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Climate
litigation risk
Is there shelter from the storm?
wtwco.com
2 / Climate litigation risk — is there shelter from the storm?
In this paper launched to coincide with
New York Climate Week 2023 we combine
the expertise of WTWs Susan Doering and
Michelle Radcliffe (Corporate Risk & Broking
and Insurance Consulting & Technology
respectively) along with Martin Lockman
Climate Law Fellow at the Sabin Center for
Climate Change Law and Associate Research
Scholar at Columbia Law School to focus on
the relatively less well documented impact of
climate litigation on the insurance market.
As regulators shareholders and investors increasingly
focus on the risk of climate litigation it is crucial for
(re)insurers to understand their potential exposure to
climate litigation across different lines of business.
The paper aims to help non-life (re)insurers understand
the scope of private sector climate litigation highlight
its potential impact on different policy lines and
present (re)insurers with an overview of coverage
considerations risk assessment measures and areas
for future innovation. We also identify how reinsurers
can be proactive in addressing the global climate
transition. Many categories of climate litigation arise
from companies failure to plan for and protect against
the impacts of global climate change. By building
tools scenarios and systems to identify assess and
mitigate climate litigation risk (re)insurers can work with
their clients to identify and mitigate risk resulting in a
mutually beneicial outcome for all parties.
We focus on a high-level discussion of risks mitigants
and opportunities and do not provide any legal
advice. The question of whether any speciic cost will
be covered under a particular policy will depend on a
number of factors including details of the underlying
climate lawsuit the wording of any relevant policies
and the governing law of the applicable jurisdiction. The
high-level frameworks discussed in this paper emphasize
one point: while climate litigation is often novel it is
rarely unpredictable. With the requisite knowledge care
and diligence (re)insurers can work with their clients to
reduce risks across their portfolios and in the real world.
Climate litigation
Exploring the impact of climate litigation risk
on the insurance market.
Susan Doering
Senior Director
Head of Climate
Risk Management
Solutions and Global
Client Advocate
Michelle Radcliffe
Director Climate
Analytics Insurance
Consulting &
Technology. Climate
& Insurance law SME
Martin Lockman
Climate Law Fellow
and Associate
Research Scholar at
the Sabin Center for
Climate Change Law
With the requisite knowledge...
(re)insurers can work with their
clients to reduce risks across their
portfolios and in the real world.
As of December 31 2022 the UN reported
that excess of 2180 climate lawsuits had
been iled in more than 65 jurisdictions
across the world.1
Climate litigation risk — is there shelter from the storm / 3
Introduction
Since the United Nations Environment Programme
began surveying global climate litigation in 2017 the
volume of climate lawsuits worldwide has more than
doubled. As of December 31 2022 the UN reported
that excess of 2180 climate lawsuits had been iled in
more than 65 jurisdictions across the world.1 While the
majority of climate lawsuits target governments an
increasing number of lawsuits are being brought against
private sector companies under a growing variety of
legal theories.2 While much of this litigation is in its
early stages signiicant defense costs are already being
incurred by defendant entities.3
This growing litigation risk has caught the attention
of insurance regulators around the world. The Bank of
Englands 2021 climate stress-test found that insurers
What is climate litigation?
To understand the scope of climate litigation
risk we need to irst answer a deceptively
complicated question: what is climate litigation?
The news is dominated by high-proile lawsuits that
bring broad society-changing claims about greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions and seek to assign responsibility
for climate change itself or hold fossil fuel companies
responsible for the harms associated with their products.
These cases are hugely important but just as important
for insurers are the myriad of other disputes driven by
climate change: contracts thrown into confusion by
unanticipated weather climate-stressed infrastructure
failing with calamitous effect directors and oficers sued
by shareholders for ignoring corporate climate risks.
For the purposes of this paper climate litigation refers
to disputes that arise from or are related to:
Within this deinition private sector climate litigation can
be sorted into three broad categories:
Two of these categories match terms used in climate
change policy: mitigation refers to efforts to slow halt
or reverse climate change itself while adaptation looks
at efforts to adapt to the physical societal economic
and legal changes associated with climate change.7
Unsurprisingly these policy goals are identiiable in
the associated categories of litigation. Mitigation
claims can arise either from a defendants historic GHG
emissions or attempt to prevent future GHG emissions.
Adaptation claims arise from a defendants failure to
plan for or adapt to climate change. Governance and
regulatory claims arise from a defendants breach of
established legal duties related to climate change.
These legal duties can originate from many sources.
In some cases the relevant laws and legal duties might
have been explicitly designed with climate change in
mind — for instance an upstream natural gas company
that vents methane into the atmosphere might be
sued for violating emissions permits in a jurisdiction
that regulates GHG emissions. Other governance and
regulatory suits might claim that a defendant breached
a generally applicable law in a way that raises issues of
law or fact related to the science of climate change. For
example greenwashing suits alleging that a defendant
misrepresented the climate beneits of a product often
arise under longstanding consumer protection laws
some of which are now being updated to relect the
intricacies of alleged greenwashing suits.
often struggle to estimate their exposure to climate
litigation risk.4 In 2023 Canadas federal insurance
regulator emphasized the need for insurers to prepare
for climate-related claims under liability policies and
warned that insurers and their directors and oficers
may face liability for neglecting climate-related risks.5
“Mitigation claims” can arise either
from a defendant’s historic GHG
emissions or attempt to prevent
future GHG emissions.
A partys
contribution to
climate change
1.
The physical
consequences
of climate
change
2.
Laws
regulations
and legal duties
related to
climate change.6
3.
Governance
and regulatory
claims.
Adaptation
claims
Mitigation
claims
1. 2. 3.
