Version1.01.5°C2.0°C3.0°CKeeping1.5°CAlive:ClosingtheGapinthe2020sSeptember2021OurCommissionersMr.MarcoAlvera,ChiefExecutiveOfficer–SNAMMr.ThomasThuneAnderson,ChairmanoftheBoard–ØrstedMr.JeremyBentham,VicePresidentGlobalBusinessEnvironmentandHeadofShellScenarios–ShellMr.SpencerDale,GroupChiefEconomist–BPMr.AniDasgupta,InterimCEO&President–WRIMr.BradleyDavey,ChiefCommercialOfficer–ArcelorMittalMr.Pierre-AndrédeChalendar,ChairmanandChiefExecutiveOfficer–SaintGobainDr.VibhaDhawan,Director-General,TheEnergyandResourcesInstituteMr.AgustinDelgado,ChiefInnovationandSustainabilityOfficer–IberdrolaMs.MarisaDrew,ChiefSustainabilityOfficer&GlobalHeadSustainabilityStrategy,AdvisoryandFinance–CreditSuisseMr.ReaganFarr,PresidentandChiefExecutiveOfficer–SiliconRanchMr.WillGardiner,ChiefExecutiveOfficer–DRAXMr.JohnHaley,ChiefExecutiveOfficer–WillisTowersWatsonMr.PhilippHildebrand,ViceChairman–BlackrockMr.JohnHolland-Kaye,ChiefExecutiveOfficer-HeathrowAirportMr.FredHu,FounderandChairman–PrimaveraCapitalDr.TimothyJarratt,ChiefofStaff-NationalGridMr.HubertKeller,ManagingPartner–LombardOdierMs.ZoeKnight,ManagingDirectorandGroupHeadoftheHSBCCentreofSustainableFinance–HSBCMr.JulesKortenhorst,ChiefExecutiveOfficer–RockyMountainInstituteMr.MarkLaabs,ManagingDirector–ModernEnergyMr.RichardLancaster,ChiefExecutiveOfficer–CLPMr.LiZheng,ExecutiveVicePresident–InstituteofClimateChangeandSustainableDevelopment,TsinghuaUniversityMr.LiZhenguo,President–LONGiSolarMr.MartinLindqvist,ChiefExecutiveOfficerandPresident–SSABMr.JohanLundén,SVPHeadofProjectandProductStrategyOffice–VolvoGroupDr.MaríaMendiluce,ChiefExecutiveOfficer–WeMeanBusinessMr.JonMoore,ChiefExecutiveOfficer–BloombergNEFMr.JulianMylchreest,ManagingDirector,GlobalCo-HeadofNaturalResources(Energy,Power&Mining)–BankofAmericaMs.DamilolaOgunbiyi,ChiefExecutiveOfficer–SustainableEnergyForAllMr.PaddyPadmanathan,PresidentandCEO–ACWAPowerMr.VinayakPai,GroupPresidentEMEA&APAC–WorleyMs.NanditaParshad,ManagingDirector,SustainableInfrastructureGroup–EBRDMr.SanjivPaul,VicePresidentSafetyHealthandSustainability–TataSteelMr.AlistairPhillips-Davies,CEO–SSEMr.AndreasRegnell,SeniorVicePresidentStrategicDevelopment–VattenfallMr.MattiaRomani,HeadofSustainability–AutonomyCapitalMr.SiddharthSharma,GroupChiefSustainabilityOfficer–TataSonsPrivateLimitedMr.MahendraSinghi,ManagingDirectorandCEO–DalmiaCement(Bharat)LimitedMr.SumantSinha,ChairmanandManagingDirector–RenewPowerMr.IanSimm,FounderandChiefExecutiveOfficer–ImpaxLordNicholasStern,IGPatelProfessorofEconomicsandGovernment-GranthamInstitute-LSEDr.GüntherThallinger,MemberoftheBoardofManagement–AllianzMr.SimonThompson,Chairman–RioTintoDr.RobertTrezona,HeadofCleantech–IPGroupMr.Jean-PascalTricoire,ChairmanandChiefExecutiveOfficer–SchneiderElectricMs.LaurenceTubiana,ChiefExecutiveOfficer-EuropeanClimateFoundationLordAdairTurner,Co-Chair–EnergyTransitionsCommissionSenatorTimothyE.Wirth,PresidentEmeritus–UnitedNationsFoundationMr.ZhangLei,ChiefExecutiveOfficer–EnvisionGroupDr.ZhaoChangwen,DirectorGeneralIndustrialEconomy–DevelopmentResearchCenteroftheStateCouncilMs.CathyZoi,President–EVgoKeeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s3MajorETCreportsandworkingpapersBetterEnergy,GreaterProsperity(2017)outlinedfourcomplementarydecarbonisationstrategies,positioningpowerdecarbonisationandcleanelectrificationasmajorcomplementaryprogresslevers.MissionPossible(2018)outlinedpathwaystoreachnet-zeroemissionsfromtheharder-to-abatesectorsinheavyindustry(cement,steel,plastics)andheavy-dutytransport(trucking,shipping,aviation).MakingMissionPossible(2020)showedthatanet-zeroglobaleconomyistechnicallyandeconomicallypossiblebymid-centuryandwillrequireaprofoundtransformationoftheglobalenergysystem.MakingMissionPossibleSeries–aseriesofreportsoutlininghowtoscaleupcleanenergyprovisiontoachieveanet-zeroemissionseconomybymid-century.Thereportssetoutspecificactionsinthe2020stoputthisnet-zeroby2050targetwithinreach.InOctober2020,thecorporatemembersoftheCleanSkiesforTomorrowinitiative(CST)developedaJointPolicyProposaltoAcceleratetheDeploymentofSustainableAviationFuelsinEurope.ProducedfortheGettingtoZeroCoalition,“TheFirstWave–Ablueprintforcommercial-scalezero-emissionshippingpilots”(2020)highlightsfivekeyactionsthatfirstmoverscantaketomaketangibleprogresstowardszeroemissionpilotsoverthenextthreetofouryears.SteelingDemand:Mobilisingbuyerstobringnet-zerosteeltomarketbefore2030demonstratesthatdemandsignalsfromsteelbuyerstosteelmanufacturerscanhelpunlockinvestmentandbreakthroughtechnologiesneededfornet-zeroprimarysteel.China2050:AFullyDevelopedRichZero-carbonEconomydescribedthepossibleevolutionofChina’senergydemandsectorbysector,analysingenergysources,technologiesandpolicyinterventionsrequiredtoreachnet-zerocarbonemissionsby2050.AseriesofreportsontheIndianpowersystemandoutliningdecarbonisationroadmapsforIndianindustry(2019-2020)describedhowIndiacouldrapidlyexpandelectricitysupplywithoutbuildingmorecoal-firedpowerstations,andhowIndiacanindustrialisewhilstdecarbonisingheavyindustrysectors.Sectoralfocusesprovideddetaileddecarbonisationanalysesoneachonthesixharder-to-abatesectorsafterthepublicationoftheMissionPossiblereport(2019).Ourlatestfocusonbuildingheating(2020)detailsdecarbonisationpathwaysandcostsforbuildingheating,andimplicationsforenergysystems.AsacorepartneroftheMissionPossiblePartnership,theETCalsocompletesanalysistosupportarangeofsectoraldecarbonisationinitiatives:GlobalReportsSectoralandcross-sectoralfocusesGeographicalfocusesChinaZeroCarbonElectricityGrowthinthe2020s:AVitalStepTowardCarbonNeutrality(January2021).FollowingtheannouncementofChina’saimtoachievecarbonneutralitybefore2060andpeakemissionsbefore2030.Thisreportexamineswhatactionisrequiredby2030alignedwithwhatisneededtofullydecarboniseChina’spowersectorby2050.SettingUpIndustryforNet-Zero(June2021)exploresthestateofplayinAustraliaandopportunitiesfortransitiontonet-zeroemissionsinfivesupplychains–steel,aluminium,liquifiednaturalgas,othermetalsandchemicals.Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s4Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s5TheEnergyTransitionsCommission2OurCommissioners3Glossary7Introduction8Chapter116Theneedforfasterprogressinthe2020sChapter222WhathaschangedsinceParis?Technologies,costs,andscientificunderstandingChapter326AssessingthepotentialtogobeyondNDCs:MethodologyandapproachChapter430Feasibleactionstoaccelerateemissionsreductions–6keycategoriesforpriorityaction4.1Significantandrapidreductionsinmethaneemissions314.2Haltingdeforestation,beginningreforestationandothercarbonsequestrationopportunities384.3Decarbonisingthepowersector–acceleratingcoalphaseout404.4Acceleratingroadtransportelectrification434.5Acceleratingsupplydecarbonisationinbuildings,heavyindustryandheavytransport454.6Energyandresourceefficiencyimprovements47Chapter554Addingitup–Canweclosethegap?Chapter658ActionsatandafterCOP26Acknowledgements62ContentsKeeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s6GlossaryAbatementcost:ThecostofreducingCO2emissions,usuallyexpressedinUS$pertonneofCO2.Afforestationandreforestation:“Theplantingofnewforestsonlandnotcurrentlyunderforestcover.Theforestsremovecarbonfromtheatmosphereastheygrow.”1BECCS:Atechnologythatcombinesbioenergywithcarboncaptureandstoragetoproduceenergyandnetnegativegreenhousegasemissions(i.e.,removalofcarbondioxidefromtheatmosphere).See‘BiCRS’.BEV:Battery-electricvehicle.BiCRS:Biomasscarbonremovalandstorage.ThistermincludesBECCSandotherformsofcarbondioxideremoval(e.g.,biochar).2Biochar:“Thethermaldecompositionofbiomassintheabsenceofoxygenformsacharcoalknownasbiochar.Thiscanbeaddedtosoilstoimprovesoilfertilityandtoactasastablelong-termstoreofcarbon.”3Bioenergy:Renewableenergyderivedfrombiologicalsourcesintheformofsolidbiomass,biogas,orbiofuels.Biofuels:“Liquidfuelsderivedfrombiomass,usedprimarilyfortransport,includingethanol,biodieselandotherliquids.”4Biomassorbio-feedstock:Organicmatter,i.e.,biogenicmaterial,availableonarenewablebasisfromlivingorrecentlylivingorganisms.Includesfeedstockderivedfromplantsoranimals,suchasagriculturalandenergycrops,woodandforestryresidues,organicwastefrommunicipalandindustrialsources(includingmanure),andalgae.Carboncaptureandstorageoruse(CCS/U):Weusetheterm‘carboncapture’torefertotheprocessofcapturingCO2onthebackofenergyandindustrialprocesses.Unlessspecifiedotherwise,wedonotincludedirectaircarboncapture(DACC)whenusingthisterm.Theterm‘carboncaptureandstorage’(CCS)referstothecombinationofcarboncapturewithundergroundcarbonstorage;while‘carboncaptureanduse’(CCU)referstotheuseofcarbonincarbon-basedproductsinwhichCO2issequesteredoverthelongterm(e.g.,inconcrete,aggregates,carbonfibre).Carbon-basedproductsthatonlydelayemissionsintheshortterm(e.g.,synfuels)areexcludedwhenusingthisterminology.Carbondioxideremovals(CDR):sometimesshortenedto‘carbonremovals’referstoactionssuchasNCSorDACCSthatcanresultinanetremovalofCO2fromtheatmosphere.Carbonemissions/CO2emissions:Weusethesetermsinterchangeablytodescribeanthropogenicemissionsofcarbondioxideintheatmosphere.1UKCommitteeonClimateChange(2018),Biomassinalow-carboneconomy.2Sandalowetal.(2021),Biomasscarbonremovalandstorage(BiCRS)roadmap.3UKCommitteeonClimateChange(2018),Biomassinalow-carboneconomy.4BP(2014),BiomassintheEnergyIndustry–anintroduction.5BP(2014),BiomassintheEnergyIndustry–anintroduction.6BP(2014),BiomassintheEnergyIndustry–anintroduction.7Griscometal.(2017),NaturalClimateSolutions.Carbonoffsets:Reductionsinemissionsofcarbondioxide(CO2)orgreenhousegasesmadebyacompany,sector,oreconomytocompensateforemissionsmadeelsewhereintheeconomy.Carbonprice:Agovernment-imposedpricingmechanism,thetwomaintypesbeingeitherataxonproductsandservicesbasedontheircarbonintensity,oraquotasystemsettingacaponpermissibleemissionsinthecountryorregionandallowingcompaniestotradetherighttoemitcarbon(i.e.,asallowances).Thisshouldbedistinguishedfromsomecompanies’useofwhataresometimescalled‘internal’or‘shadow’carbonprices,whicharenotpricesorlevies,butindividualprojectscreeningvalues.Circulareconomymodels:Economicmodelsthatensuretherecirculationofresourcesandmaterialsintheeconomy,byrecyclingalargershareofmaterials,reducingwasteinproduction,light-weightingproductsandstructures,extendingthelifetimesofproducts,anddeployingnewbusinessmodelsbasedaroundsharingofcars,buildings,andmore.Directaircarboncapture(DACC):Theextractionofcarbondioxidefromatmosphericair.Thisisalsocommonlyabbreviatedas‘DAC’.Directaircarboncaptureandstorage(DACCS):DACCcombinedwithcarbonstorage.EBITsectors:Energy,building,industry,andtransportsectors.Ecosystemservices:Servicesfromnatureincludingnutrientcycling,floodanddiseasecontrol,andrecreationalandculturalbenefits.5Embeddedcarbonemissions:Lifecyclecarbonemissionsfromaproduct,includingcarbonemissionsfromthematerialsinputproductionandmanufacturingprocess.Greenhousegases(GHGs):Gasesthattrapheatintheatmosphere.GlobalGHGemissioncontributionsbygas–CO2(76%),methane(16%),nitrousoxide(6%)andfluorinatedgases(2%).HeavyGoodsVehicles(HGV)orHeavyDutyVehicle(HDV):Bothtermsareusedinterchangeablyandrefertotrucksrangingfrom3.5tonnestoover50tonnes.Internalcombustionengine(ICE):Atraditionalengine,poweredbygasoline,diesel,biofuels,ornaturalgas.ItisalsopossibletoburnammoniaorhydrogeninanICE.Levelisedcostofelectricity(LCOE):Ameasureoftheaveragenetpresentcostofelectricitygenerationforageneratingplantoveritslifetime.TheLCOEiscalculatedastheratiobetweenallthediscountedcostsoverthelifetimeofanelectricity-generatingplantdividedbyadiscountedsumoftheactualenergyamountsdelivered.Lifecycleemissions:Emissionsfromtheenergy,material,andwasteflowsofaproductandtheirimpactontheenvironment.6Lifecycleassessments(LCAs)shouldtakeintoaccountthegreenhousegasimpactsacrosslandusechange(ifapplicable),growth,harvesting,transportation,conversion,anduseofbioresources.Naturalcarbonsinks:NaturalreservoirsstoringmoreCO2thantheyemit.Forests,plants,soils,andoceansarenaturalcarbonsinks.NaturalClimateSolutions(NCS):Actionsconsideredtobeasubsetofnature-basedsolutions(NBS)withaspecificfocusonaddressingclimatechange.NCShasbeendefinedas“conservation,restoration,and/orimprovedlandmanagementactionstoincreasecarbonstorageand/oravoidgreenhousegasemissionsacrossglobalforests,wetlands,grasslands,agriculturallands,andoceans”.7NCScanbecoupledwithtechnologytosecurelong-termorpermanentstorageofGHGs,examplesincludeCCS,theuseoftechnologiessuchastorrefactiontoprocessbiomassormonitoringtoimproveforestmanagementtechniquesforincreaseddensity.Negativeemissions(or‘netnegative’emissions):isusedforthecasewherethecombinationofallsectorCO2emissionspluscarbonremovalsresultsinanabsolutenegative(andthusareductioninthestockofatmosphericCO2).Net-zero-carbon-emissions/Net-zero-carbon/Net-zero:WeusethesetermsinterchangeablytodescribethesituationinwhichtheenergyandindustrialsystemasawholeoraspecificeconomicsectorreleasesnoCO2emissions–eitherbecauseitdoesn’tproduceanyorbecauseitcapturestheCO2itproducestouseorstore.Inthissituation,theuseofoffsetsfromothersectors(‘realnet-zero’)shouldbeextremelylimitedandusedonlytocompensateforresidualemissionsfromimperfectlevelsofcarboncapture,unavoidableend-of-lifeemissions,orremainingemissionsfromtheagriculturesector.Peatlands:Peatlandscontainlayersofpartiallydecomposedorganicmaterialpreservedinwaterloggedenvironments.Theycontainalargefractionoftheworld’sterrestrialcarbonstockandwhendamagedordestroyedcanbecomelargesourcesofGHGemissions.Zero-carbonenergysources:Termusedtorefertorenewables(includingsolar,wind,hydro,geothermalenergy),sustainablebiomass,nuclearandfossilfuelsifandwhentheirusecanbedecarbonisedthroughcarboncapture.Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s7IntroductionInNovembertheworldwillholdthelandmark26thConferenceoftheParties(COP26)inGlasgow,aimingtoaccelerateglobalactiontoavertpotentiallycatastrophicclimatechange.Aheadofthatmeeting,manycountries,cities,andcompanieshavemadecommitmentstoreachnet-zeroemissions(whetherforcarbondioxideorallgreenhousegasemissions(GHGs)by2050or2060).Inaddition,over100countrieshavesubmittednew“nationallydeterminedcontributions”(NDCs)withintheParisagreementframework,updatingtheirprevioustargetsforreductionstobeachievedby2030.But,thesumofthesepledgesstillfallsfarshortofwhatisrequiredtodeliveramorethan50%chanceoflimitingglobalwarmingto1.5°C.1Thisreportdescribes6setsofactionwhichifagreedatCOP26andimplementedduringthe2020swouldmakeitpossibletoachievethe1.5°Ctarget.Itfocusesonactionswhichareclearlytechnicallyfeasibleandwhichcouldinitiallybeprogressedbyleadinggroupsofgovernmentsand/orcompanieswithouttheneedforcomprehensiveinternationallynegotiatedagreements.Manyoftheseactionswouldalsodeliversignificantco-benefits,forexamplethroughimprovedlocalairquality.Fouroftheactioncategorieswouldentaileithernilorevennegativecosts,orcostswhichcouldveryeasilybeabsorbedbytheglobaleconomy:•Theseincludelowcostactionstoreducemethaneemissions,whichhasnotpreviouslyreceivedtheattentionitdeserves,givenmethane’scrucialroleinglobalwarmingandthebigpotentialforshorttermreductionsandfavourableclimateimpact;•Theyalsoincludeactiontoaccelerateroadtransportelectrification,energyefficiencyimprovement,andthedecarbonisationofsectorssuchassteel,cement,shippingandaviation,whichuntilrecentlywereseenas“hardertoabate”.Insomeofthesesectorsindeedtechnologicalprogress,costreductionsandcorporatecommitmentsmakeitlikelythatemissionreductionswillrunaheadofcurrentNDCcommitmentsevenifnonewagreementsweremadeatCOP26.Butadditionalcommitmentsandagreementswouldreinforcethepowerful“ambitionloop”betweennationalpolicy,corporateactionandtechnologicalprogress,enablingstillfasteremissionsreduction,whilesupportingeconomicgrowth.Twocategoriesofactionwouldhoweverentailmaterialeconomiccost.Committingtononewcoalinvestmentsisclosetocostless,butreducingemissionsfromexistingcoalplantsbeforeendoflifewouldimposesomecost,particularlyinsomelowerincomedevelopingcountries.Sotoowouldactiontohaltdeforestation,whichhaslongbeenidentifiedasahighpriority,butwithlimitedprogress.Commitmentsofclimatefinancesupportfromdevelopingcountrieswillthereforeberequiredtoseizethepotentialinthesetwospecificcategories.Thestartingpoint-howbigisthegap?BoxAshowsthestartingpointfromwhichemissionsreductionsmustbeachievedandexplainsthecomplexitiesinvolvedinassessingtherelativeimportanceofcarbondioxideandmethaneemissions.Accordingtotheperiodconsideredoverwhichthewarmingimpactsofmethanearefelt,currentCH4emissionsofaround375MtCH4/yearcouldbeconsideredasequivalenttoanywherebetween11GtCO2/year(100-yearview)and31GtCO2/year(20-yearview),andthemeasureofimpactofanygivenmethaneemissionsreductionvariesbythesameproportion.Thereisnoclear“correct”waytomeasuretheequivalenceofmethaneemissions,butgiventhevitalimportanceofreducingglobalwarmingsoon–andtheriskoftippingpointsandfeedbackloopsfromcontinuedwarming-thereisastrongargumentforplacingasmuchemphasisonthe20-yearperiod(whichimpliesa84timesmultipliervsCO2)asonthe100-year(28multiplier)approach.LatestanalysisbytheIPCCsuggeststhatabout40%ofglobalwarmingsofarhasbeencausedbymethaneratherthancarbondioxideemissions.Inthisreport,wethereforeplaceverystrongemphasisontheimportanceofreducingmethaneemissionsandshowtheimpactofmethanereductionsonboththe20-yearand100-yearbases.21TheParisagreementcommittedtheworldtolimitingglobalwarmingto“Wellbelow2°C,whilepursuingeffortstolimitthetemperatureriseto1.5°C”.TheIPCCSpecialreportonGlobalWarmingof1.5°C,publishedinAutumn2019arguedthatalimitof1.5°Cshouldbetheobjectivegiventheincreasingharmwhichwouldresultastemperaturerisestoandbeyondthatpoint.Itisalreadyclosetoimpossibletoensureahighprobabilitythatwarmingwillbelimitedto1.5°C.Thisreportfocusesontheactionsrequiredtogivea50:50chanceoflimitingwarmingto1.5°Canda90%chanceofkeepingitbelow2°C.2Emissionsfromothergreenhousegasesarealsoimportant-particularlynitrousoxide,muchofwhichresultsfromuseoffertilisersintheagriculturalsector,andfluorinatedgases,typicallyusedasrefrigerants–howevertheactionsidentifiedinthisreportfocussolelyonreducingemissionsfromcarbondioxideandmethane.Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s8Themaingasesresponsibleforglobalwarmingarecarbondioxide,methane,nitrousoxideandfluorinatedgases.Estimated2019emissionsareshownintheboxabove,ataround40GtCO2,13.5MtN2Oandaround375MtCH4.Ineachcase,the“forcingeffect”whichinducesglobalwarming,isafunctionoftheatmosphericconcentrationofthegasatanytime.Differencesintheaveragelifetimeofgaseshaveimplicationsforwhetheremissionsreductionsobjectivesshouldfocusonstocks(thetotalquantity)orflows(theannualrate),andforhowtocomparetherelativeimportanceofcarbondioxideandmethaneemissions:•Carbondioxideandnitrousoxidearebothlong-livedgases,whichtakemanydecadesorcenturiestodissipate.Annualflowsmustthereforefalltozerotopreventfurtherincreasesinatmosphericconcentrationsandthustemperature,andemissionreductionstrategiesshouldensurethatcumulativefutureemissionsdonotexceeddefinedmaximum“budgets”.OnetonneofN2Ohasaforcingeffectequaltoabout260timesatonneofCO2,andtoday’s15MtofannualN2Oemissionscanthusbeconsideredequivalenttoaround4GtCO2.•Bycontrast,methaneisarelativelyshort-livedgas.Concentrationsandtheforcingeffectwouldthereforestabiliseiftheflowofnewmethaneemissionsceasedtorise.However,thisdoesnotmeanthattheappropriateobjectiveshouldbesimplytostabiliseratherthanreducemethaneemissions.Thefactthatmethaneisshort-livedmeansthatreducingmethaneemissionsisthemostpowerfullevertoreduceshort-termtemperaturerisesandrisksofunlockingclimatefeedbackloops.Appropriateobjectivesformethaneemissionsarethereforeexpressedintermsofhowfastannualflowsshouldfallovertimeratherthan“budgets”.3Giventhedifferentlifetimesofcarbondioxideandmethane,estimatesofthe“carbonequivalent”effectofmethaneemissionsdependsonthetimescaleassumed.Over100years,atonneofmethaneemittedtodayhasaforcingeffect(andthereforeimpactontemperatureonaverageovertheperiod)about28timesthatofatonneofcarbondioxideemittedtoday.However,viewedover20years,methane’simpactisaround84timesgreaterpertonneemitted.(Thesewerecorrectedto29.5and82.5respectivelyintheIPCC’srecentAR6report).Neithermeasureisdefinitively“correct”,butthepossibilityofclimatefeedbackloopsandtheneedtolimittemperatureincreasesasrapidlyaspossiblearguesforastrongfocusonthe20-yeartimeframeand84-timesmultipliermeasure.3ETCConsultationPaper(2021)Reachingclimateobjectives:theroleofcarbondioxideremovals.BoxA:TheemissionsstartingpointandkeymeasurementissuesTotalemissionstodayare40GtCO,4GtCOefromNOand375MtCHfromEBITsectors,wasteandAFOLUScopeofemissionsconsidered(2019)CarbonDioxide(GtCO)ProcessEmissionsOtherFuelEmissionsNitrousOxide(GtCOe)Methane(MtCH)5.14.66.60.91.10.30.00.00.00.00.10.00.00.00.00.00.0133.479.5160.10.00.00.00.00.00.10.10.10.30.10.12.63.32.66.40.35.83.10.0Buildings(heating)Buildings(other)RoadTransportShippingAviationRailCementIronandSteelChemicalsandPetrochemicalsOtherIndustriesFuelProduction(fugitiveemissions)AFOLUTotalWasteManagement39.5GtCO13.5MtNO4.0GtCOeNOTES:¹Duetotheproductionprocess,processemissionsandfuelemissionsaretypicallynotseparatedforironandsteel;AFOLU:Agriculture,Forestry,andOtherLandUse.Estimatesofglobalgreenhousegasemissionsin2019rangewidelyasaresultofvaryingassumptions,includingdifferentassumptionsonGWPofmethane.SOURCE:SYSTEMIQanalysisfortheETCbasedon:IEA(2020),EnergyTechnologyPerspectives;EDGARdatabase;SSPdatabasebyIIASA;IEA(2020),MethaneTracker.Deforestation,land-usechangeAgriculture373MtCH31COe11COeKeeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s9Usingthe100-yearapproachreferencedinmanyexternalsources,currenttotalGHGemissionsamounttoabout55GtCO2equivalent(“CO2e”,seeexhibitinBoxA)andthatfigurewouldcontinuetoriseunderabusiness-as-usualscenario.Analysissuggeststhatpoliciesalreadyinplacecoulddeliverareductiontoaslowas51GtCO2eby2030.NewNDCcommitmentscouldbringemissionsdownbyanother2-5GtCO2e,toalevelaround46-49GtCO2ein2030.However,reductionsintotalemissionstosomewherearound25-30GtCO2eby2030wouldbeneededtoputtheworldonapathwaywhichwouldlimitglobalwarmingto1.5°C.4Theworld,therefore,facesan“emissionsgap”ofaround20-23GtCO2ebetweenwhatneedstobeachievedandwhatislikelytobecommittedtoinNDCsagreedbyCOP26.5SixsetsofactionstoclosethegapAlmostallofthisgapcouldbeclosedviathefeasibleactionsidentifiedinthisreport.Methaneemissionscouldbecutby40%,deliveringabout130MtCH4ofreductionnotalreadyincludedincurrentNDCs.ThiswouldbeequivalenttoaCO2ereductionofaround3.5Gtonthe100-year(28multiplier)basis,andaround11Gtonthe20-yearbasis(84multiplier)(Exhibit1).Feasibleactionscouldreducecarbondioxideemissionsbyanadditional17GtCO2beyondNDCcommitments,with6.6GtCO2ofreductionsdeliveredby“Nature-BasedSolutions”andover10GtCO2viaacceleratedreductionofemissionsfromtheenergy,building,industryandtransport(EBIT)sectors(Exhibit2).Inordertoachievethis,weproposeaprogrammeofactioninvolvingsixactionareas:1.Significantandrapidreductionsinmethaneemissions,deliveringanadditionalreductionof3.5GtCO2e(100-yearview)to11GtCO2e(20-yearview)beyondcurrentNDCs,dependingonthetimeperiodassumed.Thiscouldbeachievedviatwodistinctcategoriesofaction:•Emissionsarisingfromfuelproduction,transport,anduse,whichcurrentlyamounttoaround135MtCH4,couldandshouldbereducedby60%ormoreby2030,ledbyreductionof75%inUS,Russia,CanadaandChina.Coal-relatedemissionswillautomaticallyfallifcoaluseisphasedoutinthepowersector,whileemissionsarisingfromleaksintheoilandgasproductionanddistributionsystemcouldberadicallyreducedthroughanarrayoftechnicallyfeasibleactions.Manyoftheactionsrequiredtoachievethiswillentailnegative,zero,orminimalcost,butrapidprogresswillonlybeachievedthroughstrongactionbykeygovernments,companies,andthefinancialsectorsupportedbystrongregulation,independentmonitoring,andcertification.•Reducingemissionsinthewasteandagriculturalsectorswillbemorechallenging.Low-costopportunitiesclearlyexist,butprogresswillrequireactionsbyverylargenumbersofcompaniesandindividualproducersacrosstheworldorentailconsumerbehaviourshiftstowardsmoreplant-basedandlessmeat-baseddiets.However,astronginternationalfocusonachievingthepotentialreductions,supportedbymultipleformsofnational,corporate,city,andconsumeraction,coulddeliverreductionsof30%by2030.Giventhevitalimportanceofreducingmethaneemissionsfast,COP26shouldthereforebeusedasanopportunitytolaunchaninitiativetoreduceannualmethaneemissionsbyatleast40%by2030,or150MtCH4peryear,buildingon(butstrengthening)theGlobalMethanePledge.2.Haltingdeforestation,beginningreforestationandothercarbonsequestrationopportunities.Thepotentialandneedtoreducecarbondioxideemissionsbyendingdeforestationhaslongbeenrecognised.By2030,3.6GtCO2ofannualemissionscouldbeeliminatedifdeforestationceased,andalmost3GtCO2perannumcouldberemovedfromtheatmosphereviareforestationandothernature-basedactionstosequestercarboninsoilsandrestoredecosystems.Developmentofnewtechnologyisnotnecessarytoachievethis(thoughitcanbeanenabler),andinprinciplethecostsofabatementarelow,butsuccesswillrequireacombinationof:•Flowsoffinancefromdevelopedtodevelopingcountriestocovertheshort-termopportunitycostofpreservingtropicalforestsratherthanexploitingthemforalternativeactivitiessuchasfeedstockcropsorcattlerearing,andtosupportreforestationofaround300millionhectaresoflandby2030.Estimatessuggestthatthecostofsuchactionwouldbelowcomparedwithothermitigationoptions–forinstancenearly2GtCO2couldpotentiallybeavoidedatacostoflessthan$10pertonneofCO2,withafurther1GtCO2availableatlessthan$100pertonneofCO2.6Estimatesforreforestationandafforestationareconsistentlyintherangeofaround$5-50/tCO2.7Large-scalefinancialflowswillberequiredtoachievethepotentialreductions–forexample$200billionperannumwouldberequiredtoachieve5GtCO2ofreductionsatanaveragecostof$40pertonne.•Jurisdictionalapproachestolandmanagementataregionalornationallevel,thatensureemissionsaregenuinelyreduced,ratherthansimplydisplaced.•Widespreadchangesinconsumerbehaviourtobeginashiftfrommeat-basedtomoreplant-baseddiets.4TheGHGemissionslevelbaselinesandpathwaysinthisreportarebasedonanalysisfromClimateActionTracker.FurtherdetailsonthisanalysisandcomparisonwithothermethodologiesareincludedintheAnnex.CAT’sestimatesforNDCsareconsistentwiththeSeptember2021updateoftheUNFCCCNDCSynthesisReport.5Theemissionsgapwouldbelargerifusinga20-yearmultiplierformethane,howeverthisreportconsistentlyusesthe100yearmultiplierwhenreferringtothe2030emissionsgapinCO2e.6BasedonestimatesinGriscometal.(2017)NaturalClimateSolutions.7RoyalSociety(2018)GreenhouseGasRemoval.Fussetal.(2018)Negativeemissions—Part2:Costs,potentialsandsideeffects.Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s10Inadditiontonature-basedformsofcarbonsequestrationitispossibletoachieve0.1GtCO2carbonremovalby2030viacarboncapturetechnologiescombinedwithgeologicalstorageofCO2,whetherviaBiCRS(biomasscarbonremovalandstorage)orDACCS(directaircaptureofCO2plusstorage).Earlyprojectsinthe2020scanensurethesetechnologiesareavailabletodeployatscalebeyond2030.Exhibit1Exhibit2GlobalCHemissionsMtCH,Global,annualGtCOe,Global,annualBasedon20-yearGWP=8401002003004002019~3801871620~235NDCsFossilAg,WasteGap2030-1.5°CcompatibleHighlyfeasibleactionstoreducemethanecandeliveranadditional~130MtCH₄(3.5-11GtCO₂e)beyondcurrentNDCsin2030Keyactions~130MtCHSectorpotentialscaleddownbasedonlikelyoverlaptoavoiddoublecountingwithNDCs0102030402019NDCsFossilAg,WasteGap2030-1.5°CcompatibleSectorpotentialscaleddownbasedonlikelyoverlaptoavoiddoublecountingwithNDCs331.565020Keyactions~11GtCOeBasedon100-yearGWP=28010202019NDCsFossilAg,WasteGap2030-1.5°Ccompatible100.51.91.706.6Keyactions~3.5GtCOeNOTE:NDCemissionsreductionsarebasedonaverageofCAT“pledgesandtargets”pathwayadjustedforCH₄.1.5Ccompatiblelevelsin2030arebasedonIPCC1.5Cno/lowovershootscenariomedian.SOURCE:IPCC(2018),Globalwarmingof1.5°C.AnIPCCSpecialReport,ClimateActionTracker(CAT),SYSTEMIQanalysisfortheEnergyTransitionsCommission(2021).Highlyfeasibleactionstoreducecarbondioxidecandeliveranadditional~17GtCO₂reductionsbeyondcurrentNDCsin2030GlobalCO₂emissionsGtCO₂,Global,annual504030201002030-BAU>40AchievedbyNDCsNature-basedsolutions(includingcarbonremovals)PowerRoadSupplysidedecarbonisationinothersectorsEnergyandresourceefficiencyGap2030-1.5°Ccompatible(CATaverage)NOTE:2030BAUCO₂emissionsareestimatedbasedonCATCO₂e2030BAUaverage(53GtCO₂e)minuscurrentmethanelevelsinGWP=25terms(9.3GtCO₂e).NDCemissionsreductionsareestimatedbasedonaverageofCAT“pledgesandtargets”pathwayadjustedforCO₂.1.5°Cand2°Ccompatiblelevelsin2030arebasedonIPCC1.5°Cno/lowovershootscenarioranges.SOURCE:IPCC(2018),Globalwarmingof1.5°C.AnIPCCSpecialReport,ClimateActionTracker(CAT),SYSTEMIQanalysisfortheEnergyTransitionsCommission(2021).2019>252°C~19-241.5°C36.63.52.32.12.5~2Keyactions~17GtCO₂SectorpotentialscaleddownbasedonlikelyoverlaptoavoiddoublecountingwithNDCsEBIT=Energy,Buildings,TransportandIndustryKeyEBITactions~10GtCO₂Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s11AcrucialpriorityforCOP26shouldbetogainasstronganagreementaspossibleonendingdeforestation,supportedbyappropriateflowsofinternationalclimatefinance.Anendtodeforestation,thebeginningofreforestationandothernature-basedsolutionsshouldindeed(alongwithactiontoeliminateemissionsfromexistingcoalplants–seebelow)bethehighestpriorityforuseofthefundswhichrichdevelopedcountrieshavecommittedtointernationalclimatefinance.3.Decarbonisingthepowersector–acceleratingcoalphase-out.PowersectorCO2emissionswereover13Gtin2019,with9.5Gtofthisarisingfromcoal-firedpower.Inaddition,coal-relatedCH4emissionsofanestimated40MtCH4produceanequivalentimpactof1GtCO2e(100-yearview)to3GtCO2e(20-yearview).Acceleratingthemovebeyondcoalpowergenerationisthereforeoneofthehighestpotentialactionstoreduceemissionsintheshortterm.Anadditional3.5GtCO2reductions,beyondcurrentNDCcommitments,togetherwithproportionalcutsincoal-relatedmethane,couldbeachievedviaacombinationofthreeactions:•Clearinternationalagreementtobuildnonewcoalplants,scrappingthevastmajorityofthe300GWofproposednewcoalcapacitystillinthepipeline.Thisisaclosetocostlesscommitmentsincerenewablesarenowcheapenoughtodeliverincreasesinpowerproductionandconsumptionattotalsystemcostsfullycompetitivewithnewcoal.8•CommitmentsbyallOECDcountriestocompletelyphaseoutanyunabatedcoalgenerationby2030–eitherthroughclosingcoalplantsentirelyorbyaddingCCS.ThecostsofthiswillbeverysmallrelativetotheGDPofrichcountries.9•Actiontophaseout~760GWolderexistingcoalplants(e.g.plantsgreaterthan20yearsold)inmiddle-incomeanddevelopingeconomies.Thismayentailasignificantnetcostandshouldbeahighpriorityfortheuseofclimatefinancefundsbywhichtherichdevelopedworldsupportsaccelerateddecarbonisationinlower-incomedevelopingcountries.Astrongagreementbetweenmajorcountriestomovebeyondcoalinthe2020sisthereforeavitalCOP26priority.ThisshouldalignandexpandonexistinginitiativessuchasthePoweringPastCoalAllianceandentailfinancialsupportfromdevelopedcountriestomiddle-incomeanddevelopingcountries.104.Acceleratingroadtransportelectrification:Technologicalprogressandcostreductioninbatteriesandelectricvehicles(EVs)nowmakeitpossibletodriveroadtransportelectrificationfarmorerapidlythanseemedfeasiblefiveyearsago.Withinthenextdecade,shiftingtopassengerEVswillbeanegativecosttransition,deliveringsavingstoconsumersratherthanadditionalcosts.NationalstrategiesforvehicleelectrificationincludedintheNDCshavebeguntoreflectthispotential,butinmostcasesstilldonotreflectthesizeofthepotentialzero-costprize.AgreementatCOP26tobanallsalesofICElight-dutyvehiclesby2035,combinedwithcity-basedactiontorestricttheuseofexistingICEvehiclesbeyonddefinedfuturedates,couldleadtoaround20%ofcarsontheroadbeingelectricby2030anddeliveraround2GtCO2/yearofreductions,withanadditional0.6GtCO2/yearofsavingspossiblefromlowornegativecostactiontoimproveheavy-dutytruckefficiency.Astrongagreementtocommittoendingsalesoflight-dutyICEvehiclesby2035atthelatestisthereforeacrucialCOP26priority,supportedbycleartargetsfromcountriesandcarmanufacturers.5.Acceleratingsupplydecarbonisationinbuildings,heavytransport,andheavyindustry.AstheEnergyTransitionsCommission(ETC)showedinitsMissionPossiblereportinNovember2018,itistechnicallyandeconomicallyfeasibleforeventheso-called“hardertoabate”sectorsoftheeconomy–suchassteel,cementandchemicals,long-distanceaviationandshipping–toreachnetzeroemissionsbymid-centuryatatrivialcosttoglobaleconomicgrowthandlivingstandards.Manyleadingcompaniesinthesesectorshavenowmadenetzeroby2050commitments.Untilrecentlyhowever,mostpublishedpathwaysforemissionreductionsinthesesectorsassumedastronglyconvexshape,withverylimitedprogressto2030,followedbygradualaccelerationinthe2030s.MostcurrentNDCsthereforereflectthisminimalneartermambition.TheMissionPossiblePartnership(MPP)isnowworkingtodefineandagreesectoralpathwaysto2030andonto2050.Insomesectorsthesewillstillsuggestonlymoderatereductionpotentialinthe2020sgiventheinherentchallengescreatedbylonglastingcapitalassets.Butactiontomaximiseprogresscouldstilldeliveranadditionalreductionofaround1GtCO2perannumby2030,andenablefulldecarbonisationoftheseindustriesbetween2030-2050.TheconcentratedandinherentlyglobalnatureoftheseindustriesmakesthemnaturaltargetsforinternationallyagreedactionatCOP26.Actionsfocusedonkeyenablingtechnologies–inparticularhydrogenandCCS–couldsupportsectoralfocusedinitiatives.8ETC(2021)MakingCleanElectrificationPossible.9ETC(2021)MakingCleanElectrificationPossible.10ThePPCAencouragescountriesandcorporatestocommittophaseoutcoalby2030intheOECDandEU,andbynolaterthan2050intherestoftheworld.Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s12Internationalagreementstoaccelerateelectrificationofpartsofindustryandbuildings–e.g.viathedeploymentofheatpumpandothertechnologiesrelevanttoresidentialheatingandoflightindustry-couldalsohelpdeliveranadditional1GtCO2/yearofemissionsreductions.COP26shouldaimtoachieveagreementsbetweenleadingcoalitionsofcountries,companiesandsectoralorganisationstodriveaccelerateddecarbonisationofthesteel,cement,aviationandshippingsectors.Leadingcountriescouldalsocommittoacceleratedelectrification(e.g.viaheatpumps),andscalingupcleanhydrogen.6.Energyandresourceefficiency:Manypastanalyseshaveidentifiedamajoropportunitytoreduceemissionsbyimprovingtheenergyefficiencyofbuildings,equipmentandmaterialsuse,andthroughwiderchangestoincreaseoverall“energyproductivity”(energyuseperunitofGDP)through,forinstance,better-designedcities,digitaltechnologies,andmorecircularproductionsystems.However,progresshasbeendisappointlyslowandhasdeclinedinrecentyears,inpartbecauseitrequiresactionbymanymillionsofeconomicactorsacrosstheworld.Moreover,manyaspectsofrequiredpolicyareinherentlylocalinnature,limitingthepotentialroleforinternationalagreements.Butaninternationalagreementforspecificstandardsandregulationsfocusedonimprovingtheenergyefficiencyofnewbuildingscoulddeliver1.4GtCO2peryearreductionby2030,withanother1.5GtCO2potentiallyfromaseriesofotheractions(e.g.retrofitstoexistingbuildingsandimprovedlongevityandrecyclingofconsumergoods).Earlyactiontoencouragelesscarbon-intensivecitydesignisessentialinthe2020stodeliverfasterprogressinthe2030-40s.Governmentcommitmentstoadoptbest-in-classbuildingstandardsandproductefficienciesshouldthereforebeapriorityatCOP26.TheinfographicsonthefollowingpagessetoutaselectionofspecificactionswhichcouldbetakentoseizetheopportunitiesidentifiedandhighlightspotentialdiscreteinternationalagreementsthatcouldbeusedtoincreaseambitionatCOP26.Acomprehensivelistofactionsisfoundattheendofthisreport.Almostinevitably,agreementsmadeatCOP26willnotbesufficientinthemselvestomakeitcertainthata1.5°Cpathwaycanbeachieved.ButifCOP26cangainagreementthatthesearetheareasforhighestpotentialshort-termaction,achievesomeprogressoneach,andputinplaceprocessesforfuturereinforcementofcommitmentsoverthenexttwoyears–leadingtoastocktakein2023-itcouldstillplayacrucialroleinkeepingalivethepotentialtolimitglobalwarmingto1.5°C.Therestofthisreportsetsoutthisargumentindetail,coveringinturn:•Theneedforfasterprogressinthe2020s.•WhathaschangedsinceParis?Technologies,costs,andscientificunderstanding.•AssessingthepotentialtogobeyondNDCs:methodologyandapproach.•Feasibleactionstoaccelerateemissionsreductions–6keycategoriesforpriorityaction.•Addingitup–canweclosethegap?•ActionsatandafterCOP26.Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s13Chapter1Theneedforfasterprogressinthe2020sKeeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s16Todate,theworldhasseenman-madewarmingofaround1.1°Cabovepreindustriallevelsand,astherecentIPCCreportwarns,isalreadyseeingtheimpactofclimatechange.11Toavoidsevereharmtohumanwelfare,globalwarmingshouldideallybelimitedto1.5°Candtheprobabilityofexceeding2°Ckeptverysmall(e.g.lessthan10%).Thiswillrequirenotonlyreducingcarbondioxideemissionstoaroundzerobymid-century,butreducingthemby40-50%by2030,whilealsocuttingmethaneemissionsbyabout40%.Nationalcommitmentsalreadymade,orlikelytobemadebyCOP26,fallwellshortofthisrequirement.EstimatessuggestthatcurrentsubmittedNDCs,togetherwithlegallybindingnetzerocommitments,puttheworldonatrajectoryto2.4°Cofwarmingbytheendofthecentury.12ThecarbonbudgetandmethaneemissionreductionsAsexplainedinBoxA,thereisnosingle“correct”waytoexpressallGHGs(andinparticularmethane)inonesummary“CO2equivalent”figure.Incalculatingtheremaining“carbonbudget”–e.g.howmuchcarbondioxidecanbecumulativelyemittedwhilelimitingglobalwarmingtoanygiventemperature–theIPCC,therefore,assumesafuturerateofreductionformethaneandothernon-carbondioxideemissionsandthencalculatestheacceptableleveloffuturecumulativecarbondioxideemissionslikelytotriggeracertainlevelofwarming.Exhibit3showstheIPCC’srangeofassumptionsformethanereductionin1.5°Cscenarios,withamediancutofaround40%by2030andaround55%by2050.Ifmethaneemissionsdidfallalongthismedianpathway,theremainingcarbonbudget–i.e.emissionsthatwouldbepossiblefrom2020onwards-witha50%chanceoflimitingwarmingto1.5°C(andaroughly90%chanceoflimitingtobelow2°C)wouldbeabout500GtCO2(Exhibit4).13Slowerprogressonreducingmethaneemissions,woulddecreasethecarbonbudgetavailable.Thereareaninfinitenumberofpathwaysforannualcarbonemissionswhichcouldproducean“areaunderthecurve”equaltothis500GtCO2budget,particularlyifweassumedthatanovershootofthebudgetinthefirst30yearscouldbeoffsetbynegativeemissionsafter2050.Butgivenpotentialfeedbackloopsandtippingpointswithintheclimatesystem,itisunacceptablyriskytorelyonlargescalenegativeemissionslaterinthecentury,andtheIPCCpathwayswhichavoidsuchrelianceshowthatCO2emissionsneedtobecutfromtoday’s40GtCO2tobelow25GtCO2by2030.IncludingotherGHGsincarbondioxideequivalence–andusingtheconventional100timeframeand28multiplierformethane-thisimpliesthattotalemissionsneedtofallfromaround53GtCO2etodaytoaround25-30GtCO2eby2030.14Currentcommitmentsfallfarshortofthisrequirement.11IPCC(2021),ClimateChange2021:ThePhysicalScienceBasis(AR6).12WRI(2021)ClosingtheGap.13FivekeyelementsofthesciencewhichunderpinsthecarbonbudgetwererevisedforthepublicationoftheIPCC’sSixthAssessmentReport.Theseincluded:1)estimatesofhistoricalwarmingtodate,2)theamountofwarmingeachtonneofCO2produces(theTransientClimateResponsetoCumulativeEmissions(TCRE)),3)howmuchwarmingoccursoncenet-zeroisreached,4)climatewarmingdrivenbynon-CO2greenhousegasemissions(e.g.methane),and5)earthsystemfeed-backsnototherwisecovered(e.g.permafrostthawandwildfire).Overall,therevisionofeachthesefivefactorsresultedinrelativelylittlechangefora50%percentile1.5°Ccarbonbudget,howevertheupperandlowerpercentileshavenarrowedinrange.14Usingthe20-yeartimeframeandGWP=84multiplier,thiswouldequatetoaneedtofallfromaround75GtCO2etodaytoaround40GtCO2eby2030.Exhibit3MethaneinIPCCSR1.5LowOvershootPathwaysMethaneMtCH₄,Global,annualUnderIPCCpathwaysforlow/no1.5Covershoot,methaneemissionsmustdeclineby~35%by2030050100150200250201020152020202520302035204020452050300400350MedianProjectionsunderIPCCscenariorangeHistoricalEmissionsfromEDGARdatabaseUpperrangeHistoricalLowerrangeIllustrative1.5°CpathwayrangeNOTE:Historicalvaluesformethaneemissionshaveaveryhighrangeofuncertainty.SOURCE:EDGARdatabase,IPCC(2018),Globalwarmingof1.5°C.AnIPCCSpecialReport~-35%-55%Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s17Currentpledgesrelativetoneed.Anincreasingnumberofcountrieshavesettargetstoachievezeroemissionsat,orclosetomid-century.AsofSeptember2021,55countriescovering70%ofglobalCO2emissions(and70%ofglobalGDP)havemadenet-zerocommitments,includingChina,theUnitedStates,andtheEuropeanUnion(Exhibit5).15Momentumhasalsogrownacrosstheindustry,withover3000businessesand173largestinvestorscommittingtoachievezeroemissionsby2050.16Short-termambitionsoutto2030arereflectedintheNDCswhicharesubmittedundertheParisagreement.TheseNDCstypicallysettargetsforemissionsreduction(orreductionsincarbonintensity)anddescribemeasuresandpolicieswhichnationalgovernmentswilltaketomeetthem.UndertheParisagreementframework,NDCsshouldbeupdatedeveryfiveyears,withtheobjectivebeingtoestablisha“ratchetmechanism”inwhichtargetscanonlybetightened.Thisratchetmechanismhasledtosomeincreaseinambition,withfurthertighteningofemissionreductiontargetscomparedwiththosesubmittedimmediatelyafterParis(Table1).SinceSeptember2020,newNDCshavebeensubmittedbyover115countrieswhile48countrieshavestatedtheirintentiontoenhanceambitionoractioninaneworupdatedNDC.EstimatesfromClimateActionTrackersuggestthattheaggregateimpactofthesenewcommitmentscouldreduce2030emissionsbyanadditional2-5GtofCO2eequivalentbelowthetrajectoryimpliedbycurrentpolicies(Exhibit6).17However,thisstillleavesagapofabout20GtCO2ecomparedwiththepathwayrequiredtodelivera50%probabilityoflimitingglobalwarmingto1.5°C.FurtherGHGreductions–inparticularforcarbondioxideandmethane–mustthereforebeachievedifwearetoclosethegap.15ECIU(2021)NetZeroTracker;IEA(2021)NetZeroby2050:ARoadmapfortheGlobalEnergySector.163067businessesand173ofthebiggestinvestorshavesigneduptotheClimateAmbitionAlliancecommittedtoachievingnetzeroby2050atthelatest.SeeUNFCCC(2021)RacetoNetZero.17ClimateActionTracker(2021)CATEmissionsGap.Exhibit4Tohavea50%chancetoremain<1.5°Cwarming,IPCCestimatestheremainingcarbonbudgettobe~500GtCOfrom2020GlobalemissionspathwaycharacteristicsintheIPCC1.5ºCreportGtCO/year01020304050201020304050607080902100-10-20TheIPCCgeneratedalargenumberof1.5ºCscenarios,outofwhichtheyselectedfourillustrativepathways(largerlinesonthegraph);Inpathwayslimitingglobalwarmingto1.5ºCwithnoorlimitedovershoot●,aswellaspathwayswithahighovershoot●,COemissionsarereducedtonet-zerogloballybyaround2050.500GtCOfrom202050%chance850GtCOfrom20201350GtCOfrom2020~90%chance67%chanceCHandNOreductionscorrespondingtochosencarbonbudget400GtCOfrom2020700GtCOfrom20201150GtCOfrom2020CHreductionby2050~50%(42%-76%range)NOreductionby2050~30%(-25%-48%range)N/AN/A500GtCOfrom2020<1.5ºC<1.7ºC<2ºCChosencarbonbudgetinthisreportSOURCE:IPCC(2021),ClimateChange2021:ThePhysicalScienceBasis(AR6).SOURCE:IPCC(2018),GlobalWarmingof1.5°CKeeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s18Exhibit5In2021,morethan70%ofallglobalemissionswerecoveredbyaformofnet-zerotarget2030405060201520162017201820192020202110020%30%40%50%80%70%60%10%0%CountrieswithpledgesYearAccelerationinnet-zerocommitmentsNet-zerotargetsaccountforaround70%ofglobalGDP15countrieshavemadetheirnet-zerotargetalegalobligation•••InlawProposedGlobalCOcovered(rightaxis)InpolicydocumentsSOURCE:IEA(2021),NetZeroby2050,Energy&ClimateIntelligenceUnit(2021),Net-ZeroEmissionsRace2021Scorecard.Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s19Table1:NDCcommitmentsforkeycountriesCountry(and%ofcurrentglobalGHGemissions)2016NDCUpdatedNDC2020/21NDCcoverageDetailonsectoralcoverageEU(7.5%)Atleast40%domesticreductioninGHGby2030comparedto1990.NDC:Commitstothenetdomesticreductionofatleast55%inGHGemissionsby2030comparedto1990.Domesticpolicy:NetZerotargetfor2050.Sectorcoverageiseconomy-wideincludingLULUCF.GHGtargetcoversallemissions,includingmethane.Targetssetforcertainsectors(e.g.renewableenergy,energyefficiency).InternationalMethaneEmissionsObservatory(IMEO)setuptomonitorCH4emissionsusingcompanydata,satellitetechandscientificstudies.USA(12.7%)A26-28%GHGemissionsreductionsbelow2005by2025(incl.LULUCF).NDC:50-52%GHGemissionsreductionsbelow2005by2030(incl.LULUCF).Domesticpolicy:NetZerotargetfor2050.TargetincludesLULUCFandcoversemissionsfromallsectorsandGHGs,includingmethane.Climateplancoversfulldecarbonisationofpowersectorby2035.USPresidentBidenhasreinstatedmethaneregulations,andestablishedacooperativeforumwithCanada,Norway,QatarandSaudiArabiatocreatemethanestrategies.China(26.1%)Aimtohavecarbonemissionspeakbefore203andtolowercarbondioxideemissionsperunitofGDPby60-65%fromthe2005level.NDC:NoformalupdatedNDChasbeensubmitted.Domesticpolicy:ChinahasproposedtolowercarbondioxideemissionsperunitofGDPbyover65%fromthe2005level.Separatetargetannouncedin2020fornet-zeroGHGby2060(excl.LULUCF).TargetincludesLULUCFforeststockbutnoemissionstarget,andnoemissionstargetformethane.SpecifictargetsoncarbondioxideemissionsbyGDP,shareofnon-fossilfuelsinprimaryenergyconsumption,foreststockandinstalledcapacityofwindandsolarpowerallincreasedinupdatedNDC.India(7.1%)2030unconditionaltargetof33-35%below2005emissionsintensityofGDPby2030,andnon-fossilshareofcumulativepowergenerationcapacity40%.AllexcludingLULUCF.LULUCFspecifictargetadditionalcarbonsinkof2.5-3GtCO2eby2030.NDC:NoformalupdatedNDChasbeensubmitted.Domesticpolicy:Targetof450GWofrenewableelectricityby2030.Nationalhydrogenstrategy.DidnotspecifythecoverageofGHGgasesandsectoralcoverageinmetricsoftheemissionsintensitytargetin2015NDC.Targetssetforfullelectrificationforhouseholdsandcoalpowerdevelopment.Japan(2.5%)2030unconditionaltargetof26%below2013by2030forGHGemissionsreductions.Long-termgoalof80%GHGemissionreductionby2050(baselinenotspecified).NDC:resubmittedwithoutchangein2020.Domesticpolicy:Anew2030GHGemissionsreductiontargetwasannouncedrevising26%below2013levelstoa46%reductionby2030,workingtowardsa50%reduction.NetZerotargetfor2050.Economy-widecoverageincludingLULUCF.GHGemissionstargetincludemethane.Specificcoverageofroadtransportsectorintargets.Somesectoralroadmaps.Sources:ClimateActionTracker(2021)Countries;WRI(2021)ClimateWatch:HistoricalGHGEmissions.Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s20Exhibit6CurrentlypledgedNDCsareinsufficienttostayon1.5°Cpath–remaining“emissionsgap”of~20-23GtCOeby2030(ClimateActionTracker)GlobalGHGEmissions:emissionsbasedonpledgedandcurrentpoliciesGtCO2e,Global,annual0102030405020002005201020152020202520302035204020452050205520606070CurrentPolicyProjections(BAU)100-year,28multiplierformethaneemissionsPledgesandTargets(NDC)-May2021-HighPledgesandTargets(NDC)-May2021-Low1.5°CCompatibleNote:CATestimatesoftheemissionsgapareslightlylowerthanestimatescitedbytheUNEPEmissionsGapreport,duetodifferingassumptionstakenacrossbaselines(e.g.factorssuchasCOVID-19adjustmentsinbaselineemissionstrajectories,rangeofuncertaintyofNDCs,andrangeofIPCC’s1.5°Ccompatiblescenarios.SeeTechnicalAnnexforfurtherdetail.NDCcontribution~2-5GtCO2e2030Emissionsgap~20-23GtCO2eNOTES:¹CurrentPoliciesScenarioisbasedonimplementedpoliciesandcountrybaselinetrajectoriesfromgovernmentandinternationalsources.ThePledgesandTargetsScenariosrepresentsaquantificationofcountry-by-countryNDCcommitments.The“1.5°Ccompatible“Scenarioisdefinedasthemedianofpathwaysthatlimitglobalwarmingto1.5°C,orbelow,throughoutthe21stcenturywithnoorlimited(<0.1°C)overshoot.SOURCE:ClimateActionTracker,2021.Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s21Chapter2WhathaschangedsinceParis?Technologies,costs,andscientificunderstandingKeeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s22ManyoftheoptionstoreduceemissionsdiscussedinthisreportwerealreadyknownatthetimeoftheParisAgreementandinsomecasesinformedtheinitialNDCssubmitted.Sincethen,however,theneedforrapidemissionsreductionshasbecomemoreapparent,andprogressindevelopingtechnologiesandreducingcostshasincreasedthepotentialforrapidlow-costreductions.Inparticular;•Technologyandcostdevelopmentshavegreatlyincreasedthepotentialforrapidemissionreductionsinthepowersector,inroadtransport,andpartsofheavyindustry(e.g.viaelectrificationortheuseofhydrogen).•Improvingscientificunderstandinghasshownthevitalneedforforcefulactionondeforestationandmethaneemissions.TechnologicalprogressandcostreductionsGlobalemissionshavenotyetstartedtofall.Buttechnologyandcostdevelopments–inpartdrivenbythemomentumwhichthe2015ParisAgreementhelpedcreate–havenowmadepossiblefarmorerapidandlow-costreductionsthanseemedfeasibleatParis.18•Technologicalprogressandlarge-scaledeploymenthasdrivendramaticfallsinthecostofwindandsolarpower(Exhibit7),asaresult,renewablesarenowthecheapestwaytogenerateelectricityinmostregions,andareincreasinglycost-competitivewithfossilfuel-basedgenerationonatotalsystemcostbasis.19•Collapsingbatterycostsandimprovedenergydensitieshavemadebattery-electriclight-dutyvehiclesincreasinglycompetitivewithICEvehicles,withfurthermajorcostreductionsandperformanceimprovementscertaintooccur(Exhibit8).20•Dramaticreductionsinthecostofelectrolysersarenowaprospect,makingpossiblesignificantcutsinthecostofgreenhydrogenproduction.21Opportunitiesfortherapidandcost-effectivedecarbonisationofpowersystemsandlight-dutyroadtransporthavegreatlyincreasedasaresult.Furthermore,workbytheETCandtheMissionPossiblePartnershiphasshownthatthesupposedlyharder-to-abateheavyindustrysectors(steel,cement,andchemicals)andlong-distancetransport(shippingandaviation)couldallbedecarbonisedby2050atatrivialcosttoglobalgrowthorlivingstandards.22Thesedevelopmentscreateanewcontextthatisnotyetfullyreflectedincountries’strategiesandNDCs.Togethertheymakepossiblefarmorerapidemissionreductionsinthe2020sthanwerepreviouslyenvisaged,withconsequentearlierandsharperreductionsincoal,oil,andgasuse.Nationalandinternationalstrategiesshouldthereforeseizethisopportunity,drivingfurthertechnologicalprogress,scaledeployment,andfasteremissionsreductions.MajorreportsbytheETChavesetouttheactionsrequiredtoensurethatprogressisfastenoughtodelivernet-zeroemissionsby2050.23Thepotentialformorerapidprogressshouldalsobematchedbyanincreasedambitionforthe2020s.Threeoftheprioritiesidentifiedinthisreport–fasterpowersectordecarbonisation,roadtransportelectrification,andsupplydecarbonisationofotherenduses–respondtothisopportunity.Furthermore,thedevelopmentandcommercialisationinthe2020sofzero-carbonenergytechnologiesforenergy-intensivesectorsdrivenwillbevitaltoensuredeepdecarbonisationinthe2030sand2040s.18SeeSYSTEMIQ(2020),TheParisEffect:HowTheClimateAgreementisReshapingtheGlobalEconomy.19SeeETC(2021)MakingCleanElectrificationPossible.20SeeETC(2021)MakingCleanElectrificationPossible.21SeeETC(2021)MakingtheHydrogenEconomyPossible.22ETC(2018)MissionPossible,ETC(2020)MakingMissionPossible,MissionPossiblePartnership.23ETC(2020),MakingMissionPossible;ETC(2021)MakingCleanElectrificationPossible;ETC(2021)MakingtheHydrogenEconomyPossible.Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s23Exhibit7Exhibit8WindandsolarLCOEhavedramaticallydecreasedinthelast10yearswithlatestlowestauctionpricesforsolarPVbelow$20/MWhPVandwindLCOEglobalbenchmarksLCOE,$/MWh,2020realLowestauctionsprices1502002503003504002010201220142016201820202022100500Fixed-axisPVSolarPVOffshorewindOnshorewind34682484139312213103TrackingPVOnshorewindOffshorewind•Portugal:$13.2/MWh(lowestoffer)(Aug2020)•India:$38/MWhforsolar+batteriesdelivering80%ofhoursperyear(June2020)•AbuDhabi:$13.5/MWh(lowestoffer)for2GW(April2020)•Qatar:$15.7/MWhfor800MW(Jan2020)•Saudiarabia:$16.9/MWhfor900MW(2019)•Portugal:$16/MWhfor1.4GW(July2019)•Chile:$32.5/MWhfor240MW(mixedwithsolarandgeothermal)•US:averagewindpriceat$20/MWh(2017)•Mexico:$20.6/MWhfor250MW(2017)•UK:$51/MWh(£39.7/MWh)for6GW(2019)•France:$48/MWhfor600GW(2019)LEFTHANDSIDE:Theglobalbenchmarkisacountryweighted-averageusingthelatestannualcapacityadditions.RIGHTHANDSIDE:Economicsofauctionpricesmaybefavouredbylocaltaxtreatmentsandotherimplicitsubsidies.SOURCE:Pressresearch;BloombergNEF(2021)1H2021LCOEUpdate.Batterypriceshavedecreasedannuallyby19%inthelastdecadeandareexpectedtofallbelowUS$100/kWhby2024Lithium-ionbatterypackprices-ObservedReal2020$/kWhBatteryprices-OutlookPredicted1,19192472666859238429522018115713792584520102011201220132014201520162017201820192020202420302035-19%-19%-8%-5%CompoundannualgrowthrateSOURCE:BloombergNewEnergyFinanceLithium-ionBatteryPricesurvey(2020).Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s24Deforestationandmethaneemissions–improvedscientificunderstandingNewtechnologies–inparticularsyntheticmeats–maysoonmakeitpossibletodramaticallyreducetheimpactoffoodproductiononthenaturalenvironmentandclimate.Butthesedevelopmentsareatanearlystage,andthetechnologiesrelevanttonature-basedsolutionshaveevolvedslowlyratherthandramaticallyoverthelastfiveyears.However,increasingscientificunderstandingmakesrapidactiontocutdeforestationandtostartreforestationevenmorevitalthan5yearsago.Inparticular:•TheIPCCSpecialReporton1.5°C,publishedinAutumn2018,madeacompellingcaseforseekingtolimitglobalwarmingto1.5°C.Thiswouldbeimpossiblewithoutarapidendtodeforestationalongsidesignificantcarbonremovalsdeliveredbynature-basedsolutions.•Latestdeforestationtrendsandscientificanalysishasincreasedtheriskthatmajortropicalrainforestcouldswitchfrombeinganetsinktoanetsourceofcarbondioxideemissions.24Meanwhile,trendsinmethaneemissionsandscientificanalysishavegreatlyincreasedtheimportanceofcuttingmethaneemissionsfast.TheIPCCAR6reportestimatesthatmethaneemissionshavebeenresponsiblefor0.5°Cofwarmingsincethepre-industrialera,comparedwith0.8°CforCO2(withsomeoffsettingreductionsresultingfromaerosolandothergases).25Estimatesoftotalmethaneemissionsareinherentlylesscertainthanforcarbondioxide(illustratingthevitalimportanceofmoreeffectivemeasurement)butmethaneemissionshavealmostcertainlyrisenbyaround10%overthelast20years.26Astheworldcontinuestowarm,andtheadverseimpactsofclimatechallengesbecomeevermoreapparent,itisvitaltofocusonshort-termopportunitiestoreduceforcingeffectsandmitigatetemperatureincreases.Cuttingmethaneemissionsisthelargestsuchopportunity.24See,forexample,Gattietal(2021)Amazoniaasacarbonsourcelinkedtodeforestationandclimatechange.25FigureSPM.2inIPCC(2021)SummaryforPolicymakersinClimateChange2021:ThePhysicalScienceBasis(AR6).26NOAA(2021)TrendsinCH4.Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s25Chapter3AssessingthepotentialtogobeyondNDCs:MethodologyandapproachKeeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s26Thisreportaimstoidentifyactionsthatcoulddeliversignificantreductionsinemissionsinthe2020sandwhicharenotalreadyincludedinNDCs.Todothiswehave:•UsedtheIEA’sNetZeropathwayreport,aswellasanumberofotheranalysesasastartingpoint;27•Appliedasetofcriteriatoassessthefeasibilityofimplementation;•EstimatedhowfartheidentifiedinitiativesarealreadyincludedwithinNDCs.TheIEA’sNetZeroreportInMay2021theIEApublishedalandmarkreportonhowtoachievenet-zeroby2050.Thisreportaimedtodescribetheemissionspathwayrequiredtomeetacarbonbudgetcompatiblewitha1.5°Cobjective,withoutsignificantrelianceonnegativeemissionsafter2050oronnature-basedoffsetsinthenext30years.Itsetsouthowtheworldcouldachievea38%reductioninCO2emissionsby2030,withnear-totaldecarbonisationoftheglobalpowersystemby2040andtheapplicationofelectricity,hydrogen,bioenergy,andCCStodecarbonisetheroadtransport,buildings,andtheso-calledhard-to-abatesectors(e.g.heavyindustry,aviation,shipping).Italsoidentifiedopportunitiesforenergyefficiencyimprovementandconsumerbehaviourchange,whichaccountfor18%and7%respectivelyoftheemissionsreductionsbetween2020-30;behaviourchangeisthenresponsibleforahighershare(18%)ofsubsequentemissionreductionsbetween2030and2050(Exhibit9).AllthereductionsdescribedbytheIEAforthe2020sareclearlytechnicallypossibleusingtechnologiesthatarealreadyavailableforcommercialdeployment.AdditionalassessmentcriteriaTheIEA’srecentreportisanexcellentstartingpointforidentifyingtechnicallyfeasibleemissionreductionsinthe2020s.InthisreportwedrawontheIEAworkbut,inaddition,applythreefurthersetsofcriteriatoassesshowfeasibleactualimplementationwillbe:27SeeTechnicalAnnexforfullmethodologyandexternalreferences.Exhibit9TheIEAhasdevelopedascenariodrivenbytheneedtoreduceCOemissionsonapathcompatiblewith1.5ºCwithouttheuseofnature-basedoffsetsIEANZS;PathwaytoNetZeroGtCO,Global,annualIEANZS:Emissionsreductionsbymitigationmeasure,2020-205015202530354045301520202025203020352040204520502020203020501050-5MeasuresMeasuresGtCO-38%+24%-50%+51%-100%21.16.3TransportIndustryElectricity&HeatOtherBuildingsActivityMigrationMeasuresBehaviourandavoideddemandEnergyefficiencyHydrogen-basedElectrificationBioenergyWindandsolarOtherfuelshiftsCCUSSOURCE:IEA(2021),NetZeroby2050:ARoadmapfortheGlobalEnergySectorKeeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s27•Istheactioneitherpotentiallycost-saving/cost-competitive?Andifnot,istheadditionalcostincurredonethatcouldeasilybeabsorbedbyrichdevelopedcountries,whetherintheirdomesticeconomyorthroughclimatefinancesupporttolow-incomedevelopingcountries?•Istheactionpoliticallyattractiveforotherreasons?Forinstance,becauseofco-benefitssuchasreducedlocalairpollutionorjobcreation.•CouldtheactionbeacceleratedthroughaninitiativeoragreementlaunchedatorafterCOP26?Forexample,cantheactionbedrivenbyasmallnumberofleadingcountries(ratherthanrequiringcomprehensiveinternationalagreements)and/orbyarelativelysmallnumberofcompanies:aretherealreadyexistinginitiativesthatcouldbeleveragedandreinforced?AdjustingforexistingcommitmentsinNDCsToassessthepotentialforadditionalreductionsinthe2020sbeyondcurrentcommitments,weneedtoavoiddoublecountingbetweentheactionswehaveidentified,andtheabatementalreadyincludedincurrentNDCs.However,quantifyingwhatisincludedinNDCsforeachsetsofactionsischallenging.NDCsvarygreatlyintheirdetailandspecificityandarenotsubmittedinaconsistentformatwithaneasilyquantifiablelinkbetweenemissionstargetsandsectoralactions.Indeed,a2016ETCassessmentoftheNDCssubmittedunderthe2015ParisAgreementsuggestedthat60%oftheabatementintheNDCswasunspecified,withnoindicationofhowtheemissionsreductiontargetwouldbeachieved.28ToadjustforthepotentialalreadyincludedinNDCsacrossoursixgroupsofaction,we,therefore,makeahigh-levelassessmentofthelikelyoverlapofcurrentNDCsforeachactionwehavequantified(highoverlap;moderateoverlap;lowoverlap),drawingonaliteraturereviewofNDCcommitments.29WethenscaledownthetotalfeasiblepotentialforeachsectorbasedontheassessedoverlapwithcurrentNDCs.Thisensuresthattheadditionalactionsweidentifydonotincludetheaverageof3.5GtCO2eincludedincurrentNDCs(Exhibit10).28EnergyTransitionsCommission(2016),PathwaysfromParis,AssessingtheINDCOpportunity.29SeeTechnicalAnnexforfurtherdetailonourscalingdownmethodology.Criticalactionsacrosssixdifferentsectors:6keystepsTotalpotentialby2030AcceleratingemissionsreductionsfrommethaneNatureBasedSolutions(includingcarbonremovals)DecarbonisingthepowersectorDecarbonisingroadtransportSupply-sidedecarbonisationinothersectorsEnergyandresourceefficiencyTOTALTotalfeasiblepotentialby2030AssessmentofoverlapwithNDCsNDCoverlapscalingNDCoverlapreductionAdditionalfeasiblepotentialby2030beyondNDCs123456~4.2[12.6]GtCOe4[11]GtGtCOeModerate~-10-15%-0.5[1.5]GtCOe3.5[11]GtCOe~11GtCO7.6GtCOModerate~-10-15%-0.9GtCO6.6GtCO~8GtCO4.6GtCOHigh~-20-30%-1.2GtCO3.5GtCO~2.8GtCO2.6GtCOModerate~-10-15%-0.3GtCO2.3GtCO~3GtCO2.2GtCOLow~-5%-0.1GtCO2.1GtCO~4.5GtCO2.9GtCOModerate~-10-15%-0.4GtCO2.5GtCO~33GtCO~24GtCO-3.5GtCO21GtCOeNOTE:Methaneemissionsin[]representequivalencetocarbondioxideundera20-yeartimeframe,assumingGWP=28.Exhibit10Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s28Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s29Chapter4Feasibleactionstoaccelerateemissionsreductions–6keycategoriesforpriorityactionKeeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s30Usingthecriteriadescribedinsection3,wehaveidentifiedthepotentialtoreduceemissionsfasterthanNDCcommitmentsduringthe2020s.Thissectionsetsoutthedetailedfindings,startingwithreducingmethaneemissionsandfollowingwithfivekeyopportunitiestoacceleratecarbondioxidereductions.4.1SignificantandrapidreductionsinmethaneemissionsTheIPCCAR6reportestimatesthatmethaneemissionshavebeenresponsiblefor0.5°Cofwarmingsincethepre-industrialperiod,comparedwith0.8°Cproducedbycarbon.30Sincemethaneemissionsareshort-livedintheatmosphere,cuttingmethaneemissionsisthequickestwaytoreduceglobaltemperature,offsettingtheimpactofthegrowingstockofcarbonintheatmosphere.ThoughcuttingmethaneemissionsisnotasubstituteforactiononCO2.Ingeneral,therehasbeeninsufficientfocusontheneedtoreducemethaneemissions,manyNDCspaylittleattentiontoit,andoverthelast10years,methaneemissionshavecontinuedtorise.Arangeofinitiativeshasrecentlybeendevelopedtoaddressmethane,whichincludestheEuropeanUnion’s2020MethaneStrategy,state-leveltargetssetbyNewYorkandCalifornia,andindustry-ledeffortssuchasupstreamoilandgasmethaneintensitytargetsfromtheOGCI,reportingframeworkssuchastheOilandGasMethanePartnership(OGMP),andcertificationstandardssuchasMiQ.31InSeptember2021,theGlobalMethanePledgewaslaunchedbytheUSandtheEU,whowerejoinedbyotherlargeemittersinanagreementtoreducemethaneemissionsby30%by2030.However,ETCanalysisinthissectionsuggestspotentialtoachievea40%reduction,particularlyinthelargestemittingcountries,with60%reductionsinfossilfuelemissionsand30%inthewasteandagriculturalsectors.Cuttingmethaneemissionsdramaticallyby2030shouldthereforebeahighpriorityatandafterCOP26.In2019,globalmethaneemissionswereestimatedtobearound375MtCH4(equivalentto31GtCO2eifa20-yearGWPfactorisapplied,and11GtCO2ewitha100-yearview),witharound135MtCH4fromfuelproduction,transportanduse,around80MtCH4fromwastemanagement,andaround160MtCH4fromtheagriculturesector.32Thereareopportunitiestocutallcategoriesoftheseemissions,withadistinctionbetween:•Fossilfuelderivedemissions,wheretherearelow-costopportunitiestocutemissionsbyatleast60%by2030.•Wasteandagriculturalemissions,wheredramaticearlyreductionswillbemoredifficultduetotheverylargenumberofproducersandconsumersinvolved,butwhereCOP26shouldstillseektoachieveconsensusaroundthenecessityandpossibilityofsignificantreductions,reachingatleasta30%reductionby2030.ReducingmethaneemissionsinthefossilfuelsupplychainOil,gas,andcoalaretogetherresponsibleforaround120MtCH4,with80MtCH4inoilandgasand40MtCH4incoal.33Intheoilandgassector,emissionsarehighestinRussia,theUS,andasetofotherlargeoilandgasproducingcountries,followedbyalargetailofcountrieswithsmallemissionsvolumestogetheraccountingforaround25%oftheoilandgastotal(Exhibit11).Coalemissionsareconcentratedinkeymininglocations,withover50%ofcoalminemethaneemissionscomingfromChina.3430IPCC(2021)ClimateChange2021:ThePhysicalScienceBasis(AR6).31MiQisanot-for-profitinitiativethathasdesignedagascertificationsystemwhichintroducesnaturalgastothemarketthathasbeendifferentiatedbasedonmethaneemissionsduringproduction.32EDGARDatabase.33IEA(2020)MethaneTracker.Additionalnon-wasteandnon-agriculturalmethaneemissionscomefromotherenergysourcessuchasbiomass.34UN(2021)GlobalMethaneAssessment:BenefitsandCostsofMitigatingMethaneEmissions;GlobalMethaneInitiative(2015)CoalMineMethaneCountryProfile:China.Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s31MovingbeyondcoalinpowergenerationwouldeliminatemethaneemissionsfromcoalminingaswellasCO2fromcoalcombustion(seeopportunityforaction3:‘Decarbonisingthepowersector–acceleratingcoalphaseout’).Inaddition,wherecoalminingdoesforatimecontinue(whetherforthermalorcokingcoal)thereareseverallow-costwaystoreduceemissions,includingpre-miningdegasificationandoxidationofventilationairmethane.35Butevenclosedcoalminescancontinuetoproducemethaneemissionsfordecadesafterclosureifextractionandutilisationschemesarenotputinplace.36Thescaleoftheseemissionsisnotadequatelyunderstoodbutoneestimatesuggeststhatabandonedcoalminescouldberesponsibleforasmuchas40MtCH4in2020,inadditiontotheestimated40MtCH4fromcoalminesstillinuse.37Actiontoreduceabandonedcoalminemethaneemissions,forinstanceviadeliberateflooding,arethereforeessential.Ourestimateassumesthat80%ofcoal-basedmethaneemissionsfromexistingmines(32MtCH4perannum)couldbeeliminatedatalowcostbefore2030.Oilandgasmethaneemissionscouldinprinciplebereduceddramaticallyatverylowcosts.38Abatementcostsvaryaccordingtofossilfuelprices,asreducedleakageallowsproducerstosellmorefuel(providingalargerbenefitthehigherthegasprice,anddecreasingabatementcosts).IEAestimatessuggestthatatcurrentgaspricesover30MtCH4couldbeeliminatedatnegativecost,whileafurther20MtCH4canbeeliminatedatcostsequivalenttobelow$50pertonneofCO2evenifweusedthe100year/28multiplierbasis,orbelow$20pertonneonthe20year/84multiplierbasis(Exhibit12).Comparedwithmanycarbonabatementopportunitiesnowbeingpursuedorwhichwillhavetobepursuedtoachieveazero-carboneconomy,cuttingfossilfuelmethaneemissionsisalow-costopportunity.Indeed,theaveragecostofeliminating50MtCH4fromtheoilandgassystem–withaCO2equivalentvalueof1.4Gt(100-yearview)to4.2Gt(20-yearview)–isnomorethanaround$5pertonneofCO2equivalent,eveninyearswithlowgasprices.Thescaleofthepotentialisalsoillustratedbythemajorvariationsinmethaneleakagerates–thevolumeofmethaneleakedasapercentageoftotalextraction-whicharewitnessedaroundtheworld,withbasecaseestimatesrangingfrom0.01%inNorwayto1.3%inRussiaand2.2%intheUSA,andover5%incertainMiddleEasternandAfricancountries(Exhibit13).3935UN(2021)GlobalMethaneAssessment:BenefitsandCostsofMitigatingMethaneEmissions.36Kholodetal.(2020)Globalmethaneemissionsfromcoalminingtocontinuegrowingevenwithdecliningcoalproduction.37Otherestimates,suchasKholodetal.(2020)suggestthatmethaneemissionsfromcoalminingcouldbesignificantlyhigherthanIEAestimates.38Keycost-savingandlow-costabatementactionsincludereplacementofdevices(e.g.pumps,electricmotors,compressorsealorrods,etc),installationofnewemissionscontroldevices(e.g.vapourrecoveryunits,blowdowncapture,flares,plungers),anddeployingleakdetectionandrepair(LDAR).39TheOilandGasClimateInitiative(OGCI),representingmajoroilandgascompanies,hassetatargettoreach0.2%by2025.However,thebest-in-classstandardisNorway’scurrentlevelbelow0.05%.Exhibit11Methaneemissionsfromfossilfuelswereestimatedaround120MtCHin2019–foroilandgas,highconcentrationinRussiaandUS,witha‘longertail’inothercountriesOilandgasmethaneemissionsbycountry,2019MethaneMtCH14RussiaUnitedStatesIranTurkmenistanIraqChinaAlgeriaLibyaVenezuelaCanadaSaudiArabiaNigeriaOther12543332222118<0.010.5-0.011-0.5Highlydistributedacross59countriesSOURCE:IEA(2021)MethaneTrackerdata.Total2019methaneemissionswouldbeequivalentto10GtCO2eor30GtCO2eusingGWPsof28and84respectively.Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s32Exhibit12Exhibit13Existingtechnologiescanreduce~30MtCHemissionsfromoilandgasatnegativeabatementcostsMarginalabatementcostcurveforoilandgasrelatedmethaneemissions(2019)-4-204-6-8-1001020305050610USD/MBtuMtCH8ReplaceexistingdevicesEarlydevicereplacementPumpsCompressorsealorrodInstrumentairsystemsInstallnewdevicesVaporrecoveryunitsBlowdowncaptureLeakdetectionandrepairUpstreamDownstreamOtherFlaresPlungersElectricmotorSOURCE:IEA,MethaneTracker,2020.Note:Abatementcostsdependonfossilfuelprices,andabatementcostsincreaseinyearswithlowgasandoilprices.~20USD/tCOe2EstimatedMethaneLeakageRatesbyCountryCountryNorwayOilandGasMethaneLeakageRate(%)–Baselineestimate0.01%Netherlands0.01%UnitedKingdom0.25%Qatar0.3%UAE0.7%Romania0.9%Egypt1.1%Oman1.2%Nigeria1.2%Russia1.3%Algeria1.6%UnitedStates2.2%Libya5.1%Yemen5.3%Angola6.7%NOTE:Methaneleakageratemeasurementsincludehighdegreeofuncertainty.ThisdatarepresentsEDF’scentralbaselineestimate,EDFalsodevelopshigh/lowranges.SOURCE:Greif,Constantin,andJuliusEcke.‘Scenarios,EffectivenessandEfficiencyofEUMethanePricingintheEnergySector’.Berlin:EnvironmentalDefenseFund,25January2021.https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/content/Enervis-Study-January-2021.pdf.Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s33Thedetailedactionstoreducetheseemissionswillneedtobetakenbyoilandgascompaniesacrosstheworld,withthelargestIOCsandNOCsplayingamajorrole,applyingthewiderangeoftechnicaloptionswhichtheIEAhasidentified.However,forcefulactionwillalsorequireclearmonitoringanddetectionofmethaneleaks.Hereinternationalsatellitescanplayanincreasinglyeffectiverole,andstrongnationalregulationsshouldbeintroducedtospecifymaximumacceptableleakratesandapplylargefinesforexcessleaks.Certificationschemesshouldbeintroducedtoenablecustomerstoassessthefullclimateimpactoftheiroilorgasconsumption.Someoftheseprioritiesarealreadybeingpursuedbyexistinginitiatives,butCOP26couldplayamajorroleingainingglobalconsensusaroundtheneedandpotentialforforcefulaction,alignedaroundaglobaltargetofa60%reductionby2030,supportedbyinternationallyagreedmechanismsformonitoringandnationalreportingwhichwillcreateincentivesfornationalandcorporateaction.Exhibit14setsoutourscenarioforpotentialmethanefossilfuelemissionreductions,with80MtCH4eliminatedby2030,whichwouldbeequivalentto2.2GtCO2(100yearview)–6.7GtCO2(20yearview)ofemissionsreductions.97%ofcountryNDCsdocovermethaneemissionstosomedegree,and13countries,includingRussiaandCanada,havespecificallysetmethanereductiontargets,buttheassessedoverlapwithcurrentNDCsisstillsmall,leavinganestimatedadditionalpotentialof~70MtCH4by2030.40Exhibit15describesthespecificactionsrequired.40UNFCCC(Feb2021)NationallyDeterminedContributionsundertheParisAgreement:SynthesisreportbytheSecretariat.Exhibit14MethaneGlobalCH₄emissionsreductionsvsBAUscenario,2030OverlapwithNDCsTotalfeasiblepotentialTotaladditionalpotential~80MtCH₄~2.2(100-year)-6.7(20-year)GtCO₂eFeasibilityassessmentExistingvoluntaryandregulatoryinitiativesKeycountries2/3nocost,1/3additionalcost–canaffordESGpressureonoilandgasproducersfromkeyblocbuyers(e.g.EU)andfinancialsectorMonitoringpotentialExistingvoluntaryinitiativesReductionsachievedwithlowcostsolutionsSomeESGpressureonoilandgasproducersfromkeyblocbuyersandfinancialsectorMonitoringpotentialHighercostLowerbuyerpressureLowerESGpressureonproducers(e,g,NationalOilcompanies)LowcostanddrivenbycoalphaseoutConcentratedinkeycountries(China)Monitoringpotential✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓•••✓✓✓~71MtCH₄~1.9(100-year)-6(20-year)GtCO₂e010203040506070809010022NDCoverlapassessment:251232MtCH₄,Global,annualLikelysomeoverlapwithexistingNDCcommitmentsNOTE:RangeformethaneemissionsillustratesCO₂equivalenceusingGWPsof28and84.SOURCE:Expertinterviews,IEA.UN(2021)GlobalMethaneAssessment:BenefitsandCostsofMitigatingMethaneEmissions.Moderate(~10-15%scaledown)Shaded/green–higherfeasibilityUnshaded/yellow–lowerfeasibilityMethane(Fossil):2030emissionsreductionscopeandfeasibility75%totalreductioninRussia,US,China,CanadaUpto50%(cost-savingorlow-costreduction)inothercountries80%low-costreductionincoalminingemissionsAdditional25%reduction(withadditionalcosts)inothercountriesKeeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s34ReducingmethaneemissionsintheWasteandAFOLUsectorsMethaneemissionsfromagricultureandwastewereestimatedaround160MtCH4and80MtCH4respectivelyin2019,accountingfor70%oftotalmethaneemissions.Keydriversofemissionsfromtheagriculturesectorincludeentericfermentationfromanimalsandanimalmanuremanagement.Inwaste,keydriversincludefoodthatiswastedandrotsbeforereachingconsumers(e.g.onthefarm,orintransit/storage);aswellaslandfillandwastewater,wheremethaneisproducedwhenorganicwastedecomposesinanoxygen-freeenvironment(anaerobicdecomposition).Therearemanylow-costopportunitiestoreducetheseemissions,viaconsumerbehaviourshifts(e.g.towardsplant-baseddiets),actionstoreducewastethroughbettersupplychainmanagement,andimprovedagriculturalandwastemanagementpractices.Keytechnologydevelopments–includingtheapplicationofdigitaltechnologytosupplychainmonitoringandmanagement,andsynthetic/plant-basedmeatalternatives–aresteadilyincreasingthepotentialforemissionssavings.However,estimatesofpotentialemissionsreductioninthesesectorsareinevitablylesscertainduetoalargenumberofindividualproducersandconsumersinvolved,thereforewehaveonlyassessmentaproportionofthetotalpotentialabatementhereashighlyfeasible.Ourestimatesuggeststhat70MtCH4(25%ofthetotal)withaCO2equivalentvalueof1.9GtCO2e(100-yearview)to6GtCO2e(20-yearview)couldbeeliminatedby2030(Exhibit16).GivenamoderateassessedoverlapwithactionsalreadyExhibit15●Acceleratingreductionsfrommethane:FossilsectorCommitmentstostandardisedinternationalsatellitemonitoringprogrammesformethaneemissionsmeasurementSupportingactionsatinternational,nationalandcompanylevelinthe2020sPrimaryactorsStrongnationalregulations,startinginthetopemittingcountries,specifyingmaximumacceptableleakrates(wellbelow1%)andapplyinglargefinesforexcessleaksDemand-sidepressurefromlargebloc-buyerssettingmaximumacceptableleakratesClearandambitiouscommitmentsfromcompanies(e.g.goingbeyondOGCI’sgoalof20%reductionby2025)totakeactionsanddeploytechnologies(e.g.replacementofpumps,electricmotors,andotherdevices,installationofnewemissionscontroldevicessuchasvapourrecoveryunits,deployingleakdetectionandrepair)Agreementbetweenleadingcountriesandcompaniestocutfossilmethaneemissionsby60%inthe2020s(buildingontheGlobalMethanePledge)andtoagreeframeworkandcommonstandardsformonitoringandreporting(e.g.buildingonMiQ).TargetoutcomesfromCOP262030objectivesClearcommitmentsbythefinancialsectortoceasefundingoilandgascompanieswhichfailtomeetappropriatemethanereductionstandards•Increasereforestationvialeader-levelpledges,buildingoninitiatives(e.g.REDD+,BonnChallenge),inlinewithhighintegritystandards(e.g.IUCN)•••DevelopedanddevelopingcountrygovernmentsFossilproducers••Fossilproducers•Fossilproducers•FossilproducersMultilateralfinancialinstitutions,banks,assetmanagers••••DevelopedanddevelopingcountrygovernmentsFossilproducers•••••75%emissionscutfromoilandgasinmajoremitters(UnitedStates,Canada,Russia,China)50%cutfromoilandgasinallothercountries80%low-costreductionincoalminingemissions100-yearview20-yearview80MtCH2.2GtCOe6.7GtCOeTotalfeasiblepotentialby2030~10-15%~10-15%~10-15%%NDCsscaledownofsector71MtCH1.9GtCOe6GtCOeAdditionalfeasiblepotentialby2030beyondNDCsKeeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s35includedincurrentNDCs,theestimatedadditionalpotentialreductionis62MtCH4peryearby2030.Exhibit17setsouttheactionstopursuethatopportunity.ReducingmethaneemissionsinagricultureandwastewillalsoreduceNitrousOxide(N2O)emissions,particularlyasreducedfoodwasteandlessfeed-intensivefoodproductionwillreducetheuseoffertilizerinagriculture.FurtheractionsalongtheagricultureandwastevaluechaincouldreduceN2Oinparticularviaimprovedmanagementofcroplandnutrients.ScalingtheseNitrousOxideemissionsreductionswiththeactionsidentifiedinExhibit16suggestafurther0.5-1GtCO2eofemissionsreductions(2-4MtN2O)couldbepossible.4141Roeetal(2019),Contributionofthelandsectortoa1.5°Cworld.N2Osavingswouldbeinadditiontotheaggregatedsavingsidentifiedinthisreport.Exhibit16Methane(AgricultureandWaste):2030emissionsreductionscopeandfeasibilityMethaneGlobalCHemissionsreductionsvsBAUscenario,2030OverlapwithNDCsTotalfeasiblepotential~70MtCH₄~1.9(100-year)–6(20-year)GtCO₂eFeasibilityTotaladditionalpotential~62MtCH₄~1.7(100-year)–5(20-year)GtCO₂eUnlikelytooverlapwithexistingNDCcommitmentsLikelysomeoverlapwithexistingNDCcommitmentsLikelysomeoverlapwithexistingNDCcommitmentsNOTE:RangeformethaneemissionsillustratesCO₂equivalenceusingGWPsof28and84.¹SDG6.2-increasingtreatedwastewaterfrom20%to60%globally.²Uppermiddle-incomecountriesreduceemissionsby45%,highincomeby75%.SOURCE:BasedonfeasiblemitigationpotentialfromRoeetal.(2019),SYSTEMIQanalysisfortheEnergyTransitionsCommission(2021).Shifttoplant-richdietsReducingfoodwaste(beforereachingconsumer)ImprovedagriculturalpracticeOtherwastereductionsLandfill²Wastewater¹HealthbenefitsCostsavingInlinewithtechnologytrendsCostsavingConsumerawarenessandeducationcampaignsSocialconcernExistingcoalitions(e.g.WatertoZero)SocialconcernInlinewithtechnologicaltrendsReducedcosts,socialconcernsaboutanimalwelfare✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓????0204060801001201401319192189101320Shaded/green–higherfeasibilityUnshaded/yellow–lowerfeasibilityNDCoverlapassessment:MtCH₄,Global,annualModerate(~10-15%scaledown)Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s36Exhibit17Individualactionencouragedbygovernmentandindustrypublicawarenesscampaignstoscaleadoptionofplant-richdietsConsumersDeveloped,developingcountryandlocalgovernmentsLeadingfoodandagriculturecompanies,andsectoralassociationsCommitmenttodeveloplabellingforlow-methanemeat,milk,andrice,andworkwithvaluechaintosetlow-methanestandards,Leadingfoodandagriculturecompanies,andsectoralassociationsSupportfordevelopmentofalternativeproteinsLeadingfoodcompaniesDevelopedanddevelopingcountrygovernmentsCommitmenttophaseoutpolicysupportforintensivelivestockfarminganddistortingsubsidiesDevelopedanddevelopingcountrygovernmentsIndustrycommitmentstoreducingfoodwastearisingonfarmsandintransit,e.g.viatechnologytoimprovesupplychaineffectivenessandprocurementstandardsLeadingfood,agriculture,andcommoditytradingcompaniesandsectoralassociationsInvestmentinwastewatertreatment,particularlyindevelopingcountriesenabledbydevelopmentfinanceInvestmentinwastecollection,includingseparatingorganicandnon-organicwastes,andrecyclablesWatercompaniesLocalgovernmentsMultilateralfinancialinstitutions●Acceleratingreductionsfrommethane:AgricultureandWastesectorAgricultureWasteTargetoutcomesfromCOP262030objectivesSupportingactionsatinternational,nationalandcompanylevelinthe2020sPrimaryactorsCountryandcompanycommitmentstocutnonfossilmethaneemissionsby30%inthe2020s,buildingontheGlobalMethanePledge.20%ofpeopleeatingplant-richdietsglobally,upfrom10%today30%reductioninemissionsfromfood-chainwaste20%reductioninemissionsfromwastewaterandlandfill•••••••••••••••••••••100-yearview20-yearview70MtCH1.9GtCOe6GtCOeTotalfeasiblepotentialby2030~10-15%~10-15%~10-15%%NDCsscaledownofsector62MtCH1.7GtCOe5GtCOeAdditionalfeasiblepotentialby2030beyondNDCsKeeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s374.2Haltingdeforestation,beginningreforestationandothercarbonsequestrationopportunitiesCurrentlevelsof(net)carbondioxideemissionsresultingfromtheFoodandLandusesector(FOLU)areestimatedtobearound6GtCO2.42,43Butthetotalpotentialtomitigateclimatechangeisgreaterthanthis6GtCO2figure,sincethenetfigurereflectsacombinationofgrossemissionssourcesof16GtCO2(derivingprimarilyfromdeforestationtoprovidelandforlivestockandlivestockfeedproduction,cultivationofsoilandoxidationofwoodproducts)andgrosscarbonremovalsintosinksequaltoaround11GtCO2(throughforestsandotherecosystemswhichsequesterscarbondioxide).44,45Thereareclearopportunitiesbothtoreducethesources(e.g.byendingdeforestation)andtoincreasethesinks(e.g.throughreforestation).Iftheworldistohaveanychanceoflimitingglobalwarmingto1.5°C,AFOLUemissions,particularlyfromlandusechange,mustswitchfrombeingamajorsourcetoasignificantnetsinkofemissionsassoonaspossible.Intotalweestimatetotalpotentialtoreducenetemissionsbyasmuchas12GtCO2by2030via(Exhibit18):•Arapidendtodeforestation,particularlyintropicalregions.Clearingahectareoftropicalforestforagriculture,canemitover400tonnesofCO2.46Andifcurrentratesofdeforestationcontinue,thiswouldreleaseover40GtCO2intotheatmosphereduringthe2020s.Inaddition,itisvitaltoendtheconversionofcoastalwetlandsandpeatlandstoagriculturaluses.Together,actionstoreduceFOLUrelatedcarbondioxidesourcescouldreduceannualemissionsby5GtCO2by2030.•Reforestationwhichcouldpotentiallyremovemorethan3GtCO2peryearby2030andrestoringcoastalwetlandsandpeatlandsafurther1GtCO2.•Improvementsinforestmanagementandimprovedsequestrationofcarboninsoilscouldremoveafurther3GtCO2(e.g.throughimprovedfarmingtechniques,orintheformofbiochar).47Ithaslongbeenrecognisedthatnature-basedsolutionscoulddeliveremissionreductionscostswhicharelowcomparedwithothermitigationoptions.Estimatessuggestforinstancethatnearly2GtCO2ofdeforestationcouldbeavoidedatacostoflessthan$10pertonneofCO2,withafurther1.5GtCO2availableatlessthan$100pertonneofCO2.48Estimatesforreforestationandafforestationareconsistentlyintherangeofaround$5-50/tCO2.49Newtechnologiessuchassyntheticmeat,geneticmanipulationtoincreasecropyieldsortheapplicationofdigitaltechnologytosupplychainmanagementandmonitoringcouldcontributetofasterprogress.Consumerbehaviourshiftstowardsplant-richdiets(whichwouldalsoreducemethaneemissions)couldalsoplayamajorrole.However,pastprogressonendingdeforestationhasbeenslow.Thisreflectsboththemajorshort-termgainswhichcanaccruefromconvertingforestlandtoagriculture(forinstancetosoyfarming),andtheneedforsolutionstotakeintoaccountmultiplefactors,including:•Optionstoimproveagriculturalproductivitybutalsotosecurealternativelivelihoodsforforest-basedcommunities.•Uncertaintiesoverexistinglandtenurerights.•Themisalignedincentives-includingthe“opportunitycost”ofusingtheland-ofmultiplerelevantactorsconnectedalongvaluechainsfromlocalindividualfarmers,throughintermediatebusinessestoconsumersacrosstheworld.•Theneedforjurisdictionalapproachestomanagetheuseoflandatanationalorregionallevel,whichensuresthatemissionsaregenuinelyreducedratherthansimplydisplaced.Insomecasescountriesmayneeddirectsupporttodeveloptheseapproaches.•Impactsonbiodiversity,watersupply,ecosystemservicesandothernaturebenefitsaswellasonCO2emissions.42FOLUCO2emissionsareexpressedastheoverallnetfigurewhichresultsfromthecombinationofgrossemissionsandgrossremovals.FOLUCO2emissionsaregeneratedprimarilyfromtheanthropogenicimpactsofdeforestationandotherlandusechange.Theseemissionsgeneratedareinpartoffsetbycarbonsinks,whichsequesteremissions.Note‘FOLU’emissionsarealsoattimesreferredtointheUNFCCCframeworkas‘LandUse,LandUseChangeandForestry’emissions(LULUCF).43Doesnotincludenon-CO2emissionsinthisestimate.44IPCC(2019)ClimateChangeandLand:anIPCCspecialreportonclimatechange,desertification,landdegradation,sustainablelandmanagement,foodsecurity,andgreenhousegasfluxesinterrestrialecosystems.45Itisimportanttoacknowledgethesignificantuncertaintyintheselevels,sincetheemissionsresultingwhenahectareofforestiscutdownorburntvariesverysignificantlydependingonspecificlocalcircumstance.46Probos(2020)Tropicalforests–thefactsandthefigures.47SeeTechnicalAnnexforfulldetailsonmethodologyandsources,drawinginparticularontheassessmentinRoeetal(2019)Contributionofthelandsectortoa1.5°Cworld.48BasedonestimatesinGriscometal.(2017)NaturalClimateSolutionsandRoeetal.(2021)Land-basedmeasurestomitigateclimatechange:potentialandfeasibilitybycountry.49RoyalSociety(2018)GreenhouseGasRemoval.Fussetal.(2018)Negativeemissions—Part2:Costs,potentialsandsideeffects.Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s38Asaresult,evenlow-costopportunitiesmaynotbegraspedwithoutinternationalagreementwhichcommitsmajorcountriestoaction,supportedbyflowsofclimatefinancewhichcanoffsettheshort-termincentivesfordeforestationandmakereforestationandothernature-basedsolutionseconomic.Someinitiativesalreadyexist,andaredrivingsomeprogress(e.gREDD+,theForestInvestmentProgram)50,butadramaticincreaseinscaleisnowrequired.Thesefinancialflowswillhavetoinvolvemajorintergovernmentalcontributionsbutcouldalsoentailamajorrolefortheprivatepurchaseofcarbonremovalcreditsbycompanies,supportedbythedevelopmentofappropriatecarbonmarkets.TheETCwillshortlyissueareportonCarbonDioxideRemovalswhichwillexplorethepotentialforandrelativemeritsofdifferentformsoffinancialflows,butitisclearthattherequiredscaleisverylarge.Achieving5GtCO2emissionsreductionsatacostof$40pertonnewouldrequireafinancialflowof$200billionperannum.Suchnaturalclimatesolutions(alongwiththephase-outofexistingcoalemissionsconsideredinthenextsection)shouldbethehighestpriorityuseofinternationalclimatefinancecommitments.EstimatingacredibletargetforemissionsreductionsintheFOLUsectorinthe2020sisthereforeinherentlymoredifficultthaninrelationtosomeothercategoriesofaction,butthetechnicalpotentialissogreatthatachievingabestpossibleagreementandcommitmentsatCOP26andaftershouldbeamongthehighestpriorities.Weestimatethatafeasibleprogrammeofactionscouldreducenetemissionsbyaround7.5GtCO2by2030,ofwhich4.6GtCO2resultfromreducedsources,with2.9GtCO2reflectingincreasedsinks(carbonremovals).Inadditiontonature-basedformsofcarbonsequestrationitispossibletoachievecarbonremovalviacarboncapturetechnologiescombinedwithgeologicalstorageofCO2,whetherviaBiCRS(BiomassCarbonRemovalandStorage)orDACCS(directaircaptureofCO2plusstorage).TheforthcomingETCreportoncarbonremovalsassessesthisopportunity,alongsidenature-basedsolutions.ThepotentialforBiCRSislimitedbythesupplyoftrulysustainablebiomass51butthepotentialforDACCSisintechnicaltermslimitless.ItwillhowevertaketimetoreduceDACCScoststoreasonablyaffordablelevels(e.g.$100pertonne)andtobuildlarge-scaleoperations.Forbothtechnologies,earlyprojectsinthe2020scanpavethewayforalargerscaleupofengineeredgreenhousegasremovalsbeyond2030.WeestimatearealisticpotentialtouseBiCRSandDACCStoachievearound0.1GtCO2/yearofadditionalemissionreductionsby2030.AllofthiswouldbeadditionaltocurrentNDCs(Exhibit19).AmajorityofenhancedNDCsdoreferencenature-basedsolutionsintheirmitigationandadaptationstrategies,butclearnumericaltargetsareoftenlacking.52Afterallowingfora“moderate”overlapwithcurrentNDCs,weestimateadditionalpotentialreductionsat6.6GtCO2peryearby2030.SpecificactionsrequiredtodeliverthisaredescribedinExhibit20.50TheClimateInvestmentFund’saForestInvestmentProgram(FIP)providesdirectinvestmentstoaddressthedriversofdeforestationandforestdegradationprovidinggrantsandlow-interestloanstogovernments,communitiesandbusinessstakeholders.SeeCIF(2020)SustainableForests.51SeeETC(2021)BioresourceswithinaNet-ZeroEmissionsEconomy:MakingaSustainableApproachPossible.52WWF(2021)NDCs–AForceforNature?3rdEditionEnhancedNDCs.Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s39Exhibit19BICRSandDACCSGlobalCO₂emissionsreductionsvsBAUscenario,2030TotalfeasiblepotentialTotaladditionalpotentialOverlapwithNDCsPotentialtoshiftbioenergytowardshigherpriorityuses(inlinewithconclusionsofETCbioenergyreport)ETCworkstreamsonCarbonDioxideRemovalsandonscalingCCS✓EmergingdevelopmentsinDACCSasascalablesolutionSignificantcleanpowerdemandETCworkstreamonscalingCCS✓•BICRS(BiomassCarbonRemovalandStorage)DACCS(DirectAirCarbonCaptureandStorage)Source:HannaR,AbdullaA,XuY,VictorDG.(2021),“Emergencydeploymentofdirectaircaptureasaresponsetotheclimatecrisis”.NatCommun.,SYSTEMIQanalysisfortheEnergyTransitionsCommission(2021).Shaded/green–higherfeasibilityUnshaded/yellow–lowerfeasibilityGtCO,Global,annualFeasibilityPotentialscalesuprapidlybeyond20300.000.050.100.150.200.1GtCO₂0.040.060.060.1GtCO₂UnlikelytooverlapwithexistingNDCcommitmentsBiCRSandDACCS:2030emissionsremovalsscopeandfeasibilityExhibit18AFOLUCOGlobalCOemissionsreductionsvsBAUscenario,2030OverlapwithNDCsTotalfeasiblepotential~7.5GtCO₂FeasibilityTotaladditionalpotential~6.5GtCO₂EndingdeforestationEndingconversioncoastalwetlandspeatlandsReforestationRestorationcoastalwetlandsandpeatlandsImprovedforestmanagementandagroforestryEnhancedsoilsequestrationinagriculture,biocharUnlikelytooverlapwithexistingNDCcommitmentsLikelytooverlapwithexistingNDCcommitmentsNOTE:¹"Maximumadditional"mitigationpotentialby2030fromGriscometal.(2017).Estimateisconstrainedtobeconsistentwithmeetinghumanneedsforfoodandfiber.²"Costeffective"mitigationat<$100/tCO₂in2030fromGriscometal.(2017).Estimateisconstrainedtobeconsistentwithmeetinghumanneedsforfoodandfiber,andavoidingnegativeimpactstobiodiversity(noestablishmentofforestswheretheyarenotthenativecovertype).SOURCE:Roeetal.(2019)Inlinewithexistinginitiatives(e.g.REDD+,conservationinitiatives)HighgeographicconcentrationEnabledbytechfocusedonsupplychaintransparencyandconsumerawarenessImprovingbiodiversityandfoodsecuritySomecosts,fundingcommitments✓✓✓✓•AdditionalcostoutlaysandfundingcommitmentsLessgeographicconcentrationConsumerawareness,socialconcernMonitoringpotential••✓✓Plantationforestryinitiatives(sustainableplantations)supportbyDevelopmentFinanceInstitutionsSmallscaleandchallengingbusinessmodelsHighjobscreationpotential••✓Earlierstagedevelopments•????GtCO,Global,annual01234567891011121IndonesiaBrazilROW0.80.81.51.510.30.30.3210.6Shaded/green–higherfeasibilityUnshaded/yellow–lowerfeasibilityNature:2030emissionsreductionandremovalsscopeandfeasibilityNDCoverlapassessment:Moderate(~10-15%scaledown)Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s40Exhibit20Commitmenttohaltdeforestation(esp.inBrazil,Indonesia,DRC),supportedbyfinancialsupportfromdevelopedcountries(e.g.viaGreenClimateFund,debtfornatureswaps,grants)DevelopedanddevelopingcountrygovernmentsCommitmentstodevelopdeforestation-freesupplychains,buildingonexistinginitiatives(e.g.FACTDialogue),andsupportedbyduediligencestandards,technologyadoptionforsupplychaintraceability,andindividualactionandpubliccampaignstoscaledeforestation-freeconsumptionLeadingfood,agriculture,mining,forestry,andcommoditytradingcompaniesandsectoralorganisationConsumers,encouragedbypublicinformationExpansionofcarbonmarketmechanisms,includingVoluntary,non-Voluntary(e.g.EUETS,CORSIA)withfullaccountingofland-useemissionsandforhigh-quality,additionaloffsetsTaskForceonScalingVoluntaryCarbonMarkets(TFSVCM),otheroffsetrelatedinitiatives,potentialbuyersDevelopedanddevelopingcountrygovernmentsCommitmenttoeliminatingdistortingagriculturalsubsidies(e.g.soy,palm)andsupportforhigh-yieldcropsimprovingagriculturalproductivityDevelopedanddevelopingcountrygovernmentsPromotedietshift,“healthiercalories”,andreducedconsumptionparticularlyindevelopedcountriesDevelopedanddevelopingcountrygovernmentsLeadingfoodandagriculturecompaniesConsumersCommitmentstoacceleratestandardsandguidelinesforCO2storagedevelopmentandappraisalprocess,sustainabilityofbiomassfeedstock•Increasereforestationvialeader-levelpledges,buildingoninitiatives(e.g.REDD+,BonnChallenge),inlinewithhighintegritystandards(e.g.IUCN)DevelopedanddevelopingcountrygovernmentsDevelopedanddevelopingcountrygovernments•●Nature-basedsolutions(includingcarbonremovals)TargetoutcomesfromCOP26Key2030targetsSupportingactionsatinternational,nationalandcompanylevelinthe2020sPrimaryactorsAstrongagreementonendingdeforestation,supportedbyclearcommitmentsforinternationalclimatefinancefromdevelopednations.95%reductionindeforestationandconversionofcoastalwetlandsandpeatlands,intandemwithsupportforsustainablelivelihoodsfordependentcommunities1.8GtofCO2removalsfromafforestation(on~300Mha)andrestorationofcoastalwetlandsandpeatlands,buildingontheBonnChallenge0.8GtofCO2removalsfromimprovedforestmanagement&agroforestry0.3GtofCO2removalsfromenhancedsoilsequestrationinagricultureandbiochar(adoptionofregenerativeagricultureon~400Mha);0.1GtofCO2removalsfromscalingBICRSandDACCS•••••••••••••••••••7.6GtCOTotalfeasiblepotentialby2030~10-15%%NDCsscaledownofsector6.6GtCOAdditionalfeasiblepotentialby2030beyondNDCsKeeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s414.3Decarbonisingthepowersector–acceleratingcoalphaseoutPowersectoremissionswere13.2GtCO2in2019,ofwhich9.5GtCO2camefromcoal-firedpower.Chinaaccountsforjustunderhalfofallcoal-firedpoweremissions(4.5GtCO2),andIndiaforone-tenth(1GtCO2).53Andwhilethepaceofnewcoaldevelopmentshasslowed,newcoalplantsarestillbeingbuiltinChinaandmanydevelopingcountries.EveninOECDcountriestherearestill1.2Gtofemissionsfromcoalfiredstations.Reducingemissionsfromcoalgenerationisthereforeamongthehighestpriorityandhighestpotentialactions.54Itentailstwodistinctelements:•First,ensuringthattheneartotalityofnewgrowthofelectricitycapacityandgeneration,concentratedprimarilyindevelopingeconomies,iszero-carbon.