IMF-公众对减缓气候变化政策的支持：一项跨国调查（英）-2023.10-49页VIP专享VIP免费

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2023

OCT

Public Support for

Climate Change Mitigation

Policies

A Cross-Country Survey

Era Dabla-Norris, Salma Khalid, Giacomo Magistretti, and

Alexandre Sollaci

WP/23/223

IMF Working Papers describe research in

progress by the author(s) and are published to

elicit comments and to encourage debate.

The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are

those of the author(s) and do not necessarily

represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board,

or IMF management.

* We are grateful to Thomas Helbling and Krishna Srinivasan for their support in running the survey that led to this project, and to

Hibah Khan for assistance with the questionnaire design and initial data analysis. We also thank seminar participants at the IDB and

IMF, and participants in the launch event for “Public Perceptions of Climate Mitigation Policies: Evidence from Cross-Country

Surveys” for helpful comments and suggestions. The views expressed in paper are solely those of the author(s) and do not

necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.

IMF Working Paper

Fiscal Affairs Department

Public Support for Climate Change Mitigation Policies: A Cross-Country Survey

Prepared by Era Dabla-Norris, Salma Khalid, Giacomo Magistretti, and Alexandre Sollaci *

Authorized for distribution by Era Dabla-Norris

August 2023

IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit

comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.

ABSTRACT: Building public support for climate mitigation is a key prerequisite to making meaningful

strides toward decarbonization and achieving net-zero emissions. Using nationally representative,

individual-level surveys for 28 countries, this paper identifies the current levels and drivers of support for

climate mitigation policies. Controlling for individual characteristics, we find that pre-existing beliefs about

policy efficacy, perceived costs and co-benefits (e.g., cleaner air), and the degree of policy progressivity

are important drivers of support for carbon pricing policies. The knowledge gap about climate mitigation

policies can be large, but randomized information experiments show that support increases (decreases)

after individuals are introduced to new information on the benefits (potential costs) of such policies.

RECOMMENDED CITATION: Dabla-Norris, Era, Salma Khalid, Giacomo Magistretti, and Alexandre Sollaci.

2023. “Public Support for Climate Change Mitigation Policies: A Cross-Country Survey.” IMF Working Paper

23/223, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.

JEL Classification Numbers: Q54, Q58, C83, C90

Keywords: Climate mitigation policies; survey; experiments

Author’s E-Mail Address: edablanorris@imf.org; skhalid@imf.org; gmagistretti@imf.org;

abalduinosollaci@imf.org.

WORKING PAPERS

Public Support for Climate Change

Mitigation Policies

A Cross-Country Survey

Prepared by Era Dabla-Norris, Salma Khalid, Giacomo Magistretti, and

Alexandre Sollaci1

1 We are grateful to Thomas Helbling and Krishna Srinivasan for their support in running the survey that led to this project, and to

Hibah Khan for assistance with the questionnaire design and initial data analysis. We also thank seminar participants at the IDB and

IMF, and participants in the launch event for “Public Perceptions of Climate Mitigation Policies: Evidence from Cross-Country

Surveys” for helpful comments and suggestions. The views expressed in paper are solely those of the author(s) and do not

necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.