ClimatelitigationriskIsthereshelterfromthestorm?wtwco.comClimatelitigationExploringtheimpactofclimatelitigationriskontheinsurancemarket.SusanDoeringMichelleRadcliffeMartinLockmanSeniorDirector,Director,ClimateClimateLawFellowHeadofClimateAnalytics,InsuranceandAssociateRiskManagementConsulting&ResearchScholaratSolutionsandGlobalTechnology.ClimatetheSabinCenterforClientAdvocate&InsurancelawSMEClimateChangeLawInthispaper,launchedtocoincidewithtools,scenariosandsystemstoidentify,assess,andNewYorkClimateWeek2023,wecombinemitigateclimatelitigationrisk,(re)insurerscanworkwiththeexpertiseofWTW’sSusanDoeringandtheirclientstoidentifyandmitigaterisk,resultinginaMichelleRadcliffe(CorporateRisk&Brokingmutuallybeneficialoutcomeforallparties.andInsuranceConsulting&Technologyrespectively),alongwithMartinLockman,Wefocusonahigh-leveldiscussionofrisks,mitigants,ClimateLawFellowattheSabinCenterforandopportunities,anddonotprovideanylegalClimateChangeLawandAssociateResearchadvice.ThequestionofwhetheranyspecificcostwillScholaratColumbiaLawSchool,tofocusonbecoveredunderaparticularpolicywilldependonatherelativelylesswelldocumentedimpactofnumberoffactors,includingdetailsoftheunderlyingclimatelitigationontheinsurancemarket.climatelawsuit,thewordingofanyrelevantpolicies,andthegoverninglawoftheapplicablejurisdiction.TheAsregulators,shareholders,andinvestorsincreasinglyhigh-levelframeworksdiscussedinthispaperemphasizefocusontheriskofclimatelitigation,itiscrucialforonepoint:whileclimatelitigationisoftennovel,itis(re)insurerstounderstandtheirpotentialexposuretorarelyunpredictable.Withtherequisiteknowledge,care,climatelitigationacrossdifferentlinesofbusiness.anddiligence,(re)insurerscanworkwiththeirclientstoreducerisksacrosstheirportfoliosandintherealworld.Thepaperaimstohelpnon-life(re)insurersunderstandthescopeofprivatesectorclimatelitigation,highlightWiththerequisiteknowledge...itspotentialimpactondifferentpolicylines,and(re)insurerscanworkwiththeirpresent(re)insurerswithanoverviewofcoverageclientstoreducerisksacrosstheirconsiderations,riskassessmentmeasures,andareasportfoliosandintherealworld.forfutureinnovation.Wealsoidentifyhowreinsurerscanbeproactiveinaddressingtheglobalclimatetransition.Manycategoriesofclimatelitigationarisefromcompanies’failuretoplanforandprotectagainsttheimpactsofglobalclimatechange.Bybuilding2/Climatelitigationrisk—isthereshelterfromthestorm?IntroductionAsofDecember31,2022,theUNreportedSincetheUnitedNationsEnvironmentProgrammethatexcessof2,180climatelawsuitshadbegansurveyingglobalclimatelitigationin2017,thebeenfiledinmorethan65jurisdictionsvolumeofclimatelawsuitsworldwidehasmorethanacrosstheworld.1doubled.AsofDecember31,2022,theUNreportedthatexcessof2,180climatelawsuitshadbeenfiledinoftenstruggletoestimatetheirexposuretoclimatemorethan65jurisdictionsacrosstheworld.1Whilethelitigationrisk.4In2023,Canada’sfederalinsurancemajorityofclimatelawsuitstargetgovernments,anregulatoremphasizedtheneedforinsurerstoprepareincreasingnumberoflawsuitsarebeingbroughtagainstfor“climate-relatedclaimsunderliabilitypolicies,”andprivatesectorcompaniesunderagrowingvarietyofwarnedthatinsurersandtheirdirectorsandofficerslegaltheories.2Whilemuchofthislitigationisinitsmayfaceliabilityforneglectingclimate-relatedrisks.5earlystages,significantdefensecostsarealreadybeingincurredbydefendantentities.3Thisgrowinglitigationriskhascaughttheattentionofinsuranceregulatorsaroundtheworld.TheBankofEngland’s2021climatestress-testfoundthatinsurersWhatisclimatelitigation?Twoofthesecategoriesmatchtermsusedinclimatechangepolicy:“mitigation”referstoeffortstoslow,halt,Tounderstandthescopeofclimatelitigationorreverseclimatechangeitself,while“adaptation”looksrisk,weneedtofirstansweradeceptivelyateffortstoadapttothephysical,societal,economic,complicatedquestion:whatisclimatelitigation?andlegalchangesassociatedwithclimatechange.7Unsurprisingly,thesepolicygoalsareidentifiableinThenewsisdominatedbyhigh-profilelawsuitsthattheassociatedcategoriesoflitigation.“Mitigationbringbroad,society-changingclaimsaboutgreenhouseclaims”canariseeitherfromadefendant’shistoricGHGgas(GHG)emissionsandseektoassignresponsibilityemissionsorattempttopreventfutureGHGemissions.forclimatechangeitselforholdfossilfuelcompanies“Adaptationclaims,”arisefromadefendant’sfailuretoresponsiblefortheharmsassociatedwiththeirproducts.planfororadapttoclimatechange.“GovernanceandThesecasesarehugelyimportant,butjustasimportantregulatoryclaims,”arisefromadefendant’sbreachofforinsurersarethemyriadofotherdisputesdrivenbyestablishedlegaldutiesrelatedtoclimatechange.climatechange:contractsthrownintoconfusionbyTheselegaldutiescanoriginatefrommanysources.unanticipatedweather,climate-stressedinfrastructurefailingwithcalamitouseffect,directorsandofficerssued“Mitigationclaims”canariseeitherbyshareholdersforignoringcorporateclimaterisks.fromadefendant’shistoricGHGemissionsorattempttopreventForthepurposesofthispaper,“climatelitigation”refersfutureGHGemissions.todisputesthatarisefrom,orarerelatedto:Insomecases,therelevantlawsandlegaldutiesmight1.2.3.havebeenexplicitlydesignedwithclimatechangeinmind—forinstance,anupstreamnaturalgascompanyAparty’sThephysicalLaws,thatventsmethaneintotheatmospheremightbecontributiontoconsequencesregulations,suedforviolatingemissionspermitsinajurisdictionclimatechangeofclimateandlegaldutiesthatregulatesGHGemissions.Othergovernanceandchangerelatedtoregulatorysuitsmightclaimthatadefendantbreachedclimatechange.6agenerallyapplicablelawinawaythatraisesissuesoflaworfactrelatedtothescienceofclimatechange.ForWithinthisdefinition,privatesectorclimatelitigationcanexample,“greenwashing”suitsallegingthatadefendantbesortedintothreebroadcategories:misrepresentedtheclimatebenefitsofaproductoftenariseunderlongstandingconsumerprotectionlaws,1.2.3.someofwhicharenowbeingupdatedtoreflecttheintricaciesofalleged‘greenwashing’suits.MitigationAdaptationGovernanceclaimsclaimsandregulatoryclaims.Climatelitigationrisk—isthereshelterfromthestorm/3Table1:TypesofclimatelitigationDisputetypeDefinitionExamplesMitigationDisputesthatarisefroma•Emissionssuitsallegingthatacompany’sactivitiesorproductsdefendant’scontributioncontributedtoclimatechange.Adaptationtoclimatechangeoraplaintiff’sattempttolimit•FinancedemissionssuitsallegingthatacompanyactivelyGovernance&futureGHGemissions.contributedtoanotherentity’sGHG-emittingactivitiesbyprovidingRegulatorycapitalinvestment,advisoryservices,orothersupport.TheseDisputesthatarisefromaclaimsmaytargetfinancialsectoractors,riskadvisors,orstrategicdefendant’sfailuretoplanconsultants,andmayincludedirectsuitsagainst(re)insurers.fororadapttothephysical,societal,orlegalimpactsof•Suitsagainsttheownersoroperatorsofinfrastructurefollowingclimatechange.climate-drivendisasters(forexample,damcollapsesorwildfires).Disputesarisingfrom•ClaimsagainstdirectorsandofficerswhomakecorporatebreachesoflegaldutiesinvestmentsinGHG-emittinginfrastructurethatfacelegalorthatraiseissuesoflaworeconomicriskfromtheclimatetransition.factrelatedtothescienceofclimatechange.