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POLICY BRIEF

What Can Indonesia Learn from

South Africa’s Experience of the

Just Energy Transition Process?

Anissa Suharsono, Martha Maulidia

July 2023

Just Energy Transition Partnerships and the Importance of

Accelerating Energy Transition

Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) are essentially a ﬁnancing mechanism agreed

between a group of industrialized countries and a developing country, designed to fund a

transition of the coal-dependent developing nation away from fossil fuel production and

consumption toward low-carbon energy while addressing the social consequences involved. As

of May 2023, JETP deals have been announced for South Africa, Indonesia, and Vietnam.

In a nation where coal plays an important role in the economy, robust social and economic

measures must be taken and included in the JETP plans, as transitioning away from coal will

aect a signiﬁcant portion of the population.

Finance provided under the JETP may include grants, loans, and investments, and, as of

March 2023, the donor group includes the International Partners Group (IPG) and the

Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero Working Group. The IPG represents the donor

countries, made up of Canada, Denmark, the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,

Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net

Zero Working Group represents over 550 major ﬁnancial institutions from 50 countries, such

as HSBC and Citibank (Kusuma, 2023).

The JETP scheme was ﬁrst announced at the UN Climate Change Conference (COP 26) in

November 2021. It was described at the time as a long-term partnership designed to support

the Republic of South Africa in decarbonizing its energy system—preventing up to 1–1.5

gigatonnes of emissions over the next 20 years—and help the country accelerate its transition

from coal to a low-emission, climate-resilient economy. It was launched with a funding

commitment of USD 8.5 billion in the ﬁrst phase of ﬁnancing, with the comprehensive

investment plan made public a few days before COP 27 (European Commission, 2022).

IISD.org 2

What Can Indonesia Learn from South Africa’s Experience

of the Just Energy Transition Process?

The second JETP deal was announced during the G20 Summit in November 2022. The

IPG—led by the United States and Japan—pledged to mobilize USD 20 billion (around IDR

300 trillion) over the next 3–5 years to accelerate Indonesia’s energy transition through early

retirement of coal power plants and deployment of renewable energy. The deal appears to

herald a dramatic shift in energy policy, setting a new target for renewables—which will need

to account for 34% of the country’s power production by 2030.

Indonesia is currently in the process of preparing its comprehensive investment plan. This

brief will assess the JETP process South Africa went through 1 year after it was announced

to highlight any relevant ﬁndings and lessons to assist policy-makers implementing the

Indonesian JETP.

Process and Organizational Structure of

South Africa’s JETP

Since the announcement of the JETP at COP 26 in November 2021, several policy reforms

that will beneﬁt and enable the South African JETP have been started or announced. These

reforms include the following:

• an updated Climate Change Bill;

• proposed changes to electricity sector regulations;

• release of a Just Transition Framework and a just energy transition investment plan;

• green hydrogen developments, including a Hydrogen Economy Roadmap;

• the South African Green ﬁnance taxonomy and Sustainability and Climate Change

Disclosure Guidance, with the carbon tax rate expected to increase progressively

every year;

• a National Mine Closure Strategy and discussion on South African Renewable Energy

Master Plan;

• further rounds of bids for renewable energy projects are underway, and the licensing

threshold for new generation capacity has been raised to 100 MW, opening new ways

for private sector investment in renewable energy projects (Presidential Climate

Finance Task Team & IPG, 2022a, 2022b).

Collectively, these policy measures aim to reduce barriers to clean energy deployment and

to align energy policy with the agreed phase-down of coal generation. Despite the high-level

agreement and moves toward policy reform, these reforms are still controversial.

The South African JET Investment Plan (JET IP) was developed throughout the course of

2022, and it articulated the need for ZAR 1,48 trillion (USD 98 billion) investment in three

priority sectors over a period of 5 years. It is important to note that the JET IP only sets

out the guiding principles for implementation of the Just Transition Framework and is not

exhaustive of all the transition needs in South Africa. The USD 8.5 billion in the ﬁrst phase of

ﬁnancing will be spent on the most urgent programs identiﬁed under the IP.

IISD.org 3

What Can Indonesia Learn from South Africa’s Experience

of the Just Energy Transition Process?

In the past few years, South Africa has been undergoing the process of electricity sector

reform. This reform process is also recognized to be one of the key measures to support the

implementation of the JET IP. In the 12 months following the announcement of the JETP

(Presidential Climate Finance Task Team & IPG, 2022), the president announced several steps

in the transformation of the electricity sector, such as

• removing licensing thresholds for embedded generation to enable private investments

in large, utility-scale generation projects;

• reviewing the Integrated Resource Plan 2019 to reﬂect the need for additional

generation capacity and South Africa’s climate commitments;

• reducing designated local content for solar panels from 100% to 35% (The Presidency

Republic of South Africa, 2023);

• oering incentives for rooftop solar, developing feed-in taris for the purchase of

electricity surplus from residential customers, and further work on tax incentives;

• enhancing the eort to restructure Eskom as well as addressing crime and corruption

through a law-enforcement team;

• using climate funding provided through the JETP to invest in transmission grid and

repurpose coal power plants that have reached end of life;

• establishing a National Energy Crisis Council to strengthen Presidential oversight of

delivery against announced reforms. South Africa’s severe load-shedding due to the

ongoing energy crisis is also partly the reason for the establishment of the National

Energy Crisis Council (Proctor, 2023).

The electricity sector reform measures are also broadly aimed at increasing the rate of

deployment of new (and, in many cases, privately owned) generation, much of it renewable.

However, there are still elements within the government who are opposed to reforms,

remaining unconvinced that renewables can replace thermal generators. These elements may

continue to seek to undermine or reverse the reforms. As in many countries, in South Africa,

there is often a gap between policy and implementation, and not all of these initiatives have

translated into practical changes.

Organization Structure and Roles

Chaired by the United Kingdom, the IPG was established to coordinate the partnership

announced at COP 26 between its members and the government of South Africa. In February

2022, the Presidential Climate Finance Task Team was formed, and it serves as a counterpart

for the IPG. It engages with the IPG to advise Cabinet on the ﬁnancing package’s composition,

aordability, and alignment with the regulatory environment. It also coordinates with relevant

government departments and the private sector to develop relevant ﬁnancing mechanisms and

facilities to enable international climate ﬁnance.