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PublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPoliciesACross-CountrySurveyEraDabla-Norris,SalmaKhalid,GiacomoMagistretti,andAlexandreSollaciWP/23/223IMFWorkingPapersdescriberesearchinprogressbytheauthor(s)andarepublishedtoelicitcommentsandtoencouragedebate.TheviewsexpressedinIMFWorkingPapersarethoseoftheauthor(s)anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement.2023OCT©2023InternationalMonetaryFundWP/23/223IMFWorkingPaperFiscalAffairsDepartmentPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPolicies:ACross-CountrySurveyPreparedbyEraDabla-Norris,SalmaKhalid,GiacomoMagistretti,andAlexandreSollaciAuthorizedfordistributionbyEraDabla-NorrisAugust2023IMFWorkingPapersdescriberesearchinprogressbytheauthor(s)andarepublishedtoelicitcommentsandtoencouragedebate.TheviewsexpressedinIMFWorkingPapersarethoseoftheauthor(s)anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement.ABSTRACT:Buildingpublicsupportforclimatemitigationisakeyprerequisitetomakingmeaningfulstridestowarddecarbonizationandachievingnet-zeroemissions.Usingnationallyrepresentative,individual-levelsurveysfor28countries,thispaperidentifiesthecurrentlevelsanddriversofsupportforclimatemitigationpolicies.Controllingforindividualcharacteristics,wefindthatpre-existingbeliefsaboutpolicyefficacy,perceivedcostsandco-benefits(e.g.,cleanerair),andthedegreeofpolicyprogressivityareimportantdriversofsupportforcarbonpricingpolicies.Theknowledgegapaboutclimatemitigationpoliciescanbelarge,butrandomizedinformationexperimentsshowthatsupportincreases(decreases)afterindividualsareintroducedtonewinformationonthebenefits(potentialcosts)ofsuchpolicies.RECOMMENDEDCITATION:Dabla-Norris,Era,SalmaKhalid,GiacomoMagistretti,andAlexandreSollaci.2023.“PublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPolicies:ACross-CountrySurvey.”IMFWorkingPaper23/223,InternationalMonetaryFund,Washington,DC.JELClassificationNumbers:Q54,Q58,C83,C90Keywords:Author’sE-MailAddress:Climatemitigationpolicies;survey;experimentsedablanorris@imf.org;skhalid@imf.org;gmagistretti@imf.org;abalduinosollaci@imf.org.WearegratefultoThomasHelblingandKrishnaSrinivasanfortheirsupportinrunningthesurveythatledtothisproject,andtoHibahKhanforassistancewiththequestionnairedesignandinitialdataanalysis.WealsothankseminarparticipantsattheIDBandIMF,andparticipantsinthelauncheventfor“PublicPerceptionsofClimateMitigationPolicies:EvidencefromCross-CountrySurveys”forhelpfulcommentsandsuggestions.Theviewsexpressedinpaperaresolelythoseoftheauthor(s)anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement.WORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPoliciesACross-CountrySurveyPreparedbyEraDabla-Norris,SalmaKhalid,GiacomoMagistretti,andAlexandreSollaci11WearegratefultoThomasHelblingandKrishnaSrinivasanfortheirsupportinrunningthesurveythatledtothisproject,andtoHibahKhanforassistancewiththequestionnairedesignandinitialdataanalysis.WealsothankseminarparticipantsattheIDBandIMF,andparticipantsinthelauncheventfor“PublicPerceptionsofClimateMitigationPolicies:EvidencefromCross-CountrySurveys”forhelpfulcommentsandsuggestions.Theviewsexpressedinpaperaresolelythoseoftheauthor(s)anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement.1IMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPoliciesContentsIntroduction.........................................................................................................................................................3RelatedLiterature...........................................................................................................................................4TheSurvey...........................................................................................................................................................5DescriptiveStatistics..........................................................................................................................................8TextAnalysis..................................................................................................................................................9DriversofSupportforClimateMitigatingPolicies........................................................................................11EmpiricalMethodology.................................................................................................................................11PerceptionsofClimateChange....................................................................................................................12PerceptionsofClimatePolicies....................................................................................................................13SupportforOtherClimatePolicies...............................................................................................................18InformationExperiments..................................................................................................................................20ClimateAction:CommunityandGlobalSupport...........................................................................................22CarbonPricingandInternationalAction.......................................................................................................22Conclusion........................................................................................................................................................24References.........................................................................................................................................................26AnnexA.Tables................................................................................................................................................29AnnexB.AdditionalFigures............................................................................................................................33AnnexC.TextAnalysis....................................................................................................................................34AnnexD.SampleQuestionnaire......................................................................................................................36IMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPoliciesIntroductionTacklingclimatechangeisanurgentandfundamentalchallenge.Whileprogresshasbeenmadeintermsofpolicycommitments,ambitionsandimplementationstilllagwellbehindwhatisneededtoreducinggreenhousegasemissionsandachieving2015Paristemperaturegoals.Garneringpublicbuy-inforclimatepoliciesiscriticaltodecarbonizationandachievingnetzero.Afirststepinthisdirectionistounderstandpublicviewsonclimatechange,whatdrivessupportformitigationpolicies,andwhatmightincreasepolicysupport.Withthisgoalinmind,weconductlarge-scalesurveysacross28advancedandemergingmarketeconomiestoexaminehowindividualcharacteristicsandbeliefsshapeclimateriskperceptionsandpreferencesforclimatepolicies.Whileweconsiderdifferentclimatemitigationpolicies,wefocusonsupportforcarbonpricing.Carbonpricingiswidelyacceptedasthemosteffectivepolicyforcurbingemissions(seeParry,2019),andithasbeenshowntowork(Martinetal.,2014,Andersson,2019,andAbrelletal.,2022),butpoliticalacceptabilityofsuchpoliciesisoftenlow.Inthispaper,wedocumentthesurveyfindings;policyimplicationsareprominentlydiscussedinDabla-Norrisetal.(2023).Thelarge-scalesurveyscollectcomprehensiveinformationondemographiccharacteristicsofrespondents,climateriskperceptions,viewsonspecificpolicies,andopinionsaboutinternationalburdensharingofthecostsofclimatemitigationpolicies.Informationexperimentsshedlightonwhattypeofinformationcanshiftviewsonclimatepolicies.ThesurveyswereconductedbetweenJulyandAugustof2022,atimewhenhighenergypricesandtheircost-of-livingimpactswereparticularlysalientforthepublic.Weseethistimingasapositivefeatureofthestudy,asrespondentsweremorelikelytohaveamoreinformedviewaboutsomeofthe(short-term)costsofclimatemitigationpolicies,makingtheresultsmoremeaningfulforpolicymaking.Acrosscountries,mostpeoplesurveyedwereconcernedaboutclimatechange,withahighershareinemergingmarketeconomiesalreadyfeelingitseffectscomparedwithadvancedeconomies.Onaverage,concernforclimatechangeismoreprevalentamongwomen,theeducated,andthosewithapositiveviewaboutgovernmentregulationoftheeconomy(aproxyforpoliticalstance).Respondentsthatreportfollowingthenewsarealsomorelikelytobeconcernedaboutclimatechange,especiallythosethatfollowtraditional(i.e.,notonline)sources.However,wealsouncoversubstantialcountry-levelheterogeneityacrossalldemographicfeatures.Infact,theimpactofdemographiccharacteristicsonclimateriskperceptionsinvariablyrangefrompositivetonegativedependingonthecountryanalyzed.However,concernalonedoesnottranslateintoacross-the-boardsupportforpolicies.Textanalysisofanopen-endedquestiononwhatrespondentsthinkagoodclimatepolicyshouldachieverevealsthatclimategoals(e.g.,reducingemissions)areoftenconflatedwithotherenvironmentalobjectives,suchasdecreasingpollutionorcleaningoceansandrivers.Policyattributesandknowledgeaboutpolicyimpactsmatter,particularlyforacceptabilityofcarbonpricing.Specifically,wefindthat,alongwithclimateriskperceptions,threekeypolicyattributesaremajorpredictorsofwhetherpeoplesupportcarbonpricing:(1)IMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPoliciesperceivedeffectivenessinreducingemissions,(2)perceivedfairnessordistributionalburden,and(3)perceivedco-benefitsintermsofimprovedairquality,healthoutcomes,andnewjobs.Informationexperimentssuggestthatprovidingindividualswithmoreinformationaboutthecostsandbenefitsofspecificpoliciescanhelpbridgeinformationgapsandshiftrespondents’opinions.Indeed,wefindthatincreasingthesalienceofcost-of-livingimpactsofcarbonpricingpolicieslowerssupportforcarbonpricing,whileprovidinginformationonpolicyeffectivenessandrevenuerecyclingopportunitiescanenhancesupport.Supportforthemostpopularpolicymeasure—subsidiesforrenewableenergyandlowcarbontechnologies—isalsoattenuatedwhenrespondentsareinformedaboutpotentialincreasesintaxesorcutinotherspendingwhichmaybenecessarytofinancethesesubsidies.Thesurveysalsorevealstrongpreferencesforredistribution.Respondentsindicatedincreasedsupportforcarbonpricingifrevenuesareredistributedtolow-incomehouseholds,usedtoincreasesocialspendingonhealthcareandeducation,orearmarkedtofundgreeninfrastructureandlow-carbontechnologies.However,thereissubstantialheterogeneityacrossindividualsinpreferencesforrevenuerecycling.Respondentswithhighereducationalattainment,thoseindicatingahighleveloftrustinothers,andthosesupportingaroleforgovernmentinterventionintheeconomyareallmorelikelytofavorrevenuerecycling.Finally,giventhatclimatechangemitigationisapublicgood,weexaminehowrespondentsviewtheircommunity’swillingnesstoacttocounteractglobalwarmingversustheirown.Concernaboutclimatechangeisthebiggestdriverofwillingnesstochangeindividualbehavior,followedbysupportforclimatepolicies.Wealsofindthatfemale,moreeducated,andolderrespondentsaremorewillingtochangetheirownbehavior,whilebeingskepticalabouttheircommunity.Incontrast,respondentsthathavechildrenandthosethatexpressahighdegreeoftrustinothershavemorepositiveviewsontheircommunity’scommitmenttochangebehavior.Attheinternationallevel,mostpeopleinoursurveybelievethatclimatechangepolicywillonlybeeffectiveifmostcountriesadoptmeasurestoreducecarbonemissions.Interestingly,themajorityofrespondentsinbothadvancedandemergingmarketeconomiesthinkthatallcountries,notonlyrichones,shouldpaytoaddressclimatechange.Furthermore,theytendtoagreethatburdensharingshouldbebasedoncurrentratherthanhistoricalemissions,thoughtheseviewsaremorepronouncedinadvancedeconomies.RelatedLiteratureAgrowingnumberofstudieshaveexaminedattitudesaboutclimatechange,howclimatepoliciesareperceived,andwhatdeterminestheirsupport(Bergquistetal.,2022;Bumann,2021;DrewsandvandenBergh,2016;andFairbrother,2022provideextensivereviews).Individualbeliefsandconcernsaboutclimatechange,socioeconomiccharacteristics,andeconomicandpoliticalideologyshapepolicysupport.Studieshavealsoexaminedthedriversofindividualwillingnesstoadoptclimate-friendlybehaviorsandtheimportanceofsocialnorms(Andreetal.,2021;Carattinietal.,2019).Sparkman(2022)showsthatpeopleoftenmisperceivenationalconcernaboutclimatechangeandsupportformitigatingpoliciesinaIMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPoliciesrepresentativesampleofU.S.adults.Bechteletal.(2019)andBechteletal.(2021)showthatsupportforclimatepoliciesdependsoninternationalcoordination.Weconfirmmanyofthesefindingsforalargesampleofadvancedandemergingmarketeconomies.Ourpaperisalsorelatedtoalargeliteraturethathasexaminedattitudestowardscarbontaxation(BranziniandCaratini,2017;Carattinietal.,2018;Carattinietal.,2017;IMF,2019;andKlenertetal.,2018providecomprehensivereviews).Ingeneral,studieshighlightdistributionalandeffectivenessconcernsaskeydriversofsupport,includinginindividualcountries(seeamongothers,Sommeretal.,2022forGermany;DouenneandFabre,2022;forFrance).Anumberofpapersshowthatprovidinginformationcanimprovesupportforcarbonpricing.UsingsurveydatafromCanadaandSwitzerland,Mildenbergeretal.