•Professionalliabilityorproductliabilityclaimsagainstarchitects,engineers,ormanufacturerswhofailtoconsiderthechangingclimatewhendesigningbuildingsorproducts.•“Greenwashing”suitsallegingthatacompanymademisstatementsormisrepresentationsabouttheimpactofitsactivitiesonclimatechange.•Securitieslitigationallegingthatacompanyfailedtodisclosematerialclimate-relatedriskstoitsbusiness.•Governmentenforcementactionsallegingthatacompanybreachedclimate-relatedlaws,likeemissionspermittingschemes.4/Climatelitigationrisk—isthereshelterfromthestorm?Affectedproductlines(Re)insurers,likeotherfinancialsectorfirms,faceClimatelitigationhasalreadytriggeredprominentnumerousrisksfromclimatelitigation,includingnotices,coverage,andcoveragedisputesunderCGLoperationandinvestmentrisksthatcouldresultinandenvironmentalliabilitypolicies.Inaddition,theBanklosses,directlawsuitsarisingfromtheirowncorporateofEngland’s2021ClimateBiennialExploratoryScenarioactivities,andregulatoryaction.However,thissection(alsocalledthe“climatestresstest”)identifiedD&Ofocusesonauniquerisktothe(re)insuranceindustry:policiesandprofessionalindemnitypoliciesasbeingtheindustry’sexposuretoclimatelitigationriskarisingparticularlyexposedtoclimatelitigation.9Claimsunderfromcurrentportfoliosofunderwrittenpolicies.otherpolicylines,likeproductliabilityandemployerliability,mayrarelyusethephrase“climatechange,”Whilearapidlyevolvingrisk,climatelitigationisbutmayneverthelessbeimpactedbychangingclimateincreasinglysignificantforanumberofpolicyconditionsandextremeweatherevents.lines,including:70%ofglobalclimatelawsuits,Commercialgeneralliability(“CGL”)8andmostoftheprominentcoverageDirectors&officers(“D&O”)policiesdisputesrelatedtoclimatelitigation,arefiledintheU.S.10EnvironmentalliabilitypoliciesThissectionclassifiesandanalyzespoliciesaccordingtoProfessionalliabilityorprofessionalindemnitypoliciesthestandardsandlanguageprevailinginNorthAmericaninsurancemarkets,andprimarily(butnotexclusively)ProductliabilityciteslitigationfromtheUnitedStates.Thisislargelyapracticalchoice—70%ofglobalclimatelawsuits,andWorker’scompensationoremployer’sliabilitymostoftheprominentcoveragedisputesrelatedtopolicies,amongothers.climatelitigation,arefiledintheU.S.10However,thefactualcircumstancesandtheoriesofharmunderlyingtheseclaimswillberelevanttoabroaderswatheofmarkets,subjecttolocallawsandpolicylanguage.CommercialgeneralliabilityMitigationDefendantsinmitigationlitigationoftenattempttoclaimarighttodefenseandindemnificationAdaptationundergeneralliabilitypolicies.Asmitigationlitigationoftenallegescumulativeharmfromdecadesofemissions,theseclaimscanresultinnotificationsunderhistoricCGLpolicies.(SeeGovernance&page7:TheAlohaPetroleumLitigation).RegulatoryAdaptationlitigationmayresultinclaimsunderCGLpolicieswhenaclient’sallegedfailuretoadapttoclimatechangecausesharmtothirdparties.Forexample,theU.S.ArmyCorpsofEngineershasfacedlawsuitsarisingfromitsoperationofdamsandwatercontrolinfrastructureduringHurricaneHarveyin2017.ThesesuitsallegethattheArmyCorpsfailedtoappropriatelyreviseitswatercontrolplanstoreflectknownfloodrisks,andsubsequentlydestroyedneighboringpropertieswhenitsreservoirsoverflowedduringthehurricane.(SeeFortBendCnty.v.UnitedStatesArmyCorpsofEngineers,59F.4th180,186(5thCir.2023)).Impactnotapparent,butmayemergebasedonpolicylanguageandjurisdictionalcharacteristics.Climatelitigationrisk—isthereshelterfromthestorm/5TheAlohapetroleumlitigationSomeclimatedefendantshavealreadysubmittedclaimsforindemnityinrespectofdefensecostsassociatedwithclimatelitigation,andsomeofthoseclaimshaveledtosignificantcoveragedisputesbetweenpolicyholdersandtheirinsurers.In2020,theCityandCountyofHonolulu1andtheCountyofMaui2broughtclaimsagainstanumberoffossilfuelcompanies.Theseplaintiffsallegethatthecompanieshidtheknownharmfuleffectsoftheproductstheysold,andseekdamagesandotherreliefarisingfromtheirclimate-relatedharms.Oneofthedefendants,AlohaPetroleum,Inc.,broughtacoveragesuitagainstitsinsurer,NationalUnionFireInsuranceCo.ofPittsburgh(“NationalUnion”).Inthecase(AlohaPetroleumv.NationalUnionFireInsuranceCo.ofPittsburgh),AlohaPetroleumclaimsthatitisentitledtodefenseandindemnificationunderfourCommercialGeneralLiabilitypolicies,whichcoverfourdiscreteone-yearperiodsbetween1980and1986.3Followingdiscovery,AlohaPetroleumfiledanAmendedComplaint,inwhichanadditional19insurancepoliciesarelisted,allissuedbetween1980and2009(byeitherNationalUnionoranotherinsurer,AmericanHomeAssuranceCompany(“AmericanHome”)),inrespectofwhichAlohaPetroleumnowseeksindemnity.4TheAmendedComplaintalsocontainsaclaimagainstNationalUnionforitspurportedly“badfaith”denialofAlohaPetroleum’sinitialclaims,whichallegesthatNationalUnion’sinitialcoveragedenialwasbasedsolelyonapollutionexclusionina1985commercialgeneralliabilitypolicy.AlohaPetroleumfurtherclaimsthatNationalUnionnowconcedesthatsomeofthepoliciesinrespectofwhichindemnityissoughtdonotcontainsuchapollutionexclusion,suchthattheinsurer“hasnoreasonablebasisforrefusingand/orfailingtodefendAlohaunder[threeofthepolicies].”5Whilethislawsuitremainsunresolved,itillustratesthetypesofcoveragedisputesthatcanarisefromclimatelitigation.Footnotes:1Complaint,City&CountyofHonoluluv.SunocoLP,Civ.No.20-380(Haw.1stCir.Ct.filedMar.9,2020).2Complaint,CountyofMauiv.SunocoLP,Civ.No.20-380(Haw.2ndCir.Ct.filedOct.12,2020).3SeeComplaint,AlohaPetroleumLtd.v.NationalUnionFireInsuranceCo.ofPittsburgh,Civ.No.22-372(D.Haw.filedAug.10,2022).4SeeFirstAm.Complaint¶¶8–32.,AlohaPetroleumLtd.v.NationalUnionFireInsuranceCo.ofPittsburgh,Civ.No.22-372(D.Haw.filedAug.10,2022).5Id.¶¶91–95.iAsagovernmententity,theArmyCorpsofEngineersissubjecttoasignificantlydifferentsetoflegalclaimsthanprivatecompanies.However,thefactualallegations—theArmyCorps’allegedfailuretoadaptitsoperationstochangingphysicalconditions—illustrateanarchetypicaladaptationclaim.EnvironmentalinsuranceMitigationMitigationclaimsarisefromorallegetheharmfulemissionofGHGs,whicharecolloquially(andoftenlegally)consideredapollutant.However,environmentalpoliciesoftencoveranarrowAdaptationrangeofharms,andsomemodernenvironmentalpoliciesexplicitlyexcludeclaimsrelatedtotheGovernance&emissionofGHGs.11ThequestionofwhetheramitigationclaimiscoveredunderCGLpolicies,Regulatoryenvironmentalpolicies,orneitherwillrequiresignificantanalysisofboththespecificclaimandthelanguageofanyapplicablepolicies.(Seepage11:“ExclusionaryLanguage”and“DefinitionofPollution”).Climatechangeisdrivinganincreaseinsecondaryperilslikehurricanes,wildfires,andfloods.Ifcompaniesfailtoappropriatelyprepareforsuchincreasedrisks,thesedisasterscanresultinsignificantpollution.Followingapollutionevent,third-partylawsuitsandgovernmentenforcementactionsundergeneralenvironmentallawsmayresultinclaimsagainstenvironmentalpolicies.Forexample,in2017floodingrelatedtoHurricaneHarveycausedanexplosionatachemicalfacilityinTexas,resultinginaseriesoflawsuits,regulatoryenforcementactions,andcriminalprosecutions.In2023,thefacility’sownerrevealedthatthecostsassociatedwiththesedisputeshadbeenlargelycoveredbyenvironmentalinsurancepolicies.(Seepage10:TheArkemaChemicalFactoryExplosion).6/Climatelitigationrisk—isthereshelterfromthestorm?DirectorsandofficersinsuranceMitigationThedirectorsandofficersofcompanieswhosebusinessmodelsrelyonGHGemissionsmayfaceaAdaptationvarietyofmitigationclaims.Forexample,in2023ClientEarth(aU.K.nonprofit)filedashareholderderivateactionagainsttheboardofdirectorsofShell,allegingthatthedirectors“breachedtheirGovernance&legaldutiesunderthe[U.K.]CompaniesActbyfailingtoadoptandimplementanenergytransitionRegulatorystrategythatalignswiththeParisAgreement.”12WhileClientEarth’scasewasdismissed,andEnglishcourtshave,todate,“showedreluctance”toaccepttheseclaims,legalcommentatorshavesuggestedthatcaseslikethismayreflectawider,andgrowing,trendinsuitsagainstdirectors.13Thedirectorsandofficersofawidevarietyofcompaniesmayfaceadaptationclaimsallegingthattheyhavefailedtoconsider,orpreparefor,thephysical,legal,economic,andsocietalrisksassociatedwithclimatechange.Forexample,inMcVeighv.RetailEmployeesSuperannuationTrust,anAustralianpensionfundmembersuedtheRetailEmployeesSuperannuationTrust,allegingthatthefundviolatedvariousfiduciarydutiessetforthinAustralianlaw“byfailingtoprovideinformationrelatedtoclimatechangebusinessrisksandanyplanstoaddressthoserisks.”(SeeAmendedConciseStatement,McVeighv.RetailEmployeesSuperannuationTrust,FederalCourtofAustralia,NSD1333/2018,(filedSept.21,2018)(Austl.)).McVeighsettledbeforetrial,followinganumberofgovernanceconcessionsbytheTrustrelatedtoitsclimatechangerisk-assessmentprocedures.14Directorsandofficersmayalsofaceclaimsarisingundergeneralcorporatelawthatostensiblyhavelittletodowitheithercorporateemissionsorclimaterisk.Forexample,inNovember2022shareholdersofEnvivia,acompanythatmanufacturedpurportedlysustainablebiofuelpellets,suedthecompanyandseveraldirectorsfor“misrepresent[ing]theenvironmentalsustainability”ofitsproducts,whichamarketreportissuedshortlybeforethesuithaddescribedas“flagrantlygreenwash[ed].”ThereleaseofthemarketreportcausedthepriceofEnvivia’sstocktofalldramatically.(SeeComplaint,Fagenv.Envivia,Civ.No.22-2844(D.Md.filedNov.3,2022)).Professionalliability/professionalindemnityMitigationImpactnotapparentincurrentclimatelitigation,butmayemergeinindustrieswithsignificantAdaptationcontributionstoGHGemissions.Governance&ProfessionalliabilitypoliciesmaybeexposedtoadaptationclaimsassertingthataninsuredRegulatoryprofessionalfailedtoadequatelyconsidertheimpactsofclimatechange.15Forexample,followingHurricaneHarveyhundredsofhomeownersinaTexashousingdevelopmentsuedtheengineeringfirmCostello,Inc.foritsallegedlyflaweddesignofaleveeprotectingtheneighborhood.ThefounderofCostello,Inc.notedthattheleveesweredesignedtoa100-yearfloodstandardthatHurricaneHarveydemonstratedwasinadequate.16Impactnotapparentincurrentclimatelitigation,butmayemergebasedonpolicylanguageandjurisdictionalcharacteristics.ProductliabilityMitigationMitigationclaimsmayimplicateproductliabilitypolicieswheretheunderlyingclaimallegesadefectcausing,orriskarisingfrom,aproduct’sGHGemissions.Forexample,municipalitiesAdaptationinHawaiiarecurrentlysuinganumberoffossilfuelcompaniesfordamagesassociatedwithGovernance&theirproducts’GHGemissions.Amongotherclaims,thesuitsassert“failuretowarn”claims—Regulatoryatheoryofproductliabilitywhichallegesthataharmresultedfromamanufacturerordistributor’sfailuretowarnpurchasersofthepotentialrisksofusingaproduct.(Seepage7:TheAlohaPetroleumLitigation.)Productliabilitypoliciesmayalsobeimpactedbyclaimsthataproduct’sfailuretoconsidertheimpactofclimatechangerendersitunfitforitspurposeorrecommendeduse.Productsasdiverseassandals,electronicspackaging,andpowersubstationsmaybevulnerabletoincreasedheatandextremeweatherevents.Impactnotapparentincurrentclimatelitigation,butmayemergebasedonpolicylanguageandjurisdictionalcharacteristics.Climatelitigationrisk—isthereshelterfromthestorm/7Worker’scompensation/employer’sliabilityMitigationImpactnotapparentincurrentclimatelitigation,butmayemergeinselectindustrieswithsignificantcontributionstoGHGemissions.AdaptationGovernance&Climatechangeexposesemployeestoincreasingphysicalrisksintheworkplace,likeheatwavesRegulatoryandotherextremeweatherevents.17Employerswhofailtoadequatelyprotecttheirworkforcesagainsttheserisksmayfacelawsuitsfrominjuredworkersandenforcementactionsfromgovernmentsallegingviolationsofworkersafetylaws.18TheArkemachemicalfactoryexplosionArkemaInc.istheownerandoperatorofachemicalfacilityinCrosby,Texas.A2016reportwrittenbyArkema’sinsureridentifiedthattheArkemafacilitywasvulnerabletoflooding,amongotherrisks,becauseinsurancefloodzoneshadshiftedsincethefacilitywasbuilt.Althoughtheinsurancereportidentifiedthefloodrisk,itdidnotmakeanyrecommendationstoArkematoaddressfloodinghazards.FollowingunrelatedchangestotheCrosbyfacility,Arkema’sinsurerindicatedthatitwassatisfiedwiththefacility’sriskprofile.1InAugustof2017,theCrosbychemicalfacilitywasfloodedfollowingheavyrainfallcausedbyHurricaneHarvey.Arkema’sfloodedfacilitylostpoweranditschemicalrefrigerationsystemsfailed,whichinturnledtofires,anexplosion,andunauthorizedtoxicairemissions.2Followingtheexplosion,Arkemaanditsexecutivesweresubjecttoaseriesofprivatelawsuits,regulatoryenforcementactions,andcriminalprosecutions.3ThemajorityoftheseclaimshavebeencoveredbyArkema’senvironmentalinsurancepolicies.4Footnotes:1U.S.ChemicalSafety&HazardInvestigationBoard,OrganicPeroxideDecomposition,Release,andFireatArkemaCrosbyFollowingHurricaneHarveyFlooding81–82(May2018),https://www.csb.gov/arkema-inc-chemical-plant-fire-/.2Complaint,CountyofMauiv.SunocoLP,Civ.No.20-380(Haw.2ndCir.Ct.filedOct.12,2020).3Foranoverviewoftheselawsuits,seeMartinLockman,ModellingClimateLitigationRiskfor(Re)Insurers,SabinCenterforClimateChangeLawAnnex3(July18,2023),https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/sabin_climate_change/201.4Arkema,2022UniversalRegistrationDocument329(Mar.28,2023).8/Climatelitigationrisk—isthereshelterfromthestorm?ClimatelitigationcoverageconsiderationsKeypolicytermsaffectingcoverageExclusionarylanguageGiventheseriousuncertaintiessurroundingclimateFacedwiththeriskofclimatelitigation,itisimportantforlitigationandthepotentialscaleofclimatedamages,many(re)insurersandtheirclientstounderstandtheextentto(re)insurersmaywanttoentirelyexcludeclimateclaimswhichclimatelitigationmaybecoveredbytheircurrentfromcoverage.Severalorganizationshavedevelopedandhistoricpolicies,andtounderstandthecoverageexclusionarylanguagedesignedtolimit(re)insurerexposureimplicationsofnewlywrittenpolicies.Thissectiontovariouskindsofclimateliabilityrisk.21However,whileaddresseskeypolicytermsaffectingclimatelitigationsampleexclusionsareavailable,the(re)insuranceindustry’scoverage.Itisimportanttonotethatthediscussionofwillingnesstoadoptsuchexclusionswilldependon:policytermsinthissectionisgeneral,andthatthequestionofwhetheraspecificclimatelitigationclaimwillbecovered1.theeaseofidentifyingclimateclaims,underaspecificinsurancepolicyrequiresanuancedand2.theeaseofdistinguishingclimateclaimsfromother,jurisdiction-specificanalysis.Withintheselimitations,however,severaltermshavebeenidentifiedasparticularlycoveredclaims,andimportantforunderstandingclimatelitigationrisk.3.thewillingnessofclientstoacceptpolicieswithGeneraltermsclimatelitigationexclusions,orindeed(re)insurersAnumberofgenerallyapplicablepolicytermsarehighlyappetitetowritethem.relevantinthecontextofclimatelitigation.Forexample,mitigationclaimsrelatedtolong-termGHGemissionsAsapracticalmatter,someclimateclaimswillbemuchoftenallegethatharmwascausedandsufferedovermanyeasiertoexcludefromcoveragethanothers.Mitigationyearsordecades,andpolicyholdersarelikelytoseekclaimsarerelativelyeasytoidentify—althoughtheymayindemnityacrossmultiplepolicyperiods.Ifajurisdictiontakeavarietyofforms,iitheyarisefromadefendant’sallowsclaimsacrossmultiplepolicyperiodstobeappliedinvolvementintheemissionofaspecificsetofGHGtomultipleinsurancepolicies,andtherelevantpoliciespollutants.Adaptationclaims,ontheotherhand,aredonothaveanti-stackingornon-cumulationclauseslikelytobeintertwinedwithotherclaimsthatarenotthatlimitcoverage,long-termmitigationclaimswillobviouslyclimate-related.Ifanewhousingdevelopmentlikelysignificantlyexceedthelimitsofasinglepolicy.19isunderminedbyunanticipatedflooding,forexample,Likewise,theselong-tailclaimsmeanthatpoliciesitmaytakeyearsofcomplexlitigationbeforethepartieswith“claims-made”triggersmaybelessexposedto(andtheirinsurers)determinethatthecollapsewasmitigationclaimsthanpolicieswith“losses-occurring”causedbyafailureofthebuildertoplanforthechangingor“occurrence”triggers.20Defensecostprovisions,climate.Otherclimateclaims,likesomegovernanceandincludingcoveragetriggers,limits,andsub-limits,areregulatoryclaimsagainstdirectorsandofficers,maybealsocrucialtoassessmentsofclimatelitigationcoverage.easytoidentifyasclimate-relatedbuthardtoexcludeClimatelitigationisoftenfact-intensiveandreliantonforcommercialreasons.While(re)insurersmayeasilyexpertevidence,soevenlawsuitsclaimingrelativelyidentifylawsuitsalleginggreenwashing,forexample,minordamagescanresultinsignificantlegalfees.thesesuitsareultimatelyverysimilartoothercorporatemisrepresentationrisksthataregenerallyconsideredinsurable.Topreservebroadcoverageandmeetclientexpectations,D&Ocarriershavehistoricallypreferredtouseriskselectionpracticesovercategoricalexclusions.22Table2:Climateclaims—ExclusionsClaimIsitidentifiable?Isitexcludable?Are(re)insurersexcluding?Yes.MitigationGenerallyeasyRelativelyeasytoexclude,andexclusionmaybetoidentify.commerciallyviablewherepollutionexclusionsExclusionsarenotyetarecommon.common.AdaptationCanbedifficultDifficulttoexclude,andmaybelimitedbyExclusionsarenotyettoidentify.commercialviabilityforpoliciesthatotherwisecommon.coverclaimsrelatedtoriskassessment.Governance&GenerallyeasyMaybelimitedbycommercialviabilityforpoliciesRegulatorytoidentify.thatotherwisecovergovernanceandregulatoryrisk.iiForexample,themitigationlawsuitsunderlyingtheAlohaPetroleumcoveragedisputeallegethattheplaintiffssufferedharmfromGHGemissionsassociatedwiththeproductssoldbythedefendantfossilfuelcompanies.However,severalcoreclaimsintheunderlyingcaseallegethatthedefendantsengagedingreenwashingaroundtheirproducts,andmightbetreatedasgeneral“governanceandregulatory”claimsiftheunderlyingharmfulactivitydidnotspecificallyrelatetothedefendants’contributionstoGHGemissions.(Seepage7:TheAlohaPetroleumLitigation;seealsoComplaint,CountyofMauiv.SunocoLP,Civ.No.20-380(Haw.2ndCir.Ct.filedOct.12,2020)).Climatelitigationrisk—isthereshelterfromthestorm/9Forcompetitivereasons,carriersmaybeunwillingtoDefinitionofPollutantleadtheindustryinapplyingclimatelitigationexclusionsuntilsignificantlossesarisefromclimate-relatedWhileGHGsareconsidered“pollutants”underanumberofclaims.However,ifandwhencarriersbegintosustainlegalframeworks,(re)insurersandclientsmaystruggletomeaningfulclimate-relatedlosses,considerationofthedeterminewhetherGHGsareconsidered“pollutants”forviabilityofexclusionarylanguagewilllikelybecomethepurposeofapplyingpollutionexclusionsornarrowlymorecommonplace,especiallyfor‘atrisk’sectorsdefinedpollutantcoverage.24Thereissignificantuncertaintyandjurisdictions.aroundwhether“pollutionexclusions”inexistingpoliciescoverGHG-relatedclaims,25anddifferentjurisdictionsmayDefinitionof“Occurrence”&fortuityprinciplestakeavarietyofapproachestointerpretingpolicylanguage.EvenifGHGsaredeemedacovered“pollutant”undertheInsurersholdingaportfolioof“occurrence-based”termsofaspecificpolicy,somepoliciesmayonlycoverpoliciesmaybeexposedtomitigationclaimswherepollutant-relatedclaimsarisingfromaccidentalspillsandsuchclaimsincludelossesfordamagesasaresultofcontamination,andmaynotcoverclaimsarisingfromlong-termcorporateGHGemissions.23Insuchcases,GHGsthatwereintentionallyorknowinglyemittedfroma(re)insurersandclientswillhavetocloselyexaminemitigationdefendant’sactivities.boththeunderlyingclimatelitigationclaimsandanyrelevantpoliciestodeterminewhetheraspecificclaimiscovered.Climate-relateddamagethatnaturallyarisesfromtheintentionalactsofadefendant,likeburningorsellingfossilfuels,mayfalloutsideofpolicy“occurrence”definitions(see:Fortuity,“Occurrence,”andSteadfastInsuranceCo.v.AESCorp.below).Equally,fortuityprinciples,whetherexplicitlyincludedinaninsurancepolicyorpresentinajurisdiction’slaw,maymeanthatcoverisnotaffordedtothird-partyclimateclaimsthatweretheprobableconsequenceofadefendant’sownactions.However,whilefortuityprinciplesvarybetweenjurisdictions,fortuityisanaffirmativedefensetocoveragethatisnotoriouslychallengingforinsurerstobringsuccessfully.Ascompaniesbecomeincreasinglyawareofspecificclimate-relatedrisksandassociateddamage,however,adaptation“fortuity”defensesmaybecomemoreviable.Fortuity,“Occurrence,”andSteadfastInsuranceCo.v.AESCorp.InSteadfastInsuranceCo.v.AESCorp.,themostprominentcoveragedisputearisingfromaclimatelitigationcase,aninsurancecompanysoughtadeclaratoryjudgmentthatitwasnotrequiredtodefendorindemnifyitspolicyholder,AESCorp.,againstalawsuitseekingclimatechange-relateddamages.Theallegationsintheunderlyingcase,NativeVillageofKivalinav.ExxonMobilCorp.,claimedthattheplaintiffswereharmedbytheintentionalGHGemissionsfromthedefendant’spowerplants.TheVirginiaSupremeCourtaffirmedarulinginfavoroftheinsurancecompany.ThecourtheldthatharmsarisingfromintentionalGHGemissionsdidnotrepresentan“accident”or“occurrence”underthetermsofthecommercialgeneralliabilitypolicythatAESCorp.hadpurchased,becausetheemissions,andtheresultinginjurytotheKivalinavillagerswereallegedtobethe“naturalorprobableconsequencesofanintentionalact.”1Footnote:1AESCorp.v.SteadfastInsuranceCo.,283Va.609,621(2012);seealsoSteadfastInsuranceCo.v.AESCorp.,ClimateChangeLitigationDatabase(n.d.),http://climatecasechart.com/case/steadfast-insurance-co-v-the-aes-corporation/.10/Climatelitigationrisk—isthereshelterfromthestorm?Table3:SummaryofpolicytermsandprinciplesaffectingclimatelitigationcoverageRiskmitigantMitigationclaimsAdaptationclaimsRegulatory&GovernanceclaimsGeneralterms(policyHighlyrelevanttocoverage.Highlyrelevanttocoverage.Highlyrelevanttoduration,policyHighlyrelevanttocoverage.coverage.triggers,anti-stacking,Someexclusionsmaybedefensecostlimits)possible.Difficulttoapplyclimate-specificexclusions.ClimateexclusionarylanguageDefinitionofHighlyrelevanttocoverage.Limitedrelevancetocoverage.Limitedrelevanceto“Occurrence”coverage.FortuityprinciplesHighlyrelevanttoclaimMaybecomeincreasinglyLimitedrelevancetoassessment,butcouldrelevantasclimateadaptationcoverage.Definitionoftriggerdifficultcoveragebecomesmorecommon.“Pollutant”disputes.LimitedrelevancetoLimitedrelevancetocoverage.coverage.Highlyrelevanttocoverage.Table4:SummaryofriskassessmentpracticesaffectingclimatelitigationexposureRiskassessmentMitigationclaimsAdaptationclaimsRegulatory&RiskselectionGovernanceclaimsIncreasinglyviable,becauseViable,becausecompaniesMarketselectioninformationaboutclienthavesignificantlydifferentViable,becausecompaniesGHGemissionsisprocessesforidentifyingandhavesignificantlydifferentClientincreasinglyavailable.respondingtoclimaterisks.processesforidentifyingengagementandrespondingtoViable,becauseatpresent,Bespokeassessmentclimaterisks.mitigationclaimstargetrequiredduetothebroadscoperelativelyfewindustries.ofpotentialclaimsBespokeassessmentanddefendants.requiredduetothebroadEngagementaroundGHGViable,sinceclientsarescopeofpotentialclaimsreductionsandnetzeroplanningincentivized(andmayanddefendants.viableinmanyindustries,butincreasinglybemandated)maybedifficultforthemosttoassessclimatethreatstoViable,sinceclientsareprominenttargetsofmitigationtheirbusinesses.highlyincentivizedtolawsuits(e.g.,fossilfuelidentifyregulatoryriskstocompanies)thathavebuilttheirbusiness.theirbusinessmodelsaroundGHGemissions.Climatelitigationrisk—isthereshelterfromthestorm/11RiskassessmentandriskselectionWhileitiscrucialfor(re)insurersandtheirclientstobyidentifyingtheriskiestjurisdictions,industries,andunderstandhowclimatelitigationisaddressedunderclients.However,thewiderangeofclimatelitigationcurrentandhistoricpolicies,(re)insurersalsohaverisksmeansthatinsurersmayhavetoadoptavarietytheopportunitytoadoptsophisticatedandproactiveofriskselectionprocesses.responsestowardsriskinnewlywrittenpolicies.Asinitialsteps,(re)insurerscanfocusonriskawareness,Insomeareas,riskidentificationmayrelyonrelativelyfewandensurethatknowledgeandunderstandingofvariables.Theexposureofasectortomitigationlitigation,climatelitigationriskfiltersacrosstheirorganizationsforexample,willbecloselytiedtoitsrelationshipto(andparticularlytheirunderwritingteams).ArmedwithGHG-emittingactivities.iiiOtherkindsofclimatelitigation,theindustry’sgrowingunderstandingofclimatelitigationontheotherhand,canbehighlynuancedandtiedtorisk,(re)insurerscanthenbegintoadoptbespokeclient-specificfactors.Companieseachhaveuniqueriskselectionpractices.Thesepracticesmayincludeadaptationneedsbasedonthedetailsoftheirbusinessescreatingportfolio-wideriskmodels,client-specificriskandthephysicalcharacteristicsoftheiroperations.selectionpractices,corporateunderwritingguidelines,Similarly,mostcompanieswillhaveuniquegovernanceandclimatelitigationprotocols.andcomplianceneeds,basedontheregulationsthattheyaresubjecttoandtheclimate-relatedrisksthattheyface.PortfolioriskassessmentUnderstandingthedifferentriskprofilesofpolicyholderswillhelpinsurersassessthelikelyfrequencyandseverity(Re)insurersshouldcarryoutassessmentsoftheirofclimateclaimsthattheymayface.portfolios’exposuretoclimatelitigation.Thisisnotjustgoodpractice—insuranceregulatorsareincreasingly(Re)insurersshouldcarryoutassessmentsoftheirrequiring(re)insurerstoquantifytheirexposuretoportfolios’exposuretoclimatelitigation.Thisisclimatelitigationrisk.26Thisassessmentmustincludeanotjustgoodpractice—insuranceregulatorssignificantretrospectiveanalysis,becauseaspreviouslyareincreasinglyrequiring(re)insurerstoquantifydiscussedmany(re)insurersfacelegacyriskfromtheirexposuretoclimatelitigationrisk.long-tailclaimslikemitigationlawsuits.Fortunately,thegrowthinclimatelitigation,(andparticularlyofUnderwritingguidelinesandclimateclimatelitigationthatislikelytoresultinnotificationstolitigationprotocolsinsurers)hasbeenaccompaniedbyagrowingnumberofquantitativeandqualitativetoolstomodelclimateWhenarmedwiththerequisiteknowledge,underwriterslitigationrisk.27Giventhecomplexanddynamicnatureareabletoincludeclimateriskexposureintheirofclimatechange,andthecorrespondinglycomplexunderwritingguidelinesandframeworks,contentlitigationlandscape,suchmodelscannotbestatic;anyvarying,forexample,byreferencetolineofbusiness,modelbasedonapre-defineduniverseoflitigationriskssectorandjurisdiction.Understandingthedifferentwouldsoonbecomeobsolete.28Theoutputofsuchriskprofilesofpolicyholderswillassistunderwritersinmodellingexerciseswillbeofwide-useto(re)insurers,assessingthelikelyfrequencyandseverityofclimatefeedingintotheirunderwriting,claims,capital,pricing,litigationclaims,andunderwritersmayneedtocollectreservingandexposuremanagement.someclient-specificdataaboutactivities,climatepolicies,andgovernanceprocesses.29WhilenoentityRiskselectionpracticescancompletelycontrolwhetheritwillfaceathird-partylawsuit,engagementandtransparencyaroundInsurersthatdevelopexpertiseinassessingclimateclimatelitigationriskwillhelpbothunderwritersandlitigationriskcanbegintoimplementclimatepolicyholdersassesstheirexposuretoclimatelitigation.underwritingriskselectionpracticesfornewpolicies.Suchpracticescanraiseclientawarenessabouttheirexposuretoclimatelitigationrisk,andmayallow(re)insurerstopricenewclimatelitigationcoverageiii(Re)insurersshouldbewaryofrelyingentirelyonreportedemissions,liketheGHGProtocol’s“Scope1,2,and3”measurements,becausemitigationdefendantsoftencontributetoGHGemissionsthroughavarietyofchannels.Sometargetsofmitigationlitigation,likefossilfuelcompanies,energyutilities,andchemicalmanufacturersmayemitGHGsdirectlyorthroughtheirproducts.However,somemitigationlitigationhasbeentargetedtowardscompaniesthatadviseorfinanceGHG-emittingindustriesbutdonotthemselvescreatesignificantGHGemissions.See,e.g.,Complaint¶200,CountyofMultnomahv.ExxonMobilCorp.etal.,Civ.No.22-25164,Or.Cir.Ct.(filedJune22,2023)(suingtheconsultingfirmMcKinsey,amongothercompanies,for“coordinat[ing]andparticipat[ing]inadeliberatemisinformationcampaign”aroundclimatechangeatthebehestofGHG-emittingcompanies).12/Climatelitigationrisk—isthereshelterfromthestorm?InnovationinclimatelitigationcoverageTheevolvinglandscapeofclimatelitigationriskofferswhilstalsotakingstepstominimizetherisksthattheirmanyopportunitiesfortheinsuranceindustrytoactivitiesposetosociety.Engineeringfirmsthatadaptcreateinnovativecoverageproductsandriskcontroltheirpracticestothechangingclimate,forexample,maysolutions.Ascorporationsawakentotheincreasingsignificantlyreducetheirriskofadaptationlitigation.riskofclimatelitigation,insurersarealreadyfacingaSimilarly,publiclytradedcompaniesthatapplyindustrygrowingdemandforclimaterelatedriskmanagementbestpracticestoevaluatetheirexposuretoclimateservices.30Inresponse,insurersandbrokerscandevelopchangemayreducetheexposureoftheirdirectorsnewclimatebasedfinancialproducts,advisoryservices,andofficerstogovernanceandregulatorylitigation.analytics,andriskcontrolmechanismstomeettheirEngagementisnotapanacea—someclimatelitigationclients’needs.risks,likehistoricGHGemissions,cannoteasilybereducedthroughclientengagement.However,formanyProductdevelopmentcategoriesofclimatelitigation,clientengagementaroundlosscontrolwillreduceriskbymakingtheworldClimatelitigationcreatesanumberofnewareasofmoreresilienttotheimpactsofclimatechange.uncertainty.Wherepolicyholdersarelookingtomitigateoroffsettheirownrisks,insurershavetheopportunityTheexpertiseandanalyticaltoprovidenewrisktransfersolutions.Forexample,intechniquesthatwillallowcarriersresponsetolegaluncertaintyincarbonoffsetmarkets,toidentifyandquantifyclimateanumberofinsurershavebeguntodevelopproductslitigationriskwillalsobeincrediblythatinsurepre-vettedemissionsoffsets“againstriskslikevaluabletocompaniesseekingtoinvalidation,third-partynegligenceandfraud.”31Similarly,understandtheirownexposuretotheWorldBank’sMultilateralInvestmentGuaranteeclimatelitigation.Agencyhasbeguntoofferproject-specificpoliticalriskinsurancetoprotectinvestmentin“carbonoffsetConclusionprojectsindevelopingcountries.”32Giventheuncertaintysurroundingclimatelitigation,andtheinsuranceClimatelitigationisacomplexandrapidlygrowingindustry’straditionalrelianceuponpastperformancetothreattotheinsuranceindustry,anditiscrucialtodetermineinsurabilityandcostsforrisktransfer,carriersunderstandthepotentialthreatthatpolicyholdersmayinitiallybereluctanttoacceptlargeswathesoffacefrommitigationlitigation,adaptationlitigationclimatelitigationrisk.Aswithallareasofemergingrisk,andgovernanceandregulatorylitigation.Eachspecialistunderwriting,andmarketcollaborationmaycategoryofclimatelitigationhasdifferentbeneededtomeetindustrycapacitydemand.characteristics,targetsdifferentdefendants,andimpactsinsuranceproductsinverydifferentRiskidentificationandclientengagementways.Toaddressallthree,(re)insurerswillneedtoadoptriskassessmenttools,guidelines,andControllingclimatelitigationriskwillalsorequireprotocolsthataretailoredtothejurisdictions,significantinnovationfromtheinsuranceindustry.policylines,andsectorswheretheywritebusiness.(Re)insurersmustbuildnewandinnovativeriskmodelsClimatelitigationisnotrandom.(Re)insurersanddevelopclimateriskselectionpracticestoidentifywhounderstandthescopeandimpactofclimatelegacyrisksembeddedintheirexistingportfoliosandlitigationwillbewell-positionedtonotonlylimitpriceriskinnewpolicies.Theexpertiseandanalyticaltheirownhistoricliabilitiesbutunderstandnewrisktechniquesthatwillallowcarrierstoidentifyandquantifyexposures,buildnewcoveragelines,risktransferclimatelitigationriskwillalsobeincrediblyvaluabletoproducts,andservices.Indoingso,(re)insurerscancompaniesseekingtounderstandtheirownexposurehelptheirclientsplanforandadapttoforeseeabletoclimatelitigation.Riskassessmenttoolsdesignedclimaterisks,whileprovidingrisktransferproductstoevaluateaprospectiveclient’sinsurabilitycanalsotohelpprotectthemagainstunforeseeableones.helpinsurersengagewiththeirclientstoidentifyopportunitiesforlosscontrol.Climatelitigationlosscontrolmayhavesignificantbenefitsforinsurers,clients,andthebroaderworld,becausemuchofclimatelitigationisdownstreamofreal-worldharm.Manycompanieswillbeabletoreducetheirclimatelitigationriskbyadoptingpractices,policies,andsystemsthatcomplywithrelevantlaws,Climatelitigationrisk—isthereshelterfromthestorm/13References16https://www.houstonpublicmedia.org/articles/news/2018/04/05/277534/homeowners-sue-costello-engineering-1U.N.EnvironmentProgramme,GlobalClimateLitigationReport:firm-over-harvey-flood-damage/.2023StatusReview13(July27,2023),https://www.unep.org/resources/report/global-climate-litigation-report-2023-status-review17https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/publications/[hereinafterU.N.2023ClimateLitigationReview].Climate%20and%20Labour%20Issue%20Paper_28%20April%202016_v1_lowres.pdf2Seeid.at50–60.18See,e.g.,RachelFrazin,TexasHeatWaveInvigoratesCallsfor3CamillaHodgson&IanSmith,ClimateLitigationThreatenstoWorkerHeatProtections,TheHill(June29,2023),https://thehill.PushUpCompanies’InsuranceCosts,FinancialTimes(Aug.28,com/policy/energy-environment/4072477-texas-heat-wave-worker-2022),https://www.ft.com/content/1115a034-3fa0-4814-9a87-protections/42bb56128352[hereinafterHodgson&Smith].19ClimateChangeandInsuranceat192–93.4BankofEngland,Resultsofthe2021ClimateBiennialExploratoryScenario(CBES),BoxC:ClimateLitigationRisk(May24,2022)20MarkRothwell,MartinEarle,ChoongHernOoi,JamesOrr,Shradahttps://www.bankofengland.co.uk/stress-testing/2022/results-of-Shroff&JoianhuaSiew,PracticalGuidetoClimateChangeforthe-2021-climate-biennial-exploratory-scenario[hereinafter2021GeneralInsurancePractitioners16(2019),https://www.actuaries.CBESResults].org.uk/system/files/field/document/Practical%20Guide%20to%20Climate%20Change%20for%20GI%20Practitioners_1.pdf5OSFIGuidelineB-15—ClimateRiskManagement,OfficeoftheSuperintendentofFinancialInstitutionsCanada(Mar.2023),https://21SeeLMAModelClimateChangeExclusion,Lloyd’sMarketwww.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/Docs/b15-dft.pdf.Association(Nov.10,2021),https://www.lmalloyds.com/LMA/News/LMA_bulletins/LMA_Bulletins/LMA21-041-DP.aspx(addressing6SeeMinterEllison,TheCarbonBoomerang—LitigationRiskexclusionarylanguagearoundmitigationclaims);ExclusionsfromasaDriverandConsequenceoftheEnergyTransition3(2017),InsuranceCoverageforClimateHarms,TheChanceryLaneProjecthttps://2degrees-investing.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/(n.d.),https://chancerylaneproject.org/climate-clauses/exclusions-Carbon-boomerang.pdf;seealsoMarkRothwell,MartinEarle,from-insurance-coverage-for-climate-harms/(addressingabroadChoongHernOoi,JamesOrr,ShradhaShroff&JianhuaSiew,rangeofclimatelitigationclaims).PracticalGuidetoClimateChangeforGeneralInsurancePractitioners16(2019),https://www.actuaries.org.uk/system/22SeeMartinLockman,ModellingClimateLitigationRiskfor(Re)files/field/document/Practical%20Guide%20to%20Climate%20Insurers,SabinCenterforClimateChangeLaw40(July18,2023),Change%20for%20GI%20Practitioners_1.pdf[hereinafterPracticalhttps://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/sabin_climate_change/201.GuidetoClimateChangeforGeneralInsurancePractitioners].[hereinafterModellingClimateLitigationRisk]7SeeRespondingtoClimateChange:MitigationandAdaptation,23PracticalGuidetoClimateChangeforGeneralInsuranceNASA(n.d.),https://climate.nasa.gov/solutions/adaptation-Practitionersat16.mitigation/.24ClimateChangeandInsurance164–79.8ChristinaM.Carroll,J.RandolphEvans,LindeneE.Patton,&JoanneL.Zimolzak,ClimateChangeandInsurance141(2012)[hereinafter25Foradiscussionofthisissue,andanoverviewofrecentU.S.casesClimateChangeandInsurance].interpretingthecommonlyused“AbsolutePollutionExclusion,”seeAmyHeadrick,ClimateChangeLitigationandInsuranceCoverage,9See,e.g.,2021CBESResults,BoxC:ClimateLitigationRiskTysonMendes(June12,2023),https://www.tysonmendes.com/(highlighting“ProfessionalIndemnity&Directors’&Officersclimate-change-litigation-and-insurance-coverage/.insurancepolicies”asparticularlyvulnerabletoclimatelitigationrisk).26See,e.g.,OSFIGuidelineB-15—ClimateRiskManagement,CanadianOfficeoftheSuperintendentofFinancialInstitutions10SeeU.N.2023ClimateLitigationReviewat18.(Mar.2023),https://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/fi-if/rg-ro/gdn-ort/gl-ld/Pages/b15-dft.aspx11See,e.g.,LMAModelClimateChangeExclusion,LLOYD’SMARKETASSOCIATION(Nov.10,2021),https://www.lmalloyds.com/LMA/27SeegenerallyModellingClimateLitigationRisk.News/LMA_bulletins/LMA_Bulletins/LMA21-041-DP.aspx28SeeModellingClimateLitigationRiskat60–61.12VictoriaBarnes,DerivativeActionCommencedinUKAgainstShell’sDirectorsforMismanagingClimateRisk,BurgesSalmon(Mar.29SeeHodgson&Smith,supranote3(discussingtheincreasein9,2023),https://www.burges-salmon.com/news-and-insight/legal-underwritingquestionsdesignedtoassessclimatelitigationrisk).updates/environment/derivative-action-commenced-in-uk-against-shells-directors-for-mismanaging-climate-risk.30LindaHedqvist,KarelineDaguer,KatherineLampen,JoeyGalloway,DianneMouradian,AssessingClimateLitigationRiskfor13GregoryBarden,SarahBatley,MichelleBradfield,AidanLawes,&Insurers,Deloitte(Mar.13,2023),https://emearegulatorystrategy.AlexMacpherson,HighCourtDismissesClientEarth’sApplicationdeloitte.com/post/102ia9c/assessing-climate-litigation-risk-for-toInitiateProceedingsAgainstShell’sDirectors,JDSupra(Aug.17,insurers.2023),https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/high-court-dismisses-clientearth-s-5541083/.31ModellingClimateLitigationRiskat28.14SeePressRelease,REST,StatementfromRESTonSettlement32SherylTianTongLee,EwaKrukowska,&IsabelJoyKua,CarbonofMcVeighLitigation(Nov.2,2020)(availableathttps://Offsets:WorldBanktoOfferInsuranceAgainstPoliticalRisk,climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/mcveigh-v-retail-employees-Bloomberg(June26,2023),https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-superannuation-trust/labor-report/world-bank-to-offer-political-risk-insurance-to-carbon-investors15IAIS,ApplicationPaperontheSupervisionofClimate-relatedRisksintheInsuranceSector14(May2021),https://www.iaisweb.org/uploads/2022/01/210525-Application-Paper-on-the-Supervision-of-Climate-related-Risks-in-the-Insurance-Sector.pdf14/Climatelitigationrisk—isthereshelterfromthestorm?AboutWTWAtWTW(NASDAQ:WTW),weprovidedata-driven,insight-ledsolutionsintheareasofpeople,riskandcapital.Leveragingtheglobalviewandlocalexpertiseofourcolleaguesserving140countriesandmarkets,wehelpyousharpenyourstrategy,enhanceorganisationalresilience,motivateyourworkforceandmaximiseperformance.Workingshouldertoshoulderwithyou,weuncoveropportunitiesforsustainablesuccess—andprovideperspectivethatmovesyou.Learnmoreatwtwco.com.wtwco.com/social-mediaCopyright©2023WTW.Allrightsreserved.WTW-122300/09/2023wtwco.com

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