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This publication is a Science for Policy report by the Joint Research Centre (JRC), the European Commission’s science and knowledge service.

It aims to provide evidence-based scientific support to the European policymaking process. The contents of this publication do not

necessarily reflect the position or opinion of the European Commission. Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf

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concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

Contact information

Name: Fabrizio Natale

Email: fabrizio.natale@ec.europa.eu

EU Science Hub

https://joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu

JRC133580

EUR 31512 EN

Print ISBN 978-92-68-04047-8 ISSN 1018-5593 doi:10.2760/82662 KJ-NA-31-512-EN-C

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How to cite this report: Deuster, C., Kajander, N., Muench, S., Natale, F., Nedee, A., Scapolo, F., Ueffing, P. and Vesnic Alujevic, L., Demography

and climate change, EUR 31512 EN, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2023, doi:10.2760/26411, JRC133580.

Contents

Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... 1

Foreword .................................................................................................................................... 2

Executive summary ................................................................................................................... 4

Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 9

Chapter 1 The role of population growth for greenhouse gas emissions at the global level 15

Chapter 2 Demographic characteristics and emissions in the EU .......................................... 33

Chapter 3 Sociodemographic differences in the attitudes towards climate change ............. 47

Chapter 4 A foresight perspective on demographic developments ........................................ 60

References ............................................................................................................................... 68

List of figures .......................................................................................................................... 76

List of Boxes ............................................................................................................................ 78

Appendix Introduction .............................................................................................................. 79

Appendix Chapter 2 ................................................................................................................. 80

Appendix Chapter 3 ................................................................................................................. 83

Appendix Chapter 4 ................................................................................................................. 90