(2022)showthatprovidinginformationontherebatefromcarbontaxrevenuesinCanadaandSwitzerlandreducesmisperceptionsandincreasesacceptability.Maestre-Andrésetal.(2021)findthatprovidinginformationonthewaycarbontaxationworksimprovessupportinSpain,butpolicyacceptabilityismorestronglyrelatedtoperceivedfairnessthantoperceivedeffectiveness.Feldhausetal.(2022)studytheroleofinformationprovisiononclimatepolicyco-benefits—asmeasuredthroughanincentivizeddonationdecision—onalargerepresentativesampleofGermanadults.Theyshowthatco-benefitshaveapositiveimpactoncontributionsforclimateprotection,withcontributionsdependingonindividualpreferences.Moststudiesonattitudestowardclimatepoliciesandinformationprovisionfocusonasinglecountryorasubsetofadvancedeconomies,butcomparativecross-countrysurveysondriversofsupportfordifferentclimatepolicies,especiallyinemergingmarketeconomies,arerelativelyscarce.1Inthisrespect,ourworkiscloselyrelatedtoarecentstudybyDechezleprêtreetal.(2022)thatusessurveyquestionsandinformationexperimentstoelicitpolicyviewsonarangeofmeasuresanddeterminetheimpactofindividualcharacteristicsandbeliefsonpolicypreferencesacross20countriesbetweenMarch2021andMarch2022.Whileoursurveyscoveranarrowerrangeofpolicies,oursampleincludesalargernumberofemergingmarketeconomies,particularlythosehighlyexposedtoclimatechange.Wealsomeasuresupportforclimatepolicieswhenhighenergypricesareparticularlysalientforthepublic.Thiselicitsmoreinformedresponsesabouttheactualcosts(forexample,lossofpurchasingpower)ofcarbonpricingpolicies.Theremainderofthepaperisarrangedasfollows:thenexttwosectionspresentdetailsaboutthesurveyinstrumentandoursample,anddescriptivestatistics.Wethenoutlinetheempiricalapproachandpresentourmainresults.Thefinalsectionpresentsourconclusions.TheSurveyOursurveycollectsdataonindividualsacross28countries,withover1,000respondentsinterviewedineachcountry(seeAnnexAforthefullcountrylist).Respondentswereatleast18yearsoldanddrawn1Afewrecentstudieshavefocusedoncross-countrycomparisons,usingvariousmethodologies,rangingfromthecollectionofvoluntaryresponsesthroughagame(UNDP,2021),publicopinionpolls(Pew,2015;Pew,2021),andsurveysrunthroughFacebook(Leiserowitzetal.,2021).IMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPoliciesfromapoolofpre-profiledpanelistsbyYouGov,agloballeaderindataanalytics.InterviewswereconductedonlinebetweenJuly5andAugust11,2022,andallsurveyswereadministeredinthelocallanguage.Standardprocedurestoensuredataqualityandintegritywereapplied,includingtestingthequestionnaireonasmallnumberofparticipantsinpilotcountriesbeforeitwasrolledout.2ThesurveyparticipantsfortheanalysiswereselectedbyYouGovtoensurethenationalrepresentativenessofthesamplebasedonahostofdifferentdemographicandsocioeconomiccharacteristics.Respondentsweretheninvitedviaemail.Toensurethatonlythoseselectedforthesurveycouldparticipate,participantswereaskedtoentertheirusernamesandpasswordsbeforeansweringthequestionnaire.Furthermore,eachrespondentcouldtakethesurveyonlyonce.Tolimitcognitivefatigue,thequestionnairewasadministeredindividuallyandonlyincludedquestionsrelatedtothestudywereincluded.Countriesinthesurveywereselectedtorepresentdifferencesinsocialnorms,institutions,andeconomiccontext.Weinclude20outofthetop-25largestemittersofcarbondioxideintheplanet(OurWorldinData,2020statistics),aswellas9outofthe25countriesmostexposedtoclimatechange(IMFClimate-DrivenInformRiskIndicator,Climate-DrivenHazardandExposurecomponent,2022).Onepotentialdrawbackofourdata,however,isthattheonlinenatureofthesurveysrendersthemlessrepresentativealongrural-urban,education,andincomelinesinmanyemergingmarketcountries(seeAnnexAforatableofrepresentativenessagainstpopulationstatistics).Asaresult,observationsareweightedsothataggregateresultsarerepresentativeofeachcountry’sage,gender,education,andregionalprofiles,aswellasthepopulation’semploymentandsocioeconomicstatus.Ourfour-partquestionnaire(Figure1andAnnexD)isdesignedtogatherinformationaboutrespondents’demographiccharacteristics,viewsonclimatechange,policypreferences,andopinionsoninternationalcooperation.Thefirstsectionofthesurveycollectssocioeconomicanddemographiccharacteristicsofrespondents,includingtheirage,gender,maritalstatus,householdsize,education,employmentstatus,income,sourceofnews,carownership,anduseofpublictransportation.Thissectionalsocollectsinformationonindividual’sbaselinetrustinotherpeopleandtheirgovernment,andtheirviewsontheroleofgovernmentineconomicregulation(aproxyforeconomicideology).3Thesecondsectioncollectsinformationonrespondents’concernsabouttheseriousnessofthethreatposedbyclimatechangeanditsurgency.Respondents’baselineawarenessofkeyclimatepoliciesisalsoassessed,aswellastheirknowledgeaboutclimatecommitmentsmadebytheirowngovernments.Next,weaskanopen-endedquestiononwhatrespondentsbelievethegoalofagoodclimatepolicyshouldbe.Thisquestionisdesignedtoelucidatewhatindividuals’specificgoalsare,andwhethertheyalignwithcurrentclimatemitigationpolicies.Thesectioncloseswithasetofquestionsthatassessthe2YouGovusesapanelmemberincentivizationprograminwhichpointsareaccumulatedandcanbeexchangedforcash.Surveystookonaverage10–12minutestocomplete.Samplingwithreplacementmitigatessurveynonresponsebiasinoursample,withsamplingweightsusedtomaintainrepresentativenesswithrespecttocensusinformation(orindustry-accepteddata,wherecensusdataareunavailable).3Right-leaningorientationhasbeenassociatedwithlowersupportforpubliclyfinancedclimatepolicies,particularlyintheUnitedStatesandUnitedKingdom(Ziegler,2017;Fairbrother,2022).IMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPoliciesbaselinesupportforcarbonpricing,aswellasrespondents’viewsregardingitsbenefits,costs,andincidenceacrossincomegroupsandbusinesses.Thethirdsectionintroducestheinformationandincidenceexperiments.Theinformationexperimentconsistsofproviding(randomlyselected)halfofrespondentswithashorttextthatexplainstheefficacyofcarbonpricinginreducingemissionsandcreatinginnovation-friendlyincentivesforbusinesses.Theotherhalfreceivesnoextrainformation.Wethenreassesssupportforacarbonpricingpolicytoevaluatehowthisinformationcanalterrespondents’policypreferences.Theincidenceexperimentfollowsthesamelogic,butguidesrespondentsthroughscenariosinvolvingthecostsofcarbonpricingpolicies.Forarandomlyselectedhalfofrespondents,thesecostsareframedaspersonal;fortheotherhalftheyareframedasgeneral/societal.Inthiscase,thereislimitedvariationintheaverageresponsesacrosstreatmentandcontrolgroupsandthereforetheresultsarenotpresentedindetailhere.Finally,thesectioncollectsinformationonredistributivepreferencesregardingrevenuerecyclingfromcarbonpricingandpreferencesforalternativeclimatepoliciessuchasregulationsandsubsidiesforlow-carbontechnologyandrenewables.Inthelastsectionofthesurvey,weassessrespondents’perceptionsofinternationalburdensharing.Thisincludesassessingwhetherparticipantsbelievethatallcountriesneedtoadoptclimatepoliciesforthemtobeeffective,andwhethercountrieshavedifferentburdensofresponsibilitybasedonpastorcurrentemissions.Finally,weaskcollectrespondents’viewsabouttheirownortheircommunity’swillingnesstoreduceenergyconsumptiontolimitclimatechange.Figure1summarizesthesurveystructure.Figure1.StructureoftheSurveyIMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPoliciesDescriptiveStatisticsAcrossallcountries,mostrespondentsseeclimatechangeasaconcern.ThisisshowninFigure2,whichplotstheshareofpopulationthatconsidersclimatechangetobeafairlyseriousorveryseriousproblem.EveninthecountriesliketheUSA,Norway,orSaudiArabia—whichdisplaysomeofthelowestriskperceptionsforclimatechange—around70percentofthepopulationstillconsidersittobeanissue.IncountrieslikethePhilippines,SouthKorea,orColombia,thissharehoversabove90percent.However,beliefsabouttheurgencyandimminenceofclimatechangegreatlyvaryacrosstheworld.Ahighershareofrespondentsindevelopingeconomiesbelieveclimatechangeisalreadyhappeningandispersonallyaffectingthemandtheirfamilies(Figure3).Forexample,over60percentofrespondentsinColombia,Mexico,andthePhilippines,countriesmorevulnerabletotheadverseeffectsofclimatechange,perceivethepersonaleffectsofclimatechangetobeimminent,comparedwithonly20percentintheNetherlandsorNorway.Knowledgeofclimatemitigationpoliciesvariesacrossregionsandcountries.Eventhough20outofthe28countriessurveyedhavecarbonpricingpoliciesinplace(Parryetal.,2022),fewerrespondentsexpresspriorknowledgeofacarbontaxoremissionstrading(cap-and-trade)systemcomparedtootherpoliciessuchaslawsandregulationstodrivedowntheenergyuseofbuildings,carsandappliancesandsubsidiestolow-carbontechnologyorrenewableenergy(Figure4).Figure2.ShareofRespondentsWhoThinkClimateChangeIsaSeriousProblemSource:IMFstaffcalculationsbasedonIMF-YouGovsurvey.Note:Thisfigureshowsthesharesofthosesurveyedineachcountrywhoresponded,“averyseriousproblem”or“fairlyseriousproblem”tothequestion“Inyourview,howseriousofaproblemisclimatechange?”IMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPoliciesFigure3.ImminenceofClimateChange(Percentofrespondents)AsiaPacificPhilippinesSingaporeKoreaMalaysiaJapanIndiaVietnamChinaIndonesiaThailandAustraliaAmericasColombiaMexicoBrazilCanadaArgentinaUSAMiddleEastEgyptSaudiArabiaEuropeItalyUKSpainGermanyFranceTürkiyePolandTheNetherlandsNorwayOtherpeopleRightnow89797575717074706968678681757574636754777574737368645955Next5to10years612171714211817222112101412101410182412713111620161718Over10yearsfromnow3444455104572355667966766791211Won'teveraffect11113111118113511025252411545YouoryourfamilyRightnow69424838364853525351356361524039395339433348364138412020Next5to10years22393744353232272933322729273334232430363432333944313836Over10yearsfromnow61010121310111587136610101412912101511141210122322Won'teveraffect222245124311114721359383723778Source:IMFstaffcalculationsbasedonIMF-YouGovsurvey.Note:Thisfigureshowsthedistributionpfresponsesineachcountytothequestions“Whichofthefollowingcomesclosesttoyourviewofhowclimatechangeisaffectingpeoplearoundtheworld?”(toppanel)and“Whichofthefollowingcomesclosesttoyourviewofhowclimatechangewillaffectyouoryourfamily?”(bottompanel).Figure4PriorKnowledgeofClimateMitigationPolicies(Percentofresponses.Multipleanswerspossible)AsiaPacificAustraliaChinaIndiaIndonesiaJapanMalaysiaPhilippinesSingaporeKoreaThailandVietnamAmericasArgentinaBrazilCanadaColombiaMexicoUSAMiddleEastEgyptSaudiArabiaEuropeFranceGermanyItalyTheNetherlandsNorwayPolandSpainTürkiyeUKCarbontax65342819343621635823291522702116451216612343263134382157Cap-and-tradeor45432621202727334030311634422218401317252516214144332436emissionstradingsystems70756168637070747158714863716461694350646465726263705776Lawandregulations76716255637066705967695661706264696866657174676376757579limitingcarbonemissionsSubsidizingrenewableenergysourcesSource:IMFstaffcalculationsbasedonIMF-YouGovsurvey.Note:Thisfigureshowsthedistributionofresponsesineachcountrytothequestion“Which,ifany,ofthefollowingwaysofreducingclimatechangehaveyoupreviouslyheardof?Pleaseselectallthatapply”.Bluedenoteshighervalues.TextAnalysisNext,weaskrespondentsanopenquestion:“Whatdoyouthinkagoodclimatepolicyshouldaimtoachieve?”Thisisdesignedtogatherbaselineinformationonindividualbeliefsaboutdesirablepolicyattributesandgoals,andwhetherthesegoalsarealignedwithexistingclimatechangemitigationpolicies.ResponsestothequestionsweretranslatedintoEnglish,andthetextisanalyzedforcommontrends.Figure5panel1showsawordcloudwiththemostcommonwordsusedacrossallanswers.Thesizeofeachwordisproportionaltothefrequencywithwhichitisused;forbettervisualization,thecolorofeachwordalsovarieswithitsfrequency,fromblue(mostfrequent),tored,togreen(leastfrequent).IMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPoliciesWefollowstandardpracticestoidentifythefrequencywordsintext,suchasremovingstopwords(e.g.,“and”and“the”)andtokenizingandlemmatizingwords(seeFerrarioandStancheva,2022).Wealsomanuallyequategroupsofwordsthathavethesamemeaninginourcontext,suchas“useless”and“reduceuse”(seeAnnexCfordetails).Next,eachwordisclassifiedintotheirgrammaticalfunction,andwelookatthemostcommoncombinationsofwordsinwhichaverbisfollowedbyanoun.Thegoalinthiscaseistoidentifyspecificactionsthatapolicyshouldtake,andwhatitshouldbeaimedat.ThoseresultsareshownintheformofaSankeychartFigure5(panel2).Inbothcases,aclearpreferenceforpoliciesthatreducegreenhousegasemissionsandpollutionemerges.Notsurprisingly,vehicleemissionsandenergyproductionreceiveparticularattention,astransportationandelectricpowersectorsarethetwolargestemittersandresponsibleforover50percentofGHGemissionsintheUnitedStatesalone.4However,Figure5alsorevealsapreferenceforothergoalsthatarenotnecessarilyrelatedtoclimatechange.Thisincludesenvironmentalconcernssuchasreducingtheuseofplasticandwaste,“increasingawareness”oftherisksassociatedwithclimatechange,and“encouragingpeople”tomitigatethoserisks.1.WordCloudFigure5.GoalsofaGoodClimatePolicy2.SankeyChart:Verb+NounCombinationsSource:IMFstaffcalculationsbasedonIMF-YouGovsurvey.Note:Wordsizeandcolorinpanel1areproportionaltowordfrequencyrank(colororder:blue,red,green).Linksizeinpanel2isproportionaltocombinationfrequency;eachpairofwordsinthefigureappearsatleast50timesinthedata.Lastly,weclassifyalloftheanswersinoursurveyintobroadtopicsandanalyzethedistributionoftopicsacrossourdata(Figure6).Thisclassificationisdonebyfirstassociatingeachofthe160mostfrequentwordsinthedatatooneoffourtopics:environmentalprotection,reducingemissions,energygeneration,4Seehttps://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions(accessedMay2023).IMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPoliciesandraisingawareness.Wealsoincludea“don’tknow”categorytocaptureanswersthatindicatelackofknowledge.Thisallowsustoclassifyover75percentofallwordsusedinourdataset.5Next,wecombthrougheachanswerinourdataanddetermineifitincludesanyofthewordsclassifiedintooneofthefourtopicsabove.Ifitdoes,wecountthatanswerasmentioningthatparticulartopic.Notethatunderthismetricthesameanswercanmentionmultipletopics,andwedonotdifferentiatebetweenthenumberofwordsmentionedbytopic.Figure6showsthedistributionoftopicsinresponsesbylevelofeconomicdevelopmentofcountries.Respondentsfromemergingmarketcountriesmorefrequentlymentionenvironmentalprotection,whilethoseinadvancedcountriesfocusonemissionsandtheenergymatrix.Anotherconsiderationistheimportanceofincreasingawarenessthatclimatechangeisarealthreat,andconvincingpeopletoadapttheirconsumptionaccordingly.Interestingly,nearly15percentofrespondentsinadvancedeconomiessaythattheyhavenoopinionordonotknowwhatagoodclimatepolicyshouldaimtoachieve.Figure6.ClassificationofResponsesintoTopicsSource:IMFStaffcalculationsbasedonIMF-YouGovsurvey.Note:Thisfigureshowstheshareofanswersthatcontainatleastonewordrelatedtoeachofthefourbroadtopics,plustheshareofanswersthatrelatethattheydonotknowwhataclimatepolicyshoulddo.Notethatanswerscanbeclassifiedintomorethanonetopic.DriversofSupportforClimateMitigatingPoliciesEmpiricalMethodologyWestudythedriversofperceptionsofclimatechangeandsupportofclimatepoliciesusingthefollowingregressions:5Thisprocessmakesourclassificationadmittedlysubjective.However,giventhesimilarityacrossanswers,othermethodsoftopicanalysis,suchastheLatentDirichletAllocation,producedtopicsthatincludemostlythesamewords,makingthemhardtodistinguish.Ourmethodthusprovidesmorecontrolovertheallocationofwords,leadingtotopicsthataremoreintuitive.TableC.1inAnnexCfordetailstheclassificationofeachwordintoitsrespectivetopic.IMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPolicies𝑦,𝛽𝑋,𝛾𝜀,where𝑦,istheresponseforindividual𝑖livingincountry𝑐;𝑋,isasetofcovariatesofinterestineachspecification;𝛾arecountryfixed-effectsthatcontrolforthelevelofdevelopment,exposuretoclimate-relatedevents,andanyothercountry-specificcharacteristics;and𝜀,isaresidual.Mostoftheregressors𝑋,taketheformofindicatorvariables.Dataareweightedbysamplingweightsthatalignkeydemographicsinoursurveytothegeneralpopulationineachcountry,andstandarderrorsareclusteredatthecountrylevel.Insomeinstances,weestimatetheaboveregressionaboveonacountry-by-countrybasistocaptureheterogeneityacrosslocations(inthosecases,countryfixed-effectsareexcluded).Whensurveyquestionsthatinvolveanswersonaratingscaleareconsidered,z-scoresareusedasthedependentvariable𝑦,.Thesearecalculatedonacountry-by-countrybasisbysubtractingthesamplemeananddividingbythesamplestandarddeviationofeachvariable.Theadvantageofdoingsoisthatweavoidbiasesthatarisewhenthereisadifferentdispositionfortakingstrongpoliticalstancesamongpeopleindifferentcountries(fore.g.,forculturalreasons).Thedisadvantageofthez-scoreisthatcoefficientsareinterpretedinunitsofstandarddeviations,whichcanmaketheirinterpretationmorechallenging.Asaresult,whenanalyzingthedeterminantsofsupportforcarbonpricing,adominanceanalysisoftherelativeimportanceofthevarious(groupsof)regressorsisalsoconducted.PerceptionsofClimateChangeWefirstexaminehowsocioeconomiccharacteristics,lifestyle,andenergyusagecorrelatewithclimateriskperceptionsacrossandwithincountries.Onaverage,climatechangeconcernsaremoreprevalentforfemales,theeducated,andthosewhosupportgovernment’sroleinregulatingtheeconomy.6Wealsofindstrongerconcernsfromrespondentswhofollowthenews,especiallytraditionalnewssourcessuchasnewspaper,television,andradio.Oppositiontoclimatepoliciesisstronglycorrelatedwithloweravailabilityofpublictransportationandgreaterrelianceoncars(Figure7,panel1).Wefindconsiderablecross-countryheterogeneityinthedriversofclimateriskperceptions.Forexample,climateconcernsarehigheramongyoungerrespondentsinAustraliaandCanada.InArgentinatheoppositeistrue,witholderrespondentssystematicallymoreconcernedaboutclimatechangethanyoungerones(Figure7,panel2).Infact,wefindcountry-specificeffectsineitherdirectionformostofthedemographicvariablesinthedata.Thisalsoincludescharacteristicsthatdonothaveastatisticallysignificantimpactonclimateperceptioninthefullsample.Oneexampleishouseholdincome:whilenotsystematicallyassociatedwithclimateconcern,thereafewnotableexceptions(Australia,thePhilippines,andtheUnitedStates)inwhichhighincomehouseholdsarelessconcernedaboutclimatechangethanlower-incomehouseholds.6Thegendergapinclimateriskperceptionsisinlinewithexistingresearch(XiaoandMcCright,2014).Varioustheoreticalreasonsforthisgaphavebeenposited,includingdifferentialriskpreferencesandvalueorientation(forexample,altruism,socialvalues),amongothers.IMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPoliciesFigure7.ClimateConcernandIndividualCharacteristics1.RegressionCoefficients&95%ConfidenceIntervals2.RangeofRegressionCoefficientsinCountry-levelRegressionsAge(35-54)Age(55+)FemaleChildreninhouseholdEducation(vocationalorhigh-school)Education(college)EmployedIncome(medium)Income(high)Car(s)inhouseholdUsepublictransportNewsfromtraditionalsourcesNewsfrommodernsourcesTrustpeopleSupportsgovt.regulatingeconomy‐0.4‐0.200.20.40.60.8Source:IMFstaffcalculationsbasedonIMF-YouGovsurvey.Note:Ordinaryleastsquaresregressiononz-scoresofthedependentvariable(seriousnessofclimatechange)withcountryfixedeffectsareinpanel1andanalogouscountry-levelregressionsinpanel2.Panel2reportstherangeofcoefficientestimatesbycountry(countryflags).Inpanel1,the95percentconfidenceintervalsarecomputedusingstandarderrorsclusteredbycountry.Datalabelsinpanel2useInternationalOrganizationforStandardization(ISO)countrycodes.PerceptionsofClimatePoliciesNext,weassessthebaselinesupportforarangeofclimatemitigationpoliciesacrosscountries.Overall,thehighestlevelofsupportisseenforsubsidiestolow-carbontechnologiesandrenewableenergy(Figure8;seealsoDechezleprêtreetal.,2022).ThisisparticularlyevidentinEurope,wherehighenergypricesresultedinaconsiderableincreaseinthecostoflivingatthetimethesurveyswereconducted.Carbonpricingandregulationsonemissionshaveacomparablelevelofsupportacrossmostcountries.Whencomparingoverallsupportforallpoliciesacrossregions,wefindthatitishighestinAsia,aregionwheremanyofthecountry’smostvulnerabletoclimatechangearelocated.Wenextturntothedriversofsupportforclimatepolicies,zoominginoncarbonpricing.Specifically,weexaminewhichbeliefsandcharacteristicsarecorrelatedwithsupportforthepolicy,aswellastherolethatinformationplays.Ouranalysisdistinguishesbetweenadvancedandemergingmarketeconomies,butwenotethatcountry-specificcontextcouldaffectthelevelsofsupportforclimatepolicies.Figure9showstheresultsoftheempiricalanalysisfortheentiresampleofcountries,wheresupportforcarbonpricingisregressedagainstarichsetofindividual-levelcharacteristics,beliefs,andcountryfixedeffects(seeTableinAnnexAforthefullregressionresults).Wefindthatthereisasignificantpositiveassociationbetweenclimateriskperceptionsandsupportforcarbonpricingpolicies,suggestingthatrespondentswhoviewclimatechangeasamoreseriousthreatarealsomorelikelytosupportcarbonIMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPoliciespricing.Thereisalsoasignificantpositiveassociationbetweentheperceptionthatthecarbonpricingpolicyiseffectiveatreducingemissionsandthestrengthofsupportforthepolicy.Figure8.SupportforMitigationPolicies(Percentoffavorableresponses)AsiaPacificAustraliaChinaIndiaIndonesiaJapanMalaysiaPhilippinesSingaporeKoreaThailandVietnamAmericasArgentinaBrazilCanadaColombiaMexicoUSAMiddleEastEgyptSaudiArabiaEuropeFranceGermanyItalyTheNetherlandsNorwayPolandSpainTürkiyeUKCarbonpricing52556746395868586060744162505358444346442945403229445641Subsidiestolow-carbon65656662456673686169715665626969535557585465555060656162technologies/renewables52506444315360485256644850505456433541443540383433434844RegulationslimitingemissionsSource:IMFstaffcalculationsbasedonIMF-YouGovsurvey.Note:Eachrowinthisfigureshowstheshareoffavorableresponsesineachcountrytothequestions“Thinkingaboutalloftheimpactsofacarbonpricingpolicy,towhatextentdoyousupportoropposesuchapolicyinyourcountry?”,“Thinkingaboutalltheimpactsofasubsidytorenewableenergy,towhatextentdoyousupportoropposethispolicyinyourcountry?”,and“Thinkingaboutalloftheimpactsofregulation,towhatextentdoyousupportoropposethispolicyinyourcountry?”respectively.Figure9.DriversofSupportforCarbonPricing:PolicyAttributes,Perceptions,andBelief1.Perceptions,Efficacy,andInequality2.CostandBenefitsConcernsClimatechangeaffectsyouJoblossesClimatechangeisseriousMoreexpensiveenergyIncreasedfuelcostsLargecorporationsloseHigherpricesSmallbusinessesloseNewlow‐carbonjobsHigh‐incomeHHsloseBetterpublictransportMoreinvestmentinrenewablesMiddle‐incomeHHsloseMoneyforsocialgoods/servicesLow‐incomeHHsloseBetterpublichealthCarbonpricingiseffectiveLessroadcongestionBetterairquality‐0.2‐0.100.10.20.3‐0.3‐0.2‐0.100.10.20.3Source:IMFstaffcalculationsbasedonIMF-YouGovsurvey.Note:Ordinaryleastsquaresregressionisonz-scoresofthedependentvariable(supportforcarbonpricing)withthefullsetofsocioeconomiccontrolsandcountryfixedeffects.The95percentconfidenceintervalsarecomputedusingstandarderrorsclusteredbycountry.HH=household.Concernsaboutthedistributionalimpactofcarbonpricingweakensupport:ifrespondentsfearthatcarbonpricingpolicieswillharmlower-incomeormiddle-incomehouseholdsandsmallbusinesses,theyIMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPoliciesarelesslikelytosupportthesepolicies.Figure9panel2focusesontheperceivedcostsandbenefitsofcarbonpricingpolicies.Notsurprisingly,cost-of-livingimpacts(reflectedinthepricesofenergy,fuel,andoverallinflation)andconcernsaboutjoblosseslowersupport.However,wefindthatpolicyco-benefitsalsoresonatewiththepublic,particularlyimprovedairquality,investmentinrenewableenergy,andimprovedpublichealth.Asinthecaseofclimateriskperceptions,thereissignificantheterogeneityacrosscountriesinthedriversofsupportforcarbonpricing(Figure10).DistributionalconcernsdampensupportforcarbonpricingpoliciesmoreinemergingmarketeconomieslikeBrazil,India,andthePhilippinesthaninadvancedeconomiessuchastheNetherlands,Singapore,andtheUnitedKingdom.Withinadvancedeconomies,JapanandSpainarenotableexceptions,asdistributionalconcernssignificantlylowersupportforcarbonpricingpolicies.InseveralEuropeancountries,suchasFrance,Italy,Norway,andPoland,theperceptionofjoblossesfromcarbonpricingpoliciesalsolowerssupport,whileemploymentconcernsarelesssignificantcorrelatesinBrazil,Egypt,thePhilippines,andSaudiArabia.ConcernsabouthigherfuelcostsarealsomorestronglycorrelatedwithlackofsupportinGermanyandtheUnitedStatesrelativetoothercountries.ImprovedairqualityisasignificantdriverofsupportinBrazil,Mexico,andSpain,whilerespondentsinJapan,NorwayandAustraliaaremoreinclinedtosupportcarbonpricingifitincentivizesinvestmentinrenewableenergy.Figure10.DriverofSupportforCarbonPricing:Cross-Countryheterogeneity1.Perceptions,Efficacy,andInequalityconcerns2.CostsandBenefits(Coefficientestimates)(Coefficientestimates)IMFStaffcalculationsbasedonIMF-YouGovsurvey.Note:Country-levelOLSregressionsonz-scoresofthedependentvariable(supportforcarbonpricing)willthefullsetofsocio-economiccontrols.Barsrepresentestimatesofdifferencesinbeliefsfromcross-countryregressions.Endpointsrepresentthesmallestandlargestcoefficientsfromtheregressions.Toassesswhichofthesebeliefscanpredictsupportforcarbonpricing,weconductadominanceanalysisthatshowstheshareofoverallvariancethatisexplainedbyeachindividualfactor(orgroupoffactors).Wefindsupportforclimatechangeisdrivenprimarilybyperceptionsofpolicyefficacyandconcernsaboutclimatechange,withequityandfairnessconsiderationsandpolicybenefitsclosebehind(FigureIMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPolicies11,panel1).Beliefsintheeffectivenessofcarbonpricinginreducingemissionsandperceptionsofpolicybenefitstogetheraccountforabout45percentofthevariationinsupport.Acrosscountries,equityanddistributionalconcernsaccountforanother20percentofthevariationinpolicyviews.Cost,affordability,distributionalconcerns,andbeliefsaboutlackofpolicyeffectivenessarealsothemostfrequentlycitedreasonsforopposingcarbonpricingamongrespondentswhodonotsupportcarbonpricingpolicies(Figure11,panel2).Ananalysisofthecontributionofdifferentbeliefstooverallsupportforcarbonpricingacrosscountries(notshownhere,butavailableuponrequest)revealsthatefficacyandequityconcernsarethemostimportantcontributorsintheemergingmarketssample.Bycontrast,concernsaboutpolicyefficacyandclimateriskperceptionsaremajorpredictorsofpolicyviewsinadvancedeconomies.Overall,ourcross-countryresultsconfirmsomeofthepatternsobservedforspecificcountries,wheretheimportanceofperceivedfairness,effectiveness,andself-interesthasbeenhighlighted.TheresultsarealsosimilartothestudybyDechezleprêtreetal.