石油2023—分析和预测至2028（英文版）--IEAVIP专享VIP免费

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Oil

2023

Analysis and forecast to 2028

The IEA examines the

full spectrum

of energy issues

including oil, gas and

coal supply and

demand, renewable

energy technologies,

electricity markets,

energy efficiency,

access to energy,

demand side

management and

much more. Through

its work, the IEA

advocates policies

that will enhance the

reliability, affordability

and sustainability of

energy in its

31 member countries,

11 association

countries and beyond.

Please note that this

publication is subject to

specific restrictions that limit

its use and distribution. The

terms and conditions are

available online at

www.iea.org/t&c/

This publication and any

map included herein are

without prejudice to the

status of or sovereignty over

any territory, to the

delimitation of international

frontiers and boundaries and

to the name of any territory,

city or area.

Source: IEA. All rights

reserved.

International Energy Agency

Website: www.iea.org

IEA member

countries:

Australia

Austria

Belgium

Canada

Czech Republic

Denmark

Estonia

Finland

France

Germany

Greece

Hungary

Ireland

Italy

Japan

Korea

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Mexico

Netherlands

New Zealand

Norway

Poland

Portugal

Slovak Republic

Spain

Sweden

Switzerland

Republic of Türkiye

United Kingdom

United States

The European

Commission also

participates in the

work of the IEA

IEA association

countries:

INTERNATIONAL ENERGY

AGENCY

Argentina

Brazil

China

Egypt

India

Indonesia

Morocco

Singapore

South Africa

Thailand

Ukraine

Oil 2023 Abstract

PAGE | 3

I EA. CC BY 4.0.

Abstract

The global energy crisis has moved energy security to the fore of the international

policy agenda and boosted the momentum behind the deployment of clean energy

technologies. Investment in clean energy is accelerating at a faster rate than for

fossil fuels, helping bring peak oil demand into view. Oil 2023, the IEA’s

medium-term outlook, provides a comprehensive overview of evolving oil supply

and demand dynamics through to 2028. The report examines how a stronger drive

by governments towards a low-emissions future and changes in behaviour will

impact oil market fundamentals in the coming years. Oil 2023 explores some of

the challenges and uncertainties that lie ahead, including upstream investment,

sources of new supply growth, spare capacity and shifting patterns of oil demand.

It also provides insights as to how these changing dynamics will affect refining and

trade flows.