•Secondly,byreducingemissionsfromexistingcoalgenerationinlinewiththeIEA’sNetZeropathwaywhichassumesthattheworldcanachievezerocarbonpowersystemsby2040,andearlierindevelopedeconomies.Thiscouldbeachievedby(i)retiringexistingcoalplants(inparticulartheolderlessefficientones)beforeendoflife,(ii)byusingcoalgeneratingplantsforlessoftheyear,increasinglyprovidingabackuptorenewablegeneration,(iii)byaddingCCS.Thefirststepisaclosetocostlessactioninmostpartsoftheworld.SolarPVoronshorewindisnowthecheapestformofnewpowergenerationincountriesthatmakeuptwo-thirdsoftheglobalpopulationand90%ofelectricitygeneration.55ETCanalysisoftheChineseandIndianpowersystems,showsmoreoverthatitistechnicallyfeasibletorelyentirelyonzerocarbonpowersources(primarilyVRE)forallelectricitysupplygrowthfromnowon,andsuchastrategywillimposeverylimitedornoextrasystemcost,includingallowanceforallstorageandflexibilityrequirements.56Fourty-fourcountrieshavealreadycommittedto‘nonewcoal’,andthebulkofproposednewcoalpowerislocatedinasmallsubsetofcountries,whereactioncouldbetargeted.57AcrucialobjectiveofCOP26shouldthereforebetogainagreementona“nonewcoal”strategy,buildingontheUN’sNoNewCoalinitiative,supportedbystrongcommitmentsfromallmajorfinancialinstitutionsanddevelopmentbanks,andnationalexportcreditagenciesnottofinanceanynewcoaldevelopments.Weestimatethatsuchacommitmentcouldreduce2030emissionsbyanother0.7GtCO2.Thephaseoutofexistingfossilassetswillpresentagreaterchallenge,inparticulargiventherelativelyyoungageofthecoalfleetinChinaandIndia,whererecentadditionshavebeenconcentrated(Exhibit21).Whileinsomelocationsthecostofnewrenewablesisalreadybelowthemarginalcostofrunningcoalplants–thereforemakingtheearlycoalretirementeconomicallyfavourable-someexistingplants,particularlythosesupportedbyexistingPowerPurchaseAgreements(PPAs)overmultipleyears,willcontinuetobeeconomicinyearsaheadunlesssignificantcarbonpricesareimposed.58Inthesecases,earlyretirementofcoalplants,orrunningthematlowerutilisationratesmayimposeadditionalcosts.59AddingCCStotheseplantscouldextendtheirlifetimeandincreasetheirutilisationbutwouldalsocomeatadditionalcost.However,giventhesizeoftheopportunity,actiontoreduceexistingcoalemissionsmustbeahighpriority:•Indevelopedcountriesthisshouldbeacceptedasanecessarycontributiontowardsglobalclimatemitigation,andCOP26shouldaimforacommitmentthatallOECDcountrieswillclosedownunabatedcoalplantsby2030.Thiscoulddeliver1.2GtCO2peryearofemissionreductionsby2030.•Inthecaseoflower-incomedevelopingcountries,suchasIndiaorIndonesia,theearlyexitofalargeportionoftheexistingcoalfleetatadditionalcostwillrequiresupportfromclimatefinance,withsomeofthecostbornebyricherdevelopedeconomies,andtheretirementofcoalassetswillalsorequirewellthought-outstrategiesforajusttransitionforaffectedworkers.53BloombergNEF(2020)NewEnergyOutlook.54Thefocusofthissetofactionsisoncoalretirementanditsdisplacementviavariablerenewables(VRE)tomeetpowersystemdemandandsystemgrowth(supply-side);effectofmitigationpotentialfromadditionalelectrificationthatismetviazero-carbonpower(demand-side)iscapturedinothersectors.55ETC(2021)MakingCleanElectrificationPossible.56SeeTERI/ETCIndia(2020)RenewablePowerPathways:ModellingtheIntegrationofWindandSolarinIndiaby2030andRMI/ETCChina(2021)ChinaZero-CarbonElectricityGrowthinthe2020s:AVitalStepTowardsCarbonNeutrality.57E3G(2021)NoNewCoalby2021.58ETC(2021)MakingCleanElectrificationPossible.59SeeRMI(2020)HowtoRetireEarlyforanestimateofthecostsofanearlycoalphaseout.Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s42Phasingoutexistingnon-OECDcoalassetswhichwillbe20ormoreyearsoldin2030(~760GWincludingChinaandIndia),couldintotalreduceemissionsby2.7GtCO2/yearby2030,with2.4GtCO2/yearassessedashigherfeasibility.Afurther2.7GtCO2/yearcouldbeeliminatedifnewernon-OECDcoalassetswereretiredearlyorequippedwithCCS,butthisisunlikelytobeafeasibleobjectivewithinthenext10yearsandweconsideronlyasmallproportionofthistobepossible(around0.1GtCO2/year).HigherfeasibilitypotentialforcoalphaseoutisalsounderpinnedbytheneedforJustTransitionstrategies,viafundingforearlyretirementandre-skillingoncoalminers.Atnationallevel,employmenteffectsfromcoalphaseoutwillusuallybemorethanoffsetbytheextrajobscreatedbyrenewables,atleastduringthenext30yearsofrapidcapacityexpansion.60TheCOP26Presidencyisalreadyaimingtogaina“nonewcoal”commitmentatCOP26;andmanyOECDcountriesareacceleratingexistingcoalphaseout.Goingbeyondthistophaseout,coalinlowerincomecountrieswouldrequiresignificantcommitmentofdevelopedcountryfunds.If,forinstance,theadditionalcostincurredforretiringcoalassetsearlyweretwocentsperkWhofelectricityproduced,thecostperGtofemissionreductionswouldbeabout$20-$25billion.61Alongsideendingdeforestationandincreasingreforestation,thisisthehighestprioritypotentialuseoftheclimatefundswhichdevelopedcountrieshavepromised.Intotal,actionsrelatedtocoalphase-outcoulddeliver4.6GtCO2peryearofemissionsreductionsby2030,or3.5GtCO2afteradjustmentoractionsalreadyinNDCs(Exhibit22).AsignificantshareofthenonewcoalandOECDcoalphaseoutreductionsisprobablyalreadycovereredbycurrentNDCs,87%ofwhichreferexplicitlytoplansforVREexpansionalongsidequantitativedomestictargetsforincreasedrenewableenergyshare(forinstancethosesubmittedbytheEU,China,IndiaandJapan).62ButearlyphaseoutofexistingcoalisnotyetenvisagedbyChinanorbyanylowincomedevelopingcountry.ThespecificactionstodeliverthisreductionaresetoutinExhibit23.60ETC(2021)MakingCleanElectrificationPossible.61Assuming1000Mtofemissionscomesfrom1to1.25millionGWhofcoalgeneration,or1000-1250billionkilowatt-hours.Attwocentsperkilowatt-hourthisis$20-$25billion.62UNFCCC(Feb2021)NationallyDeterminedContributionsundertheParisAgreement:SynthesisreportbytheSecretariat;IRENA(2019),NDCsin2020:Advancingrenewablesinthepowersectorandbeyond,InternationalRenewableEnergyAgency,AbuDhabi.Exhibit21Powersectoremissionsin2019were13GtCO₂,withasignificantsharecomingfromcoalinkeyregions;challengeisrelativelyyoungageofthecoalfleetCoalPowersectoremissionsbyregionGtCO₂,Global,annualCoalfleetbyage,ChinaandIndiaGW2.34.51468201,0001,5005000Coalcapacityaddedpost-2010Coalcapacityadded2000-2010Coalcapacityaddedpre-2000CoalTotalGlobalPowerEmissions,13.2GtCO₂TotalPowerCoalEmissions,9.5GtCO₂SOURCE:BloombergNEF(2020)NewEnergyOutlook,GlobalEnergyMonitorCoalPlantdatabase,SYSTEMIQanalysisfortheEnergyTransitionsCommission(2021).OECDChina1.6ROWIndiaOECD501China1,048ROW287India233Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s43Exhibit22CoalGlobalCOemissionsreductionsvsBAUscenario,2030OverlapwithNDCsAdditionaltoNDCsLikelytooverlapwithexistingNDCcommitmentsFeasibilityNoadditionalcostAirqualitybenefitsKeycountries,Existinginitiatives,e.g.PoweringPastCoalAlliance✓✓✓✓NoadditionalcostAirqualitybenefitsKeycountriesExistinginitiatives,e.g.PoweringPastCoalAlliance✓✓✓✓SystemreadinesstodealwithhigherVREFeasible2030scale-upofVREandzero-carbonflexibilityKeycountriesSomeadditionalcost–requirestargetedclimatefinanceindevelopingcountries✓✓✓•CostandscalingchallengeswithCCSLikelihoodforCCStofocusonsectorswithfeweralternativedecarbonisationopportunities••4.6GtCO₂Totaladditionalpotential3.5GtCO₂NonewcoalOECDunabatedcoalphaseoutby2030Phaseoutexistingoldercoalinnon-OECD(>20yearsin2030)Phaseoutofnewerunabatedcoalassets(CCS)SomelikelyoverlapwithexistingNDCcommitmentsUnlikelytooverlapwithexistingNDCcommitmentsNOTE:CCSassumes90%capturerate.SOURCE:BloombergNEF(2020)NewEnergyOutlook,GlobalEnergyMonitorCoalPlantdatabase,IEA(2021)NetZeroby2050:ARoadmapfortheGlobalEnergySector,SYSTEMIQanalysisfortheEnergyTransitionsCommission(2021).Shaded/green–higherfeasibilityUnshaded/yellow–lowerfeasibilityGtCO,Global,annual0123456780.10.50.31.80.60.10.20.2Keycountriesfornewcoalpipelineinclude,Indonesia,Vietnam,TurkeyKeynon-OECDcountriesincludeSouthAfrica,Indonesia,Russia,Ukraine,VietnamChinaIndiaROW1.20.30.350.351.7NDCoverlapassessment:High(~20-30%scaledown)Coal:2030emissionsreductionscopeandfeasibilityKeeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s44Exhibit23Commitmentto2030unabatedcoalphaseoutinOECD(e.g.viaPoweringPastCoalAlliance),alongsidesupportforJustTransitionstrategiesCommitmenttohaltnewcoalprojects(esp.inChinaandIndia)ChinaandIndiagovernmentDevelopedcountrygovernmentsImmediatecommitmentsnottofinancenewcoalpowerplants,newcoalminesorcoalmineextensions,andtoceasefinancingcompaniesincoalminingduringthe2020sMultilateralfinancialinstitutionsBanksTargetedfinancialsupportfromdevelopedcountriesforearlycoalretirementindevelopingcountries(e.g.India),e.g.viacommitmentsfromGreenClimateFundand/orviaphilanthropic/privatesectorcapitalDevelopedcountrygovernmentsMultilateralfinancialinstitutionsBanksPhilanthropiccapitalCommitmentstoincreasedcorporateprocurementofrenewables,viainitiativessuchasRE100,inadditiontogovernment-setquantitativetargetsforgrowthofzero-carbongenerationandreductionofgridcarbonintensity(gCO2/kWh)Energy-intensiveindustryTech,finance,consultingDevelopedanddevelopingcountrygovernmentsImmediateendtofossilfuelsubsidiesalongsideredistributivemeasuresIntroductionandextensionofcarbonpricingDevelopedanddevelopingcountrygovernments●DecarbonisingthepowersectorSupportingactionsatinternational,nationalandcompanylevelinthe2020sPrimaryactorsTargetoutcomesfromCOP262030objectivesAgreementbetweenleadingcountriesandcompaniestocutfossilmethaneemissionsby60%inthe2020s(buildingontheGlobalMethanePledge)andtoagreeframeworkandcommonstandardsformonitoringandreporting(e.g.buildingonMiQ).Nonewcoalfrom20222030coalphaseoutinOECDPhaseoutolderexistingcoalplantsbuiltbefore2010•••••••••••••••••••••4.6GtCOTotalfeasiblepotentialby2030~20-30%%NDCsscaledownofsector3.5GtCOAdditionalfeasiblepotentialby2030beyondNDCsKeeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s454.4AcceleratingroadtransportelectrificationRoadtransportemissionswere6.5GtCO2in2019,withoverhalfgeneratedintheUnitedStates,EuropeandChina.DespitethedipinemissionsdrivenbytheCovid-19pandemic,whenemissionsfellto5.6GtCO2in2020,projectionsforroadtransportdemandhighlightgrowingemissionsthroughthe2020s.Thisisdrivenbygrowthintheglobalvehiclestock,despiteimprovementsinvehicleefficiency.63However,technologicalprogressandcostreductionsnowmakeitpossibletophaseoutlightdutyInternalCombustionEngines(ICEs)farmorerapidlythanseemedfeasiblewhentheParisagreementwassigned.Batterypriceshavefallen85%in10yearsandareprojectedtofallbelow$100/kWhby2024,reaching$60/kWhby2030,andstilllowerlevelsinthe2030s.GiventhefarlowerfuelcostsofEVs,someestimatessuggestthatthetotalcostofownership(TCO)ofEVsisalreadylowerthanthatofICEsforsomesegments.Thisadvantagewillextendtoalllight-dutysegmentsandsomeheavy-dutysegmentsoverthenextdecade.Upfrontcostscouldreachparityforsomecategoriesoflight-dutyvehicleasearlyasthemid-2020sandformostlight-dutysegmentsbefore2030.64Newbusinessmodelsinthemobilitysector,suchasride-hailingandcar-sharing,aredrivingincreasedEVpenetration(sincelowmarginaloperatingcostsalreadyoutweighhigherupfrontcostswhenvehicleutilisation)andmanydeliveryandmobilitycompaniesseekingtodemonstratesustainabilitycredentialstocustomersandfinanciersarealsoearlyadopters.EVscanalsodeliverotherimportantco-benefits,suchasimprovedlocalairquality.Citygovernmentshavebeenincreasinglyfocusedonthepromotionofbetterairquality,atrendthatisheightenedinthecontextofaglobalpandemiccausedbyarespiratoryillness.65InadditionmanycountriesseeaswitchtoEVsasanopportunitytogrowindustrialcompetitivenessinanewdomain(e.g.asChinahasshownviathegrowthofdomesticEVbatteryandcarmanufacturers).63BloombergNEF(2020)Long-TermElectricVehicleOutlook.64BloombergNEF(2020)Long-termElectricVehicleOutlook;ETC(2021)MakingCleanElectrificationPossible.65SeeforexampleLondon’sUltraLowEmissionZone(ULEZ).Exhibit24LightDutyVehiclesICESalesPhaseOutAnnouncedplansICESalesPhaseOutCOUNTRYNet-ZeroTargetICEsalesPhaseOutEndICEInvestCOMPANY2020202520302035204020452050NOTES:Selectedmarkets.ICEphaseoutforsomecountriesstillincludeshybrids.¹NotinnationalClimateProtectionPlan.SOURCES:ICCT(June2021),BNEF(2021)LongTermElectricVehicleOutlook,T&E,BNEF(2021)HittingtheEVInflectionPoint.NorwayTheNetherlandsIrelandIcelandSingaporeAustriaSloveniaJapanUS:50%ofallvehiclesalestobeelectricIndia:30%ofallvehiclesalestobeelectricCanadaDenmarkUKUS(California)CapeVerdeChinaFranceSpainCostaRicaUS(Conneticut,Maryland,Massachusetts,NewJersey,NewYork,Oregon,RhodeIsland,Vermont,WashingtonGermanyKeeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s46Asaresult,andevenwithoutadditionalpolicyimpetus,EVsarelikelytoaccountforthevastmajorityoflight-dutyvehiclesalesby2040,andinmanycountriesevenearlier.Manyleadingautomanufacturershavemadecommitmentstosellingonlyelectricorhybridvehiclesby2035orearlier,andanincreasingnumberofcountriesarealsosettingdatesfortheprohibitionofICEsales(Exhibit24).ManyNDCshoweverdonotyetreflectthelikelypaceofdevelopment,letalonecreatepressureforfurtheracceleration.Thereisthereforeamajorlow-costopportunitytocutemissionsfasterthancurrentNDCsassume.Withvehiclesalesandproductionconcentratedinarelativelysmallnumberofcountriesandcompanies,ICEphaseoutagreementsforlight-dutyvehiclesbetweenleadingcountriesandcompaniescoulddrivestillfastertechnologicalprogressandcostreduction,furtherreducingthecostofdecarbonisationforothercountries(inparticularinthedevelopingworld).AnagreementatCOP26betweenleadingcountriesandcompaniestobanalllight-dutyICEsalesby2035atthelatest,supportedbymajorcitycommitmentstophaseouttheuseofexistingICEsincitycentresduringthe2030s,andrequiredinvestmentsincharginginfrastructure,wouldthereforebeacredibleobjective.Significantimprovementsinheavy-dutytruckfuelefficiencycouldalsobedrivenbyagreementsbetweenmajorcountriesandcompanies,butmay,insomeinstancescomewithadditionalcost.66Intotalweestimateatechnicalpotentialof3.0GtCO2/yearreductionby2030ofwhichasmuchas2.75GtCO2/yearshouldbefeasibletoachieve.SomeofthispotentialisincludedincurrentNDCs,whichoftenincludereferencestoenergyefficiencyimprovement,butfewofwhichmakeexplicitreferencetodatesforICEphaseout.67Overallweestimatethatabout2.3GtCO2/yearofreductioncouldbeadditionaltocurrentNDCs(Exhibit25).ThekeyactionstoachievethisaredescribedinExhibit26.66Thoughadditionalcostsforupfrontvehiclepurchase,couldbeoffsetbyreducedfuelconsumptionoverthelifetime.67UNFCCC(Feb2021)NationallyDeterminedContributionsundertheParisAgreement:SynthesisreportbytheSecretariat.RoadRoad:2030emissionsreductionscopeandfeasibilityGlobalCOemissionsreductionsvsBAUscenario,2030OverlapwithNDCsTotalfeasiblepotential2.6GtCO₂LikelytooverlapwithexistingNDCcommitmentsFeasibilityCostsavingfortruckoperatorsAirqualityimprovements✓✓CostsavingasEVcostscomedownAirqualityimprovements,stakeinnewsupplychains✓✓CostsavingasEVcostscomedown–slightlydelayedAirqualityimprovements,stakeinnewsupplychains✓✓AggregatedmarketESGandcustomerretentionbenefits✓✓AggregatedmarketESGandcustomerretentionbenefits✓✓Totaladditionalpotential2.3GtCO₂012320%fueleconomyimprovementintrucksAcceleratedICEphaseout–US,EU,OECDAsia,China,India¹AcceleratedICEphaseout–Developingcountries¹AcceleratedEVsalesinlightcommercialfleets²AcceleratedEVsinride-hailing(e.g.Uber)²UnlikelytooverlapwithexistingNDCcommitmentsNOTE:¹Assumingthatin2030EVsare20%ofglobalcarstock,54%2/3Wstock,23%busstock,22%vanstock,8%truckstock(25%EVfleetaverageacrosssegments).