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ISSNXXXX-XXXXThispublicationisaScienceforPolicyreportbytheJointResearchCentre(JRC),theEuropeanCommission’sscienceandknowledgeservice.Itaimstoprovideevidence-basedscientificsupporttotheEuropeanpolicymakingprocess.ThecontentsofthispublicationdonotnecessarilyreflectthepositionoropinionoftheEuropeanCommission.NeithertheEuropeanCommissionnoranypersonactingonbehalfoftheCommissionisresponsiblefortheusethatmightbemadeofthispublication.ForinformationonthemethodologyandqualityunderlyingthedatausedinthispublicationforwhichthesourceisneitherEurostatnorotherCommissionservices,usersshouldcontactthereferencedsource.ThedesignationsemployedandthepresentationofmaterialonthemapsdonotimplytheexpressionofanyopinionwhatsoeveronthepartoftheEuropeanUnionconcerningthelegalstatusofanycountry,territory,cityorareaorofitsauthorities,orconcerningthedelimitationofitsfrontiersorboundaries.ContactinformationName:FabrizioNataleEmail:fabrizio.natale@ec.europa.euEUScienceHubhttps://joint-research-centre.ec.europa.euJRC133580EUR31512ENPrintISBN978-92-68-04047-8ISSN1018-5593doi:10.2760/82662KJ-NA-31-512-EN-CPDFISBN978-92-68-03464-4ISSN1831-9424doi:10.2760/26411KJ-NA-31-512-EN-NLuxembourg:PublicationsOfficeoftheEuropeanUnion2023©EuropeanUnion,2023ThereusepolicyoftheEuropeanCommissiondocumentsisimplementedbytheCommissionDecision2011/833/EUof12December2011onthereuseofCommissiondocuments(OJL330,14.12.2011,p.39).Unlessotherwisenoted,thereuseofthisdocumentisauthorisedundertheCreativeCommonsAttribution4.0International(CCBY4.0)licence(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Thismeansthatreuseisallowedprovidedappropriatecreditisgivenandanychangesareindicated.ForanyuseorreproductionofphotosorothermaterialthatisnotownedbytheEuropeanUnion,permissionmustbesoughtdirectlyfromthecopyrightholders.TheEuropeanUniondoesnotownthecopyrightinrelationtothefollowingelements:-Coverpageillustration,©AlexanderOzerov/stock.adobe.com;©appledesign/stock.adobe.com-page16,©blvdone/stock.adobe.com;©number1411/stock.adobe.com;©Diego/stock.adobe.com;©EmanuelCorso/stock.adobe.com-page34,©zoranlino/stock.adobe.com;©AlexanderOzerov/stock.adobe.com;©Evrymnt/stock.adobe.com;©kunakorn/stock.adobe.com-page48,©Halfpoint/stock.adobe.com-page61,©zzzz17/stock.adobe.com;Howtocitethisreport:Deuster,C.,Kajander,N.,Muench,S.,Natale,F.,Nedee,A.,Scapolo,F.,Ueffing,P.andVesnicAlujevic,L.,Demographyandclimatechange,EUR31512EN,PublicationsOfficeoftheEuropeanUnion,Luxembourg,2023,doi:10.2760/26411,JRC133580.iContentsAbstract.....................................................................................................................................1Foreword....................................................................................................................................2Executivesummary...................................................................................................................4Introduction...............................................................................................................................9Chapter1Theroleofpopulationgrowthforgreenhousegasemissionsatthegloballevel15Chapter2DemographiccharacteristicsandemissionsintheEU..........................................33Chapter3Sociodemographicdifferencesintheattitudestowardsclimatechange.............47Chapter4Aforesightperspectiveondemographicdevelopments........................................60References...............................................................................................................................68Listoffigures..........................................................................................................................76ListofBoxes............................................................................................................................78AppendixIntroduction..............................................................................................................79AppendixChapter2.................................................................................................................80AppendixChapter3.................................................................................................................83AppendixChapter4.................................................................................................................901AbstractDemographyisintimatelyrelatedtobothclimatechangeadaptationandmitigation.ThereportfocusesondemographyandclimatemitigationthroughanalysesoftrajectoriesforemissionsandpopulationatglobalandEUlevels.Atthegloballevel,thereporthighlightstheroleofpopulationmomentum.Whilepopulationgrowthimpliesalmostbydefinitionhigheremissions,atleastintheshortterm,theintrinsicinertiaindemographicprocessesimpliesthatsolutionstoreduceemissionsneedtocomefromreducinginequalities,thegreeningoftheeconomyandachangeinconsumptionratherthanfrominterventionsonfertility.AttheEUlevel,thereportfindsthatalthoughinabsolutetermsolderpeopleemitless,theyhavehigherpercapitaemissions,agreatershareoftheiremissionsisconcentratedincarbon-intensiveconsumptionitemsandtheyarelesslikelytochangetheirattitudesorbehaviourtowardsmoreenvironmentallyfriendlypatterns.ConsideringthetrendsfortheageingoftheEUpopulation,theseintergenerationaldifferencesinconsumptionandattitudesaddanewpolicychallengetothealreadypressingneedtoreducethedifferencesinresponsibilitiesforemissionslinkedtoincome.2ForewordOurEuropeisconstantlyevolving.Today,twoofthemostsignificantmegatrendsarepopulationgrowthandclimatechange.Theyaretrendsthatcannotbeseenday-to-day,orevenyear-to-year.Inaworldwhereonlyfast-movingtrendscatchtheeye,theytendtopassunnoticed.Itoftenfallstoscientiststoexplaintheirimplications,andtopointtothefundamentaltransformationsthattheywilleventuallybring.Thereportthatfollows,writtenbytheJointResearchCentreattheEuropeanCommission,takesacloselookatbothtrends,andofthemannerinwhichtheyinteract.Itexamineshowchangesinthestructureandsizeofpopulationswillimpactoureffortstoreducegreenhousegasemissions,mitigateclimatechange,andpromoteenvironmentalsustainability,bylookingattrendssuchasage,gender,educationandthecompositionoftheworkingpopulation.Itshowsthatdespitetheslowrateofchange,thesedemographicfactorsmustbeincludedinoureffortstoreachcarbonneutralitybytheyear2050.Levelsofeducation,geographicaldistribution,andinter-generationalchangeareshowntobeespeciallyimportant,astheyexertsignificantinfluenceonattitudestoclimatechange.Thereportclearlydemonstrateshowyoungergenerations,peoplewhoarehighlyeducatedandresidentsoflargetownsaremoreawareoftheproblemofclimatechange,andmoreopentochangingtheirbehaviour,witheducationbeingthesinglestrongestfactor.ClimateChangeandDemographyremindsusthatevenunderoptimisticscenarios,wheretheParistargetoflimitingglobalaveragetemperatureincreasesto1.5degreesismet,considerablechallengeswillremain.Therewillbetemperatureandprecipitationextremes,moretropicalstorms,andasignificantriseinsealevels.Anddemographicfactorswillplayamajorroleinoureffortstoadapttoclimatechange.Noteverybodywillbeaffectedinthesamemanner,withsomesocietiesandsomesectorsofsocietysignificantlymorevulnerablethanothers.Wealthypopulationswithhigheducationlevelstendtohavemoreefficientinstitutionsandbetterpublichealthsystems,andeffectiveearlywarningsystems.Asthedangersofclimatechangegrowovertime,thesedemographiceffectswillbecomeincreasingnoticeable.Thisunderlinestheimportanceoflookingbeyondmitigation,andoffactoringdemographictrendsintolong-termadaptivecapacity.Forpolicymakers,therearemanyimportantimplicationsintheknowledgethatfollows.Whencombinedwithreportswithabroaderenvironmentalscope1),theyserveasanurgentreminderoftheneedforpoliciesthatarenotonlygreenandtransformational,butinclusiveaswell.Ourgreenfuturewillneedtobebuilt–bycitizensandforcitizens,leavingnoonebehind.Unforeseentrainingneedswillneedtobemet,andfiscalpolicieswillneedtobeadaptedtoavoidgrowingdisparities.Designingeffectivepoliciesrequiresaclearunderstandingofthetargetaudience.Thisreportpointstoapicturethatisshifting,andwewillstudyitslessonswithcare.Itwillhelpimproveourunderstandingoftheinterplaybetweenpopulations,climate,biodiversityandenvironmentalchange,andoftheneedforwell-designedpoliciesthathelpEuropeadapttothecomplexchangesahead.Europeisevolving–andwithgoodpolicymaking,wecansteerittoasustainable,inclusivefuture.DubravkaŠuicaVirginijusSinkevičiusVice-PresidentDemocracyandDemographyCommissionerEnvironment,OceansandFisheries1TheEUEnvironmentalForesightSystem(FORENV)–Finalreportof2021-22annualcycle–EmergingenvironmentalissuesduetodemographicchangesintheEU,PublicationsOfficeoftheEuropeanUnion,Luxembourg,2023ISBN978-92-76-60198-2,3AcknowledgementsWethank:DesaSRESEN(CABŠuica)forthesteeringofthisstudy;WolfgangLUTZ(IIASA),ManfredROSENSTOCK(DGENV)andNicoleOSTLAENDER(JRC)forcommentsandsuggestions;PatrickGERLAND(UnitedNationsPopulationDivision)forguidancewiththeUNPopulationProjectionsdata;GuidoTINTORIforfeedbackandcontributionstoChapter3;SonaKALANTARYANfortheassistanceinrelationtoAfrobarometerinChapter3;FrancescoSERMI(JRC),JanetAVRAAMIDES(JRC),JanLOESCHNERandDavideBONGIARDO(JRC)fortheassistancewithcommunicationmaterialandgraphicalediting.AuthorsChristophDEUSTER(Chapter3),NinaKAJANDER(Box1,2),StefanMUENCH(Chapter4),FabrizioNATALE(Editor,Executivesummary,Introduction,Chapter1andChapter2),AstridNEDEE(Box1,2),FabianaSCAPOLO(Executivesummary),PhilippUEFFING(Chapter1),LuciaVESNICALUJEVIC(Chapter4)4ExecutivesummaryThedefiningroleofpopulationinclimatechangere-emergedinNovember2022whentheworldpopulationreachedofthesymbolicmilestoneof8billion.Besidesaffluenceandtechnology,populationisthethirdfactorintheequationdeterminingglobalemissions.Therelationshipbetweendemographyandclimatechangecanbeseenfromtwodirections.Ononeside,populationsizeanddemographiccharacteristicsinfluenceemissionsandmitigationefforts.Ontheotherside,populationsareimpactedbyclimatechange,anddemographiccharacteristicsareamongthefundamentalaspectsthatneedtobeconsideredwhenassessingtheexposureandvulnerability,aswellasclimatechangeadaptationoptions.ThisreportfocusesonthemitigationsideoftherelationshipandprovidesanalysesoftrajectoriesofemissionsandpopulationattheglobalandEUlevels.Whilethealarmistviewsofexponentialpopulationgrowth,whichcharacterisedthedebateinthe1970s,arebynowmostlysuperseded,thediscussionsabouttheroleofpopulationgrowthonemissionscontinuetoshiftbetweendifferentviewpoints.Oneindicatesthateachpersononanalreadycrowdedplanetwillalmostbydefinitionincreaseoverallemissions,asecondoneemphasisestheneedtoaddressincomeinequalitieswithinandacrossregions,andathirdonebelievesintheroleofdisruptiveinnovationsinovercomingthesustainabilitychallengesposedbyeconomicandpopulationgrowth.Theslowdownofpopulationgrowth,theprevailingroleassignedtoincomeandtechno-optimismshouldnotcomeattheexpenseofamoreencompassingconsiderationofdemographicfactorsinclimatechangemitigationefforts.Somedemographershavelamentedthatthepopulationisoftenconsideredasanaccessoryonlyorjustasanexogenousinputintheenergyandeconomicmodelsofclimatechange.Actually,demographyisbarelymentioned,ornotadequatelyconsidered,inthetoolboxofclimatemitigationandadaptationpolicies.Inanefforttoraiseawarenessoftheroleofdemographyinclimatechange,thisreport,withamixofempiricalanalyses,literaturereview,policymappingandforesight,addressesaseriesofkeyquestionsrelatingtotheimpactsthatdemographicchangeintheEUandatthegloballevelhaveonemissions.Whatistheroleofpercapitagreenhousegasemissionsacrossmainworldregionsascomparedtotrendsinpopulation,technologiesandeconomicgrowth?Howarethesetrendsdecoupledfromemissions?Thegrowthoftheworldpopulationoverthemediumtermisdrivenbytheyouthfulagestructureofsomeworldpopulations,whichstemsfrompasthighfertility.Theso-calleddemographicmomentumimpliesthatsomeofthefurthergrowthofthetotalpopulationinthecomingdecadesisalreadypre-programmedintheagestructureofthepopulation,eveniffertilityisatareplacementlevel.Therefore,immediatesolutionstoreduceemissionsuntil2050mustcomeprimarilyfromthegreeningoftheworldeconomyandachangeinpercapitaconsumption.Thisdoesnotmeanthatchangesintheglobalpopulationsizeareirrelevant.Inthelongerterm,populationsizewillmattergreatlyintermsofvulnerabilityandpopulation’scapacitytoadapttothealreadyunavoidableclimatechange.Consideringfutureemissions,thepopulationsizeofthecurrentlow-emissioncountrieswillmakeabigdifferenceastheireconomiesgrowandconsumptionlevelsrise.Bothoftheseissuesrequiremorecarefulstudiesintermsoftheirimplicationsforsustainability.Withinthegeneraltrendofglobalpopulationgrowth,itiskeytotakeintoaccountregionaldifferencesinthedemographicstructureandtherelationsbetweenpopulationdynamicsandurbanisation,greentransitionanddevelopment.Futurepopulationgrowthwillbeconcentratedintheregionsoftheworldwhichhavecurrentlythelowestofpercapitaemissionsandlimitedresponsibilityforpastemissions(Figure1).Althoughstartingfromthislowlevel,theseregionsareexpectedtohavetheslowestprogressintermsofdecarbonisation,improvementinenergyefficiencyanddecouplingofeconomicgrowthfromemissions.5Figure1Population,emissionsandcarbonintensitySource:ownelaborationofenergyandemissionprojectionsfromIEA(2022)andpopulationprojectionsfromUNDESA.SeeChapter1fordetails.Notes:thesizeandthecolourofthesymbolsreflecttheemissionspercapitaandthecarbonintensity(i.e.,theratiobetweenemissionsandenergy).TheEUneedstocontinueitsdiplomaticeffortsatthegloballevelonclimateactiontoguarditspositionasarolemodelfortheinternationalcommunity.ItlieswiththeEUandotheraffluentregionsthathaveaccountedforalargeshareofhistoricemissionstoleadthecoordinationeffortstoreduceenergyintensity,developgreentechnologytodecoupleeconomicactivityfromburningfossilfuelsandadoptmoresustainableconsumptionpatterns.Policiessupportingsustainabledevelopmentthroughimprovementinhealth,andeducation,aswellasinequalityandpovertyreductionmayslowpopulationgrowthwhencarefullydesigned,buttheinternationalconsensusonacommonpopulationanddevelopmentagendaiswaning.TheEUcouldfurtherintensifyitssupportforstrategiestoreducechildandmaternalmortality,provisionofuniversalaccesstoeducation,particularlyofgirls,genderequality,endingofchildmarriage,andprovisionofuniversalaccesstosexualandreproductivehealthandreproductiverights.Whatwillbetheeffectofageing,shrinkinghouseholdsize,bettereducationandurbanisationonemissionsintheEU?Despitehavingamarginalroleinglobalpopulationgrowth,thedemographicdynamicsintheEUareexpectedtoplayaroleinthelevelofemissionsthroughtheirimpactsonconsumption.Overall,emissionsfollowcloselytheincomeandtotalexpenditureageprofiles.However,whenneutralisingtheeffectofincomeandwhenconsideringemissionsinpercapitaterms,itispossibletoobservethatolderpeopletendtoemitonaveragemorethanyoungergenerations(Figure2).Incities,emissionsarelowerthankstoso-calledurbaneconomiesofscale(e.g.,fromthesharingofpublictransport).Ontheotherhand,theseefficienciesarecontrastedbythehigherincomeofurbanresidents,whichnormallytranslatesinmoreconsumptionandemissions.Inaddition,whenconsideringemissionsinpercapitaterms,peopleincitiesarepenalisedbythefactthathouseholdsincitiestendtobesmallerwithrespecttoruralareasandthereforeemissionsaredividedbyasmallernumberoffamilymembers.AfricaChinaEU2010202020502010202020502010202020500.0B0.5B1.0B1.5B2.0B2.5BPopulation0K2K4K6KMtCO2AnnouncedPledgesScenario(IEA,2022)Populationgrowth,emissionsanddecarbonisation466Carbonintensity(MtCO2/PJ)0.24.1Emissionspercapita(tCO2)6Figure2EffectonemissionsintheEUfromageanddegreeofurbanisationSource:regressionsbasedonEurostatHouseholdBudgetSurveydata(2015)andExiobasemultipliers.SeeChapter2fordetailsInthenextdecades,despitethedifferencesinconsumptionpatternsacrossageprofiles,theprojectedchangesintheagestructureoftheEUpopulationarenotexpectedtoleadtodramaticincreasesinemissions.Theshiftintheresponsibilityforemissionstowardsoldergenerationsismorerelevant.Thefactthatmoreandmoreemissionswillbeproducedbyolderpeoplewhohavefewerpossibilitiesandpredispositiontochangetheirpatternsofconsumptionposestheneedtotargetmitigationpoliciesparticularlytowardsoldergenerations.Howcansociodemographicdifferencesinattitudestowardsclimatechangeimpactthegreentransitionthroughbehaviouralchangesandpoliticalsupport?IntheEU,youngergenerations,highlyeducatedpersons,andresidentsoflargetownsandcitiesaremorelikelytobelievethatclimatechangeisthemostseriousorveryseriousproblem(Figure3).Householdemissionsbyagefollowlargelytheincomeprofileandpeakatage45-49InrelativeandinpercapitatermsolderpeopletendtohavelargeremissionsgiventheirsmallerhousehouldsizeandconcentrationofexpendituresoncarbonintensiveresidentialitemsAgeprofileofemissionsEmissionswithcontrolforincomeEmissionswithoutcontrolforincomeEmissionswithoutcontrolforincomeandinpercapitatermsRuralTownTownTownRuralRuralCityCitieshaveloweremissionsthankstourbaneconomiesofscaleRuralareashaveloweremissionsgiventhelowerincomeRuralareashavelowerpercapitaemissionsgivenlowerincomeandlargerhouseholdsizeEmissionsbydegreeofurbanisation7Figure3Concernsaboutclimatechangebyage,educationandplaceoflivingSource:ownelaborationofEurobarometerdata.SeeChapter3fordetailsThesesociodemographicdifferencesintheconcernsaboutclimatechangealsotranslateintodifferencesinreportedpersonalbehaviours.Intermsoftrendsanalysedoverthepastdecade,theperceivedseriousnessofclimatechangeincreasedamongEUcitizens.Thelevelofawarenessoftheseverityofclimatechangevarieslessacrossagegroups,thanovertime.Thismightindicatethatindividualperceptionsofclimatechangearemoredeterminedbytheideasandbeliefsthatcharacteriseparticularperiodsintime,ratherthanthecharacteristicsofspecificgenerations.Educationisnotonlyshapingtheperceptionofclimatechange,butcanalsodetermineindividualactionsandthesupportforgovernmentalclimatestrategies.Policydesignonclimateactionshouldconsiderthechangingageandeducationstructuresaswellastheregionaldistributionofstudents.Itshouldalsoincludeastrongfocustoimprovetheoveralllevelofenvironmentaleducation.HowwilluncertaintiesontherelationshipbetweendemographyandclimatechangeunfoldconsideringforesightscenariosfortheEUinaglobalcontext?Demographicdevelopmentshaveanimportantroleinrelationtoclimatechange,butatthesametime,theyarelong-termtrendsthataredifficulttoinfluence.Low-carboninnovationwillbeacentrallevertoreduceemissionsandcompensatefordemographictrends.Itwillbeofcrucialimportancetoacceleratethetransferofgreentechnologiestocountriesthathavenotyetcreatedfossilfuelpathdependencies.Education,urbanisationandsocialcohesionhaveafundamentalroletoplayinthesocietalpushforenvironmentalactionandsustainability.Itisveryimportanttounderstandandfocusonhowlifestylescanbecomemoresustainable,asthegreentransitioncanbeinfluencedlargelybychangesinlifestylesandindividualbehaviours.Globallycoordinatedeffortsarekeyfortheglobalclimatetransition.Governmentsinregionsthathavethefinancialandtechnologicalcapacitiestobepioneersshouldcapitaliseontheseanddemonstratethattheclimatetransitionispossible.OverallconclusionThefindingsofthisreporthighlighttheneedtorecognisethatworldregionsarenowatverydifferentstagesoftheirdemographictransitions,withdifferentimplicationsforclimatechange.AgeEducationPlaceofliving21%18%17%16%10%14%25%17%17%19%Shareofrespondentsconsideringclimatechangeasthemostseriousproblembyage,educationplaceofliving8IntheEU,thefocusisontheimpactofageingonchangingconsumptionpatternsandthedifferencesinattitudesinrelationtoclimatechangeacrossagegroups.Whilethesetrendsarenotexpectedtocausealargeincreaseinemissions,theyhighlighttheneedforpoliciesaimedataddressingintergenerationalinequalities.ThefactthatthroughoutEuropetheyoungergenerationsarebettereducatedthantheolderones-andmoreeducationcomeswithmoreenvironmentalawarenessandflexibilityinchangingconsumerbehaviour-islikelytobeademographicforceacceleratingthegreentransitionintheEU.Atthegloballevel,theEUcouldproactivelysupporttheadvancementoftheinternationalagendaonpopulationanddevelopment.Inthatcontext,itcouldfurtherintensifythesupportforstrategiestoprovideuniversalaccesstosexualandreproductivehealthandreproductiverightsandtoeducation,especiallyforgirls.9IntroductionBackgroundandpolicycontextOn15November2022,theworldpopulationreachedthesymbolicmilestoneof8billion.Thisoccasionwasmarkedbydebatesontheimpactofpopulationgrowthonenvironmentalsustainability,thecarryingcapacityoftheplanetandclimatechange2.Withpopulationgrowthdecreasingandwiththepopulationpeakinsight,thetrajectoryoftheglobalpopulationisnowmoreresemblingthe“S”shapeofalogisticfunctionratherthantheexponentialindefinitegrowthformulatedbyneo-Malthusiansinthe1970s(seeFigure4).Shiftingfromaconceptofexponentialgrowthtologisticgrowthdoesnotmeanthatpopulationislessrelevantforclimatechange.Growthratesareappliedtoamuchlargerpopulationthaninthepastandagrowthrateof1%forthepopulationof2022meansaddingtennewcities,almostthesizeofNewYork,inoneyear.Itisdifficulttoimaginehowthisexpansion,whichwillcontinueatleastuntil2060,couldnotposeconsequencestoglobaleffortsforclimatemitigationandadaptation.Ontheotherhand,therecognitionthatweareapproachinganeweracharacterisedbythestabilisationofpopulationgrowthand,inthelongrun,bypopulationdeclinebringsnewelementstothedebatearoundtheroleofdemographyinclimatechange.Thisroleisre-dimensionedespeciallywhenconsideringpopulationagainstthebackdropoftrajectoriesofenergyconsumptionandeconomicgrowthstillgovernedbyexpectationsofexponentialgrowth.Atthesametime,itbecomesmoreimportanttoconsiderthedifferencesintrendsacrossworldregionsandthespecificitiesofdemographiccharacteristics,besidesjusttotalpopulationsizeandgrowth.VariationsinthestagesofdemographictransitionacrossworldregionsposedifferentchallengestoclimatechangemitigationWithinthegeneraltrendofgrowthoftheglobalpopulation,regionsandcountriesintheworldarepositionedatdifferentstagesinahistoricalprocessofdemographictransition.Thisprocessfollowsawell-definedpaththealongsideurbanisationdevelopmentandindustrialisation.Despitedifferencesinthestartandtimeandsometimesinthespeedoftransition,mostcountriesareexperiencingacharacteristicshiftfromalevelofhighmortalityandhighfertilitytoaleveloflowmortalityandlowfertility.ManydevelopingcountriesandagreatpartofAfricaarestillintheearlystageofdemographictransitionandexhibitrapidpopulationexpansionwithamarkedyoungagestructure.Onthecontrary,mostindustrialisedcountriesandallEUMemberStateshavecompletedthedemographictransitionandarenowfacingthechallengesofageingandofpopulationdecline.Thedifferentgrowthratesandagestructuresofpopulationshaveimplicationsforclimatechangemitigationefforts.ByjustlookingatthelimitedpopulationgrowthinadvancedeconomiesandtheEU,demographicfactorsseemtoplayjustaminorroleinthedebateaboutfutureglobalemissions.Ifanything,thedemographicdeclinebecomesanissueofconcernforitsmacroeconomicimpactsandpossibleconsequencesofstagnation.TheseconcernsareforexamplereflectedintheCommunication“AGreenDealIndustrialPlanfortheNet-ZeroAge”recentlylaunchedbytheEuropeanCommission(2023c),wheredemographicchangeismentionedalongsidehighinflation,labourshortages,andpost-COVIDsupplychainsdisruptions,asoneoftheheadwindschallengingtheresilienceoftheEUindustry.Acompletelydifferentperspectiveemergeswhenconsideringtheprojectionsfortheexpansionoftheglobalpopulation,whichwillbemostlyconcentratedintheAfricancontinent.Thequestionhereishowpopulationgrowthcanbereconciledwitheconomicgrowthandaforeseeableincreaseinconsumptiontowardsthelevelsnowenjoyedonlybyadvancedeconomies.FromalarmistviewstothedownplayingofdemographyfromglobalwarmingpoliciesWhilethealarmistviewsofexponentialpopulationgrowtharebynowdiscardedbymostanalysts,also,themoremoderateconcernsabouttheimpactofastillexpandingworldpopulationareoftenminimisedwiththeargumentthatultimatelyemissionsaremoreinfluencedbyincomeratherthanbypopulationsizeitself.Theshiftofattentiontowardsincomeisgenerallyaccompaniedbytrustinhumaningenuityandintherolethattechnologycanplayintheeffortstodecarboniseoureconomies.Someseeinmorepeopleontheplanetopportunitiesarisingfortheenrichmentinhumancapitalanddiversitywhichwillultimatelyallowaddressingthechallengesfacedbyhumanity(Goldin,2014).Techno-optimistsputtrustintheforceofinnovationandtendtoignorethebasicdependenceofglobaleconomiesonenergyandinparticularonthematerialneedsoffossil2Seeforexamplehttps://populationmatters.org/8-billion-people-and-counting/andhttps://www.un.org/en/dayof8billion10fuels(Smil,2022).Attheextreme,futuristslikeHarari(2017)orKurzweil(2001)invokeupcomingsingularitiessuchasdigitaltransformation,artificialintelligenceortheadventoffusionenergywhichwillallowforthehumanspeciestocontinuealongitspathofexponentialeconomicexpansion,independentlyfrompopulationsizeandplanetaryboundaries.Thepossibleconsequenceoftoo-optimisticviewsdismissingpopulationfromtheequationgoverningfutureemissionsisthatpopulationpoliciesgetalsoignoredfromthetoolboxofinstrumentstoaddressclimatemitigationandadaptation.Asprovocativelystatedinthetitleofanarticlebyleadingdemographers,populationrisksbeing“leftoutinthecold”fromglobalwarmingpolicy(Bongaarts&O’Neill,2018).Theargumentsraisedbythesedemographersarethatpopulationgrowthisnotover,thatpopulationchangeisnotdestinyandthatalsosmallreductionsinfertilitythroughfamilyplanningpoliciescouldhavetangibleeffectsonemissions.Partofthereasonwhypopulationpoliciesareleftasidefromthedebatesonenvironmentalsustainabilitydatestothehostilitytowardscoercivepopulationcontrolpolicieswhichdevelopedintheperiodbetween1974and1994leadingtotheCairopopulationconference(Coole,2021).TheconsensusreachedinCairoandre-affirmedinthesubsequentFrameworkofActionsforthefollow-uptotheProgrammeofActionoftheInternationalConferenceonPopulationandDevelopment(UnitedNations,2014),representedaparadigmshiftwheretheconcernsofover-populationandsustainabilityhavebeenreplacedbyastrongfocusonthecentralityofindividualhumanrightsanddignity,universalaccesstosexualandreproductivehealthforsustainabledevelopment.Akeyquestionraisedbysomeauthorsnowadaysisifthesehumanrightsprinciplescannotbealsoreconciledwitheffortstostabilisetheplanet’shumanpopulationforenvironmentalreasons(Coole,2021).Accordingtotheseauthorsavoidingfamilyplanningpolicyforitscontroversialnaturecouldmeanrenouncingtoanimportantclimatepolicyleverintheeffortstoreachzero-netemissions;agoal,thatgiventheurgencyandtherisksofenvironmentalandhumancivilisationcatastrophes,shouldbepursuedwithallpossibleinstrumentsatourdisposal.Atwo-sidedrelationbetweendemographyandclimatechangeinEUpoliciesEUpoliciescontainseveralreferencesabouttherelationshipbetweendemographyandclimatechangeconsideringbothdirectionsofthecausalpathwaysmovingfromandtopopulation(seeBox1andBox2andmoredetailsonthemappingexerciseofEUpoliciesintheAppendixtotheIntroduction).Ontheoneside,climateadaptationpoliciesanddemographypolicieshighlighttheimpactsofclimatechangeandenvironmentaldegradationontheEUpopulationintermsofexposureandvulnerability,and,ontheotherside,climatemitigationpoliciescaterfortheimplicationsoftheEUgreentransitionforthedifferentpopulationgroupswiththemainideathatnopersonandnoplaceisleftbehind.Ratherthanonpopulationsizeandgrowth,mostofthedemographicreferencesinEUclimatemitigationandadaptationpoliciesarerelatedtotheneedtocaterforthevulnerabilityofanageingpopulation,low-incomestatusandruralplaceofliving.Box1RoleofdemographyinEUclimateadaptationanddemographypoliciesClimatechangeanddemographicchangearetwoglobaltrendsthatimpactoneanother.TheEuropeanpopulationisageingrapidly.EurostatprojectsthattherewillbeclosetohalfamillioncentenariansintheEU-27by2050(Eurostat,2023a).ThisshiftintheagestructureoftheEuropeanpopulationishappeninginparallelwithchangesinclimate.Increasinglyfrequentheatwaves,droughtsandextremeweathereventsaffectoverallmortalityrates,humanwell-beingandpeople’slivelihoods.Inthecontextofanageingpopulation,olderadultswillbecomevulnerableandfacechallengesrelatedtotheirhealth,housing,mobilityaswellastheircapacitytodealwithextremeweather.TheseinterlinkagesbetweenclimatechangeanddemographicchangerepresentbothchallengesandopportunitiesfortheEU.Tacklingthemwillrequireforward-lookingpolicies,whichprotectvulnerablegroups–inparticularolderpersons.TheEUAdaptationStrategy(EuropeanCommission,2013)stressestheunequalexposureoftheEUpopulationtotheimpactsofheatwaves,flooding,waterscarcity,forestfiresandsea-levelrise.ThestrategyindicatesthatinregionswithlowGDP,ahighproportionofpeoplewithlowsocio-economicstatusandahighpercentageofolderpeopleliveareasaffectedbyhightemperatures.Thestrategyidentifiestheageingpopulationasparticularlyvulnerabletoclimatechangeimpacts.FloodingincitiesandwaterscarcityaremorefrequentlyexperiencedinsouthernEurope,wheremorethanhalfofthepopulationlivesinpermanentwaterscarcityconditions.Climatechangeismentionedasafactorinfluencinghumanlivelihoodsandwell-beingintheEUinitiatives,whichaimtotackletheconsequencesofdemographicchange.Thepolicyinstrumentshighlighthowthepressurescreatedbythedemographicchangeareexacerbatedbyclimatechangeandenvironmentaldegradation.TheCommissionDemographyReports2020and2023(EuropeanCommission,2020b,2023a)warnedthatglobalwarmingand11environmentaldeteriorationcouldhaveamajorimpactondemographicchange,contributingtodecreasedlifeexpectancy,increasedmortality,chronicillnessesandpeopledisplacement.TheGreenPaperonAgeing(EuropeanCommission,2021d)emphasisesthatinthecontextofdemographicchange,therewillbemoreolderadultssufferingfromchronicdiseases,whiletheeffectsofclimatechange,naturaldisastersandenvironmentaldegradationputdisproportionatepressureonolderpeopleandtheirhealth.Thiswillincreasetheneedforhealthcareservicesthatareadaptedforolderadultsandthatareabletocopewiththeconsequencesofthechangingclimate.TheEuropeanCareStrategy(EuropeanCommission,2022)aimstorespondtothischallenge.Itemphasisestheneedtoadaptcaresettingssothattheyprotectolderpeoplefromclimaticconditionssuchasheatwaves.Olderpeoplearenottheonlydemographicgroupthatisdisproportionallyaffectedbyclimateimpacts.TheStrategyontheRightsoftheChild(EuropeanCommission,2021c)underlinesthatclimatechangealsoexacerbatespre-existingformsofdiscriminationagainstchildrenandmakesthemmoreexposedtovulnerablesituations.Therightsforchildrenpresentedinthestrategyincludetherighttoliveinacleanandhealthyplanetandtherighttoenjoythenaturalenvironment.Thestrategyalsohighlightstheopportunityfortoday’schildren,whoareattheforefrontofraisingawarenessoftheclimatecrisis,tobeleadersoftomorrow.TheEducationforClimateCoalitionaimstohelpchildrenbecomeagentsofchangeintheimplementationoftheEuropeanClimatePactandtheEUGreenDeal.Theleastindustrialisedregionsareparticularlyvulnerabletotheeffectsofclimatechange.Thechangingclimaticconditionsincreasethevulnerabilityoffarmersandruralcommunities,whofacespecificchallengesrelatedtoclimatechange,includingincreasingheatwavesanddroughts.TheLong-termVisionforRuralAreas(EuropeanCommission,2021b)indicatesthatruralareaswillpotentiallybeargreatercostslinkedtotheclimatetransition.However,italsounderlinesthatthenaturalresourcesofruralareasarekeydefiningassetsforbuildingasustainablefuture,andthatruralareasplayakeyroleinmakingtheEUthefirstclimate-neutralcontinentby2050.Inthiscontext,supportingfarmers,forestersandruralentrepreneurswhoaretheenablersofthetransitiontowardsagreenersocietyisessential.TheEURuralActionPlanidentifiesconcreteareasforactiontomakeruralareasmoreresilienttoclimatechange.Theseincludeactionstoincreasethepreservationofnaturalresourcesandthegreeningoffarmingactivitiesandsupplychains.TheCommission’sCommunicationonHarnessingTalentinEurope’sRegions(EuropeanCommission,2023b)recognisesthatthelabourshortagesthattheEUasawholehasbeenconfrontedwithcouldincreaseinthecontextofthetransitiontowardsclimateneutrality,unlessskillsarealignedwiththechangingneedsofthemarket.Disadvantagedregions,whichalreadyfacetheproblemofintensedepartureoftheiryoungandskilledworkforce,arelikelytobemoreacutelyimpacted.TheCommunicationproposestoolsandstrategiestoaddressthelossoftalentandskillsinthemostdisadvantagedregionsandoutlinestargetedmeasurestotransformruralcommunitiesaffectedbypopulationloss,ageingandalackofeconomicopportunitiesintodynamictalent-drivenlocations.Box2RoleofdemographyinclimatemitigationpoliciesHumanpopulationsareatthecentreoftheclimatedebate.Populationgrowthandhumanactivitiescontributetoincreasedgreenhousegasemissions.Demographicchangeandpopulationageingwillleadtodiverseconsumptionandemissionspatterns.Climatechangeimpactsdifferentdemographicgroupsandgeographicareasdifferently.Olderpeople,childrenlivinginpovertyaswellaspopulationsinareasthataresensitivetoclimateimpactssuchassea-levelrise,areparticularlyvulnerabletoclimatechangeandenvironmentaldegradation.Embeddingdemographicconsiderationsinclimatepolicies,andunderstandingthediverseimpactofclimatechangeondifferentdemographicandsocioeconomicgroups,isimportantforthedesignofclimatemitigationpoliciesthattakeintoaccounttheneedsofthechangingpopulation.TheEuropeanGreenDealaimstotransformtheEUintoamodern,resource-efficientandcompetitiveeconomy.Itsmainobjectiveistoensurethattherewillbenonetemissionsofgreenhousegasesby2050,thateconomicgrowthisdecoupledfromresourceuse,andthatnopersonandnoplaceisleftbehind.ThismeansthatallEuropeansshouldbeabletobenefitfromthetransitionasfairlyaspossible.Overall,thegreentransitionisexpectedtobringpositiveimpactsintermsoftheeconomyandjobs,buttheimpactswillbefeltdifferentlybydifferentsocio-economicgroups,economicsectorsandcountries.TheEuropeanCommissionhasproposedaSocialClimateFund,whichwillprovidefundingtotheEUMemberStatestosupportvulnerableEuropeancitizens.TheSocialClimateFundispartoftheEU’sFitfor55in2030package,i.e.theEU’splantoreducegreenhousegasemissionsbyatleast55%by2030comparedto1990levels,inlinewiththeEuropeanClimateLaw.Itwillbenefitvulnerablehouseholdsandtransportusersthatareparticularlyaffectedbyenergyandtransportpoverty.OtherpolicymeasuresalsocontainelementstoincreasetheinclusivenessandsocialconsciousnessofEUclimatepolicies.TheEnergyTaxationDirectiveofferspossibilitiestoexemptvulnerablehouseholdsfromhigherenergytaxes,theEnergyEfficiencyDirectiveandRenewableEnergyDirectiveaimtostimulateenergysavingstoalleviateenergypovertyandtheAlternativeFuelsInfrastructureRegulationaimstoensurethatchargingandrefuellinginfrastructureforzero-emissionvehicleswillreachallpartsofEurope.12TheEnergySystemIntegrationStrategystressesthatthetoolscreatedinthecontextoftheintegrationstrategyshouldreflecttherealityofdemographicchangeandinparticulartheincreasingnumbersofolderconsumerswhoneedtobespecificallysupportedinthedigitaltransition.Also,theCommission'scommunicationontheRenovationWaveforEuropetacklesenergyefficiencytogetherwithaccessibility,aimingtomakebuildingsmoreusableandsustainableinthecontextofanageingpopulation.TheSustainabilitySmartMobilityStrategy(EuropeanCommission,2020a)representsabestpracticeintermsofintegratingdemographicconsiderationsintoEUpolicies.Thestaffworkingdocumentcontainsachapterondemographictrendsandtheirimpactonmobility,usingpopulationprojectionsbasedonEurostatdata.Thedocumenthighlightsthatbesidestherelativegrowthoftheshareofthepopulationlivinginurbanareas,ageingsocietiesinEuroperepresentademographictrendthatislikelytoshapemobilitypatternsinthefuture.Thestrategyrecognisesthatanewapproachtothedesignofnetworkandbusinessmodelsisneeded,whichshouldalsotakeintoconsiderationtheimpactofclimatechangeonthecurrentandfutureinfrastructureaswellasthedemographicchangeimpactingthemobilitypatternsofthefuture.TheNewEuropeanBauhaus(EuropeanCommission,2021a)isanothergoodexampleofintegratingdemographicinsightsintoEUpolicies.TheCommission’scommunicationanditsannexesmakeamplereferencestotheneedsofdifferentsegmentsofsocietyandsocio-economicgroups.TheNewEuropeanBauhausisguidedbythreevalues–sustainability,aestheticsandinclusion.Inthiscontext,thestrategyconsiderstheneedsoftheageingpopulation,aswellastheneedsofthemostvulnerablegroups–theelderly,youngpeopleandmigrantsNotjustpopulationsizePopulationisakeyelementinIntegratedEconomicAssessmentmodels(IAMs)usedtoevaluatetheinteractionbetweenpopulation,technology,energy,economicgrowthaswellascarboncyclesandclimate.TheNobellaureateNordhauswhopioneeredthedevelopmentofIEAmodelsunderlinesthattherearethreewaystoreduceemissions:“lowerpopulationgrowth,lowergrowthinlivingstandards,andlowerCO2intensity(decarbonization)”(Nordhaus,2013).TheroleofthepopulationisexplicitlyacknowledgedinIPCCreports.ThelatestAR6SynthesisReportforexamplestatesthat“Globally,grossdomesticproduct(GDP)percapitaandpopulationgrowthremainedthestrongestdriversofCO2emissionsfromfossilfuelcombustioninthelastdecade(highconfidence)”(IPCC,2023a).IntheIPCCreportspopulationismoreoftenmentionedwhenconsideringtheoppositedirectionoftherelationdescribingtheimpactofclimatechangeonthepopulation.Thefocusisinthiscaseontheadaptationgapsandtheimpactofclimatechangeintermsofexposureandhighervulnerability,consideringthedifferentdemographic,socioeconomiccharacteristicsandgeographicalcontextofpopulations.TheIEA2022EnergyOutlookreport(IEA,2022)providesdetailedmodellingofenergysupplyanddemandaccordingtodifferentenergyandemissionsmitigationscenarios.Inthesemodels,populationisanexternalinputwithlimitedconsiderationsofthepossibleinteractionsandfeedbackloopsbetweenGDP,energyandthedemographiccomponentsoffertility,mortalityandmigration.Furthermore,bothIAMandenergymodelsmostlyreferontotalpopulationandtendtoignoretheinfluencesonemissionsfrommorespecificdemographicdimensionssuchasage,education,rural-urbanplaceofresidenceandhouseholdsizeandcomposition.ExamplesofquestionswhicharisewhenconsideringmoreexplicitlytheroleofthesedemographiccharacteristicsonclimatechangeandenvironmentalimpactsarecontainedinarecentforesightexerciseconductedbyDGENVundertheEUforesightsystemforthesystematicidentificationofemergingenvironmentalissues(FORENV)(EuropeanCommissionetal.,2023).ThefinalreportofthisexerciseidentifiesemergingenvironmentalissueslinkedtodemographicchangesintheEUusingexpertknowledgeanddesk-basedresearchintoexistingrelevantliterature.Inparticular,thefollowingthreeissuesrefertodemographicdynamicsintheEUwhichcouldrepresentimportantdriversforenvironmentalimpacts.•HowmightEurope’sageingpopulationinfluencepoliticalpreferencesforthegreentransition?•Whatwillbetheenvironmentalimpactofchangesinthedemographicmakeupofurbanareas?•AsEurope’spopulationages,willconsumptionpatternschangeandwhatwillthismeanfortheenvironment?AimandstructureofthisreportThemainaimofthisreportistoargueinfavourofamoreencompassingconsiderationofdemographicelementsinclimatechangemitigationpoliciesandmodelling.13ThereportbuildsontheFORENVexerciseandtacklesthethreequestionsabovethroughfindingsfromtheliteratureandoriginalempiricalanalyses.ItexpandstheFORENVexercisebylookingattherelationbetweendemographyandemissionsnotonlyintheEUbutalsointheglobalcontext.Thereportisstructuredintofourmainchapters.Chapter1setsthescenebydescribingtherelationshipbetweenpopulationandenvironment;whyitmatters;howitisaddressedinternationallyandwhatarepossibleconsequencesof(in)action.Thechapterintroducestheconcernsaboutthesizeoftheglobalpopulation,theenvironmentandsustainabledevelopmentthatstartedinthemiddleofthe20thcenturyandhowitshiftedfromconcernsmainlyaboutfoodproductionandsubsistencetoconcernsaboutemissionsandclimatechange.ItthendiscussesthecontributionofthepopulationtoemissionshighlightingtheimportanceofdemographicmomentumandthedecouplingofemissionsfrompopulationandGDPgrowth.Chapter2focusesontheEUandexamineshowage,householdsizeandrural-urbanplaceoflivingcandetermineemissionsalongtheconsumptionchannel.TheanalysesarebasedonthemergingofmicrodatafromtheEUHouseholdBudgetSurveyandCO2multipliersfrommacromultiregionalinputandoutputtablesrepresentingthespecificitiesofsustainabilityofproductionsystemsinnationaleconomiesandtradedependencies.Chapter3turnstotheindividualperspective.Itanalysespeople’sattitudestowardsclimatechange.Inparticular,itillustrateshowindividualsperceiveclimatechange,howtheyevaluatetheimportanceofpersonalactionsandtheresponsibilityofstateauthoritiesfortacklingclimatechange,andhowtheyassesspublicpoliciesandthegoalsoftheEuropeanGreenDeal.Chapter4complementstheotherchapterswithaqualitativeandforward-lookingperspective.ItmakesuseofReferenceforesightscenariosontheglobalstandingoftheEUin2040toexploretheimplicationsandpossiblefuturetrajectoriesfocusingonthepointsleftunansweredintheempiricalliteratureandinthequantitativeanalysesintheotherchapters.1415Chapter1TheroleofpopulationgrowthforgreenhousegasemissionsatthegloballevelKeymessages•Amajorchallengetoachievingasustainablefutureofhumanactivitywillbetomeetinternationalcommitmentandsignificantlyspeeduptheloweringofgreenhousegasemissionsinadvancedeconomiesaswellastosupporttheprospectofeconomicgrowth,urbanisationanddevelopmentinemergingeconomieswithareductioninenergyandemissionintensity.•Debatesaboutthelimitstopopulationgrowthhaveresurfacedinthecontextofclimatechangeandwilllikelyremainsalientwiththeworldpopulationprojectedtocontinuegrowingbyatleastanotherbillionuntilmid-century.•Demographicresearchhasbeenslowincontributingtothestudyofclimatechangedespitethehumanpopulationbeingatthecentreofglobalwarming.•Populationisalessercontributortoglobalemissionsthaneconomicgrowth,anditisconcentratedintheregionswiththelowestemissions.•Thereisalargegapbetweentheemissionsproducedbyapersoninpoorercountries,wherepopulationgrowthratesareoftenhigh,andtheemissionsproducedbyapersoninhigher-incomecountrieswherepopulationgrowthratesareoftenloworalreadynegative.•Besidespopulationgrowth,otherdemographicfactorssuchasurbanisation,ageing,orinternalandinternationalmigrationprocesses,influenceglobalemissions.•Whilepopulationaddstoeconomicdemand,globalfertilitylevelsarealreadyfallingandtheworldpopulationisprojectedtostopgrowinginthesecondhalfofthe21stcentury.•Thegrowthoftheworldpopulationoverthemediumtermishighlycertainasitistoalargeextentdrivenbythecurrentyouthfulagestructurethatstemsfrompastgrowth.•Long-termprojectionsoftheworldpopulationhaveahighdegreeofuncertaintyandwhethertheglobalpopulationlevelsoffat9,10or11billioninthesecondhalfofthiscenturywillhaveastrongeffectonemissionsastheworldisfaroffthetrackfrombecomingcarbonneutralby2050.•Sustainabledevelopmentisrecursivelylinkedtolowerbirthrateswhich,inturn,alsocontributestolowertotalemissions,butactiontoaccelerateprogresstowardsinternationaldevelopmentgoalswouldneedtobetakennowtomakeadifferencelong-termasthereisasignificantlagforpolicyeffectsduetodemographicinertia.•TheEUiscommittedtoaninternationallyagreedpopulationanddevelopmentagenda,includingsupportforcurrentgoalstoreducechildandmaternalmortality;provideuniversalaccesstoeducation;achievegenderequality;endchildmarriage;andprovideuniversalaccesstosexualandreproductivehealthandreproductiverightsthatarealsorelatedtoafastertransitiontolowerlevelsoffertility.•Internationalconsensusonanindividual-rights-basedapproachtopopulationpoliciesiswaningwhichimpedesprogresstowardsthegoalsofacommonpopulationanddevelopmentagenda.16IntroductionAfterquadruplinginsizeinthelastcentury,thenumberofpeopleintheworldisnowabove8billionandwillplausiblyreachbetween9and12billionbeforelevellingoffduringthecourseofthe21stcentury(UnitedNationsDepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairs,PopulationDivision,2022).Globaltemperatureshaveincreasedby1.1degreesCelsiusinthattimeandthefuturepopulationwillfacethechallengeofanadditional1.5to3degreesCelsius(IPCC,2023a).Theincreaseinthesizeoftheworldpopulationandthewarmingoftheclimatehavebeenlabelled‘megatrends’or‘grandtransitions’definingourtimesandfuture(EEA,2015;Lutz,2017;Smil,2021).Athirdof50surveyedNobellaureatescited‘populationgrowthandglobalwarming’asthebiggestthreattohumanitymakingitthetopanswerbeforenuclearwar,infectiousdiseases,AIorinequality3.Theimportantpointisthepresumedlinkintheposedquestionthatpopulationgrowthandclimatechangewerepresentedascombinedandnotindividualthreats.Asimplisticnarrativeofpopulationgrowthcausingclimatechangeevokesconcernsaboutthere-emergenceofcoercivepoliciestocontrolfertility,theUnitedNationsPopulationFundstressesinitslatestreportonthestateoftheWorldPopulation(UNFPA,2023).Thereisalsoastarkmismatchinpopulationgrowthratesandlevelsofemissionsacrosscountries.Themainemitters,historicandcurrent,theUS,China,andtheEU,areregionswherethepopulationhasstoppedgrowingorisgrowingatalowpace.Theregionswherepopulationsaregrowingstrongestarethosethatonlycontributeafractiontoglobalwarming.Nevertheless,giventhathumanactivityisthemaincauseofglobalwarming,agrowingglobalpopulationentailsincreasinggreenhousegasemissionsintheabsenceofchangeinhowhumanityconsumesandhowitproducesenergy(O’Neilletal.,2010).ThischapterseekstoillustratethecomplexrelationshipbetweenpopulationgrowthandclimatechangefromtheperspectiveoftheEUinaglobalcontext.ItfirstsummarisesthefindingsoftheUnitedNation’sInternationalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC),themajorinternationalbodythatbringstogetherexpertsandscientiststoassessthecurrentscientificknowledgeonclimatechange,whichhasstressedtheneedtoaddressclimatechangeandtheroleofpopulationgrowthforgreenhousegasemissions.Thisisfollowedbyadiscussionofthehistoryofdebateaboutthelimitsofpopulationgrowthanditscurrentunderstandinginthecontextofclimatechange.ThechapterthenturnstodemographicstudiesoftheroleofpopulationgrowthinclimatechangeandlooksatpledgedandstatedpoliciesbytheEUincomparisontootherregionstodecoupleeconomicactivityfromglobalwarming.Thepotentialofreducingemissionsbyslowingthepaceofpopulationgrowththroughpolicyinterventionsisdiscussedbeforethemainpointsaresummarisedintheconclusion.Beyondtheeffectofpopulationgrowthonclimatechange,otherdemographicprocessessuchasageingfromchangesintheagecompositionofapopulation,changesinfamilysizeandhousecomposition,orurbanisationandchangesinpopulationdensityhavebeenshowntoimpacttheemissionsofgreenhousegas.Thischapterwillfocusmostlyonthefactorofpopulationgrowthforclimateemissionsasitisthecentralthemeofthedebateaboutlimitstohumanpopulationsandpolicystrategiestoreducethepaceofpopulationgrowth.Furthermore,adetailedoverviewofthedemographiccompositionandstructureofemissionsispresentedinChapter2whichanalysestheEuropeancontext.TheroleofpopulationgrowthinglobalemissionsinIPCCreportsTheimportanceofaddressingclimatechangeClimatechangeisoneofthedefiningglobalchallengesfacinghumanitytoday.Thewarmingoftheplanetisalreadybeingfeltintheformofextremeweathereventssuchasfloodsanddroughts,risingsealevels,andlossofbiodiversity.Continuousriseintemperatureswillintensifytheseconsequencesofclimatechangewithlikelyseriousimplicationsforhumanhealth,foodsecurity,andeconomicstability.TheIPCCAR6Synthesisreportstatesthat“Itisunequivocalthathumaninfluencehaswarmedtheatmosphere,oceanandlandsincepre-industrialtimes”(IPCC,2023a).Industrialisation,deforestation,andlarge-scaleagriculturehavedramaticallyincreasedtheemissionofgreenhousegasesforalmosttwocenturiesleadingtothewarmingoftheatmosphere,oceanandland;andglobalemissionsarecontinuingtoreachrecordlevels.In2015,theParisAgreementundertheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC)wassignedbyalmostallcountriesaroundtheworld.Itshowedglobalcommitmenttotheformulatedaimto3Grove,J(2017)Dogreatmindsthinkalike?TheTHE/LindauNobelLaureatesSurvey.TheTimesHigherEducation,News,31.08.2017.RetrievedApril212023.URL:https://www.timeshighereducation.com/features/do-great-minds-think-alike-the-the-lindau-nobel-laureates-survey17strengthentheglobalresponsetoclimatechangeandlimitglobalwarmingtolessthan2degreesCelsiusabovepre-industriallevelsandtopursueeffortstoevenkeeptheincreaseintemperaturebelow1.5degreesCelsius4.However,countriesarenottakingsufficientactiontoreachpledgedemissionreductiontargetsandtheSecretaryGeneraloftheUnitedNationsurgedcountriesatthelatestconferenceofthepartiestotheUNFCCCthat“theworldstillneedsagiantleaponclimateambition”5.TheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)reportedinitslatestfindingsthattheworldisoff-trackfromkeepingglobalwarmingbelowthetargetof1.5degreesCelsius.Itwouldneedrapid,far-reachingandunprecedentedchangesinallaspectsofsocietytoreachnet-zeroemissionsby2050.TheEUhasrecognizedtheneedtoaddressclimatechangeandintroducedacomprehensiveplanfocusedonthegreeningofitseconomytoreachacarbon-neutraleconomyby20506.Theintroducedpolicyinstrumentstargetinvestmentinrenewableenergy,supportforenergyefficiencyofbuildings,protectionoftheenvironment,thegreeningoftheagriculturalsector,andtransitiontosustainablecarbon-neutralmobilityandtransportation(seeBox1).However,alsotheEUclimateactionhasbeenconsideredinsufficientinitscurrentform7andtheEuropeanCommissionhasstatedtheneedforurgentadditionalaction8.Withhumanactivity,theprimarycauseforincreasingconcentrationofgreenhousegasemissions,populationgrowthistightlylinkedtoclimatechange.TheIPCCSynthesisReportoftheFifthAssessmentRound(AR5)in2014statedthat“Anthropogenicgreenhousegasemissionshaveincreasedsincethepre-industrialera,drivenlargelybyeconomicandpopulationgrowth,andarenowhigherthanever.”Thisstatementsomewhatmaskedthedependencyofgreenhousegasemissionsonnotonlypopulationandincomebutalsoonconsumptionpatternsandtheefficiencyoftechnologiesforproductioninthesummaryreportforpolicymakers.TherecentlypublishedIPCCSixthAssessmentReport(AR6)highlightsthecomplexrelationshipbetweenpopulationandclimate.ItanalysestheimpactofpopulationgrowthonclimatechangewhichisdiscussedintheReportontheMitigationofClimateChange(WGIII)oftheAR6withafocusonthedecouplingofgrowingpopulationsizeandincreaseinemissionsbasedonlinkagesbetweenfutureclimatechangescenarioswithasetofdifferentpopulationprojectionscenarios(IPCC,2023b).TheSynthesisReport’ssummaryforpolicymakersnowemphasisestheinterlinkagesofdemographicpressuresfrompopulationgrowth,changesinpopulationcomposition,andurbanisationwithotherdrivers.TheIPCCalsostressesthatpopulationgrowthisnotthemainfactorforglobalwarmingandthatincreasesinemissionscanalsobeobservedindependentlyfromtheincreaseinpopulationsize:“globalgreenhousegasemissionshavecontinuedtoincrease,withunequalhistoricalandongoingcontributionsarisingfromunsustainableenergyuse,landuseandland-usechange,lifestylesandpatternsofconsumptionandproductionacrossregions,betweenandwithincountries,andamongindividuals”(IPCC,2023a).TherelationshipbetweenpopulationgrowthandclimatechangeDebatesaboutlimitstopopulationgrowthhaveresurfacedtodayinthecontextofclimatechangeConcernsaboutthesizeoftheglobalpopulationandclimatearenotnew.Population-environmentinteractionshavebeenexaminedsincetheglobalpopulationbegangrowingrapidlymorethan200yearsagoduringtheonsetoftheindustrialrevolution(Hunteretal.,2022).Fromthelast18thcenturyonwards,thedemandsonresourceshavesteadilyincreasedwhilenegativeecologicalconsequencesemergedsuchasworseningairandwaterquality,thedeclineinwaterandlandresources,orwithtimeclimatechange(LiviBacci,2017b;Véron,2013).TheideaofpopulationgrowthboundbylimitsofsubsistenceoriginatesfromtheworkofThomasMalthuspublishedin1798inhisEssayontheprincipleofpopulation(Malthus,1798).Itpostulatesthatfoodproductionwasnotabletokeepupwiththepaceofpopulationgrowth,anideathathasbeencoined‘Malthusiantrap’.4UnitedNations(2023)ClimateAction–TheParisAgreement.Retrieved:20.04.2023,URL:https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/paris-agreement5UnitedNations(2023)COP27-The27thConferenceofthePartiestotheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange.Retrieved:20.04.2023,URL:https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/cop276SeerecentspeechbyPresidentvonderLeyenattheBeyondGrowthConferenceintheEuropeanParliamenthttps://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_23_27617ClimateActionTracker(2022)EU–5Nov2022Update.RetrievedApril212023.URL:https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/eu/8EuropeanParliament(2023)StatementoftheEuropeanCommissiononthedebateon:IPCCreportonClimateChange:acallforurgentadditionalaction.Retrieved28.04.2023,URL:https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2023-04-20-ITM-003_EN.html18Malthussuggestedthatpeopledelaymarriageorremainsingletolowerfertilityandslowpopulationgrowth.Healsoarguedthatincreasedmortality,especiallyamongthepoor,wasnecessarytopreventoverpopulationsothatpopulationkeepswithinthelimitsofavailableresources.Malthus’sargumentsreceivedmuchprominenceinupdatedforminthe1960sand1970swhenthepaceofpopulationgrowthwasatitspeak.ThomasEhrlichpublishedthebook‘ThePopulationBomb’arguingthatuncheckedpopulationgrowthwouldleadtoenvironmentaldegradation.TheClubofRomepublished‘TheLimitstoGrowth’warningaboutthecollapseofsocietyinthecaseofcontinuedpopulationgrowth,resourcedepletionandpollutionbasingitsresultsonafirstcomputerisedpopulation-environmentmodelthatpredictedtheworldpassingitscarryingcapacitywithin100years.Theseideasarelabelledneo-Malthusianasthebasedpremiseremainsoverpopulationandresourcescarcitywhiletheinfluenceofconsumptionandtechnologyisacknowledged.Neo-Malthusianthinkingwasprevalentininternationalorganisationsandnationalgovernments.Populationcontrolwasseenasnecessarytoachieveeconomicdevelopmentandpreventresourcescarcity(McDonald,2016).Thisisreflectedinthepopulationpoliciesintroducedatthattimeinthetwomostpopulouscountries:theone-childpolicyinChinaandIndia’spopulationcontrolprogramthatentailedsterilisationcampaignswithfundingfromtheWorldBank,theSwedishInternationalDevelopmentAuthority,andtheUnitedNationsPopulationFund(Follet,Chelsea,2020).Therehasbeenstrongoppositiontotheideathatpopulationgrowthislimitedbyresourcescarcity.Opponentsarguedthatthroughouthistory,populationgrowthhasdriventechnologicaladvancesthathaveallowedhumanitytokeeppacewithincreasingdemandsonnaturalresourcesandfoodproduction(Kremer,1993).Populationgrowthwouldleadtoinnovationandadaptation,andthustoeconomicprogressandincreasedagriculturaloutputwithoutdepletingresources(Boserup,1965).Thetippingpointwhereresourcesbecomelimitedandtheirdepletioncausesdisastrousconsequencesleadingtosocialcollapsehasnotmaterialised.AtthetimeofMalthus,theworldpopulationstoodatabout1.5billion.WhentheClubofRomepublishedaboutthelimitsofgrowththeworldpopulationwasabouttoreach4billion.Sincethen,theworldpopulationhascontinuedtogrow,albeitatacontinuouslyslowerpacesincethe1960s(Figure4).Ratherthananeffectoflimitsofgrowth,thisisexplainedbymoreandmorecountriescompletingthedemographictransitionfromalargelyruralagrariansocietywithhighbirthratesandhighdeathsratestoapredominantlyurbanindustrialsocietywithlowbirthratesandlowdeathsrate,whichhashappenedinthecourseofeconomicdevelopmentandmodernisation(Lee,Ronald&Mason,Andrew,2006;LiviBacci,2017a).Figure4Globalpopulationsizeandannualgrowthrate:estimates,1950-2022andprojections2022-2100.Notes:annualgrowthrate:dotsandleftaxis;totalpopulation:lineandrightaxis.Source:before1950,Cohen(2003);1950-2021,UNDESA;2022-2100,IHME,IIASA,UNDESA.164016801720176018001840188019201960200020402080-0.5%0.0%0.5%1.0%1.5%2.0%Avg.populationannualgrowthrate-2B0B2B4B6B8B10BPopulation"EssayonthePrincipleofPopulation""Thelimitsofgowth""Thepopulationbomb""Cairoconsensus""EssayonthePrincipleofPopulation""Thelimitsofgowth""Thepopulationbomb""Cairoconsensus"HistoricalestimatesIHMEIIASAUNDESA19Thedifferenttheoriesarenotnecessarilymutuallyexclusiveandofferpartialviewsontheimpactofpopulationgrowth(Jolly,1994).Theretrospectiveobservationthatwarningsaboutadverseconsequencesofpopulationgrowthattimeswhentheworldpopulationwasmuchsmallerandthencontinuedtogrowdoesnotprovethatfuturegrowthwillnothavenegativeeffectsontheenvironment(Weber&Sciubba,2019).Trewavas(2002),forexample,pointstorepeated‘Malthusianwatersheds’inagriculturethathumanityhasovercomebyapplyingscientificknowledgetoincreasecropyields.RatherthandisprovingMalthusiantheory,itemphasisestheneedforcontinuedinnovationtomeetthedemandsofagrowingpopulation.Whileconcernsaboutsustainabilityhavereplacedconcernsaboutsubsistence,thedifferentperspectivescontinuetoprovidethebasisfordebate(Hunteretal.,2022).Today,inatimewhentheworldreached8billionpeople,thefocusofthepopulation-environmentrelationshiphasshiftedtodebatesaboutclimatechangeandlossofbiodiversity.Thequestionofwhethertheworld’spopulationshouldbereducedisnowlinkedtolimitingglobalwarming(Mills&Rahal,2021).However,afterthefiercedebateaboutthefinitepopulationgrowthandthelinkstotheintroductionofcoercivepopulationcontrolpolicies,demographicresearchhasonlyslowlystartedtocontributetothestudyofclimatechangedespitethehumanpopulationbeingatthecentreofglobalwarming.Thisdebateaboutthecontributionofpopulationgrowthtoclimatechangewilllikelyremainsalientgiventhehighcertaintyofcontinuedpopulationgrowthbyatleastanotherbillionbymid-century.Thefurtheroutthehighertheuncertaintyintheprojection,buttheglobalpopulationisunlikelytostartdecliningbeforewellintothesecondhalfofthecentury.TheUnitedNationsprojectthatthesizeoftheglobalpopulationwilllikelybebetween8.5billionand8.6billionin2030,between9.4billionand10billionby2050andbetween8.8billionand12.4billionby2100.Therearealternativeprojectionsoftheglobalpopulationwhichincludeafasterdeclineinfertilityrates(Lutzetal.,2014;Vollsetetal.,2020).However,thedifferencesoverthemediumtermuntil2050,wheremuchclimateactionwillhavetohavehappened,aresmall.PopulationsizebytheendofthecenturyisbelowthemediumprojectionoftheUNandthetimingoftheturningfrompopulationgrowthtodeclineisprojectedtohappenearlier.Thepopulation-emissionmismatch:wealthinequalitiesacrossandwithincountriesreflectdisparatelevelsofemissionsFuturepopulationgrowthisunevenlydistributedacrossworldregions.Currently,theworldisstillgrowingatapaceof80millionpeopleannually.ThisisaboutthesizeofthemostpopulousEUMemberState,Germany,acountrythatwouldexperiencepopulationdeclineifitwasnotforimmigration.Infact,manycountriesandregionshavealreadystoppedgrowingorareprojectedtodosointhenextdecadeswhileothersareprojectedtocontinuetogrowthroughoutthe21stcentury.Itisthecountriesinthoseregionswithnoorslowpopulationgrowthwhereemissionsarehighest.Sub-SaharanAfricaisprojectedtoincreaseitspopulationfrom1.1billionpeopletodayto3.8billion(3.0-4.8billion,95%predictioninterval)in2100,becomingthemostpopulousworldregionandaccountingforaround80%offutureglobalpopulationgrowth.OtherregionswithprojectedsustainedgrowthareOceania,NorthernAfricaandWesternAsia.AllotherregionsinAsia,EuropeandNorthernAmericaandLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanwilllikelystartdeclininginpopulationsizebeforethemiddleofthecentury.Decelerationofpopulationgrowthanddevelopmenthavetendedtoprogressinparallelandmaybemutuallyreinforcing(Dyson,2010).Regionswithcurrentlyhighpopulationgrowtharealsothepoorestwithlowlevelsofconsumptionwhich,inturn,explainstheverylowcontributiontogreenhousegasemissions.However,becauseitisalsotheseregionsthatareparticularlyaffectedbytheconsequencesofglobalwarming,asimplisticcausallinkbetweenpopulationgrowthandclimatechangehassometimesbeendrawn.Themismatchofpopulationandemissionrelatedtoconsumptionpatternsisbestseenwhengroupingcountriesbytheirlevelofincome(Figure5).Today’shigh-incomecountriesintheworldachievedtheirwealthforthemostpartthroughhighlyresource-intensivepatternsofproduction.Historically,thesecountrieshaveaccountedformostemissions,withupper-middle-incomecountriesalsocontributingsignificantly.Upper-middleincomecountrieshavebecomethehighestabsoluteemitterinthe21stcentury.Together,high-incomeandupper-middle-incomecountriesaccountforabout85%ofglobalemissionswhileonlybeinghometo50%oftheglobalpopulation.20Figure5Trendingreenhousegasemissionsandglobalpopulation,1961-2021,byincomegroup;andclimategoals.Source:OwncalculationbasedondatafromGlobalCarbonProject(Friedlingsteinetal.,2019),andUnitedNationsDepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairsPopulationDivision(2022)Fortheotherhalfoftheworldpopulation,whichlivesinlowerandlower-middle-incomecountriesandisonlyresponsiblefor15%ofglobalemissions,asimilarpathtoeconomicdevelopmentisnolongersustainablenorreplicable(UnitedNationsEnvironmentalProgramme,2016).Humaneconomicactivityhasoverlyreliedontheburningoffossilfuelsandhasalreadycausedalevelofglobalwarmingthatthreatensthebasisforsustainabledevelopmentinthefuture(IPCC,2014).Tomakeprogresstowardsglobaldevelopmentgoalssuchasthealleviationofpovertywithoutovershootingclimatetargets,high-emittingcountrieshavetosubstantiallyreducetheiremissions(Bruckneretal.,2022).Thelargegapbetweentheemissionsproducedbyapersoninpoorercountries,whichtendtohavehigherpopulationgrowth,andtheemissionsproducedbyapersoninhigher-incomecountriesillustratesthedifficultpathtosustainabledevelopment.Mostlow-incomeandlower-middle-incomecountriesinAfrica,AsiaandOceaniacontinuetoexperiencehighpopulationgrowth,above2%intheformerand1%inthelatter(Figure6).Inmostupper-middle-andhigh-incomecountriespopulationgrowthisbelow1%orisnegative.Averageemissionsperinhabitantincreasesfromlessthan0.1metrictonsofCO2emissionspercapitainthecountrywiththelowestvalue,theDemocraticRepublicofCongo,to32.2metrictonsCO2emissionspercapitainthecountrywiththehighestvalue,Qatar(amore300-foldhighervalueofemissions).21Figure6Populationchange(2020-2021)comparedtopercapitaGrossNationalIncome(2021)andpercapitagreenhousegasemissions(2021).Source:owncalculationsbasedondatafromUnitedNationsDepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairsPopulationDivision(2022),WorldBankandtheGlobalCarbonProject(Friedlingsteinetal.,2019).Notes:eachcirclerepresentsacountry;thesizeofsymbolsisproportionaltopercapitaemissions;coloursrepresentworldregions.ResponsibilityforemissionsbywealthleveldiffersnotonlybetweencountriesbutalsowithincountriesaccordingtoestimatesfromChancel(Chancel,2022).Thelifestylesofthewealthiestpeoplearemuchmoreenergy-intensivethanthoseofothermembersofsociety,astheyhaveamuchhighershareofthemainsectorscontributingtoemissions:industry,agriculture,energyproduction,transportandbuildings.Therichest10%oftheworld'spopulationareresponsiblefor48%ofgreenhousegasemissions,whilethebottom50%intermsofwealthemitonly12%.Thedifferenceisevenstarkerovertime.Inthelast30years,thewealthiest1%oftheglobalpopulationhascaused24%ofemissionsaccordingtoestimates.Thisaccountsfor7%moregreenhousegasemissionsthanthebottomhalfofthepopulation,andthegaphasbeenincreasing.Thehighlyskewedconcentrationofindividualgreenhousegasemissionswithincountrieshasbecomethemaindriverofinequalitiesinemissionsinthe21stcentury.In1990,62%ofglobalcarboninequalitywasduetobetween-countryinequality.Thischangedintheearly2000s.In2019,64%ofglobalcarboninequalitywasduetowithin-countryinequality.Acontinuedriseintemperaturewillseverethedisproportionalconsequencesofclimatechangeforthepoorest.Populationgrowthinconjunctionwithurbanisationprocesseswillincreasetheexposureofpopulationsespeciallyinlower-middle-andlow-incomecountriestoadverseeffectsofglobalwarmingwhilealsoexacerbatingpressuresonresourcesandecosystems.Itwilllikelyalsofurtherconcentratevulnerabilitytoclimatechangewherethecapacitiesoflocal,municipalandnationalgovernments,communitiesandtheprivatesectorarealreadyleastabletoprovideinfrastructuresandbasicservices(IPCC,2023a).Atthesametime,tocontributetoclimatechangemitigation,thepoorestcountriesalsofacethetasktoprogresswiththeirdevelopmentwithoutsubstantiallyincreasinggreenhousegasemissions.PopulationasafactorinfutureemissionsEmpiricalstudiesoftheroleofpopulationArecentreviewofdemographicperspectivesonglobalenvironmentalchangebyMuttarak(2021)showedthatdemographyhasmadeasignificantcontributiontoresearchonclimatechangebyprovidingscientificinsightsintohowthesize,distributionandcompositionofcurrentandfuturepopulationscontributetogreenhousegasemissions.Amongdemographersandothersocialscientists,therehasbeenawidespreadagreementof22populationasamediatingvariable,meaningthetheorythatpopulationdynamicsaffecttheenvironmentthroughvariablessuchasthelevelofconsumptionandtechnology,butalsoinstitutionsandculture.MuchresearchhasfocusedontheroleofpopulationgrowthandapproachedtheinvestigationofitsroleforglobalwarmingthroughthefamousIPATequationproposedbyEhrlichandHolden(Ehrlich&Holdren,1971)andextendedversionsofit.Appliedtoglobalgreenhousegasemissions,theIPATequationproposesthattheimpactonclimatechange(I)isdeterminedbytheinteractionofpopulationsize(P),affluenceorinotherwordsconsumption(A)andtechnology(T).Thetechnologycomponentisfurtherseparatedintotheelementofenergyconsumedperunitofincome(energyintensity)andtheemissionsperunitofenergy(emissionintensity)toachievetheso-called‘Kaya-Identity’(B.O’Neilletal.,2000)thatrelatestogreenhousegasemissionstoitsmaindrivers(Kaya,Yoichi,1990).TherearefurthermodificationsoftheIPATformulasuchastheSTIRPATformulafromDietzandRosa(Dietz&Rosa,1994)(toaddnuancebyallowingfordifferentialimpactsbyeachofthecomponentsoftheequation.TheIPATidentityapproachprovidesanunderstandingoftheinteractionbetweenitscomponents.Whileitdoesnotaccountforfactors(e.g.cultureorinstitutions)(Sherbininetal.,2007),itgivesinsightintotherelativecontributionofchangesinpopulationcomparedtoincreaseinconsumption,advancesintechnologytowardshigherenergyefficiencyandlowercarbonintensity.MostempiricalstudiesfollowingtheIPATapproachfindthatpopulationgrowthispositivelyassociatedwithanincreaseingreenhousegasemissions,whiletheincreaseinconsumptionplaysthestrongestrole(Dietz&Rosa,1997;Hamilton&Turton,2002;MacKellaretal.,1995;O’Neilletal.,2012a;Weber&Sciubba,2019).Forexample,astudylookingatOECDcountriesattributed12%ofincreaseinCO2emissionsbetween1982and1997topopulationgrowthcomparedto36%attributedtoanincreaseintheGDPpercapita(Hamilton&Turton,2002).ArecentstudyonsubnationalregionsinEuropefindsthatpopulationgrowthwillmakeitmoredifficulttoachieveambitiousclimategoalsduetoregionsinWesternEuropethataregrowinginpopulationfrominternalandinternationalmigration(Weber&Sciubba,2019).TheauthorsalsopointoutthatcurrentMemberStatepoliciesweremoredirectedtowardsincreasingfertilityandthatthebenefitofastableordecliningpopulationwasrarelydiscussedinEUpolicydocuments.Itisimportanttonotethatpopulationgrowthisnottheonlydemographicfactorinfluencingemissions.AsthestudyontheregionsoftheEUshowsprocessessuchasinternalandinternationalmigrationalsoplayarole.O’Neillshowedthaturbanisationandageingthroughtheirimpactonpopulationdistributionandagestructureareassociatedwithemissionsandtheireffectswillbeimportantinthefutureinparticularworldregions(O’Neilletal.,2012b).InChina,changesinpopulationstructuretogetherwithchangesinconsumptionlevelarehighlycorrelatedwithincreasesinemissionsoverthelastdecadewhilepopulationgrowthdidnotplayasignificantrole(Zhu&Peng,2012).Demographicprocessesandchangesincludinginpopulationstructureanddistribution,ageing,urbanisation,andhousesizechangesareimportantwhenthinkingabouttheimpactofpopulationonclimatechange(seealsoChapter2).Inthelatestsixthassessmentreport,theIPCCdevelopedfiveSharedSocioeconomicPathways(SSPs)thatintegratedifferentscenariosoffuturedemographicchange.TheSSPsweredesignedtorepresentplausiblefuturetrajectoriesforglobaldevelopmentbasedonvaryingassumptionsabouteconomic,social,andtechnologicaltrends.EachofthefiveSSPsrepresentsadifferentcombinationofdemographic,economic,andsocialfactors,whichlinktoprojectionsofgreenhousegasemissionsandlanduseandexplaindifferentfutureoutcomesofclimatechange(Kc&Lutz,2017;Riahietal.,2017).ForeachSSP,asinglesetofbaselineprojectionswaschosenforpopulation,education,urbanisation,andGDP.Theyarecoupledwithbaselineprojectionsofscenario-specificchangesinemissionsandlandintheabsenceofclimatepoliciestoallowfortheevaluationofmitigationstrategies.Riahietal(2017)foundthatlowemissiontargetsmightbeoutreachinSSPsfeaturinghighchallenges.TheIPCCreports(2023),forexample,highmitigationchallengesforSSP3whichrepresentsafutureof‘RegionalRivalry’wheretheworldispoliticallyandeconomicallyfragmentedwithcountriesperusingtheirinterests.ThelimitstomitigationstrategiesunderthisSSPresultfromtheassumptionsofslowtechnologicalchange,highlevelsofglobalpopulationgrowth,andlackofmultilateralism.However,acrossallSSPs,assumptionsaboutenergyintensityandeconomicgrowtharefoundasthemostrelevantdeterminantsoffuturemissions,bothwithandwithoutclimatepolicy(Marangonietal.,2017).TheuseofasinglepopulationprojectionineachoftheSSPsdoesnotallowforpossibleuncertaintyinfuturepopulationtrajectorieswithineachscenario.Whilethisapproachdoesprovideasuitablebasetoanalyseclimatechangepolicies(Rozell,2017),itisimportanttonotethatinfouroutofthefiveSSPs,thefuturegrowthoftheglobalpopulationisprojectedtobeslowerthanintheUnitedNationsmediumprojection.Thedifferenceinprojectionsismainlyduetoagenerallyassumedfasterdeclineinfertilityratesincountrieswherefertilityrates23arestillhigh.Ifthisassumptiondoesnotmaterialise,theeventualsizeoftheworld’spopulationcouldbelargerthanprojectedintheSSPsandtheeffortsneededtodecoupleeconomicgrowthfromglobalwarmingwouldneedtobeevengreaterthananticipated(UnitedNationsDepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairs,PopulationDivision,2021a).Decouplingpopulationgrowthfromincreasesinemissionsisamajorchallengeforachievingsustainabledevelopmentinpoorercountrieswhereper-capitaemissionsarestilllowAsimplewaytoappreciatethesustainabilityofthepathwaysofpopulationandeconomicgrowthistoconsiderhowtherespectivetrendsforthesetwocomponentsintheIPATequationaredecoupledwithrespecttothetrendforemissions.Ideally,weshouldobserveatrendwhereeconomicgrowthandpopulationgrowtharerespectivelycompletely-orontheirwaytobeingpartially–decoupledfromemissions.Inotherwords,growthofpopulationandGDPshouldhappenwithaless-than-proportionalincreaseor,evenbetter,adeclineinemissions.Thisprincipleisrecognisedinthe2030AgendaandforSustainableDevelopmentadoptedbyallUNMemberStatesin2015.Specifically,SDG8on‘DecentWorkandEconomicGrowth’emphasisestheneedtodecoupleeconomicgrowthfromenvironmentaldegradationtoallowsustained,inclusive,andsustainableeconomicgrowthwithoutresourcedepletion,climatechange,orwaterandairpollution.Wecalculateadecouplingindexforthetrendsofpopulationandemissionsoverthedecadesfrom1990and2020.Wesumthenationalemissionsfallinginthefollowingfourcategoriesofdecoupling:populationdecline,emissionsgrowingbutlessthanpopulation,andemissionsgrowingmorethanpopulation.Thefigureshowsboththeabsolutelevelofemissionsandrelativesharesforeachcategory.Figure7Populationgrowthandemissionsgrowthoverthelastthreedecades.Source:owncalculationsbasedondatafromUnitedNationsDepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairsPopulationDivision(2022)andtheGlobalCarbonProject(Friedlingsteinetal.,2019).Notes:eachcategoryofpopulationdecouplingconsiderthesumofemissionsacrossallcountrieswhichrecordedacertainvalueofthedecouplingindicator.Countriesandtheiremissionsmaychangethecategoryfromoneperiodtotheother.Thelowerpanelofthefiguregivestherelativeshareoftotalemissionsaccordingtotheirdecouplingfrompopulationgrowth.Thecomparisonofemissionstochangesinpopulationsizeovertimeshowsthatthemajorityofemissionshavebeenconcentratedincountrieswheretheyweregrowingatafasterratethanpopulationandthatthetotalamountofemissionshasalsoincreased(Figure7).Asimplisticinterpretationofthiscouldbethatpopulationgrowthisproblematicwithcountriesfailingtodecoupleincreaseinpopulationfromemissions.Tobeonadecouplingpath,emissionsshouldgrowlessordecreasedespitepopulationgrowth.Intheory,populationgrowthshouldnotinfluenceemissionsdifferentlyacrosscountriesandwhenallrelevantcausallinkagesareaccountedforinastatisticalmodelitshouldonlyactasascalefactorwithanelasticityofone.RegressionestimatesofthestochasticversionoftheIPATequationshowbothelasticitiesaboveandbelowoneandthisisasignthat24therearemorecomplexinteractionandunobservedfactorsbesidesthesimplemultiplicativeeffectofthethreemaindriversoftechnology,populationandaffluence(O’Neilletal.,2012b).WhenlookingatspecificareasandaddingchangesinGDPtothecomparisonofincreasingemissionsandpopulationgrowth,high-incomeareassuchastheEUandtheUnitedStates,whereemissionsarealreadyhigh,appearastheregionsthatarereducingemissionswhilemanagingtogrowtheirGDPandexperiencingpopulationgrowth(Figure8).InChina,India,andRussiaemissionsaregrowingatafasterpacethanpopulation,butataslowerpacethantheirGDPisincreasing.ItisinAfricaandalsoinBrazilwhereemissionsaregrowingfasterthanbothGDPandpopulation.Thisisagainasimplisticcomparison.Thecontributiontoemissionsismuchsmallerastheirlevelofenergyuseismuchlower.However,itindicatesadifficultpathwaytosustainabledevelopment.Figure8ChangeinemissionscomparedtothechangeinGDPpercapitaandpopulationgrowthacrossselectedregions.Source:owncalculationsbasedondatafromUnitedNationsDepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairsPopulationDivision(2022)andtheGlobalCarbonProject(Friedlingsteinetal.,2019).Futureemissionsuntil2050havebeenprojectedbytheInternationalEnergyAgency(IEA)fordifferentscenarios(IEA,2022).TheresultsfromtheAnnouncedPledgesScenario(APS)areex-postexaminedtolookatthepathwaysfordecarbonisationaccordingtotheannouncedambitionsandtargetsbygovernments.TheAnnouncedPledgesScenariorepresentsthemostrecentlyannouncedambitionsandtargets,asofSeptember2022,toreducegreenhousegasemissionsandtotransitiontoalow-carboneconomyuntil2050.Thestartingpositionintermsofcarbonintensityin2020variessignificantly,withtheChineseeconomythemostcarbon-intenseandthecombinedeconomiesofAfricatheleastcarbon-intense(Figure9).Africa’strajectorystandsout.Whileprojectedtoexperiencestrongpopulationgrowthfrom1.4billionto2.5billion,carbonintensityisprojectedtoremainatcurrentlevelsandthetotalamountofemissionsincreasing.TheeconomyofIndiaisprojectedtodecreasecarbonintensityonlyafter2030andisaccompaniedbymoderaterelativepopulationgrowth.China,theEU,andtheUnitedStatesareprojectedtosignificantlydecarbonisetheireconomiesandlowerthetotalamountofemissions.ThetotalamountofemissionsinRussiaisprojectedtodecreaseslightlywithasmalldecreaseinpopulationandsmalladvancestowardslowercarbonintensity.25Figure9Futurecarbonintensitiescomparedtopopulationprojectionsandpledgedemissionstargetsacrossselectedregions.Source:owncalculationsbasedonemissionprojectionsfromIEA(2022)andpopulationprojectionsfromUnitedNationsDepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairsPopulationDivision(2022)TheprojectionsoftheIEAoffutureemissionsundercurrentlypledgedpolicyambitionsandtargetsunderlinethedifficultpathwaytosustainabledevelopment(IEA,2022).Thechallengeformitigatingclimatechangewillbetocompensatefortheeconomicgrowthinlessdevelopedcountries,withreductionsinenergyintensityandemissionintensitystartingfromdevelopedeconomies(O’Neilletal.,2012b).Withthelikelycontinuedpopulationgrowthuntilwellintothe21stcentury,andGDPasthemaindriverofemissions,itlieswiththeaffluentregionsoftheworldtointensifytheireffortsingreeningtheireconomiesandadoptingsustainableconsumptionpatterns.Decouplingthecurrentover-relianceonfossilfuelsfromeconomicactivitywillrequireintensifiedpoliticalactionandinvestmentsbygovernmentsincooperationwiththeprivatesectorandcivilsocietyinallregionsandwithstrongsupportfromtheinternationalcommunity.Politicalactioninthecontextofpopulation,sustainabledevelopmentandclimatechangeDemographicforesightonthefuturetrajectoryoftheworldpopulation:continuedgrowthishighlycertainanddrivenbypopulationmomentumThepossiblecontributionofslowingglobalpopulationgrowthforclimatemitigationcanbefrequentlyfoundasarecommendationtopolicymakers(O’Neilletal.,2012b).TheIPCCreportsthatrecognizepopulationgrowthincombinationwitheconomicgrowthasakeydrivingforceforclimatechange,identifydemographicpressuresasahighlycertainfuturedriverforgreenhousegasemissions(IPCC,2023a).Atthesametime,thefuturetrajectoryoftheglobalpopulationinthe21stcenturyissuggestedasanuncertainoutcomethatwillbeamongthemostimportantin‘determiningourfuture’(Smil,2022).Theprospectsandpossiblemagnitudeofslowingpopulationgrowthtoreducethepopulationfactorintheequationofclimatechangeemissionsremainsahighlydebatedtopic.26Figure10Projectedfutureage-sexcompositionoftheglobalpopulationin2050and2100.UnitedNationsmediumprojectionswith95%uncertaintyintervalsbyageandsex.Source:ownelaborationofdatafromUnitedNationsDepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairsPopulationDivision(2022),Aswasdiscussedearlier,thepaceofpopulationgrowthhasbeenslowingandglobalpopulationwilllikelyleveloffbeforetheendofthe21stcentury.Theroleofpopulationgrowthcanthereforebeassumedtobecomelessofadriverofclimatechangeoverthecomingdecades.However,projectionsofthesizeoftheglobalpopulationaremuchmorecertainoverthemediumtermthanoverthelongterm.Thatisbecausemanyofthepeoplewhowillbealiveoverthenextdecadesarealreadyborn.Weusedatafromthe2022RevisionoftheUnitedNationsWorldPopulationProspects(UnitedNationsDepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairs,PopulationDivision,2022)toassessthepaceoffuturepopulationgrowth.Theprojectedageandsexcompositionfor2050and2100withthe95%upperandlowerconfidenceintervalsforeachsingle-yearagegroup(the95%predictionintervaldescribesarangeofvalueswhereafutureobservationisexpectedtofallwith95%confidence)isshowninFigure10.For2050,theuncertaintyaboutthesizeofthepopulationbelowtheageof29ismuchhigherthanfortherestofthepopulationgiventhatthesearepeoplewhoareyettobeborn(thebaselineyearoftheprojectionsis2022).Theuncertaintyalsoincreasesthelowertheagegiventhatfuturetrajectoriesfertilitylevelsbecomelesscertainthefurtheroutintime.In2100,everyonebelowtheageof79isyettobebornanduncertaintyaboutpeoplewhowillbeborntowardstheendof21stcenturyisverylow.Thecontinuedandhighlycertaingrowthoftheworldpopulationprojecteduntil2050ismainlyaresultofstrongpopulationgrowthinthepastandtherelativelyyouthfulagecompositionofthecurrentworldpopulation.Theconsequenceispopulationmomentum,whichdescribesthephenomenonwherebyapopulationcontinuestogrowevenafterthefertilityrate,ortheaveragenumberofchildrenperwoman,dropstoreplacementlevelbecausealargeproportionofthepopulationisintheirreproductiveyears.Itexplainswhytheworld’spopulationislikelytoaddoverabillionpeopleinthecomingdecadesalthoughmanycountriesalreadyexperiencelowfertilityratesanddespiteaglobalaveragenumberofbirthsperwomanthathasdroppedfrom5.3in1963to2.3todayandisprojectedtocontinuetodeclineto2.1(1.9to2.495%predictioninterval9)in2050and1.8(1.5-2.495%predictioninterval)in2100.Howmuchthenumberofbirthsperwomaninallcountriesoftheworldhasshiftedtowardslowerlevelsfrom1950totodayandtheprojectedcontinuationofthistrendcanbeseeninFigure11.Themajorityofcountriesalreadyexperiencefertilitylevelsbelowthereplacementlevelof9The95%predictionintervaldescribesarangeofvalueswhereweexpectafutureobservationtofallwith95%confidence272.110.Iffertilityfrozeatthecurrentlevelsin2022andremainedconstantineverycountry,theworldpopulationwouldincreaseto10.2billionby2050,halfabillionmorethantheprojected9.7million.Figure11Estimatesandprojectionsofthenumberofbirthsperwomaninallcountriesandareaoftheworld,1950to2100.Source:owncalculationsbasedondatafromUnitedNationsDepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairsPopulationDivision(2022)Toquantifythecontributionofmomentumtofuturepopulationchange,wedecomposetheincreaseingrowthintheglobalpopulationandinmajorregionsthatisprojecteduntil2050anduntil2100(Andreev,Kirilletal.,2013).Besidetheeffectofmomentum(orpopulationagestructure),theeffectsofotherdemographiccomponentsoffertility,mortalityandmigrationareestimated.Itshowsthatthecurrentagestructureoftheworldpopulationaccountsforanincreaseof15%intheglobalpopulation(Figure12).Thatisabout1.2billionofthe1.7billionoftheprojectedtotalincreaseof23%from8billionin2022to9.7billionpeoplein2050.Theremainingincreaseofhalfabillionismostlyattributedtomortalitywhichaccountsforanincreaseof6%inglobalpopulationandfertilitywhichaccountsforanincreaseof2%oftheglobalpopulation.Lookingatthegrowthuntiltheendof21stcentury,theincreaseinpopulationto10.3billionisdriventoalargepartbytheextensioninlifeexpectancy(mortality)andtoasmallerpartstilltheeffectofthecurrentyouthfulagestructure.Fertilityisprojectedtoaccountforadecreaseinglobalpopulation.Inotherwords,withouttheyouthfulagestructureofthecurrentpopulationandintheabsenceofimprovementtohumanlifeexpectancyoverthecomingdecades,theglobalpopulationwouldbe3%smallerin2100thanitistoday.Thesmallcontributionofthefertilitycomponenttoglobalpopulationgrowthuntil2050anditsnegativecontributionuntil2100areexplainedbytheincreasingnumberofcountriesexperiencingbelowreplacementfertility.Figure12showsthatlowfertilityaccountsforthenegativechangeinpopulationsizealreadyin2050inallworldregionsexceptforsub-SaharanAfrica,theregionsofMelanesia,Micronesia,andPolynesiainOceania,NorthernAfricaandWesternAsia.Fertilityisthemajordriverofpopulationgrowthinsub-SaharanAfricawhere,byitself,itisprojectedtoleadtoagrowthofthepopulationby45%by2050toby133%by2100.Thatitdoesnottranslatetoasignificantcontributiontofertilityonthegloballevelisexplainedbythecompoundedoffsettingeffectoflowfertilityacrossmostotherregions.Furthermore,thelargerthepopulationinregionsthestrongertheeffectfortheglobaltotal.InEurope(andwhenlookingonlyattheEU-27),theimpactofagestructureisalreadynegativeoverthenextdecades.Thatmeansthatthemomentumeffecthasswungtheotherway.EveniffertilitywouldgobacktoreplacementlevelinEurope,intheabsenceofincreasesinlife-10The2.1replacementthresholdisageneralassumption.ThelevelcanbeuptohalfapointhigherincountrieswithskewedsexratiosfromsonpreferenceandsexselectiveabortionsorwherechildandyoungadultmortalityishighReplacementfertility28expectancyorcontributionsfrommigration,thepopulationwouldcontinuetodeclineduetoagestructuremarkedbyageing.Thestronginfluenceofpopulationmomentumdemonstratestheinertiainthetrendofworldpopulationsizeoverthenext30years.Itcanbeanticipatedthattheworldpopulationwillcontinuetogrowbyatleastanotherbillionby2050.Thisunderlinestheurgencyforpoliciestoreducegreenhousegasemissionsfromconsumptionandinvestintechnologytolowerenergyintensity.Loweringbirthrateswouldnothaltstrongpopulationgrowthinthemediumtermandtranslateintoloweringemissionswhichispivotalinlightofthetimepressureandexpectedcumulativeeffectsofclimatechange(Bradshaw&Brook,2014).Policymakers,whencarvingoutpathwaystoamoresustainablefuture,shouldrecognisethedemographicforesightonthefuturetrajectoryofthecontinuedgrowthoftheworldpopulationoverthemedium-term.ThelatestIPCCreporthashighlightedtheneedtotakedrasticactionnowasthereisinsufficientglobalactiontostaybeloweventhe2°Cgoal.Figure12Relativecontributionofcomponentsoffuturepopulationgrowth(agestructure,fertility,mortalityandmigration)from2022to2050andfrom2022to2100,fortheworldandmajorregions.Source:owncalculationsbasedonpopulationprojectionscenariosfromUnitedNationsDepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairsPopulationDivision(2022).Notes:Regionsgroupedtoreflectcommondemographictrendsacrossregions;EU-27representsasubsetofEurope.Thatisnottosaythatpopulationpoliciescannotmakeacontribution.Onthecontrary;thereareprovenandeffectivepoliciesthatsupportdevelopmentandstrengthenhumanrightswhilealsoleadingtolowerfertilityrates(Bongaarts&O’Neill,2018).However,thesignificantinertiaindemographictrendsneedslong-termvision.Accelerateddeclineinglobalfertilityrateswillshowpredominantlyinlowergreenhousegasemissionsfrom29populationsizeinthesecondhalfofthiscentury(Casey&Galor,2016).Policyactionwouldneedtohappennowtoseethepotentialcontributionthatdemographycanmaketomitigateclimatechange.Asseveraldecadestendtopassbetweenahuman’sbirthanddeath,thereisasignificanttimelagforpoliciestotakeeffectduetodemographicinertia(Jolly,1994)(Bongaarts,1992).Policiessupportingsustainabledevelopmentinhealth,education,inequalityandpovertymayslowpopulationgrowthwhencarefullydesigned,butinternationalconsensusonacommonpopulationanddevelopmentagendaiswaningThereisgeneralagreementonthereciprocalrelationshipoffertilityanddevelopmentandthatrapidpopulationgrowthinmanylow-incomeandlower-middle-incomecountriesisbothasymptomandcauseofslowprogressindevelopment.Infact,populationpolicieshaveevolvedwithlevelsoffertility(UnitedNationsDepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairs,PopulationDivision,2021b).Whilecountriesthatadoptedlowerfamilypoliciesarenowconcernedwithageingandpopulation,mostofthecountriesofsub-SaharanAfricaandinPacificIslandStates,whichcontinuetoexperiencehigherlevelsoffertility,havepopulationpoliciestolowerfertility.Thereisalsogeneralagreementthathighlevelsoffertilityarelinkedtoalackofautonomyandopportunityamongyoungwomenandgirlsandonkeysustainabledevelopmentstrategiessuchasthereductionofchildandmaternalmortality,theprovisionofuniversalaccesstoqualityeducation,genderequality,theempowermentofwomenandgirls,theprovisionuniversalaccesstosexualandreproductivehealthservices,includingfamilyplanning,aswellasaccesstosexualandreproductiverights(UnitedNationsDepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairs,PopulationDivision,2021a).TheyareformulatedintheProgrammeofActionofthe1994UNConferenceonPopulationandDevelopment(ICPD),held1994inCairo,thatreachedaglobalconsensusonarights-basedapproachtopopulationanddevelopmentthatshiftedawayfromsettingdemographictargets.TheProgrammeofActionrecognisessexualandreproductivehealthandreproductiverights,aswellastheempowermentofwomenandgirlsandgenderequalityasmainpillarsofpopulationanddevelopmentprogrammes.Manyofthestudiesontheeffectofpopulationgrowthandotherpopulationprocessesonclimatechangestatetheneedtoslowpopulationgrowthtomitigateglobalwarmingandargueforgreatersupportofrights-basedpopulationpolicies.CaseyandGalor(2016),forexample,foundlowerfertilitytohavethesimultaneouseffectofincreasingincomeandloweremissionsandstressedthatpopulationpoliciesshouldbeconsideredaspartoftheglobalpolicyresponsetoclimatechange.Dasgupta(2021)arguesthatthe2030AgendaonSustainableDevelopmentandtheParisAgreementwerereticentaboutpopulationanddisregardedtherolepopulationplaysinourdemandsonnatureandcallsforgreaterinternationalinvestmentintofamilyplanningprogrammes.BongaartsandO’Neill(2018)identifyamisperceptionthatpopulationpolicywastoocontroversialtosucceedandadvocatefortheconsiderationofpopulationpoliciesbytheIPCC.Strongervoicesseeinexcusableneglectofethicalmeasurestoreducefertility(Bradshaw&Brook,2014)orarguetentativelythatdiscourseabouthowtothinkethicallyaboutpopulationchangeanditsimplicationsforsustainabledevelopmentwasoverdue(UNFPA,2023).The2023reportontheStatusoftheWorldPopulationoftheUnitedNationsPopulationFund(UNFPA)assessesresurfacingdebatesabout‘overpopulation’.Itiscriticalaboutthecontributionofstudiesthatdeemslowingpopulationgrowthasessentialforthemitigationofclimatechangeorotherdevelopmenttargets,especiallyinthecontextofsexualandreproductiveautonomy.Whileacknowledgingtheeconomicanddevelopmentbenefits,thereportemphasisesthattheseshouldnotbesecondarygoalstotheessentialgoalofempoweringwomenandgirls.Thiscouldhaveadetrimentaleffectasitraisessuspicionaboutfamilyplanningprogrammesasabackchannelofpopulationcontrol(Sasser,2014).However,familyplanningcombinedwithotherhumanwelfaresuchasincreasedequalityandtheexpansionofeducationandemployment,aswellasimprovementofthestatusofwomenandgirlswouldsupportdemographictransitionsthatofferopportunitiesforeconomicanddevelopmentalgain(Lee,Ronald&Mason,Andrew,2006).Inthatway,theProgrammeofActionoftheInternationalConferencecloselylinkstothe2030AgendaforSustainableDevelopment.TheEuropeanUnion’sdevelopmentapproachalignswiththeUN’s2030Agendaandoffersstrongsupportforhealth,education,andclimateandenergyastwoofthefiveprioritiesoftheGlobalGatewaystrategy,butalsospecificallyforgenderequality,womenempowerment,andreproductivehealthandrights.Thisisformulatedinthe2017EuropeanConsensusonDevelopment,intheEU’s2021ActionPlanonGenderEqualityandWomen’sEmpowerment,andinthe2022YouthActionPlan.CommissionerforInternationalPartnershipsJuttaUrpilainenstatedthat“TheEUiscommittedtotherightofeveryindividualtodecidefreelyandresponsiblyonmattersrelatedtotheirsexualityandtheirsexualandreproductivehealth–thisisacorepartofourglobal30healthpolicy11.”TheEUwasalsotheninthlargestdonortoUNFPAwith59million12USDollarsandspends2%ofitsoverseasdevelopmentaidbudgetonmattersofsexualandreproductivehealthandrights13.TheEUsupportsmultipleUNinitiativessuchastheUNFPAsuppliespartnership,theEU-UNSpotlightInitiativetoendviolenceagainstwomen,ortheUNICEF-UNFPAGlobalProgrammetoEndChildMarriage.SixEUMemberStatesarealsoamongthetoptendonorstoUNFPA.IncontrasttotheEU’scommitmenttothegoalsofUNFPA,theconsensusintheinternationalcommunityonmattersrelatedtosexualityandreproductioniswaning.Debatesaboutmattersofsexualandreproductivehealthandrightsandcomprehensivesexualityeducation,abortionandaccesstocontraceptionarenownew,butoppositionininternationalforumshasincreased.BasedonaqualitativepolicyanalysisofdevelopmentsattwoUNCommissionsbetween2014and2019,theCommissionontheStatusofWomenandtheCommissiononPopulationandDevelopment,Gilbyetal.(2021)findsaretreatfrompreviouslyagreedonlanguageinUNnegotiationsandconferencesthatwouldpresentachallengefortherealisationofdevelopmentgoalsrelatedtosexualandreproductivehealthandreproductiverights.Thelackofinternationalconsensusonmattersrelatedtosexualityandreproductionisarguedtoimpedetheadvancementonotherpointsofthepopulationanddevelopmentagenda(Coole,2021)(seeChapter4foraforesightexerciseonpossibleconsequencesofafragmentedworldforpopulationanddevelopment).Indeed,theannualCommissiononPopulationandDevelopment,whichistaskedwithmonitoringandreviewingtheimplementationoftheICPD’sProgrammeofAction,didnotadoptresolutionsinfiveofthepasttenyearsalthougheachannualmeetingsetsthefocusonadifferentpopulationanddevelopmenttheme.NoconsensusresolutioncouldbeagreedtointhemostrecentannualmeetingoftheCommissiononPopulationandDevelopmentinApril2023onthethemeof‘population,educationandsustainabledevelopment’14.Againstthebackdropofworseningenvironmentalprognoses,Coole(2021)analysedUNconferencesandnegotiationsandseesa‘toxificationofthepopulationdiscourse’.Shequestionswhetherthegoalofuniversalaccesstosexualandreproductivehealthandreproductiverightsandthegoalofreducingfertilityandslowingpopulationgrowthtocontributetothemitigationofenvironmentaldegradationwerenotcompatibleandadvocateforareconsiderationofdemographictargetsasalegitimateinterestofsustainabledevelopment.However,Gilbyetal.(2021)seeaneedtodefendthecommitmenttosexualreproductivehealthandreproductiverightsininternationalagenda-setting.ConclusionHowtheglobalpopulationaddressesclimatechangeisoneofthedefiningquestionsofthe21stcentury.ThelatestassessmentreportoftheInternationalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)clearlystatedtheresponsibilityofhumanactivityforglobalwarmingandtheinterlinkagesofdemographicpressuresfrompopulationgrowth,changesinpopulationcomposition,andurbanisationchannelledthroughunsustainableenergyuse,landuse,lifestylesandconsumption.Theobjectiveofthischapterwastoillustratetherolethatpopulationprocessesandespeciallypopulationgrowthplayinglobalemissionsofgreenhousegases,tohelpanticipatefuturetrajectoriesofemissionsandpopulationsacrossworldregions,andtodiscusspoliciesconcerningpopulationandsustainabledevelopmentandthewaninginternationalconsensusonanindividualrights-basedapproach.Despitethehumanpopulation,theverysubjectofdemography,beingatthecentreofglobalwarming,demographicresearchonlyslowlystartedtocontributetothestudyofclimatechangeafterdebatesaboutthefiniteofpopulationgrowthduetoresourcescarcityandlinkstotheintroductionofcoercivepopulationcontrolpoliciesinthe1960sand1970s.Recentadvancesinmethodology,datacollectionandavailability,andtheintegrationofpopulationandclimatechangescenarioshavealloweddemographytomakeimportantcontributionstothefieldbydemonstratingthesizeableeffectthatpopulationprocessessuchaspopulationgrowth,ageing,orurbanisationhavehadonthenumberofglobalemissions.However,thereisadramaticpopulation-emissionmismatchdefinedbywealthinequalities.Population,alessercontributortoglobalemissionsthaneconomicgrowth,isconcentratedintheregionswiththelowestemissionswhileemissionsarehighestinregionswherepopulationgrowthisloworwherepopulationshavestartedto11EuropeanCommission,DirectorateforInternationalPartnership,NewsAnnouncement,24Sept2022,Sexualandreproductivehealthandrights:EUannouncesadditional€45millionforUNFPASuppliesPartnership.URL:https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/news-and-events/news/sexual-and-reproductive-health-and-rights-eu-announces-additional-eu45-million-unfpa-supplies-2022-09-24_en12UNFPA,Donorcontributions.URL:https://www.unfpa.org/data/donor-contributions13Countdown2030Europe.EuropeanSupport–CountryProfiles.https://www.countdown2030europe.org/analysis14UnitedNationsDepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairs(2023)CommissiononPopulationandDevelopment,fifty-sixthsession(2023).URL:https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/events/CPD5631decline.Thepopulation-emissionmismatchalsotranslatestowealthinequalitieswithincountries.Thelifestylesofthewealthiestpeoplearemuchmoreenergy-intensivethanthoseofothermembersofsociety.Therichest10%oftheworld'spopulationarecurrentlyresponsiblefor48%ofgreenhousegasemissions,whilethebottom50%intermsofwealthemitonly12%;andthehistoricgapofcumulativecontributionstoemissionsisevenstarker.Forhalfoftheworldpopulationthatlivesinlowerandlower-middle-incomecountriesandisonlyresponsiblefor15%ofglobalemissionstoday,apathtoeconomicdevelopmentdependentonresource-intensivepatternsofconsumptionandproductionisnolongersustainablenorreplicable.Therefore,amajorchallengetoachieveasustainablefutureofhumanactivitywillbetorealiseinternationalcommitmentstosignificantlylowertheemissionofgreenhousegasesinadvancedeconomiesthathavelargelybeenresponsibleforanthropogenicglobalwarmingandtosupporttheprospectofeconomicgrowth,urbanisationanddevelopmentinemergingeconomieswithareductioninenergyandemissionintensity.Empiricalanalysisofprojectedfutureemissionsandthecontributionofprojectedpopulationgrowth,economicgrowth,emissionintensity,andenergyintensitydemonstratesthedifficultpathaheadtorealisethedecouplingofachievingeconomicanddevelopmentalgoalswhilebecomingcarbonneutral,especiallyincountrieswithstrongpopulationgrowth.TheEUneedstokeeppushingaheadwithitsgreenanddigitaltransitionagendatoguarditspositionasarolemodelfortheinternationalcommunity.ItlieswiththeEUandotheraffluentregionswhohaveaccountedforthelargeshareofhistoricemissionstoleadthewayinintensifyingeffortstoreduceenergyintensity,developgreentechnologytodecoupleeconomicactivityfromburningfossilfuelsandadoptsustainableconsumptionpatterns.Analysisoftheglobaldemographictrendsshowsthatcontinuedgrowthishighlycertaindespitetheglobalfertilitylevelhavingcontinuouslyfallento2.3birthsperwomanandthemajorityofcountriesexperiencingbelowreplacementlevelfertility.Medium-termgrowthuntil2050isdriventoalargeextentbypopulationmomentumandtheglobalpopulationwilllikelygrowbyatleastanotherbillionoverthenextthreedecades.Populationmomentumdescribestheeffectofthecurrentyouthfulagestructureoftheglobalpopulationthatleadstocontinuedpopulationgrowthevenafterfertilityratesdeclineduetothelargenumberofpeopleofreproductiveageandyoungeragesarrivinginthereproductiveagerangeoverthecomingdecades.Populationgrowthwouldcontinueeveniffertilitylevelsweretofallimmediatelytobelowreplacementlevelsinallcountries.Therefore,neededthedrasticsolutionscalledforbytheIPCCtoreduceemissionuntil2050changemustcomefromthegreeningoftheworldeconomyandachangeinconsumption.Uncertaintyinpopulationprojectionsincreasessignificantlyoverthelongertermuntil2100andwhethertheglobalpopulationlevelsoffat9,10or11billioninthesecondhalfofthiscenturywillhaveastrongeffectonemissionsastheworldisfaroffthetrackfrombecomingcarbonneutralby2050.Actiontoaccelerateprogresstowardssustainabledevelopmentgoals,whichispresumedtobeafastertransitiontolowerbirthrates,needstobetakennowtomakeadifferencelong-term.Asseveraldecadestendtopassbetweenahuman’sbirthanddeath,thereisasignificanttimelagforpolicyeffectstorealiseduetodemographicinertia.Policiessupportingsustainabledevelopmentinhealth,education,inequalityandpovertymayslowpopulationgrowthwhencarefullydesigned,butinternationalconsensusonacommonpopulationanddevelopmentagendaiswaning.TheEUisastrongsupporteroftheinternationalagendaonpopulationanddevelopmentanditsbroaderdevelopmentstrategyisalignedwithinternationalgoalsoneducation,healthandclimate.ThefindingsofthischapterhighlighttherolethattheEUcouldplaywithitsexternalpoliciesinstrumentsthatsupportsustainabledevelopment,whichisrecursivelylinkedtolowerbirthsrateswhich,inturn,alsocontributestolowertotalemissions.TheEUcouldfurtherintensifythealreadyexistingstrongsupportforstrategiestoreducechildandmaternalmortality;provideuniversalaccesstoeducation;achievegenderequality;endchildmarriage;andprovideuniversalaccesstosexualandreproductivehealthandreproductiverights.Internationalconsensusonanindividual-rights-basedapproachtopopulationpoliciesiswaninginrelevantUnitedNations’forumswhichimpedesprogresstowardsthewholepopulationanddevelopmentagenda.Twocontrarywayshowtoaddressthisroadblockarebeingproposed:intensifyeffortstodefendindividualrightsonsexualityandreproductionoropentheparadigmforre-evaluationinfavouroftheadvancementofothersustainabledevelopmentissues.3233Chapter2DemographiccharacteristicsandemissionsintheEUKeymessages•Inadditiontothegeneralrelationwithincome,individualemissionsareshapedbytheinteractionbetweenageandtotalexpenditures,thecompositionoftheexpenditurebasket,therural-urbanplaceoflivingandthehouseholdsize.•Whentakingtheseinteractionsintoaccount,itispossibletoobserveanincreaseinpercapitaemissionswithage.Giventheoveralllowerlevelofexpendituresofolderpeople,thisincreaseisinrelativetermsandisexplainedbytheconcentrationoftheirconsumptionofcarbon-intensiveitemsforhousingandbytheirsmallerhouseholdsize.•Householdslivingincitieshaveloweremissionsthankstourbaneconomiesofscale,moreefficientformsofmobilityandsmallerhouses.However,suchadvantagesarecontrastedbyhigherincomeandbysmallerhouseholdsizes.•BytakingintoaccounttheeffectsofageonemissionsindemographicprojectionsfortheEU,weestimateanincreaseofemissionsof6%by2039.Afterthispeak,emissionsareexpectedtodecreaseby4%bytheendofthecentury.•Overall,theeffectofageingispresentbutnotstriking.Whatismorerelevant,isthatdemographictrendswillalsoimplyashiftintheresponsibilityforemissionstowardsoldergenerations.By2060,39%oftotalemissionswillbeproducedbypeopleabove65.•Thistrendbearsimplicationsifweconsiderthattheconsumptionpatternofolderpeopletrapstheminhighemissionsconsumptionpatternswithlimitedpossibilitiesforchange.•Thefindingsofthischapterhighlighttheimportanceoftargetingpolicymeasuresforenergyefficiencyandgreentransitionsforolderandlow-incomeindividuals.IntroductionChapter1describeshowtheeffectofpopulationonemissionscanberepresentedthroughasimplemultiplicativeequationbetweentotalpopulation,affluence,energyefficiencyandcarbonintensity(IPAT).Inthisequationpopulationsizeisafactorofscalewherepopulationincreasesproportionallytranslateintoincreasesintheemissions(O’Neilletal.,2012a).Focusingonlyonpopulationsizerepresentsanoversimplificationofthepathwaysleadingtoemissions.SeveralstudiesanalysingenergyconsumptionintheUS(Estiri&Zagheni,2019;O’Neill&Chen,2002)ordirectlyCO2emissionsinvariousEuropeanandOECDcountries(Ivanova&Wood,2020;Ottelin,2022;Zhengetal.,2022)haveshownthatbesidestotalpopulation,age,education,rural-urbanplaceoflivingandhouseholdsize,candeterminethelevelofemissions,eitherdirectlyorindirectlythroughinteractionswiththeotherthreecomponentsoftheIPATequation.Theseadditionaldemographiceffectstakeplacethroughthetwomainchannelsofconsumptionandproduction.Intheconsumptionchannel,ageiscorrelatedwiththeoveralllevelofspendingandsavingsandcanthereforeincreaseemissionsasmoreincomeisdestinedforconsumption.Moreover,withchangesoverthelifecourse,spendingpreferencescanshifttowardsmoreorlesscarbon-intensiveproductsorservices.Whenconsideringtheproductionchannel,theagestructureofthepopulationaffectslabourproductivityandatthemacrolevel,itcanboosteconomicgrowththroughademographicdividendorcausestagnationduetotheshrinkingandageingofthelabourforce(Bloometal.,2015).Thesemacroeconomiceffectshaveinturnrepercussionsonemissionswhich,asseeninChapter1,arecloselylinkedtoGDPpercapitaandincomedistributionacrossandwithincountries.Furthermore,theagecompositionandeducationlevelofthelabourforcecandeterminetheavailabilityofspecificskillswhichwillberequiredfortheindustrialtransformationtowardsagreeneconomy.ThischaptercomplementsChapter1byexamininghowage,householdsizeandrural-urbanplaceoflivingcandetermineemissionsintheEU15.15TheanalysiscoversE27withtheexceptionofAustriaandisreferringto2015whichrepresentsthelatestyearavailablefortheHouseholdBudgetSurveymicrodata.34Thechapterfocusesontheconsumptionchannel.Asstressedbyseveralauthors(Davis&Caldeira,2010;Throne-Holstetal.,2007)andbytheSGD12(“Unsustainablepatternsofconsumptionandproductionarerootcausesofthetripleplanetarycrisesofclimatechange,biodiversitylossandpollution”)toreachclimatemitigationtargetsitisnotsufficienttopursueimprovementsinenergyefficiencyandthedecarbonisationontheproductionsidebutweneedtolookmorecloselyonthelessappealingideaofactingontheconsumptionsideofemissions.TheanalysesinthischapterarebasedonmicrodatafromtheEurostatHouseholdBudgetSurvey(HBS).HBSprovidesinformationabouthouseholdfinalconsumptionofgoodsandservices,withinformationonincomeandotherdemographicandsocio-economiccharacteristicsofhouseholdsandtheirmembers.TheexpendituredatafromHBS,expressedinEuro,havebeentransformedintogreenhousegasesandCO2equivalentsusingmultipliersfromMulti-RegionalSupplyandInput-OutputTables(Tukkeretal.,2014).Thesetablesconnectproductiontofinalconsumptiongivingadetailedrepresentationoftheinterindustrymonetaryflowsinnationaleconomiesandinternationaltrade.Withasetofenvironmentalextensions,theyalsoprovideatranslationofmonetaryflowsintoenvironmentalimpactsandmaterialneeds.Byconsideringthemixofamacroandmicroapproachwecanavailononesideofadetailedbreakdownofconsumptionbyindividualandhouseholdsocio-demographiccharacteristicsand,ontheotherside,reflectthespecificcharacteristicsandtheenvironmentalsustainabilityofnationaleconomies.Inaddition,theconnectionbetweennationalaccountsthroughtradeinthemultiregionalinput-outputtablesallowsaccountingfortheresponsibilityofemissionslinkedtotheconsumptionofimportedgoodsproducedinothercountries.Asawordofcaution,itmustbestressedthattheemissionsderivedfromtheHBSdonotallowtocaptureemissionsrelatedtogovernmentspendingandpublicinvestmentsnortheycanrepresentitemsofconsumptionrelatedtoone-timepurchasessuchasahouseoranewcar.Inaddition,themergingbetweenthemacroandmicrodataisnotalwaysstraightforwardsincethetwosourcesusedifferentclassificationschemes,respectivelythePRODCOMitemsofproductioninthemultiregionalinputandoutputtablesandtheCOICOPitemsofconsumptioninHBS.OurapproachentailsthereforeaseriesofmethodologicaladjustmentsandlimitationswhicharedescribedmoreindetailintheAppendixtoChapter2.Thefirstfoursectionsinthischapterdescribetheemissionspatternsaboutincome,thecompositionoftheexpenditurebasket,theroleofhouseholdsizeandoftherural-urbanplaceofresidence.Sectionfivecombinesthesedifferentperspectivesandexaminestheroleofageonemissionsaftercontrollingfortheotherdemographiccharacteristics,throughaseriesofregressionmodels.ThefinalsectionprovidesasimplesimulationoftheevolutionofemissionsintheEUbasedonEurostatdemographicprojections.FindingsEmissionspeakatmiddleagealongsidetheincreaseinincomeandexpendituresAsindicatedinChapter1thestrongestdriverforemissionsisincome.Incomeistranslatingintoconsumptionand,despitedifferencesinthecarbonintensityofdifferentformsofconsumption,thefutureoftrajectoriesofemissionscanbeconsideredlargelydependingoneconomicgrowth.Acorrelationbetweenincomeandageiswellestablishedintheliterature.StudiesbasedonthesystemofNationalTransferAccounts(R.Lee&Mason,2014)showcleardifferencesinthedistributionofincome,expenditureandpublicandprivatetransfersacrossgenerations.ThismacroperspectiveisconfirmedinouranalysesofmicrodatafromtheHBS.InFigure13weshowtheprofilesofincome,expenditureandemissionsasafunctionofage.Formostoftheanalysesincludedinthischapterwherewerefertoindividualattributesandinparticulartoage,weallocatetheHBSexpenditurefromthehouseholdtoonereferencepersoninhousehold16.Thissolutionisnotjustatechnicalstepbutrelatesmorefundamentallytotheissueofallocationofresponsibilityforemissionslinkedtodecisionsforconsumptionamongthemembersofhouseholds.Inourapproach,weassumethattheresponsibilityforemissionsofchildrenliesentirelywithoneoftheirparents.Inotherwords,olderpersons16Thepersonaged16ormorewhomostcontributestothehouseholdincome,howeversomecountriesusesubjectivecriteria(e.g.thepersonwhoisdesignatedassuchbytheothermembers).35inherittheresponsibilityfortheemissionslinkedtotheage-specificpatternsofconsumptionoftheyoungergenerations,aslongastheyliveinthesamehousehold.AsshownintheupperpanelofFigure13theprofileofbothincomeandexpenditureasafunctionofageshowsatypicalinvertedUshape.Bothincomeandtotalexpenditureincreaseuntilage50-54andthenstarttodecline.Figure13AverageincomeandexpenditureandmedianemissionsbyageintheEU(2015)Source:ownelaborationofEurostatHBSmicrodataandCO2multipliersfromExiobase.Notes:thegreybandshowsthelevelofindividualannualemissionsinaworldwheretheavailablecarbonbudgetcompatiblewiththetargetsof1.5°Cand2°CwouldbeequallydistributedacrosstheworldpopulationThegapbetweenthetwolines,ofexpenditureandincome,isfollowingasimilarinvertedUshapeandbecomeslargerinmiddleage.Alowergapinthecaseoftheyoungerandoldergenerationsreflectsthefactthattheytendtoconsumeahigherportionoftheirincome.Fromthis,theyhavelowerroomforsavingsandinvestmentsandpossiblyaneedtocompensatefordeficienciesinincomethroughintergenerationalprivateorpublictransfers.Theyoungergenerationismostlysupportedthroughprivatetransferbytheparentswhiletheoldergenerationissupportedbygovernmentsthroughthepensionsystem.Inourdata,wecannotobserveexpenditureslinkedtogoodsandservicesproducedbygovernmentssuchaseducationandhealthcare.Byimputingalsothesevaluestoexpenditures,likenormallydoneinNationalTransferAccounts,wewouldnotjustseeashrinkinggapbetweenconsumptionandincomebutactuallythattheoldergenerationhasabalanceofconsumptionwellovertheirincome.Theunbalancebetweenincomeandconsumptionacrossageshighlightstheconsequencesofincreasingdependencyratesandtheimpactofdemographictrendsofageingonthesustainabilityofthegovernment’sbudget(R.Lee&Mason,2014).WhatismoreinterestingforourpurposesisthattheprofilesforincomeandexpenditureaftertheconversionofEurointoCO2directlytranslateintoasimilarprofileforemissionsacrossagegroups.ThelowerpanelinFigure13showsthatthemedianemissionspeakatage40-44andstarttodeclineafterage50-54.Thedifferenceacrossagegroupsissubstantialandcorrespondstoalmost5tofCO2moreforpeopleaged40-44withrespecttopeopleaged20-24andover75.Toputthesenumbersinperspective,theallowedemissionswhichatagloballevelwouldbecompatiblewith1.5°Cand2°Ctargetshavebeenestimatedintherangebetween1.9tand4.9tofCO2,respectively(Chancel,2022).ThemedianofemissionsacrossEUMSforallagegroupsisgenerallyabovethesetargetsandinthecaseofages40-44,itisalmostdoublewhatisallowedtoreachthe2°Ctarget.Besidesagedifferences,thecloserelationshipbetweenincome,expenditureandemissionspointstoanotherformofinequalityinthedistributionofemissionsinthepopulation.36Chapter1alreadybrieflydescribedhowtheresponsibilityforemissionsisunequallydistributedacrossworldcountriesdependingonthelevelofGDPpercapita.TheseglobalinequalitiesinthedistributionofemissionsaboutincomeareevidentalsoinourhouseholdperspectiveandwhenconsideringtheincomedistributionwithinEUcountries.Figure14providesanestimateofthemedianemissionsacrossquantilesoftheincomedistributionwithintheEU.Thequantilesareorderedfromlow-incomelevelsonthelefttohigh-incomelevelsontheright.TheyarecalculatedoneachnationaldistributionandthereforeneutralisedifferencesinincomeacrossEUMS.Figure14MedianemissionsintheEUbyincomequantileSource:ownelaborationofEurostatHBSmicrodataandCO2multipliersfromExiobaseAlso,inthiscase,thelevelofemissionsisputincontextwiththelevelwhichwouldberequiredtolimitglobalwarmingto1.5-2°C.Medianemissionsincreasewiththelevelofincome,startingfromaround3tCO2inthelowestincomequantiletoreachingaround16tCO2inthehighestincomequantile.ThemedianlevelofemissionsofthepoorerhouseholdsintheEUiswithintherangeoftheglobalindividualemissionstargetof2°CwhiletherichesthouseholdsintheEUhaveemissionswhichareseventimeshigherthanwhatwouldbeallowedtomeetthe1.5°Ctarget.TakentogetherthetwoanalysesaboveindicatethattherearetwointerlinkedformsofinequalitiesinthedistributionoftheresponsibilityforemissionsintheEU.Thefirstisinter-generationalandthesecondisrelatedtotheunequaldistributionofincomewithinandacrosscountries.Giventhestrongassociationbetweenincomeandage,wecanexpectthatageingintheEUwillimpactemissionsthroughbothintergenerationaleconomictransferandincomeinequalities.EmissionsbyyoungergenerationsaremostlycausedbytransportwhileolderpeoplehaveemissionsconcentratedonresidentialitemssuchasheatingandelectricityDespitetheoverallassociationbetweenincomeandemissions,smalldifferencesbetweenthetwoageprofilesinFigure13canbeexplainedbyadifferentcompositionofthebasketofconsumptionandthecarbonintensityofthespecificexpenditureitemsduringthelifecourse.Figure15showsforeachagegroupthesharesandthemedianabsolutelevelsofemissionsrelatedtofourmaincategoriesofexpenditures:health,residentialitems,transports,foodandaremainingothercategorygroupingitemssuchaseducation,clothing,communication,durableandnon-durablegoods.37Figure15RelativeandmedianabsoluteemissionsintheEUbymainconsumptioncategoriesandbyage(2015)Source:ownelaborationofEurostatHBSmicrodataandCO2multipliersfromExiobaseResidentialemissionshavethemostimportantroleintotalemissionsforallagegroupsexceptages25-29.Theirrelevanceisincreasingwithage,reachingmorethan80%forpeopleabove85.Theresidentialcategorycomprisesitemssuchasrents,whichhaveahighweightintermsofexpendituresbutlowimpactsintermsofemissions,butalsoitemssuchasenergyforheating,gasandelectricity,whichhavethehighestmultipliersfortheconversionfromEurointoemissionsofCO2equivalents,amongallexpenditureitems.Thesecondmostimpactingcategoryisrepresentedbytransport.Thiscategoryincludes,amongitsmostimpactingitems,seatransport,flightsandgasolineandpetrolforprivatecars.Therelativeimportanceoftheemissionsgeneratedbytransportisofalmost50%inthecaseofthoseaged25-29.Transportsemissionsdecreasewithageandhavethereforeanoppositetrendwithrespecttoresidentialemissions.Byageofretirement,therelativeimportanceoftotalemissionslinkedtotransportishalvedto25%andforagesabove85itdropstolessthan2.5%reflectingthealmosttotalreductionofthemobilityofveryoldpeople.Inthecaseofoldpeople,itisalsopossibletoobservetheincreaseinemissionslinkedtohealthandareductionofexpenditureforthecategoryother.Thesetwocategorieshaveaverylowrelevanceintermsoftheircontributiontototalemissions.Insynthesis,agreatpartofthepatternsofemissionsisexplainedbyashiftofimportanceforthetwocategoriesofresidentialandtransportbetweenyoungerandoldergenerations.Transportsplayamajorroleinthecaseofyoungerageswhileresidentialemissionsplayamajorinolderages.Theitemsintheconsumptionbasketreactdifferentlytochangesinincomewithineachagegroup,basedonthediscretionaryversusnon-discretionarynatureofspending.Thisbearsimportantimplicationsforthepossibilitiesofmodifyingthebehaviourstowardslessimpactingconsumptionpatterns.Tohighlightsuchconstraints,Figure16presentsthedistributionofthetotalexpendituresacrossthecategoriesofconsumptionforeachincomeandagegroupofthepopulation.Inthiscase,weconsideramoredetailedbreakdownintoelectricity,gasandotherfuels,foodandnon-alcoholicbeverages,restaurantsandhotelsandtransport.Thefiguretellsforexamplethatpeopleofageabove60inthepoorestincomequantile(Q1)haveonaverage12%oftheirspendingdestinedtoelectricity,gasandotherfuels.38Figure16MediansharesofspecificitemsofconsumptioninthetotalexpendituresofeachageandincomequantilegroupSource:ownelaborationofEurostatHBSmicrodataAsalreadyseenwhenconsideringtheagepatternsforemissions,independentlyfromtheirincome,peopleofageabove60haveahighershareofexpendituresdestinedforresidentialenergywhileyoungerpeopletowardstransport.Figure16alsohighlightsthatwithintheagegroupover60,theshareofresidentialenergyisparticularlypronouncedforthelowerincomequantilesandtendstodecreasewithincome.Thispatternisintheoppositedirectionwhenconsideringthediscretionaryspendingforrestaurantsandhotelsandtransport.Inthesecases,theoldpeopleintherichestincomequantileshavehigherrelativespendingthanthepoorestpeople.Inmoretechnicaltermswecanrecogniseinthesesharesofconsumptionacrossagesandincomelevelsvariationsinelasticitiestoincomeaboutdiscretionaryversusnon-discretionaryspending.Theconsumptionofoldpeopleandpoorpeopleisconcentratedonresidentialenergywhichnotonlyhashighcarbonintensitybutisalsorepresentingahighshareoftotalexpenditureduetoitsnon-discretionarynature.Thisimpliesthatforthistypeofconsumption,theyalsohavelimitedleveragetomodifytheirbehaviour.Inotherwords,theoldandpoordespitetheirlowlevelofemissionsinabsolutetermsare“trapped”inapatternofhighemissionsinrelativetermswithlimitedscopetoshifttowardsmoresustainablelifestyles.Giventheirsmallerhouseholdsize,olderpeoplehavehigheremissionswhenconsideringtheminpercapitatermsAsindicatedabovewhenconsideringthespendingpatternsbyage,sofar,wehaveattributedhouseholdexpendituresentirelytothereferencepersoninthehousehold.However,sincethehouseholdsizeisalsocorrelatedwithage,itisalsorelevanttoexplorehowindividualemissionsvarywhenaccountingforchangesinhouseholdsizeoverthelifecourse.Forthispurpose,wedividethetotalhouseholdexpendituresandemissionsbythenumberofmembersofeachhousehold17toobtainemissionsinpercapitaterms.17InlinewithanalysesofincomeandothervariablesrequiringtoswitchfromahouseholdtoindividualperspectivewerelyontheOECD-modifiedequivalencescalewhichassignsavalueof1tothehouseholdhead,of0.5toeachadditionaladultmemberandof0.3toeachchild.39Figure17Medianhouseholdandpercapitaemissions(upperpanel)andaveragehouseholdsize(lowerpanel)byageintheEU(2015)Source:ownelaborationofEurostatHBSmicrodataandCO2multipliersfromExiobaseThesizeofthehouseholdiscloselylinkedtothevariousstagesofthelifecourseandfamilyformation.FromthelowerpanelinFigure17,wecanobservethattheaveragehouseholdsizetendstoincreasewithageandreachesitsmaximumvalueof2.4forreferencepersonsaged40-44.Afterthispeak,thehouseholdsizestartstodecreaseasaresultofchildrenleavingtheirfamiliesand,atolderages,thepassingawayofapartner.Thesevariationsinhouseholdsizehavecleareffectswhenswitchingfromtotalemissionstopercapitaemissions.Inparticular,wecanobservethatduetosmallerhouseholdsize,emissionsinpercapitatermspeakat55-59ratherthanatage40-44.Withageing,percapitaemissionscontinuetobehighdespitethedeclineinexpendituresandincome.AccordingtoEurostatdata,theaveragehouseholdsizeintheEUwasonaverage2.2membersandthenumberofsingle-personhouseholdswithoutchildrenintheEUincreasedby28.5%between2009and2021(Eurostat,2023b).Asseenfromtheanalysisinthissectionthisdemographicprocessofshrinkinghouseholdsizewhichiscloselylinkedtolowfertilitycouldbringanincreaseinemissionsattheaggregatelevelduetoareductionofso-calledfamilyeconomies(e.g.,theenergyconsumptionofhousesdesignedforlargerfamilieswillbesharedbyasmallernumberofresidents).40CityresidentscanbenefitfromenergysavingsandurbaneconomiesofscalebuttheytendtoemitmorewithrespecttoruralresidentsduetotheirhigherincomeandtheirsmallerhouseholdsizeBesidesageandhouseholdsize,thethirddemographiccharacteristicwhichisexpectedtogenerateimpactsonconsumptionandemissionsisrepresentedbytherural-urbanplaceofliving.Thefindingsfromtheliteratureontheimpactsofurbanisationonemissionsandenvironmentalsustainabilityaremixed.Papersbasedondataatthenationallevel,citylevelandmicroanalysesofhouseholdbudgetdatafindbothnegativeandpositiveeffects(Ala-Mantilaetal.,2014;Fremstadetal.,2018;Koslowskietal.,2020;Moranetal.,2018).Thesemixedresultsmaybelinkedtodifferencesinthegranularityofanalysis,whichespeciallyinmacrostudiesmayconstrainthepossibilityofproperlycontrollingforincomeandotherfactorsinfluencingemissions,inthegeographicalcontext,inthedevelopmentlevelofcountriesandthestageofurbanisation.WemayexpectforexampleverydifferenteffectsonemissionsifwecompareurbanisationinslumsandmegacitiesindevelopingcountrieswiththedensificationofoldcitiesinEurope,urbansprawlingintheUSorrapidlyemergingnewcitiesinChina.ThelatestIPCCAR6synthesisreportrecogniseswithhighconfidencethaturbanisationandurbanformareamongthethreekeydriversofemissions,besidespopulationsizeandincome(IPCC,2023a).Thereportalsohighlights,ononeside,theopportunitiesfordecarbonisationthroughurbanplanningand,ontheotherside,thechallengesposedbyurbanisationandthepositivecorrelationbetweenurbanisationandincome.Citiesallowforurbanefficienciesandeconomiesofscale,forexamplethroughthesharingofpublicspacesandtransport,buttheyalsoentailanacceleratedpaceoflifeandchangesinlifestylewithpotentialadverseconsequencesonemissions.Thesetwocontrastingfactorsemergeclearlywhenlookingathowthegrowthofmaterialinfrastructureandinnovationandeconomicactivityscaledifferentlytocitypopulationsize.Figure18Examplesofscalingofinnovation,economicactivityandmaterialinfrastructurewithrespecttopopulationsize.Source:reproductionofestimatespublishedinBettencourt(2020).InFigure18ascalingfactoraboveoneinthecaseofinnovationandeconomicactivitylikenewpatents,employmentandGDPmeansthatcitiescreatetheconditionsforeconomicgrowthovertheirpopulation,whileascalingfactorlowerthanoneformaterialinfrastructurelikeroadsurfaceandgasolinesales,pointstohigherefficienciesandso-calledurbaneconomiesofscale.AssuccinctlystatedbyWestinhisattempttoestablishanew“scienceforcities”theveryessenceofcitiesandtheir“job”istofacilitatehumaninteraction,innovationandexchangeofinformationbyprovidingadequateandmoreefficientinfrastructure(West,2017).Thepotentialadverseconsequencesofemissionsentailedinthisrolelieinthecorrelationbetweenhigherincomeandconsumption.Akeyquestionwhichneedstobestilladdressedisiftheprocessofurbanisationisstillverystrongindevelopingcountries,urbanefficiencieswillprevailontheemissionsgeneratedbyhigherincomeandlifestylechanges.InthecaseoftheEU,whereurbanisationisalmostcompleteandonthecontrary,therearesignsofcounter-urbanisationandsuburbanisation,thequestionsare:firstiftheseprocessesaregoingtobesubstantialandsecondiftheywillimplylosingsomeoftheadvantagesofcitiesintermsofeconomiesofscale,whilenotfundamentallyalteringthehighlevelsofconsumption.41Inlinewiththeotheranalysesofthischapter,weapproachthesequestionsbyusingdatafromtheHBSsurvey.Inthiscase,weconsiderhowemissionsvaryinfunctionofthevariableofthedegreeofurbanisationwhichdescribesifthehouseholdisresidinginacity,townorruralarea.Also,bylookingatsimplemedianemissionsacrossthesethreeclassesofthedegreeofurbanisation(Figure19)wecanrecognisethattheplaceofresidenceofhouseholdshasindeedconsiderableimpactsonboththerelativecompositionofemissionsacrosscategoriesofconsumptionandtheirabsolutelevel.Inthethreerural-urbantypologiesresidentialemissionsplaythemajorrolerangingfrom60%incities,55%intownsandabove70%inruralareas.Inruralareas,residentialemissionshavethehighestshareintotalemissions(73%)butalowabsolutelevel(2.5tCO2)incomparisontocities(3tCO2)andtowns(3.2tCO2).Emissionslinkedtotransportplayarelativelysmallerroleinruralareaswhiletheyregister,inabsoluteterms,asimilarvaluetotheemissionsincities.Townsappeartobepenalisedbothwithrespecttocitiesandruralareas,giventhehighertransportemissionsinrelativeandabsolutetermsandhighresidentialemissionsinabsoluteterms.Figure19Relativeandabsolute(median)emissionsbycategoryofconsumptionanddegreeofurbanisationSource:ownelaborationofEurostatHBSmicrodataandCO2multipliersfromExiobaseTofurtherexploretheeffectsoftherural-urbantypologiesweuseaseriesofregressionmodelswhichallowcapturingsimultaneouslyeffectslinkedtoagestructure,incomeandhouseholdsize.Figure20presentstheresultsofthreemodelsshowingforsimplicityonlythecoefficientsforthedegreeofurbanisation(forfullmodelresultsseetableinAppendixtoChapter2).42Figure20EffectofthedegreeofurbanizationonemissionsinthreeseparateregressionmodelsSource:statisticalmodelsbasedonEurostatHBSmicrodataandCO2multipliersfromExiobase.SeeAppendixtoChapter2formodels’specificationsandresultsThefirstmodelontheleftincludescontrolsforincomeandage.Inthismodelhouseholdslivingintownsandruralareashavehigheremissionsthanthoselivingincities(consideredasbaseline).Thismodelisneutralisingtheeffectofayoungerpopulationandmoreimportantlythehigherincomeincities.Thelevellingofincomeallowsforurbaneconomiestoemergeandhighlightsthebeneficialeffectsonemissionslinkedtosavingsfromshortercommutingtime,moreefficientandsustainabletransportandsmallerhouses.Inthesecondmodel,afterexcludingthecontrolforincome,thelowerconsumptioninruralareasprevailsandweobtainaloweremissionforruralresidentsincomparisontopeoplelivingincities.Thelastmodelbyconsideringasadependentvariabletheemissionsinpercapitatermsfurtherreducestheeffectonemissionsforruralresidentsincomparisontothoselivingincities.Theresultsofthismodelareexplainedbythefactthatpeopleinruralareascanshareemissionswithmorefamilymembersandbenefitfromso-calledfamilyeconomies.AsalreadyseenwiththedescriptiveanalysesinFigure19,householdsintownsareatanintermediatepositionhavinghigheremissionsduetothehigherincomeincomparisontothoselivinginruralareasandhigheremissionsincomparisontothoselivingincitiesmainlyduetothehighincidencelinkedtotransports18.Inessence,therearethreecomponentswhichcandeterminedifferencesinemissionsacrossrural-urbantypologies.Incities,theadvantageslinkedtourbaneconomiesofscalearecontrastedbyhigherconsumptionandbyalowerfamilyeconomyandcanonlyemergewhencontrollingforthesetwolastcomponents.Whencontrollingforincome,householdsizeandplaceofresidence,emissionstendtoincreasewithageThepatternsofincomeandexpenditureandhouseholds’sizeinfunctionofage,describedinprevioussections,canbefinallycombinedinaseriesofregressionmodelstoexploretheroleofageonemissions.18Toexplorewhatisdrivingdifferencesintotalemissionsweusedaseriesofmodelsfittedindependentlyforthemaincategoriesofconsumption.FordetailedmodelresultsseeAppendixtoChapter2.43Figure21Effectsofageonemissions,emissionspercapitaandemissionspercapitaaftercontrollingforincome,educationanddegreeofurbanizationSource:statisticalmodelsbasedonEurostatHBSmicrodataandCO2multipliersfromExiobase.SeeAppendixtoChapter2forfullmodels’specificationsandresults.Notes:regressioncoefficientsforagearenormalisedusingmin-maxnormalisationFigure21showstheseeffectsintheformofnormalisedcoefficientsforageestimatedinthreeregressionmodels.Thefirstmodelhasasadependentvariablethetotalemissionsofthehouseholdandastheonlyindependentvariabletheageofthereferencepersonofthehousehold.Thesecondmodelconsidersemissionspercapitaasthedependentvariable.Thelastmodelexpandsthesecondmodelwiththeadditionofthelevelofincomeofthehouseholdandtheplaceofresidenceofthereferenceperson,ascontrolvariables.TheinvertedU-shapeageprofileemergingfromthefirstmodelfortotalemissionsmirrorscloselyresemblestheexpendituresandincomeprofilesbyagealreadyseeninFigure13.Thelargesteffectonemissionsisrecordedforages40-44and45-49anddecreasesprogressivelywithage,suggestingthatemissionsmayberelatedtothefinancialresourcesofhouseholdsatdifferentages.Theaccountingofthedifferenthouseholdsizesinthesecondmodelhasacriticaleffectontheageprofileofemissions.Theemissionspercapitaremainlowatyoungeragescorrespondingtochildbearingandfamilyformation.Afterage45-49whenthechildrenleavetheirfamilies,theemissionsincreasemorerapidly,andafterage60-64theystarttodecrease.Inthethirdmodel,aftercontrollingfortheeffectofincome,thepercapitaemissionsforages25-29becomemoreevident.Theeffectonemissionsdecreasestothelowestlevelatage40-44andafterwardsstartsagaintoincreasewithage.Thislastmodelisinlinewiththeresultsinotherstudies(Ottelin,2022;Zhengetal.,2022)showingtheincreaseinthelevelofpercapitaemissionsassociatedwithageingsocieties.However,whenconfrontingwiththeothertwomodels,itisalsopossibletorecognisethatthehigherlevelsofemissionsofolderpeoplearegeneratedbythereductionofthehouseholdsizeandemergeonlyaftercontrollingfortheirdecreasingincome.Inotherwords,olderpeoplecanbeaccountableforhigheremissionsonlyinrelativetermswithinaloweroveralllevelofexpendituresandmostlybecausetheycannotbenefitfromtheeconomiesofscaleoflivinginlargefamilies.DemographicdeclineandageingintheEUcouldbringadecreaseinemissionsinthelongrunandtoaconcentrationoftheresponsibilityforemissionsinolderagegroupsPrevioussectionshaveshownthattheemissionsaredependingonage,householdsizeanddegreeofurbanisation.Thesearestaticpatternsreferringto2015.Futureemissionsscenarioswillbeshapedbyhowthedecarbonisationandenergyefficiencygainsinthegreentransitionwillinteractwitheconomicgrowthand44withchangesindemographiccharacteristics,that,aswehaveseen,caninfluencethelevelandtypeofconsumptioninamorecomplexwaythanjustthetotalpopulation.Apropermodeltoprojecttheevolutionofallthesecomponentsgoesbeyondthescopeofthisreport.However,tohaveanideaoftheconsequencesofageingintermsofemissionswereverttoastylisedprojectionwherewesimulatetheeffectofagekeepingalltheotherelementsstatic.Inthismodel,weapplythecoefficientsestimatedfromthemodelonemissionspercapitabyagetotheEurostatprojectionsoftheEUpopulationuntil2100.Throughthisapproach,wetakeaseriesofsimplifyingassumptions.First,weconsiderthesamecarbonintensitycoefficientsofconsumptionembeddedintheCO2multipliersof2015.Secondly,weletallthedimensionsplaytheirroleonlythroughage,possiblyneglectingchangesintherelationsbetweenageandhouseholdsizeandurbanisation.Finally,weassumethattherelationbetweenageandemissionsremainsconstantovertimeandthereforewedonotaccountforthepossibilitythatfuturegenerationswilladoptdifferentbehavioursincomparisontotheirparentsatthesameage.Figure22ProjectedpercentagechangeofemissionsintheEU(upperpanel)andshareofprojectedemissionsbyagegroups(lowerpanel)Source:theprojectedemissionsarecalculatedbyapplyingtheage-specificemissioncoefficients(seeFigure21)totheEurostatEUROPOP19projectionsTheresultsoftheprojectionarepresentedintheupperpanelofFigure22intermsofthepercentagechangeofemissionswithrespecttothelevelofemissionsoftheyear2015.Tocomparethisoutlookforemissionswiththetrendforpopulation,thesamegraphincludesthepercentagechangeforthetotalpopulation.Theprojectionsindicatethatemissionswouldincreasewithrespecttothebaselinereachinganexcessofalmost6%by2039.Afterthispeak,theyareexpectedtodecreaseby4%bytheendofthecentury.Emissionsincreasemorethanjustpopulation.Inparticular,theyareexpectedtoexceedpopulationgrowthby3%in2039.InthelongrunemissionsintheEUwilldeclinefollowingpopulationtrendsbutthisdeclinewillbelessrapidduetotheimpactsofageingonconsumption.Overall,theeffectofageingispresentbutnotstriking.WhatisprobablymorerelevanttonoteinthelowerpanelofFigure22isthatdemographictrendswillalsoimplyachangeintherelativeresponsibilityforemissionsacrossagegroupswithashiftintheresponsibilityforemissionstowardsoldergenerations.By2060,39%oftotalemissionswillbeproducedbypeopleabove65andthiswillgroupwillovertaketheothertwoyoungeragegroupsintermsofresponsibilityforemissions.Onthecontrary,theresponsibilityforemissionsoftheagegroup20-39isexpectedtoconstantlydecreasefrom30%in2015toaround23%from2060until2100.45ConclusionThischapterconsideredhowdemographiccharacteristicsandinparticularage,householdsizeandrural-urbanresidencecouldinfluenceemissionsthroughaseriesofeffectsonconsumption.EspeciallyintheEUwherepopulationgrowthisnotexpectedtoplayabigroleinfutureemissions,itisimportanttolookattheroleofthesedemographiccharacteristicsratherthantotalpopulationsize.Theincreaseintheshareofemissionsproducedbyolderpeoplebearspolicyimplicationsforthetargetingofclimatemitigationpolicies.Olderpeopledespitethelowerconsumptioninabsolutetermshavehigherconcentrationsofemissionsonhighcarbonintensityproductsandproducemoreemissionsinpercapitaterms.Theyarealsomorerepresentedinruralareasthancitiesandcannotavailofurbaneconomies.Finally,theyhavefewerpossibilitiestochangepatternsofconsumptionhavingaconcentrationofspendingonhighcarbonintensityitemswhichalsohavelowelasticitiestoincome.Allthesefactorstakentogetherandfromafutureperspectivehighlightapriorityoftargetingmitigationpolicies,particularlyforoldergenerations.Theshiftintheresponsibilityforemissionsbetweengenerationsbringsnewelementstothedebatesaroundsocialjusticeinclimatechangebesidesthenormalconsiderationofincomeinequalities.Ononeside,climatechangeisimpactingyoungergenerations,ontheotherside,theresponsibilityforemissionswillincreasinglylieinolderagepeople,whodonotnecessarilyhavethemeanstomodifyconsumptiontowardsmoresustainablelifestyles.Thenextchaptershowshowtheseintergenerationaldifferencesintheresponsibilityforemissionslinkedtoconsumptionpatternsalsorelatetodifferencesinattitudesandconcernsaboutclimatechangeandelaboratesonhowattitudesmayormaynottranslateintobehavioursandactions.4647Chapter3SociodemographicdifferencesintheattitudestowardsclimatechangeKeymessages•AccordingtotheClimateChangeSpecialEurobarometersurvey,citizensofEUcountriesthinkthatclimatechangehasbecomethesinglemostseriousproblemfacingtheworldasawhole.AroundfourinfiveEUcitizensperceiveclimatechangeasaveryseriousproblem.•Theperceptionoftheseverityofclimatechangediffersacrossgroupswithdisparatesociodemographiccharacteristics.Youngergenerations,highlyeducatedindividuals,andresidentsoflargetownswithintheEUaremorelikelytobelievethatclimatechangeisthemostseriousandaveryseriousproblem.•AlargemajorityofEUcitizenssaythatgovernmentalentitiesareresponsiblefortacklingclimatechangeandaroundtwo-thirdsreportthattheyrecentlytookpersonalactiontofightclimatechange.Moreeducatedindividualsaremorelikelytoidentifyatleastoneresponsiblegovernmentalbodyandtoclaimtohavetakenpersonalaction.•Reportedpersonalbehavioursdifferbythedegreeofindividualconcernaboutclimatechange.EUcitizensthatperceiveclimatechangeasabiggerproblemandthatseeanindividuallevelofresponsibilityforactionalsomoreoftenclaimtohavetakenpersonalstepstotackleclimatechange.•AlmostallEUcitizenssupportthekeytargetoftheEUstrategyonAdaptationtoClimateChangeofmakingtheEUeconomyclimate-neutralby2050.AboutfouroutoffiveEUcitizensbelievethatthedamagescausedbyclimatechangeoutweighthecostsofagreentransition.•Overthepastdecade,theperceivedseriousnessofclimatechangeincreasedamongEUcitizens.Theawarenessoftheseverityofclimatechangevarieslessacrossagegroupsthanovertime.Thismightindicatethatindividualperceptionsofclimatechangearemoredeterminedbythezeitgeistthanelementsthatarecharacteristicofspecificgenerations.•ThefindingsontheattitudestowardsclimatechangerecordedintheEUarebroadlyinlinewiththegeneraltrendsatagloballevel.AccordingtotheAfrobarometersurvey,aroundthreeoutoffivecitizensofselectedAfricancountriesheardaboutclimatechangebuttheawarenessisdecreasingwithage,theeducationallevel,andislessprevalentamongruralarearesidents.•AlargemajorityofthoseAfricancitizensthatheardaboutclimatechangesaythatclimatechangeismakinglifeworse.SimilartoEUcitizens,Africancitizensthatperceiveclimatechangeasabiggerproblemalsomoreoftenbelieveintheeffectivenessofpersonalactionstofightit.IntroductionTheincreasingvisibilityoftheadverseeffectsofclimatechangethroughtheexpandingintensityandfrequencyofextremeweathereventsgeneratedgrowingpublicattentionforthetopicofclimatechange.AsdescribedatlengthinChapter1ofthisreport,importantinternationaldebatesabouttheurgencyofclimateactionhaveledtoanincreasinglyconduciveenvironmentfortheadoptionofclimatemitigationpolicies.In2015,theUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyestablishedtheSustainableDevelopmentGoalsincludingaspecificgoalonclimateaction.Inthesameyear,theParisAgreementhasbeennegotiatedby195signatories,whichsetsthetargetoflimitingtheriseinglobaltemperaturelevelstowellbelowtwodegreesCelsius.Asdiscussedinmoredetailintheboxintheintroductionofthisreport,theEuropeanGreenDealhasbeenadoptedin2019asanessentialadaptationstrategy.Itcontainskeytargetsfortacklingclimatechangeandchallengesrelatedtoenvironmentalfactors.Finally,inrecentyears,theFridaysforFuturemovementgainedmomentumandmobilizedmillionsofparticipantsinclimatestrikesworldwide.Inlightofthegrowinglevelofpublicattentionandimportantdebatesaboutclimatechangetopics,thischapterprovidesanoverviewofpeople’sperceptionsandattitudestowardsclimatechange.Tothisend,thechapterturnstotheindividualperspective.Itcomplementsthepreviouschaptersbyanalysinghowindividualsperceiveclimatechange,howtheyevaluatetheimportanceofpersonalactionsandtheresponsibilityofstateauthoritiesfortacklingclimatechange,andhowtheyassesspublicpoliciesandthegoalsoftheEUstrategyonAdaptationtoClimateChange.Inlinewiththegeneraltopicofthereport,thechapterspecificallyfocusesonthelinksbetweensociodemographicdimensionsandattitudestowardsclimatechange.Sinceindividualconsumptionhabitsareaffectedbythepersonallevelofconcernaboutclimatechange(Saarietal.,2021),theanalysisaimstoaddresswhetherdifferencesinattitudesandbehavioursarepotentiallyacontributingfactorbehindtherelationshipbetweenageandemissionsoutlinedinthepreviouschapter.Inaddition,thechapteranalyseswhichothersociodemographicfactorstakeonapivotalroleinpotentiallyshapingclimateactions.48ThecurrentanalysisbuildspredominantlyonsurveydatafromtheClimateChangeSpecialEurobarometerwavesbienniallycollectedsince2009.ThissurveycollectsinformationonindividualperceptionsandattitudestowardsclimatechangeinallEuropeanUnionMemberStatesandconsistsofnationallyrepresentativesamplesofaround1,000respondentspercountry.ThemajorfocusofthechapterliesontheattitudesofEuropeancitizenstowardsclimatechangeandonhowtheseattitudesvaryacrossgroupswithspecificsociodemographiccharacteristics.Thechapterdescribestheresultsofamultivariateregressionanalysisthatallowsestimatingtheeffectofvarioussociodemographicvariablesonindividualattitudestowardsclimatechange.Inthisway,thechaptermirrorstheanalysisofthepreviouschapters.Morespecifically,chapter2demonstratedtherelevanceofageandothersociodemographicfactorsinshapingemissionlevels.Buildingonthisfinding,thischapterstudieswhethersimilarpatternsarealsoreflectedinindividualattitudesandbehaviourstofurtherenrichtheanalysisoftheinteractionsbetweendemographicchangeandgreentransition.Furthermore,thecurrentchapteraddresseshowsomeoftheattitudesevolvedoverthemostrecentdecadetoinvestigatewhetherattitudesareultimatelyformedbytheparticularmindsetofacertaingenerationorratherstronglyaffectedbyfactorsthatarecontemporaryatcertainpointsintime.ThethreatsassociatedwithclimatechangearenotlimitedtotheEuropeancontext.Itisthereforeessentialtobroadenthegeographicalscopeofthechapterandtoincludeaglobaldimensionintheanalysisofthisreport.Inrecentyears,amassivelyincreasingnumberofinternationalsurveysstudiedindividualattitudestowardsclimatechangeinvariousworldregions(foralimitedselectionofthelatestsurveyssee(Dabla-Norrisetal.,2023;Dechezleprêtreetal.,2022;IPSOS,2022;PewResearch,2022;Seahetal.,2022;UNDP&UniveristyOxford,2021).Overall,severalcommonfindingsofthesesurveysindicatethatpeoplearegloballygettingmoreconcernedaboutclimatechange,youngerindividualsaremoreworriedaboutclimatechange,andeducationisanimportantsociodemographicfactorshapingattitudestowardsclimatechange(Arıkan&Günay,2021;Kvaløyetal.,2012;T.Leeetal.,2015;Levi,2021).Thefinalsectionofthischapteraddsfurtherdetailstothesegeneralcommonfindingsbyprovidinginformationonattitudestowardsclimatechangein34Africancountries.Theanalysisreliesonnationallyrepresentativesurveydatafromthe2016-2018waveoftheAfrobarometer.ThisallowsplacingthespecificfindingsontheattitudesofEUcitizensintoabroaderglobalperspective.FindingsEUcitizensthinkclimatechangeisthesinglemostseriousproblemAccordingtothemostrecentwaveoftheClimateChangeSpecialEurobarometer,around18percentofindividualsintheEUidentifiedclimatechangein2021asthesinglemostseriousproblemfacingtheworldasawhole.Whenaskedtoselectthemostseriousissueamongalistofelevenitems,respondentstotheEurobarometermostfrequentlynamedclimatechange.19Thismeansthattheshareofrespondentswhoseeclimatechangeasthemostpressingconcernislargerthantheshareofrespondentswhoidentifyissuessuchaspoverty,hungerandlackofdrinkingwater(17percentofrespondents),thespreadofinfectiousdiseases(17percent)ortheeconomicsituation(15percent)asmostsevere.Forthefirsttimesincerespondentswereaskedtoidentifythesinglemostseriousproblemfacingtheworldasawhole,climatechangetopsthelistofselectedproblems.20Intermsoftheperceivedseriousnessofclimatechange,avastmajorityofEUcitizenssaythatclimatechangeisaveryseriousproblem.RespondentstotheEurobarometerwereaskedtoranktheseriousnessofclimatechangeonascalefromonetoten.Morethan78percentofEUcitizensassignanumberofsevenorhighertotheseriousnessofclimatechange,whichisinterpretedasthethresholdforseeingclimatechangeasaveryseriousproblem.YoungergenerationsintheEUmoreoftenperceiveclimatechangeasaseriousproblemAsdescribedindetailinChapter2,thelevelofemissionsisessentiallyaffectedbysociodemographiccharacteristics.Ageisaparticularlyimportantfactorshapingemissions.Thischapteranalyseswhetherasimilarrelationshipisalsoreflectedinindividualattitudestowardsclimatechange.TheEurobarometerindeedindicates19TheprecisequestiontextsandansweroptionsareprovidedintheAppendixtoChapter3.20Inthe2021SpecialEurobarometerquestionnaire,threenewitemswereaddedtothelistofsinglemostseriousproblems,whichimpliesthatthequestioncannotbeuseddirectlytocompareresultsbetweendifferentwavesofthesurvey.Nevertheless,overtheyearsthelistofitemshasbeenexpandedwhichmighthaveevenreducedthelikelihoodthatclimatechangetopsthelistofmostseriousproblems.49thatthesharesofindividualsthatregardclimatechangeasthesinglemostseriousproblemandasaveryseriousproblemvaryacrossgroupswithdifferentsociodemographiccharacteristics.Exceptfortheoldestagegroup,climatechangeisselectedmoreoftenthananyotheritemasthesinglemostseriousproblemfacingtheworldasawholeacrossallagegroups.Onlyamongrespondentsolderthan60yearsofage,theshareofrespondentsthatidentifythespreadofinfectiousdiseasesasthemostpressingissue(20percent)islargerthantheshareofrespondentsselectingclimatechange(16percent).Youngerpeoplearemorelikelytoseeclimatechangeasthesinglemostseriousproblemandasaveryseriousproblemthanoldergenerations.Figure23illustratesthatthesharesofrespondentsseeingclimatechangeasthemostorasaveryseriousproblemaredecreasingacrossfouragegroups.Whilearound21percentofEUcitizensof15-29yearsofageperceiveclimatechangeasthesinglemostseriousproblem,thissharedecreasesto18,17,and16percent,forEUcitizens30-44,45-59,andabove60yearsofage,respectively.Similarly,around83percentofEUcitizensof15-29yearsofagethinkthatclimatechangeisaveryseriousproblem,whereasthisshareamountstoapproximately78percentfortheotherthreeagegroups.Figure23Perceivedseriousnessofclimatechangein2021inEuropeSource:ownelaborationandregressionanalysesbasedonEurobarometer,2021Thesepatternsareconfirmedbytheresultsofamultivariateregressionanalysis.Morespecifically,alogitmodelisusedasastronganalyticaltoolthatprovidesfurtherinsightsandaddsprecisiontotheestimated50relationshipbetweensociodemographiccharacteristicsandattitudestowardsclimatechange.21Thespecificationsincludedummyvariablesfortheagegroupsanalysedaboveandmultipleadditionalsociodemographicvariables.ThelowestpanelofFigure23containsthevisualisationoftheregressionresults.Thefiguredepictstheestimatesexpressedasaveragemarginaleffectsandthecorrespondingconfidenceintervals.Theestimationcoefficientsfortheagegroupdummiesshowthatolderagegroupsarelesslikelytoperceiveclimatechangeasthesinglemostseriousproblemorasaveryseriousproblem.Thecoefficientsforthethreeolderagegroupsarenegativeandtheresultsarehighlystatisticallysignificant.Forexample,theprobabilitythatindividualsbetween30and44yearsofagenameclimatechangeasthesinglemostseriousproblemis27percentlowerthanforthereferenceagegroupofindividualsof15-29yearsofage.Similarly,individualsaged30to44are28percentlesslikelytoseeclimatechangeasaveryseriousproblemthanthoseaged15to29.HighlyeducatedEUcitizensaremoreconcernedaboutclimatechangeInaddition,Figure23illustrateshowtheperceivedseriousnessofclimatechangevariesbygroupswithdifferenteducationallevels.Comparedtothegroupwithaprimarylevelofeducation,theshareofindividualsselectingclimatechangeasthesinglemostseriousproblemfacingtheworldasawholeisaround2.5timeslargerforthegroupwithatertiarylevelofeducation.Likewise,only73percentofEUcitizenswithprimaryeducationseeclimatechangeasaveryseriousproblem.Thissharerisesto77and82percentforEUcitizenswithasecondaryandtertiarylevelofeducation,respectively.Themultivariateregressionanalysisalsoincludesdummyvariablesfordifferenteducationallevels.Thestatisticallysignificantresultsconfirmthathighlyeducatedindividualshaveahigherprobabilityofthinkingthatclimatechangeisaveryseriousissue.Comparedtotheprimaryeducated,thoseholdingatertiarydegreeofeducationarearoundtwiceaslikelytoseeclimatechangeasthemostseriousproblemandasaveryseriousproblem.ResidentsoflargetownswithintheEUmoreoftenperceiveclimatechangeasaveryseriousproblemClimatechangeismorefrequentlyregardedasaveryseriousorasthemostseriousprobleminlargetownsthaninmiddletownsorruralareas.22Around19percentofrespondentsinlargetownsacrosstheEUseeclimatechangeasthemostseriousproblem,and81percentofresidentsoflargetownsthinkthatclimatechangeisaveryseriousproblem.Thesesharesaremuchsmallerforindividualsinruralareasormiddletowns,amountingto17percentandbetween76and79percent,respectively.Thecoefficientforthedummyvariablecapturingwhetheranindividuallivesinalargetownispositiveandstatisticallysignificantforthequestionabouttheperceivedseriousnessofclimatechange.Inhabitantsoflargetownsare18percentmorelikelytobelievethatclimatechangeisaveryseriousproblemcomparedtoresidentsinmiddletownsandruralareas.Finally,itisimportanttonotethattheindividualeconomicsituationaffectstheperceptionoftheseriousnessofclimatechange(Baiardi&Morana,2021).Thoserespondentsthatreportdifficultiespayingtheirbillsattheendofthemonthare23percentlesslikelytoseeclimatechangeasthesinglemostseriousproblemand27percentlesslikelytoseeclimatechangeasaveryseriousproblemcomparedtothegroupofcitizenswithoutsuchpaymentproblems.GovernmentsareseenaskeyactorsresponsiblefortacklingclimatechangeintheEUInadditiontopublicawarenessabouttherisksassociatedwithclimatechange,broadpublicsupportisessentialinordertoenablegovernmentalentitiestodesigneffectivepoliciesforclimatechangemitigation.Thisrequirescomprehensivepublicacceptanceofgovernmentalauthorityfortakingclimateaction,whichmaynotbeautomaticallygrantedbycitizens(Fairbrother,2022).Forexample,Dechezleprêtreetal.,(2022)andDrews&Bergh,(2016)showthatpublicsupportforclimatepoliciesisdeterminedbyavarietyoffactorsandiscontext-specific.RespondentstotheSpecialEurobarometerwereaskedtoselectfromalistofsixitemstheentitiestheyperceiveasbeinginchargeofaddressingtheeffectsofclimatechange.Multipleselectionswereallowed.21DetailsonthemodelspecificationandthecorrespondingregressiontablesareprovidedintheAppendixtoChapter3.22Theclassificationacrosstherural-urbantypologyfollowstheself-reportedcategoriesincludedintheSpecialEurobarometerquestionnaire.TheprecisequestiontextsandansweroptionsareprovidedintheAppendixtoChapter3.Thethreecategoriesanalysedheremightbeinterpretedascities,towns,andruralareasasdefinedinthenewdegreeofurbanisation(Dijkstra&Poelman,2014).51Atotalof85percentofrespondentsthinkthatatleastonegovernmentalentityisresponsible,consistingof63percentofrespondentsmentioningnationalgovernments,57percentselectingtheEU,and43percentchoosingregionalandlocalauthorities.Atthesametime,around58percentofEUcitizensseetheresponsibilitywithbusinessesandtheindustry,41percentreportapersonallevelofresponsibility,and30percentmentionenvironmentalgroups.Figure24providesthesharesofEUcitizensidentifyingatleastonegovernmentalentityasbeingresponsiblefortacklingclimatechangedisaggregatedbygroupswithspecificsociodemographiccharacteristics.Thesharesareincreasingonlyslightlyacrossmostoftheagegroupsandtherural-urbantypologies.Theydeviatefromthetotalaveragesharebyamaximumofaroundonepercentagepoint.Bycontrast,82percentofEUcitizenswithaprimarylevelofeducationnameatleastonegovernmentalentityasresponsiblefortacklingclimatechange,comparedtoasmanyas89percentofhighlyeducatedEUcitizens.Figure24Stateresponsibilityandpersonalactionforfightingclimatechangein2021inEuropeSource:ownelaborationofregressionanalysesbasedonEurobarometer,202152AlmosttwointhreeEUcitizensreportthattheyhavepersonallytakenactiontotackleclimatechangeInadditiontogeneralpublicsupportforclimateactionsofgovernmentalactors,effortsattheindividuallevelareessentialforaddressingthecomplexchallengesassociatedwithclimatechange.AccordingtotheEurobarometer,64percentofEUcitizensclaimtohavetakenactiontofightclimatechangeoverthepastsixmonths.Whilethisfractiondoesnotdifferconsiderablyacrossagegroupsandamongurbanandruralarearesidents,theshareofEUcitizensthatreporthavingtakenactionis26percentagepointslargerforthosewiththehighestlevelofeducationthanfortheprimaryeducated.Thesefindingsareconfirmedbytheresultsofamultivariateregressionanalysis.ThelowerpanelofFigure24showsthattheaveragemarginaleffectsareveryclosetozeroforthedummyvariablesreflectingtheageandplaceofresidence.Moreover,almostnoneoftheestimatedcoefficientsforthosevariablesarestatisticallysignificant.Meanwhile,EUcitizenswithatertiarylevelofeducationarealmosttwiceaslikelytoplaceresponsibilityforclimateactiononatleastonegovernmentalentityandareaboutthreetimesmorelikelytosaytheyhavetakenpersonalactionthanEUcitizenswithprimaryeducation.Asopposedtotheeffectsformostoftheothervariables,theseresultsarehighlystatisticallysignificant.Finally,comparedtothegroupofindividualswithoutpaymentproblems,thosewithsuchfinancialissueshavea19percentand17percentlowerprobabilitytoassignresponsibilitytogovernmentalentitiesandtosaytheyhavetakenpersonalactiontoaddressclimatechange,respectively.ClimatechangeawarenessandthereportedindividualactionstotackletheissueareinterlinkedintheEUWhiletheprevioussectionshighlightedanincreasinglevelofpublicawarenessabouttheproblemandacommonbeliefofsharingapersonallevelofresponsibilityforaddressingclimatechangeissues,itislessclearwhetherthesehigherlevelsofawarenessalsoleadtochangesinindividualbehaviours.Forexample,arecentstudyinGermanyidentifiesagapbetweenbehavioursandattitudesprovidingnostrongevidenceforadjustmentsinconsumptionhabits(Venghausetal.,2022).Inlightofthisevidence,thissectionanalyseswhetherpersonalactionsandclimatechangeawarenessarepotentiallyinterlinked.Figure25showsthedifferencesinreportedbehavioursforthoseEuropeansthatarerelativelymoreorlessconcernedabouttheseverityofclimatechange.Amongthe78percentofrespondentstotheEurobarometerthatperceiveclimatechangeasaveryseriousproblem,69percentalsoreporthavingtakenpersonalstepstotackleclimatechange.Bycontrast,amongtherespondentsthatdonotseeclimatechangeasaveryseriousissue,only47percentclaimtohavetakenaction(leftpanelofFigure25).Similarly,78percentofthosethatbelievetobepersonallyresponsiblealsosaytheytooksomepersonalactiontotackleclimatechangeinthepastsixmonths(rightpanelofFigure25).Thisshareis24percentagepointssmallerforthoseEuropeansthatdonotseeapersonallevelofresponsibility.Inlinewiththefindingsofotherstudies,thisshowsthattheindividualperceptionofpersonalresponsibilityisanessentialdeterminantofattitudestowardsclimatechange(Syropoulos&Markowitz,2022).Figure25Perceptionofclimatechangeandpersonalactionin2021inEuropeSource:ownelaborationbasedonEurobarometer,2021WhileFigure25indicatesthatpotentiallyastronglinkbetweenclimatechangeawarenessandbehavioursexists,itisimportanttorecognisethatthecurrentanalysisisnotabletoovercomethepotentialbiasesresultingnoactiontookactionnoactiontookactionNotaveryseriousproblemVeryseriousproblemNotaveryseriousproblemVeryseriousproblemNotpersonalresponsiblePersonalresponsibleNotpersonalresponsiblePersonalresponsible0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%53fromagapbetweenreportedandactualindividualbehaviour.Inthisregard,someoftherecentliteraturereportachangeinindividualvotingbehaviourandincreasingpublicpressureforplacingclimateactionhighonpoliticalagendas(Hoffmannetal.,2020;Venghausetal.,2022).Thenextsection,therefore,turnstotheanalysisofindividualsupportforpublicpoliciesrelatedtoclimateactionwithintheEU.AlargemajorityofEUcitizenssupportthekeygoalsoftheEuropeanClimateLawMultilateralsettingsareseenasparticularlyeffectiveandsuitablefordesigningpoliciesinclimateaction(Bechteletal.,2022).Inthatsense,theadoptionoftheEuropeanGreenDealin2019hasbeenamilestonefortheEUonthepathtoaddressingtherisksofclimatechangeandachievingclimateneutrality.23ThekeyelementthatcharacterisesEuropeanClimateLawisthegoalofmakingtheEUclimate-neutralby2050throughareductioningreenhousegasemissionstoaminimumwhilecounteractingtheremainingemissions.In2021,theEUreaffirmeditsgoalofachievingclimateneutralitybyreducingemissionswithintheEUbyatleast55percentby2030.AccordingtotheEurobarometer,morethan92percentofEUcitizensdeclareagreementwiththekeytargetofachievingclimateneutralityby2050.24Figure26illustratesthatfornoneofthegroupswithdifferentsociodemographiccharacteristicsdescribedinthischapter,theapprovalratedeviatesmorethanonepercentagepointfromthetotalaverageapprovalrate.ThisindicatesthatdifferentsociodemographicfactorsdonotmarkedlyaffectindividualsupportforthekeytargetoftheEuropeanClimateLawofachievingclimateneutrality.23SeetheboxonpopulationanddemographyinEUGreenDealPoliciesintheintroductionofthisreportforadetaileddiscussionofthedevelopmentoftheEUAdaptationtoClimateChangepolicyframeworks.24Inordertoensureconsistencywithrespecttothequestionsanalysedabove,therespondentsthatreporttonotknowingananswertothequestionareexcludedforthecomputationofapprovalrates.54Figure26Attitudetowardsgreentransitionin2021inEuropeSource:ownelaborationofregressionanalysesbasedonEurobarometer,2021Inaddition,around82percentofEUcitizensthinkthatthecostsofthedamagescausedbyclimatechangearesubstantiallyhigherthanthecostsassociatedwithinvestmentsrequiredforagreentransition.25Onlyforthegroupofinhabitantsoflargetowns,theagreementratediffersbymorethantwopercentagepointsfromtheaveragerateandpeaksatalmost85percent.Similartofigures1and2,thelowerpanelofFigure26illustratestheresultsofamultivariateregressionanalysisaddressingthealignmentofEUcitizenswiththespecificclimatemitigationmeasuresoutlinedabove.Unsurprisingly,thedepictedabsolutesizesoftheaveragemarginaleffectsaremuchsmallerthantheeffectsizesforthemultivariateregressionanalysesreportedinFigure23andFigure24.ThisprovidesadditionalsuggestiveevidencethatindividualagreementwiththecentralelementsofEuropeanClimateLawislessaffectedbysociodemographiccharacteristicsthanthelevelofconcernandperceptionofresponsibilityfortacklingclimatechange.IntheEU,theattitudestowardsclimatechangevarystrongerovertimethanacrossagegroupsWhilethefindingsdescribedabovepointtoaninverserelationshipbetweenthelevelofclimatechangeconcernandage,thereisalargestrandofliteraturestudyingwhetherthisrelationshipsimplyreflectscharacteristicsspecifictocertaingenerations(Ballewetal.,2019;Skeirytėetal.,2022).Hence,thedistinctionbetweenage-specificandcohort-specificeffectsmeritsattention(Geys,2006;Gray,2014;Milfontetal.,2021).Toalimited25Inordertoensureconsistencywithrespecttothequestionsanalysedabove,therespondentsthatreporttonotknowingananswertothequestionareexcludedforthecomputationofapprovalrates.55degree,theEurobarometerallowsfocussingonthisdistinctionsinceitcollectedinformationabouttheindividualperceptionsofclimatechangeformorethanadecade.26Figure27illustrateshowtheattitudestowardsclimatechangeevolvedovertimeandvariedbydifferentagegroups.Theshareofrespondentsthinkingclimatechangeisaveryseriousproblemincreasedbyabouttenpercentagepointsfrom69percentin2011to79percentin2021.Atthesametime,fornoneofthesixperiodsanalysedinthisreport,theage-group-specificsharesofpeopleperceivingclimatechangeasaveryseriousproblemdeviatedbymorethanfivepercentagepointsfromthetotalaverageshares.Thissuggeststhatclimatechangeawarenessismoreinfluencedbytime-specificfactorsthancharacteristicsthatdistinguishdifferentgenerations.Figure27OpinionsandattitudestowardsclimatechangebyagegroupsovertimeinEuropeSource:ownelaborationofEurobarometer(2011-2021).Notes:DuetochangesinEUmemberships,thecompositionofthecountrysamplechangedovertime.ThesamplesincludeCroatiasince2013andexcludetheUnitedKingdomsince2017.Inaddition,Figure27showshowthesharesofrespondentstotheEurobarometerclaimingthatgovernmentalentitiesareresponsibleandpersonalactionshavebeentakentotackleclimatechangedevelopedovertime.Comparedtotheperceptionoftheseverityofclimatechange,theopinionsontheselatterpointsweresomewhatmorenuancedacrossdifferentagegroupsandovertime.Nevertheless,thetrendlinesdepictedinFigure27indicatethatoverthepasttenyears,thesharesofEUcitizensthinkingthatgovernmentalentities26Inthecontextofstudyingthebehaviourofcertaingenerations,adecademightbeashortperiodoftime.However,academicliteraturehasfocussedontimeintervalsofsimilarlengthtostudygenerationaleffects(seeMilfontetal.,2021).Inaddition,itisimportanttonotethattheEurobarometerdoesnotrepeatedlyinterviewthesameindividualsovertime,whichmaypotentiallycreatebiases.Nevertheless,theEurobarometerconsistsofnationallyrepresentativesamplesfordifferentpointsintime,whichsubstantiallymitigatesthisrisk.56areresponsiblefortakingactiontotackleclimatechangeincreasedbyfivepercentagepointsfromaround80percentin2013to85percentin2021.Overthesameperiod,theshareofEUcitizenssayingthattheyhavetakenpersonalactionstofightclimatechangegrewbyeventwelvepercentagepointsfromlessthan52percentin2013tomorethan64percentin2021.Morethanhalfofthecitizensin34AfricancountrieshaveheardaboutclimatechangebutawarenessdiffersacrossgroupswithdiversesociodemographiccharacteristicsSomeofthekeyresultsforEUcitizensoutlinedindetailabovearebroadlyinlinewiththefindingsofanumberofotherlargesurveysconductedindifferentworldregions.ThemostrecentstudiesincludethesurveyofUNDPandtheUniversityofOxfordcollectinginformationfromaround1.2millionindividualsin2021in50countriesworldwide,Dechezleprêtreetal.,(2022)surveyingaround40,000individualsin20countries,Dabla-Norrisetal.,(2023)gatheringdataonaround30,000peoplein28countries,Ipsosinterviewingapproximately23,500peoplein34countriesin2022,thePewResearchCenteranalysingtheopinionsofalmost20,100individualsin19highlydevelopedcountriesin2022,andSeahetal.,(2022)focussingonaround1,400respondentsintenSoutheastAsiancountries.Thegeneralcommonfindingsofthesesurveysindicatethatthelevelofconcernaboutclimatechangeisrisingbutisessentiallyhigheramongyoungerandmoreeducatedindividuals.ThefinalpartofthischapterfurthercontextualisestheseresultsatabroadergloballevelbyprovidingadditionaldetailsbasedonsurveydatacollectedinAfrica.ThisallowsplacingthefindingsontheattitudestowardsclimatechangeofEUcitizensintoawiderglobalcontext.Morespecifically,thissectioncomplementstheaboveanalysisbydescribingdatacollectedintheseventhwaveoftheAfrobarometerpublicopinionsurvey.SimilartotheSpecialEurobarometer,thequestionnaireofthe2016-2018waveoftheAfrobarometerincludesanumberofquestionsontheindividualperceptionandattitudestowardsclimatechange.Thesurveycollectsdatafor34Africancountriesandcontainsnationallyrepresentativesamplesofaround1,200observationsforeachcountry.ComparedtoEUcitizens,surveyrespondentsinAfricausuallyfacesharplydifferentsocioeconomicchallenges.Inlightofevidencedemonstratingthatindividuallevelsofconcernaboutclimatechangegrowwithnationalandpersonalincomelevels(Baiardi&Morana,2021;Franzen&Vogl,2013;Louetal.,2022),itmightnotbesurprisingthattheperceptionofthemostseriousproblemsmaystronglydifferbetweensocietiesinbothworldregions.27ItiscruciallyimportanttobeawareofthestrongdisparitiesinsocioeconomicconditionswhenanalysingandinterpretingtheresultsontheattitudestowardsclimatechangeofrespondentstotheAfrobarometer.Theresultsdiscussedinthissectionshouldthereforebeinterpretedwithcaution.Asafirststep,itisimportanttodescribethesharesofrespondentsthathaveheardaboutclimatechange.Figure28showsthatbetween2016and2018atotalof59percentofindividualsinthe34Africancountrieshaveheardaboutclimatechange.28Thissharevariesconsiderablybyage,educationallevel,andplaceofresidence.While61percentofrespondents15-29yearsofageheardaboutclimatechange,only55percentofthoseabove60yearsofageareawareofit.Theshareofpeoplethatheardaboutclimatechangeinurbanareasisninepercentagepointslargerthantherespectiveshareofresidentsinruralareas.TheresultsfurtherindicatethateducationisaparticularlystrongdeterminantoftheawarenessofclimatechangeinAfrica.Morethan81percentofrespondentstotheAfrobarometerholdingatertiarydegreesaytheyheardaboutclimatechange,whereasthisshareisaslowas47percentfortherespondentswithaprimarylevelofeducation.27Forexample,whenrespondentstotheAfrobarometerwereaskedaboutthemostimportantreasonforemigrating,onlyatinyfractionmentionednaturaldisastersasareason.Themajorityofreasonsforemigrationwereassociatedwitheconomicopportunities.28TheprecisequestiontextsandansweroptionsareprovidedintheAppendixtoChapter3.57Figure28Opinionsandattitudestowardsclimatechangebyagegroupsin2016-2018inAfricaSource:ownelaborationofAfrobarometer(2019).In34Africancountries,alargemajoritythinksclimatechangeismakinglifeworsebutasizableminoritydoesnotseeneedforactionOnlythoserespondentsthatreporttohaveheardaboutclimatechangeweresubsequentlyaskedaboutitsimpactandoptionsfortakingactiontoaddressit.29Alargemajorityof71percentofcitizensofthe34surveyedAfricancountriesbelievethatclimatechangeismakinglifeworse,whileasizableminorityofaround24percentthinkthatclimatechangedoesnotneedtobestopped.Somewhatsurprisingly,theshareofindividualsagreeingthatclimatechangeismakinglifeworseislargerforolderagegroups,lesseducatedindividuals,andresidentsofruralareas.Similarly,youngerindividualsandresidentsofurbanareasrelativelymoreoftenthinkthatclimatechangedoesnotneedtobestopped.Finally,similartotheanalysisforEUcitizensabove,itispossibletostudytherelationshipbetweentheindividualperceptionofclimatechangeandpersonalactionstotackleclimatechange.AmongtherespondentstotheAfrobarometerthatthinkclimatechangeismakinglifeworse,alargemajorityof62percentsayordinary29Itisimportanttonotethatthisconditionalityinthequestiondesignmightgeneratesizeablebiases.ThismayfurtherimpedethedirectcomparabilityoftheresultsoftheEurobarometerandAfrobarometersurvey.58citizenscandosomethingtotackleclimatechange.30Meanwhile64percentofthoserespondentsthatsayclimatechangeisnotmakinglifeworsealsodonotbelieveintheeffectivenessoftheactionsofordinarycitizens.Interestingly,theseresultsareverysimilartotheresultsreportedintheleftpaneloffigure4thatinvestigatestherelationshipbetweentheindividualperceptionandpersonalactiontotackleclimatechangeintheEU.ThissuggeststhatforthoserespondentstotheAfrobarometerthatheardaboutclimatechangesimilarlinksbetweentheperceivedseverityandthepossibilityoftakingpersonalstepstofightclimatechangeexist.ConclusionTheanalysisofthischaptercomplementedthepreviouschaptersbyprovidingadditionalinsightsintotheindividualperspective.ThechapterprimarilybuiltonsurveydatacollectedthroughtheEurobarometerandtheAfrobarometersurveys.Inparticular,theanalysisfocussedontheattitudesofEUcitizenstowardsclimatechangeandprovidedadetailedperspectiveofthesociodemographicdriversbehindtheseattitudes.ThefindingsindicatethatthelevelofconcernaboutclimatechangeincreasedamongEUcitizensinthepastdecade.Age,educationalattainment,andtheplaceofresidencehaveastrongeffectontheindividualperceptionoftheseverityofclimatechange.Bycontrast,theperceptionofpublicandindividuallevelsofresponsibilityfortacklingclimatechangeandthesupportforpublicpoliciesforclimateaction,suchastheEuropeanClimateLawandEU’sStrategyonAdaptationtoClimateChange,differgenerallymuchlessbetweendiverseagegroups.Inaddition,thefindingssuggestthatwhileattitudestowardsclimatechangemaybedeterminedtosomedegreebyage,effectsthatarespecifictocertainmomentsoftimecanhaveastrongimpactonhowclimatechangeispubliclyperceived.Inlinewithevidenceprovidedbyanoverwhelmingnumberofstudies,thefindingspointtotheimportantroleofeducationasafactorthatnotonlyshapestheperceptionofclimatechangebutalsoindividualstepsandthesupportofgovernmentalclimateactions.Furthermore,thepersonallevelofconcernaboutclimatechangeframestheindividualwillingnesstotakeactions.Onabroaderscale,thesefindingsappeartobegeneralisableforworldregionsbeyondEurope.SurveydatacollectedinAfrica,aworldregionwhereclimatechangeknowledgeisfarfromuniversallyexisting,showthateducationisaparticularlystrongdeterminantofhowclimatechangeisperceived.Inaworldinwhichtheadverseconsequencesofclimatechangebecomeincreasinglyvisibleandindividualclimatechangevulnerabilityisgrowing,thesefindingsareastrongindicationthatsociodemographicfactorsplayanimportantroleforshapingtheindividualattitudestowardsclimatechange.Thissuggeststhatbesidesaccountingfortheeffectofage,policiesdesignedtoaddressclimatechangewouldbenefitfromincludingastrongfocusongenerallevelsofeducationandenvironmentaleducationinparticular.30ThiscategoryincludesrespondentstotheAfrobarometerthatanswer“ordinary[citizens]candoalittlebit”or“ordinary[citizens]candoalot”whenaskedtoassesshowmuchordinarycitizenscandotostopclimatechange.5960Chapter4AforesightperspectiveondemographicdevelopmentsKeymessages•TheForesightapproachusedinthischapterhelpstoidentifyemergingissuesanduncertaintiesthat,giventhelong-termhorizonofclimatechange,aredifficulttocapturepurelythroughmodellingefforts.