(2022).However,incontrasttotheirstudy,wefindthatperceptionsofpolicycostsexplainamuchsmallershareofthevariationinsupportforcarbonpricing.OurfindingsarealsoinagreementwithClementsetal.(2013)andCoadyetal.(2018),whoidentifykeyingredientsforsuccessfulenergyreforms,includingextensivecommunicationprograms,clearuseofrevenues,androbustassistanceforvulnerablegroups.Figure11.DriversofSupportforCarbonPricing:PolicyAttributes,Perceptions,andBeliefs1.RelativeImportanceofExplanatoryVariablesin2.ReasonsfornotsupportingcarbonpricingpoliciesSupportforCarbonPricingPerceptionofpolicyeffectivenessIncreasesenergycostsAdvancedEconomiesPerceptionofclimateriskIneffectiveatreducingclimateEmergingMarketsEquity/distibutionalconcernschange10203040506070PerceptionofpolicybenefitsCostsmemoneyCountryfixedeffectsHarmseconomy/joblossesPerceptionofpolicycostsDemographicandSocioeconomicIncreasesinequalityKnowledgeofclimatepoliciesNotpoliticallyfeasible0Noneedtoreducecarbon/tackleclimatechangeMycountryshouldnotpaytoreduceclimatechange0102030Source:IMFStaffcalculationsbasedonIMF-YouGovsurvey.Note:ThefigureonleftshowstheresultsofadominanceanalysisevaluatingtheshareofvarianceexplainedbydifferentsetsofbeliefsandperceptionsintheOLSregressionofthedeterminantsofsupportforcarbonpricing.Thefigureontherightshowstheresponserate(inpercentageofrespondents)tothequestion‘Whydoyouopposeacarbonpricingpolicyinyourcountry’,forthesampleofrespondentswhoopposecarbonpricing.Thesurveysalsoallowustoidentifywhichindividualcharacteristicsandbeliefsarerelatedtosupportforcarbonpricing.College-educatedandemployedrespondentsaremoresupportiveofcarbonpricing,IMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPoliciesalthoughthepositiverelationshipwitheducationisnotablyreversedinKoreaandJapan(Figure12).Supportforcarbonpricingpoliciesisalsostrongerforindividualswhoexpressmoretrustinotherpeople,andamongthoserespondentswhosupportaroleforgovernmentinregulatingtheeconomy.Oppositiontocarbonpricingishigheramongfemales,althoughthisresultisdrivenprimarilybytheemergingmarketeconomiessubsampleandisnotasignificantpredictorofsupportinadvancedeconomies.Greaterrelianceoncarsalsocorrelateswithreducedsupportforcarbonpricing,primarilyinadvancedeconomiessuchasItaly,Germany,andtheUnitedStates,whiletheuseofpublictransportationincountriessuchasArgentina,Singapore,andtheUnitedKingdomdampenssupportforcarbonpricing.Althoughstatisticallysignificant,socio-economic,anddemographiccharacteristicsexplainonlyasmallproportion(lessthan5percent)oftheoverallvariationinpolicyviews.Figure12.DriversofSupportforCarbonPricing:RoleofIndividualCharacteristics1.Regressioncoefficients&95%CIs–Fullsample2.Cross-CountryHeterogeneity(Wouldyousupportacarbonpricingpolicyinyourcountry?)(Wouldyousupportacarbonpricingpolicyinyourcountry?)Age(35‐54)Source:IMFStaffcalculationsbasedonIMF-YouGovsurvey.Note:Country-levelOLSregressiononz-scoresoftheAge(55+)dependentvariable.Barsrepresentestimatesofdifferencesinbeliefsfromcross-countryregressions.EndpointsrepresenttheFemalesmallestandlargestcoefficientsfromtheregressions.ChildreninhouseholdEducation(vocationalorhigh‐school)Education(college)EmployedIncome(medium)Income(high)Car(s)inhouseholdUsepublictransportNewsfromtraditionalsourcesNewsfrommodernsourcesTrustpeopleSupportsgovt.regulatingeconomy‐0.15‐0.1‐0.0500.050.10.150.20.25Source:IMFStaffcalculationsbasedonIMF-YouGovsurvey.Note:OLSregressiononz-scoresofthedependentvariable;controllingforcountryfixedeffects.The95percentconfidenceintervalsarecomputedusingstandarderrorsclusteredbycountry.Atfirstglance,carbonpricingappearstobeamongtheleastpopularclimatemitigationpolicies.However,supportforcarbonpricingincreaseifrevenuesarerecycled.Theliteraturehasbroadlyexploredthreerevenuerecyclingstrategies:theearmarkingofrevenuestosupportemissionreductionprojects,theredistributionofrevenuestoachievealessfiscallyregressiveoutcome,andthereductionofothertaxesIMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPoliciestoachievearevenue-neutraloutcome(IMF,2019;Klenertetal.,2018;Carattinietal.,2018).7Consistentwithstudiesthatfindapositiverelationshipbetweenpolicyprogressivityandacceptability,amajorityofrespondentsthinkthatrevenuesshouldbeusedtohelpharder-hit,low-incomehouseholds,toincreasesocialspendingonhealthcareandeducation,orbeearmarkedforlow-carbontechnologiesandrenewables(Figure13).Again,thereissignificantcross-countryvariationinsupportfordifferentrecyclingschemes.InJapan,SouthKorea,SingaporeandCanada,ahighshareofrespondentsalsosupportsoffsettingcutstoothertaxes.OverathirdofrespondentsinChina,Australia,Vietnam,andUnitedStatessupportassistingworkersinaffectedindustries.Figure13.RevenueRecyclingtoIncreaseSupportforCarbonPricing(multipleanswerspossible)AsiaPacificAustraliaChinaIndiaIndonesiaJapanMalaysiaPhilippinesSingaporeKoreaThailandVietnamAmericasArgentinaBrazilCanadaColombiaMexicoUSAMiddleEastEgyptSaudiArabiaEuropeFranceGermanyItalyNetherlandsNorwayPolandSpainTurkeyUKHelpinglow-income54513748365542614851473446524338434243384349514139454254householdsClimateprojects(renewables/43444140284551434640434038375452322931393742373041434041greentechnology)Socialservices(healthcare/39383446303744372838414038405143303231313029393137433241education)Reducingtaxeson29373324383929414238322730372028242831362836282932312927individualsAssistingworkersinaffected28332324212226272625342427222525232324262027211518272622industriesReducingtaxeson1319212011221716152523121811121012151915111811161311169businessesSource:IMFStaffcalculationsbasedonIMF-YouGovsurvey.Note:Thisfigureshowsthedistributionofresponses(inpercentagepoints)tothequestion“Acarbonpricingpolicythatchargescompaniesfortheiremissionswouldalsoraisetheamountofmoneythegovernmentisabletocollectandspend.Which,ifany,ofthefollowingwouldincreaseyoursupportforthepolicy?Pleaseselectuptothree.”Beliefsaboutequityconsiderationscorrelatewithindividualcharacteristics.Toexaminethis,weseparatelyregresssupportforthreemaintypesofrevenuerecycling—helpinglow-incomehouseholds,fundingclimateprojects,andincreasingsocialspendingonhealthandeducation—againstdemographicandsocio-economiccharacteristics,controllingforcountryfixedeffects(Figure14).Wealthier,moreeducatedindividualstendtofavorusingrevenuesfromcarbonpricingtofundrenewableenergyandlow-carbontechnologiescomparedtolowerincomeandlesseducatedindividuals.Respondentsmoresupportiveofthegovernment’sregulationoftheeconomyaremorelikelytosupportrevenuerecyclingtohelplow-incomehouseholds.Theseresultssuggestthatgroupdifferenceswithincountriescanshapepreferencesforrevenuerecycling.SupportforOtherClimatePoliciesAsdiscussedearlier(Figure8),subsidiesforlowcarbontechnologiesandrenewablesarethemostfavoredclimatepolicyacrosscountries.Forinstance,inEuropeandtheUnitedStates,itistheonlypolicysupportedbyoverhalftherespondents.Subsidiesforgreentechnologiesandrenewablesreceivehigh7Implementationdetailscanalsoimpactpublicsupport.Forexample,Bourgeoisetal.(2021)findthatcarbontaxesarebestacceptedifrevenuesareearmarkedinatransparentway.Earmarkingisalsonotnecessarilythefirstbestfromaneconomicefficiencystandpoint,althoughitmaybeoptimalfromapoliticaleconomyperspective(BrettandKeen,2000).IMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPolicieslevelsofsupportastechnologicaladvancesareseeninmanycountriesasoneofthemostimportanttoolsforsolvingtheclimatecrisis(UNFCCC,2022).However,anotherimportantfactorthatplaysinfavorofsubsidiesisthat,whiletheirbenefitsarewellunderstood,theircoststendtobelesssalient(Fairbrother,2022)—aresultweconfirminthenextsection.Amongrespondentswhodonotsupportsubsidiesforlow-carbontechnologiesandrenewablesandregulations,costsoflivingconcernsarethemostfrequentlycitedreasonforopposition,followedbyconcernsaboutcorruptionandpolicyeffectiveness(Figure15).Respondentsalsopointedtotheunfairadvantageconferredtosomefirmsinthecaseofsubsidiesanddifficultiesinenforcingandmonitoringregulationsasadditionalconcerns.Figure14.SupportforRevenueRecyclingandIndividualCharacteristicsRegressioncoefficients&95%CIsSource:IMFStaffcalculationsbasedonIMF-YouGovsurvey.Note:OLSregressiononz-scoresofthedependentvariable(supportforeachrevenuerecyclingmeasure)controllingforcountryfixedeffects.The95percentconfidenceintervalsarecomputedusingstandarderrorsclusteredbycountry.Figure15.ReasonsforNotSupportingOtherClimatePolicies1.ReasonsforNotSupportingSubsidies2.ReasonsforNotSupportingRegulationsSource:IMFStaffcalculationsbasedonIMF-YouGovsurvey.Note:thisfigureshowsthedistributionofresponses(inpercentagepoints)tothequestions:“Whydoyouopposeasubsidytorenewableenergyinyourcountry?Pleaseselectallthatapply”.“Whydoyouopposeregulatingemissionsinyourcountry?Pleaseselectallthatapply”.Excludingopenendedresponseanddon’tknow.IMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPoliciesInformationExperimentsKnowledgeandunderstandingofclimatepoliciescanshapesupportformitigationpolicies.However,thereisstillasizableinformationgaptobefilledinmostcountries(FigureB.1inAnnexB).Forexample,fewerthan20percentofrespondentsinIndonesiasaythattheyknowwhatacarbontaxis,eventhoughonewasslatedforimplementationinearly2022.Thelackofpublicawarenessisnotconfinedtoemergingmarketeconomies—anemissiontradingsystemwasestablishedintheEuropeanUnionin2005,andyetlessthanaquarterofrespondentsinseveralEUcountriesreportedtohaveheardofsuchapolicy.Similarly,peoplemaynotbelievecarbonpricingcanreduceemissionsthroughchangesinbehaviortowardcleaneralternativesorthatsuchapolicycanbeprogressive.Thereisalsoasizableshareofrespondentsinmanycountrieswithnoclearopinionsaboutclimatemitigationpolicies.Forexample,abouthalfoftherespondentsinEgypt,Indonesia,andJapanneithersupportednoropposedacarbonpricingpolicy(FigureB.2).Toassesstheimpactofinformationonpolicysupport,weconductthreeexperiments.First,beforeaskingaboutsupportforcarbonpricing,werandomlyprovidehalfofthemwithashortparagraphdescribingtheeffectivenessofcarbonpricinginreducingemissionsandthesocietalbenefitsthatcancomefromrecyclingrevenuesraisedwiththispolicy.Wefindthatprovidingsuchinformationincreasessupportforcarbonpricingbyalmost7percentagepoints(Figure16,panel1).Theinformationmostlyshiftsneutralornegativepolicyviewstowardsafavorablestance.Wealsofindsubstantialheterogeneityintheimpactoftheinformationinterventionacrosscountries.Inparticular,theimpactoftheinformationtreatmentinenhancingsupportforcarbonpricingishigherincountrieswherethereislittlepreexistingknowledgeofcarbontaxesasacarbonpolicyinstrument(Figure16,panel2).Wenexttesthowsupportformitigationpolicieschangeswhenpeoplearemadeawareofthepotentialimplicationsforthempersonallyviafinancialtrade-offsintermsofincreasedpricesortaxes.8Supportforcarbonpricingfallsbyabout9percentagepointswhenrespondentsarepresentedwithcostimplications(Figure17,panel1).Thisresultalsoholdsforpopularpoliciessuchassubsidiesforrenewableenergyandlow-carbontechnologies.Whenthecostimplicationsofsubsidiesaremadesalientbytellingrespondentsthatpublicsupportcouldresultinanincreaseintheirtaxesoradecreaseinothergovernmentexpenditures,theshareofrespondents’favorabletowardthepolicydeclinesfrom62to42percent(Figure17,panel2).8Thereisnorandomizationinthisexercise—afterhavingreportedtheirinitialstancetowardthepolicy,allrespondentsaregiventheadditionalpieceofinformationonpolicycostsandthenaskedagainabouttheirsupportforthepolicy.IMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPoliciesFigure16.CarbonPricingEfficacyInformationTreatment1.CarbonPricingEfficacyTreatment2.Country-LevelHeterogeneity600.35560.30COLPercentofrespondentsCoefficientoninformationtretament0.25SAUsupportingcarbonpricing520.20ARGVNMCHNMEXTHAESPITAEGYPHLNDLJPNGRB480.150.10DEUAllPOLMYSUSAKORTURBRAINDSGPCAN440.05IDNAUSNOR400.00FRANoinformationgroupInformationgroup0.000.100.200.300.400.500.600.700.80PriorknowledgeofcarbontaxSource:IMFstaffcalculationsbasedonIMF-YouGovsurvey.Note:Panel1showstheshiftintheshareofrespondentssupportingcarbonpricingacrosstworandomhalvesofoursample,oneofwhich(Informationgroup)istoldthatcarbonpricingprovidescorrectincentivestodecarbonizeandcanencourageinnovationandthatrevenuescanberecycled.Theeffectoftheinformationtreatmentonrespondents’supportisstatisticallysignificant(z=11.35,p=0.00).Panel2showsacountry-levelscatterplotofrespondents’priorknowledgeofcarbonpricing(x-axis)againstthesizeofthecountry-leveltreatmenteffectfrominformationprovision(y-axis).Datalabelsinpanel2useInternationalOrganizationforStandardization(ISO)countrycodes.Figure17.InformationonCostImplicationsofCarbonPricingandSubsidies1.CarbonPricing2.Subsidies6070Percentofrespondents65supportingsubsidiestorenewablesPercentofrespondents5660supportingcarbonpricing525550484544403540Afterinformationon30AfterinformationoncostscostsBeforeinformationonBeforeinformationoncostscostsSource:IMFstaffcalculationsbasedonIMF-YouGovsurvey.Note:Thepanelsshowtheshiftintheshareofrespondentssupportingcarbonpricing(panel1)