalsystemstonegativeclimatedisclosureofclimaterisks.changeimpacts”(SCF2014;IPCC2022b).100.TheIPCC’sSixthAssessmentReportestimatesthe94.Anumberofgapsexistintheclimatefinancemarginalabatementcostofcarbonforpathwaysthattrackingdata,andClimatePolicyInitiative(CPI),whichlimitwarmingto1.5°Cwithnoorlimitedovershootasprovidesthemostcomprehensiveassessmentofglobal$220/tCO2withaninterquartilerangeof$170–$290/tCO2climatefinanceflows,takesaconservativeapproachin2030,and$630/tCO2withaninterquartilerangeoftocollectingandreportingdata.CPImakeseffortsto$430–$990/tCO2in2050(IPCC2022b).avoiddouble-countingbyexcludingsecondarymar-kettransactionssuchastradingonfinancialmarkets,101.Productionsubsidiesbenefittheproducersofbecausetheydonotrepresentnewinvestmentbutratherfossilfuels,suchasentitiesinvolvedinexplorationandexchangeofmoneyforexistingassets;R&Dandinvest-extraction,bulktransportationandstorage,andrefin-mentinmanufacturing,sincethesecostsarefactoredingandprocessing.Consumptionsubsidiesbenefitintofinancingforprojectsthatultimatelydeploytech-consumersoffossilfuels,atthepointatwhichtheyarenologies;revenuesupportmechanismssuchasfeed-incombustedorusedasend-useproducts,suchaspowertariffsandotherpublicsubsidies,sincetheyaredesignedandheatgeneration;industrialprocesses;useintrans-topaybackprojectinvestmentcosts;financingforfossilportation;andinprimaryindustriessuchasagriculturalfuels;anddatawheretheyareunreliable,suchasprivatefertilizerandplasticproduction(OECDandIISD2023).sectorenergyefficiencyinvestment(CPI2021).102.TheIEA’s(2021a)definitionofcleanenergyincludes95.Itisimportanttonotethatwhileinternationalpublicrenewables,nuclear,batterystorage,energyefficiencyclimatefinanceflowsarewelltracked,comprehensiveandelectrification,low-carbonfuels,andcarboncapture,dataondomesticpublicclimatefinanceareavailableutilization,andstorage.onlyforsomecountries(Naranetal.2022),sototalpublicclimatefinancemaybehigherthaniscurrentlytracked.103.TheGreenhouseGasProtocolclassifiesScope3GHGemissionsasindirectemissionsthatoccurinacompa-96.Significantdatagapsexistforprivateclimatefinanceny’svaluechain.trackingdatasets,soactualclimate-relatedfinanceflowsmaybehigher(CPI2021).Thisispartofwhybetterdisclosure,ascoveredinIndicator4,isimportant.97.Totalclimatefinancefromdevelopedtodevelopingcountries,includingexportcreditsandmobilizedprivatefinance,was$83.3billionin2020(OECD2022a).STATEOFCLIMATEACTION2023196REFERENCESAllen,C.,A.Chuney,C.Holness,R.Jacobson,U.Kosar,andV.Suarez.2022.“SettingDAConTrack:StrategiesforHubAbramczyk,M.,A.B.Jaffee,A.Chitkara,M.Diawara,A.Implementation.”Washington,DC:Carbon180.Lerch,andJ.Newcomb.2017.“PositiveDisruption:Limitinghttps://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b9362d89d5ab-GlobalTemperatureRisetowellbelow2C°.”Basalt,b8c51d474f8/t/6261d1890b76863f1047a2dd/1650577901659/CO:RockyMountainInstitute.https://rmi.org/insight/Carbon180-SettingDAConTrack.pdf.positive_disruption_limiting_global_temperature_rise/.Alongi,D.M.2014.“CarbonCyclingandStorageinMan-Abrasu,Sibi.2023.“IndiaPausesPlanstoAddNewgroveForests.”AnnualReviewofMarineScience6(1):CoalPlantsforFiveYears,BetsonRenewables,195–219.doi:10.1146/annurev-marine-010213-135020.Batteries.”APNews,June1.https://apnews.com/article/india-coal-pause-plan-climate-renew-Ameli,N.,O.Dessens,M.Winning,J.Cronin,H.Chenet,ables-68b75402af663e4553434bc672fc9cda.P.Drummond,A.Calzadilla,etal.2021.