•Demographicdevelopmentshaveasubstantialinfluenceonclimatechangeandcanposeachallengefortheclimatetransitionbuttheyarelong-termdevelopmentsthataredifficulttoinfluence.•Low-carboninnovationwillbeacentrallevertoreduceemissionsandcompensatefordemographictrends.Itwillbeofcrucialimportancetotransfergreentechnologiestocountriesthathavenotyetcreatedfossilfuelpathdependencies.•Notonlyisitimportanttounderstandtheurgencyoftheclimatetransitionbutalsotounderstandhowlifestylescanbemoresustainable.Education,urbanisationandsocialcohesionhaveafundamentalroletoplayinthesocietalpushforenvironmentalactionandsustainability.•Theglobalclimatetransitionrequiresgloballycoordinatedefforts.Governmentsinregionsthathavethefinancialandtechnologicalcapacitytobefirstmoversshouldcapitaliseonitanddemonstratethattheclimatetransitionispossible.IntroductionForesightscenariosprovideaframeworktoinvestigatesomeofthequantitativeassumptionsraisedinpreviouschaptersofthisreport.Climatechangehasalong-termhorizon,whichcreatesmanyuncertaintiesthataredifficulttocapturepurelythroughmodellingefforts.Foresightisanapproachthathelpstoidentifyemergingissuesanduncertainties,andflagthemtodecisionmakerstomanagethemefficiently(EuropeanCommissionetal.,2023).Foresightscenarioshavealreadybeenwidelyusedinthefieldofclimateaction(e.g.SharedSocioeconomicPathways(SSPs)(O’Neilletal.,2017)andIPCCSpecialReportonEmissionScenarios(Nakićenović&IPCC,2000)).Theyofferapossibilitytoexploretherobustnessofforecasts(quantitativeassumptionsaboutthefuture),byposing‘whatif’-questionsandofferingarangeofplausiblefutureconditions.Inthisstudy,weusetheJointResearchCentre’sreferenceforesightscenarios(Vesnic-Alujevicetal.,2023)toassesscommonassumptionsontheinterrelationofdemographicdevelopmentsandclimatechange.Thereferencescenariosarebroadinnature,andlookatuncertaintiesoffuturedevelopmentinfiveareas:i)socialvalues;ii)sourceofgeopoliticalpower;iii)reactiontoenvironmentaldegradation;iv)food,water,health,andenergynexus;andv)technologicaldevelopments.Usingbroadscenariosenablesaholisticassessmentofdemographicchangeandhowthesedifferentareasarerelatedtoit.Figure29givesanoverviewofthereferencescenariosandtheirmaincharacteristicsinrelationtothefiveareasoffuturedevelopment.TheAppendixtoChapter4providesmoredetailedinformationontheuseofstrategicforesightfordecision-makingandthereferencescenarios.61Figure29OverviewofreferencescenariosFivedemographicandtwocross-cuttingassumptionswereselectedforstresstesting.Theywereselectedbasedontheresearchexplainedinpreviouschapters,focusingonelementsofuncertaintywhenconsideringfuturedevelopments.Twoparticipatoryworkshopswereorganisedtodiscusstheseassumptions.Theaimoftheworkshopswastostress-testtheassumptionswithinscenarios,byexploringhowpertinenttheseassumptionsarewithineachofthefourreferenceforesightscenarios,andtodiscusstheirimplications.Thischaptersummarisestheinsightsgainedduringtheseworkshopsandananalysisofthefourreferencescenarios.Foreachassumption,asummaryisprovidedtowrapuptheunderstandingoftheassumptionintheliteratureandhowitaffectsclimatechange.Thissummaryisfollowedbyadiscussionofhowplausibleeachassumptionwouldbeineachoftheforesightscenarios.Thechapteralsopresentstakeawaystoguidedecisionsonhowtodealwithfuturedemographicdevelopmentsinthecontextoftheclimatetransition.62Thischapterlooksatfivedemographicandtwocross-cuttingdriversofthefuture.First,assumptionsregardingthefivedemographicdriversofthefuturei)householdsize,ii)incomelevels,iii)lifestylechanges,iv)urbanisation,andv)populationsizearediscussed.However,ouranalysissuggeststhattwocrosscuttingnon-demographicdriverswillalsobecrucialtoconsider.Hence,thischapteralsodiscussestheroleofvi)technologicalinnovationandvii)geopolitics.FindingsHouseholdsizeAdecreaseinhouseholdsizescouldleadtohigherpercapitaemissions.Recenttrendsinmostindustrialisedcountriesshowaconstantdecreaseinhouseholdsizes,whichcanbeexplainedbyacombinationoflowfertilityandchangesinsocialnormsaboutfamilyformationandstructure.Thedecreaseinaverageglobalhouseholdsizeissubstantial(Ivanova&Büchs,2022).AsshowninChapter3,thisdevelopmentcanbeproblematicfromaclimatemitigationperspective,assmallerhouseholdstendtohavehigherpercapitaemissionsthanlargerhouseholds(Lévayetal.,2021).Thereasonforthiscorrelationisthatlargerhouseholdscanrealiseeconomiesofscale(Ivanova&Büchs,2022).Forexample,sharingspaceorappliancescanleadtosubstantialsavingswhenitcomestoenergy-intensiveservices,suchasheatingorcooling(Underwood&Zahran,2015),butalsoresourceconsumption.Smallerhouseholdsizesinthefutureareplausiblebuttheresultingimpactdependsonregionaldifferences.Thetrendtowardssmallerhouseholdsizesisplausibleinallfourscenarios,asageing,lowfertility,andhouseholdsizereductionintheprocessofdemographictransitiongohandinhand.Furthermore,regionaldevelopmentsplayafundamentalrole.Astrongernegativeimpactisplausibleinthecaseofstrongeconomicgrowthincurrentdevelopingcountries(Strugglingsynergies,Opposingviews),asanincreaseinwealthwouldleadtoamoreaccelerateddemographictransitionwithsubstantialshiftstolowfertilityandthussmallerhouseholds.Thisdevelopmenthasalreadytakenplaceinmoreaffluentregions(Storms).Low-carboninnovationcouldmitigatethenegativeimpactofdecreasinghouseholdsizesbutnotfullynegateit.Lowinnovationratesorlackofgreeninnovationfocuspointtoaparticularlynegativeimpactofdecreasinghouseholdsizes(Storms,Endgame).Onlystep-changesindecarbonisingelectricity,heating,andcoolingsectorscanmitigatethiseffect(Strugglingsynergies).However,itwillbedifficulttooffsetcompletelythenegativeimpactofsmallerhouseholds,aseveninaclimate-neutraleconomy,smallerhouseholdsizeswouldleadtohigherresourceconsumptionduetothelackofeconomiesofscale.Socialvaluesareanotherimportantfactorinmitigatingtheimpactofdecreasinghouseholdsizes.Smallerhouseholdsizesaremoreplausibleifthereisalackofsocialglue(Storms,Endgame).Alackofsocialcohesion,astrongfocusonindividualism,andmoreself-centredsocietiescouldleadtoanincreaseinisolatedindividualsthatlivebythemselves(Storms,Endgame).Incontrast,apositiveimpactcouldbeachangeinattitudes,inparticularare-thinkingofthesuccessofaneconomy(Strugglingsynergies,Opposingviews).Forexample,replacinggrossdomesticproductastheperformanceindicatorwithotheralternatives,suchasindicatorsofhappinessorsustainabilitycouldhaveapositiveimpactonsocialcohesionandchangetheprioritiesofindividuals,leadingtolessimportanceofstatussymbols.IncomelevelsAnincreaseinincomeisbelievedtohaveanegativeimpactongreenhousegasemissions.Chapter1describesextensivelythefundamentalroleofeconomicgrowthindeterminingthelevelofemissionsbesidestotalpopulationsize,carbonintensity,andenergyintensity.TherelationbetweeneconomicgrowthandemissionscanbeexaminedthroughtheproductionandmacrochannelofGDPandincomeinequalityinnationaleconomies,asdescribedinChapter1,orthroughthemicrochannelofindividualandhouseholdconsumptionpatterns,asdescribedinChapter2.Thisrelationshipisnotnecessarilylinearatmacrolevel:theEnvironmentalKuznetsCurvesuggeststhatenvironmentalpressureincreasesatearlystagesofeconomicgrowthwhereasitdecreasesinlaterstages.However,researchsuggeststhattheeffectholdstrueforonlylessthanhalfofhigh-incomecountries(Narayanetal.,2016).Therationaleforconsideringtheconsumptionchannelisbecausehouseholdswithhigherincomestendtohavemorecarbon-intensivelifestyles(Lévayetal.,2021).63Theassumptionofincreasingincomeisnotplausibleacrossallscenarios.Wealthincreasesareplausibleifthereisnon-restrainedcapitalismandastrongpreferenceforwealth(Endgame),orifaregionpreferseconomicgrowthtosustainability(Opposingviews).De-globalisationandhighinflation(Storms),acostlyclimatetransition(Strugglingsynergies),orthepreferenceforsustainabilityovereconomicgrowth(Opposingviews)makesubstantialwealthincreaseslessplausible.Higherincomescanleadtoincreasedemissionsbutthisisnotanecessity.Ontheotherhand,higherincomedoesnotnecessarilyleadtoincreasedconsumption,forexample,ifthecostofclimateactionrequireshigherinvestmentsleadingtolowerdiscretionaryincome(Strugglingsynergies),orifthereisageneraltendencytowardsmoresustainableconsumption(Strugglingsynergies,Opposingviews).Low-carbonproductionsystemswouldbeawaytoreducetheimpactofhigherincomelevels.Inscenarioswithastrongfocusongreeninnovation,itisplausiblethatthegrowthinwealthandemissionscanbedecoupled(Strugglingsynergies).However,suchadecouplingwouldrequireveryhighlow-carboninnovationratesthatoutpaceeconomicgrowth(formoredetailsondecouplingseeChapter1).Animportantfactoriswherewealthincreaseswillberealisedandbywhom.Negativeimpactsofwealthincreasesareparticularlyplausibleinregionswithlowpercapitaincome(Opposingviews)asanincreaseinwealthwouldnotleadtohighersavingsbuttohigherlevelsofconsumption.Climatediplomacyandinternationalrelationswillalsoplayanimportantroletoavoidemissionreductionsinoneregionbeingoutweighedbyemissionincreasesinanotherone(Opposingviews).Italsobecomesapparentthatglobalemissionreductionscanbeplausibledespitewealthincreases,ifaregionbecomesarolemodelfortheclimatetransition,illustratingitspositiveimpactsforcitizens(Strugglingsynergies,Opposingviews).LifestylechangesLifestylechangesrelatedtotransport,food,heating,andcoolingaredifficulttorealisebutcanplayanimportantroleintheclimatetransition.AsshowninChapter2,thecompositionofexpenditurebasketsofhouseholdstowardsmoreorlesscarbon-intensiveitemscaninfluencetheoveralllevelofemissionsofindividualsandhouseholds.Inthisrespect,lifestylescanhaveasubstantialimpactonthegreenhousegasemissionsofhouseholdsthatevenexceedstheimpactofincomegrowth(Grotteraetal.,2020;Zhangetal.,2020).Relevantlifestylechangesregardingemissionsincludetransport(e.g.reductionofmotorizedtransportandshifttopublictransport),food(e.g.reducingtheconsumptionofmeat),andheatingandcooling(e.g.reducetheenergyneededforheatingandcooling)(Grotteraetal.,2020).Thehighestpotentialforemissionreductionsthroughlifestylechangesisamonghigherincomegroups(Grotteraetal.,2020).However,changinglifestylestoadegreethatwouldmeaningfullysupporttheclimatetransitionisdifficult(Capsticketal.,2014).Radicalchangesinlifestylesarenotplausibleinallscenarios.Onebarriertoradicallifestylechangesisconservativesocialvaluesthatfocusontheprotectionofwealthinanageingsociety(Storms).Anotherbarrierisfocusingonadaptationtotheadverseimpactsofclimatechangeinsteadofreducinggreenhousegasemissions(Endgame).However,strongsupportfortheclimatetransitionfromonesocietalgroupcanleadtosociety-widechangesinbehaviours(Strugglingsynergies,opposingviews).Severalconditionsthatarenotprimarilytargetingtheclimatetransitioncouldhavepositiveimpactsonemissions.Scenariospointtodevelopmentsthatcancomplementlifestylechangesandthusincreasetheirefficiency.Aglobaleconomywithmoredistributedsupplychainscouldleadtoashifttolocalconsumption(Storms,Opposingviews).Furthermore,scenariosthatarecharacterisedbyscarcitycouldleadtoafocusofconsumptionongoodsthataddressbasicneeds(Storms).Lastly,innovationcouldleadtothereplacementofcarbon-intensiveproductswithgreenalternatives,forexamplereplacinganimalswithlab-grownproteins(Endgame).Asocietalpushfortheclimatetransitioncanleadtolifestylechanges.Scenariospointtoadividebetweengenerationswhenitcomestothewillingnessandabilitytochangelifestyles.Thosescenariosthatseeastronginfluenceoftheyouthinpoliticsandsocietycreateastrongerpushforgreenbehaviouralchanges(Strugglingsynergies,Opposingviews)whereasafocusonservinganageingsocietyseemstocementestablishedbehaviouralpatterns(Storms).Itbecomesalsoapparentthatastrongsocietalpushcancreatemomentumforgreenpolicies,triggeringtechnologicaldevelopmentsandbehaviouralchange(Strugglingsynergies).Importantenablersforsociety-widelifestylechangesaresocialcohesionandeconomiesofscaletomakesurethatallsocietalgroupshaveaccesstogreenlifestylesandnotonlyasmallelite(Endgame).64UrbanisationUrbanisationcangreatlyinfluencegreenhousegasemissionsbuttherelationcanbebothpositiveornegative,dependingontheurbanformandthegeographicalcontext.Insightsfromresearchpointtothefactthatcarbonfootprintsinurbanareasarehigherthaninruralareas,astherearehigherincomelevelsincities,whichleadtomorecarbon-intensiveconsumptionpatterns(Ottelin,2022).However,assessmentsthatcontrolforincomelevelsandhouseholdsizeconcludethatthepercapitagreenhousegasemissionsinurbanareasarelowerthaninruralareas(Ottelin,2022).Thepositiveimpactofurbanisationonemissionsdependsonthetypeofurbanisationandismostpronouncedincompactcities(Abdallh&Abugamos,2017).Compactcitiesenableshorterintra-urbantravellingdistances,lessautomobiledependency,moredistrict-wideandlocalenergysolutions,andoptimallanduse(OECD,2012).UrbanisationisoneoftheMegatrendstheworldfacesanditisplausibleinallscenariosthatthistrendwillcontinue.However,scenariospointtodifferentimpactsofurbanisationonclimatechange.Somescenariosimplythaturbanisationwouldnotbemanagedtoaimatemissionreductions(Storms,Endgame,Opposingviews).However,urbanisationthatisgearedtowardssustainabilityalsoseemsplausible(Strugglingsynergies,Opposingviews).Theimpactofurbanisationisstronglyinterlinkedwithotherdemographicdrivers.Thedevelopmentofthesedriverspartlydeterminesifurbanisationwillbebeneficialordetrimentaltosustainability.Strongeconomicgrowthlowersthechanceofpositiveimpactsofurbanisationonsustainability(Endgame)whileslowereconomicgrowthmightincreasethem(Storms).Furthermore,thepositiveimpactofurbaneconomiesofscaleonsustainabledevelopmentisonlyplausibleinscenarioswithsufficientgreeninnovation(Strugglingsynergies,Opposingviews).Lastly,greenlifestylesmakeapositiveimpactofurbanisationmoreplausible(Strugglingsynergies).Urbaneconomiesofscaleareplausibleinthescenarios.Nevertheless,theplausibilityofemissionreductionsishigherinscenariosthatassumechangesinconsumptionbehaviour,suchasco-housingorcarsharing(Strugglingsynergies,Opposingviews).Citiescanalsocreateanecosystemthatfosterschanginglifestylesthroughexchangesbetweenresidents,reinforcingsustainabledevelopmentpaths(Strugglingsynergies).However,bothdevelopmentsrequireplannedurbanisationthatisgearedtowardssustainabledevelopment(Strugglingsynergies,Opposingviews).Adverseenvironmentalandsocietalimpactscanendangertherealisationofurbaneconomiesofscale.Scenarioswithhighglobalwarmingtrajectoriesindicatethatbuildingsinurbancentreswillrequirethecreationofmoregreenspacesincitiestocontrastheatislandeffects.Atthesametimeairconditioningcouldincreaseurbanheatandbringtohigherenergydemands(Endgame).Furthermore,alackofsocialcohesionwillmakeplannedurbanisationmoredifficult,aspovertycanincreasetheriskofslumification(Storms,Endgame,Strugglingsynergies).Suchdevelopmentswouldmakeitdifficulttobenefitfromurbaneconomies.PopulationsizePopulationgrowthcanleadtohighergreenhousegasemissionsandliteraturesuggestsitwillcontinueinthenearfuture.Populationsizeandthegrowthinpopulationiswidelyconsideredoneofthedriversofenvironmentalstressandgreenhousegasemissions(Muttarak,2021;O’Neilletal.,2012a).However,itsimpactisconsideredlesssubstantialthansomeoftheotherdriversinthischapter(Arto&Dietzenbacher,2014;Muttarak,2021).Thereisastronglinkbetweenpopulationgrowthandotherdevelopments,asconsumptionpatternsanddevelopmentsingreentechnologiescanoffsetpartsofitsnegativeimpact(Arto&Dietzenbacher,2014;Rosa&Dietz,2012).Familyplanningcansomewhataffectfertilitytrends(O’Neilletal.,2012a)butthemomentumofpopulationgrowthisexpectedtoleadtoapopulationsizeofatleast10billionbytheendofthecentury(Rosa&Dietz,2012).Continuedpopulationgrowthisplausibleinallfourscenariosanddifficulttooffset.However,differentgrowthratesareplausibleinthelongtermdependingonthedevelopmentsinthescenarios.Forexample,extremedirectandindirectimpactsofclimatechangecouldcauseaslowdowninpopulationgrowth(Storms,Endgame).Inaddition,theevolutionofaffluenceandfertilityindevelopingcountries(e.g.Sub-SaharanAfrica)andthepossiblereboundoflowfertilityinpost-transitioncountriescouldcreatesomedivergenceinpopulationgrowthinthelongrun(Endgame,Strugglingsynergies,Opposingviews).65Educationandeconomicdevelopmentsaretwofactorsthatcanleadtodifferentlong-termpopulationdevelopmentsinthedifferentscenarios.Bettereducationsystemsandfamilyplanningoptionscanreducefertilityrates(Endgame).Ontheotherhand,sometechnologiescanhelptosustainlargerpopulations,forexample,newfoodproductiontechnologiesthatrequirelesslandoraremoreresilienttoextremeweatherevents(Endgame,Strugglingsynergies).Strongeconomicdevelopment,particularlyinemergingeconomieswithcurrentlyyoungpopulationscanleadtoasofteningofthepopulationgrowthcurve(Endgame,Strugglingsynergies,Opposingviews)aworseningglobaleconomywouldmakecontinuedfastpopulationgrowthplausible(Storms).Theimpactofpopulationgrowthongreenhousegasemissionscandiffer,dependingontechnologicaldevelopmentsandlifestyles.Inthecurrentsituationwitheconomiesthatarenotclimateneutral,eachnewpersonwillincreasehumanity’scarbonfootprint.Onlystepchangesinthedevelopmentofgreentechnologieswillpavethewaytoclimateneutrality(Strugglingsynergies).Inaddition,consciouschangesinlifestyles,suchassustainablefamilyplanning,canleadtofertilitylevelsthatarenotstressingtheenvironmentalboundariesoftheearth(Strugglingsynergies,Opposingviews).TechnologicalinnovationItisassumedthatinnovationandincreaseddigitalisationcanleadtoemissionreductions.Technologicalinnovationisimportantbecauseitincreaseseconomicgrowthbutcanalsoimpactenergyconsumption(Acheampongetal.,2022).Thereisevidencethatlow-carboninnovationcanhelptocopewiththechallengesposedbydemographicdevelopments(Jordaanetal.,2017;Rosa&Dietz,2012).Shiftsofemissionsbetweensectorsshouldnotbeunderestimated.Forexample,whileinnovationintheindustrialsectorcandecreasetheemissions,itcanleadtoincreasesintheconstructionsector(Erdoğanetal.,2020).Thepositiveimpactofinnovationcanalsovarybetweendifferentregions,andgreentechnologyinnovationsseemtocontributemoretoreducingemissionsinhigherincomecountriesthanlowerincomecountries(Duetal.,2019).Adequateinnovationratesdonotseemplausibleinthemajorityofscenarios.Slowinnovationratesareproblematicbecausetheylowertheplausibilityofmeaningfulalterationstoexistingcarbon-intensiveindustries(Storms).Veryhighinnovationrateswouldbeneededwithafocusonlow-carboninnovationtobecomeclimate-neutral(Strugglingsynergies,Endgame).However,highlow-carboninnovationratesinonlyonepartoftheworldmightnotbesufficient,ifmajoremittersremaininotherpartsoftheworld(Opposingviews).Innovationfocusonlow-carbontechnologiesisimportantbutnotsufficient.Besidesincreasinginnovationrates,itiscrucialthatinnovationfocusesonclimateneutralitytoachieveadequateemissionreductions(Strugglingsynergies).Otherwise,innovationcouldleadtomorecarbon-intensiveconsumptionpatterns(Endgame).Climatechangeadaptationisalsoanimportantareaofinnovationbuthasitslimitsandshouldnotbeconsideredasthesinglesolutiontodealingwithclimatechange(Endgame).Reducedemissionsrealisedbytechnologicalinnovationneedtobesupportedbylifestylechangessothatthesebenefitsarenotneutralisedbyanincreaseinconsumption(Storms,Endgame).Disruptiveinnovationwithacommongoaltoreachclimateneutralityiskey.Marginalefficiencyimprovementswouldnotbesufficienttobecomeclimateneutralintime,anddisruptiveinnovationonaglobalscalewillbecrucial(Strugglingsynergies,Storms).Higherself-reliancecouldbeadriverformoreregionalsolutionsalthoughwithlimitedeffects(Storms).Mission-orientedinnovationfordecarbonisingtheeconomyradicallywouldmakeitplausibletokeepclimatechangeatlowlevels(Strugglingsynergies).Suchradicalinnovationwouldrequireglobaltechnologytransfers(Strugglingsynergies),butthesedonotseemalwaysplausibleinfuturewithoutfunctioningmultilateralism(Storms,Opposingviews).GeopoliticsGeopoliticaltensionscouldreducetheefficiencyofclimateaction.Thereisevidenceofastrongcorrelationbetweenclimatechangeandpeaceandsecurity(Sharifietal.,2021).Theriseingeopoliticaltensionsthatwehaveexperiencedintherecentpastisproblematic.Geopoliticaltensionsledtoachangedglobalorder,lessincentivestowardsglobalcooperation,weakeralliances,andinterruptionsofglobalsupplychains(KPMG,2022).Thesedevelopmentsareworrying,asafragileglobalgovernancethreatenstoresultindecreasedeffortstofightclimatechange(Thorp,2022).66Domesticorinternationalpoliticaltensionsareplausibleacrossthemajorityofscenarios.Politicaltensionscanoccurbetweencountriesorregions(Storms,Opposingviews),orwithinacountry(Strugglingsynergies).Scenariosshowthatgeopoliticaltensionscouldmakeitdifficulttoimplementglobalsystemstogoverntheclimatetransition(Storms,Opposingviews).Furthermore,increasedgeopoliticaltensionscoulddivertinvestmentsawayfromtheclimatetransitiontowardsdefenceandsecurity(Storms).Lastly,migrationduetoclimatechangecouldleadtotensionsbetweenandwithincountries(Storms,Endgame).Alackofglobalagreementcanaffecteffortstowardsclimateneutrality.Alackofmultilateralism,regionsturninginwards,ortradedisruptionscouldaffecteffortsforenvironmentalactionnegatively(Storms).Whileglobalcompetitioncouldstimulateinnovationingeneral,itcouldalsoimpedetargetedinnovationtowardsgreentechnologies,iffocusedonotherareas(Endgame,Opposingviews).Havingtheworlddividedintoblocksmakesitdifficulttoreachaconsensusonglobalclimateaction(Opposingviews).Incontrast,stablemultilateralismforcollectiveglobalactionandsciencediplomacycouldleadtoaworldthatcollectivelyengagesinfightingclimatechange(Strugglingsynergies).ConclusionTheforesightanalysispointstofieldsofactionthatarecrucialtomanagingdemographicdriversinthecontextoftheclimatetransition.Itbecomesclearthatmanydemographicdevelopmentshaveasubstantialinfluenceonclimatechange.Furthermore,theyposeachallengefortheclimatetransition,astheyarelong-termdevelopmentsthataredifficulttoinfluence.However,ouranalysisshowedseveralstrategiestocopewithdemographicchangetoachievethegoalsoftheclimatetransition.Ananalysisofdriversacrossfourforesightscenariosyieldedanoverviewofoptionsthatcanhelptomanagedemographicdevelopmentsinthecontextoftheclimatetransition.Lookingahead,therearethreerelevantfieldsofaction:futuretechnologies,futuresocieties,andfuturegovernments.Futuretechnologies:fundamentaltechnologicalchangeisnecessarytobecomeclimateneutral.Thisiswhygreeninnovationwillbecrucialtodecarbonisetheglobaleconomy.Low-carbontechnologiesareacentrallevertoreduceemissionsdespitehouseholdsizedecreases,growingpopulation,andincreasingaffluence.Financialflowshavetobesteeredtowardsinnovationthatlowersemissionsfromburningfossilfuelsorproductionprocessesandreducestheresourcefootprintofeconomies.Mission-oriented,disruptiveinnovationaimedatenvironmentalactioncouldensurehighinnovationrates.Theseareneededtoachieveglobalclimateneutralityfastenoughtomeetthegoalofkeepingglobalwarmingat1.5°C.Itwillalsobeofcrucialimportancetotransfergreentechnologiestocountriesthathavenotyetcreatedfossilfuelpathdependenciesandcanbuildupenergyandindustrialecosystemsusinginnovativelow-carbontechnologies.Futuresocieties:societalpushtowardssustainabilitywillbecrucial.Tobeabletoreachclimateneutrality,oursocietieshavetore-thinkifeconomicdevelopmentcancontinuetobetheguidingprincipleforfuturedevelopment.Thereisalreadyanongoingdiscourseonusingsustainabilityindicatorsorindicatorsofwell-beinginsteadofgrossdomesticproduct.Suchaparadigmchangewouldbebeneficialtocopewithgloballyincreasinglevelsofpopulationandwealth.Itwouldalsohelptochangeconsumptionpatternsandadaptlifestylestobemoreenvironmentallyfriendly–despiteincreasinglevelsofaffluence.Educationwillbeacornerstoneforasustainablefuturesociety.Notonlyisitimportanttounderstandtheurgencyoftheclimatetransitionbutalsotounderstandhowlifestylescanbemoresustainable.Anothercornerstonewillbeasocietalpushforenvironmentalaction.Somedemographicdevelopmentsareadvantageoustocreatesuchasustainedpush.Forexample,urbanisationcouldcreatecommunitydynamicsthatfuelaself-reinforcingsocietalpushformoresustainablelifestyles.Socialcohesionwillplayacrucialroleincreatingwidepublicacceptanceofenvironmentalactionandshouldbeatthecoreofanyclimatestrategy.Futuregovernments:governmentsneedtoplanaheadandlookforgloballyconcertedsolutions.Formersmaller-scaleexamples,suchasthetransitionofcoalregions,haveshownthatforward-lookingplanningiscrucialtoturnthechallengesofatransitionintoopportunities.Theglobalclimatetransitionrequireseffortsatamuchbiggerscalethanthetransitionofoneeconomicsectorinacertainregion.Convincingsocietyofambitiousenvironmentalactioncanbeachallenge,asitwouldrequirefollowinguncharteredterritories.Governmentsinregionsthathavethefinancialandtechnologicalcapacitytobefirstmoversshouldcapitaliseonitanddemonstratethattheclimatetransitionispossible.Whenitcomestomanagingdemographicdevelopments,plannedapproacheswillbeessential.Forexample,plannedurbanisationcanleadtoanincreaseinclimateresilience,ifitsnegativeimpacts(e.g.thecreationofheatislands)aresoftenedwhileitspositiveimpacts(e.g.urbaneconomiesofscale)aremaximised.Lastly,climatechangeisaglobalproblemthatneedsgloballycoordinatedsolutions.Climatediplomacywillbecrucialtomakesuretheglobalcommunityworkstogether67towardsacommongoal.Therefore,internationalcollaborationisessentialtoworktowardsglobalclimateneutrality.68ReferencesAbdallh,A.A.,&Abugamos,H.(2017).Asemi-parametricpaneldataanalysisontheurbanisation-carbonemissionsnexusfortheMENAcountries.RenewableandSustainableEnergyReviews,78,1350–1356.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2017.05.006Acheampong,A.O.,Dzator,J.,Dzator,M.,&Salim,R.(2022).Unveilingtheeffectoftransportinfrastructureandtechnologicalinnovationoneconomicgrowth,energyconsumptionandCO2emissions.TechnologicalForecastingandSocialChange,182,121843.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2022.121843Afrobarometer.(2019).MergedRound7data.Ala-Mantila,S.,Heinonen,J.,&Junnila,S.(2014).Relationshipbetweenurbanization,directandindirectgreenhousegasemissions,andexpenditures:Amultivariateanalysis.EcologicalEconomics,104,129–139.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2014.04.019Amer,M.,Daim,T.U.,&Jetter,A.(2013).Areviewofscenarioplanning.Futures,46,23–40.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2012.10.003Andreev,Kirill,Kantorova,Vladimira,&Bongaarts,John.(2013).DemographicComponentsofFuturePopulationGrowth(No.2013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nsintheEUfromageanddegreeofurbanisation........................................................................6Figure3Concernsaboutclimatechangebyage,educationandplaceofliving....................................................................7Figure4Globalpopulationsizeandannualgrowthrate:estimates,1950-2022andprojections2022-2100.18Figure5Trendingreenhousegasemissionsandglobalpopulation,1961-2021,byincomegroup;andclimategoals.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................20Figure6Populationchange(2020-2021)comparedtopercapitaGrossNationalIncome(2021)andpercapitagreenhousegasemissions(2021)...................................................................................................................................................21Figure7Populationgrowthandemissionsgrowthoverthelastthreedecades.................................................................23Figure8ChangeinemissionscomparedtothechangeinGDPpercapitaandpopulationgrowthacrossselectedregions.........................................................................................................................................................................................................24Figure9Futurecarbonintensitiescomparedtopopulationprojectionsandpledgedemissionstargetsacrossselectedregions.........................................................................................................................................................................................................25Figure10Projectedfutureage-sexcompositionoftheglobalpopulationin2050and2100.UnitedNationsmediumprojectionswith95%uncertaintyintervalsbyageandsex.........................................................................................26Figure11Estimatesandprojectionsofthenumberofbirthsperwomaninallcountriesandareaoftheworld,1950to2100.............................................................................................................................................................................................................27Figure12Relativecontributionofcomponentsoffuturepopulationgrowth(agestructure,fertility,mortalityandmigration)from2022to2050andfrom2022to2100,fortheworldandmajorregions................................28Figure13AverageincomeandexpenditureandmedianemissionsbyageintheEU(2015)...................................35Figure14MedianemissionsintheEUbyincomequantile..............................................................................................................36Figure15RelativeandmedianabsoluteemissionsintheEUbymainconsumptioncategoriesandbyage(2015).............................................................................................................................................................................................................................37Figure16Mediansharesofspecificitemsofconsumptioninthetotalexpendituresofeachageandincomequantilegroup............................................................................................................................................................................................................38Figure17Medianhouseholdandpercapitaemissions(upperpanel)andaveragehouseholdsize(lowerpanel)byageintheEU(2015)........................................................................................................................................................................................39Figure18Examplesofscalingofinnovation,economicactivityandmaterialinfrastructurewithrespecttopopulationsize...........................................................................................................................................................................................................40Figure19Relativeandabsolute(median)emissionsbycategoryofconsumptionanddegreeofurbanisation............