andsubsidiestorenewableenergy(panel2)asaresultofadditionalinformationonthecostimplicationofeachpolicy.Carbonpricingtreatmentinformsrespondentsthatthepolicyreducesgreenhousegasesbutalsoincreasesthecostofliving.Thesubsidytreatmentinformsrespondentsthatthesubsidyforlow-carbontechnologiesandrenewablesmustbepaidforwithanincreaseintaxes(ordecreaseinothergovernmentspending).Declinesinsupportforbothpoliciesarestatisticallysignificant(carbonpricing:z=-28.83,p=0.00;subsidies:z=-54.52,p=0.00).IMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPoliciesClimateAction:CommunityandGlobalSupportClimatechangemitigationisapublicgood,requiringcollectiveactiontosucceed.Inthissection,wefirstexaminerespondent’sindividualwillingnesstoadoptclimate-friendlypractices.Wecontrastthiswithhowwillingtheythinkothersintheircommunityaretomakebehavioralchanges.Finally,wegaugesupportforinternationalactions.Weasksurveyparticipantswhethertheyarewillingtodecreasetheamountofenergytheyusetohelpreduceclimatechange.Wealsoinquirewhethertheythinktheircommunityiswillingtodothesame.Wefindthatwhileavastmajorityofrespondents(over75percent)arewillingtoengageinenergy-savingbehavior,theyhavelesstrustintheircommunity’swillingnesstodothesame(only51percentofrespondentsthinktheircommunitywillact).Examiningcorrelatesofthe(perceived)willingnesstochangebehavior,wefindthatfemales,older,andmoreeducatedrespondentsreportahigherpersonalwillingnesstoactandareskepticalabouttheircommunity’sintentions.Incontrast,respondentswithhigherlevelsoftrustinpeopleholdmorepositiveviewsabouttheircommunity’swillingnesstoreduceenergyconsumption.Havingchildreninthehouseholdandowningacarcorrelateswithahigherinclinationtothinkthattheircommunitywouldact—ratherthanactingthemselves—whiletheoppositeistrueforpeoplewhoregularlyusepublictransport.Supportforclimatepolicies(inparticular,carbonpricing)isassociatedwithhigherwillingnesstoreduceenergyconsumption,bothattheindividualandatthe(perceived)communitylevel.Finally,climateriskperceptionsmakepeoplemorepronetotakeindividualactionratherthantorelyontheircommunitytoact(Figure18,panel1).Overall,climateriskperceptionsand,toalesserextent,supportforclimatepolicies,arethemostimportantdriversofpersonalwillingnesstoact(Figure18,panel2).CarbonPricingandInternationalActionAvastmajorityofrespondentsinoursurveythinkthatclimatechangepolicywillonlybeeffectiveifmostcountriesadoptmeasurestoreducecarbonemissions,rangingfromaround60percentinJapanto80percentintheUnitedKingdom(Figure19).Onetheonehand,thiscoulddrivedownsupportforclimatepoliciesifpeoplethinksuchcoordinationisunlikely.Onthehand,italsosuggeststhatpeoplemightbemorewillingtoadoptcostlypoliciesifothercountriesdosoaswell,bothbecausetheeffortsofothercountriesmakeitmorelikelythatpolicieswillbeeffectiveandbecausethoseeffortsresonateonfairnessgrounds.99Somerecentstudies,however,findthatpeoplepreferunilateralactions,suggestingthatpublicsupportforcostlyclimatepoliciesmaynotmeaningfullydependonwhetherornotothercountriesarealsocontributing(Mildenberger,2019;Beiser-McGrathandBernauer,2019).IMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPoliciesFigure18.WillingnesstoReduceEnergyConsumption–Individualvs.Community1.RegressionCoefficientsand95%Confidence2.RelativeImportanceofExplanatoryIntervalsVariablesinDeterminingIndividualWillingnesstoAct‐0.2‐0.100.10.20.30.4Age(35-54)Age(55+)FemaleChildreninhouseholdEducation(vocationalorhigh-school)Education(college)EmployedIncome(medium)Income(high)Car(s)inhouseholdUsepublictransportNewsfromtraditionalsourcesNewsfrommodernsourcesTrustpeopleSupportsgovt.regulatingeconomyHeardpoliciesClimatechangeseriousClimatechangeaffectsyouSupportforcarbonpricingSource:IMFstaffcalculationsbasedonIMF-YouGovsurvey.Note:Panel1reportscoefficientsandconfidenceintervalsfromOLSregressiononz-scoresofthedependentvariables(individualandperceivedcommunity’swillingnesstoreduceenergyconsumptiontotackleclimatechange)controllingforcountryfixedeffects.The95percentconfidenceintervalsarecomputedusingstandarderrorsclusteredbycountry.Starsdenoteastatisticallysignificantdifferencebetweenthecoefficientsofavariablesinthetworegressions(p<0.1,p<0.05,p<0.01).Panel2showstheresultsofadominanceanalysisevaluatingtheshareofvarianceexplainedbydifferentsetsofexplanatoryvariablesintheOLSregressiononthedriversofpersonalwillingnesstoactreportedinpanel1.Figure19.MultilateralismandEffectivenessofClimatePolicies(Percentofresponses)100806040200JapanKoreaNorwaySaudiArabiaUSAPolandTürkiyeIndonesiaGermanyEgyptVietnamTheNetherlandsBrazilThailandChinaIndiaMalaysiaCanadaArgentinaAustraliaFranceMexicoSpainSingaporePhilippinesItalyColombiaUKAgreeNeitheragreenordisagreeDisagreeSource:IMFstaffcalculationsbasedonIMF-YouGovsurvey.Note:Thisfigureshowsthedistributionofresponsesineachcountrytothestatement“Climatechangepolicywillonlybeeffectiveifmostcountriesadoptmeasurestoreducecarbonemissions.”IMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPoliciesOnemajorhurdleforinternationalagreementonclimateactionisthedistributionofmitigationcostsacrosscountries.Governmentsfrequentlyinvokeprinciplesofdistributivejusticeinnegotiationsandpublicdebatetojustifytheirpositiononburdensharing—astancethatistypicallyalignedwiththeircountries’economicinterest.Twobroadconsiderationstypicallyinvokedarethe“polluterpays”principle(“proportionaltocurrentemissions”and“proportionaltothehistoryofemissions”)andthe“ability-to-pay”principle(“onlyrichcountriespay”).Interestingly,mostrespondentsinbothadvancedandemergingmarketeconomiesthinkthatallcountries,notonlyrichones,shouldpaytoaddressclimatechange(Figure20).Further,alargeshareofrespondentsinmostcountriesthinkthatburdensharingshouldbebasedoncurrentratherthanhistoricalemissions,withthedifferenceinviewsbeingmorepronouncedinadvancedeconomies.10Figure20.InternationalBurdenSharing:WhoShouldPay?(Percentofresponses)AsiaPacificAustraliaChinaIndiaIndonesiaJapanMalaysiaPhilippinesSingaporeKoreaThailandVietnamAmericasArgentinaBrazilCanadaColombiaMexicoUSAMiddleEastEgyptSaudiArabiaEuropeFranceGermanyItalyTheNetherlandsNorwayPolandSpainTürkiyeUKOnlyrichcountries16212816192522141623232423162123142828271314131921242714Allcountries69685973486669737461705765656871635151586973705756645570Don'tknow1512121133881310167201219106232222151813182424121816Currentemissions51405047355048504747524143504854443736494849534555484151Pastemissions28443535263841323835373341273738263537352031161816333726Don'tknow2216151838121118151810261623168302826163219313629192223Source:IMFstaffcalculationsbasedonIMF-YouGovsurvey.Note:Thisfigureshowstheshareofresponses(inpercentagepoints)tothequestions“Whichcountriesdoyouthinkshouldbepayingtoreducecarbonemissions?”(toppanel)and“Shouldcountriesbepayingtoreducecarbonemissionsbasedontheircurrentoraccumulatedhistoriclevelsofemissions?”(bottompanel).ConclusionAchievingnetzeroemissionsgloballywilldemandswiftanddecisiveactionbypolicymakers,andthisrequirespublicbuy-in.Thispaperuseslarge-scalepublicperceptionssurveysacross28emergingmarketandadvancedeconomiestoexamineshowindividualsviewdifferentclimatemitigationpoliciesandwhatdrivestheirsupport.Wefindthereissignificantheterogeneityonclimateriskperceptionsandpreferencesforpoliciesacrossindividualsandcountries.Respondentsinemergingmarketeconomies(ingeneral,countriesmore10ThisresultissimilartoastudybySchleichetal.(2016)thatexaminescitizens’perceptionsofdistributivejusticeusingsurveysfromChina,Germany,andtheUnitedStates.IMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPoliciesvulnerabletoclimatechange)tendtoseeitasabiggerproblemandaremoresupportiveofpoliciestomitigateit.Concernsaboutclimatechangearealsohigheramongwomenandcorrelatedwitheducationalattainmentsupportforaroleforgovernmentinterventionintheeconomy.Oursurveysfindthatlackofsupportforcarbonpricingisdrivenbyconcernsaboutrisingenergypricesandtheperceptionthatsuchpoliciesareineffectiveatreducingclimatechange.Anothermajorconcernistheirperceivedregressiveness(disproportionateimpactonlow-incomehouseholds).Thissuggeststhatcarbonpricingpoliciescanbemademoreacceptabletothepopulationwhentheyareimplementedina“fairer”way,withplanstorecyclerevenuestowardscitizens’mainconcerns.Themostappropriateuseoftherevenues,however,iscontextual,aspreferencesforrevenue-recyclingvarybothacrossandwithincountries.Wealsofindthatpolicyco-benefitsresonatewiththepublic.Next,wetestwhetherprovidingmoreinformationabouttheeffectivenessofcarbonpricingpolicies,aswellastheircosts,canchangesupport.Comparedtothecontrolgroup(whichreceivednoextrainformation),individualsthataregivenashorttextdescribingtheeffectivenessofcarbonpricingpoliciesandtheirco-benefitsincreasetheirsupportby7percentagepoints.Incontrast,readingaparagraphhighlightingthecostsofsuchpoliciesdecreasesrespondents’supportby9percentagepoints.Theseresultssuggestthatprovidinginformationaboutclimatechangeimpacts,howcarbonpricingworks,optionsforrevenuerecycling,andimprovingawarenessofpolicyco-benefitscanallbecriticaltoshapingpublicviewsoncarbonpricing.Finally,thepaperconsidersthe“publicgood”aspectofclimatechangeandexamineshowindividualsseeclimateactionbyothers.Ingeneral,wefindthatpeoplewhoreportahigherwillingnesstochangetheirownbehaviortomitigateclimatechangearealsoskepticalthattheircommunitieswilldosoaswell.However,fromaninternationalpointofview,wefindthatrespondentstendtoactmorecooperatively.First,mostpeoplebelievethatclimatechangemitigationcanonlyworkifmostcountriesadoptmeasuretodoit.Second,themajorityofrespondentsineverycountryinoursamplefindthatallcountriesshouldbeartheburdenofthosepolicies,notonlytherichones.Finally,wealsofindbroadsupportforpoliciesbasedoncurrent,ratherthanhistorical,emissions.Thefindingsinthispaperarerelevantforpolicymakersandexpertswhoseekthebroadestpublicsupportfortheadoptionofclimatepolicies.Whilewefindalargeknowledgegapabouttheimpactsofcarbonpricingpolicies,wealsofindthatprovidinginformationtopeoplecandrivesupportforsuchpolicies.Theimplementationdetailsofmitigationpoliciescanalsobecrucial,particularlymechanismstoattenuatethenegativeimpactofcarbonpricingonlow-incomehouseholds.IMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPoliciesReferencesAbrell,J.,M.Kosch,andS.Rausch.2022.“Howeffectiveiscarbonpricing?—Amachinelearningapproachtopolicyevaluation.”JournalofEnvironmentalEconomicsandManagement,112,p.102589.Andersson,J.J.2019.“CarbontaxesandCO2emissions:Swedenasacasestudy.”AmericanEconomicJournal:EconomicPolicy,11(4),pp.1-30.Andre,P.,T.Boneva,F.Chopra,andA.Falk.2021.“FightingClimateChange:TheRoleofNorms,Preferences,andMoralValues.”CEPRDiscussionPaperNo.DP16343.CenterforEconomicandPolicyResearch.Baranzini,A.,andS.Carattini.2017.“Effectiveness,EarmarkingandLabeling:TestingtheAcceptabilityofCarbonTaxeswithSurveyData.”EnvironmentalEconomicsandPolicyStudies19(1):197–227.Bechtel,M.,F.Genovese,andK.Scheve.2019.“Interests,NormsandSupportfortheProvisionofGlobalPublicGoods:TheCaseofClimateCo-operation.”BritishJournalofPoliticalScience49(4):1333–335.Bechtel,M.,K.Scheve,andE.vanLieshout.2021.“ImprovingPublicSupportforClimateActionthroughMultilateralism.”YaleUniversityWorkingPaper,NewHaven,CT.Beiser-McGrath,L.,andT.Bernauer.2019.“CommitmentFailuresAreUnlikelytoUnderminePublicSupportfortheParisAgreement,”NatureClimateChange9(3):248–52.Bergquist,M.,A.Nilsson,andN.Harring.2022.“Meta-analysesofFifteenDeterminantsofPublicOpinionaboutClimateChangeTaxesandLaws.”NatureClimateChange12:235–40.Bourgeois,C.,L.Giraudet,andP.Quirion.2021.“Lump-sumvsEnergy-efficiencySubsidyRecyclingofCarbonTaxRevenueintheResidentialSector:AFrenchAssessment.”EcologicalEconomics184:107006.Brett,C.andM.Keen.2000.“Politicaluncertaintyandtheearmarkingofenvironmentaltaxes.”JournalofPublicEconomics,75(3),pp.315-340.Bumann,S.2021.“WhatAretheDeterminantsofPublicSupportforClimatePolicies?AReviewoftheEmpiricalLiterature.”ReviewofEconomics72:213–28.Carattini,S.,A.Baranzini,P.Thalmann,P.Varone,andF.Vöhringer.2017.“GreenTaxesinaPost-ParisWorld:AreMillionsofNaysInevitable?”EnvironmentalandResourceEconomics68(1):97–128.Carattini,S.,M.Carvalho,andS.Fankhauser.2018.“OvercomingPublicResistancetoCarbonTaxes.”WileyInterdisciplinaryReviews:ClimateChange9(5):e531.Carattini,S.,S.Levin,andA.Tavoni.2019.“CooperationintheClimateCommons.”ReviewofEnvironmentalEconomicsandPolicy13(2):227–247.Clements,B,D.Coady,S.Fabrizio,S.Gupta,T.Alleyne,andC.Sdralevich.2013.“EnergySubsidyReform:LessonsandImplications.”InternationalMonetaryFund,Washington,DC.IMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPoliciesCoady,D.,I.Parry,andB.Shang.2018.“EnergyPriceReform:LessonsforPolicyMakers.”ReviewofEnvironmentalEconomicsandPolicy12(2).Dabla-Norris,E.,T.Helbling,S.Khalid,H.Khan,G.Magistretti,A.Sollaci,andK.Srinivasan.2023.“PublicPerceptionsofClimateMitigationPolicies:EvidencefromCross-CountrySurveys.”IMFStaffDiscussionNote2023/002.InternationalMonetaryFund,Washington,DC.Dechezleprêtre,A.,A.Fabre,T.Kruse,B.Planterose,A.Chico,andS.Stantcheva.2022.