“HigherCostofFinanceExacerbatesaClimateInvestmentTrapinDevel-Adow,M.,A.Wemanya,K.Opfer,C.Nweke-Eze,A.B.Njamn-opingEconomies.”NatureCommunications12(1):4046.shi,J.Fernandez,andS.Singer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ingbiodiversitylossandbuildingajustandequitableeconomy.ConvenedbyWorldResourcesInstituteandtheBezosEarthFund,SystemsChangeLabsupportstheUNClimateChangeHigh-LevelChampionsandworkswithkeypartnersandfundersincludingClimateActionTracker(aprojectofClimateAnalyticsandNewClimateInstitute),ClimateWorksFoundation,GlobalEnvironmentFacility,JustClimate,MissionPossi-blePartnership,Systemiq,UniversityofExeterandtheUniversityofTokyo’sCenterforGlobalCommons,amongothers.SystemsChangeLabisacomponentoftheGlobalCommonsAlliance.AboutSystemsChangeLab’sPartnersforthisReportBezosEarthFundNewClimateInstituteTheBezosEarthFundistransformingthefightagainstNewClimateInstituteisanon-profitthinktanksupportingclimatechangewiththelargesteverphilanthropicimplementationofactionagainstclimatechangeinthecommitmenttoclimateandnatureprotection.We’recontextofsustainabledevelopmentaroundtheworld.investing$10billioninthisdecisivedecadetoprotectNewClimateInstituteconnectsup-to-dateresearchwithnatureanddrivesystems-levelchange,creatingajustrealworlddecision-makingprocesseswithafocusontransitiontoalow-carboneconomy.Byprovidingfundinginternationalclimatenegotiations,nationalandsectoralandexpertise,wepartnerwithorganizationstoaccel-climateactionandcorporateclimatecommitments.erateinnovation,breakdownbarrierstosuccessandcreateamoreequitableandsustainableworld.JoinusUnitedNationsClimateChangeinourmissiontocreateaworldwherepeopleprosperinHigh-LevelChampionsharmonywithnature.ClimateActionTrackerTheUnitedNationsClimateChangeHigh-LevelCham-pionsforCOP27andCOP28–MahmoudMohieldinandTheClimateActionTracker(CAT)isanindependentRazanAlMubarak–driverealworldmomentumintoresearchprojectthattracksgovernmentclimateactiontheUNClimateChangenegotiations.TheydothisbyandmeasuresitagainstthegloballyagreedParisAgree-mobilizingclimateactionamongstnon-Stateactorsmentgoaloflimitingwarmingto1.5˚C.Acollaboration(companies,cities,regions,financial,educationalandoftwoorganizations,ClimateAnalyticsandNewClimatehealthcareinstitutions)toachievethegoalsoftheParisInstitute,theCAThasbeenprovidingthisindependentAgreement,inclosecollaborationwiththeUNFCCC,theanalysistopolicymakerssince2009.MarrakechPartnershipandtheCOPPresidencies.ClimateAnalyticsWorldResourcesInstituteClimateAnalyticsisaglobalclimatescienceandpolicyWorldResourcesInstituteisaglobalresearchinstituteengagedaroundtheworldindrivingandorganizationthatturnsbigideasintoactionatthesupportingclimateactionalignedtothe1.5°Cwarmingnexusofenvironment,economicopportunity,andlimit.IthasofficesinAfrica,AustraliaandthePacific,thehumanwell-being.Caribbean,NorthAmericaandSouthAsia.OurChallenge:NaturalresourcesareatthefoundationofClimateWorksFoundationeconomicopportunityandhumanwell-being.Buttoday,wearedepletingEarth’sresourcesatratesthatarenotClimateWorksFoundationisaglobalplatformforsustainable,endangeringeconomiesandpeople’slives.philanthropytoinnovateandscalehigh-impactclimatePeopledependoncleanwater,fertileland,healthyfor-solutionsthatbenefitpeopleandtheplanet.Wedeliverests,andastableclimate.Livablecitiesandcleanenergyglobalprogramsandservicesthatequipphilanthropyareessentialforasustainableplanet.Wemustaddresswiththeknowledge,networks,andsolutionstodrivetheseurgent,globalchallengesthisdecade.climateprogressforamoresustainableandequitablefuture.Since2008,ClimateWorkshasgrantedover$1.7OurVision:Weenvisionanequitableandprosperousbilliontomorethan750granteesinover50countries.planetdrivenbythewisemanagementofnaturalresources.Weaspiretocreateaworldwheretheactionsofgovernment,business,andcommunitiescombinetoeliminatepovertyandsustainthenaturalenvironmentforallpeople.Copyright2023WorldResourcesInstitute.ThisworkislicensedundertheCreativeCommonsAttribution4.0InternationalLicense.Toviewacopyofthelicense,visithttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

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