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................41Figure20Effectofthedegreeofurbanizationonemissionsinthreeseparateregressionmodels.......................42Figure21Effectsofageonemissions,emissionspercapitaandemissionspercapitaaftercontrollingforincome,educationanddegreeofurbanization.......................................................................................................................................43Figure22ProjectedpercentagechangeofemissionsintheEU(upperpanel)andshareofprojectedemissionsbyagegroups(lowerpanel)...............................................................................................................................................................................44Figure23Perceivedseriousnessofclimatechangein2021inEurope...................................................................................49Figure24Stateresponsibilityandpersonalactionforfightingclimatechangein2021inEurope.........................51Figure25Perceptionofclimatechangeandpersonalactionin2021inEurope................................................................52Figure26Attitudetowardsgreentransitionin2021inEurope....................................................................................................54Figure27OpinionsandattitudestowardsclimatechangebyagegroupsovertimeinEurope.................................55Figure28Opinionsandattitudestowardsclimatechangebyagegroupsin2016-2018inAfrica.........................57Figure29Overviewofreferencescenarios...............................................................................................................................................6177ListoftablesTable1ExampleofbridgingtablebetweenCOICOPandPRODCOM..........................................................................................80Table2ImpactcategoriesenteredinthecalculationofCO2emissions...................................................................................80Table3OLSregressionsforemissions........................................................................................................................................................81Table4OLSRegressionsforemissionsbycategoryofconsumption........................................................................................82Table5AttitudesandsociodemographiccharacteristicsinEuropein2021–Descriptivestatistics.......................84Table6AttitudesandsociodemographiccharacteristicsinEuropein2021–Multivariateregressionanalysis............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................85Table7Referencescenarios..............................................................................................................................................................................9178ListofBoxesBox1RoleofdemographyinEUclimateadaptationanddemographypolicies..................................................................10Box2Roleofdemographyinclimatemitigationpolicies.................................................................................................................1179AppendixIntroductionDemographyinEUGreenDealpolicies–amappingexerciseThetablebelowindicatessomeoftheEUGreenDealpolicieswhichintegratedemographicconsiderationsinthepolicydesign,considerclimateandenvironmentalimpactsonspecificsocio-economicordemographicgroupsandaimtoincludedifferentdemographicgroupsinclimateorenvironmentalaction,orgivethemanactiveroleinthepolicyplanning.Theassessmentisbasedonamappingofkeywords(population,demography,demographicchange,ageing,elderly,migration,migrant,fertility,mortality,equality,youth,young,child)inthemainclimateandenvironmentalpolicyinstruments.ThemappingisnotmeanttobeexhaustiveanditdoesnotincludeallGreenDealinstruments.Themappingprovidesapositiveindicationfortheinstrumentsthatmakeaspecificreferencetodemographicaspectsand/orinclusivenessinthemainpolicyinstruments(usuallytheRegulation,proposalforaRegulationortheCommissionCommunicationlayingthefoundationsofthepolicyinstrument).ThemappingaimstoprovideastartingpointforafurtherdiscussionontheinclusionofdemographicinsightsinEUpolicies,andtoenablesharingofknowledgeofbestpracticesinthisarea,topromoteacoherentpolicyapproachthatisinclusiveandforwardlooking.Mostofthepolicyinstrumentsanalysedconsidertheimpactofclimatechangeandenvironmentaldegradationonpopulationstoacertainextent.Theshadingofthegreenindicatestheextenttowhichdemographicaspectsareconsideredinthepolicyinstruments.Thedarkergreenindicatesthattheissueiswellorquitewelladdressed,whilelightergreenindicatesthatthereisareference,withoutalotofdetailordeeperanalysis.Ingeneral,furtheranalysiscouldbeusefulontheimpactofdemographicchangeandpopulationdynamicsonclimateandenvironmentaltargets,aswellasontheimpactofclimatechangeandenvironmentaldegradationonthedifferentdemographicgroups,inparticularthemostvulnerablegroups(olderpersonsandchildren),onthelongterm.Integratingforesighttechniquestosuchanalysiscouldhelpunderstandtheeffectsonthemostvulnerablegroupsonthelongterm(by2050andbeyond),unlesstheclimatetargetsaremet.Furthermore,furthereffortscouldbemadetoincludeolderpersons,youngpeopleandchildreninthedebatesandplanningforclimatepolicies.PolicyinstrumentConsiderstheimpactofclimatechangeand/orenvironmentaldegradationonpopulationsortheimpactofpopulationchangeontheclimateConsiderstheimpactofclimatechangeand/orenvironmentaldegradationondifferentdemographicgroups,inparticularthemostvulnerablegroups(children,youngpeople,migrants,olderpersons)Integratesdemographicinsightsoranalysisofdemographictrends(e.g.,ageing)inpolicydesignStrivestoincludedifferentdemographicgroups,inparticularchildren,youngpeopleandolderadultsinclimate/environmentalaction,orgivethemanactiverole/voiceinthepolicyplanning.EuropeanClimateLawüûûüEuropeanClimatePactüüûûTheEUadaptationstrategyüüüûTheEnergysystemintegrationstrategyüûüûRenovationWaveforEuropeüüüûSustainabilitySmartMobilityStrategyüüüûNewEuropeanBauhausüüüüZeropollutionactionplanüüüûBiodiversitystrategyfor2030üûûü80AppendixChapter2MergingHBSandI/Otables(EXIOBASE)TheanalysesinChapter2arebasedonmicrodatafromHBS(wave2015)andmacrodatafrommultiregionalI/OtablesfromtheExiobaseproject(Tukkeretal.,2014).TheHBSmicrodataincludesdetailedhouseholdbudgetsforaround270,000householdsintheEU(excludingAustria)withallthenecessaryinformationtoanalyseemissionsaccordingtoindividualandhouseholdsocio-demographiccharacteristics.Ontheotherhand,EXIOBASEprovidesgreenhousesgasesequivalentsmultipliersneededtotranslateEurosofconsumptionintoemissions.ThemergingofHBSandEXIOBASEreliedonabridgingmatrixfrom(Ivanova&Wood,2020)whichgivesthepossibilitytolinkthe200itemsofproductionaccordingtothePRODCOMclassificationinExiobasetothe63itemsofconsumptionaccordingtotheCOICOPclassificationfollowedinHBS.Inthismatrix,PRODCOMitemshaveaone-to-manyrelationshipwithCOICOPasshowninthefollowingexample.Table1ExampleofbridgingtablebetweenCOICOPandPRODCOMTheseweightscanbeseenasthesharesoftheenvironmentalimpactsfromproductioningredientsthatneedtobetakenintoaccounttocalculatethetotalemissionsofaconsumptionitem.Forexample,toestimateemissionslinkedtotheconsumptionofelectricitywewouldneedtoaccountfortheemissionsassociatedwithitsdifferentproductionforms(wind,solar,nuclear…).TheemissionsthemselveswereobtainedfromthesatelliteaccountsintheI/Otablesandincludedthefollowingmaingreenhousegases.ValuesofoutputforeachgashavebeenconvertedintoCO2equivalentsusingstandardconversionfactorsfromtheliterature31.Table2ImpactcategoriesenteredinthecalculationofCO2emissionsTheCO2multipliersarespecifictoeachproductionitemandcountryandtakeintoaccountthespecificitiesofnationalindustries.Whilestillreferringto2015,theycaptureinsomesensetheprogresstowarddecarbonisationandgreentransitioninnationaleconomies.Forimportedproducts,thesystemofI/Oallowsto31CO2(1),CH4(25),N2O(298),SF6(22800)(fromcombustionandnon-combustion)GWP100-Kyotoprotocolhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_warming_potentialCOICOPPRODCOMElectricityDistributionandtradeservicesofelectri..ElectricitybycoalElectricitybygasElectricitybynuclearElectricitybywindTransmissionservicesofelectricity0.100.010.400.140.060.27CH4-agriculture-airCH4-combustion-airCH4-noncombustion-Extraction/productionof(natural)gas-airCH4-noncombustion-Extraction/productionofcrudeoil-airCH4-noncombustion-Miningofantracite-airCH4-noncombustion-Miningofbituminouscoal-airCH4-noncombustion-Miningofcokingcoal-airCH4-noncombustion-Miningoflignite(browncoal)-airCH4-noncombustion-Miningofsub-bituminouscoal-airCH4-noncombustion-Oilrefinery-airCH4-waste-airCO2-agriculture-peatdecay-airCO2-combustion-airCO2-noncombustion-Cementproduction-airCO2-noncombustion-Limeproduction-airCO2-waste-biogenic-airCO2-waste-fossil-airN2O-agriculture-airN2O-combustion-airSF6-airA.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.81tracebacktheenvironmentalimpactstothecountriesoforigin.Inthisway,EUconsumerswouldforexamplebeaccountablefortheemissionsofproductsproducedabroadconsideringthespecificsustainabilityofthecountriesoforigin.ThemultiplierforeachCOICOPwascalculatedastheweightedsumofthegreenhousegasmultipliersacrosstheirrespectiveproductioningredients.Afterthismultiplication,doneatthelowestlevelof63COICOPitems,wecalculatedtotalemissionsandemissionsatahigherlevelofclassificationforeachhousehold(e.g.residential,transports,food…)throughsimplesums.Toexploreemissionsbyindividualcharacteristicsandinparticularbyageweallocatedentirelytheemissionsofthehouseholdtotheageofthereferencepersoninthehousehold.ThereferencepersonsaredefinedaccordingtotheHBSguidelinesas“thepersonaged16ormorewhomostcontributestothehouseholdincome,however,somecountriesusesubjectivecriteria(e.g.thepersonwhoisdesignatedassuchbytheothermembers).foreachhousehold”.SomelimitationswhicharenotaddressedentirelyinourexercisearelinkedtounderreportingofexpendituresintheHBSdata,differencesbetweenpricesofproductionusedinPRODCOMandconsumptionusedinHBS,notinclusionofproductswithdirectconsumptionandthelackofgovernmentexpenditures.Exiobaseprovidesaverydetailedrepresentationofinterindustryflows.Allthisdetailhastheadvantage,asindicatedabove,ofcapturingspecificitiesofthesustainabilityofnationalproductionsystemshoweveritalsoentailsagreatdealofnoiseandattimesahighvariationofcountry-PRODCOMmultiplierswhichwithconsiderableimpactinamicroanalysisperspective.Toreducethenoiseandavoidbiasingtheresultsfromoutliersweexcludedfromtheanalysissomecountry-PRODCOMmultiplierswithparticularlyhighvalues.Furthermore,forthedescriptiveanalysesinthechapterare2wheneverpossibleweusedmedianvaluesinsteadofaverages.RegressionstablesfortotalemissionsandemissionspercapitaBesidesthesimpledescriptiveanalyseswithcross-tabulationsandmedians,Chapter2isbasedonaseriesofregressionmodelsconsideringeitherthelogtotalemissionsorthelogofpercapitaemissionsasdependentvariables.Allthesemodelsincludecountry-fixedeffects.ThefollowingtableprovidesdetailedresultsoftheestimationsshowninthefiguresinChapter2.Table3OLSregressionsforemissionsTheindependentvariableincomeisalsoexpressedinalogandproxiedbytotalhouseholdexpendituretocompensatethatnotallcountriesreportvaluesforincome.Thedescriptiveanalysesaboutthebreakdownofemissionsbymaincategoriesofexpenditureshavebeencheckedandthroughaseriesofmodelsfittedforresidential,transport,food,healthandotheremissions.VariableEmissionsbyageR2:0.49Nrobs:264588EmissionspercapitabyageanddouR2:0.48Nrobs:264588Emissionspercapitabyagewithcontrolforincom..R2:0.57Nrobs:264588EmissionsbyageanddouR2:0.50Nrobs:264588EmissionsbyagewithcontrolforincomeanddouR2:0.67Nrobs:26458825-2930-3435-3940-4445-4950-5455-5960-6465-6970-7475-7980-84>=85TownRurallog(Income)0.613(0.014)0.606(0.014)0.590(0.014)0.558(0.014)0.532(0.014)0.461(0.014)0.460(0.014)0.406(0.014)0.326(0.014)0.268(0.014)0.203(0.014)0.162(0.016)0.080(0.017)-0.17(0.004)0.460(0.012)0.455(0.012)0.425(0.012)0.412(0.014)0.337(0.014)0.329(0.014)0.309(0.012)0.290(0.017)0.279(0.014)0.268(0.014)0.256(0.014)0.189(0.014)0.37(0.012)0(0.004)n.s.-0.08(0.004)-0.03(0.012)-0.03(0.012)-0.00(0.012)n.s.0.679(0.003)0.358(0.016)0.343(0.014)0.304(0.012)0.301(0.012)0.297(0.012)0.259(0.012)0.177(0.012)0.075(0.012)0.040(0.012)0.017(0.004)0.008(0.012)n.s.-0.07(0.005)0.613(0.014)0.606(0.014)0.590(0.014)0.557(0.014)0.532(0.014)0.460(0.014)0.459(0.014)0.406(0.014)0.328(0.014)0.268(0.014)0.207(0.014)0.166(0.016)0.086(0.017)0.070(0.004)0.996(0.003)0.186(0.014)0.186(0.012)0.178(0.010)0.172(0.010)0.168(0.010)0.166(0.012)0.159(0.010)0.154(0.010)0.151(0.012)0.141(0.012)0.116(0.012)0.096(0.012)0.096(0.004)0.050(0.012)0.050(0.004)82Overall,thecoefficientsestimatedfromthesemodelsconfirmtheshiftinemissionstypologiesacrossyoungerandolderagesandtheroleoftransportandresidentialemissionsontherural-urbandifferences.Table4OLSRegressionsforemissionsbycategoryofconsumptionVariableEmissionsbyageanddoufoodR2:0.59262699healthR2:0.21209533otherR2:0.45264084residen..R2:0.46264602transportR2:0.35210953Emissionsbyage,douandincomefoodR2:0.72262699healthR2:0.31209533otherR2:0.68264084residen..R2:0.54264602transportR2:0.51210953EmissionspcabyageanddoufoodR2:0.60262699healthR2:0.24209533otherR2:0.45264084resident..R2:0.44264602transportR2:0.3521095325-2930-3435-3940-4445-4950-5455-5960-6465-6970-7475-7980-84>85log(Income)RuralTown-0.0140.013n.s.0.0370.0040.0360.004-0.1220.0140.0760.0120.1930.0120.2920.0110.3460.0110.4220.0110.4920.0110.5080.0110.4790.0110.4110.0110.3180.0120.1740.0120.0020.007n.s.-0.0550.0070.9290.0300.9240.0270.9460.0250.8710.0250.7990.0240.7070.0240.6450.0240.5700.0240.5360.0240.5080.0240.4690.0250.4100.0250.2330.027-0.0550.005-0.2670.006-0.9340.022-0.7270.020-0.4520.018-0.2020.0180.0760.0170.2270.0170.3810.0170.4840.0170.5410.0170.5340.0180.4370.0180.2750.019-0.0520.0170.0070.005n.s.-0.2330.0060.3760.0230.4060.0200.4490.0180.5170.0180.5670.0180.5900.0170.6260.0170.6480.0170.6550.0170.6330.0180.5680.0180.4580.0180.2580.0190.2800.0080.3020.009-0.8160.044-0.6370.035-0.4730.030-0.1240.0290.1170.0280.3290.0270.5650.0270.6880.0270.7130.0270.7220.0270.7410.0280.6850.0280.4800.0300.0070.011n.s.0.0110.010n.s.0.0560.0030.1330.0030.7510.002-0.0430.0120.0370.0100.0750.0100.1240.0090.1330.0090.1520.0090.1700.0090.1650.0090.1320.0090.0830.0100.0470.0100.0370.025n.s.0.0220.0070.0450.0070.8810.0051.0510.0280.9810.0250.9340.0230.7610.0230.6290.0230.4700.0230.3310.0230.1950.0230.1350.0230.0990.0230.0860.0230.0970.024-0.0180.004-0.0970.0041.3690.003-0.8090.017-0.7030.015-0.5330.014-0.4260.014-0.3660.013-0.3210.013-0.2750.013-0.2130.013-0.1480.013-0.0980.013-0.0720.013-0.0620.014-0.0260.014.0.0280.005-0.1310.0050.8070.0040.4570.0210.4220.0180.4030.0170.3860.0170.3820.0160.3580.0160.3310.0160.2990.0160.2830.0160.2570.0160.2110.0160.1640.0170.0820.018-0.0250.023n.s.-0.0230.023n.s.-0.0040.024n.s.0.3130.0070.4620.0081.6140.006-0.9590.038-0.8180.030-0.7200.026-0.4930.025-0.3250.024-0.1980.0240.1220.0240.1310.026-0.0680.0230.0590.024-0.0330.003-0.0650.0030.0830.0130.1510.0120.2060.0110.2790.0100.3460.0100.3420.0100.3170.0100.2730.0100.2050.0100.1520.0100.1230.0100.1160.0110.0950.011-0.0650.007-0.1560.0071.1680.0301.1270.0271.1150.0250.9910.0250.8880.0240.7320.0240.5600.0240.3700.0240.2530.0240.1990.0240.1990.0240.2290.0250.1570.0260.0010.017n.s.-0.1250.005-0.3690.005-0.7320.021-0.5640.019-0.3230.017-0.1170.0170.0700.0170.1200.0160.1600.0160.1790.0160.2130.0170.2450.0170.2340.0170.1960.018-0.0630.005-0.3340.0060.5810.0220.5690.0200.5780.0180.6020.0180.6200.0170.5850.0170.5200.0170.4280.0170.3510.0170.3060.0170.2800.0170.2550.0180.1800.0190.2100.0080.1930.009-0.7620.043-0.5850.034-0.4280.029-0.0970.0280.1270.0270.2880.0270.4250.0260.4390.0260.3870.0260.3850.0260.4480.0270.4800.0270.3980.02983AppendixChapter3EmpiricalanalysisThemultivariateregressionanalysisisbasedonthefollowingsimpleestimableequation:•𝐴!"=𝛽#+𝑆𝐷!"𝐵+𝛼"+𝜖!",where𝐴describesthesetofattitudestowardsclimatechange,𝑆𝐷denotesasetofsociodemographiccharacteristics,𝛼capturecountry-specificfixedeffects,and𝜖istheerrorterm.Thesubscripts𝑖and𝑐standfortheindividualandcountry,respectively.Thedependentvariable𝐴takesavalueequaltozerooronedependingontheindividuallevelofagreementtosixquestionsonattitudes.Morespecifically,forthecategory“climatechangeisthemostseriousproblem”,thevariabletakesavalueofoneiftheanswertoQB1aoftheSpecialEurobarometerisequalto1andavalueofzeroiftheanswerisequalto2-11and996.32Forthecategory“climatechangeisaveryseriousproblem”,thevariabletakesavalueofoneiftheanswertoQB2isequalto7-10andavalueofzeroiftheanswerisequalto1-6.Forthecategory“stateauthoritiesareresponsiblefortacklingclimatechange”,thevariabletakesavalueofoneiftheanswertoQB3isequalto1-3and997andavalueofzeroiftheanswerisequalto4-6,996and998.Forthecategory“personalactiontakentofightclimatechange”,thevariabletakesavalueofoneiftheanswertoQB5isequalto1andavalueofzeroiftheanswerisequalto2.Forthecategory“maketheEUclimate-neutralby2050”,thevariabletakesavalueofoneiftheanswertoQB10isequalto1-2andavalueofzeroiftheanswerisequalto3-4.Finally,forthecategory“costsofclimatechangearehigherthanofgreentransition”,thevariabletakesavalueofoneiftheanswertoQB4isequalto1-2andavalueofzeroiftheanswerisequalto3-4.Thesetofsociodemographiccharacteristics𝑆𝐷includesdummyvariablesfortheagegroupsof30-44,45-59,andabove60yearsofage.Inaddition,itincludesadummyvariableforgender,adummyvariableforrespondentsthatsaytheyliveinlargetowns,andadummyvariableforthoseindividualsthatreportadifficultytopaythebillsattheendofthemonthmostofthetimesorfromtimetotime.Finally,twodummyvariablescapturetheindividuallevelofeducation,forthoserespondentsthatobtainedasecondarylevelofeducationandthosethatacquiredatertiarylevelofeducation.Itisimportanttonotethatallthesevariablesarederivedfromself-declaredinformation.Theempiricalmodelsdescribedbyequation(1)areestimatedusingalogitmodel.Table1containssomekeydescriptivestatisticsandtable2depictstheresultsofthemultivariateregressionanalysis.32ThedescriptionoftheEurobarometerQuestionnaireinthisappendixprovidestheprecisequestiontextsandansweroptions.84Table5AttitudesandsociodemographiccharacteristicsinEuropein2021–DescriptivestatisticsObservationsMeanStd.Dev.MinMaxClimatechangeisthemostseriousproblem26,6070.1770.38101Climatechangeisaveryseriousproblem26,6000.7610.42601Stateauthoritiesareresponsiblefortacklingclimatechange26,4530.8460.36101Personalactiontakentofightclimatechange26,5130.6230.48501MaketheEUclimate-neutralby205026,3280.9150.27801Costsofclimatechangearehigherthanofgreentransition24,8700.8190.38501Age26,66349.93917.0401597Female26,6690.5240.49901Largetown26,6670.3250.46801Secondary26,6330.5400.49801Tertiary26,6330.4240.49401Paymentproblems26,5110.2940.45601Source:Eurobarometer(2021).85Table6AttitudesandsociodemographiccharacteristicsinEuropein2021–MultivariateregressionanalysisVariablesClimatechangeisthemostseriousproblemClimatechangeisaveryseriousproblemStateauthoritiesareresponsiblefortacklingclimatechangePersonalactiontakentofightclimatechangeMaketheEUclimate-neutralby2050CostsofclimatechangearehigherthanofgreentransitionAge30-44-0.042(0.012)-0.054(0.016)-0.009(0.008)0.003(0.013)-0.009(0.009)-0.010(0.019)Age45-59-0.042(0.015)-0.058(0.015)0.002(0.006)-0.005(0.017)-0.017(0.009)-0.014(0.017)Age60+-0.047(0.015)-0.052(0.014)0.014(0.008)-0.036(0.019)-0.008(0.011)-0.003(0.016)Female-0.001(0.010)0.049(0.008)-0.001(0.007)0.053(0.010)0.028(0.006)0.040(0.007)Largetown0.009(0.009)0.027(0.013)0.010(0.012)0.017(0.014)0.021(0.012)0.041(0.010)Secondary0.033(0.030)0.072(0.024)0.034(0.021)0.126(0.048)0.017(0.017)-0.017(0.014)Tertiary0.102(0.028)0.114(0.015)0.083(0.019)0.235(0.050)0.024(0.020)0.000(0.019)Paymentproblems-0.035(0.006)-0.051(0.014)-0.025(0.014)-0.038(0.017)-0.032(0.013)-0.048(0.018)CountryFixedEffectsYesYesYesYesYesYesObservations26,41826,41126,26526,32826,14524,720Notes:Standarderrorsareclusteredatcountrylevelandreportedinparentheses.p<0.01,p<0.05,p<0.1.Averagemarginaleffectsarereported.Source:Eurobarometer(2021).86Questionnaire,EUROBAROMETER95.1,2021.1.Climatechangeisthemostseriousproblem:Question:QB1a-Whichofthefollowingdoyouconsidertobethesinglemostseriousproblemfacingtheworldasawhole?Answeroptions:1–Climatechange;2–Internationalterrorism;3–Poverty,hungerandlackofdrinkingwater;4–Spreadofinfectiousdiseases;5–Theeconomicsituation;6–Healthproblemsduetopollution;7–Proliferationofnuclearweapons;8–Armedconflicts;9–Theincreasingglobalpopulation;10–Deteriorationofnature;11–Deteriorationofdemocracyandruleoflaw;996–Other;998–None;999–Don'tknow2.Climatechangeisaveryseriousproblem:Question:QB2-Andhowseriousaproblemdoyouthinkclimatechangeisatthismoment?Pleaseuseascalefrom1to10,with'1'meaningitis"notatallaseriousproblem"and'10'meaningitis"anextremelyseriousproblem".Answeroptions:1–1Notatallaseriousproblem;2–2;3–3;4–4;5–5;6–6;7–7;8–8;9–9;10–10Anextremelyseriousproblem;999–Don'tknow3.Stateauthoritiesareresponsiblefortacklingclimatechange:Question:QB3-Inyouropinion,whowithintheEUisresponsiblefortacklingclimatechange?Answeroptions:1–Nationalgovernments;2–TheEuropeanUnion;3–Regionalandlocalauthorities;4–Businessandindustry;5–Youpersonally;6–Environmentalgroups;996–Other;997–Allofthem;998–None;999–Don'tknow4.Personalactiontakentofightclimatechange:Question:QB5-Haveyoupersonallytakenanyactiontofightclimatechangeoverthepastsixmonths?Answeroptions:1–Yes;2–No;999–Don'tknow5.MaketheEUclimate-neutralby2050:Question:QB10-Towhatextentdoyouagreeordisagreewiththefollowingstatement:Weshouldreducegreenhousegasemissionstoaminimumwhileoffsettingtheremainingemissions,forinstancebyincreasingforestedareas,tomaketheEUeconomyclimate-neutralby2050.Answeroptions:1–Totallyagree;2–Tendtoagree;3–Tendtodisagree;4–Totallydisagree;999–Don'tknow6.Costsofclimatechangearehigherthanofgreentransition:Question:QB4-Towhatextentdoyouagreeordisagreewitheachofthefollowingstatements?3-Thecostsofthedamagesduetoclimatechangearemuchhigherthanthecostsoftheinvestmentsneededforagreentransition.Answeroptions:1–Totallyagree;2–Tendtoagree;3–Tendtodisagree;4–Totallydisagree;999–Don'tknow877.Sociodemographiccharacteristics:a)AgeQuestion:SD5-Howoldareyou?Answeroptions:Yearsb)GenderQuestion:D11-GenderAnsweroptions:1–Man;2–Woman;3–Noneoftheabove/Nonbinary/donotrecognizeyourselfinabovecategoriesc)EducationQuestion:SD3b-Whatisthehighestlevelofeducationyoucompleted?Answeroptions:1–Pre-primaryeducation;2–Primaryeducation;3–Lowersecondaryeducation;4–Uppersecondaryeducation;5–Post-secondarynontertiary;6–Short-cycletertiary;7–Bachelororequivalent;8–Masterorequivalent;9–Doctoralorequivalent;10–EducationuptoISCED4completedabroad;11–EducationISCED5andabovecompletedabroad;997–Refusal;999–Don’tknowd)LocationQuestion:D25-Wouldyousayyouliveina...?Answeroptions:1–Ruralareaorvillage;2–Smallormiddlesizedtown;3–Largetown;999–Don'tknowe)PaymentproblemsQuestion:D60-Duringthelasttwelvemonths,wouldyousayyouhaddifficultiestopayyourbillsattheendofthemonth…?Answeroptions:1–Mostofthetime;2–Fromtimetotime;3–Almostnever/Never;997–Refusal88Questionnaire,Round7AfrobarometerSurvey,2016-2018.1.Heardaboutclimatechange:Question:Q73A-Haveyouheardaboutclimatechangeorhaven’tyouhadthechancetohearaboutthisyet?Answeroptions:0–No,Ihaven’thadthechancetohearaboutit;1–Yes;9–Don’tknow/Haven’theardenoughtosay;8–Refusedtoanswer;-1–Missing2.Climatechangeismakinglifeworse:Question:Q75-Doyouthinkclimatechangeismakinglifein[ENTERCOUNTRY]betterorworse,orhaven’tyouheardenoughtosay?Answeroptions:1–Muchbetter;2–Somewhatbetter;3–Neither/nochange/aboutthesame;4–Somewhatworse;5–Muchworse;7–Notapplicable[IfresponsetoQ73was0=No];9–Don’tknow/Haven’theardenoughtosay;8–Refusedtoanswer;99–Notaskedinthecountry;-1–Missing3.Climatechangedoesnotneedtobestopped:Question:Q76-Doyouthinkthatclimatechangeneedstobestopped?[Ifyes]Howmuchdoyouthinkthatordinary[ENTERNATIONALITY]candotostopclimatechange?Answeroptions:1–Muchbetter;2–Somewhatbetter;3–Neither/nochange/aboutthesame;4–Somewhatworse;5–Muchworse;7–Notapplicable[IfresponsetoQ73was0=No];9–Don’tknow/Haven’theardenoughtosay;8–Refusedtoanswer;99–Notaskedinthecountry;-1–Missing0–No,climatechangedoesn’tneedtobestopped;1–Yes,Ordinary[ENTERNATIONALITY]candonothingatall;2–Yes,Ordinary[ENTERNATIONALITY]candoalittlebit;3–Yes,Ordinary[ENTERNATIONALITY]candoalot;7–Notapplicable[IfresponsetoQ73was0=No];9–Don'tKnow[DNR];8–Refusedtoanswer;99–Notaskedinthecountry;-1–Missing4.Sociodemographiccharacteristics:a)AgeQuestion:Q1–Howoldareyou?Answeroptions:Years;998–Refused;999–Don’tknow;-1–Missingb)EducationQuestion:Q97–Whatisyourhighestlevelofeducation?Answeroptions:0–Noformalschooling;1–Informalschoolingonly(includingKoranicschooling);2–Someprimaryschooling;3–Primaryschoolcompleted;4–IntermediateschoolorSomesecondaryschool/highschool;5–Secondaryschool/highschoolcompleted;6–Post-secondaryqualifications,otherthanuniversitye.g.adiplomaordegreefromapolytechnicorcollege;7–Someuniversity;8–Universitycompleted;9–Post-graduate;99–Don’tknow;98–Refusedtoanswer;-1–Missingc)LocationQuestion:89URBRUR-UrbanorRuralPrimarySamplingUnitAnsweroptions:1–Urban;2–Rural;3–Semi-Urban;460–Peri-Urban90AppendixChapter4StrategicforesightStrategicforesightisthedisciplineofexploring,anticipatingandshapingthefuturetohelpbuildandusecollectiveintelligenceinastructured,andsystemicwaytoanticipatekeyfuturedevelopments(EuropeanCommission,2020c).Itusescollectiveintelligenceinastructuredandsystematicwaytoexploredifferentpossiblefutures,aswellasanticipateemergingissues,challengesandopportunitiesandpotentialimplicationstobetterprepareforchangeanddrawinsightsforpolicymaking.Itcanhelppolicymakersactinthepresenttoshapethefuturewewant.Scenarioplanningisoneofthemostestablishedforesightmethods.Ithasbeenusedsincethelate1940s(Horwath,2006;vanNottenetal.,2003).Inthefollowingcoupleofdecades,theiruseexpandedtosupportdecision-makingprocessesandpolicyanalysisinbothbusinessandgovernmentrealm(Ameretal.,2013;vanNottenetal.,2003).Nowadaysmanygovernmentsaroundtheworld,aswellasbusinesses,usestrategicforesightandscenarioplanningasaspecificmethod(e.g.Finland,Canada,Shell).ThisisespeciallyimportantintimesofVUCA(volatility–uncertainty–complexity–ambiguity),asunderthesecircumstances,traditionalpredictandcontrolapproachesoflinearplanningcannotaddressandunderstandtheimplicationsofchallengesanduncertaintieswearefacing(Chermack,2022;Ramírez&Wilkinson,2016).Foresightscenariosaredevelopedattheedgeofplausibility,takingintoconsiderationsignals,trendsanduncertaintiesthatlieaheadandtheirinteractions,inacoherentandsystematicway(Ameretal.,2013).Theychallengeandquestionassumptionswehaveaboutthefuture.Thisiswhytheyareprovocativetoenlargedecision-makers’perspectives(Schulteetal.,2021),reframetheunderstandingofissuesfacedtoday(Mukherjeeetal.,2020)aswellashelpshapethefutureandadapttoitbetter(Scoblic&Tetlock,2020).Therefore,theyareneitherpredictionsnorprojectionsandtheydonotdescribevisionsordesirablefutures.Buildingupontrends,uncertaintiesandweaksignals,foresightscenariosareusedassimulationsofplausiblefuturesandpossiblefutureconditions.Assuch,theycanbeusedtostress-testtherobustnessofastrategyorapolicyandpointtowardspotentialuncertainties.Theycanhelpunderstandthechoicesavailabletodayandtheirpotentialconsequencesforthefuture.ReferenceforesightscenariosIn2020,theEuropeanCommissionJointResearchCentrewastaskedtoproducethesetofreferenceforesightscenarios.(EuropeanCommission,2020c)Onlineworkshopswithadedicatedworkinggroupwereheldin2021.Resultswerelaterrefinedandvalidatedwithexpertsthroughaseriesofinterviewsconductedin2022.ThescenarioswererecentlypublishedasaJointResearchCentreScienceforPolicyReport.ThescenarioswerebuiltusingOxfordScenarioPlanningApproach.Initscoreliestheideathatlookingatdifferentfuturescenariosallowustoreframe‘officialfuture’andre-perceiveourideasandoptions.Throughit,thisapproachallowsustolearnaboutthepresentfromtheperspectiveofthefuture(andnottheopposite)(Ramírez&Wilkinson,2016).Therefore,scenariobuildingisanimportantlearningprocess.However,theuseofscenariosaftertheircreationisevenmoresignificant.Thereareseveralwayshowscenarioscouldbeused,forexampletodiscussimplicationsforaspecificpolicyarea,tobeusedinstrategicdiscussionsortostress-testorwind-tunneldifferentpolicyoptionsandassumptions.ReferenceforesightscenariosontheglobalstandingoftheEUin2040bringfourplausiblefuturestopointtowardskeyuncertainties.Theseuncertaintiesinclude,forexample,shiftsingeopoliticalpower,environmentalaction,technologicaldevelopments,andsocialvalues.Thefourscenariosaretitled:Storms,Endgame,StrugglingSynergies,OpposingViews.Herebelowweprovideasnapshotofthesefourfutures.Basedontheanalysisoftheentireforesightscenarioset,potentialimplicationsforaspecificpolicyareacanbediscussed.Areportdedicatedtothedevelopmentofthereferencescenariosprovidesmoredetails(referencetocome).91Table7ReferencescenariosStormsGlobalco-operationhascollapsedandtheworldisdividedintoblocks.Eachgeopoliticalblockisprotectingitsownwayoflife.Strategicautonomyisthecredo.Scarcityisthenewnormal,leadingtohostilitybetweentheblocks.Thecollapseofmultilateralismmadeagloballyco-ordinatedapproachtoclimatemitigationandenvironmentalprotectionimpossible.Socialequalityandtheprotectionofminoritiesarenotpriorities.EndgameEconomicgrowthtrumpswellbeing.Theinternationalcompetitionforcompaniesandjobsincreasedthepowerofbusinessesovergovernments.Innovationisseenasthemeanstoachievecompetitiveadvantagesmainlythroughhigherefficiencyandaccesstonewtypesofresources.Authoritarianpowersandtheriseofpopulismleadtoalowerprotectionoftheenvironmentandhumanrights.StrugglingsynergiesWhilethereisstrongmultilateraldeterminationtofightclimatechange,otherenvironmental,economic,andsocialaspectsofsustainabilityareside-lined.Technologyleadershipinlow-orzero-carbontechnologiesisadeterminantofsuccess.Socialinequalitieshaveincreased.Citizensincreasinglystruggletofindabalancebetweenglobalvaluesandtheirpersonaldesires,namelyatthecruxofconsumptionandsustainability.OpposingviewsAgreenenlightenedandeuro-centriceliteleadstheinterestsoffuturegenerationsinaprogressiveglobalblock,the‘regenerativealliance’.Socialequalityandenvironmentalsustainabilityarethetopprioritiesintheregenerativealliance.Thereisan‘exploitativealliance’centredaroundBrazil,Russia,India,andChinaandfollowsadifferentapproach.Economicsandefficiencyareatthecentre,withoutbeingsteeredbysustainabilitygoals.GETTINGINTOUCHWITHTHEEUInpersonAllovertheEuropeanUniontherearehundredsofEuropeDirectcentres.Youcanfindtheaddressofthecentrenearestyouonline(european-union.europa.eu/contact-eu/meet-us_en).OnthephoneorinwritingEuropeDirectisaservicethatanswersyourquestionsabouttheEuropeanUnion.Youcancontactthisservice:—byfreephone:0080067891011(certainoperatorsmaychargeforthesecalls),—atthefollowingstandardnumber:+3222999696,—viathefollowingform:european-union.europa.eu/contact-eu/write-us_en.FINDINGINFORMATIONABOUTTHEEUOnlineInformationabouttheEuropeanUnioninalltheofficiallanguagesoftheEUisavailableontheEuropawebsite(european-union.europa.eu).EUpublicationsYoucanviewororderEUpublicationsatop.europa.eu/en/publications.MultiplecopiesoffreepublicationscanbeobtainedbycontactingEuropeDirectoryourlocaldocumentationcentre(european-union.europa.eu/contact-eu/meet-us_en).EUlawandrelateddocumentsForaccesstolegalinformationfromtheEU,includingallEUlawsince1951inalltheofficiallanguageversions,gotoEUR-Lex(eur-lex.europa.eu).OpendatafromtheEUTheportaldata.europa.euprovidesaccesstoopendatasetsfromtheEUinstitutions,bodiesandagencies.Thesecanbedownloadedandreusedforfree,forbothcommercialandnon-commercialpurposes.TheportalalsoprovidesaccesstoawealthofdatasetsfromEuropeancountries.

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