“FightingClimateChange:InternationalAttitudestowardClimatePolicies,”OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopmentandNationalBureauofEconomi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467.375.322.615.3India51.651.056.155.031.167.819.618.976.979.13.52.066.174.133.058.713.510.979.178.517.710.5Indonesia50.454.960.766.928.767.612.310.968.971.918.917.349.053.123.656.812.08.265.080.023.211.8Italy48.747.565.868.915.670.414.723.068.074.717.22.343.549.424.561.720.215.368.980.710.94.0Japan48.647.859.756.337.343.414.011.162.964.323.024.657.449.137.536.316.311.864.871.020.817.2Malaysia51.142.572.877.210.264.818.332.670.466.911.30.5Mexico48.848.0TheNetherlands49.749.0Norway50.449.8Philippines50.848.0Poland48.447.7SaudiArabia57.860.2Singapore52.349.0SouthKorea49.949.7Spain49.048.9Thailand48.649.0Türkiye50.149.9UnitedKingdom49.448.4UnitedStates49.548.5Vietnam49.452.4IMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPoliciesTableA.3.MainRegressionResultsVariables(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)Age(35-54)RevenueRevenueAge(55+)ClimateCarbonRecyclingLow‐RecyclingRevenueFemaleChangePricingIncomeClimateRecyclingSocialChildreninhouseholdSeriousnessSupportHouseholdProjectsservicesEducation(vocationalorhighschool)Education(college)0.006‐0.0270.0060.003‐0.002Employed(0.025)(0.021)(0.010)(0.009)(0.009)Income(medium)‐0.003‐0.0040.0540.0670.023Income(high)(0.044)(0.025)(0.015)(0.016)(0.013)Car(s)inhousehold0.155‐0.0170.022‐0.0050.039Usepublictransport(0.022)(0.009)(0.011)(0.011)(0.010)Newsfromtraditionalsources‐0.0080.017‐0.008‐0.0400.004Newsfrommodernsources(0.020)(0.014)(0.009)(0.010)(0.010)Trustpeople0.079‐0.0060.0490.0500.032Supportsgovt.roleinregulatingeconomy(0.043)(0.021)(0.013)(0.012)(0.013)Carbonpricingeffective0.1710.0540.0350.1190.054Low-incomeHHslose(0.048)(0.022)(0.015)(0.009)(0.012)Middle-incomeHHslose0.0450.031‐0.025‐0.013‐0.023High-incomeHHslose(0.020)(0.018)(0.008)(0.009)(0.007)Smallbusinesseslose‐0.0090.011‐0.0070.0390.017Largecorporationslose(0.025)(0.015)(0.012)(0.010)(0.008)0.0320.015‐0.0570.0730.021(0.023)(0.018)(0.017)(0.013)(0.013)‐0.125‐0.034‐0.013‐0.001‐0.006(0.022)(0.016)(0.013)(0.009)(0.008)0.134‐0.0260.0770.0780.082(0.024)(0.017)(0.008)(0.009)(0.008)0.3030.0150.0980.1100.054(0.059)(0.034)(0.020)(0.022)(0.021)0.2110.0260.0910.1210.051(0.056)(0.033)(0.019)(0.023)(0.020)0.0210.0870.0190.0340.016(0.022)(0.012)(0.010)(0.010)(0.010)0.5450.1610.1360.1270.113(0.075)(0.018)(0.018)(0.019)(0.016)0.252(0.010)‐0.110(0.013)‐0.086(0.010)‐0.031(0.010)‐0.045(0.007)0.054(0.009)IMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPoliciesTableA.3.(continued).MainRegressionResultsVariables(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)BetterairqualityLessroadcongestionClimateCarbonRevenueRevenueRevenueBetterpublichealthChangePricingRecyclingLow‐RecyclingRecyclingSocialMoremoneyforsocialgoodsandservicesSeriousnessSupportIncomeClimateservicesMoreinvestmentinrenewablesHouseholdProjectsBetterpublictransport0.210Newlow-carbonjobs(0.019)Higherprices0.071Increasedfuelcosts(0.016)Moreexpensiveenergy0.104Joblosses(0.017)Heardofclimatepolicies0.082Climatechangeserious(0.019)Climatechangeaffectsyou0.176Efficacyinformationtreatment(0.015)0.069(0.023)0.084(0.018)‐0.078(0.019)‐0.079(0.012)‐0.072(0.015)‐0.173(0.016)0.127(0.042)0.210(0.012)0.052(0.008)0.147(0.015)CountryfixedeffectsYESYESYESYESYESObservations17,79413,96117,95717,95717,957R-squared0.1240.4520.0400.0500.034Source:IMFstaffcalculationsbasedonIMF-YouGovsurvey.Note:Thedependentvariablesarethez-scoresofindividualresponsestoclimateQ4(col1),Q15a&Q15b(col2),Q18_1(col3),Q18_4(col4),Q18_4(col5).Standarderrors,inparentheses,areclusteredatthecountrylevel.HH=household.p<0.1;p<0.05;p<0.01.IMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPoliciesAnnexB.AdditionalFiguresFigureB.1.PriorKnowledgeofClimateMitigationPolicies(Percentofresponses.Multipleanswerspossible)AsiaPacificAustraliaChinaIndiaIndonesiaJapanMalaysiaPhilippinesSingaporeKoreaThailandVietnamAmericasArgentinaBrazilCanadaColombiaMexicoUSAMiddleEastEgyptSaudiArabiaEuropeFranceGermanyItalyTheNetherlandsNorwayPolandSpainTürkiyeUKCarbontax65342819343621635823291522702116451216612343263134382157Cap-and-tradeor45432621202727334030311634422218401317252516214144332436emissionstradingsystems70756168637070747158714863716461694350646465726263705776Lawandregulations76716255637066705967695661706264696866657174676376757579limitingcarbonemissionsSubsidizingrenewableenergysourcesSource:IMFstaffcalculationsbasedonIMF-YouGovsurvey.Note:Thisfigureshowsthedistributionofresponsesineachcountrytothequestion“Which,ifany,ofthefollowingwaysofreducingclimatechangehaveyoupreviouslyheardof?Pleaseselectallthatapply”.Bluedenoteshighervalues.FigureB.2.SupportforCarbonPricing(Percentofresponses)100%AsiaPacificAmericasMiddleEastEurope80%60%40%20%0%JapanIndonesiaChinaSingaporeThailandMalaysiaKoreaAustraliaPhilippinesIndiaVietnamArgentinaColombiaUSAMexicoCanadaBrazilEgyptSaudiArabiaPolandGermanyNorwayItalyFranceUKTheNetherlandsSpainTürkiyeSupportOpposeNeutral/don'tknowSource:IMFstaffcalculationsbasedonIMF-YouGovsurvey.Note:Thisfigureshowsthedistributionofresponsesineachcountrytothequestion“Thinkingaboutalltheimpactsofacarbonpricingpolicy,towhatextentdoyousupportoropposesuchapolicyinyourcountry?”IMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPoliciesAnnexC.TextAnalysisThetextanalysisisbasedonanswerstotheopen-endedquestion“Whatdoyouthinkagoodclimatepolicyshouldaimtoachieve?”(see[Q8]fromthesamplequestionnaireinAnnexD).Beforeansweringthisquestion,respondentsweregivenashortparagraphexplainingwhatclimatechangeisandsomeofitspotentialcauses.Therewasnoinformationgivenontheeffectofclimatepoliciesortheirpotentialeffects.Therewerejustover28,500non-missinganswerscollectedfromthesurvey.Datacleaning:ThetextdatacleaningwasdoneinPython,usingthe“spacy”and“nltk”libraries.Wefirstremovednumericalandspecialcharacters,aswellaspunctuation,fromeachoftheanswers.Second,weidentifiedallthe“don’tknow”answers.Thiswasdonebydeterminingwhethereachanswercontainsstringssuchas“don’tknow,”“don'tknow,”“dontknow,”“donotknow,”“notknown,”“notsure,”“noidea,”“noclue,”“amuncertain,”“amnotcertain,”or“idk.”Ifanyofthoseexpressionsareincludedinananswerwithfewerthan15words,thatansweristaggedasindicatingthattherespondentdoesnotknowwhataclimatepolicyshoulddo.The15-wordthresholdisusedtoavoidtagginglongeranswers(whicharelikelytocontainmoreinformation)thatalsoincludesomeofthoseexpressions.Next,allanswersaretokenized(splitintosinglewords),andalltokensaresubsequentlylemmatized(i.e.,convertedintoabaseform).Thisprocessuseslexicalknowledgebasestogetthecorrectformforeachword.Forexample,“policies”isconvertedto“policy”;“am”and“is”arebothconvertedto“be.”Weremovestopwords,wordsthathavefewerthanthreeletters,andanywordthatappearsonthequestion’stextfromeachoftheanswersinthedata.Finally,wealsoaggregateafewfrequentlyusedphrasestotheircommonmeaning.Thisprocessequates“reuse”and“recycle”;“useless,”“cut,”“minimize,”“reduceuse,”and“reduction”areallequatedto“reduce”;“takecare”and“protect,”“raise”and“increase”;“ensure”and“encourage”;“eliminate”and“stop”;“develop”and“build”;“car”and“vehicle”;“payattention”and“increaseawareness.”IMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPoliciesTableC.1.WordsClassifiedintoEachTopicEnvironmentEnergyReduceEmissionsAwarenesswordfreqwordfreqwordfreqwordfreqenvironment1546energy2259reduce6259people1321waste1220gas1072vehicle3232global749tree968fuel829emission2783increase695plastic838clean826pollution1479government524protect819renewable818stop1113encourage518air747fossil615greenhouse675country515plant745sustainable491control421awareness515nature690power375prevent402public442water681electric347pollute365promote306green674solar342consumption365population261recycle614alternative272zero363citizen242forest560wind211dioxide306education163natural538generation195footprint228environmental531nuclear177law205deforestation324electricity170ban169recycling284coal162regulate156protection282burn149regulation148preserve255garbage191river180sustainability180conservation180reforestation167sea167planting156animal151Notethatsomeofthemostfrequentwordscannotbeclassifiedintoanyofthesetopics.Forexample,theword“warming”ismentioned619timesandcouldrefertoanyofthetopicsabove;otherwordssuchas“need”and“possible”(mentioned468and451times,respectively)arealsonotclassifiedastheyaretoobroadtofitanyofthetopics.IMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPoliciesAnnexD.SampleQuestionnaireQuestionnaireswerecustomizedsoresponseoptionsdifferforeachcountry.BelowisthequestionnaireusedintheUSA:DemographicQuestionsBase:all[Q1]Age:[Q2]Gender:[Q3]Whatisyourhighestcompletededucation?<1>Ididnotcompleteanyformaleducation<2>Earlychildhoodeducation<3>Primaryeducation<4>Lowersecondaryeducation(GCSEsorequivalentlevel)<5>Uppersecondaryeducation(A-Levelsorbaccalaureate)<6>Post-secondary,non-tertiaryeducation(generallyvocational/professionalqualificationof1-2years,e.g.college,tradeschool)<7>Short-cycletertiaryeducation(vocationaleducationandtraining,studyingtowardsanon-academicdegree,e.g.,nursing/teachingdiploma)<8>Bachelorsorequivalentleveldegree<9>Mastersorequivalentleveldegree<10>Doctoralorequivalentleveldegree[Q4]Whatisyourgrosshouseholdincome?<1>Lessthan$10,000<2>$10,000-$14,999<3>$15,000-$19,999<4>$20,000-$24,999<5>$25,000-$29,999<6>$30,000-$39,999<7>$40,000-$49,999<8>$50,000-$59,999<9>$60,000-$69,999<10>$70,000-$79,999<11>$80,000-$99,999<12>$100,000-$119,999<13>$120,000-$149,999<14>$150,000ormore<15>Prefernottosay[Q5]Whatisyourcurrentmaritalorrelationshipstatus?<1>Married<2>Nevermarried<3>Single<5>Divorced<6>WidowedIMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPolicies<7>Separated<8>Domestic/civilpartnership<97fixed>Other<999fixed>Prefernottosay[Q6]Howmanyofthepeopleinyourhouseholdareunder18?[Q7]Howmanypeople,includingyourself,arethereinyourhousehold?Pleaseincludebothadultsandchildren.[Q8]Which,ifany,ofthefollowingoptionsbestdescribesyourcurrentemploymentstatus?<1>Workingfulltime<2>Workingparttime<3>Temporarilylaidoff<4>Retired<5>Permanentlydisabled<6>Homemaker<5>Student<8>Unemployed<97>Other<99>Prefernottosay[Q9]WhatisyourState/RegionofResidence?<1>South<2>Northeast<3>Midwest<4>West[Q10]Howmanycars,ifany,doyoupersonallyownorlease,eitherindividuallyorjointly?<1>One<2>Two<3>Threeormore<98>Don'tknow<99>Notapplicable-Idonotownacar[Q11]Whichmodesoftransporthaveyouusedinthelast12months?Pleaseselectallthatapply.<1>Walking/Cycling<2>Car/personalvehicle<3>Taxiorridesharing<4>Net:Publictransport<5>Notransportusedinthelast12months[Q12]Whichwouldyousayisyourprimarysourceofnews?PleaseselectONEoptiononly.-Aprintedcopyofanewspaper/magazine-Anewspaper's/magazine'swebsite-Anewswebsitenotassociatedwithanewspaper/magazine-Anewsapponamobileortabletdevice-EmailnewslettersorRSSfeeds-Socialnetworkwebsites-BlogsnotassociatedwithmajormediaorganizationsIMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPolicies-Television-Radio-Noneoftheabove-Don'tknow-Notapplicable-Idon'tfollowthenews[Q13]Ifyouhadtouseoneofthesefivecategoriestodescribeyoursocialclass,whichonewoulditbe?LowerClassorPoorWorkingClassMiddleClassUpper-middleClassUpperClassClimateQuestionsBase:all[Q1]Towhatextentdoyouagreeordisagreewiththefollowing:-[Q1_1]Mostpeoplecanbetrusted-[Q1_2]Thenationalgovernmentinyourcountrycanbetrustedtodotherightthing<1>Stronglyagree<2>Slightlyagree<3>Neitheragreenordisagree<4>Slightlydisagree<5>Stronglydisagree<98>Don’tknowBase:all[Q3]Inyouropinion,howmuchofaroleshouldeachofthefollowinghaveinregulatingtheeconomy?-[Q3_1]Thenationalgovernment-[Q3_2]Localgovernment<1>Alargerole<2>Amoderaterole<3>Aminorrole<4>Assmallaroleaspossible<98>Don’tknowThissurveyisonthetopicofclimatechange.Byclimatechangewemeanlong-termchangesinglobalweatherpatterns.Overthelastcentury,climatechangehasresultedinhigher-than-averagetemperatures,risingoceanlevels,andahigherfrequencyofextremeweathereventsandnaturaldisasters(e.g.,storms,floods,droughts).Burningfuelslikepetrol,diesel,gas,orcoalreleasesgreenhousegases,suchascarbondioxide,trapsheatintheearth’satmosphereandacceleratesclimatechange.Base:all[Q4]Inyourview,howseriousofaproblemisclimatechange?<1>Averyseriousproblem<2>Afairlyseriousproblem<3>Notaveryseriousproblem<4>Notaproblematall<98>Don’tknowIMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPoliciesBase:all[Q5]Whichofthefollowingcomesclosesttoyourviewofhowclimatechangeisaffectingpeoplearoundtheworld?<1>Climatechangeisaffectingpeoplearoundtheworldrightnow<2>Climatechangeisn’taffectingpeoplerightnow,butwillwithinthenext5to10years<3>Climatechangeisn’taffectingpeoplerightnow,butwillover10yearsfromnow<4>Climatechangewon’teveraffectpeople<98>Don’tknowBase:all[Q6]Andwhichofthefollowingcomesclosesttoyourviewofhowclimatechangewillaffectyouoryourfamily?<1>Climatechangeisaffectingmeormyfamilyrightnow<2>Climatechangeisn’taffectingmeormyfamilyrightnow,butwillwithinthenext5to10years<3>Climatechangeisn’taffectingmeormyfamilyrightnow,butwillover10yearsfromnow<4>Climatechangewon’teveraffectmeormyfamily<98>Don’tknowBase:all[Q7]Asfarasyouknow,hasyourgovernmentmadeacommitmenttotakeactiontoreduceclimatechange?