/18

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POLICYBRIEF©2023InternationalInstituteforSustainableDevelopmentWhatCanIndonesiaLearnfromSouthAfrica’sExperienceoftheJustEnergyTransitionProcess?AnissaSuharsono,MarthaMaulidiaJuly2023JustEnergyTransitionPartnershipsandtheImportanceofAcceleratingEnergyTransitionJustEnergyTransitionPartnerships(JETPs)areessentiallyafinancingmechanismagreedbetweenagroupofindustrializedcountriesandadevelopingcountry,designedtofundatransitionofthecoal-dependentdevelopingnationawayfromfossilfuelproductionandconsumptiontowardlow-carbonenergywhileaddressingthesocialconsequencesinvolved.AsofMay2023,JETPdealshavebeenannouncedforSouthAfrica,Indonesia,andVietnam.Inanationwherecoalplaysanimportantroleintheeconomy,robustsocialandeconomicmeasuresmustbetakenandincludedintheJETPplans,astransitioningawayfromcoalwillaffectasignificantportionofthepopulation.FinanceprovidedundertheJETPmayincludegrants,loans,andinvestments,and,asofMarch2023,thedonorgroupincludestheInternationalPartnersGroup(IPG)andtheGlasgowFinancialAllianceforNetZeroWorkingGroup.TheIPGrepresentsthedonorcountries,madeupofCanada,Denmark,theEuropeanUnion,France,Germany,Italy,Japan,Norway,theUnitedKingdom,andtheUnitedStates.TheGlasgowFinancialAllianceforNetZeroWorkingGrouprepresentsover550majorfinancialinstitutionsfrom50countries,suchasHSBCandCitibank(Kusuma,2023).TheJETPschemewasfirstannouncedattheUNClimateChangeConference(COP26)inNovember2021.Itwasdescribedatthetimeasalong-termpartnershipdesignedtosupporttheRepublicofSouthAfricaindecarbonizingitsenergysystem—preventingupto1–1.5gigatonnesofemissionsoverthenext20years—andhelpthecountryaccelerateitstransitionfromcoaltoalow-emission,climate-resilienteconomy.ItwaslaunchedwithafundingcommitmentofUSD8.5billioninthefirstphaseoffinancing,withthecomprehensiveinvestmentplanmadepublicafewdaysbeforeCOP27(EuropeanCommission,2022).IISD.org2WhatCanIndonesiaLearnfromSouthAfrica’sExperienceoftheJustEnergyTransitionProcess?ThesecondJETPdealwasannouncedduringtheG20SummitinNovember2022.TheIPG—ledbytheUnitedStatesandJapan—pledgedtomobilizeUSD20billion(aroundIDR300trillion)overthenext3–5yearstoaccelerateIndonesia’senergytransitionthroughearlyretirementofcoalpowerplantsanddeploymentofrenewableenergy.Thedealappearstoheraldadramaticshiftinenergypolicy,settinganewtargetforrenewables—whichwillneedtoaccountfor34%ofthecountry’spowerproductionby2030.Indonesiaiscurrentlyintheprocessofpreparingitscomprehensiveinvestmentplan.ThisbriefwillassesstheJETPprocessSouthAfricawentthrough1yearafteritwasannouncedtohighlightanyrelevantfindingsandlessonstoassistpolicy-makersimplementingtheIndonesianJETP.ProcessandOrganizationalStructureofSouthAfrica’sJETPSincetheannouncementoftheJETPatCOP26inNovember2021,severalpolicyreformsthatwillbenefitandenabletheSouthAfricanJETPhavebeenstartedorannounced.Thesereformsincludethefollowing:•anupdatedClimateChangeBill;•proposedchangestoelectricitysectorregulations;•releaseofaJustTransitionFrameworkandajustenergytransitioninvestmentplan;•greenhydrogendevelopments,includingaHydrogenEconomyRoadmap;•theSouthAfricanGreenfinancetaxonomyandSustainabilityandClimateChangeDisclosureGuidance,withthecarbontaxrateexpectedtoincreaseprogressivelyeveryyear;•aNationalMineClosureStrategyanddiscussiononSouthAfricanRenewableEnergyMasterPlan;•furtherroundsofbidsforrenewableenergyprojectsareunderway,andthelicensingthresholdfornewgenerationcapacityhasbeenraisedto100MW,openingnewwaysforprivatesectorinvestmentinrenewableenergyprojects(PresidentialClimateFinanceTaskTeam&IPG,2022a,2022b).Collectively,thesepolicymeasuresaimtoreducebarrierstocleanenergydeploymentandtoalignenergypolicywiththeagreedphase-downofcoalgeneration.Despitethehigh-levelagreementandmovestowardpolicyreform,thesereformsarestillcontroversial.TheSouthAfricanJETInvestmentPlan(JETIP)wasdevelopedthroughoutthecourseof2022,anditarticulatedtheneedforZAR1,48trillion(USD98billion)investmentinthreeprioritysectorsoveraperiodof5years.ItisimportanttonotethattheJETIPonlysetsouttheguidingprinciplesforimplementationoftheJustTransitionFrameworkandisnotexhaustiveofallthetransitionneedsinSouthAfrica.TheUSD8.5billioninthefirstphaseoffinancingwillbespentonthemosturgentprogramsidentifiedundertheIP.IISD.org3WhatCanIndonesiaLearnfromSouthAfrica’sExperienceoftheJustEnergyTransitionProcess?Inthepastfewyears,SouthAfricahasbeenundergoingtheprocessofelectricitysectorreform.ThisreformprocessisalsorecognizedtobeoneofthekeymeasurestosupporttheimplementationoftheJETIP.Inthe12monthsfollowingtheannouncementoftheJETP(PresidentialClimateFinanceTaskTeam&IPG,2022),thepresidentannouncedseveralstepsinthetransformationoftheelectricitysector,suchas•removinglicensingthresholdsforembeddedgenerationtoenableprivateinvestmentsinlarge,utility-scalegenerationprojects;•reviewingtheIntegratedResourcePlan2019toreflecttheneedforadditionalgenerationcapacityandSouthAfrica’sclimatecommitments;•reducingdesignatedlocalcontentforsolarpanelsfrom100%to35%(ThePresidencyRepublicofSouthAfrica,2023);•offeringincentivesforrooftopsolar,developingfeed-intariffsforthepurchaseofelectricitysurplusfromresidentialcustomers,andfurtherworkontaxincentives;•enhancingtheefforttorestructureEskomaswellasaddressingcrimeandcorruptionthroughalaw-enforcementteam;•usingclimatefundingprovidedthroughtheJETPtoinvestintransmissiongridandrepurposecoalpowerplantsthathavereachedendoflife;•establishingaNationalEnergyCrisisCounciltostrengthenPresidentialoversightofdeliveryagainstannouncedreforms.SouthAfrica’ssevereload-sheddingduetotheongoingenergycrisisisalsopartlythereasonfortheestablishmentoftheNationalEnergyCrisisCouncil(Proctor,2023).Theelectricitysectorreformmeasuresarealsobroadlyaimedatincreasingtherateofdeploymentofnew(and,inmanycases,privatelyowned)generation,muchofitrenewable.However,therearestillelementswithinthegovernmentwhoareopposedtoreforms,remainingunconvincedthatrenewablescanreplacethermalgenerators.Theseelementsmaycontinuetoseektoundermineorreversethereforms.Asinmanycountries,inSouthAfrica,thereisoftenagapbetweenpolicyandimplementation,andnotalloftheseinitiativeshavetranslatedintopracticalchanges.OrganizationStructureandRolesChairedbytheUnitedKingdom,theIPGwasestablishedtocoordinatethepartnershipannouncedatCOP26betweenitsmembersandthegovernmentofSouthAfrica.InFebruary2022,thePresidentialClimateFinanceTaskTeamwasformed,anditservesasacounterpartfortheIPG.ItengageswiththeIPGtoadviseCabinetonthefinancingpackage’scomposition,affordability,andalignmentwiththeregulatoryenvironment.Italsocoordinateswithrelevantgovernmentdepartmentsandtheprivatesectortodeveloprelevantfinancingmechanismsandfacilitiestoenableinternationalclimatefinance.IISD.org4WhatCanIndonesiaLearnfromSouthAfrica’sExperienceoftheJustEnergyTransitionProcess?Figure1.SouthAfricanJETPgovernancestructureSource:EuropeanCommission,2022.TheJETPsecretariatistaskedwithprovidingtechnicalandcoordinationsupporttothepartnershipinaneutralandobjectivemanner.Inordertoassistwiththesecretariat’swork,theClimateInvestmentFundBoardwillprovidethesupportandresourcesneeded.Severalconsultationscoveringkeyissues—suchasthenatureofthefinancialoffer,sharedunderstandinginpriorityareas,JETPIPoutlineandcontents,andthescopeandresponsibilitiesofthesecretariat—wereheldinMay2022.TheyinvolvedthePresidentialClimateFinanceTaskTeam,IPG,governmentfocalpoints,anddevelopmentfinanceinstitutions.Theseconsultationsincludedanassessmentofrelevantpoliciesandguidelines,preliminaryreviewofinvestmentandpolicyimplications,andmappingdevelopmentfinanciers’activitiesandprogramsthatcansupportthejustenergytransition.Atthesametime,thesecondmissionoftheAcceleratingCoalTransitionInvestmentProgramme(fundedbytheClimateInvestmentFundandledbytheWorldBankGroupandTheAfricanDevelopmentBank)washeldinordertoaligntheprogramandsupportthebroaderJETP.Tosupportthesecretariat,JETPhasalsoestablishedfiveworkinggroupstogathertechnicalexpertiseandexperienceinthefollowingareas:finance,implementation,power,greenSouthAfricanCabinetInter-MinisterialCommittee(IMC)JustEnergyTransitionPresidentialClimateFinanceTaskTeam(PCFTT)Members:IndividualswithrelevantexperienceMandate:FinalrecommendationsforInvestmentPlanandﬁnancingpackageInternationalPartnerGroup(IPG)Members:CapitalsandlocalteamsMandate:FinancingofferandendorsedInvestmentPlanJETPSecretariatIndependentteam:Coordinatingtechnicalworkinggroups,accountabletoJET(SAandIPG)Mandate:CoordinatethejointworkingprogramofPCFTTandIPGforﬁnalrecommendationsoftheInvestmentPlanandﬁnancingpackage,draftthereports,coordinatemediaengagementsofJETPChairIISD.org5WhatCanIndonesiaLearnfromSouthAfrica’sExperienceoftheJustEnergyTransitionProcess?hydrogen,andtransport.Termsofreferenceforeachworkinggrouparestillbeingdeveloped,buttheywillcentrearoundinvestmentsequencinginrelationtoSouthAfrica’sgoalsandchallenges.HighlightedShortcomingsoftheSouthAfricaJETPProcessTheJETPdealmayserveasacatalystforenergytransitionandcouldalsoopenthedoortomoreclimatefunds.However,becauseitisanewmechanismwhereallthedetailsarestillunderdevelopment,thereisalwaystheriskofthedealfailingtodeliveronitspotential.Oneoftheaspectsthatmustbemetinordertofulfillthe“just”aspectoftheenergytransitionistoensureabalancebetweentacklingcleanenergyissuesanddeliveringasociallyjusttransition.Raisingfinancesimplyforenergyinfrastructureisrelativelyeasyduetotheprospectoffavourableinvestmentreturns,butthesamecannotbesaidaboutraisingfinancetosupportcoalworkersandcommunities.EnsuringthatJETPprogramsareabletodeliverajustenergytransitionaswellasinfrastructureinvestmentisasignificantchallenge(Halsey,2022).Box1.ThepolicyimplementationgapandtheSouthAfricanJETPThegapbetweenstatedtargetsandpolicyobjectivesandtheirimplementation(thepolicyimplementationgap)isanoften-observedphenomena.Newinitiatives,particularlythosethatareambitiousandunprecedented,faceatoughjourneytorealization.Threekeyfactorsinfluencethelikelihoodofdelivery;Indonesianpolicy-makersshouldconsiderand,wherepossible,mitigatethesefactorsinthedevelopmentoftheJETP.1.Shortcomingsatthefeasibilitystage.Policiesdevelopedwithoutfullunderstandingoftheeconomic,social,andinstitutionalbarriersmayproveimpossibletoimplement.Toavoidthis,transparencyandconsultationatthedesignstagearecritical.ThereportedlackofcivilsocietyconsultationinSouthAfricamayhavegivenrisetopolicy-makingblindspots.2.Misestimationofthepoliticallandscapeandcrossdepartmentalcoordination.Proposalsaretypicallydevelopedbyaleadgovernmentministry.Withoutadequatecoordination,theproposalsmaynotcarrythesupportofallgovernmentstakeholders.InSouthAfrica,theoriginalpremiseofthedeal—earlyphase-outofcoalgenerationinexchangeforinternationalfinanceforcleanenergy—iscurrentlybeingopenlyquestionedbygovernmentministers.Thisindicatesthatthepoliticallandscapewasnotfactoredintothedealattheinceptionphase.3.AstheJETPmovestowardsimplementation,furtherproblemswillarise.Monitoringandevaluationwillbecomeincreasinglyimportanttoidentifyproblemsanddevelopmitigationmeasures.ThedevelopmentofstructurestomonitorandevaluatetheJETPwillbecomeincreasinglyimportant.TheSouthAfricanJETPdesignprocesshasbeencriticizedfornotbeinginclusiveofthepeoplemostaffectedbyitsimplementation.PriortothepublicationoftheJETPIPinIISD.org6WhatCanIndonesiaLearnfromSouthAfrica’sExperienceoftheJustEnergyTransitionProcess?November2022,eventhoughvariouspolicydocumentshadbeendiscussedandformalized(andtheSouthAfricataskteamandtheworkinggroupshadbeenworkingontheinvestmentplan),thegeneralpublicdidnothavethechancetoconsultthesedocuments,norhadanyrepresentativesofaffectedcommunities.TheJETforumsconvenedbythePresidentialClimateCommissionarealsoseenasnotyetsufficienttoaddresstheseconcerns.Thereisalsothefactthatevenwiththeinclusionofacomprehensivedefinitionof“just”transition,thereisaverynarrowfocusonthemitigationofdecarbonizationandthehistoricalimpactsofcoalmininginSouthAfrica.Thecurrentstateoftheenergysystem—wherethereisstill“unjustness”intermsofaccesstoandaffordabilityofelectricity—isalsonotaddressedintheJETPdeal,sinceuniversal,affordableaccessisnotidentifiedasaJETPfocusarea.ThisshowsalackofalignmentbetweentheinterestsoftheJETPwiththeself-identifiedinterestsinthepowerofthemajorityofSouthAfricans(PublicAffairsResearchInstitute,2023).Theissueofvestedinterestsandwidespreadcontinued(andpossiblyevenincreasing)supportforcoalinSouthAfricawouldalsobearelevantissueforpolicy-makersinIndonesiatoconsider.InthecaseofSouthAfrica,theelectricitysupplycrisis,whichwouldhavebeenanidealargumentfortransitioningtowardrenewables,isdrivingdemandstoextendthelifeofcoalassetsandpossiblyevenbuildoutmorecoalinfrastructure(PublicAffairsResearchInstitute,2023).TherulingAfricanNationalCongresswentasfarasissuingarecommendationforEskomtodelaythedecommissioningofitsagingcoalpowerplantstominimizeload-shedding.Thecontradictionbetweenthediscussionofacceleratedphase-outsundertheJETPandlifeextensionsreflectsthecontroversyaroundelectricityplanningandtheimplementationoftheenergytransition.Despiteannouncementsandtargets,manypoliciesdonotcometofruition.Box1outlinesthreedriversforthisgapbetweenpolicyandimplementation.OverviewoftheSouthAfricaJETPIPandComparisonwiththeIndonesianContextThissectiondescribesthekeyfeaturesandchallengesofSouthAfrica’sJETPIPandidentifieskeysimilaritiesanddifferenceswiththeIndonesiancontext.BudgetAllocationsandPrioritySectorsSouthAfricacreatedtheJETPIPtodefineitsprimaryinvestmentneedsinthefieldsofelectricity,new-energyvehicles,andgreenhydrogenforthenext5yearstosupporttheobjectivesofenergysecurity,economicgrowth,andjusttransition.TheJETPIPalsohighlightsinitiativesrelatedtotheelectricitysector’stransitionintheMpumalangaProvince,aswellasoutliningtwocrucialcross-cuttingpriorities(skillsdevelopmentandmunicipalcapacity).TheJETPIPestimatesthattotalinvestmentintheidentifiedsectorsisUSD98.7billion.Itshouldbenoted,therefore,thattheIPG’spledgeofUSD8.5billioncannotfundalltheinvestmentslisted.Instead,themostcatalyticprogramsandprojectsthatarereadytobeimplementedintheJETIP’sportfolioofneedsshouldbeprioritized.Inaddition,thereisaneedforadditionalfundingtoimplementalltheidentifiedactions.IISD.org7WhatCanIndonesiaLearnfromSouthAfrica’sExperienceoftheJustEnergyTransitionProcess?Tables1and2showthetotalJETIPfundingrequirementspersectorforthenext5years,aswellastheindicativeallocationofthepledgedUSD8.5billion.Table1.SouthAfricaJETIPfundingrequirementspersector,2023–2027Fundingrequirements2023–2027ZARbillion(USDbillion)Electricitysector711.4(47.2)Newenergyvehiclesector128.1(8.5)Greenhydrogensector319(21.2)Skillsdevelopment2.7(0.18)Municipalcapacity319.1(21.3)TOTAL1,480(98.7)Source:ThePresidency,RepublicofSouthAfrica,2022.AsTables1and2show,highpriorityisgiventotheelectricitysector,whichtakesup48%ofthetotalbudgetallocation.Theprimaryinvestmentareasforinfrastructureintheelectricitysectorareasfollows:•tohandlethedecommissioningoftheretiringcoalgenerationfleetinaccordancewiththerevisedIntegratedResourcePlanwhilesimultaneouslyimplementingtherapidandlarge-scalegenerationofrenewableenergy;•topromptlyenhancethetransmissiongridinfrastructuretoaccommodatethetransitiontorenewableenergy;•toupdateandmodernizetheelectricitydistributionsystem.Table2showsthatover73%ofthebudgetforelectricitygoestowardnewsolarPVandnewwind,whileabout20%ofthebudgetgoestotransmission.Table2.SouthAfricanationalelectricitysector’sinfrastructureinvestmentneeds,2023–2027Nationalelectricitysector’sinfrastructureinvestmentneedsZARbillionCoalplantdecommissioning4.1Transmission131.8Distribution13.8NewsolarPV233.2Newwind241.7Newbatteries23.1TOTAL1,480(98.7)Source:ThePresidency,RepublicofSouthAfrica,2022.IISD.org8WhatCanIndonesiaLearnfromSouthAfrica’sExperienceoftheJustEnergyTransitionProcess?TheImportanceofUpgradingtheTransmissionGridTheSouthAfricaJETPIPallocatesZAR647.7billion(35.4USDbillion)toelectricityinfrastructure,or48%ofthetotalJETPinvestmentneedsofZAR1,480billion(USD98.7billion).Around20%oftheinfrastructurefundisallocatedforthedevelopmentoftransmissionsystem.SouthAfrica’selectricitylandscapeoperatessimilarlytoIndonesia’sintermsofthestrongpresenceofthegovernment,whereitsstateutilitycompany,Eskom,controlsthesupplychainfromgenerationtodistributionandisthesolebuyerofpower.However,recentregulatorychangeshavegraduallyerodedthismonopoly.Forexample,independentgeneratorsarenowpermittedtodevelopprojectsandselloutputdirectlythroughtheEskom-ownedpowernetworktolargeconsumers.Since2019thePresidentofSouthAfrica,CyrilRamaphosamandatedthesplitofEskomintothreedivisions:generation,transmissionanddistribution(Paton,2019).Thismove,partoflargerreformefforts,willspreadthecontroloverthethreefunctionsandmaycreateopportunitiestoaccelerategridstrengtheningandupgrade.However,implementationremainsdifficultandcontroversial.Intermsoftransmission,thetwocountries’situationsaresomewhatcomparable.SouthAfrica’stransmissioninfrastructurelacksthecapacitytoacceptelectricity,especiallyfromthenewrenewableenergypowerplants.Indonesiaalsourgentlyneedstoupgradeitsoutdatedtransmissionsystemtoadapttotheflexiblenatureoftheincreasedshareofrenewablesinthegrid.TransformingIndonesia’selectricitytransmissionsystemiscriticaltoensuringthereliabilityofpowersupplyfromrenewablesources:therefore,theJETPIPcouldbeakeyopportunitytoraiseambitionsinthisarea.Currently,Java–BaliistheonlyinterconnectedgridsysteminIndonesia,withothersystemsremainingisolated.Indonesiaaspirestocompletetheinterconnectionofallmajorislandstobefollowedbyinter-islandpowergridconnectionasstatedintheGrandStrategyofEnergy(NationalEnergyCouncil,2022).However,thefeasibilityoftheplanremainsquestionableduetothelengthyplanninganddevelopmenttimesandcapital-intensivenatureofinterconnectionprojects.ItwillbeevenmorechallengingifitistobeadoptedaspartofJETP.ThebrieftimewindowofJETP(only3to5years)demandsquickwinstobeincludedintheprojectpipeline.Onlycertaintransmissionprojectsarelikelytomeetthecriteria,suchasanupgradeoranexpansionofexistingsystemsoraconnectionbetweentwosystemsliketheongoingJava–Baliconnectionproject.Generally,ittakesaround10yearstobuildagreenfieldtransmissionline.Thiscaneventakelongerconsideringthetime-to-builddelays.Thecurrenttransmissionplanisstillnotinlinewiththeambitiontohaveinterconnectedgridsystemsthataredesirableforanincreasedshareofvariablerenewableenergy.IntheNationalElectricityCompany(PerusahaanListrikNegara/PLN)’scurrentbusinessplan(NationalElectricitySupplyBusinessPlan/RencanaUsahaPenyediaanTenagaListrik/RUPTL2021–2030),PLNplanstobuild1.4timesthecurrenttransmissionlines’lengthand2.2timesthecurrentcapacityofmainsubstationsbetween2021and2030(PLN,2021)Thisnumberisbasedontheobjectiveofbuildingreliabletransmissionsystemsthatconnectlocallyavailableenergysourceswithdemand,minimizingtheneedforaninterconnectedgrid.WithahigherIISD.org9WhatCanIndonesiaLearnfromSouthAfrica’sExperienceoftheJustEnergyTransitionProcess?targetofrenewableenergy,asagreedinJETP,PLNneedstobuildmorethanwhatithasalreadyplanned.Onepotentialbarriertoexpansionisthecurrentownershipstructure.ThecurrentsystemisownedandoperatedbyPLN,allowinglittleroomforprivatesectorparticipation.GridimprovementwillrequirealargeamountofinvestmentthatPLNneedstorecover.ThedevelopmentofNusantaraGridwillneedinvestmentofUSD100billionuntil2050(InstituteforEssentialServicesReform[IESR]etal.,2021)whichdoesnotincludeinter-islandconnectivity(Guitarra,2022).PLN’ssmart-gridprogram,aimedatimprovingtheefficiencyandproductivityofthegrid,requirescapitalexpendituresofuptoIDR25trillion(aroundUSD1.7billion)inthefirstphase.Thesecondphase,whichfocusesonresilience,customerengagement,sustainability,andself-healing,willrequirecapitalexpenditureofuptoIDR50trillion(aroundUSD3.4billion)(Arifin,2021).ThetotalinvestmentofUSD5billionisalmostsixtimesPLN’snetprofitofUSD887millionin2021.Deliveringthesevolumesofinvestmentwillrequireinnovation.Overall,themovesinSouthAfricatoprioritizethedevelopmentofthetransmissionnetworkalongsideinstitutionalreformstoenableadditionalmodelsofownershipandinvestmentshouldbeincludedinpolicy-makingdiscussionsinIndonesia.FocusonCoal-DependentRegionsSouthAfrica’sJETPIPputsanemphasisonjusttransitionmeasuresinitscoal-dependentprovince,Mpumalanga,whichaccountsformorethan80%ofthecountry’scoalproduction.Transitioningintocleanenergywillaffectaround90,000peopleemployedinthecoalminesandpowerplantsinthisregion,moreemployeesinthecoalsupplychainandservices,localcommunitiesaffectedbythecoalphaseout,andsmallandmedium-sizedenterprises,aswellaspeopleself-employedeitherformalorinformallyincoal-relatedbusinesses.Mpumalangaishometo12ofEskom’s15CFPPs,includingthelargestCFPPinthecountry,KusilePowerPlant.Afterstartingoperationin2017,Kusile’slasttwounitswillbecompletedin2024,foratotalcapacityof4,800MW.Meanwhile,EastKalimantan,thelargestcoal-producingprovinceofIndonesia,has21CFPPsthatsuppliedmorethan45%oftheprovince’selectricityin2022(EastKalimantanProvincialGovernment,2023).ThelargestCFPPsaremostlylocatedonJavaisland,hometo55%ofIndonesia’spopulation.Tolowertheshareofcoalinpowerproduction(andhenceincreaserenewableenergy’sshareoftheenergymix),PLNplannedtoretireoldandinefficientCFPPsinJavaandSumatra,withatotalcapacityofaround4.8GW.Evenwiththisgoal,itwillnotmeettheJETP’stargetofreaching34%ofrenewableenergyshareby2030.TomeettheJETPtarget,IndonesiashouldconsidercancellingallCFPPscurrentlyinRUPTL’spipeline(2.9GW),retiremoreCFPPs(includingthoseownedbyindependentpowerproducersandcaptiveplantsupto8.2GW),andreplacethelostcoalcapacitywithrenewableenergy(IESR,2023).Indonesiahasbeentheworld’slargestexporterofcoalsince2005,withtotalproductionof687milliontonnesin2022,ofwhich72%(494milliontonnes)wasexported(MinistryofEnergyandMineralResources,2023a),mainlytoChina,India,Japan,andSouthKoreaIISD.org10WhatCanIndonesiaLearnfromSouthAfrica’sExperienceoftheJustEnergyTransitionProcess?(Kusnandar,2022).Thelucrativecoalmarketofthepast2yearsboostedthestate’snon-taxrevenuefromthemineralsandminingsectortorecordlevels:IDR124.4trillionin2021(Syahputra,2022)andIDR183.35trillionin2022,around25%ofthetotalnon-taxrevenue(MinistryofFinance,2023).Morethan80%ofthenon-taxrevenueisfromcoalroyaltiesalone(Julian,2023).In2022,theminingsectorhad244,945localemployeesand5,355foreigneremployees(MinistryofEnergyandMineralResources,2023b).Coalphase-outwillaffectregionsthathaveahighdependenceoncoal.Forexample,SangattaMineandPaserMine,whichhavebeenincommercialoperationsince1992and1993,respectively,havecreatedeconomicdependenceforthelocalpeople,notonlyintheimmediateareabutalsoinneighbouringregionswithinterlinkedsupplychains.Indonesia’scomplexrelationshipwithcoalcallsforthetransitiontobecarefullymanagedtopreventdetrimentalsocio-economicimpacts.Tobeabletotransitionawayfromcoaltorenewableenergy,moreattentionneedstobegiventojusttransitionaspectsinbothcoal-producingandcoal-reliantregions.Inadditiontodirectandindirectemployeesoftheoverallcoalvaluechain,localcommunitiesmoregenerallyneedtobeactivelyengagedindecisionmakingovertheclosureofcoalminesandretirementofCFPPs.AkeylessonfromtheexperienceinSouthAfricaisthatamechanismisneededtomakesurethatlocalcommunitiesareconsultedfirstbeforedecidingontheinvestmentplanandtomakesuretofacilitatedirectandmeaningfulinputontheinvestmentplanfromthelocalcommunity.ThesocialjusticeelementisimportantbecausethatiswhatsetsJETPapartfrompreviousfinancingcooperation.Itemphasizesthejusticeelement,notmerelyfocusingonthemeasureoftonnesofCO2equivalent(Kramer,2022).TheFinancialMechanismIndonesiashouldconsiderthefinancingprinciplessetoutintheSouthAfricaJETPIPwhiledevelopingitsownapproach.Theseprinciplesinclude,amongothers,technologytransfer,additionality,andmainstreamingofjusttransitioncomponents.AccountingfortheseprincipleswillensurethequalityofJETPfinancewhileatthesametimeaddressingfinancingimpedimentstoIndonesia’senergytransitionefforts,suchasthelackofbankableandsizableprojectsandthehighcostoffunds.MorestrategiesneedtobedevelopedtoovercomeoutstandingissuesthathamperIndonesia’srenewableenergydevelopment,includingfossilfuelsubsidiesandlocalcontentrequirements.Itiscriticaltodevelopfinancingprinciplesthatstrikeabalancebetweenensuringcredibilityofsupportedprojectsandprogramsandprotectingnationalinterests.JETPIPfinanceshouldalsoconsiderUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChangeprinciplesthatnotonlyfocusonthefinancingitselfbutalsooffersbroadersupportstobuildcapacityandensuretechnologyandskillstransfertoimproveIndonesia’sclimateresponseconsideringitscapabilities,nationalcircumstances,andpriorities.Financeshouldalsobeadditionaltoexistingcommitmentsandavoidrelabellingofongoing,planned,andcommittedsupports.OnecriticismoftheSouthAfricanJETPhasbeenthedifficultyinclearlydistinguishinghowmuchofitisgenuinelyadditional.IISD.org11WhatCanIndonesiaLearnfromSouthAfrica’sExperienceoftheJustEnergyTransitionProcess?WhiletheIPGandIndonesiahaveagreedtosplitthetotalcommitmentsinto50%privatefundingand50%publicfunding,thesplitsbetweengrantsandconcessionalloansstillneedtobeagreedontoreflecttheenormousfinancingneedstoimplementjusttransitionmeasures.InSouthAfrica’sJETPIP,grantsandtechnicalassistancemakeupatinypercentage(slightlybelow4%),whileconcessionalloansmakeupthemajorityofthecommitment(63%),followedbycommercialloansandguarantees(18%and15%,respectively).Bothpartiesalsoneedtomakesurethatfinancingcomesintheformofconcessionalloansandavoidsmoreexpensivecommercialloans,somethingthatisseenasabarriertorenewableenergydevelopmentinIndonesia.IndonesiashouldalsofollowSouthAfricainrequiringmoreadvantageousrisk-sharingarrangements,includingprovidingdebtinlocalcurrencyandlimitingtheuseofgovernmentguarantees.Anotherimportantfinancingissuetobeconsideredisthatfinancingforjusttransitioncomponents,whichaddresstheimpactsonlivelihoods,localgovernments,andsmallbusinesses,shallbemainstreamedandintegratedintoallJETIPprogramsandprojects.InSouthAfrica’scase,thesocialcomponentreceivesaround26%oftotalfundingandthelargerportion(74%)goestowardinfrastructuredevelopment.Privatefundingwillnaturallypreferinvestmentwithtangiblereturns,suchasinfrastructure,butthisshouldbeaccompaniedwithjusttransitioncomponents.Publicfunding,includinggrants,willbeusedasseedfundingandwillhelppreparethesocialfoundationforjusttransition.Recognizingtheimportanceofthis,itdeservestoreceiveahigherportionoffunding.SouthAfricamakesinvestmentintransmissionanddistributionsystemsaprioritythatshouldbetackledfirst.Meanwhileinvestmentinrenewableenergysupplyissetasthelastoftheinvestmentsequencing(Figure2).SouthAfricastartedtheRenewableEnergyIndependentPowerProducersProgramin2011andintroducedrenewableenergyauctionschemestoincreasepowercapacitythroughprivatesectorinvestment,mostlyinrenewableenergy.Theauctionschemehasmanagedtoreducethepriceofrenewables,notablysolarPVandwind,by75%forPVand54%foronshorewind,injustthreeroundsofauctions,orabout4years(Kitzingetal.,2022).Withalotofprojectsinthepipeline,itisunderstandablethatinvestmentonrenewableenergysupplyisplacedlastininvestmentsequencing.AkeydifferencebetweenSouthAfricaandIndonesiaisthattherenewablesindustryinSouthAfricaissignificantlymoremature,duetoalongerhistoryofdeploymentandprocurement.Indonesiahasnotyetarrivedatthepointofcheaprenewables,althoughitseemsthatauctionsonfloatingsolarPVprojectshavemanagedtolowerthepricetoUSD0.0368/kWh,thelowestinthecountry’shistory(Christianetal.,2021).Also,thecurrentshareofrenewableenergy(10.4%in2022)meansthatitisstillstrugglingtoachieveitsownrenewableenergytargetof23%by2030,letalone34%.Atthesametime,transmissionwilltakealongtimetobuildandneedstobeprioritized.Withthesechallenges,Indonesianeedstobeextracautiousinselectinginvestmentprioritiesandsequencing.IISD.org12WhatCanIndonesiaLearnfromSouthAfrica’sExperienceoftheJustEnergyTransitionProcess?Figure2.InvestmentsequencingofSouthAfrica’sJETPSource:ThePresidency,RepublicofSouthAfrica,2022.RecommendationsforIndonesia’sJETPProcess1.SelectProjectstoBeIncludedintheJETPIPCarefullyandBeAbletoDemonstrateResultsBothIndonesiaandSouthAfricaneedtoanswerthechallengesindeliveringenergytransitionresultswithintheJETPperiodofbetween3and5years.ProgramsandprojectsthatareeligibletobeincludedinJETPneedtobecarefullyselectedtobeabletoshowprogresswithinshortperiodoftimedespitetheirlong-termcharacteristics.Infrastructureprojects,notablypowertransmissionprojects,havetime-to-builddelaysthatneedtobetakenintoaccount.2.AgreeonaStrongEnergyPolicyThatBindsthePowerSectorinIndonesiatotheCoalPhase-OutPlanasLaidOutintheJETPIPSouthAfrica’senergycrisisandtheongoingdebatesaroundpotentialdelaysshuttingdowncoalpowerplants(Sguazzin&Burkhardt,2023)maylookabitdifferentfromIndonesia.Indonesiahasbeenexperiencingoversupplyinelectricitysince2020,especiallyinJava,Bali,andSumatera(NationalEnergyCouncil,2022).However,delayingcoalphase-outisalsounlikelytohappenifastrongpolicythatbindsPLNandIPPsisabsent.Indonesia’senergyplanningandpolicyarevulnerabletoglobalgeopoliticalchange,asevidencedbytheeffectsofRussia’sinvasionofUkraineonnationalenergypoliciesaroundtheworld.GlobalfossilenergypriceshavedrivenIndonesia’sdomesticenergypolicytorespondtothemarketbyincreasingproductiontargets,asevidencedinvariousgovernmentplanningdocuments,includingMEMR’sstrategicplan.Thechallengeishowtomakepolicymorealignedwithlong-termplanningandthecommitmenttothetransitionfromcoal.PLN’sinternalplanstograduallyshutdowncoalplants,startingwith6.17GWofCFPPsinJavaandSumatraby2030(Setiawan,2022)areagoodsign,indicatingthatperhapstherewillbefewerdifficultieswhenitcomestoimplementation.However,theSouthAfricanexampleshowsthatifkeyactorsarenotalignedwiththeagreedtargetsandplans,implementationmaybeachallenge.Forthedevelopmentoftransmissionsystems,thereisabiggapbetweenwhatPLNhasplannedinits2021–2030businessplan(RUPTL)andtheneedtobuildmoretransmissionsystemsthatareinterconnectedandmoderntosupportmorevariablerenewableenergycomingintothesystem.Currently,PLNplanstobuild1.4timesthecurrentlengthoftransmissionlinesand2.3timesthecurrentcapacityofsubstationsby2030.ForenergyTransmissiongridandmunicipaldistributioninfrastructureDecompositionandrepurposingofcoalassetsSocialfoundationsplanningandcommunitysupportIncreasingthesupplyofRE;foundationforEVandGH2sectordevelopmentIISD.org13WhatCanIndonesiaLearnfromSouthAfrica’sExperienceoftheJustEnergyTransitionProcess?transitiontomaterialize,PLNneedstomultiplythespeedandfinancialcapabilitytobuildevenmoretransmissioncapacitythanithasalreadyplanned.Thiscanonlybeachievedwithprivatesectorsupportandattractiveprofit-sharingmechanismsthatworkforthebusinessmodelsofbothPLNandprivatecompanies.TheSouthAfricanJETPIPallocates20%ofitselectricityinfrastructurefundstogridinvestment.IndonesiashouldconsideradoptingasimilarapproachforitsIP.3.FocusClearlyontheSocialImpactsofJETPItneedstobeemphasizedagainthatJETPisnotsimplyaninfrastructurefinancepackage.Italsoaimstoaddressthesocialimpactsofthecleanenergytransition,andassuch,shouldbestructuredtoprioritizeprojects’socialbenefits:employment,supporttolocaleconomies,andthebestuseofresources.Supportforcoal-dependentregionssuchasEastKalimantanshouldbewellplannedandfocusonpeopleandcommunitiesbeyondworkersandpotentialrepurposeofcoalminesandplants.Thesupportshouldalsoensurethattheprocessisparticipatory,transparent,andprotectivetowardsmarginalizedcommunities.Inpractice,thiscouldmeanthatprojectscanreceivemoregenerousfinancialsupportiftheyareaddressingenergyaccessbarriers,arelocatedinformercoal-producingregions,orarelinkedtocommunityenergyschemes.Projectsthatmakeuseofexistinginfrastructure—likerepurposingofgridinfrastructurenearformercoalplantstohostnewrenewableenergygeneration—couldalsobesingledoutforsupport.Finally,projectsthatavoidtheuseofscarceresources,suchasagriculturalland,couldalsobeprioritized,forexample,throughthedeploymentofsolarPVonwarehouseroofsandabovecarparks.WhiletheJETPisafantasticopportunitytorethinktheenergysystem,theupcoming6-monthperiodtodevelopthecomprehensiveinvestmentplanwillbecriticalforthesuccessofIndonesia’senergytransition.Withoutseriousreformstoremovestructuralbarrierstorenewableenergydeployment,thedealwillnotsucceed,and,withoutamethodforbalancingthesocialandeconomicbenefitsofprojects,thetransitionmaynotbeas“just”asintended.OneofthehighlightedissuesintheSouthAfricanJETPprocessishowthegovernmentseemstoneglectthehardworkofnegotiatingwiththelabourunions,whichunderstandablyresultedinconcernsandpushbackfromthelocalcommunitieswhoselivelihoodsdependoncoalminingandcoalpowerplants.Therefore,Indonesianeedstoensurethatinputfromcivilsociety,affectedcommunities,andtheresearchcommunityaretakenintoaccount—itisessentialtoaddressconcernsandavoidpotentialpitfalls.4.SeizetheOpportunityoftheJETPIPandUsePublicFundstoLeveragePrivateInvestmentTheSouthAfricanJETPIPservesasablueprintfortheentireenergytransitionroadmap.ItidentifiesthefinancialrequirementsofUSD98.7billionoverthenext5years,tocomefrombothpublicandprivatesectors,andthattheUSD8.5billionpledgedundertheJETPdealisjustonefundingsourcetocarryouttheentiresectortransformation.Indonesiaisinthesamesituation.TheUSD20billionpledgedintheJETPdealaccountsforonlyasmallpercentageofthetotalfundingrequiredtodeliverajustenergytransition.Differentestimatesoftheactualneedforenergytransformationaremuchhigher—roughlyIISD.org14WhatCanIndonesiaLearnfromSouthAfrica’sExperienceoftheJustEnergyTransitionProcess?USD240billiontoreduceemissionsby2030(MinistryofFinanceestimate)(Sukarno,2022),orUSD22billion/year(IESRetal.,2021),orUSD1trillionuntil2060(MinistryofEnergyandMineralResources,2022).ThereforeIndonesiashouldreplicateSouthAfrica’sefforttocomeupwiththetotalnumbersforrequiredfinance,andincludethisintheJETPIP.Thiswouldserveasaguidanceforhowmuchfinancingshouldberaisedandhowtobestprioritizetheprojects.Indonesiashouldcarefullyallocatepublicfinancetoleveragemaximumprivateinvestment.LimitedfiscalspaceshouldnotbeanexcuseforalackofpublicfundingtosupportenergytransitionwhenIndonesiacontinuesspendinglavishlyonfossilfuelsubsidies.In2022,thesesubsidiesreachedarecordIDR551.2trillion(USD37billion(Kristianus,2023),whichcouldhavebeendivertedtodevelopmentpriorities,includingenergytransitionmeasures.5.MitigateRiskandEnsureSmoothImplementationoftheJETPbyPrioritizingtheAchievementofaBroadConsensusAcrossGovernmentAmongthechallengesSouthAfricaisfacingintheimplementationofJETParevestedinterestsandagrowingwidespreadsupportforcoal.Thereisatrendofexploitingthecurrentenergycrisisasanargumenttoextendandexpandthelifetimeofcoaloperations.Onecrucialfactorcontributingtothisdilemmaisthelackofagreementwithinthegovernmentitself.Theabsenceofaunifiedstancebetweenthegovernmententitiesinvolvedhascauseddiscord,leadingtoconflictingpoliciesandobjectives.TopreventthesamescenariofromhappeninginIndonesia,itshouldbeaprioritytoachieveabroadconsensusacrossthegovernment,especiallyamongthelineministriesresponsibleforexecutingtheprogramsthatfallundertheJETP’sscope.Byfosteringagreementandalignmentamongthesekeystakeholders,theissuesofcoalretirementcanbeproactivelyaddressedandthecountrycanchartacoherentpathtowardsustainableenergyalternatives.6.TranslatetheCommitmenttoJETPIntoLegislationJETPisdesignedtobeamultiyeardeal,andtheUSD20billionpledgedatCOP27wasjustthefirstphaseoffunding.Toensurethecountry’scommitmenttodecarbonizationandcoalphase-outwillcontinuethroughoutmultipleadministrations,itshouldbetranslatedintolegislationsimilartoUUNo.17/2004ontheKyotoProtocolandUUNo16/2016ontheParisAgreement.AnotheralternativeistoissueapresidentialmandatethatregulatesthegoverningbodyoftheIndonesianJETPtocarryoutitstaskuntilapredeterminedperiod.IISD.org15WhatCanIndonesiaLearnfromSouthAfrica’sExperienceoftheJustEnergyTransitionProcess?ReferencesArifin,Z.