²Assumingtrajectoryto100%EVsalesby2030in‘leader’countries,and80%in‘laggard’countriesforrelevantfleets,equivalentto24%LDVEVstockby2030(vs15%EVstockin2023inBAU).SOURCE:BloombergNEF(2020)NewEnergyOutlook,IEA(2021)NetZeroby2050:ARoadmapfortheGlobalEnergySector,SYSTEMIQanalysisforTheClimateGroup(2021),SYSTEMIQanalysisfortheEnergyTransitionsCommission(2021).0.61.10.250.60.30.2GtCO,Global,annualShaded/green–higherfeasibilityUnshaded/yellow–lowerfeasibilityNDCoverlapassessment:Moderate(~10-15%scaledown)Exhibit25Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s47ActionfromnationalGovernments,andcityandcorporateactorsatCOP26beyondcandeliverover2Gt/yearofemissionsreductionsby2030Light-dutyICEsalesbansby2035,andcommitmentsfrommajorautomakersfor100%zero-emissionvehiclesby2035DevelopedanddevelopingcountrygovernmentsMajorautomanufacturersCommitmentsto100%newEVpurchasesincorporateandmobilityfleetsby2030atthelatest(e.g.viaEV100)Logisticscompanies(e.g.Amazon)Transportnetworkcompanies(e.g.Uber)Commitmenttostringentfleet-widefuelefficiencystandardsforcars,vansandHGVsingCO2/kmfromthe2020sDevelopedanddevelopingcountrygovernmentsRemovesubsidiesforpetrolanddiesel,maintainorincreasetaxationonpetrolanddieseltocreateincentivesforheavy-dutytransitionDevelopedanddevelopingcountrygovernmentsCommitmentstoEVcharginginfrastructurerolloutwithclearinternationalstandards,alongsidepotentialroadtollsandfeesforICEvehicles,scrappageschemesforICEvehiclesDevelopedanddevelopingcountry,citygovernmentsBansandrestrictionsonuseofICElightdutyvehiclesinmajorcitiesaimingforcomprehensivebansinmostmajorcities(reinforcingandacceleratingtheCitiesRacetoZeroandtheC40GreenandHealthyStreetsDeclaration)Citygovernments●DecarbonisingroadtransportTargetoutcomesfromCOP262030objectivesAstrongagreementtocommittoendingsalesoflight-dutyICEvehiclesby2035atthelatest,supportedbycleartargetsfromcountries,citiesandautomanufacturers.Achieve20%globalEVstockinlightdutyvehiclesAchieve10%globalnon-ICEstockforheavygoodsvehicles(HGVs)Achieve25%EVstockincorporateandmobilityfleetsby2030Achieve20%fuelefficiencyimprovementinHGVsSupportingactionsatinternational,nationalandcompanylevelinthe2020sPrimaryactors••••••••••••••••••2.6GtCOTotalfeasiblepotentialby2030~10-15%%NDCsscaledownofsector2.3GtCOAdditionalfeasiblepotentialby2030beyondNDCsExhibit26Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s484.5Acceleratingsupplydecarbonisationinbuildings,heavyindustryandheavytransportAtthetimeoftheParisagreement,mostanalysisassumedthatitwouldbedifficultandveryexpensivetodecarbonisesectorswheredirectelectrificationwaseitherimpossibleormoredifficultthaninlightdutyroadtransport.ButtheETC’sMissionPossiblereportofNovember2018showedthatitispossibleforalltheso-called“hard-to-abate”sectors–suchassteel,cement,chemicals,long-distanceaviationandshipping–toachievezeroemissionsby2050atverylowcoststoeconomicgrowthandconsumerlivingstandards.Keytechnologiestofosterthetransitionalongsidedirectelectrificationincludehydrogen,bioenergyandCCS.Manyleadingcompaniesandsectoralorganisationswithinthesesectorshavenowmadecommitmentstoachievenetzeroemissionsby2050,andsectoralprogrammeswithintheMPParedevelopingfeasiblepathwaysfromtodaytothat2050objective.Thesepathwaysareoften“convexcurve”inshape,withonlylimitedprogressinthe2030s,followedbyaccelerationinthe2030s.Thisinpartreflectstheinherentdifficultyofachievingmajorearlyemissionreductionsinsectorswhichhavelonglastingcapitalassetssuchassteelorcementplants,shipsorplanes.However,afeasiblesetofactionscouldstilldeliverover1GtCO2peryearofadditionalemissionsreductionsfromthehardtoabateindustrialandlong-distancetransportsectors,plusanother1Gtfromacceleratedelectrificationofresidentialheatingandindustry(Exhibit27).•Inthesteelsector,whichcurrentlyaccountsforaround3GtCO2ofemissionsperannumglobally,analysisbytheNetZeroSteelInitiativeillustratesthatupto1.3GtCO2couldbeeliminatedby2030ifcarbonpricingreachingaround$60/tCO2by2030,orequivalentmechanismswereimposed.Thislevelofdecarbonisationwouldrequirearound50near-zerocarbonsteelplantsby2030.Thiswouldresultinincreasedsteelprices,butthetotalcostimpactonconsumerlivingstandardsandeconomicgrowthwouldbeminimal.Additionally,steelproductionisconcentratedinarelativelysmallnumberofcountries(China,Japan,Korea,theEU,theUSandIndia),andleadingsteelcompanieshavealreadycommittedtonetzeroby2050.Thisincreasesthepotentialforcoordinatedactionbetweenasmallgroupofcountriesandcompanies.•Opportunitiesaresmallerinlong-distanceshippingandaviationbothbecausetheseaccountforsmallercurrentemissions(about1Gtineachcase)andbecausethecostsofabatementpertonneofCO2aremuchhigher.Despitethis,forcefulearlyactionisessentialtomakeapathtodecarbonisationpossibleinthe2030sand40s,throughscalingupamarketforlow-carbonfuels.Additionally,theexistenceofinternationalregulatingbodiesinthesesectors,suchastheIMOandICAO,createsnaturalcoordinatingmechanismswhicharemissinginothersectors.Feasiblecommitmentstoensurethat10%ofthefuelburntinshippingandaviationcomesfromnewlowcarbonfuelsby2030couldtogetherdeliver0.2GtCO2/yearofadditionalabatementby2030.•MPPworkonpossibledecarbonisationpathwaysinthechemicalsandcementsectorsisatanearlierstage,butitislikelythatthesesectorscouldalsodeliverabatementwhichisnotcoveredbyexistingNDCs.AforthcomingreportfromtheGlobalCementandConcreteAssociation68suggestthattoday’s2.7GtCO2/yearofcementandconcrete-relatedemissionscouldbecuttoaround2.3GtCO2/yearby2030,enroutetozeroby2050.•Thereisamajoropportunitytodriveaccelerateddecarbonisationinindustry,aswellasresidentialheatviamorerapidelectrification,withthisheatingopportunityconcentratedinricherdevelopedcountries.Progressinallofthesesectorswillbedrivenbyacombinationofdirectelectrification,andtheuseofhydrogen,CCS,andbiofuels(inparticularinaviation).Greenhydrogenwillplayamajorrole,andcoordinatedinternationalactiontospuritsdevelopmentcouldplayanimportantroleinsupportingsectoraldecarbonisationinitiatives.Inresidentialheattherearemajoropportunitiestoaccelerateelectrificationusingheatpumps,69withupfrontinvestmentsdeliveringsubsequentfuelcostreductions.Specificstrategiesinthisarenaareinherentlynational,givendifferentstartingpoints,buttherecouldbearoleforCOP26togalvaniseactionacrossthemajoraffectedcountries(primarilyrichernationsinNorthernlatitudes)andtospurtechnologicalprogressinheatpumpefficiencyimprovement.Nationalpoliciescouldcomplementthisbybanningnewgasboilerinstallations.Weestimatepotentialtoreduceemissionsby1GtCO2/yearby2030.Intotal,weestimateareductionopportunityinthesesectorsof2.2GtCO2/yearby2030,ofwhich2.1GtCO2/yearwouldbeadditionaltoNDCs.ThisreflectstheverylimitedambitioninmostcurrentNDCsforearlydecarbonisationofeitherthesupposedlyhardtoabatesectorsorresidentialheating.70ActionrequiredtodeliverthisisdescribedinExhibit28.68GCCA(October2021)ConcreteAction.69Or,incaseswhereelectrificationviaheatpumpsisdifficult,usingresistiveheating(thoughthisrequiresadditionallow-carbonelectricitygeneration).70UNFCCC(Feb2021)NationallyDeterminedContributionsundertheParisAgreement:SynthesisreportbytheSecretariat.Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s49Exhibit27Supply-sideotherGlobalCOemissionsreductionsvsBAUscenario,2030TotalfeasiblepotentialTotaladditionalpotentialOverlapwithNDCs2.2GtCO₂FeasibilitySwitchtomoreefficienttech(e.g.heatpumps)SupportiveregulationfornewbuildsLowerenergybillsonceinstalledAdditionalCapexcostsforretrofit(suggestingsomesubsidiesrequired),disaggregatedactors✓✓✓•Keycountries(China,Japan,Korea,EU,US,India)Limitedimpactonend-consumerpricesAdditionalcostpremiumLong-lastingcapitalassets✓✓••Limitedimpactonend-consumerpricesAdditionalcostpremiumLong-lastingcapitalassets✓••InternationalregulatorybodyHigherabatementcost✓•InternationalregulatorybodyHigherabatementcost✓•2.1GtCO₂0.01.00.52.01.53.02.5AcceleratedelectrificationofbuildingheatingandindustrySteelAviationShippingCementandconcreteUnlikelytooverlapwithexistingNDCcommitmentsNOTE:¹RepresentsimpactfromfuelswitchforadditionalelectrificationinETCscenariosvsBNEFBAUPowerscenario,excludingimpactonroadtransport.SOURCE:MissionPossiblePartnershipAnalysis,BloombergNEF,ETC(2021)BioresourceswithinaNet-ZeroEmissionsEconomy,SYSTEMIQanalysisfortheEnergyTransitionsCommission(2021).10.80.60.10.10.20.2GtCO,Global,annual?Shaded/green–higherfeasibilityUnshaded/yellow–lowerfeasibilityNDCoverlapassessment:Low(~5%scaledown)Othersupply-sidedecarbonisation:2030emissionsreductionscopeandfeasibilityPotentialscalesuprapidlybeyond2030Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s50Exhibit28Introducepolicysupporttoovercome“greencostpremiums”via:Carbonpricing,quantitativefuelmandatesandcontractsfordifferencePublicprocurement(orvoluntary/encouragedprivateprocurement)ofdecarbonisedmaterials(e.gbuildingonCleanEnergyMinisterialIndustrialDeepDecarbonisationInitiativeRegulatedproductstandards–carbonemissionsintensityofmaterials(e.g.steelorcement),orlifecycleemissionsstandardsonend-products(e.g.auto,whitegoods)tocreatemarketsfordecarbonisedmaterialsDevelopedanddevelopingcountrygovernmentsEnergy-intensiveindustriesMajorcustomersofenergy-intensiveindustries(automotive,construction,internationalfreight)Commitmentstophasingouttheuseofgasboilersinnewbuildsby2025,andtosupportheatpumpdeploymentandtechnologicaladvanceDeveloped,developingcountryandcitygovernmentsNational/regionalcommitmentsfrompublicandprivatestakeholderstodevelopgreenhydrogencapacity(e.gEUcommitmentto40GWby2030,GreenHydrogenCatapultobjectiveof25GWby2026),andregulationstoswitchexistinghydrogenusetocleanhydrogenDevelopedanddevelopingcountrygovernmentsEnergyproducers,energy-intensiveindustriesIMOandconstituentmembersICAOandconstituentmembersDevelopedanddevelopingcountrygovernmentsStrengtheningofIMO2050targetfor50%reductiontonetzerowithstrong2030reductiontargetandsupportingpolicymeasures(e.gcarbonprice,zerocarbonfuelmandate)StrengtheningofICAO2050targetfor50%reductiontonetzerowithstrong2030reductiontargetandsupportingpolicymeasures(e.gcarbonprice,zerocarbonfuelmandate)●Supply-sidedecarbonisationinothersectorsSupportingactionsatinternational,nationalandcompanylevelinthe2020sPrimaryactorsTargetoutcomesfromCOP262030objectivesAstrongagreementbetweenleadingcoalitionsofcountries,companiesandsectoralorganisationstodriveaccelerateddecarbonisationofthesteel,cement,aviationandshippingsectors,buildingonexistingsectoralinitiativessuchastheNetZeroSteelInitiativeandtheGettingtoZeroCoalitionforshipping.Leadingcountriesshouldalsocommittoacceleratedelectrification,andscalingupcleanhydrogen.1GtofCO2reductionsfromacceleratedelectrificationinbuildingsandindustryAtleasta25%reductioninsteelemissions(implyinganeedfor~50nearzero-emissionssteelplants)10%sustainableaviationfuel(SAF)penetration5-7%zero-emissionshippingfuel•••••••••••••••••••2.2GtCOTotalfeasiblepotentialby2030~5%%NDCsscaledownofsector2.1GtCOAdditionalfeasiblepotentialby2030beyondNDCsKeeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s514.6EnergyandresourceefficiencyimprovementsInprincipleimprovementsinenergyproductivity(GDPperunitofenergyconsumed)shouldbeasignificantopportunityforlow-costreductionsinthe2020s.Majoropportunitiesexistalongthreedimensions:•Improvementsintheenergyefficiencyofbuildings,appliances,transportandindustrialequipment.Forexample,aninitiativetodoubletheefficiencyofairconditioning,lightingandappliancesinkeycountries,couldleadtoareductionofatleast0.5GtCO2/yearby2030.71•Improvementsinmaterialefficiencyandcircularity,forinstancethroughbetterdesignedbuildingswhichrequirelesssteelorcementinput,andgreatlyincreasedrecyclingorreusemultipleproducts.•Widerimprovementsinenergyproductivity,forinstancethroughthedevelopmentofsharedtransportsystemsorbetterdesignedcitieswhichreducetransportemissionswhilestilldeliveringhighqualitymobilityservices.Thesewiderenergyproductivityimprovementssometimesrelyonconsumerbehaviourchange,e.g.viashiftsinmodesoftransport(e.g.towardsride-hailing,car-sharing,micromobility),aswellasinvestmentsinupgradestocitydesign(e.g.cyclinglanes).Manypastanalyseshaveidentifiedlargeopportunitiesalongeachofthesedimensions,manyofwhichareinprincipleavailableatlowornegativecost,andmostofwhichcanbeachievedwithtechnologyalreadyavailable.InitsNetZeroby2050report,theIEAestimatedthat25%oftheCO2reductionsattainableby2030–amountingto5GtCO2/year–couldcomefromeitherenergyefficiencyimprovementsorbehaviourchange,withafurther8GtCO2/yearreductionpossibleinthesubsequent20years(Exhibit29).Additionally,theIRP(2018)reportTheWeightofCitieshighlightedtheemissionssavingspotentialthroughredesigninginfrastructureincities,andthatthiscouldbeachievedwithlimitedinvestment,deliveredbycompactformswithhigherdensities,smallerscaleurbanblocksanddensestreetpatterns,andretrofittingbuildingstobemoreenergyefficient.7271SeeCOP26ProductEfficiencyCalltoAction.OverallsavingshavebeenscaleddowntoreflectareductionincoalinthepowersectorintheETC’sanalysis.72IRP(2018)TheWeightofCities:ResourceRequirementsofFutureUrbanization.Exhibit29Energy&resourceefficiencyGlobalCOemissionsreductionsvsBAUscenario,20302.9GtCO₂FeasibilitySmalladditiontoconstructioncostCostsaving,lowerenergybillsExistingtechnology✓✓✓Covid-ledchangeIntravelpatterns(remotework)ESGpressureoncorporates✓✓Inlinewithexistingtrends(e.g.flightshaming)Covid-ledchangeintravelpatterns✓✓IncreasedESGpressuresoncorporatesCostsavingExistingpotentialhasstruggledtoberealised✓✓•Localinitiativesandtargets,digitaltechnologyenablers,efficiencysavingsHighCapexcostforretrofits–maynotberepaidduringlifetime✓•Mindsetshifts,cityinfrastructureupgrades•2.5GtCO₂Buildingefficiency(New)andappliancestandardsBuildingefficiency(Existing)Modalshift(cycling,eco-driving,noICEincities)Reducedbusinesstravel¹Airtravel-Changingconsumerattitudes²EnergyproductivityinIndustry0123451.40.70.20.50.20.150.050.90.9SomelikelyoverlapwithexistingNDCcommitmentsNOTE:¹Reducingbusinessclassflightsby50%²5%reductionofairtravel.SOURCE:ClimateActionTrackerresearch,IEA(2021)NetZeroby2050:ARoadmapfortheGlobalEnergySector,SYSTEMIQanalysisfortheEnergyTransitionsCommission(2021).GtCO,Global,annual?OverlapwithNDCsTotaladditionalpotentialNDCoverlapassessment:Moderate(~10-15%scaledown)Shaded/green–higherfeasibilityUnshaded/yellow–lowerfeasibilityEnergyandresourceefficiency:2030emissionsreductionscopeandfeasibilityKeeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s52However,recentimprovementsinenergyproductivityhavebeendisappointing,withannualimprovementratesofonly1.5%in2018and1.6%in2019,fallingtojust0.8%in2020,aslowenergyprices,inducedbytheCOVID-19crisis,dilutedincentivestoreduceenergyuse.73Thisdisappointingperformancereflectstheinherentnatureofmanyenergyandresourceefficiencyopportunities.Somedependonactionswithlargeleadtimesbeforefullresults,suchasbettercitydesign.Manydependonactionbyalargenumberofdiverseproducersandconsumers,makingitmoredifficulttodesignspecificpoliciesandprojectswhichcandriverapidprogressinthewaythatispossibleinthepowersystemorroadtransport.Andinsomeareas–forexampletherenovationofexistingbuildings-rapidactionwillonlyoccurifgovernmentssetclearrequirementsandrenovationstandards.Finally,behaviourchangeoftenonlyoccursafterslowlygrowingshiftsinconsumerperception,withpoliticalresistancetodrivingrapidandenforcedchange.Moreover,strongactiononallaspectsofenergyproductivityduringthe2020sisessentialtodrivemorerapidreductionsinthe2030sand2040s.Givingthiscomplexity,ourscenarioassumesthatalowerproportionofthetechnicallyfeasibleopportunityforenergyproductivityimprovementcanberealisedthanintheotherfivecategories(Exhibit29).Butoutof5GtCO2/yearoftechnicallyfeasibleprogress(broadlyinlinewiththeIEA’sNetZeropathway),anestimated2.9GtCO2/yearcouldbeseized,ifCOP26wasthelaunchingpadformultipleinitiativesagreedbyleadingnational,localandcitygovernmentsandbyleadingcompanieswhocanplayamajorroleindrivingincreasedrecycling(Exhibit30).TheoverlapbetweenactionsandcurrentNDCsisassessedas“moderate”.Althoughmanycountriesidentifyimprovedenergyefficiencyforbuildingsasakeyaction,only25%focusonopportunitiesinindustry,withpoliciestoimprovematerialcircularityoftenvagueandunambitious.74Actionstoinducechangesinbehaviourthatcouldimproveenergyefficiencyarelessfrequent,andlackinginspecificity.Accountingforthis“moderate”overlap,theadditionalpotentialwouldbe2.5GtCO2/year.73IEA(2020)EnergyEfficiency2020.74UNFCCC(Feb2021)NationallyDeterminedContributionsundertheParisAgreement:SynthesisreportbytheSecretariat.Exhibit30Globalcommitmentstoadoptbest-in-classbuilding&applianceefficiency(e.g.viaC40Net-ZeroBuildingsDeclaration,C40ConstructionDeclaration,SuperEfficientEquipment&ApplianceDeployment,PECA,KigaliCoolingEfficiencyProgramme)andfiscalsupportforretrofitsDeveloped,developingcountryandcitygovernmentsCommitmentstoincreasetaxationofbusinessclassflightsandshort-haulflightsandcommitmentstoreducingflyingDevelopedanddevelopingcountrygovernmentsTech,finance,consultingSeparatecollectionofwasteandrecyclablesandrecycling/collectiontargets,commitmentstorepair,lightweightingtargets,supplychaintransparencyDeveloped,developingcountryandcitygovernmentsEnergy-intensiveindustryCommitmentsfrommajorcitiestodevelopnetzeromobilityplans,decreasingtheneedforindividualroadtransport(e.g.viaCitiesRacetoZero,C40GreenandHealthyStreetsDeclaration)Citygovernments●EnergyandresourceefficiencySupportingactionsatinternational,nationalandcompanylevelinthe2020sPrimaryactorsTargetoutcomesfromCOP262030objectivesAstrongagreementtomakeenergyandresourceefficiencyimprovementskeyfeaturesoffutureNDCs,supportedbyadoptionofbest-in-classbuildingstandardsandproductefficiencies(e.g.viatheProductEfficiencyCalltoAction).15%+reductioninbuildingemissionsfromnon-heatingefficiency(implyingadoublingoftheefficiencyofairconditioning,lightingandappliancesinkeycountriesandacommitmenttozero-emissionsinnewbuildsfrom2021inOECDandfrom2025innon-OECD)5%+reductionintransportemissionsfromadditionalefficiencyandreducedconsumption(including20%reductionintotalaviationemissions),drivenbymodalshiftawayfromcarsinurbancentres,reducedbusinessairtravelandlowerairtraveldemandgrowth10%+reductioninindustryemissionsfromefficiencyandreducedconsumption,drivenbyimprovementsacrossenergy,material,andserviceefficiency•••••••••••••2.9GtCOTotalfeasiblepotentialby2030~10-15%%NDCsscaledownofsector2.5GtCOAdditionalfeasiblepotentialby2030beyondNDCsKeeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s53Addingitup–Canweclosethegap?Chapter5Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s54Thesixactionsidentifiedinthisreportcouldinprinciplecloseover90%ofthegapbetweentheemissionspathwayimpliedbythelatestNDCsandwhatisrequiredfortheworldtobeonapathtolimitglobalwarmingto1.5°Cby2030.Exhibits31and32showourestimateofpotentialreductionswiththefiguresadjustedtoremoveestimatedoverlapwithNDCs.