<1>Yes<2>No<98>Don’tknowBase:all[Q8]Whatdoyouthinkagoodclimate(mitigation)policyshouldaimtoachieve?Base:all[Q9]Which,ifany,ofthefollowingwaysofreducingclimatechangehaveyoupreviouslyheardof?Pleaseselectallthatapply.<1>Carbontax<2>Capandtradeoremissionstradingsystems<3>Lawandregulationslimitingcarbonemissions(e.g.,emissionsstandardsforindustry,vehicles,efficiencystandardsforappliancesetc.)<4>Subsidizingrenewableenergysources(e.g.,producingmoreelectricityfromwater,wind,andsolarpower)andlow-carbontechnologies<99>NoneoftheaboveThenextpartofthesurveywillfocusonthesefourwaysofreducingclimatechange.Youwillbeshownashortsectionoftextexplainingthepolicyandthenaskedafewquestionsaboutit.Pleaseanswerasbestasyoucan.Onepolicytotackleclimatechangeconsistsofthegovernmentchargingcompaniesfortheamountofgreenhousegas(usuallycarbondioxide)thattheyproduce(forexample,byburningfuelslikepetrol,diesel,gasorcoal).Thismeansthatcompaniespayinproportiontohowmuchtheypollute.Thispolicyisgenerallyreferredtoasa“carbonpricing”policy.Base:all[Q10]Howwouldyouratetheeffectivenessofthispolicyatreducingclimatechange?IMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPolicies<1>Veryeffective<2>Fairlyeffective<3>Notveryeffective<4>Notatalleffective<98>Don’tknowBase:randomlyselectedhalf[Q11a]Asidefromreducingclimatechange,doyouthinkthereareotherbenefitsofacarbonpricingpolicyforyoupersonally?Pleaseselectallthatapply.<1>Betterairquality<2>Lessroadcongestion<3>Betterpublichealth<4>Moremoneyraisedforsocialgoodsandservices(e.g.hospitals,schools)<5>Moreinvestment/researchonrenewableenergyproduction<6>Betterpublictransport<7>Newlow-carbonjobs<95>Other(open[Q11a_open])[open]pleasespecify<97>None–therearenobenefitsofacarbonpriceforme<98>Don’tknowBase:randomlyselectedhalf[Q11b]Andasidefromreducingclimatechange,whatdoyouthinkarethebenefitsofacarbonpricingpolicyforyourcommunity?Pleaseselectallthatapply.<1>Betterairquality<2>Lessroadcongestion<3>Betterpublichealth<4>Moremoneyraisedforsocialgoodsandservices(e.g.hospitals,schools)<5>Moreinvestment/researchonrenewableenergyproduction<6>Betterpublictransport<7>Newlow-carbonjobs<95>Other(open[Q11b_open])[open]pleasespecify<97>None–therearenobenefitsofacarbonpriceformycommunity<98>Don’tknowBase:randomlyselectedhalf[Q12a]What,ifany,doyouthinkwouldbethenegativeimpactsofacarbonpricingpolicyforyoupersonally?Pleaseselectallthatapply.<1>Higherpricesforgoodsandservicesingeneral<2>Increasedfuel/petrolcosts<3>Moreexpensiveenergyorheating<4>Joblossesandunemployment<5>Moreinequality<95>Other(open[Q12a_open])[open]pleasespecify<97>None–therearenonegativeimpactsofacarbonpricingpolicyforme<98>Don’tknowBase:randomlyselectedhalf[Q12b]What,ifany,doyouthinkwouldbethenegativeimpactsofacarbonpricingpolicyforyourcommunity?Pleaseselectallthatapply.IMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPolicies<1>Higherpricesforgoodsandservicesingeneral<2>Increasedfuel/petrolcosts<3>Moreexpensiveenergyorheating<4>Joblossesandunemployment<5>Moreinequality<95>Other(open[Q12b_open])[open]pleasespecify<97>None–therearenonegativeimpactsofacarbonpricingpolicyformycommunity<98>Don’tknowBase:all[Q13]Towhatextentdoyouthinkthefollowingwillgainorlosefromacarbonpricingpolicy?-[Q13_1]Low-incomehouseholds-[Q13_2]Middleincomehouseholds-[Q13_3]Highincomehouseholds-[Q13_4]Smallbusinesses-[Q13_5]Largecorporations<1>Gainalot<2>Gainalittle<3>Neithergainanythingorloseanything<4>Losealittle<5>Losealot<98>Don’tknowRandomization[Additionalinformation]Acarbonpricingpolicycanprovidetherightincentivestodecarbonizetheentireeconomy.Itcanencouragepeople,businesses,andgovernmentstoconsumeandemitlessgreenhousegases.Italsocanencouragecompaniestoinnovatemore.Researchsuggeststhatthispolicycangeneratesubstantialrevenue,whichpolicymakerscanusetoprovideassistancetolow-incomehouseholds,lowertaxes,investincleanenergyandclimateadaptation,orforotheruses.Base:randomlyselectedhalf(withadditionalinformation)[Q15a]Thinkingaboutalloftheimpactsofacarbonpricingpolicy,towhatextentdoyousupportoropposesuchapolicyinyourcountry?<1>Stronglysupport<2>Somewhatsupport<3>Neithersupportnoroppose<4>Somewhatoppose<5>Stronglyoppose<98>Don’tknowBase:randomlyselectedhalf(withnoadditionalinformation)[Q15b]Thinkingaboutalloftheimpactsofacarbonpricingpolicy,towhatextentdoyousupportoropposesuchapolicyinyourcountry?<1>Stronglysupport<2>Somewhatsupport<3>Neithersupportnoroppose<4>Somewhatoppose<5>StronglyopposeIMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPolicies<98>Don’tknowBase:thosewhoopposecarbonpricingpolicies[Q16]Whydoyouopposeacarbonpricingpolicyinyourcountry?Pleaseselectallthatapply.<1>It’sineffectiveatreducingclimatechange<2>Itharmstheeconomy/causesjoblosses<3>Itcostsmemoney<4>Itincreasesenergycosts<5>It’snotpoliticallyfeasible/won’tbesupported<6>Itincreasesinequalityinsociety<7>Wedonotneedtoreducetheamountofcarbonweuse/donotneedtotackleclimatechange<8>Mycountryshouldnotbepayingtoreduceclimatechange–othercountriesshould<95>Other(open[Q16_open])[open]pleasespecify<98>Don’tknowWewillnowpresentyouwithhypotheticalsituations.Pleaseanswerthefollowingquestionsasbestyoucan.Base:randomlyselectedhalf[Q17a]Ifacarbonpricingpolicysignificantlylowersgreenhousegasesbutalsoincreasesthecostofliving,wouldyousupportoropposesuchapolicy?<1>Stronglysupport<2>Somewhatsupport<3>Neithersupportnoroppose<4>Somewhatoppose<5>Stronglyoppose<98>Don’tknowBase:randomlyselectedhalf[Q17b]Ifacarbonpricingpolicysignificantlylowersgreenhousegasesbutalsoincreasesyourcostofliving,wouldyousupportoropposesuchapolicy?<1>Stronglysupport<2>Somewhatsupport<3>Neithersupportnoroppose<4>Somewhatoppose<5>Stronglyoppose<98>Don’tknowBase:all[Q18]Acarbonpricingpolicythatchargescompaniesfortheiremissionswouldalsoraisetheamountofmoneythegovernmentisabletocollectandspend.Which,ifany,ofthefollowingwouldincreaseyoursupportforthepolicy?Pleaseselectuptothree.<1>Helpinglow-incomehouseholdsdealwithhighercostsofliving<2>Reducingothertaxesonindividuals<3>Reducingothertaxesonbusinesses<4>Fundingclimate-relatedprojectssuchasrenewableenergyandgreentechnology<5>Fundingsocialservicessuchashealthcareandeducation<6>Assistingworkersinindustriesthatmayloseoutasaresultofthetax<95>Other(open[Q18_open])[open]pleasespecifyIMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPolicies<98>Don’tknow<99>NoneoftheaboveBase:randomlyselectedhalf[Q19a]Ifacarbonpricingpolicysignificantlylowersgreenhousegasesbutalsodecreasesthenumberofjobsincarbon-intensivesectors(suchasgeneratingelectricitybyburningcoal,ortransportingofgoodsusingfossilfuels),creatingsomejoblossesintheeconomy,wouldyousupportoropposesuchapolicy?<1>Stronglysupport<2>Somewhatsupport<3>Neithersupportnoroppose<4>Somewhatoppose<5>Stronglyoppose<98>Don’tknowBase:randomlyselectedhalf[Q19b]Ifacarbonpricingpolicysignificantlylowersgreenhousegasesbutalsodecreasesthenumberofjobsincarbon-intensivesectors(suchasgeneratingelectricitybyburningcoal,ortransportingofgoodsusingfossilfuels),creatingsomejoblossesinyourarea/neighborhood,wouldyousupportoropposesuchapolicy?<1>Stronglysupport<2>Somewhatsupport<3>Neithersupportnoroppose<4>Somewhatoppose<5>Stronglyoppose<98>Don’tknowAnexampleofacarbonpricingpolicyisanemissionstradingsystemorcap-and-trade.Inthissystem,companiesbuypermitsfromthegovernmentthatallowthemtopolluteuptoacertainlevel.Companiesthatdonotusealltheirpermitscouldsellthemtoothercompanies.Companiesthatneedmorepermitscaneitherbuythemorpaytoreducetheamountofcarbonthatotherpeopleororganizationsputout.However,companiescouldthenpassonpartofthecostofhavingtobuypermitsorreduceemissionstoconsumersandotherfirms,intheformofhigherprices.Base:all[Q20]Sinceanemissionstradingsystemisoneformofcarbonpricing,itscostsandbenefitsaresimilartotheonespresentedbefore.Thinkingaboutalloftheimpactsofanemissionstradingsystem,towhatextentwouldyousupportoropposethepolicyinyourcountry?<1>Stronglysupport<2>Somewhatsupport<3>Neithersupportnoroppose<4>Somewhatoppose<5>Stronglyoppose<98>Don’tknowAnexampleofacarbonpricingpolicyisacarbontax.Withacarbontax,fuelsupplierspayataxonthecarboncontentoffossilfuelsthattheyproduceorontheircarbondioxide(CO2)emissions.However,thefuelsupplierscouldinturnpassonpartofthetaxtoconsumersandotherfirms,intheformofhigherprices.Base:allIMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPolicies[Q22]Sinceacarbontaxisanotherformofcarbonpricing,itscostsandbenefitsaresimilartotheonesdiscussedintheearlierpartofthesurvey.Thinkingaboutalloftheimpactsofcarbontaxes,towhatextentwouldyousupportoropposethepolicyinyourcountry?<1>Stronglysupport<2>Somewhatsupport<3>Neithersupportnoroppose<4>Somewhatoppose<5>Stronglyoppose<98>Don’tknowOnewayofreducingclimatechangeisbysubsidizingrenewableenergyanduseofandresearchonlow-carbontechnologies.Thisinvolvesthegovernmentprovidingsubsidiesand/ortaxbreaksforresearchintorenewableenergy(suchassolarandwind)andencouragingenergysuppliersandothercompaniestoswitchtocleanerenergysources.Base:all[Q24]Thinkingaboutalloftheimpactsofasubsidytorenewableenergyandlow-carbontechnologies,towhatextentdoyousupportoropposethispolicyinyourcountry?<1>Stronglysupport<2>Somewhatsupport<3>Neithersupportnoroppose<4>Somewhatoppose<5>Stronglyoppose<98>Don’tknowBase:thosewhoopposerenewablesubsides[Q25]Whydoyouopposeasubsidytorenewableenergyandlow-carbontechnologiesinyourcountry?Pleaseselectallthatapply.<1>It’sineffectiveatreducingclimatechange<2>Itcangivesomefirmsanunfairadvantage<3>Thecostsarebornebytaxpayers<4>Thegovernmentshouldnotbepickingwinnersandlosers<5>It’snotpoliticallyfeasible/won’tbesupported<6>Itcouldincreasecorruption/lobbying<7>Mycountryshouldnotbepayingtoreduceclimatechange–othercountriesshould<8>Wedonotneedtoreducetheamountofcarbonweuse/donotneedtotackleclimatechange<95>Other(open[Q25_open])[open]pleasespecify<99>Don'tknowBase:all[Q26a]Ifasubsidytorenewableenergyorlow-carbontechnologiesincreasestheuseofcleanenergysourcesbuthastobepaidforthroughanincreaseintaxes(oradecreaseingovernmentspendinginothersectorsoftheeconomy),wouldyousupportoropposesuchapolicy?<1>Stronglysupport<2>Somewhatsupport<3>Neithersupportnoroppose<4>Somewhatoppose<5>Stronglyoppose<98>Don’tknowIMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPoliciesBase:all[Q26b]Ifasubsidytorenewableenergyandlow-carbontechnologiesincreasestheuseofcleanenergysourcesbuthastobepaidforthroughanincreaseinthetaxesthatyoupay(ordecreaseingovernmentspendinginsectorsoftheeconomythatyoubenefitfrom),wouldyousupportoropposesuchapolicy?<1>Stronglysupport<2>Somewhatsupport<3>Neithersupportnoroppose<4>Somewhatoppose<5>Stronglyoppose<98>Don’tknowAnotherpolicytoreduceclimatechangeisthroughlawsandregulationsthatlimittheamountofcarbonemissions.Thisincludesemissionstandardsforpowerplants,fueleconomystandardsforvehicles,andenergyefficiencystandardsforbuildingsandappliances.Theseregulationscouldraisethecostofenergyandothergoodstocompaniesandhouseholds.Base:all[Q30]Thinkingaboutalloftheimpactsofregulation,towhatextentdoyousupportoropposethispolicyinyourcountry?<1>Stronglysupport<2>Somewhatsupport<3>Neithersupportnoroppose<4>Somewhatoppose<5>Stronglyoppose<98>Don’tknowBase:thosewhoopposelawstoregulateemissions[Q31]Whydoyouopposeregulatingemissionsinyourcountry?Pleaseselectallthatapply.<1>It’sineffectiveatreducingclimatechange<2>Itmightnotapplytoallrelevantsectors<3>Theymightincreasethecostofliving<4>Theyaredifficulttoenforce/monitor<5>It’snotpoliticallyfeasible/won’tbesupported<6>Itcouldincreasecorruption/lobbying<7>Thegovernmentshouldnotinterfereinthemarket<8>Theycanbeburdensomeforcompaniesandhouseholds<9>Mycountryshouldnotbepayingtoreduceclimatechange–othercountriesshould<10>Wedonotneedtoreducetheamountofcarbonweuse/donotneedtotackleclimatechange<95>Other(open[Q31_open][open]pleasespecify)<99>Don'tknowBase:all[Q27]Towhatextentdoyouagreeordisagreethat?-[q27_1]Policiestoreducecarbonemissionswillleadtonewscientificbreakthroughsandnewindustries-[q27_2]Climatechangepolicywillonlybeeffectiveifmostcountriesadoptmeasurestoreducecarbonemissions<1>Stronglyagree<2>Slightlyagree<3>Neitheragreenordisagree<4>SlightlydisagreeIMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPolicies<5>Stronglydisagree<98>Don’tknowBase:all[Q28a]Shouldcountriesbepayingtoreducecarbonemissionsbasedontheircurrentoraccumulatedhistoriclevelsofemissions?<1>Contributionsshouldbebasedoncurrentcarbonemissions<2>Contributionsshouldbebasedonaccumulatedhistoriccarbonemissions<99>Don’tknowBase:all[Q28b]Whichcountriesdoyouthinkshouldbepayingtoreducecarbonemissions?<1>Onlyrichcountriesshouldcontributetoreducecarbonemissions<2>Allcountriesshouldcontributetoreducecarbonemissions<99>Don’tknowBase:all[Q29a]Howwilling,ornot,areyoutoreducetheamountofenergythatyouuseinordertohelpreduceclimatechange?<1>Verywilling<2>Fairlywilling<3>Notverywilling<4>Notatallwilling<98>Don’tknowBase:all[Q29b]Howwilling,ornot,doyouthinkpeopleinyourcommunityaretoreducetheamountofenergytheyuseinordertohelpreduceclimatechange?<1>Verywilling<2>Fairlywilling<3>Notverywilling<4>Notatallwilling<98>Don’tknowPublicSupportforClimateChangeMitigationPolicies:ACross-CountrySurveyWorkingPaperNo.WP/2023/223

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