(2021,June22).SmartgriddevelopmentinIndonesia.https://www.reinvestindonesia.com/assets/source/materials/japan/Zainal%20Arifin%20Session%203.pdfChristian,J.,Prasojo,H.,Tampubolon,A.P.,Kurniawan,D.,Arinaldo,D.,Marciano,I.,&Simamora,P.(2021).Indonesiaenergytransitionoutlook(IETO)2021.InstituteforEssentialServicesReform.https://iesr.or.id/en/pustaka/indonesia-energy-transition-outlook-ieto-2021EastKalimantanProvincialGovernment.(2023).Potensipertambangandanmigas[Dataset].https://kaltimprov.go.id/halaman/potensi-pertambangan-dan-migasEuropeanCommission.(2022).SouthAfricaJustEnergyTransitionInvestmentPlan[Text].https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_22_6664Guitarra,P.(2022,February16).Bikinkantongjebol,transmisilistrikterbukauntukswasta.CNBC.https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20220216121507-4-315783/bikin-kantong-jebol-transmisi-listrik-terbuka-untuk-swastaHalsey,R.(2022).Justtransitionfinanceproposalneedsbettertransparency.BusinessLIVE.https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2022-09-07-richard-halsey-just-transition-finance-proposal-needs-better-transparency/InstituteforEssentialServicesReform.(2023,May31).Possibleinterventionoptionstoreduceenergysectoremissions.https://iesr.or.id/en/tag/pensiun-dini-pltu-enInstituteforEssentialServicesReform,AgoraEnergiewende,&LappeenrantaUniversityofTechnology.(2021).DeepdecarbonizationofIndonesia’senergysystem:Apathwaytozeroemissionsby2050.https://iesr.or.id/en/pustaka/deep-decarbonization-of-indonesias-energy-system-a-pathway-to-zero-emissions-by-2050Julian,M.(2023,February1).DirjenMinerba:80%PNBPMinerbapada2022berasaldariroyaltibatubara.KONTAN.Kitzing,L.,Siddique,M.B.,Nygaard,I.,&Kruger,W.(2022).Worththewait:HowSouthAfrica’srenewableenergyauctionsperformcomparedtoEurope’sleadingcountries.EnergyPolicy,166,Article112999.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2022.112999Kramer,K.(2022,December7).Justenergytransition.InternationalInstituteforSustainableDevelopment.https://www.iisd.org/articles/insight/just-energy-transition-partnershipsKristianus,A.(2023,January3).Tembuspagu,realisasisubsididankompensasienergiRp551,2triliun.BeritaSatu.https://www.beritasatu.com/ekonomi/1014663/tembus-pagu-realisasi-subsidi-dan-kompensasi-energi-rp-5512-triliunKusnandar,V.B.(2022,December8).IninegaratujuaneksporbatubaraIndonesia.Katadata.https://databoks.katadata.co.id/datapublish/2022/12/08/ini-negara-tujuan-ekspor-batu-bara-indonesiaKusuma,N.(2023,March2).WhatisJustEnergyTransitionPartnerships?GreenNetworkAsia.https://greennetwork.asia/news/what-is-just-energy-transition-partnerships/IISD.org16WhatCanIndonesiaLearnfromSouthAfrica’sExperienceoftheJustEnergyTransitionProcess?MinistryofEnergyandMineralResources.(2022,September1).Transisienergibutuhbiayabesar,pemerintahajakpebisnisinvestasi.MinistryofEnergyandMineralResources.(2023a).MinerbaOneDataIndonesia:Realisasiproduksidanpenjualanbatubara[Dataset].https://modi.esdm.go.id/produksi-batubaraMinistryofEnergyandMineralResources.(2023b,January31).InvestasidanPNBPsubsektormineraldanbatubaratahun2022melampauitarget.https://www.minerba.esdm.go.id/berita/minerba/detil/20230131-investasi-dan-pnbp-subsektor-mineral-dan-batubara-tahun-2022-melampaui-targetMinistryofFinance.(2023,January4).Menkeu:Kinerjapenerimaannegaraluarbiasaduatahunberturut-turut.MinistryofFinance.https://www.kemenkeu.go.id/informasi-publik/publikasi/berita-utama/Kinerja-Penerimaan-Negara-Luar-BiasaNationalEnergyCouncil.(2022).Indonesia’sNationalGrandStrategyforEnergy.Paton,C.(2019,February8).Eskomtobesplitintothreeentities.BusinessLiveSouthAfrica.https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2019-02-08-eskom-to-be-split-into-three-entities/PerusahaanListrikNegara.(2021).RencanaUmumPenyediaanTenagaListrik2021-2030.https://web.pln.co.id/statics/uploads/2021/10/ruptl-2021-2030.pdfPresidentialClimateFinanceTaskTeam&InternationalPartnersGroup.(2022a,June21).Six-monthupdateonprogressinadvancingtheJustEnergyTransitionPartnership(JETP).UNClimateChangeConference(COP26),Glasgow2021.https://ukcop26.org/six-month-update-on-progress-in-advancing-the-just-energy-transition-partnership-jetp/PresidentialClimateFinanceTaskTeam&InternationalPartnersGroup.(2022b,November10).12-monthupdateonprogressinadvancingtheJustEnergyTransitionPartnership(JETP).UNClimateChangeConference(COP26),Glasgow2021.https://ukcop26.org/12-month-update-on-progress-in-advancing-the-just-energy-transition-partnership-jetp/ThePresidency,RepublicofSouthAfrica.(2022).SouthAfrica’sJustEnergyTransitionInvestmentPlan(JETIP).https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/download/file/fid/2649ThePresidency,RepublicofSouthAfrica.(2023).UpdateonEnergyActionPlan—January2023.https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/content/update-energy-action-plan-january-2023Proctor,D.(2023,March1).SouthAfricaenergycrisisatcriticalstageasload-sheddingco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