•Feasiblemethaneemissioncutsof130MtCH4peryearbeyondcurrentNDCscoulddeliverthecarbonequivalentofbetween3.5GtCO2(100-yearview)11GtCO2(20-yearview)ofemissionsreductionsby2030.•Endingdeforestation,beginningreforestation,improvingforestmanagementandagroforestry,anddeployingBiCRSandDACCScouldachievearound6.6GtCO2peryearby2030.•Commitmentstobuildnonewcoalpowerassetsandtobeginthephaseoutofexistingcoalgenerationcoulddeliver3.5GtCO2ofadditionalreduction.•Andacombinationofactionsinroadtransport,heavyindustry,shippingandaviation,andthroughtheaccelerationofenergyefficiencyandproductivityimprovements,coulddeliveranadditional7GtCO2ofreductions.Todifferentdegrees,theseactionscouldbethesubjectoffocused,practicalcollaborationsbetweengroupsofcountries,and/orcompanies-whichCOP26couldlaunch,orwheretheyexist,strengthen.Thebiggestuncertaintiesamongthesixcategoriesofactionidentifiedrelatetonature-basedsolutionsandtheretirementofexistingcoalassets–sincebothwilllikelyrequirefinancialcommitmentsbyrichdevelopedcountries(orcompanies)tosupportacceleratedactioninlowerincomedevelopingnations.Bycontrast,mostofactionsrequiredtoachievemethanereduction,roadtransportandenergyproductivity-basedemissionreductionsarepossibleatverylowornoadditionalcost,whileacceleratedactiontodecarboniseheavyindustry,shippingandaviationwillimposecostswhichcanbeeasilyabsorbedsincediffusedacrosstheglobaleconomy,verysmallrelativetoglobalGDP,andprimarilyeventuallybornebyrichcountryconsumers.ButnewcommitmentsandagreementsatCOP26wouldacceleratethatprogressyetfurther.Indeedrecenttechnologicalandcostreductionprogress,combinedwithcompanyandsectoralcommitmentsmakeitlikelythatinmanysectorsemissionsreductionswillprogressfasterthancurrentNDCsevenwithoutnewagreements.Moreoveracrossallsectorsoftheeconomy,thestrongerthereductioncommitmentsmade,andthemorethatcountriesworktogether,thefastertechnologicalprogress,economyofscaleandlearningcurveeffectswilldrivedownthecostofemissionreductions,insomecasestocostsbelowthatofthehighcarbonequivalent.Otheractionstofill(andgobeyond)theremainingemissionsgaparealsocertainlytechnicallyfeasible,andsomeofthesehavebeenidentifiedintheindividualsectionsofthisreport.However,theseactionshavebeenexcludedfromoursummarytotaleitherbecausetheyarelikelytoentailhighercost,orbecausethemultiplicityanddiversityofthedecisionmakersinvolvedmakesitmoredifficultforthemtobeprogressedbyagreementsbetweencoalitionsofleadingcountries,companiesandotheractors.FasterprogressontheseandotheropportunitieswillneedtobecoveredbyfurthertighteningofcountryNDCsinthefutureandencouragedbywide-rangingpolicyleverssuchascarbonpricing.Overall,theconclusionofthisreportisthattherearetechnicallyfeasibleandreasonablycost-effectiveactionswhichwouldgivetheworlda50%chanceoflimitingglobalwarmingto1.5°Cwhiledeliveringa90%chanceoflimitingwarmingto2°C.A1.5°Cpathwayisnotyetoutofreach:butwearerunningoutoftimetomakeitattainable.COP26mustcatalysetheactionsrequiredtoattainit.Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s55Exhibit31Exhibit32GlobalCHemissionsMtCH,Global,annualGtCOe,Global,annualBasedon20-yearGWP=8401002003004002019~3801871620~235NDCsFossilAg,WasteGap2030-1.5°CcompatibleHighlyfeasibleactionstoreducemethanecandeliveranadditional~130MtCH₄(3.5-11GtCO₂e)beyondcurrentNDCsin2030Keyactions~130MtCHSectorpotentialscaleddownbasedonlikelyoverlaptoavoiddoublecountingwithNDCs0102030402019NDCsFossilAg,WasteGap2030-1.5°CcompatibleSectorpotentialscaleddownbasedonlikelyoverlaptoavoiddoublecountingwithNDCs331.565020Keyactions~11GtCOeBasedon100-yearGWP=28010202019NDCsFossilAg,WasteGap2030-1.5°Ccompatible100.51.91.706.6Keyactions~3.5GtCOeNOTE:NDCemissionsreductionsarebasedonaverageofCAT“pledgesandtargets”pathwayadjustedforCH₄.1.5Ccompatiblelevelsin2030arebasedonIPCC1.5Cno/lowovershootscenariomedian.SOURCE:IPCC(2018),Globalwarmingof1.5°C.AnIPCCSpecialReport,ClimateActionTracker(CAT),SYSTEMIQanalysisfortheEnergyTransitionsCommission(2021).Highlyfeasibleactionstoreducecarbondioxidecandeliveranadditional~17GtCO₂reductionsbeyondcurrentNDCsin2030GlobalCO₂emissionsGtCO₂,Global,annual504030201002030-BAU>40AchievedbyNDCsNature-basedsolutions(includingcarbonremovals)PowerRoadSupplysidedecarbonisationinothersectorsEnergyandresourceefficiencyGap2030-1.5°Ccompatible(CATaverage)NOTE:2030BAUCO₂emissionsareestimatedbasedonCATCO₂e2030BAUaverage(53GtCO₂e)minuscurrentmethanelevelsinGWP=25terms(9.3GtCO₂e).NDCemissionsreductionsareestimatedbasedonaverageofCAT“pledgesandtargets”pathwayadjustedforCO₂.1.5°Cand2°Ccompatiblelevelsin2030arebasedonIPCC1.5°Cno/lowovershootscenarioranges.SOURCE:IPCC(2018),Globalwarmingof1.5°C.AnIPCCSpecialReport,ClimateActionTracker(CAT),SYSTEMIQanalysisfortheEnergyTransitionsCommission(2021).2019>252°C~19-241.5°C36.63.52.32.12.5~2Keyactions~17GtCO₂SectorpotentialscaleddownbasedonlikelyoverlaptoavoiddoublecountingwithNDCsEBIT=Energy,Buildings,TransportandIndustryKeyEBITactions~10GtCO₂Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s56Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s57Chapter6ActionsatandafterCOP26Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s58ByCOP26thesubmittedNDCsarelikelytofallwellshortofwhatisrequiredtoputtheworldona1.5°Ccompatiblepathway.Butthisreporthasidentifiedasuiteoftechnicallyandeconomicallyfeasibleactionswhichcouldbeimplementedduringthe2020stodeliversufficientreductionsby2030tomakea1.5°Climitstillattainable.Acomprehensivesummaryoftheseactionsispresentedinthetablesattheendofthissection.TheidealoutcomeofCOP26wouldthereforebeasetofcollaborationeffortsbetweenleadingcountries,companiesandotheractorswhich–buildingontheNDCs–wouldaccelerateactiontodeliverthesixcategoriesofadditionalreductions.Formanyoftheactionsidentifiedinthisreport,initiativesarealreadyunderway,drivenbytheCOP26PresidencyandtheHigh-LevelChampions(suchasinitiativesonphasingoutcoalinpowergeneration,nature-basedsolutionsandroadtransport)75.ImplementingtheseinitiativesisachallengingbutplausibleaimforCOP26andbeyond.Howeverevenifimplemented,thecurrentinitiativeswillnotbesufficienttoclosetheentiretyofthegapinthewaywhichExhibit32suggestsispossible.Buttheycouldcatalyseaprocesswhichcouldclosethegapoverthenextfewyears.Thisprocesscouldentail:•Gainingwidespreadagreementthatthesixcategoriesofactionidentifiedinthisreportareinprinciplefeasibleandeconomicallyaffordable,andthattheworldshouldseektoagreeactionprogrammesforeachcategoryassoonaspossible;•LaunchingprocessesatCOP26whichwilldrivefurtherprogressonthehighestpriorityactions,forinstancebygaininginternationalagreementtoestablishanindependentmonitoringandreportingprocessformethaneemissionsalongwithtargetsformethaneemissionsreduction;•GainingagreementtoahighlevelapproachwhichcouldensuretighteningoffutureNDCcommitments,reflectingprogressontheactionsandagreementsidentifiedinthisreport,whichwillbesubjecttotheUNFCCCstocktakein2023.KeyoutcomesatCOP26are:•Countryandcompanytocutglobalfossilmethaneemissionsby60%inthe2020s(buildingontheGlobalMethanePledge).•Countryandcompanycommitmentstocutnonfossilmethaneemissionsby30%inthe2020s,buildingontheGlobalMethanePledge.•Strongagreementonendingdeforestationanddrivingecosystemrestoration,supportedbyclearcommitmentsforinternationalclimatefinancefromdevelopednations.•Strongagreementbetweenmajorcountriestomovebeyondcoalinthe2020s,withclearcommitmentstononewcoal,anddevelopedcountrysupportforearlyexit.•Strongagreementtocommittoendingsalesoflight-dutyICEvehiclesby2035atthelatest,supportedbycleartargetsfromcountries,citiesandautomanufacturers.•Strongagreementbetweencountries,companiesandsectoralorganisationsforaccelerateddecarbonisationofthesteel,cement,aviationandshippingsectors.•StrongagreementtomakeenergyandresourceefficiencykeyfeaturesoffutureNDCs,supportedbyadoptionofbest-in-classbuildingstandards,productefficiencies.75Forexample,TheRacetoZerocampaigncommitsthosecompaniesthatsignup,acrossallsectors,tohalvingemissionsby2030andachievingnetzeroemissionsassoonaspossible-andby2050atthelatest.ThePoweringPastCoalAlliancesecurescommitmentstophaseoutexistingcoalpowerfromnationalgovernments,andsubnationalactors.Theactionsidentifiedherecanbedriveninpartthroughinitiativeslikethis.Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s59Keyactionsatinternational,nationalandcompanyleveltokeepParisAgreementaimsinreachAdditionalfeasiblepotentialby2030beyondNDCs6.6GtCONature-basedsolutionsCommitmentstostandardisedinternationalsatellitemonitoringprogrammesformethaneemissionsmeasurementClearandambitiouscommitmentsfromcompanies(e.g.goingbeyondOGCI’sgoalof20%reductionby2025)totakeactionsanddeploytechnologies(e.g.replacementofpumps,electricmotors,andotherdevices,installationofnewemissionscontroldevicessuchasvapourrecoveryunits,deployingleakdetectionandrepair)Individualactionencouragedbygovernmentandindustrypublicawarenesscampaignstoscaleadoptionofplant-richdietsCommitmenttodeveloplabellingforlow-methanemeat,milk,andrice,andworkwithvaluechaintosetlow-methanestandards,SupportfordevelopmentofalternativeproteinsIndustrycommitmentstoreducingfoodwastearisingonfarmsandintransit,e.g.viatechnologytoimprovesupplychaineffectivenessandprocurementstandardsInvestmentinwastewatertreatment,particularlyindevelopingcountriesenabledbydevelopmentfinanceInvestmentinwastecollection,includingseparatingorganicandnon-organicwastes,andrecyclablesCommitmenttophaseoutpolicysupportforintensivelivestockfarminganddistortingsubsidiesCommitmenttohaltdeforestation(esp.inBrazil,Indonesia,DRC),supportedbyfinancialsupportfromdevelopedcountries(e.g.viaGreenClimateFund,debtfornatureswaps,grants)Expansionofcarbonmarketmechanisms,includingVoluntary,non-Voluntary(e.g.EUETS,CORSIA)withfullaccountingofland-useemissionsandforhigh-quality,additionaloffsetsCommitmenttoeliminatingdistortingagriculturalsubsidies(e.g.soy,palm)andsupportforhigh-yieldcropsimprovingagriculturalproductivityCommitmentstoacceleratestandardsandguidelinesforCO2storagedevelopmentandappraisalprocess,sustainabilityofbiomassfeedstockPromotedietshift,“healthiercalories”,andreducedconsumptionparticularlyindevelopedcountriesCommitmentstodevelopdeforestation-freesupplychains,buildingonexistinginitiatives(e.g.FACTDialogue),andsupportedbyduediligencestandards,technologyadoptionforsupplychaintraceability,andindividualactionandpubliccampaignstoscaledeforestation-freeconsumptionIncreasereforestationvialeader-levelpledges,buildingoninitiatives(e.g.REDD+,BonnChallenge),inlinewithhighintegritystandards(e.g.IUCN)Strongnationalregulations,startinginthetopemittingcountries,specifyingmaximumacceptableleakrates(wellbelow1%)andapplyinglargefinesforexcessleaksDemand-sidepressurefromlargebloc-buyerssettingmaximumacceptableleakratesCertificationschemeswhichcanenablecustomerstoassessthefullclimateimpactofoilorgasconsumption(e.g.MIQ)ClearcommitmentsbythefinancialsectortoceasefundingoilandgascompanieswhichfailtomeetappropriatemethanereductionstandardsAcceleratingreductionsfrommethane-Fossilsector71MtCHAcceleratingreductionsfrommethane-AgricultureandWastesector62MtCHKeeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s60DecarbonisingthepowersectorEnergyandresourceefficiencyDecarbonisingroadtransportSupply-sidedecarbonisationinothersectorsGlobalcommitmentstoadoptbest-in-classbuilding&applianceefficiency(e.g.viaC40Net-ZeroBuildingsDeclaration,C40ConstructionDeclaration,SuperEfficientEquipment&ApplianceDeployment,PECA,KigaliCoolingEfficiencyProgramme)andfiscalsupportforretrofitsCommitmentsfrommajorcitiestodevelopnetzeromobilityplans,decreasingtheneedforindividualroadtransport(e.g.viaCitiesRacetoZero,C40GreenandHealthyStreetsDeclaration)Commitmentstoincreasetaxationofbusinessclassflightsandshort-haulflightsandcommitmentstoreducingflyingSeparatecollectionofwasteandrecyclablesandrecycling/collectiontargets,commitmentstorepair,lightweightingtargets,supplychaintransparencyCommitmentsfrommajorcitiestodevelopnetzeromobilityplans,decreasingtheneedforindividualroadtransport(e.g.viaCitiesRacetoZero,C40GreenandHealthyStreetsDeclaration)Introducepolicysupporttoovercome“greencostpremiums”via:Light-dutyICEsalesbansby2035,andcommitmentsfrommajorautomakersfor100%zero-emissionvehiclesby2035Commitmentsto100%newEVpurchasesincorporateandmobilityfleetsby2030atthelatest(e.g.viaEV100)Commitmenttostringentfleet-widefuelefficiencystandardsforcars,vansandHGVsingCO2/kmfromthe2020sRemovesubsidiesforpetrolanddiesel,maintainorincreasetaxationonpetrolanddieseltocreateincentivesforheavy-dutytransitionCommitmentstoEVcharginginfrastructurerolloutwithclearinternationalstandards,alongsidepotentialroadtollsandfeesforICEvehicles,scrappageschemesforICEvehiclesBansandrestrictionsonuseofICElightdutyvehiclesinmajorcitiesaimingforcomprehensivebansinmostmajorcities(reinforcingandacceleratingtheCitiesRacetoZeroandtheC40GreenandHealthyStreetsDeclaration)StrengtheningofIMO2050targetfor50%reductiontonetzerowithstrong2030reductiontargetandsupportingpolicymeasures(e.gcarbonprice,zerocarbonfuelmandate)StrengtheningofICAO2050targetfor50%reductiontonetzerowithstrong2030reductiontargetandsupportingpolicymeasures(e.gcarbonprice,zerocarbonfuelmandate)National/regionalcommitmentsfrompublicandprivatestakeholderstodevelopgreenhydrogencapacity(e.gEUcommitmentto40GWby2030,GreenHydrogenCatapultobjectiveof25GWby2026),andregulationstoswitchexistinghydrogenusetocleanhydrogenCommitmentstophasingouttheuseofgasboilersinnewbuildsby2025,andtosupportheatpumpdeploymentandtechnologicaladvanceCommitmentto2030unabatedcoalphaseoutinOECD(e.g.viaPoweringPastCoalAlliance),alongsidesupportforJustTransitionstrategiesCommitmenttohaltnewcoalprojects(esp.inChinaandIndia)Targetedfinancialsupportfromdevelopedcountriesforearlycoalretirementindevelopingcountries(e.g.India),e.g.viacommitmentsfromGreenClimateFundand/orviaphilanthropic/privatesectorcapitalCommitmentstoincreasedcorporateprocurementofrenewables,viainitiativessuchasRE100,inadditiontogovernment-setquantitativetargetsforgrowthofzero-carbongenerationandreductionofgridcarbonintensity(gCO2/kWh)Immediatecommitmentsnottofinancenewcoalpowerplants,newcoalminesorcoalmineextensions,andtoceasefinancingcompaniesincoalminingduringthe2020sImmediateendtofossilfuelsubsidiesalongsideredistributivemeasuresIntroductionandextensionofcarbonpricing3.5GtCO2.3GtCO2.1GtCO2.5GtCOCarbonpricing,quantitativefuelmandatesandcontractsfordifferencePublicprocurement(orvoluntary/encouragedprivateprocurement)ofdecarbonisedmaterials(e.gbuildingonCleanEnergyMinisterialIndustrialDeepDecarbonisationInitiativeRegulatedproductstandards–carbonemissionsintensityofmaterials(e.g.steelorcement),orlifecycleemissionsstandardsonend-products(e.g.auto,whitegoods)tocreatemarketsfordecarbonisedmaterials•••Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s61AcknowledgementsTheteamthatdevelopedthisreportcomprised:LordAdairTurner(Chair),FaustineDelasalle(Director),ItaKettleborough(Deputy-Director),MikeHemsley(HeadofAnalysis),ElenaPravettoni(Leadauthor),SannaO’Connor-Morberg,SerenaHo,TommasoMazzanti,HettieMorrison,CarolineRandle,AlasdairGraham,ScarlettBenson,JuliaOkatz,MarkMeldrum,JuliaTurner,RobCampbell-Davis,KashBurchett,AndreasWagner,CarlosAgnes,MaximilianHeld,RafalMalinowski,MichaelKast,John-HenryCharles,MarcovanVeen,LiesbethHuisman(SYSTEMIQ).TheteamwouldalsoliketothanktheETCmembersandexpertsfortheiractiveparticipation:RajitNanda(ACWAPower);ElkePfeiffer(Allianz);JavierBonaplata,NicolaDavidson(ArcelorMittal);AbydKarmali(BankofAmerica);PaulBodnar(Blackrock);WilliamZimmern(BP);JeanneNg(CLP);RobKelly(ClimateworksAustralia);DanaBarsky(CreditSuisse);BinLyu(DevelopmentResearchCenteroftheStateCouncil);TanishaBeebee(DRAX);AdilHanif(EBRD);MichaelDing(Envision);RebeccaCollyer,PeteHarrison,JohnLucas,ClaireMuurmans,PhillipNiessen(EuropeanClimateFoundation);PatrickCurran(GranthamInstitute,LondonSchoolofEconomics);MattGorman(HeathrowAirport);AndreaGriffin,AbhishekJoseph(HSBC);FranciscoLaveran(Iberdrola);ChrisDodwell(ImpaxAssetManagement);YananFu(InstituteofClimateChangeandSustainableDevelopment,TsinghuaUniversity);BenMurphy(IPGroup),ChristopherKaminker(LombardOdier);CharlesLiang,JinpengMa(LONGiSolar);BenAbraham(ModernEnergy);MattHinde(NationalGrid);EmilDamgaardGann(Ørsted);AditiGarg(ReNewPower);XavierChalbot,JonathanGrant(RioTinto);ElizabethHartman(RMI);CharlotteBrookes,MallikaIshwaran(RoyalDutchShell);EmmanuelNormant(SaintGobain);EmmanuelleSimonet,VincentMinier,VincentPetit(SchneiderElectric);ElhamAli,TraceyCrowe,BrianDean(SE4All);CamillaPalladino(SNAM);JesperKansbod,MartinPei(SSAB);MattBeasley(SiliconRanch);AlistairMcGirr(SSE);AbhishekGoyal(TataGroup);MadhulikaSharma(TataSteel);AKSaxena(TERI);ReidDetchon(UnitedNationsFoundation);MikaelNordlander(Vattenfall);RowanDouglas(WillisTowersWatson);JohanEngebratt,NiklasGustafsson(VolvoGroup);RasmusValanko(WeMeanBusiness);JenniferLayke,TarynFransen,RichardWaite,KatieLebling,FredStolle(WorldResourcesInstitute),MarkTrueman(Worley).TheteamwouldalsoliketothanktheETC’sbroadernetworkofexpertsfortheirinput:BCG,BEIS(JamesFoster,StephenDevlin,CarolinaSalvaterra,SamKarslake),ClimateActionTracker(ClaireStockwell,MatthewGidden,ClaireFyson),COP26HighLevelChampions,theCOP26StrategyUnit,DEFRA(RuthDavis,CatrionaMoss,FelicityMcCourt,AlfredCasson),E3G(NickMabey,LarissaGross,LeoRoberts,ChrisLittlecott,ChrisRadojewski,CamillaFenning),ECIURichardBlack),GranthamInstitute(NickStern),Greenpeace(JenniferMorgan),GSCC(RiaVoorhaar,EdKing,TomBrookes),SYSTEMIQ(JanezPotocnik,JeremyOppenheim,GuidoSchmidt-Traub,IrenaSpazzapan,BenDixon,MortenRosse),UCL(SimonLewis),WRI(GrahamWynne),WWF(ManuelPulgar-Vidal,DeanCooper).Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s62Keeping1.5°CAlive–ClosingtheGapinthe2020s63