/127

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Oil2023Analysisandforecastto2028TheIEAexaminesthefullspectrumofenergyissuesincludingoil,gasandcoalsupplyanddemand,renewableenergytechnologies,electricitymarkets,energyefficiency,accesstoenergy,demandsidemanagementandmuchmore.Throughitswork,theIEAadvocatespoliciesthatwillenhancethereliability,affordabilityandsustainabilityofenergyinits31membercountries,11associationcountriesandbeyond.Pleasenotethatthispublicationissubjecttospecificrestrictionsthatlimititsuseanddistribution.Thetermsandconditionsareavailableonlineatwww.iea.org/t&c/Thispublicationandanymapincludedhereinarewithoutprejudicetothestatusoforsovereigntyoveranyterritory,tothedelimitationofinternationalfrontiersandboundariesandtothenameofanyterritory,cityorarea.Source:IEA.Allrightsreserved.InternationalEnergyAgencyWebsite:www.iea.orgIEAmembercountries:AustraliaAustriaBelgiumCanadaCzechRepublicDenmarkEstoniaFinlandFranceGermanyGreeceHungaryIrelandItalyJapanKoreaLithuaniaLuxembourgMexicoNetherlandsNewZealandNorwayPolandPortugalSlovakRepublicSpainSwedenSwitzerlandRepublicofTürkiyeUnitedKingdomUnitedStatesTheEuropeanCommissionalsoparticipatesintheworkoftheIEAIEAassociationcountries:INTERNATIONALENERGYAGENCYArgentinaBrazilChinaEgyptIndiaIndonesiaMoroccoSingaporeSouthAfricaThailandUkraineOil2023AbstractPAGE3IEA.CCBY4.0.AbstractTheglobalenergycrisishasmovedenergysecuritytotheforeoftheinternationalpolicyagendaandboostedthemomentumbehindthedeploymentofcleanenergytechnologies.Investmentincleanenergyisacceleratingatafasterratethanforfossilfuels,helpingbringpeakoildemandintoview.Oil2023,theIEA’smedium-termoutlook,providesacomprehensiveoverviewofevolvingoilsupplyanddemanddynamicsthroughto2028.Thereportexamineshowastrongerdrivebygovernmentstowardsalow-emissionsfutureandchangesinbehaviourwillimpactoilmarketfundamentalsinthecomingyears.Oil2023exploressomeofthechallengesanduncertaintiesthatlieahead,includingupstreaminvestment,sourcesofnewsupplygrowth,sparecapacityandshiftingpatternsofoildemand.Italsoprovidesinsightsastohowthesechangingdynamicswillaffectrefiningandtradeflows.Oil2023Acknowledgements,contributorsandcreditsPAGE4IEA.CCBY4.0.Acknowledgements,contributorsandcreditsThispublicationwaspreparedbytheOilIndustryandMarketsDivisionoftheDirectorateofEnergyMarketsandSecurity.Theprincipalauthorsare,inalphabeticalorder,YuyaAkizuki,AlexanderBressers,JoelCouse,CiaránHealy,PegMackey,DavidMartin,JacobMessingandJennyThomson.JulienCanuandLuisFernandoRosaprovidedstatisticalsupportandessentialresearchassistance.TorilBosoni,headofOIMD,ledtheanalysisandeditedtheReport.KeisukeSadamori,directoroftheIEA’sDirectorateofEnergyMarketsandSecurity,providedexpertguidanceandadvice.DevenMooneesawmyprovidedessentialeditorialassistance.ThereportbenefitedgreatlyfromcontributionsfromotherexpertswithintheIEA,includingYasmineArsalane,AlessandroBlasi,LauraCozzi,PaoloFrankl,TimGould,PaulGrimal,JérômeHilaire,ChristopheMcGlade,JeremyMoorhouse,ApostolosPetropoulosandGianlucaTonolo.TheIEACommunicationsandDigitalOfficeprovidedproductionandlaunchsupport.ParticularthanksgotoJadMouawadandhisteam;AstridDumond,OliverJoy,JethroMullen,ThereseWalshandIsabelleNonain-Semelin.DianeMunroeditedthereport.Oil2023TableofcontentsPAGE5IEA.CCBY4.0.TableofcontentsExecutivesummary..................................................................................................................8Demand....................................................................................................................................11Globalsummary....................................................................................................................11Fundamentals.......................................................................................................................14Energytransitiongatherspace.............................................................................................17Petrochemicalspowerahead,Chinatakescentrestage.....................................................26Aviationandmarinedemandgrowthresumes.....................................................................30Demanddevelopmentsbyregion.........................................................................................33Supply......................................................................................................................................42Globalsummary....................................................................................................................42Investmentandexploration...................................................................................................47OPEC+supply.......................................................................................................................51Non-OPEC+supply...............................................................................................................65Refining...................................................................................................................................80Globalsummary....................................................................................................................80Refiningcapacity...................................................................................................................82Refiningindustryadaptstodemandchanges......................................................................86Regionaldevelopments........................................................................................................90Globaloiltrade.....................................................................................................................100Globalsummary..................................................................................................................100Crudeoilbalancesandtrade..............................................................................................102Productbalancesandtrade................................................................................................107Tables....................................................................................................................................112Abbreviationsandacronyms..............................................................................................124Unitsofmeasure.................................................................................................................125ListoffiguresAnnualoildemandgrowth,2022-2028...........................................................................................11Globalcumulativeoildemandgrowthbyfuel,2022-2028..............................................................12Impactofalternativeoilpriceforecastscenarios,2023-2028.........................................................17Cumulativetransportfuelsdemandgrowth,2022-2028.................................................................18NewEVsandimprovedefficiencywillavoid7.8mb/dofextraoildemand,2022-2028.................19GlobalannualEVsalesbycountry/region,2010-2028...................................................................20Oil2023TableofcontentsPAGE6IEA.CCBY4.0.Oiluseinpowergenerationbyregion,2022-2028.........................................................................22OECDandnon-OECDmobilityindexes,March2020toOctober2023..........................................24Estimatedteleworkingimpactonoildemand,2019-2028...............................................................25Worldoildemandandpetrochemicalsectorcontribution...............................................................27Annualolefinsoil-basedcapacitychange,(primaryoutput),2019-2028........................................28Annualchangeinoil-basedolefinsfeedstockusebyregionandbyproduct,2019-2028..............29Globalairtraffic,2019-2023(weekly)..............................................................................................30Internationalmarinebunkerdemand–impactofefficiencygains,2022-2028...............................32Globalcumulativeoildemandgrowthbyregion,2022-2028..........................................................33NorthAmericacumulativeoildemandgrowthbyproduct,2022-2028...........................................34GasolineversusdieselinEuropeanICEcarfleet,2006-2028.......................................................35Europecumulativeoildemandgrowthbyproduct,2022-2028.......................................................36Chinacumulativeoildemandgrowthbyproduct,2022-2028.........................................................37Indiacumulativeoildemandgrowthbyproduct,2022-2028...........................................................39Globaloilsupplycapacityanddemandforecast,year-on-yearchange,2022-2028......................42OPEC+sparecrudeoilproductioncapacity...................................................................................43Oilsupplychangesforselectcountriesfrom2022-2028................................................................46MiddleEastregainsmarketshareoverthemediumterm...............................................................47Globaloilandgasupstreamcapitalspending................................................................................48Oilandgascapitalspendingbyselectedcompanies.....................................................................48Conventionalproductionadditionsbysanctionyear.......................................................................49Conventionaldiscoverieshaveslowedmarkedlyoverthelastdecade..........................................50OPECcrudeoilproductioncapacitychange2023-2028................................................................52SaudiArabiaestimatedcrudeoilproductionandcapacity.............................................................53Iraq,UAEhelpdriveOPEC+supplygains......................................................................................54Kuwaitestimatedcrudeoilproductionandcapacity,2018-2028....................................................56Irancrudeoilproduction,1986-2028...............................................................................................57Russiaestimatedtotaloilsupply,2021-2028..................................................................................59OPEC+Africacrudeoilproductioncapacity(y-o-ychange)...........................................................61Libyaestimatedcrudeoilproductionandcapacity.........................................................................63Mexicototalproductionandcontributionbynewfields...................................................................64USgrowthexpectationsmoderatedbyshiftinginvestmentstrategies............................................66ProductivityincreaseshaveplateauedorreversedinkeyLTObasins..........................................67Canadianoilsupplybyproduct,2018-2028....................................................................................70WesternCanadianSedimentaryBasintakeawaycapacity.............................................................71BúziosandMerodriveBraziliangrowththroughthedecade..........................................................72GuyanagrowthdrivenbyrecentdiscoveriesintheStabroekblock...............................................73InvestmentsinNorwaydelaybutdonotoffsetNorthSeadecline..................................................75Asianoilsupplybycountry,2018-2028..........................................................................................77Africaoilproductionbycountry,2018-2028....................................................................................79Slowingdemandgrowthraisesriskoffurtherrefiningindustryclosures........................................80Refinedproductdemandgrowthcurtailedbycompetingsourcesofsupply...................................81Asiadominates2022-2028capacityexpansionsasAtlanticBasinclosuresdiminish...................82Afterthefirstfallin30yearsin2021,refiningcapacitygrowthrebounds.......................................83Netproductexportersdominaterefiningcapacitybuilding,2022-2028(mb/d)...............................84Firmandproposedrefinerycapacityadditions...............................................................................85Regionalandcountryrefinerythroughputs,2012-2028..................................................................86Changeinglobalrefiningyields,2022-2028...................................................................................88Recordrefiningmarginspostedin2022,especiallyforUSGulfCoast..........................................89ChinarefiningcapacityovertookUnitedStatesin2022,throughputsin2025...............................90Oil2023TableofcontentsPAGE7IEA.CCBY4.0.Mexicanrefinerycapacity,throughput,crudeproductionandexports............................................91OECDEuroperefinerycapacity,throughput,crudeimportsandproductexports..........................92Europeanrefinerythroughputsandfreeemissionallocations,2013-2022.....................................93North,WestandSouthandEastAfricanrefinerycrudethroughputandnetcrudeexports...........94Chinarefinerycapacity,throughput,netcrudeimports,andnetproductexports..........................96Indiarefinerycapacityandcruderuns,netcrudeimportandproductsexports.............................98Russianoilexports,January2022-May2023...............................................................................100Worldcrudeandcondensatebalancesbyregion,2019-2028......................................................101Sharesinuptakeofglobalvolumesfromnetcrudeexportingregions.........................................102Crudeoilbalancesbyregion,2012-2028.....................................................................................103Changeversus2022forcrudesurplusinAtlanticBasinbyregion...............................................105Changeversus2022forcrudesurplusEastofSuezbyregion....................................................106Worldgasolineandnaphthabalances,2022-2028.....................................................................109Worldmiddledistillatebalances(diesel,gasoil,jetfuelandkerosene),2022-2028.....................110Worldfueloilbalance,2022-2028.................................................................................................111ListofboxesHowgreenisthegrowth?................................................................................................................44Shalegrowthatriskfromlowerprices,highercosts.......................................................................68Biofuelstoprovide10%ofnewliquidfuelsupplygrowthto2028..................................................73Chinesepolicykeytobalancingglobalfuelmarkets.......................................................................97ListoftablesGlobaloildemandbyproduct(mb/d),2019-2028...........................................................................13Globaloildemandbyregion(mb/d),2019-2028.............................................................................14RealGDPgrowthassumptions.......................................................................................................15Oildemandbyproduct(mb/d):NorthAmerica,2019-2028............................................................34Oildemandbyproduct(mb/d):Europe,2019-2028........................................................................35Oildemandbyproduct(mb/d):AsiaPacific,2019-2028.................................................................36Oildemandbyproduct(mb/d):China,2019-2028..........................................................................37Oildemandbyproduct(mb/d):India,2019-2028............................................................................38Oildemandbyproduct(mb/d):CentralandSouthAmerica,2019-2028........................................39Oildemandbyproduct(mb/d):Africa,2019-2028..........................................................................40Oildemandbyproduct(mb/d):MiddleEast,2019-2028.................................................................40Oildemandbyproduct(mb/d):Eurasia,2019-2028.......................................................................41OPECcrudeoilproductioncapacity(mb/d)....................................................................................58TotalNon-OPEC+supply(mb/d)....................................................................................................65Regionalrefinerycapacityandutilisation2022-2028......................................................................83Oildemandandcallonrefinedproducts(mb/d),2022-2028..........................................................87MiddleEastrefinerycapacityexpansions(kb/d),2022-2028.........................................................95Oil2023ExecutivesummaryPAGE8IEA.CCBY4.0.ExecutivesummaryWorldoilmarketsresetGlobaloilmarketsaregraduallyrecalibratingafterthreeturbulentyearsinwhichtheywereupendedfirstbytheCovid-19pandemicandthenbytheRussianFederation’s(hereafter“Russia”)invasionofUkraine.Benchmarkcrudeoilpricesarebackbelowpre-warlevelsandrefinedproductcrackshavenowcomeoffall-timehighsafterrisingsuppliescoincidedwithamarkedslowdowninoildemandgrowthinadvancedeconomies.Moreover,anunprecedentedreshufflingofglobaltradeflowsandtwoconsecutiveemergencystockreleasesbyIEAmembercountriesin2022allowedindustryinventoriestorebuild,easingmarkettensions.WhilethemarketcouldsignificantlytighteninthecomingmonthsasOPEC+productioncutstempertheupswinginglobaloilsupplies,theoutlookimprovesoverour2022-28forecastperiod.Russia’sinvasionofUkrainesparkedasurgeinoilpricesandbroughtsecurityofsupplyconcernstothefore,helpingacceleratedeploymentofcleanenergytechnologies.Atthesametime,upstreaminvestmentsin2023areexpectedtoreachtotheirhighestlevelssince2015.Ourprojectionsassumemajoroilproducersmaintaintheirplanstobuildupcapacityevenasdemandgrowthslows.Aresultingsparecapacitycushionofatleast3.8mb/d,concentratedintheMiddleEast,shouldensurethatworldoilmarketsareadequatelysuppliedthroughoutourforecastperiod.Asalways,thereareanumberofriskstoourforecaststhatcouldaffectmarketbalancesoverthemediumterm.Uncertainglobaleconomicconditions,thedirectionofOPEC+decisionsandBeijing’srefiningindustrypolicywillplayacrucialroleinthebalancingofcrudeoilandproductmarkets.EnergycrisisacceleratestransitionawayfromoilBasedonexistingpolicysettings,growthinworldoildemandissettoslowmarkedlyduringthe2022-28forecastperiodastheenergytransitionadvances.Whileapeakinoildemandisonthehorizon,continuedincreasesinpetrochemicalfeedstockandairtravelmeansthatoverallconsumptioncontinuestogrowthroughouttheforecast.Weestimatethatglobaloildemandreaches105.7mb/din2028,up5.9mb/dcomparedwith2022levels.Crucially,however,demandforoilfromcombustiblefossilfuels–whichexcludesbiofuels,petrochemicalfeedstocksandothernon-energyuses-isoncoursetopeakat81.6mb/din2028,thefinalyearofourforecast.GrowthissettoreverseOil2023ExecutivesummaryPAGE9IEA.CCBY4.0.after2023forgasolineandafter2026fortransportfuelsoverall.Thesetrendsaretheresultofapivottowardslower-emissionsourcestriggeredbytheglobalenergycrisis,aswellaspolicyemphasisonenergyefficiencyimprovementsandtherapidgrowthinelectricvehicle(EV)sales.ThePeople’sRepublicofChina(hereafter“China”)wasthelastmajoreconomytoliftitsstringentCovid-19restrictionsattheendof2022,leadingtoapost-pandemicoildemandreboundinthefirsthalfof2023.ButdemandgrowthinChinaslowsmarkedlyfrom2024onwards,andglobaloildemandgrowthshrivelsfrom2.4mb/din2023tojust400kb/dby2028.Nevertheless,burgeoningpetrochemicaldemandandstrongconsumptiongrowthinemergingeconomieswillmorethanoffsetacontractioninadvancedeconomies.Fortotaloildemandtodeclinesooner,inlinewiththeIEA’sNetZeroEmissionsby2050Scenario(NZEScenario),additionalpolicymeasuresandbehaviouralchangeswouldberequired.Thepetrochemicalsectorwillremainthekeydriverofglobaloildemandgrowth,withliquifiedpetroleumgas(LPG),ethaneandnaphthaaccountingformorethan50%oftherisebetween2022and2028andnearly90%oftheincreasecomparedwithpre-pandemiclevels.Theaviationsectorwillexpandstronglyasairlinetravelreturnstonormalfollowingthereopeningofborders.Atthestartof2023,jetfueldemandwasstilllagging2019levelsbymorethan1mb/d,or13%.Itquicklyacceleratesandcontributesthehighestgrowthacrossallproductsovertheforecastperiod,increasingbyasubstantial2mb/d.However,efficiencyimprovementsandbehaviouralchangeswillslowthepaceofgrowthsoconsumptionwillonlysurpass2019levelsby2027.Non-OPEC+producersleadoilsupplycapacitygrowthGlobalupstreamoilandgasinvestmentisontracktoincreasebyanestimated11%in2023toUSD528billion,comparedwithUSD474billionin2022.Whiletheimpactofhigherspendingwillbepartlyoffsetbycostinflation,thislevelofinvestment,ifsustained,wouldbeadequatetomeetforecastdemandintheperiodcoveredbythereport.BasedonthecurrentpipelineofprojectsunderwayandUSlighttightoil(LTO)growthexpectations,wesee5.9mb/dofnetadditionalproductioncapacitybroughtonlineby2028.Despiteeasingfrom1.9mb/donaverageover2022-23tojust300kb/dby2028,newcapacitybuildingstillmovesinlinewithprojecteddemandgrowthovertheforecastperiod.OilproducingcountriesoutsidetheOPEC+alliance(non-OPEC+)dominatemedium-termcapacityexpansionplans,witha5.1mb/dsupplyboostledbytheUnitedStates,BrazilandGuyana.SaudiArabia,theUnitedArabEmirates(UAE)andIraqleadthecapacitybuildingwithinOPEC+,whileAfricanandAsianOil2023ExecutivesummaryPAGE10IEA.CCBY4.0.membersstrugglewithcontinuingdeclines,andRussianproductionfallsduetosanctions.Thismakesforanetcapacitygainof800kb/dfromthe23membersinOPEC+overall.Therelativelystrongincreasesfromnon-OPEC+producers,togetherwiththeprojectedslowdownindemandgrowth,temperstherequirementforOPEC+crude.Asaresult,estimatedeffectivesparecapacityofatleast3.8mb/dismaintainedthroughouttheforecastperiod.RefineryactivityandtradeupendedAthirdwaveofrefinerycapacityclosures,conversionstobiofuelplantsandprojectdelayssincethepandemicreducedtheoverhanginglobalrefinerycapacity.This,combinedwithasharpdropinChineseoilproductexportsandanupheavalofRussiantradeflows,resultedinrecordprofitsfortheindustrylastyear.Whilenetrefinerycapacityadditionsof4.4mb/dexpectedby2028outpacedemandgrowthforrefinedproducts,contrastingtrendsamongproductsmeansthatarepeatofthe2022tightnessinmiddledistillatescannotberuledout.Refinersmayneedtoshifttheirproductyieldstowardsmiddledistillatesandpetrochemicalfeedstockstoreflectchangingdemandpatterns.Demandforpetroleum-basedpremiumroadtransportfuels,suchasgasolineanddiesel,is1mb/dbelow2019levelsattheendoftheforecastperiod.Atthesametime,robustpetrochemicalactivityandslowergrowthinnaturalgasliquids(NGLs)supplyraisesdemandforrefinery-suppliedLPGandnaphtha.Chineseproductionpolicywillbepivotalforglobalmarkets.Closealignmentwithpetrochemicalplantfeedstockneedscouldleavemiddledistillatemarketsverytightby2028.WhileEastofSuezcontinuestopropelgrowthincapacityadditionsandrefineryruns,theAtlanticBasincouldseethroughputsdeclinedespitesubstantialnewplantsstartingupinNigeria,MexicoandBrazil.However,mostoftheincreaseinglobalcrudeandcondensateproductionwillcomefromtheAtlanticBasin.TheWesternHemisphere,andespeciallytheAmericas,willbethelargestincrementalsupplierofoiltoglobalmarkets,withexportsupby4.1mb/dby2028.Thisshiftintradeflowscomesinadditiontomostofthe2.5mb/dofRussiancrudeoilbackedoutofEuropeandG7countriesduetoembargoesflowingeastward.TheabsenceofadditionalMiddleEastexportsin2028versus2022andsurgingAsianimportrequirementsresultinsteadilyrisingflowsfromtheAtlanticBasintoEastofSuez.TheprevailingtrendforbothcrudeoilandproductsisincreasedsuppliesfromtheAmericasandtheMiddleEasttoAsia.RefineryadditionsanddwindlingcrudeproductionreducesAfrica’scrudeexportpotentialbyaround15%overtheforecastperiodbutcurbsitsnetproductimportrequirementsby10%.Oil2023DemandPAGE11IEA.CCBY4.0.DemandGlobalsummaryWorldoildemandreachingpeakmilestonesGrowthinworldoildemandissettolosemomentumoverthe2022-28forecastperiodastheenergytransitiongatherspace,withanoverallpeakloomingonthehorizon.Ledbycontinuedincreasesinpetrochemicalfeedstocks,totaloilconsumptiongrowthwillremainnarrowlypositivethrough2028asusagerisesto105.7mb/d,5.9mb/dabove2022levels.Crucially,however,demandforoilfromcombustiblefossilfuels(whichexcludesbiofuels,petrochemicalfeedstocksandothernon-energyuses)willhititsapexat81.6mb/dduringthefinalyearofourforecast.Thismilestonemarksahistoricpivottowardslower-emissionsources.TheslowdownhasbeenhastenedbyRussia’sinvasionofUkraineamidheightenedenergysecurityconcernsandbygovernments’post-Covidrecoveryspendingplans,withmorethanUSD2trillionmobilisedforcleanenergyinvestmentsby2030.Annualoildemandgrowth,2022-2028IEA.CCBY4.0.Note:Fossiloilcombustionistotaldemandminusfeedstockuse,othernon-energyusesandbiofuelsconsumed.Theexpectedpinnacleinoildemandforcombustiblefossilfuelsresultsfrompeakpost-pandemicconsumptionforgasolineby2023,roadtransportby2025andtotaltransportin2026.Someeconomies,notablyChinaandIndia,willcontinueto-0.50.00.51.01.52.02.53.02022202320242025202620272028mb/dTotalOilFossiloilcombustionRoadtransportOthertransportPetchemfeedBiofuelsOil2023DemandPAGE12IEA.CCBY4.0.registergrowththroughouttheforecast.Bycontrast,theOECDasawholemaycresttoitspeakthisyear–aharbingerofthesweepingimpactofmountingvehicleefficienciesandelectrification.Theglobalpost-pandemiceconomicreboundendedconclusivelyin2022,afterunprecedentedgovernmentstimulusandsupplychaindisruptionscausedconsumerinflationtosoar.ThispromptedanextraordinarytighteningofmonetarypolicythatissettoweighonGDPdeepinto2024.Onagloballevel,subparexpansioninadvancedeconomiesiscounterbalancedbyrobustactivityinAsia.ThiswasinitiallyfuelledbyChina’sreopeningandwillbemorepermanentlyunderpinnedbyIndiaasitconsolidatesitsstatusastheworld’sfastest-growingmajoreconomy.AddedtoresilientgainsinAfricaandtheMiddleEast,thiscastsnon-OECDnationsastheprincipalengineofgrowth,accountingforalmost80%ofthe2022-28increaseinglobalGDP.Globalcumulativeoildemandgrowthbyfuel,2022-2028IEA.CCBY4.0.Growthinroadtransportfueluse,longthemainstayofoildemand,isforecasttogointoreversefrom2025andwillonlynarrowlysurpassitspre-crisishighpoint.Projecteddemandfor2028wouldbe7.8mb/dhigherwithoutthesavingsfromnewEVsandefficiencyimprovementssince2022.Thisisequivalenttomorethanthetotal2022jet/keroseneornaphthadeliveriesandstands40%higherthandemandinIndialastyear–theworld’sthird-largestconsumingnation.Post-pandemicchangesinconsumerbehaviourprovideanadditionaldragontransportfuelsconsumption,ashybridworkingandvideoconferencinghavebecomeestablishedforsomebusinesssectorsinadvancedeconomies.However,atthesametime,dailytravelincitieshasseenarelativeshiftfrompublictransporttocarjourneys.-2.0-1.00.01.02.03.04.05.0LpgandnaphthaGasolineJetkeroseneGasoilOthermb/dOil2023DemandPAGE13IEA.CCBY4.0.Newnaturalgasandrenewableelectricitygenerationwillalsodentoilconsumptiongiventheirkeyroleinwiderenergytransitionpolicies.Thedisplacementoffueloil,gasoilandcrudeoilusedinpowergenerationwillbeespeciallypertinentintheMiddleEast.Severalcountriesintheregion,includingSaudiArabia,KuwaitandIraq,haveambitiousplanstomoveawayfromtheirdependenceonoil-firedpowerplants,whichwillhaveamajorimpactondomesticdemandinthesecountriesby2028.Thestalwartofdemandgrowthoverthepastdecade,petrochemicalfeedstockswillaccountformorethan40%ofoverallgainsduringourforecastperiod.Roughly65%ofthisincrease(1.5mb/dof2.3mb/d)willbeinnaphtha,drivenbynewliquids-basedsteamcrackersandaromaticsfacilities,bothheavilyconcentratedinChina.Theseburgeoningcapacitieswilloutpaceunderlyingend-userpolymerandfibredemand,especiallyduringthefirsthalfofourforecast,reshapingglobaltradeflowsandpressuringhigher-costoperators.Thesteadypaceofgrowthforpetrochemicalswillnotrelentaswithothersectors,withscantopportunitiesforefficiencygainsandcirculareconomyinitiativesonlyofferingalimitedrestraintonupwardmomentum.Globaloildemandbyproduct(mb/d),2019-2028AviationjetfueluseisforecasttocompletetheexplosivephaseofitsreboundfromCovid-eratravelrestrictionsbeforetheendof2024.Thereafter,structurallyincreasingdemandforlong-distancetravel,stronglyassociatedwithhigherGDPinmiddle-incomecountries,willremainakeypillarofoverallgrowth.Totaljet/kerosenedemandwillrisebyalmost2mb/dbetween2022and2028,butasubstantialimprovementinaircraftfuelefficienciesmeanthatitwilltakeuntil2027torecoverbeyond2019levels.Similarly,fueloilandgasoildemandformarinebunkerswillcontinuetogainground(+300kb/d)inlinewithrisingglobalGDP.However,efficiencygains,spurredbyprogressivelytighteningInternationalMaritimeOrganization(IMO)measurestoreducegreenhousegasemissions,willonceagaintempergrowth.Onaregionalbasis,theexpansioninglobaldemandwillbepoweredbyfaster-growingeconomiesinthedevelopingworld–especiallyinAsia–whileoiluseinadvancedcountriescontracts.Aroundthree-quartersofthe2022-2820192020202120222023202420252026202720282022-28GrowthRate2022-28GrowthLPG/Ethane13.213.213.814.214.414.614.815.115.515.91.9%1.7Naphtha6.66.46.96.87.07.47.88.08.28.33.4%1.5Gasoline26.723.725.626.026.626.626.626.426.125.8-0.2%-0.3Jet/Kerosene8.04.75.26.27.37.57.67.98.08.24.7%2.0Gasoil/Diesel28.326.127.528.328.428.528.728.728.828.90.4%0.6Residualfueloil6.25.66.26.56.76.76.76.76.76.70.4%0.2Otherproducts11.811.912.211.811.811.911.912.012.012.00.3%0.2Totalproducts100.791.797.599.8102.3103.1104.1104.8105.3105.71.0%5.9Annualchange0.6-9.05.82.32.40.91.00.70.50.4Oil2023DemandPAGE14IEA.CCBY4.0.increasewillcomefromAsia,withIndiasurpassingChinaasthemainsourceofgrowthby2027.Bycontrast,oildemandinNorthAmericaandEurope,whereenergytransitionpoliciesandefficiencygainswillbemostpronounced,spendsmostoftheforecastperiodincontractionarymode.Globaloildemandbyregion(mb/d),2019-2028FundamentalsGlobalGDPremainsunderpressureTheglobaleconomyreturnedtopre-Covid-19levelsinearly2021.Afteradropof3.1%in2020,realworldGDPgrewby6.4%in2021ascountriesbegantoreopenfromlockdownswhilegovernmentsandcentralbanksmassivelyincreasedfiscalandmonetarystimulus.Theextraordinaryreboundineconomicactivitygraduallydissipatedoverthecourseof2022,asconsumerpricessoaredamidboomingaggregatedemandandsupplychainproblems,exacerbatedbyrallyingcommoditypricesinthewakeofRussia’sinvasionofUkraine.Combined,thesedevelopmentseventuallyforcedglobalcentralbankstoadoptamorehawkishmonetarystancefromearly2022onwards.TheUSFederalReservehasincreasedinterestratesbyanunprecedentedfivepercentagepointsbetweenMarch2022andMay2023.ThismonetaryturnaroundhasbeguntoweighheavilyonOECDgrowth,raisingrecessionaryprospects.Addedtoagradualreductioninbanklendingtohouseholdsandbusiness,theseinterestratehikesareexpectedtoreduce2023GDPgrowthtoaround1%fortheUnitedStatesandtheeurozone.ThedownturninadvancedeconomiesrenderstheglobaloutlookevenmoredependentonChina’spost-Covidpandemicreopeningbeingabletomaintainitsearlymomentum,whichshouldeventuallyliftglobaltradeandmanufacturing.Thebearishoutlooktranslatesintobelow-trendGDPgrowthof2.4%and2.8%in2023and2024,respectively,onlyrecoveringin2025asOECDeconomiesreboundamidapivottowardsmonetaryeasing.Afterpeakingat3.7%in2025,globalGDPgrowthisseenaveraging3.3%in2026-28.20192020202120222023202420252026202720282022-28GrowthRate2022-28GrowthNorthAmerica25.022.123.924.624.724.524.324.023.823.5-0.8%-1.1S&CAmerica6.75.86.46.66.76.86.97.07.17.21.5%0.6Europe15.713.714.514.914.914.814.714.614.514.3-0.6%-0.5Africa4.13.84.04.24.34.44.54.64.74.82.0%0.5MiddleEast8.88.18.59.09.29.39.49.69.79.81.3%0.7Eurasia4.34.24.54.64.64.64.64.74.74.70.5%0.1AsiaPacific35.934.035.735.837.838.839.740.340.941.32.4%5.5World100.791.797.599.8102.3103.1104.1104.8105.3105.71.0%5.9Annualchange0.6-9.05.82.32.40.91.00.70.50.4Oil2023DemandPAGE15IEA.CCBY4.0.RealGDPgrowthassumptionsSources:IEA,IMFandOxfordEconomics.EndofpandemicmarksashiftindemandtrendsItbearsnotingthat2023marksthelastCovid-19transitionyearforglobaloildemand,withChinathefinalmajorcountrytoliftlockdownrestrictionsinDecember2022.Thesubsequentsurgeinmobilitythatpromptedareleaseofpent-upoildemandappearedtobecrestinginmid-2023andisexpectedtolosemomentumduringtheremainderoftheyear,therebynormalisingbaselinesfrom2024onwards.Inparallel,globalsupply-chainconstraintsandcross-borderrestrictionsthatcharacterised2020-22havealsoabated.Fittingly,theWorldHealthOrganization(WHO)declaredanendtotheCovid-19pandemicasaglobalhealthemergencyinMay2023.Onamacroeconomiclevel,theimpactofCovid-19willbefeltforyearstocomenowthattheunprecedentedmonetaryandfiscalstimuluspromptedbythepandemicisbeingwithdrawn.AlthoughdirectCovid-19fiscalsupportmeasureshavelargelybeenunwound,theimmensespendingprogrammeslaunchedattheheightofthepandemicwillcontinuetostretchgovernmentfinances,asdebtsundertakenwillhavetoberepaideventually.Thisisparticularlyacuteinthecurrenthighinterestrateenvironmentascentralbankliquidityisbeingwithdrawn.Theslow-burningcreditcrunchamongretailbanksinadvancedeconomieswillactasafurtherdragoneconomicactivity.Emergingmarketsareespeciallyvulnerabletoadeleveragingsqueeze,havingseentheirdebtlevelsandfiscalimbalancesrisetodangerouslevels,whichcouldunderminemedium-termgrowth.GDPgrowthintheUnitedStatesfor2023isassumedatalacklustre0.9%inourprojections,slowingtojust0.4%in2024asthecountrystruggleswiththeaftermathoftheUSFederalReserve’sinterestratehikes.Amidajobmarketthatremainshistoricallytightandelevatedinflation,theriskofawage-pricespiralisreal.Fiscalpolicyisalsoanticipatedtotighten,asbudgetdeficitsanddebtlevelshaveclimbedtouncomfortablyhighlevels.Growthisforecasttorecoversomewhat,toanaverage2%overthe2025-28period.China’seconomyisreboundingafterthemarkedslowdownin2022,ledbysoaringmobilityandservices.China’skeychallengewillbeitsabilitytomaintaineconomic201920202021202220232024-28USA2.3%-2.8%5.9%2.1%0.9%1.7%Europe1.8%-5.8%5.4%3.6%0.7%1.7%AsiaPacific4.4%-1.3%6.9%3.8%4.1%4.7%Japan-0.4%-4.3%2.2%1.0%0.6%1.3%China6.0%2.3%8.5%3.0%5.5%4.6%India4.6%-6.4%9.2%6.9%4.8%6.9%Africa3.9%-1.3%5.7%3.6%2.5%3.3%World2.9%-3.1%6.4%3.3%2.4%3.3%Oil2023DemandPAGE16IEA.CCBY4.0.momentumbeyondthecurrentreleaseofpent-updemand.Amidacontinuingmanufacturingandtradeslump,withmutedglobalgrowthweighingonexports,thiswillbeheavilydependentonanongoingrecoveryinretailspending.However,anuncertainjobmarket,underwatermortgagesandamorerisk-aversemindsetfollowingthreeyearsofdraconianpandemiccontrolsmaystandinthewayofalastingreboundinhouseholdspending.China’sotherchallengesaremyriad.Althoughtherealestatesectormayhaveseentheworstoftheslump,thelargeoverhangofunsoldpropertieswillactasadragonitsrecovery,whiletheescalatingUStechnologywarunderscoresrisinggeopoliticaltensions.China’sgrowthisprojectedtoincreasefrom3%duringlockdown-hit2022toslightlyover5%in2023,beforeaveraging4.6%in2024-28.IndianGDPisprojectedtoexpandby4.8%in2023,risingto6.3%in2024beforerecoveringtoanevenstronger7%in2025-28.Growthwillbebuttressedbyfavourabledemographicsandanexpandingmiddleclass.Therearenumerousriskstotheforecast,predominantlytothedownside.Geopoliticalrisksremainomnipresent,asChinaandtheWestgrowapart,withaChina/Russia/MiddleEasternaxisintheprocessofdeveloping.Thesewillaffectenergysupply,tradeflowsandoutrightprices.Persistentlyhighinflationcouldleadtofurtherinterestrateincreasesbycentralbanks,whichwouldcompoundproblemsforhighlyindebtedcountries,stokesocialunrestandstunttheeconomicrecoveryinhighincomecountries.Newvirusmutationscouldtriggerrenewedcontainmentmeasures,limitingmobilityandeconomicactivity.Finally,naturaldisastersandweather-relatedeventsaffectingeconomicgrowth(floods,droughts,wildfires,hurricanes)arerisingastheglobecontinuestowarm.PricescenariosseeonlymodestimpactondemandBesidesGDPgrowthrates,assumptionsoffutureoilpricesareakeycomponentofdemandestimates,withforecastssensitivetoboththeabsolutepricelevelandintertemporalchangesovertheoutlook.OilpricesusedforthemodellinginputarebasedonaspotcrudepriceofaboutUSD76/bblforNorthSeaDated,andweassumethislevelremainsconstantinrealtermsovertheforecastingperiod.Inadditiontothisbasecase,thetablebelowshowsalternativehigh-andlow-pricescenarios:High-pricescenario:Assumesoilpricesincreaseby2.5%inrealtermsperannum,inlinewiththeirlong-termhistoricalpattern.Low-pricescenario:EstimatesoffuturespotpricesarebasedontheICEBrentforwardcurve(averagingUSD79/bblin2023slowingtoUSD67/bblin2028).Thesearethendiscountedtorealterms.Oil2023DemandPAGE17IEA.CCBY4.0.Impactofalternativeoilpriceforecastscenarios,2023-2028IEA.CCBY4.0.Thehigh-pricescenariowouldlower2028globaloildemandby430kb/d.However,thiswouldnotcausedemandtopeakearlier.Conversely,thelow-pricescenariowouldraiseworldoilconsumptionby670kb/dattheendoftheforecastingperiod.EnergytransitiongatherspacePolicieswillreduceroadfueldemandandoiluseinthepowersectorTheadoptionoftighterefficiencystandardsbyregulators,structuralchangestotheeconomyandtheever-acceleratingpenetrationofEVsareexpectedtopowerfullymoderateannualgrowthinoildemandthroughouttheforecast.Roadtransportdemandwillrapidlyprogresstowardsapost-pandemicpeakof45.3mb/din2025,onlymarginallyabovethelevelof2019,beforeembarkingonagradualdecline.Globally,roadtransportoildemandwillbe460kb/dbelow2019levelsby2028.Toachieveclearpeaksintransportandoveralldemand,withswiftsubsequentreductionsinuse,furtherpolicyandbehaviouralchangeswillbeneeded.GasolinedemandwillbedisproportionatelyimpactedasEVsprogressivelyreplacevehicleswithinternalcombustionengines(ICE).About80%ofthe3mb/d2022-28oildemandgrowthestimatedtobedisplacedbyvehicleelectrificationwillbeforgasoline.Thismeansthatthefuelislikelytoexhibittheearliestandmostpronouncedpeakindemand.Usagewillneverreturnto2019levelsandthepost-pandemicpeakcouldcomeasearlyas2023.Followingabriefplateau,thedeclineisforecasttoacceleratefrom2026onwards,with2028demand900kb/dbelow5560657075808590202320242025202620272028USD/bblLowcaseBasecaseHighcaseAlternativepricescenarios-600-400-2000200400600800202320242025202620272028Cumulativeimpact,kb/dPricescenarioimpactofglobaldemandOil2023DemandPAGE18IEA.CCBY4.0.thatof2019.Totaltransportdemandwillplateauinthesecondhalfofourforecastperiod,withitshigh-watermarkexpectedin2026beforeebbinggraduallyasdeclinesinroaduseoutweighacontinuedincreaseinjetandmarinefuelsconsumption.Cumulativetransportfuelsdemandgrowth,2022-2028IEA.CCBY4.0.Efficiencyimprovementswilloccurforallfuels,notonlyroadtransportfuels,andwillhavealargeroverallimpactonoildemandthanEVs.Efficiencygainsareexpectedtoreducethegrowthinoildemandbyroughly790kb/dperyearovertheforecastperiod,foratotalof4.8mb/dinavoidedgrowth.TotaloildemandsavingsfromnewEVsalesandefficiencyimprovementsoverthe2022-28periodwillbe7.8mb/d.Whilebothfuelswillexperiencelargegainsovertheforecastperiod,gasoildemand(+620kb/d)willoutperformgasolineuse(-250kb/d)toaconsiderableextent.InadditiontothesignificanceofEVsforgasoline,thisisreflectiveoftherelativeimportanceofdieseldemandinhigher-growtheconomies.Newnaturalgasandrenewableelectricitygenerationcapacitywilldisplacefueloil,gasoilandcrudeoilconsumptioninpowergeneration,especiallyintheMiddleEast.Severalcountriesintheregion,includingSaudiArabia,Kuwait,andIraq,haveambitiousplanstomoveawayfromtheirdependenceonoil-firedpowerplants,whichwillhaveamajorimpactontheirdomesticdemandby2028.Lastly,social,politicalandbehaviouralchangesamongconsumerswillcontinuetoreshapethegrowthtrajectoryforoildemand.Whilesignificanteffortsarealreadyapparentinanumberofcountries,strongerpolicieswillberequiredtoputoildemandclosertoamoresustainabledevelopmentpathwaytowardsglobalclimatetargets.-0.50.00.51.01.52.02.53.02022202320242025202620272028mb/dGasolineGasoilJet/KeroTotaltransportRoadtransportMarinefuelsAviationfuelsByproduct-0.50.00.51.01.52.02.53.02022202320242025202620272028BysectorOil2023DemandPAGE19IEA.CCBY4.0.EVsandefficiencygainscurbroaduseofoilRoadtransportfuels,longthebackboneofoildemand,willstruggletosurpasstheirpre-crisispeakasenergyefficiencyimprovementsandsubstitutionweighheavily.Efficiencyimprovements,thetransitiontoelectricvehiclesandchangesinconsumerhabitswilloffsetpartoftheimpactofeconomicgrowth.Additionally,policychangesmeanthatanincreasingshareofroadfueldemandwillbeintheformofbiofuels,forecasttoriseby600kb/dby2028.NewEVsandimprovedefficiencywillavoid7.8mb/dofextraoildemand,2022-2028IEA.CCBY4.0.EVsalescontinuetosoarStronggovernmentpolicysupportandapushbytheautomotiveindustrytooffermoreattractivemodelshaveledtoarapidincreaseinsalesofelectricvehicles.BasedonfiguresfromtheIEA’sGlobalElectricVehicleOutlook2023,EVsalesrosefrom2millionvehiclesin2018to10.8millionin2022,whenoneinsevencarssoldgloballywaselectric.Thistrendissettocontinuewithourprojectionsassumingthatby2028morethanoneinfournewcarswillbeanEV,fortotalsalesof25.9million.Atthestartof2023,therewerearound28millionelectriccarsontheroadworldwide.Newsalesin2023-24areexpectedtoexceedthislevelandbytheendof2028morethan155millionEVswillhavebeensold.Thiswilldisplace2.3mb/dofincrementalgasolineuseand630kb/dofdieseldemandduringthisforecast.MorethanhalfofthesecarswillbesoldinChina.50556065702022202320242025202620272028mb/dTotaltransportdemandAdditionalbiofuelsEfficiencysavingsEVsavingsOil2023DemandPAGE20IEA.CCBY4.0.GlobalannualEVsalesbycountry/region,2010-2028IEA.CCBY4.0.Note:EVsalesincludebatteryelectricvehiclesandplug-inhybrids.Source:IEA,GlobalElectricVehicleOutlook2023.Indeed,thisprecipitousclimbhasbeenprincipallyaChinesephenomenon.There,electriccarsalesreached6.6millionin2022,upsix-foldcomparedwith2019.DuetotheCovid-19crisis,thegovernmentextendedsomesubsidiesforEVsin2021and2022.Whilethesenationalincentivesarenowweakening,thisshouldnotstopthecontinuedadvanceofelectricvehicles.NewmodelofferingsandlocalmeasuresinfavourofEVs(localsubsidies,nocity-levelpurchaselimitations)willsupportsalesinthecomingyears.Newsalesafter2022alonewillenableChinatoavoidalmost1mb/dofgasolinedemandgrowthby2028.InEurope,electriccarsalesroseto2.7millionin2022.ThesurgeinEVsenteringservicewassupportedbytighteremissionstandardsandpurchasesubsidiesinmajormarkets.RecentlyadoptedEUtargetscallforallnewcarsandvanstobezeroemissionsby2035.IntheUnitedStates,EVsaleswerecomparativelysmall,justshyof1millionlastyear,butstillthreetimeshigherthantwoyearsearlier.StrongnewtaxcreditsofUSD7500pervehicleforconsumersaspartoftheUSInflationReductionAct(IRA)aresettosupportthismomentumandweexpectburgeoningsalesof4.8millionby2028.TheBidenAdministrationhassetagoalofmakingzeroemissionsvehicleshalfofnewsalesby2030.EfficiencygainsleadtoasignificantreductioninroadfuelconsumptionEfficiencyimprovementswilloccurinalltransportsegments,includingroad,maritimeandaviation.Alltogether,theseefficiencygainsareexpectedtoreducegrowthbyroughly790kb/dperyearovertheforecastperiod,andby4.8mb/dintotalfrom2022through2028.0510152025302010201220142016201820202022202420262028millionsOthersEuropeUSChinaOil2023DemandPAGE21IEA.CCBY4.0.Thelargestgainswilloccurintheroadtransportsector,whereICEvehicleswill,despitethesurgeinEVsales,comprisethemajorityofvehiclessoldthroughouttheforecastperiod.Therefore,acontinuationoftheprogressseeninrecentyearswillbeessentialtoconstraindemand.Europeisparticularlyadvancedintermsofenvironmentalregulations.WhileEVsarekeytomeetingemissionstandards,efficiencyimprovementsinICEvehicleswillalsocontribute.ThecurrentEUstandardis95gramsofCO2perkilometre(g/km)fornewpassengercarsandhasappliedtoallnewcarssince2021.UnderplansadoptedinMarch2023,vehicularCO2emissionswoulddeclineby55%relativeto2021by2030.AsubstantialshareofthistargetwillbemetbyincreasingsalesoffullEVs,butimprovingefficiencyofICEvehiclesandnon-plug-inhybridswillalsobenecessary.Furthermore,theEuropeanUnionhasbroughtforwardproposalstotightenstandardsforheavy-dutyvehicles(HDVs)suchastrucksandbuses.Notably,thesewouldincreasethedesiredemissionsreductionrelativeto2019from30%to45%.IntheUnitedStates,theBidenAdministrationraisedfuelstandardsinDecember2021,reversinganearlierdecisiontoeaseregulations.AMarch2022ruleincreasedindustry-widestandardsfrom2024onwards,toreach49milespergallonby2026,with8%annualimprovementsin2024and2025,and10%in2026.Subsequentproposals,currentlyunderconsideration,wouldtargetaCO2emissionsreductionto73/kmby2028.ChinaandIndiaalsohaveambitioustargets.Indiawantstoachieve110gCO2/kmfornewcarsin2022-23,correspondingtoareductionof3%peryearinoilconsumption.ChinesePhaseVpassengercarfuelconsumptionstandards,publishedattheendof2019,loweredfuelusefornewvehiclesto4litresper100kilometres(L/100km)by2025from5L/100kmfor2020underPhaseIV.In2019,Japanapprovedatighteningoflightvehiclestandardsthrough2030,requiringfuelconsumptionof3.95L/100kmby2030,oranimprovementof32%versusaverage2016levels.Whilestronggainsinvehicleefficiencyhavecontributedsignificantlytomitigatingroadfueluse,thesebenefitsweredampenedbytheparallelincreaseinthesalesofSUVs.By2022,SUVsalesaccountedfor46%oftotalglobalcarandvansales.In2011,thisstoodatabout20%.ThegrowthofSUVscontinuestoberobustinmanycountries,includingtheUnitedStates,IndiaandacrossEurope.Insomeothers,mostnotablyChina,theshareofSUVsisstagnating,mainlydrivenbythebigriseofsmallerbattery-poweredelectriccars.Oil2023DemandPAGE22IEA.CCBY4.0.RenewablesandgastocutoilusedinMiddleEasternpowergenerationOiluseinpowergenerationhassteadilydeclinedinrecentyears,toanestimated3.5mb/din2022.Unsurprisingly,givenitsmassivehydrocarbonresources,theMiddleEasthasthehighestvolumeofoilusedforelectricitygenerationglobally,atanestimated1.4mb/din2022.Inthesameyear,Europeused220kb/d,NorthAmerica390kb/d,LatinAmerica350kb/d,AsiaPacific750kb/d,Africa310kb/dandEurasia110kb/d.Oiluseinpowergenerationbyregion,2022-2028IEA.CCBY4.0.SeveralMiddleEasterncountrieshaveplanstoreduceoreliminatetheuseofoilintheirpowersectoroverthemediumterm,largelybywayofdevelopingnaturalgas,nuclear,coalandrenewablecapacities.Countriesmaystruggletophaseoutoilentirelyduetothepronouncedseasonalityofelectricitydemand,whichpeaksduringthesummer.Acaseinpointwastheextrememid-2022heatwaveintheMiddleEast,whichstressedpowergridsacrosstheGulfregion.Inanotherdefiningcharacteristicof2022,theunprecedentedsurgeinvolatilityinenergypricesinthewakeofRussia’sinvasionofUkrainemadeforenormoussuddenchangesintherelativeeconomicsofburningnaturalgasversusoil.In2021,SaudiArabiaused420kb/dofcrudeoil,30kb/dofgasoiland290kb/doffueloilinelectricitygeneration.Thesevolumesarecomparabletopre-pandemiclevels.Thecountryhasplanstogenerateitselectricityonlyfromnaturalgas(50%)andrenewables(50%)by2030,eliminatingoilfromthepowerfuelmix.ThefirstofthreephasesoftheSaudiNationalRenewableEnergyProgram(NREP)istargetedbytheendof2024(4.87GWcapacity),generating15.1TWhanddisplacingroughly70kb/dofoil,accordingtoSaudigovernmentfigures.Saudi02004006008001,0001,2001,4001,600NorthAmericaCentralandSouthAmericaEuropeAfricaMiddleEastEurasiaAsiaPacifickb/d20222028Oil2023DemandPAGE23IEA.CCBY4.0.Aramcoestimatesthatsubstitutionbynaturalgaswilleventuallydisplace500kb/dofoildemand,mainlyinthepowersector.Iraq,too,hasambitiousplansthatcouldleadtothedisplacementofoilinthepowersector.In2020,thecountryused140kb/dofcrudeoil,30kb/doffueloiland15kb/dofgasoilinpowergeneration.Theoilandelectricityministriesaimtoadd12GWofrenewablepowerby2030.Iraqalsoplanstoadd2.5Bcf/dgasprocessingcapacityby2027(inadditiontothecurrent1.5Bcf/d).TheKurdistanRegionalGovernment(KRG)hasstartedtheconstructionoftwolargegaspipelinesdesignedtoincreasethevolumeofgasavailableforthepowersector.KuwaitopeneditsfirstfixedLNGimportfacilityinmid-2021.TheAlZourLNGterminalisdesignedtoimport22MtofLNGperyear.Kuwaitalsoplanstodevelop3.5GWofrenewablecapacityby2030andtoprogressivelyreplaceoil-firedcapacitywithnaturalgasinthecomingyears.Overall,weprojecttheuseofoilinthepowersectorintheMiddleEasttofallby550kb/dovertheforecastperiodto820kb/din2028.Morethanhalf(280kb/d)ofthisdeclinewillbeindirectuseofcrudeoil,withtheremainingdecreaseroughlyevenlydividedbetweenfueloilandgasoil.Mostregionswillmaintainoil-firedcapacityforflexibilitytomeetpeakdemand.Oildemandinthepowersectorinotherregionswillrecordonlyminorchanges.ItisprojectedtoincreasemarginallyinAfrica,todeclineslightlyinNorthAmerica,Europe,AsiaPacificandEurasia,andtoremainlargelyunchangedinLatinAmerica.FueloilandgasoiluseinpowergenerationappearstohaveincreasedinseveralAsianandEuropeancountriesin2022duetothehighpriceofnaturalgas.AnunusuallywarmEuropean2022-23winterandweakerpricesforcompetingfuelsledtoareversalofthetrendduringthesecondhalfoftheyearandinto2023.Covid-erabehaviouralchangesaltermobilitytrendsObservedthroughthenarrowframeofoildemand,amongthemostpersistentchangeswroughtbytheCovid-19pandemicwillbethoseimpactingpatternsofmobility.Overallactivitylevelshavemostlyreturnedtopre-pandemicnorms,especiallythechangesresultingfrompublichealthregulations,withmobilitymeasurestypicallyreboundingswiftlyoncerestrictionswereremoved.Nevertheless,someimpactsofCovid-19disruptionstobehaviourarelikelytobemorepermanentandthecompositionofmobilitydiffersfrompre-pandemictrends.Oil2023DemandPAGE24IEA.CCBY4.0.OECDandnon-OECDmobilityindexes,March2020toOctober2023IEA.CCBY4.0.Amongthemorelastingdevelopmentsistheincreasingprevalenceofvariousformsofteleworkingandvideoconferencingattheexpenseofbusinesstravel.Followingtheonsetofthepandemic,thenumberofpeopleworkingathomeincreaseddramatically.TheInternationalLabourOrganization(ILO)estimatedthattheshareofglobalworkerswhoperformedpaidworkintheirhomesmorethandoubledfrom8%in2019to17.5%in2020.However,thispatternwasnotevenlydistributedacrosssectorsandcountries.Inlargepart,thisreflectsthefactthatsomejobs–particularlyknowledge-intensiveservicesectorjobs–aremoreeasilyperformedremotelythanothers.Weexpectthistoresultinsignificantgeographicaldifferencesinteleworkinginthefuture,withtheimpactonoildemandlargelyconcentratedinOECDcountries.WorkingfromhomeremainsrelativelymorecommonintheUnitedStates,wherehybridworkinghaseffectivelybecomethenewnormal.USofficeoccupancyremainedaroundhalfofpre-pandemiclevelsinearly2023,comparedtoabout80%forEuropeand90%forAsia,accordingtopropertyservicesfirmJLL.LessthanhalfofUScompaniesrequireemployeestobeintheofficefulltime.Ared-hotjobmarket,withnear-recordlowunemployment,hasleveragedemployees’bargainingpower,whilerelativelylongUScommutescomparedtoothercountriesmakeforagreaterincentivetoworkremotely.ThisdevelopmenthascausedUSwork-relatedmobilitytodecouplefrommacroeconomicindicators.AlthoughgrowthinvehiclemilestravelledhaslaggednationalGDPgrowthfordecades,thetwomovedrelativelyintandeminpre-pandemicyears,withmilesrising10%between2012and2019,andGDPincreasing17%.Followingthepandemic,however,USGDPin2022reboundedto5%abovepre-pandemiclevelswhilevehiclemilesremainedabout1%below406080100120140160Mar-20Jun-20Sep-20Dec-20Mar-21Jun-21Sep-21Dec-21Mar-22Jun-22Sep-22Index(Q12020=100)AmericasEuropeAsiaTotalOECDAsia(ex.China)MiddleEastAfricaS&CAmericaOverallmobilityOECDregions406080100120140160Mar-20Jun-20Sep-20Dec-20Mar-21Jun-21Sep-21Dec-21Mar-22Jun-22Sep-22Overallmobilitynon-OECDregionsOil2023DemandPAGE25IEA.CCBY4.0.2019levels.Asimilar,lesspronounceddisparityisapparentfortotalUSemployment,whichhasalsorecoveredabove2019levels.Thisslowdowninwork-relatedmobilityhasstymiedgasoline’sdemandrecovery,reinforcingtheongoingdownwardpullofvehicleefficienciesandtheelectrificationofdriving.USgasolineconsumptionin2022averaged95%of2019levels.Conversely,gasolinedemandinOECDEurope,whereworkingfromhomehasfoundlessacceptance,hasreturnedto2019levels.ArecentanalysisontheUptakeandInequalityofTeleworkbythinktankBruegelshowedanaverageof24%amongEUworkersteleworkingin2021.However,significantdifferencesexistedbetweenthelevelofremoteworkinginmemberstatesandbetweendifferenttypesofjobs.Ingeneral,morehighlypaidjobstendedtohaveahigherdegreeoftelework.Weexpectthattheimpactonoildemandofthesetrendswillgraduallyeasethrough2024butthenplateaufortheremainderoftheforecastperiod,fallingfromapeakofaround1mb/din2020to400kb/dover2025-28.Amongthoseforwhomteleworkingisapracticaloption,thiswouldbeequivalenttoroughlytwodaysperweekathome.Estimatedteleworkingimpactonoildemand,2019-2028IEA.CCBY4.0.Datafrommultiplemajorcitiesandnationalgovernmentsrevealthatinsomecasesusageratesonpublictransporthavebeenparticularlyslowtorecover,evenasCovid-19restrictionswererelaxed.Thiswaslikelydrivenbyhealthconcernsaboutenteringcrowdedpublicspaces,aswellasbyachangeinthetypesofjourneysbeingmade.Publictransport’slacklustrerecoveryoccurredamidageneralimprovementinmobilitystatistics,implyingthatactivityhasshiftedtowardsotherforms.Extensive0.00.20.40.60.81.01.22019202020212022202320242025202620272028mb/dOil2023DemandPAGE26IEA.CCBY4.0.dataareavailablefortransportinLondon,basedonpassengerdeclarationsbyTransportforLondon(TfL)andUKgovernmenttrafficcamerainformation.Busandmetrojourneys,havingfallentoroughlyhalfof2019levelsin2020and2021,remained24%belowpre-pandemiclevelsduring2022,ayearnotaffectedbylockdownrestrictions.Conversely,journeysbyautomobilefelllesssharplythanthosebypublictransportfollowinginitialCovid-19outbreaks,withaverage2022Londoncartrafficsettlingabout25%aboveMarch2020levels.Thispatternappearstohavebeenreplicatedelsewhere.AccordingtoGermanFederalStatisticsOfficedata,whileridershiprecoveredby29%y-o-ytonearly10.2billion,average2022railandbuspassengernumbersremained14%lowerthanin2019.Overthesameperiod,long-distanceroadjourneyswentupby2.7%.Inademonstrationofthepotentialforgovernmentstoshapethesetrends,GermanpublictransportwasheavilysubsidisedduringJune-August2022.Inthesemonths,longjourneysbyrailincreasedbyabout40%.Chinaisthekeyexceptiontothispattern,aspublictransportuseinChinesecitiesreboundedtoitspre-pandemiclevelwithinweeksoftheDecember2022reopening,makingforamuchfasterandmorecompleterecoverythancitiesinmajorWesterncountries.Thisdisparitymeansthatroadfuels(inparticulargasoline)receivedexceptionalsupportincitiesthatusuallyrelyonpublictransport.However,weexpectthistounwindfurtherovertheforecastperiod,contributingtotheweakeroutlookforroadfueldemand.Petrochemicalspowerahead,ChinatakescentrestageThecontinuedexpansionofthepetrochemicalindustryanditsconsumptionoffeedstocksprovidethesinglelargestcontributiontooildemandgrowthovertheforecastperiod.Chemicalfeedstockswillaccountfor2.3mb/d(+390kb/dperyear)orabout40%,oftotaloildemandgrowthfrom2022to2028.Incontrasttoalltheothermajoroildemandsectors,petrochemicalsperformedstronglythroughouttheCovid-19pandemic.Between2019and2022,oilproductsusedasachemicalfeedstockforlightolefins(ethyleneandpropylene)andaromatics(benzene,tolueneandxylene)grewbyabout1mb/d.Overalloildemandfellby860kb/dinthesameperiod.Oil2023DemandPAGE27IEA.CCBY4.0.WorldoildemandandpetrochemicalsectorcontributionIEA.CCBY4.0.Polymers,comprisingthelargestenduseforpetrochemicalsbyvolume,areespeciallyconcentratedineverydayhouseholdconsumption.Asaresult,demandforpolymerswascomparativelyinsulatedfromtheimpactofpublichealthmeasuresandgovernmentpolicies.Furthermore,theCovid-19publichealthcrisesledtoanexceptionalriseindemandforplasticsindisposablemedicalitemsandpackagingforincreasedhomedeliveriesofmealsandconsumergoods.During2021,feedstockrequirementssurgedattheirfastestratesince2010(+860kb/d,5.9%y-o-y),asmanufacturingandconstructionactivitygainedmomentumandwithmuchofthenoveldemandof2020persisting.Anexplosiveincreaseinpetrochemicalcapacity,especiallyinChina,helpedtoaccommodatethisupsurgeindemand.Thepaceofadditionshastenedin2022,withtheyearsettingarecordfornewolefinscapacityatslightlyover16Mt/yr(+7.5%y-o-y).Atthesametime,growthindemandforpetrochemicalsslowedasexceptionalusesubsidedandindustrialactivityslackened(especiallyinEurope,whereproducerssufferedfromelevatedenergycosts).Globalfeedstockrequirementsgrewbyacomparativelymodest100kb/d(+0.7%)during2022withtheslumpinoperatingratesunevenacrossdifferentregions.OECDEuropeannaphthaconsumptioncollapsedby13.7%y-o-y,whileOECDAsiaOceaniasawafallof4.6%.Bycontrast,Chinesenaphthauseincreasedby15.2%andLPGby8.9%.MassiveChineseinvestmentsreshapingworldmarketsNewpetrochemicalplantsareheavilyconcentratedinChina,whichwillaccountfor51%ofallnewolefincapacityand48%ofincrementaloil-basedolefinsfeedstockconsumptionduringthe2022-28period.Overallnaphthauseissettoriseby1mb/dfrom2022by2028(170kb/dperyear)andLPGby530kb/d(90kb/dperyear),togetheraccountingfor54%ofChineseoildemandgrowth.13%14%15%16%17%18%19%020406080100120201820202022202420262028%oftotaldemandmb/dTotalnaphthademandTotalLPGdemandOtheroildemandPetchem%ofdemandOil2023DemandPAGE28IEA.CCBY4.0.Chineseadditionsbetween2019and2025aresettobelargerthanthetotalcapacityofexistingOECDEuropeanandAsiaOceanianpetrochemicalplants.Thiswillhaveamajorimpactonthedistributionofpetrochemicalactivityandoilconsumptionforfeedstockthroughoutourforecastperiod.China’sshareofglobalolefinsfeedstockdemandwillgrowfrom14%in2019toalmost26%by2025andwillremainclosetothislevelto2028.Annualolefinsoil-basedcapacitychange,(primaryoutput),2019-2028Note:Includessteamcracker(ethylene)andpropanedehydrogenation(propylene)capacity.IEA.CCBY4.0.Priorto2020,therewaslittlegrowthinglobalnaphthafeedstockrequirements,withtotalusedecliningby280kb/dfrom2017to2020.AlmostallgrowthinolefinfeedstockconsumptionoverthisperiodwasforethanefromNGLextraction(580kb/doverthesameperiod).However,mostnewChinesecapacityiscomingintheformofnaphthacrackers.These,inadditiontoahandfulofothermajornaphthacrackerdevelopments,willchangetheproducts’fortunes.Overall,2028naphthademandwillbe1.7mb/daboveitspre-pandemiclevel(+190kb/dperyear),drivenbyhigherdemandfromchemicalplants.Ethaneuseinsteamcrackerswillincreaseandapproach1mb/d(110kb/dperyear)overthesameperiodandthevolumeof(LPG)usedincrackersandpropanedehydrogenation(PDH)unitswillclimbby600kb/d(+70kb/dperyear).Thismeansthattherapiddeclineinnaphtha’sshareofolefinfeedstockendedbeforethestartofthepandemicandwillregisteramodestrecoverybythemid-2020s,beforeedgingdownwardsagain,stayingcloseto45%ofthetotal.Thesechangesareprincipallytheresultofthepatternsofinvestmentbychemicalproducers.WhileMiddleEastandUSplantsbasedoncost-advantagedethanewereemblematicofthepreviousinvestmentwave(2014-18),the2020-24periodfeaturesalargenumberofnaphthacrackers,integratedtorefineriesthatareoptimisedtoproducesubstantialvolumesofpetrochemicalfeedstocks.New-5051015202019202020212022202320242025202620272028mt/yChinaOtherregionsOtherAsiaMiddleEastOECDAmericasOil2023DemandPAGE29IEA.CCBY4.0.ethane-processingunitswillcontinuetocomeintoservicethroughouttheforecastperiod,basedonlocalNGLsavailability,especiallyinlocationsliketheMiddleEastandtheUnitedStates,andonimportedUScargoesinChinaandWesternEurope.Annualchangeinoil-basedolefinsfeedstockusebyregionandbyproduct,2019-2028IEA.CCBY4.0.Theadditionofsuchalargeamountofcapacityinjustafewyearswillcomfortablyoutpacegrowthinend-userdemandandleadtoashiftinpatternsoffeedstockconsumption.Thecapacitytoproduceethylenefromsteamcrackingwillgrowbyanannualaverageof7.8Mt/yrfrom2018to2028,whileweexpectethylenedemandtoexpandby4.6Mt/yroverthesameperiod.Muchofthisnewcapacityissubstitutingforimportsofbasechemicalsandcommoditypolymers,especiallyinChina,meaningthatexportersneedtocompeteforalternativemarkets.Producersinrelativelylesscost-advantagedareas,particularlyEuropeandEastAsiaexcludingChina,faceincreasingpressurerequiringcutsinoperatingratesandraisesthespectreofplantclosures.ManyEastAsianproducershaveeitherhistoricallyexportedtoChinaorpresentattractivetargetsfordisplacedexportsfromotherregions.Europeanplantsaresomewhatolderandsmallerthaninotherregionsandhighenergycostshaveweakenedimportantsegmentsofdownstreamdemand.TheymayprovevulnerabletoUSandMiddleEasternexporters.Petrochemicalfeedstockconsumptionbeganwhatweexpecttobeasustainedgeographicalshiftin2022,withChinagainingandmostotherregionslosingshare.PetrochemicalfeedstockdemandwillalsogrowstronglyovertheforecastperiodintheMiddleEast,byanannualaverageof70kb/d,andEurasia(30kb/d).MostnewplantsintheseregionswillbebasedonethaneandLPG.InRussia,majornewunitshavebeenplanned,connectedtodevelopmentsinnaturalgascapacity.-400-2000200400600800kb/dOECDAmMiddleEastOtherAsiaOtherregionsChina-400-2000200400600800NaphthaLPGEthaneOil2023DemandPAGE30IEA.CCBY4.0.However,thesefacedelaysrelatedtouncertaintyonprojectfinancingandthewithdrawalofinternationaltechnologyproviders.Weassumethatonlysomeofexpectedunitswillbecompletedduringourforecastperiod,modestlyincreasingRussia’sshareofglobalfeedstockconsumptionfrom2.4%in2022to2.9%in2028.AviationandmarinedemandgrowthresumesJetfuelprovideslargestincreaseinproductuseby2028,butonlysurpasses2019levelsby2027Withitsprofoundimpactonairtravel,theCovid-19pandemicexertedaheaviertollonjetfueldemandthanforanyotheroilproduct.Globalusagecollapsedby45%,toslightlylessthan4mb/din2020andtherecoveryfromtheselowsmadejetfueldominatedemandgainsin2022and2023,andwillpostthesinglelargestincreasebyproductintheforecast.However,thepaceofthisbounceissettoslowsharplyfrom2024oncetheresurgenceinaviationactivityislargelycompleteandmorestructuraldriversreturntothefore.Jetfuelusewillgoupatanaveragerateof150kb/dayearduring2024-28.Globalairtraffic,2019-2023(weekly)IEA.CCBY4.0.Source:OAG.Havingstabilisedataroundhalfof2019capacityflownby2H20,airtrafficstagedarobustrecoveryduring2021,2022andtheearlypartof2023.Thisreboundappearstobeclosetocompletion.Theglobalnumberofcommercialflightsnowexceedsequivalent2019levels,althoughmeasuresoftotalseatsandmilesflownstilllagslightly(assmalleraircraftandshorterroutesmakeupalargershareofthetotalthanpreviously).Onaverage,2021jetfuelusagewas63%of2019levels.020406080100120140JanFebMarAprMayJunJulAugSepOctNovDecMillionseatsflown20192020202120222023Oil2023DemandPAGE31IEA.CCBY4.0.Accordingtothelatestdata,thisroseto76%in2022andweexpectittobe91%in2023,withmostofthedifferencebeingaccountedforbyimprovementsinfueleconomysince2019.Domesticairtransportationhasrecoveredfasterthaninternationaltravel,accordingtoInternationalAirTransportAssociation(IATA)data.Thismeantthatitrosefrom36%oftotalpassengerairtrafficin2019to42%byApril2023,havingreached62%in2021.InApril2023,internationalrevenuepassengerkilometres(RPKs)were16.4%below2019levels,whiledomesticRPKswereupby2.9%.Thepandemicalsoplayedamajorroleinrestructuringtheregionaldistributionofairtraffic,whichwasmostconstrainedwheretherewerethegreatestrestrictionsontravel.Asaresult,theshareofglobalaviationintherelativelyless-impactedAmericasroseto35.2%inApril2023,accordingtoIATAdata,comparedwith27.5%in2019.USdomestictravelremainssteadyandflightsbetweentheUnitedStatesandLatinAmericahaveincreased.Notably,however,thereweresevererestrictionsoninternationaltraveltoandfromChinafor2020-22anddomesticflightsinthecountryduringthelockdownsof2022.Withrestrictionsrelaxedinlate-2022,Chinesedomesticflightnumbersrapidlyreturnedto2021levelsandinternationalflightsbeganamoregradualrecovery.InternationalflightsinvolvingChinaanditsneighboursnowaccountforthelargestincompleteshareofthereturnto2019activity.SinceChina’sreopeningattheendof2022,flightstothesecountrieshavegraduallyincreased,andweassumethattheywillreturnto2019levelsby4Q23.Thiswillmarkastepchangeindemandgrowthfrom2024onwards,withsubsequentstructuralgrowthhighlyconcentratedintheAsiaPacificregion(76%oftotal2023-28jet/kerosenegains)whererisingGDPandincreasingaccesstointernationaltravelwillbesufficienttooutweighimprovingfueleconomy.Commercialaircraftnowenteringserviceexhibitsignificantlyimprovedefficiencycomparedwiththosetheyreplace.Forexample,theAirbus320neohasfuelconsumptionthatis15%lowerthanthepreviousA320model.Boeing737MAXincreasedtheirfuelefficiencyby20%andlargerplanessuchasBoeing787orAirbusA350by25%.Combinedwiththeextenttowhichtheglobalfleetwasrenewedoverthepandemicyears,thismeansthatjetfueluseisunlikelytosurpassits2019peakuntil2027,whendemandwillexceed7.2mb/d.Environmentalregulationsandcommitments,combinedwithchangingconsumerbehaviour,willalsoweighondemand.ExpandingseabornetradesupportsmarinefuelgrowthWorldbunkerfuelconsumptionisforecasttoriseby300kb/dby2028,reaching4.5mb/d.RobustgrowthintradeandseabornefreightwillbemitigatedbytighteningefficiencystandardsimposedbytheIMO.Oil2023DemandPAGE32IEA.CCBY4.0.IMOregulations,designedtoreducecarbondioxideemissions,comeintoeffectinseveralphases.Phase1oftheEnergyEfficiencyDesignIndex(EEDI),from2015,requirednewvesselsoftherelevantsizetoproduceatleast10%lowerCO2emissions,relativetotheIMO’s2008baseline.From2020Phase2increasedthisto20%anda30%reductionwillbeimposedfromthestartof2025inEEDIPhase3.Sincetheserulesapplytonewvessels,theywilltakeeffectgraduallyasthefleetexpandsandoldervesselsarescrapped.IncorporatingfleetcompositiondatafromtheUnitedNationsConferenceonTradeandDevelopment(UNCTAD),weforecastthattheaveragegaininfuelefficiencyofglobalshippingcouldapproach10%duringtheforecastperiod,dependingontherateofreplacementofolder,less-efficientvessels.Internationalmarinebunkerdemand–impactofefficiencygains,2022-2028IEA.CCBY4.0.BasedonourmacroeconomicassumptionsandUNCTAD’sforecasts,weexpectthatunderlyingglobaldemandforseabornefreightwillgrowbyanaverageofalmost3%peryearfrom2022to2028.Thisfollowsaslightincreaseoverthepandemicyears(averagingjustover1%peryear).In2020and2021,relativelystrongdemandformovingmanufacturedgoodsfromexportingregions,especiallyEastAsia,toconsumerselsewhere,particularlyNorthAmericaandEurope,andrawmaterialstomanufacturingcentressupportedglobalshipping.Aslowdownintradeandchangesinthesizeandcompositionoftheglobalcommercialfleet,combinedwiththenewIMOrules,willlimitaveragemarinebunkerconsumptiongrowthto1.2%peryearfrom2022-28(300kb/doverall).WithouttheefficiencyimprovementsmandatedbyIMOefficiencystandards,projected2028demandwouldbemorethan400kb/dhigherin2028.3.03.54.04.55.05.52019202020212022202320242025202620272028mb/dBunkersforecastBunkers,withoutefficiencygainsOil2023DemandPAGE33IEA.CCBY4.0.DemanddevelopmentsbyregionAsiaPacificprovides90%ofglobaldemandgrowthByfar,thelargestgrowthinoildemandwilloccurinAsiaPacific,amountingto5.5mb/dfor2022-28.RegionalgrowthwillbesupportedbyincreaseddemandfornaphthaandLPG/ethane(+2.2mb/d),jet/kerosene(+1.3mb/d)andgasoil(+1.2mb/d).DemandinAfrica,Eurasia,theMiddleEastandLatinAmericawillalsorisestronglyovertheforecastperiod.Combined2028oiluseintheseregionswillincreaseby1.9mb/dversus2022levels.PetrochemicaldemandisprojectedtoplayasignificantroleinMiddleEasterngrowth.NorthAmericandemand,bycontrast,willplateauin2023at24.7mb/d,andsubsequentlydeclineby240kb/dperyearonaveragethrough2028.Europeanoildemand,averaging14.9mb/din2022,willbebuttressedbytheincreaseinjetfuelconsumptionthrough2024beforestartinganoveralldeclineaveraging120kb/dannuallythereafter.NeitherNorthAmericanorEuropewillreturntotheir2019levels.Globalcumulativeoildemandgrowthbyregion,2022-2028IEA.CCBY4.0.NorthAmerican,Europeanoildemandplateausin2023-2024,thencontractsAlthoughoildemandrosebyacombined1mb/din2022,growthinEuropeandNorthAmericawillslowtoahaltin2023-24ashigherenergyefficiencyinthe-2.0-1.00.01.02.03.04.05.06.0NorthAmericaS&CAmericaEuropeAfricaMiddleEastEurasiaAsiaPacificmb/dOil2023DemandPAGE34IEA.CCBY4.0.transportsector,penetrationofEVsandsubstitutionbyotherenergiescurbfueluse.Otherfactors,suchasteleworkingandlessfrequentbusinesstravel,willalsocontribute.Oildemandbyproduct(mb/d):NorthAmerica,2019-2028NorthAmericandemandisprojectedtogrowby100kb/din2023andsubsequentlydecline.Oildemandwillshrinkby230kb/dperyearonaverageoverthe2024-28periodonimprovedfueleconomiesinpassengercarssupportedbygovernmentpolicies.Ethanedemand,whichgrewquicklyuntil2022,willseethistrendresumeafter2026asnewcapacitycomesonline.NeithertheUnitedStates,CanadanorMexicowillseeoildemandreturntopre-Covidlevels.Additionally,demandineachofthethreecountriesreachesapost-pandemicpeakin2023.NorthAmericacumulativeoildemandgrowthbyproduct,2022-2028IEA.CCBY4.0.Followingaprojectedincreaseof50kb/din2023,Europeanoilconsumptionisexpectedtodeclinebyanaverageof120kb/dperyearfrom2024.By2028,Europeanoildemandwillbe1.4mb/dbelowits2019level.Gasoiluseisseenfallingfrom2022onwards,whilegasolinegrowthbeginstodeclinefrom2023asrisingEVsalesandefficienciesunderminedemand.20192020202120222023202420252026202720282022-28GrowthRate2022-28GrowthLPG/Ethane3.43.53.63.83.83.73.73.73.73.80.1%0.0Naphtha0.30.30.30.20.20.20.20.20.20.20.7%0.0Gasoline10.99.510.310.310.410.310.19.89.69.3-1.7%-1.0Jet/Kerosene2.01.21.51.81.91.91.92.02.02.01.6%0.2Gasoil/Diesel5.14.74.95.05.04.94.94.94.84.8-0.8%-0.2Residualfueloil0.50.40.50.60.50.50.50.50.50.5-1.7%-0.1Otherproducts2.82.62.82.92.92.92.92.92.92.90.2%0.0Totalproducts25.022.123.924.624.724.524.324.023.823.5-0.8%-1.1Annualchange0.0-2.91.80.70.1-0.3-0.2-0.3-0.2-0.2-1.2-1.0-0.8-0.6-0.4-0.20.00.20.4LpgandnaphthaGasolineJetkeroseneGasoilOthermb/dOil2023DemandPAGE35IEA.CCBY4.0.Oildemandbyproduct(mb/d):Europe,2019-2028Thedropingasoildemandislargerthanthereductioningasolineduetoeffortstodisplaceheatingoilandashifttogasolineenginecarsfromdiesel.TheshareofgasolinecarsintotalICEcarsalesgrewfrom63%in2020to69%in2022,whilediesel’ssharewentdownfrom37%to31%,accordingtotheEuropeanAutomobileManufacturers’Association.Thetotalgasoilfleetplateauedat48%in2018andshouldshrinkto35%by2028.Jetfueldemandgrowsthroughtheendoftheforecastperiod,approachingbutnotattainingpre-Covidlevels.GasolineversusdieselinEuropeanICEcarfleet,2006-2028IEA.CCBY4.0.In2028,EuropeanandNorthAmericanoildemandwillbe1.4mb/dand1.5mb/dlowerthanin2019,respectively.20192020202120222023202420252026202720282022-28GrowthRate2022-28GrowthLPG/Ethane1.31.21.21.11.21.21.21.21.21.21.2%0.1Naphtha1.11.11.11.01.01.01.01.01.01.0-0.3%0.0Gasoline2.32.02.22.32.32.32.22.22.12.1-1.3%-0.2Jet/Kerosene1.60.80.91.31.51.51.51.61.61.63.0%0.3Gasoil/Diesel7.16.56.86.86.76.56.46.36.26.1-1.9%-0.7Residualfueloil1.00.80.91.01.01.01.01.01.01.00.0%0.0Otherproducts1.41.41.31.31.31.31.31.31.41.40.4%0.0Totalproducts15.713.714.514.914.914.814.714.614.514.3-0.6%-0.5Annualchange0.0-2.00.80.40.1-0.1-0.1-0.1-0.1-0.220%30%40%50%60%70%80%200620082010201220142016201820202022202420262028GasolineDieselOil2023DemandPAGE36IEA.CCBY4.0.Europecumulativeoildemandgrowthbyproduct,2022-2028IEA.CCBY4.0.AsiaandmostemergingeconomiestopoststronggrowthInAsiaPacific(includingOECDAsiaOceania),demandwillriseby5.5mb/dduring2022-28,representingabout90%ofthetotalworldgrowth.Asinotherregions,transportfuelsleadthegainsintheinitialstagesoftherecovery.Overalldemandfirstexceedsitspre-pandemiclevelin2023.Oildemandbyproduct(mb/d):AsiaPacific,2019-2028Chinawillcontinuetoaccountforaroundone-sixthofworldoildemandandhalfofglobaloilconsumptiongrowth,asitsuseexpandsby2.9mb/dbetween2022and2028.However,thisincreaseisheavilyfront-loaded:afteramassive1.5mb/dreboundpost-lockdownsin2023,oildemandgrowthdeceleratestoroughly290kb/dy-o-yonaveragefrom2024to2028.ThisslowdowncorrespondswithChina’seconomyproceedingalongapathofstructurallylowerGDPgrowthasitseraofdouble-digiteconomicexpansionnowhavingconclusivelyended.Itspresenttargetof5%peryearstandsinmarked-0.8-0.6-0.4-0.20.00.20.4LpgandnaphthaGasolineJetkeroseneGasoilOthermb/d20192020202120222023202420252026202720282022-28GrowthRate2022-28GrowthLPG/Ethane4.44.44.64.95.15.25.45.55.65.72.5%0.8Naphtha4.54.54.84.95.25.55.86.06.16.34.2%1.4Gasoline7.57.07.57.57.87.98.08.07.97.91.0%0.4Jet/Kerosene2.91.91.81.92.52.82.93.03.13.29.2%1.3Gasoil/Diesel9.38.69.09.49.79.910.110.210.410.52.0%1.2Residualfueloil2.42.42.52.62.72.72.72.72.72.71.0%0.2Otherproducts4.95.35.44.84.84.84.94.95.05.00.9%0.3Totalproducts35.934.035.735.837.838.839.740.340.941.32.4%5.5Annualchange0.5-1.91.70.22.01.00.90.70.50.5Oil2023DemandPAGE37IEA.CCBY4.0.contrasttotheaverage9%sincethecountryembarkedonitsshiftfromaplannedtoamarketeconomyin1978.GDPgrowthissettodeceleratefurthertowards4%attheendoftheforecastperiod.Oildemandbyproduct(mb/d):China,2019-2028Demographicsareattheheartofthisdownturn.China’spopulationdeclinedin2022afterdecadesofslowingbirthrates.Thisdevelopmentshrankthevastlabourpoolunderlyingthelow-costmanufacturingmodelthatfuelledthe1990-2010economicboom.Propelledbydebt-fuelledinfrastructureinvestment,thecountryisstillcomingtotermswiththeera’slegacyofoverleveragedcorporationsandlocalgovernments,misallocatedcapital,andamassivepropertyslump.Chinacumulativeoildemandgrowthbyproduct,2022-2028IEA.CCBY4.0.Beijing’sattemptstopivotfromaneconomicmodeldrivenbyconstructionandmanufacturingtooneledbyservicesemergedin2023asconsumptionoftheretail-orientedfuelsgasolineandjet/kerosenebenefitsfromreboundingmobility.Bycontrast,gasoiluseisdepressedbyaglobalmanufacturingslump.Inaddition,thepolicyshiftisreflectedinchangesinthedemandproductmixovertheentireforecastperiod.Gasoil,linkedtoindustrialuse,willseeitssharedropbytwo20192020202120222023202420252026202720282022-28GrowthRate2022-28GrowthLPG/Ethane1.81.81.92.12.32.42.52.52.62.63.8%0.5Naphtha1.41.51.61.82.12.32.62.82.82.87.8%1.0Gasoline3.43.23.53.43.73.73.73.63.63.50.8%0.2Jet/Kerosene0.90.80.80.60.91.01.11.11.21.213.9%0.7Gasoil/Diesel3.23.03.23.33.63.63.73.73.73.71.8%0.4Residualfueloil0.40.50.50.60.60.60.60.60.60.61.2%0.0Otherproducts3.03.53.52.92.92.92.92.93.03.00.6%0.1Totalproducts14.114.315.114.716.116.617.017.317.517.63.1%2.9Annualchange0.50.10.8-0.41.50.50.40.30.10.10.00.51.01.52.0LpgandnaphthaGasolineJetkeroseneGasoilOthermb/dOil2023DemandPAGE38IEA.CCBY4.0.percentagepointsto21%between2022and2028,whileretail-drivenjet/kerosenewillrisebythreepointsto7%.Conversely,gasoline’ssharewillfallby3%to20%asvehicleelectrificationoutweighsthe2023post-lockdownreleaseofpent-uptraveldemand.Lastly,thepetrochemicalsectorwillseethelargestrelativeincrease,asLPG/naphtha’ssharerisesbyfourpercentagepointsto31%.Thesectorbenefitsfromapolicyprioritisationofeconomicself-sufficiencyamidescalatinggeopoliticaltensions,withChinaaimingtoreduceitsrelianceonpolymerimportsbygreatlyexpandingitspetrochemicalcapacity.Oildemandbyproduct(mb/d):India,2019-2028IndiaissettoovertakeChinaintermsofglobaly-o-yoildemandgrowthin2027.Thefastest-growingeconomyintheworld,withGDPgrowthaveraging6.9%for2024-2028,isaidedbybenigndemographics.IndiasurpassedChinatobecometheworld’smostpopulouscountryin2023.Althoughitsrateofexpansionhasbeenslowingfordecades,populationgrowthwilllikelynotpeakuntil2065.Furtherpropelledbytrendssuchasurbanisation,industrialisation,andtheemergenceofawealthiermiddle-classkeenformobilityandtourism,Indianoildemandwillgrowbymorethan1mb/dbetween2022and2028.Gasoil,themainfuelbyfar,willseeitsshareoftheproductmixclimbfrom32%to35%overtheforecastperiod.ActivityandtradeintherestofSoutheastAsiaaresettobenefitfromIndia’supbeateconomicprospects.MalaysiaandIndonesia,keyIndiantradingpartners,areseeingsimilarincreasesinoilconsumptiontoIndia’s,ofabout20%between2022and2028.20192020202120222023202420252026202720282022-28GrowthRate2022-28GrowthLPG/Ethane0.80.90.90.90.91.01.01.01.01.02.1%0.1Naphtha0.30.30.30.30.30.30.30.30.30.44.3%0.1Gasoline0.70.70.80.90.90.91.01.01.01.02.2%0.1Jet/Kerosene0.20.10.10.20.20.20.20.20.20.26.3%0.1Gasoil/Diesel1.61.51.51.71.81.91.92.02.12.24.3%0.5Residualfueloil0.10.10.20.20.20.20.20.20.20.20.6%0.0Otherproducts1.11.01.01.11.11.21.21.21.21.31.6%0.1Totalproducts5.04.64.95.35.55.65.86.06.16.33.0%1.0Annualchange0.0-0.40.30.40.20.20.20.10.20.2Oil2023DemandPAGE39IEA.CCBY4.0.Indiacumulativeoildemandgrowthbyproduct,2022-2028IEA.CCBY4.0.GrowthwillremainmutedinCentralandSouthAmericaamidslowingeconomicactivity,withBrazil,whereannualdemandgrowthdeceleratesfromaround70kb/din2022-24to20kb/din2028acaseinpoint.GDPgrowthinBrazil,responsibleforalmosthalfofLatinAmericanoildemand,willrecoversomewhatfromanaemiclevelsin2023towards2%attheendoftheforecastingperiod.Still,thecountry’seconomicperformanceisrelativelylacklustre,mirroringtheentireregion,especiallyincomparisontoAfricaandAsia.Lowproductivityandhighunemploymentmakeforasubduedeconomicoutlook,whileelevatedinflationandstrainedpublicfinanceslimitthescopeformonetaryorfiscalstimulus.WeprojecttotalCentralandSouthAmericademandtobe640kb/dabove2022levelsby2028.Oildemandbyproduct(mb/d):CentralandSouthAmerica,2019-2028Africanoildemandin2028willbe530kb/dhigherthanin2022asGDPgrowth,buttressedbythecontinent’srapidlyexpandingpopulation,exceeds3%onaverageovertheforecastperiod.Thisresultsinsteadygainsinroadtransportfuels.Africa’soiluseisheavilyskewedtowardsgasoil(makingup40%oftotalconsumption)asuseofdieselgeneratorsremainswidespreadamidlimitedaccesstoreliableelectricitygrids.Amongtherefinedproducts,LPGwilllead0.00.10.20.30.40.50.6LpgandnaphthaGasolineJetkeroseneGasoilOthermb/d20192020202120222023202420252026202720282022-28GrowthRate2022-28GrowthLPG/Ethane0.60.60.70.70.70.70.70.70.70.71.6%0.1Naphtha0.20.10.10.20.20.20.20.20.20.20.1%0.0Gasoline2.01.71.92.02.02.02.12.12.12.11.5%0.2Jet/Kerosene0.30.20.20.30.30.30.30.30.30.34.1%0.1Gasoil/Diesel2.32.12.32.42.42.52.52.52.62.61.4%0.2Residualfueloil0.50.40.50.50.50.50.50.60.60.61.9%0.1Otherproducts0.70.60.70.70.70.70.70.70.70.71.0%0.0Totalproducts6.75.86.46.66.76.86.97.07.17.21.5%0.6Annualchange0.0-0.90.60.20.10.10.10.10.10.1Oil2023DemandPAGE40IEA.CCBY4.0.consumptiongrowthat4.7%peryear.Urbanisationunderpinsthisrobustincreaseof150kb/doverthe2022-28period,largelyduetomorewidespreaduseofpropaneandbutaneincookingattheexpenseoftraditionalbiomass.ThisswitchisaidedbygovernmentpoliciesthatincentivisetheuseofLPG,acleancookingfuel.Oildemandbyproduct(mb/d):Africa,2019-2028PetrochemicalsdrivegrowthintheMiddleEastandEurasiaOildemandintheMiddleEastwillbenefitfromgrowthinthepetrochemicalsector,withLPG/ethaneandnaphthauseincreasingby600kb/dversus2022levels.Gasolinedemandisalsoprojectedtopoststronggainsof170kb/dovertheperiod,reflectingtheregion’sexpandingpopulationandcomparablylimitedfuelefficiencygains.However,weexpectoverallconsumptiontobepartiallyoffsetbyplanstoswitchtonaturalgasandrenewablesinthepowersector,whichwillaffectdirectcrudeburn,gasoil,andfueloiluse.MiddleEasterndemandisforecasttoincreaseby720kb/din2028versus2022levels.Oildemandbyproduct(mb/d):MiddleEast,2019-2028Finally,Eurasianoiluseisexpectedtofinishtheforecastperiod140kb/dabove2022,withpetrochemicalsbeingthemaindriverofgrowth.ThiswilloccurdespiteacontractioninRussia,where2028demandwillbeabout3%below2022’slevel.20192020202120222023202420252026202720282022-28GrowthRate2022-28GrowthLPG/Ethane0.40.40.50.50.50.50.50.60.60.64.7%0.1Naphtha0.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.6%0.0Gasoline1.21.11.21.21.21.21.21.21.31.31.1%0.1Jet/Kerosene0.30.20.20.20.20.20.20.20.30.34.2%0.1Gasoil/Diesel1.71.51.61.71.71.71.71.81.81.81.6%0.2Residualfueloil0.30.20.30.40.40.40.40.40.40.42.0%0.0Otherproducts0.30.30.30.30.30.30.30.30.30.31.5%0.0Totalproducts4.13.84.04.24.34.44.54.64.74.82.0%0.5Annualchange0.0-0.40.30.20.10.10.10.10.10.120192020202120222023202420252026202720282022-28GrowthRate2022-28GrowthLPG/Ethane2.22.22.22.22.32.32.42.52.62.73.4%0.5Naphtha0.30.30.30.30.30.30.40.40.40.44.8%0.1Gasoline1.71.51.61.71.81.81.81.91.91.91.5%0.2Jet/Kerosene0.60.30.30.50.50.50.60.60.60.63.3%0.1Gasoil/Diesel1.71.51.61.71.71.71.81.81.81.81.1%0.1Residualfueloil1.31.21.31.41.41.41.41.41.31.3-0.6%-0.1Otherproducts1.11.11.11.21.21.21.21.11.01.0-3.2%-0.2Totalproducts8.88.18.59.09.29.39.49.69.79.81.3%0.7Annualchange0.0-0.80.40.60.20.10.10.20.10.1Oil2023DemandPAGE41IEA.CCBY4.0.Thecountry’sGDPgrowthaverageswellbelow1%between2024-28,witheconomicprogresssufferinginthefaceofsanctionsandmajorpetrochemicalprojectsonhold.Oildemandbyproduct(mb/d):Eurasia,2019-202820192020202120222023202420252026202720282022-28GrowthRate2022-28GrowthLPG/Ethane0.80.90.91.00.91.01.01.01.01.11.6%0.1Naphtha0.20.20.20.20.20.20.20.20.30.34.0%0.1Gasoline1.01.01.11.11.11.11.11.21.21.21.1%0.1Jet/Kerosene0.30.20.30.20.20.20.20.20.20.2-1.1%0.0Gasoil/Diesel1.21.11.21.31.31.31.21.21.21.2-1.0%-0.1Residualfueloil0.20.20.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.1%0.0Otherproducts0.60.60.70.70.60.60.60.60.70.7-0.2%0.0Totalproducts4.34.24.54.64.64.64.64.74.74.70.5%0.1Annualchange0.0-0.10.30.10.00.00.00.10.10.0Oil2023SupplyPAGE42IEA.CCBY4.0.SupplyGlobalsummaryCapacitybuildingeasesasenergytransitionacceleratesAnexpansioninglobaloilproductioncapacity,dominatedbytheUnitedStatesandotherproducersintheAmericas,issettomoderateprogressivelyoverthemediumterm.However,thegainsstillkeepupwiththeslowerpaceofprojecteddemandgrowthoverthe2023-28forecastperiod.Theworld’stotalsupplycapacityisforecasttopostanetincreaseof5.9mb/dto111mb/dby2028,butamarkedslowdowninUSadditionsseesoverallglobalcapacitygrowtheasingannuallyfromanaverage1.9mb/din2022-23tojust300kb/dbytheendoftheforecast.Thebroaddecelerationinproductioncapacitybuildinglargelyreflectstheglobalpivottowardscleanerenergyandacorrespondingweakerdemandoutlook.Thiscreatesasparecapacitycushionofanaverage4.1mb/d,concentratedinSaudiArabiaandtheUAE,whichshouldhelpensurethatworldmarketsareadequatelysuppliedthroughoutthemediumterm.Globaloilsupplycapacityanddemandforecast,year-on-yearchange,2022-2028IEA.CCBY4.0.Note:AssumesIranandRussiaremainundersanctions.ProducersoutsidetheOPEC+alliance(non-OPEC+)dominatemedium-termcapacityexpansionplans,withanet5.1mb/dsupplyboost,or86%ofthetotalincrease.TheUnitedStatesaloneaccountsforhalfthenon-OPEC+growth,whileBrazilandGuyanacontributeanadditional1.9mb/dinLatinAmerica.-0.50.00.51.01.52.02.52022202320242025202620272028mb/dUSNon-OPEC+LatamOtherNon-OPEC+SaudiArabiaUAEOtherOPEC+DemandOil2023SupplyPAGE43IEA.CCBY4.0.SaudiArabiaandtheUAEleadtheOPEC+capacitybuildingeffort,whileAfricanandAsianmembersstrugglewithcontinuingdeclines.TheseMiddleEastheavyweightsareboostingcapacitynowinanticipationofhigherlong-termdemandfortheirbarrels.Overallcapacityfromthe23membersintheOPEC+alliancerisesby800kb/d,whichleavesasparecapacitycushionofatleast3.8mb/d.TheoutlookforRussiaiscloudedbythecurrentgeopoliticalsituation,butweexpectcapacitytofallassanctionslimititsabilitytoexport,forcingsomeproductiontobeshutin.Longerterm,thedepartureofWesterncompaniesinthewakeofRussia’sinvasionofUkrainemayalsocurbcapacitygrowthduetoprojectdelaysstemmingfromalackoftechnologyandequipment.OPEC+sparecrudeoilproductioncapacityIEA.CCBY4.0.Note:AssumesIranandRussiaremainundersanctions.Russiaaddedfrom2022onwards.Asforinvestment,globalupstreamcapitalexpendituresissettorisebyUSD54billiontoUSD528billionin2023,thehighestsince2015.Industryinvestmentingiantprojectshasslowedsharplyamidtheshifttowardsalowercarbonfuture.Ouranalysisshowscompaniesaretargetingsmaller,short-cycleprojectsandselectoilfielddevelopmentsintheAmericasandMiddleEast.Theseexpansionplanstendtobelowercostandlow-carbonprojectswithshorterpaybackperiodsascompaniesaimtoavertthepotentialforstrandedassetsamidincreasedenvironmental,socialandgovernance(ESG)pressuresandexpandingclimateinitiatives.GlobalupstreamoilScope1and2carbonemissionsareforecasttodrop11%from2022to2028,whileemissionsintensityfallsby15%givencurrentlyStatedPoliciesScenario(STEPS)andwheregrowthoccurs.02468102016201720182019202020212022202320242025202620272028mb/dOffmarketduetosanctionsOthersUAESaudiArabiaOil2023SupplyPAGE44IEA.CCBY4.0.Howgreenisthegrowth?Oilandgasoperationscurrentlyaccountfor15%oftheworld’senergy-relatedemissionsandtheindustryisunderpressuretoplayabiggerroleinenergytransitions.Lessthan5%ofoilandgasproductionhas2030targetsthatalignwiththeIEA’sNZEScenario,accordingtoanewIEAreport,EmissionsfromOilandGasOperationsinNetZeroTransitions.Overoursix-yearforecast,theworld’soilproductionisexpectedtogrowby5.8mb/dwhiletheScope1and2emissionsintensityofglobalupstreamoiloperationsissettofallbyaround15%,leadingtoanabsolutereductioninemissionsof11%.RegionalupstreamoilproductionScope1and2emissionsin2022and2028IEA.CCBY4.0TheUnitedStates,theworld’stopoilproducer,alsoaccountsforthegreatestshareofemissionsfromoiloperations.Lastyearitaccountedfor16%ofglobalScope1and2upstreamemissionsand19%ofsupply.TheBidenAdministrationhasputclimateactionatthetopofitsagendawiththeUSInflationReductionAct(IRA)andisenforcingpoliciestomitigatemethaneemissions,reduceflaringandincreasetheuseofcarboncapture,utilisationandstorage(CCUS).Asaresult,weestimatethatUSupstreamoilemissionswilldrop40%evenasproductiongrowsby13%overtheforecastperiod,mainlythroughreductionsinmethaneemissions.TheMiddleEast,hometo33%oftheworld’scurrentsupplyand26%ofupstreamoilemissions,isforecasttoproduce7%moreoilin2028whilegenerating4%lessemissions.Whileshowingsignsofprogress,someoftheregion’sproducerssuchasIran,IraqandQatarhavemoreroomtoimprovethanothers.IntheUAE,theAbuDhabiNationalOilCo(Adnoc)hasalreadycommittedtoamethaneintensityof0.15%by2025andtoreduceitsgreenhousegas(GHG)intensityby25%by2030.SaudiAramcohasanextensiveleakdetectionandrepair(LDAR)14%9%17%1%26%24%9%AfricaAsiaCaspianEuropeMiddleEastNorthAmericaSouthAmerica14%10%17%1%29%18%11%20222.2GtCO2-eq20282.0GtCO2-eqOil2023SupplyPAGE45IEA.CCBY4.0.programmethathaskeptitsmethaneemissionsamongthelowestintheindustryandhasamastergascapturesystemthathasledtoveryhighflaringefficiencies.NorthAmericaleadsinupstreamoilScope1and2emissionsreductionsIEA.CCBY4.0TacklingScope1and2emissionsfromoilandgasoperationsisoneofthemostviableandlowestcostoptionstoreducetotalGHGemissionsto2030.Curbingmethaneemissionsfromupstreamoperationsrepresentsoneofthebestopportunitiesgiventhelargescopeforcost-effectiveabatementthroughpoliciesaimedatLDARandstricterequipmentdesign.Limitingnon-emergencyflaringandelectrifyingoperationscanalsoplaylargerolesinreducingemissions.Theexactpathofemissionsreductionswilldependonpolicydecisionsandindustryresponsiveness.Yet,thedecarbonisationofoilandgasoperationsisneededandmustbepartofenergytransitions.Theindustryalsoneedstoadoptaconsistentapproachtomonitor,reportandverifyemissionsfromitsactivitiesbasedonrobustmeasurementstobuildpublicconfidenceinactionsbeingtaken.GlobaloilsupplygrowthconcentratedintheAmericasTheoutlookforactualsupplygrowth,asopposedtocapacity,showstheUnitedStates,alongwithBrazilandGuyana,dominatinggains,accountingfor80%oftheincreaseovertheforecastperiod.Tomatchourprojectedoildemandgrowthoverthenextsixyears,anincreaseof5.8mb/dwouldberequiredforsupplytoreach105.7mb/dby2028.Underthisforecast,theUnitedStatesaloneprovidesnearly45%ofthetotalrisewhiletheMiddleEastaccountsforjustover40%.Collectively,OPEC+contributes12%ofthegrowthasdeclinesfromRussiaandAfricanmemberstempergainsfromMiddleEastcountries.6070809010011012020222024202620282022=100AfricaAsiaCaspianEuropeMiddleEastNorthAmericaSouthAmericaRelativechangesinemissions0204060801001201402022202420262028Emissionintensitykg-CO2/bblOil2023SupplyPAGE46IEA.CCBY4.0.DrivenbytheUnitedStatesandothercountriesintheAmericas,worldoilproductionwillovertakepre-Covid-19levelsthisyearandcontinueitsupwardtrajectoryinthemediumterm.TheUnitedStates,BrazilandCanadaareallforecasttopumpatunprecedentedratesthisyearandthetrioisexpectedtosetfreshrecordsthrough2028.Qatarhitsitshighesteveroutputtowardstheendofthemedium-termperiod.SaudiArabiaandtheUAE,constrainedfornowbyOPEC+quotacutsthatcameintoeffectfromNovember2022andvoluntarycurbsfromMay2023thatareduetorunthrough2024,areexpectedtoproduceathistoricalhighsinthelateryearsoftheforecast.Russia,undertheweightofsanctions,poststhebiggestlossoverthesix-yearperiod,whileunderinvestmentleadstonotabledeclinesinMexicoandAngola.Oilsupplychangesforselectcountriesfrom2022-2028IEA.CCBY4.0.Note:AssumesRussiaandIranremainundersanctions.Supplyin2023isforecasttoriseby1.4mb/dtoreacharecord-highannualaverageof101.3mb/d.Butthatisasharpslowdownfromgrowthof4.5mb/din2022,whichwasdominatedbytheOPEC+allianceasitphasedouthistoric2020cutbacks.By2028,thesupplyexpansionedgesdowntojust390kb/d–inlinewithadecelerationinoildemandduetocontinuedprogressinenergyefficiencyandtheuptakeofelectricvehicles.TheslowdowninUSgrowthwillenableproducersfromtheMiddleEast–ledbySaudiArabia,IraqandtheUAE–toaddbarrelstomeetdemandgrowth.Asaresult,marketsharefromtheregionrisesto32%in2028from30%in2023.Givencurrentinvestmentandmarkettrends,theMiddleEast’sshareofworldoilproductionlookssettoincreaseoverthelongerterm.99.9105.70.30.50.72.61.00.90.80.61.596100104108mb/dOil2023SupplyPAGE47IEA.CCBY4.0.MiddleEastregainsmarketshareoverthemediumtermIEA.CCBY4.0.Note:AssumesRussiaandIranremainundersanctions.InvestmentandexplorationGlobalspendingrecalibratesasdemandgrowthslowsGlobalupstreamoilandgasinvestment,upendedbyCovid-19andlingeringuncertaintyduetotheaccelerationofenergytransitions,issettoincreasebyaround11%in2023toanestimatedUSD528billion,comparedwithUSD401billionin2021andUSD474billionin2022(seetheIEA’s2023WorldEnergyInvestmentreport).Upstreaminvestmentplans,inrealterms,are47%below2014.Yearsofefficiencygains,costcontrolsandcapitaldiscipline,punctuatedbymeasurestakenduringthepandemic-inducedbalancesheetcrisis,havereducedliftingcostsandwellheadbreakevenprices.However,tighteningmonetarypolicyandanongoinglabourshortage,higherrigratesandmaterialcostsarechallengingthesehard-wongainswithincreasingcostpressures.TheIEAGlobalUpstreamCostIndexrose22%in2022comparedwith2020,andtheIEAUSShaleCostIndexsurged38%.However,globalandUSdevelopmentcostsremain15%and5%lowerthanthehighsof2014,respectively.28%30%32%34%36%38%40%02040608010012020182019202020212022202320242025202620272028mb/dMiddleEastRestofworld%MarketshareOil2023SupplyPAGE48IEA.CCBY4.0.GlobaloilandgasupstreamcapitalspendingIEA.CCBY4.0.Source:IEAanalysisbasedoncompanyreports.Nationaloilcompanies(NOCs)invested14%morein2022,overtakingthe2019level,drivenprimarilybycapacitybuildingeffortsinSaudiArabiaandtheUAE.SaudiAramcoraiseditsupstreamspendingbyabout24%toUSD29billionandplansfurtherincreasestoboostitscrudeoilcapacityto13mb/dby2027.TheUAE’sAdnocplanstospendUSD150billionoverthenextfiveyears.OilandgascapitalspendingbyselectedcompaniesIEA.CCBY4.0.Source:IEAanalysisbasedoncompanyreports.MajorcompaniesincludeBP,Chevron,ConocoPhillips,Eni,ExxonMobil,ShellandTotalEnergies.USindependentcompaniesinclude18selectedcompanies.WhiletheabsolutelevelofspendintheMiddleEasthasrecoveredtoprevioushighs,mostoftheupstreaminvestmentincreasesin2022wereforlighttightoil0200400600800100012002014201520162017201820192020202120222023EUSDbillionActualGuidanceReal(USD2022)0510152025020406080100201820192020202120222023mboe/dUSDbillionsMajorE&PcompaniesGuidanceActualProduction0510152025020406080100201820192020202120222023mboe/dUSDbillionsUSindependentE&PcompaniesOil2023SupplyPAGE49IEA.CCBY4.0.(LTO),withaselectgroupofUSindependentexplorationandproduction(E&P)companiesraisingCapexbyabout40%.USindependentsareexpectedtospendmorein2023butcontinuedcapitaldisciplineandinvestor-orientatedpolicieswillkeeptheirCapexbelow2019levels.Upstreamcapitalexpendituresfromthemajors,whichincludesBP,Chevron,ConocoPhillips,Eni,ExxonMobil,ShellandTotalEnergies,climbedbyUSD14billionin2022afterpostingdeclinesin2020-21.Projectdelaysandincreasedcapitalefficienciesdrovethelower-than-expectedspendingbythepeergroupinthepreviousyear.Capexguidancefor2023indicatescontinuedmodestincreaseswithsimilarcorporateallocationsbetweensegments(broadlyspeaking,asupstream,downstreamandnewenergies).ConventionaldiscoveriesslowasexplorationbifurcatesIn2022,improvementsinoilmarketconditionsledtothesanctioningofprojectsthatareexpectedtoadd1.6mb/dtoglobalproductionby2028.Brazilaccountsfor20%ofthesanctionedvolumes,whiletheUnitedStatesandGuyanaeachcontribute14%andSaudiArabiaprovides12%.TheBraziliangainscomeprimarilyfromMeroandBúzios,twolargemulti-phaseprojectseventuallycomprisedof15floatingproductionstorageandoffloadingvessels(FPSOs)betweenthem.InGuyana,theExxonMobil-ledprojectwillcommissionfournewFPSOsaddingcloseto800kb/dofoutput.ProjectsinthedeepwaterGulfofMexico(GoM)andthePikkaprojectinAlaskasupporttheUSgains.ConventionalproductionadditionsbysanctionyearIEA.CCBY4.0.Note:Expectedproductionbyyearbasedonsanctionedprojects.Source:IEAanalysisbasedonRystadEnergyUCubedata.0246810201820202022202420262028mb/d20222021202020192018Oil2023SupplyPAGE50IEA.CCBY4.0.Theinvestmentcutsaffectedexplorationspendmoreacutelythanotherbusinesssegments.Asaresult,conventionaloildiscoveriesin2021felltotheirlowestsince2016,withlessthan5billionbarrelsfound–nearlymatchinga50-yearlowandhalftheannualaverageseenoverthepreviousdecade,accordingtoRystadEnergy.In2022,discoveriesrecoveredmarginally,to6billionbarrels,butarestillafarcryfromhistoricalaverages.Theeffectsoflowerexplorationspendonglobalsupplyoutputhavebeenmutedoverthepastdecadeasthegrowthofnon-conventionalproduction–accountingfor130%oftheworld’stotalgrowthovertheperiod–morethanoffsetsdeclinesinconventionaloilproduction.Movingforward,itisunclearhowlongtheshalepatchcanbolstergrowth.Asobservedin2022,USLTO’spriceresponsivenesswasrelativelymutedcomparedtothelastdecade(seebox,“Shalegrowthatriskfromlowerprices,highercosts”).Additionally,newreserveadditionsinshalehaveslowedconsiderablyfromamassive10-yearaveragereservereplacementratio(RRR)of1580%inthe2000stothelatestfive-yearaverageRRRof33%,leadingtoinventoryquestionsinkeybasins.Wedonotseethischangingoverthemediumtermasshalelosesitsswingproducerstatus.ConventionaldiscoverieshaveslowedmarkedlyoverthelastdecadeIEA.CCBY4.0.Source:IEAanalysisbasedonRystadEnergyUCubedata.Globalconventionaloilsupplypeakedin2016asshaleproductionmovedapace.Theglobalfive-year(2018-22)RRRforoilis50%havingsteadilydeclinedfromalmost100%adecadeago.Conventionalresourcediscoveriesfromexplorationhaveaveraged7.5billionbarrelsayearforthelastdecade,farshortoftheapproximately27billionbarrelsofconventionalsupplylastyear.Thisdeclinehas015304560759010519901995200020052010201520202025mb/dConventionalOther(LTO,NGLsandnon-conventional)Worldoilsupply0601201800510152025302005201020152020BbblAustraliaAsiaMiddleEastAfricaN.AmericaS.AmericaEuropeRussiaExplCapexConventionaldiscoveriesandexplorationspendUSDBillionOil2023SupplyPAGE51IEA.CCBY4.0.beenduetolowerexplorationbudgetsandreducedriskprofiles.Thedeclineinresourceadditionshassparednoregionoverthelastdecade.Inthecomingyearsweexpectexplorationspendingtobedividedbetweenhigh-impactwellsinhotspotsandinfrastructure-ledexploration(ILX).HighactivityregionscurrentlyincludeNamibia,SurinameandGuyanawhileILXlocationsareinmoreestablishedareaslikeUSGoM,theNorthSeaandChina.ExxonMobilannouncedsevendiscoveriesin2021andninein2022inGuyana.InneighbouringSuriname,TotalEnergiesandAPACorporationstruckcommercialvolumesinBlock58atSapakaraSouthin2021andKrabdaguin2022.PetrobraswillleadinBrazil’sfrontierregions,includingthenorthernEquatorialMargininthecomingyears,attemptingtobuildontheirsuccessseenintheSantosBasin.PartsofwesternAfricahavealsogarneredrenewedinterestafterEni’sBaleinesuccessoffshoreCoted’Ivoirein2021andthemassivemultibillionbarrelsdiscoveriesoffthecoastofNamibiabyShellandTotalEnergieslastyear.Infrastructure-ledexplorationeffortstendtobeshorter-cycleanddonotneedtobeaslargeasstandaloneprojectstoproceed.BP’srecentGulfofMexicoArgostiebacktoMadDog2andEquinor’sFenjaprojectintheNorwegianSeaareexamplesofsuccessfulILXprojectsthathaveutilisedexistinginfrastructuretoreducethecostandcarbonfootprintofbringingnewresourcesonline.OPEC+supplyMiddleEastdrivesmodestOPEC+increaseOPEC+oilsupply,includingcondensatesandnaturalgasliquids(NGLs),isforecasttogrowbyjust690kb/doverthesix-yearperiod,withtheMiddleEast,ledbySaudiArabia,alongwithKazakhstanmorethanoffsettinglosseslargelyfromRussia,MexicoandAngola.Thisassumesthatfrom2025,supplyfromcoreGulfproducersrisesorfallsproportionallyinlinewiththecallonOPECcrudeoil.TogetherwithRussia,theseMiddleEastcountriesformthebackboneoftheOPEC+alliancethatprovidesaroundhalftheworld’ssupplyofoil.In2022,thebloc’soutputoftotaloil,includingcondensatesandNGLs,soaredby3.1mb/dtoanaverage52.1mb/dasitphasedoutrecord2020cuts.Thisyearcouldseeadeclineof470kb/d,withRussia–undertheweightofsanctions–andMiddleEastproducers,restrictedbyextraOPEC+cutsthatareduetorunthrough2024,allpumpingless.The23-memberallianceagreedtoreducesupplyinlate2022tosupportthemarketastheeconomicoutlookworsened,pressuringprices.OutputdroppedfurtherinMay2023afteranewroundofvoluntarycutsannouncedbyselectcountriesinApriltookeffect.InearlyJune,theblocextendeditsoutputreductionalongwithvoluntarycutsthrough2024.Oil2023SupplyPAGE52IEA.CCBY4.0.Growthfromtheblocisexpectedtoreturnfrom2025onwards–albeitatarelativelymodestaveragerateasthecallonOPECcruderisesby1.1mb/doverthe2025-28periodduetoslowingdemandandadecelerationinnon-OPEC+output.SaudiArabia,theUAEandIraqwilldelivermostoftheextrabarrelsasspendingonprojectsbeyondtheMiddleEastfalters.ThesecoreGulfproducersmayhavetosustainsupplyatornear-recordratestomakeupforongoingdeclinesfromAfricanandAsianmembersoftheblocaswellasRussia.OutsideoftheMiddleEast,Kazakhstanisalsoexpectedtoscalerecordhighs.Saudi,UAEdrivegainsincapacityandsupplySaudiArabiacouldpumpatornearrecord-smashingratesduringmuchofthesix-yearforecastbymakinguseofitssparecapacity.Thisyear,theextraOPEC+cutsannouncedinearlyApril(aswellasitsadditional1mb/dreductionforJuly)areexpectedtoslowtheKingdom’scrudeoilproductionto10mb/d,480kb/dbelowanall-timehighreachedin2022.From2025onwards,Saudisupplyisforecasttorisesteadily(whenadjustedforthecallonOPECcrude)andreachanunprecedentedannualrateof11.2mb/din2028.AgradualexpansionofitscrudeoilproductioncapacityallowsRiyadhtosustainasparecushionofroughly2mb/d.OPECcrudeoilproductioncapacitychange2023-2028IEA.CCBY4.0.Note:AssumesIranremainsundersanctions.SaudiAramcoisstrivingtoraisecapacityby1mb/dtoreach13mb/din2027byfocusingonitsgiantoffshorefields.Tounderpinthateffort,AramcoexpectstoboosttotalcapitalexpendituretobetweenUSD45billionandUSD55billionin2023(comparedtoUSD38billionin2022)andincreaseitfurtheroverthenextseveralyears.Nearly60%ofcapitalexpenditureisearmarkedfortheupstream.-0.4-0.20.00.20.40.60.81.0mb/dOil2023SupplyPAGE53IEA.CCBY4.0.Riyadh’scurrentproductioncapacityisestimatedat12.2mb/d,includingtheNeutralZone,whichhasbeenrestoredtoabout500kb/d.BeforeNeutralZoneproductionwashaltedin2015,theoffshore(mainlyal-Khafji)andonshore(mostlyWafra)fieldswerepumpingataroundthatrate.TheKingdom’sfirstmaterialcapacityboostinmorethanadecadeisforecasttocomeonlinegraduallystartingfrom2024-25,thankstohighercostprojectsattheoffshoreoilfieldsofMarjanandBerri(acombined550kb/d)andZuluf(around600kb/d).Theseprojectswilloffsetfielddeclineselsewhereaswellcontributetothebuildincapacityto13mb/d.Beyondtheforecastperiod,theoffshoreSafaniyahfieldisexpectedtoexpandby700kb/d.SaudiAramcohasmeanwhilepledgedtoachievenetzeroemissionsby2050aspartoftheKingdom’sstatedaimtoreachthatgoalonanationalbasisby2060.ItsneighbourtheUAEhasalsoannouncedplanstomeetitsnetzeroemissionstargetby2050.SaudiArabiaestimatedcrudeoilproductionandcapacityIEA.CCBY4.0.Note:ProductionprojectionadjustedforcallonOPECcrude.TheUAEhasbeenaggressivelyraisingcrudecapacityinrecentyearsandlooksontracktoprovidea690kb/dincreaseoverthesix-yearperiod.Annualaveragecrudeoutputin2022hitanall-timehighof3.3mb/dand,aftereasingthisyearandnextalongwithnewOPEC+cuts,risestorecord-breakinglevelslaterintheforecast.Productioncouldreach3.6mb/dby2028,leavingtheUAEwith1.2mb/dofsparecapacity.Itsrelativelylow-costresourcebaseandsecureoperatingenvironmenthavebolsteredtheUAE’sexpansioneffort,whichhasanofficialtargetof5mb/dby2027.Tosupporttheeffort,itplanstoincreasecapitalspendingfor2023-27to9101112131420182019202020212022202320242025202620272028mb/dCapacityProductionOil2023SupplyPAGE54IEA.CCBY4.0.USD150billionfromUSD127billionfor2022-26.Weestimatecurrentcapacityat4.2mb/dandseeitgrowingto4.8mb/din2028.Offshoreoilfieldsarecoretothebuild-up.CapacityattheExxon-operatedUpperZakumfield,oneoftheworld’slargest,reached1mb/din2021–threeyearsaheadofschedule.Furthergrowthisplannedovertheforecastperiod.Tothatend,AdnochasawardedcontractstoSchlumberger,AdnocDrillingandHalliburtontoboostUpperZakumaswellastheSatahal-Razbootfields.TheUAE-basedNationalPetroleumConstructionCorpissettodevelopamuchsmalleroffshoreblock,whichisexpectedtopumpfirstoilin2023.TheblockismadeupoftheBelbazem,Ummal-SalsalandUmmal-Dholoufieldsandisexpectedtoproduce45kb/d.Iraq,UAEhelpdriveOPEC+supplygainsIEA.CCBY4.0.Note:ProductionassumptionadjustedforcallonOPECcrude.Foritsonshoresector,whichproducesflagshipMurbancrude,Adnocplanstoinvesttosustaincapacityatthe650kb/dBuHasa,itslargestonshoreoilfield.ItwillalsoraisecapacityattheAlNoufoilfieldto175kb/dby2024from160kb/dnow.Tosupportgains,Adnochascarriedoutonshoreandoffshorelicensingrounds.ItawardedexplorationrightsforonshoreBlock3toOccidentalPetroleum.Fortheoffshore,itgrantedBlock5toaconsortiumoffourPakistanicompanies,Block3toEniandThailand’sPTTEPandBlock4toCosmo.Iraqispoisedtodelivercapacitygrowthof560kb/dtoreachnearly5.3mb/din2028.Asforactualsupply,thecountryduring2022pumpedanannualrateof4.4mb/d.Thisyear,itisexpectedtoproduce4.2mb/d,whichwouldleaveitwithroughly500kb/dofsparecrudeoilcapacity.0123456201820202022202420262028mb/dSouth/CentralNorthKRGProductionIraqcrudeoilproduction,capacity0123456201820202022202420262028MurbanUpperZakumOthersProductionUAEcrudeoilproduction,capacityOil2023SupplyPAGE55IEA.CCBY4.0.Productioncapacityhasbeenconstrainedintheshorttermbyinfrastructurebottlenecksatitssouthernterminals.BaghdadsaysexportcapacityintheGulfwilleventuallyrisebyaround200kb/dto3.45mb/dafterfinishingtheinstallationofnewpumps.Iraqisalsostrivingtobringafifthsinglepointmooringbuoyintooperation,whichcouldaddatleast500kb/dtosouthernexportcapacity.Whiletherearemanyabove-groundchallengesthatcanfrustrateprojectexecution,Iraqisstraddlingsomeoftheworld’smostvastandlowestcostresources.ThesouthernoilhubofBasrah,whereinternationaloilcompanies(IOCs)aremanagingmegaprojects,willprovidemostofthecapacitygainsoverthemediumterm.BP,Eni,ExxonMobilandLukoilcurrentlymanageacombined3mb/datRumaila,Zubair,WestQurna-1andWestQurna-2,respectively.TotalEnergiesalsohasaUSD27billionenergyprojectonthedrawingboard.Thecompanyfinallystruckanagreementin2023withBaghdadonitslong-delayedschemetoconstructfourseparateoil,gasandrenewablesprojectswithinitialinvestmentofUSD10billion.TheIraqigovernmenthasnowagreedtotakeasmaller30%stakeintheproject.TotalEnergieswillhold45%andQatarEnergy25%.Thefirstphaseincludesaprojecttoinject5mb/doftreatedseawaterintocoresouthernoilfieldstosustainpressure.TotalEnergieswillalsoraiseoutputattheRatawioilfieldfrom85kb/dto210kb/dandbuildalargesolarpowerplant.Additionally,thecompanywillbuildaprocessingplantforgasproducedatWestQurna-2,Majnoon,Ratawi,TubaandLuhais.AtWestQurna-1(capacityof500kb/d),Indonesia'sstatePertaminahasdoubleditsstaketo20%byacquiringa10%sharefromExxonMobil.DiscussionsarestillunderwayforthesaleofExxon’sremaining22.7%shareinthesouthernfieldtoIraq'sBasrahOilCo.In2013,ExxonsoldalmosthalfitssharetoChinaNationalPetroleumCorp,whichcurrentlyholds32.7%.Capacityatthefieldisexpectedtorisetowards700kb/doverthenextseveralyearsonthebackofadrillingcontractsignedwithSchlumberger.AtWestQurna-2,Lukoilhasreportedlyliftedcapacityby80kb/dto480kb/dfollowingthecompletionof47newwells.Atthe300kb/dMissanfieldclusterofBuzurgan,AbuGharibandFakka,aprojecttoupgradeanoilandgasseparationunitatAbuGharibisunderway.BaghdadalsoplanstoboostoutputatMajnoon,nowpumpingroughly130kb/d,to450kb/doverthenextseveralyears.ThenorthernKirkukoilfieldsandthecapacitythatiscontrolledbytheKRGareexpectedtocontributeonlymarginalgrowthovertheforecastperiod.ThereareplanstoraiseKirkuk’scapacityto1mb/dfromroughly500kb/d.However,effortstoboostoutputhavebeenfrustratedbythelong-runningfeudbetweenBaghdadandtheKRGovercontroloflandandoil.ShipmentsalongtheIraq-TürkiyepipelinetotheTurkishMediterraneanterminalofCeyhanhavebeenhaltedsincetheendofMarch2023,forcingtheshut-inoftheKRG’sproduction.Oil2023SupplyPAGE56IEA.CCBY4.0.OfthecoreGulfproducers,Kuwaitisexpectedtoseearelativelymodestincreaseincapacity.Annualaveragecrudeoilproductionin2022rose280kb/dto2.7mb/dafterOPEC+cutswereunwound,leavingitwithvirtuallynosparecapacity.Overthesix-yearforecastperiod,weprojecta190kb/driseincapacityto3mb/d.Kuwaitestimatedcrudeoilproductionandcapacity,2018-2028IEA.CCBY4.0.Note:Otherisprimarilylightoil.Kuwaiticapacityhadbeenslippingsince2018duetoongoingfielddeclines,falling250kb/dtoroughly2.8mb/din2021.Ithassincebeenhoveringaroundthatlevelbutweprojectaslightincreasestartingnextyearasthecountryplansforanambitiousdrillingprogrammeandmoreinfrastructureinvestment.WeexpectamodestincreaseinNeutralZonecapacity(250kb/dforKuwait)tohelpoffsetfurtherdeclinesinthesouthatthegiantBurganoilfield,whichhassufferedthesteepestlosses.AlthoughCovid-19setbackanumberofexpansionprojects,a100kb/dcrudeoilgatheringcentrestartedupin2021alongwithnewfacilitiestohandle60kb/dofLowerFarsHeavyOil.Kuwaitismeanwhiletargetinga500kb/dcapacityexpansionoverthenextseveralyearsthankstoanannualdrillingprogrammeof500wells,constructionoftwogatheringcentresaswellaswaterinjectionfacilitiesandotherinfrastructurethatarenowunderway.However,thatcapacitygoalislikelytoproveoptimistic.RevivinganddevelopingKuwait’sageingandcomplexoilfields(aswellasthoseoftheNeutralZone)willrequiresubstantialinvestmentstounderpinthedrillingeffortalongwithmoreexpensiveenhancedoilrecoverytechnology.0.00.51.01.52.02.53.03.520182019202020212022202320242025202620272028mb/dSouthNorthWestOtherNeutralZoneProductionOil2023SupplyPAGE57IEA.CCBY4.0.Iransupplyedgesup,butsanctionsstymiecapacitygrowthIranremainsawildcardforworldoilmarkets.Ifitisreleasedfromsanctions,productioncouldrampupgraduallybyroughly900kb/dtoreachcapacityof3.8mb/d.Talkstorevivethe2015Irannucleardeal,whichwouldeasesanctions,havebeenonicesinceSeptember2022.However,reportsrecentlyhaveemergedsuggestingthepotentialforsomesanctionsreliefforTehran.Irancrudeoilproduction,1986-2028IEA.CCBY4.0.Note:Assumessanctionsremainthroughouttheforecastperiod.Despitetoughfinancialrestrictions,Iranmanagedtoincreasecrudeoiloutputbyabout130kb/din2022toanaverage2.5mb/d.TehranappearstobekeepingupbriskoilsalestoChinathathavebeenrunningatanestimated1mb/dsincethethirdquarteroflastyear.BeforetheformerUSadministrationwithdrewfromtheJointComprehensivePlanofActionnucleardeal(JCPOA)in2018,exportsofIranianoil,includingcondensates,hadbeenrunningabove2mb/d.HigherexportsanddomesticthroughputhavepushedIraniancrudeproductionuptoaround2.9mb/dinMay2023andwehaveheldthatlevelthroughouttheremainderoftheforecastperiod.WebelieveIranisstillabletomaintainitssprawlingoilnetwork,enablingittorampuprelativelyswiftlyifandwhensanctionsareeased.LowerwellheadproductionmostlikelyledtheNationalIranianOilCotoshutinwellsatitshigh-costoffshorefieldsandperformmaintenanceatitsmatureoilfields.Shuttinginoutputcanbehelpfulforageingoilfieldsasitwillallowpressuretorebuildandmakeiteasierforoperationstorestart.1.52.02.53.03.54.0198619911996200120062011201620212026mb/dSanctionsIran-IraqWarOil2023SupplyPAGE58IEA.CCBY4.0.Asforcapacitybuilding,Iran’seffortsinthisrespecthavelargelystalledgiventheobstaclesposedbythecollapseofexportssincetheendof2018andthelackofforeigninvestmentduetosanctions.Thepreviousroundofinternationalsanctionshadalreadylefttheoilsectorinurgentneedofforeigncashandtechnology,particularlyinenhancedoilrecoverymethodstosustainandraiseoutputatolderoilfields.ButTehranislookingtothecoreWestKarunoilfieldsofNorthandSouthAzadegan,YaranandYadavarantodrivefuturegrowthwitha1mb/dboost.Undeterredbysanctions,Iranexpectsin2023todoublecapacityto320kb/datitssouthernAzadeganfield,whichstraddlestheborderwithIraq.OPECcrudeoilproductioncapacity(mb/d)OiloutputinOman,includingcondensatesandNGLs,isprojectedtoholdrelativelysteadyovertheforecastperiodatjustshyof1.1mb/d.Theongoingdevelopmentofoffshorefieldsandthoseofferedinits2021bidroundareexpectedtohelpsustaincrudeoilproductioncapacity.Toattractupstreaminvestment,Omanhasofferedthreeonshoreblocksforoilandgasexplorationinitslatestlicensinground.Anotherroundforoffshoreblocksisduetobeannouncedlaterthisyear.Thesultanatehasalsoseta2050netzerotargetandisstrivingtorampupdomesticrenewablehydrogenproduction(seetheIEA’sRenewableHydrogenfromOman:AProducerEconomyinTransitionreport).RussiangrowthstorystallsduetoUkraineinvasionPriortoitsinvasionofUkraine,Russia’stotaloilproductionwasexpectedtoriseby100kb/dtoreach11.3mb/din2025,beforetaperinglower.Butnowoursupplyforecastistrendingaround600kb/dbelowthatpre-warestimate.In2022,totaloilsupplyrosebyamodest220kb/dto11.1mb/d.Andthisyear,despitesanctions,Russianoilsupplyhasheldupremarkablywell.Crudeandproductexportshave20222023202420252026202720282022-28Algeria1.01.01.01.01.01.00.9-0.1Angola1.21.11.01.00.90.90.8-0.4Congo0.30.30.30.30.20.20.2-0.1EquatorialGuinea0.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.0Gabon0.20.20.20.20.20.10.1-0.1Iran3.83.83.83.83.83.83.80.0Iraq4.74.74.84.95.05.15.30.6Kuwait2.82.82.92.92.93.03.00.2Libya1.21.21.21.21.21.21.20.0Nigeria1.41.31.31.21.21.21.1-0.2SaudiArabia12.212.212.412.712.913.013.00.8UAE4.14.24.34.44.54.74.80.7Venezuela0.80.80.80.80.80.80.80.1TotalOPEC33.733.934.134.434.835.035.31.5AnnualChange0.10.10.20.30.40.20.3Oil2023SupplyPAGE59IEA.CCBY4.0.beenre-directedtonewmarketsasdeeppricediscountsattracttraderswillingtoriskhandlingthebarrels.Atthesametime,drillingisbeingrampedupinthewesternSiberianoilhub.Asaresult,weexpecttotaloilsupplytofallbyjust290kb/dy-o-yto10.8mb/d.Our2023-24estimatetakesaccountofMoscow’sself-declaredcutof500kb/dthatextendsfromMarchthroughtheendof2024.Theworld’sthird-largestoilproduceraftertheUnitedStatesandSaudiArabia,RussiaadmitsthatfindingnewmarketswillbeachallengeandthatupstreamprojectsmaybedelayedassomedomesticproducersstruggletosecureequipmentandfinancingandasWesterninvestorsandlendershavemostlyquitthecountry.Weareassumingthatsupplywilleasefurtherthrough2028,withanetdecreaseof710kb/dforthesix-yearforecastperiod.Moscow’sabilitytoself-financeitsoilindustryoperationsanditsaccesstoChineseequipmentandservicesmaystaveoffafarsteeperdecline.ButatougheningofwesternfinancialmeasuresimposedonRussiacouldalsoresultinasharperdowntrend.Russiaestimatedtotaloilsupply,2021-2028IEA.CCBY4.0.Note:Assumessanctionsremainthroughouttheforecastperiod.Russia’slargestoilproducershadplannedasignificantincreaseininvestmentaimedatbolsteringoutput,butnowthoseplansappeartobeonice.MoscowhadbeenlookingincreasinglytoitshugeresourcesintheArctictoprovidegrowthtosupportproductionasitsmaturefieldsaredepleting.Tappingthosehardtorecoverreserveswillrequiresignificantandmorecostlyeffortscomparedtoconventionalfields.Andinthecurrentenvironment,itisunclearwhetherRosneft’sVostokOilmegaproject,acrucialsourceofArcticgrowth,willbeabletoachieveitsdevelopmenttargets.Thehopewasthattheprojectwouldrampuptowards600kb/din2024.Rosneft,thecountry’stopproducer,saystheprojectisstillontrackandthatithasstarteddrillingatthedevelopment’sPayakhafield.Although10.210.410.610.811.011.211.420212022202320242025202620272028mb/dOil2023estimatePre-invasionestimateOil2023SupplyPAGE60IEA.CCBY4.0.thepre-invasionaimwastoboostoutputtomorethan1.5mb/d,thislooksincreasinglydifficulttoachieveinthemediumterm.ProductioninneighbouringKazakhstanandAzerbaijaneasedlastyearduetooperationalconstraintsandvariousoutages.ButregionalsupplieswillbesupportedbythefurtherexpansionofTengizinKazakhstanandthestart-upoftheBP-ledAzeriCentralEastplatform.InKazakhstan,totaloiloutputedgeddownto1.8mb/din2022butisexpectedtorisetoarecord2.1mb/din2025andhoveraroundthatlevelthroughtheendoftheforecast.TheChevron-ledconsortiumthatoperatesTengizhasstartedearlyflowsfromaUSD45billionprojecttoboostoutputto850kb/dandsupportgrowthintheyearsahead.Theso-calledTengizFutureGrowthProject-WellheadPressureManagementProjectisnearingcompletion.Tengiz,thecountry’slargestoilfield,pumpedanaverage635kb/din2022.AtthegiantKashaganoilfield,outputisduetoreacharound450kb/dfrom2025onwards.Thefieldisnowproducingroughly400kb/d.Kazakhstanismeanwhileworkingwithinternationaloilcompaniestoraisespendinginrenewablestohelpitthroughtheenergytransition.State-ownedKazmunaigashasvowedtoreduceitscarbonemissionsby15%by2031andhasawardedsolarandwinddevelopmentschemestoforeigncompanies.Azeritotaloilsupplyslippedin2022to670kb/dandisforecasttohoveraroundthatlevelthroughouttheforecast.Althoughoutputhasbeendecliningforyears,BPisontracktodeliveroilfromtheUSD6billionAzeriChirag-Guneshli(ACG)expansionprojectnextyear.OperatorBPexpectstoproduceanextra100kb/dfromtheAzeriCentralEastplatform.Afterreachinganannualaveragepeakofroughly840kb/din2009,ACGpumped390kb/din2022.AfricanOPEC+tosufferfurtherlossesApartfromLibya,AfricanOPEC+membersareexpectedtosuffersignificantlossesoverthesix-yearperiodasproducersfailtolureenoughinvestmenttohaltdeclines.NigeriabrieflylostitsrankasAfrica’stopcrudeoilproducerin2022asoutputsankto40-yearlows.Ithassincereclaimedthetopslotaftermajorexportstreamsrecoveredandstabilised.Weexpecttoseeashort-livedrebound,withchronicunderinvestmentandsabotagecontinuingtotakeatolloncapacityandproduction.Crudeoiloutputtumbledto1.1mb/din2022andcapacityisexpectedtodeclinefrom1.4mb/din2022to1.1mb/din2028.Nigerianoilofficialshaverepeatedlyset,andmissed,targetsforthecountrytoovercomeproductionissues.OperatorshavebeenurgedtoreopenwellsasOil2023SupplyPAGE61IEA.CCBY4.0.quicklyastheycan.Andfinally,majorcrudestreamsareshowingsomesignsofrecovery,althoughtheextentofthereboundremainstobeseen.CrudeoilproductionofBonnyLighthasrecoveredtoaround100kb/dcomparedtojust50kb/din2022.Forcadosisalsoshowingmorepromise:outputinearly2023wasaround200kb/d–upfromanaverage150kb/din2022.QuaIboeoutputhasbeenfairlysteadyataround150kb/d.OPEC+Africacrudeoilproductioncapacity(y-o-ychange)IEA.CCBY4.0.Note:OtherOPEC+AfricaproducersareLibya,Algeria,EquatorialGuinea,Gabon,Congo,SudanandSouthSudan.ThebattletoreversedeclinesandrepairageinginfrastructureunderscoresthechronicunderinvestmentinNigeria’scrucialoilsector.Apoorregulatoryframeworkandsabotageofoilfacilitiesaredeterringneededspending.Additionally,newdiscoveriesinotherAfricancountriesareofferingviablealternativestoinvestorswhosedecisionsnowincorporateemissionsintensityandfasterreturnsascriticalmetrics.Formany,thefutureoftheNigerianoilindustryhingesonthesuccessofthePetroleumIndustryActtospurnewinvestment.ThenewlawhasestablishedregulatorybodiesbothintheupstreamanddownstreamsectorsandtheincorporationofNNPCLimited.Thelawalsooffersimprovedfiscaltermstoinvestorsthatthegovernmentbelieveswillattractsubstantialnewspending.However,recentsignalsfrominternationaloilcompaniesdonotlookpromising.ShellandExxonMobil,forinstance,haveannounceddivestmentplans.TotalEnergiesisreportedlyseekingtosellits12.5%stakeindeepwaterOML118,whichincludestheBongafield.OutputfromtheblockisexpectedtorisewhenevertheShell-operatedBongaSouthwestprojectfinallygetsoffthedrawingboard.-0.4-0.3-0.2-0.10.00.10.20.30.420182019202020212022202320242025202620272028mb/dAngolaNigeriaOtherOPEC+AfricaOil2023SupplyPAGE62IEA.CCBY4.0.Onabrighternote,the32kb/dIkikeoilfield,operatedbyTotalEnergies,cameonlinelastyear.ItisoneofthreeprojectsalongsideOwowoandPreoweithatTotalEnergieshasonitsbooks.Plaguedbyoperationalandtechnicalissuesatitshigh-costdeepwateroilfields,Angola’scrudeoilcapacityisexpectedtofallby350kb/dto820kb/dby2028.The2021-22start-upofanumberoffieldshashelpedtostemsomeofthenear-termdeclines.Crudeoilproductionwasbroadlysteadyy-o-yatabout1.1mb/din2022,butthatisdownfromapeakof1.8mb/din2015.TotalEnergies’sZiniaPhase2projectinBlock17reachedapeakof40kb/dlastyear.ThedeepwaterprojectwillfeedintoPazflorexports.OutputfromEni’s10kb/dCuicaand15kb/dCabacaNorthfieldswillberoutedtotheOlombendoFPSOintheeasternhubofBlock15/06.EnialsostarteduptheNdungufieldonthewestoftheblockin2022.Moreshort-termliftcouldbeprovidedfromExxonMobil’sdiscoveryattheoffshoreBavucaSouth-1well,partoftheBlock15redevelopmentplan,whichisexpectedtodeliver40kb/d.TotalEnergiesmeanwhilesignedaheads-of-agreementin2023thatpavesthewayforalong-awaitedfinalinvestmentdecisiontodeveloptheoffshoreCameiaandGolfinhofieldsonBlocks20and21.Ifgiventhego-ahead,theprojectwouldproduceoilforthefirsttimefromthedeepwaterpartoftheKwanzabasinwithinitialproductionofaround70kboe/d.Aprolongedperiodofcivilunrestin2022ledtoa150kb/dannualdropinLibyancrudeproductionto995kb/d.Butbymid-2023,outputhadrecoveredtoabout1.15mb/d.Asforcapacity,weexpectlevelstoholdbroadlysteadyataround1.2mb/doverthesix-yearperiod.Thisofcoursedependsonpoliticalstabilityandinvestmenttofundinfrastructurerepairs.Toatleastsustaincurrentlevels,Libyamustrelyonthesouthwesternel-Shararaoilfield,thecountry’slargest,whichispumpingaroundfullcapacityof300kb/d.ThenearbyElephantfieldcanproduceupto80kb/d.Intheeast,theAbuAttifelandZueitinaoilfieldscaneachcontributearound70kb/d.OtheroilfieldsintheeastoperatedbyArabianGulfOilCo(Agoco)andSirteOilCocanproducearound200kb/dand80kb/d,respectively.TheoffshoreBouriandal-Jurffieldsadd80kb/dbetweenthem.LocatedinthenortheastSirteBasin,theWahaOilCo,withcurrentcapacityofroughly400kb/d,isalsokeytofurthergrowth.Libya’senergynetworkhasbeenbatteredbycivilwar,militantattacksandalackofmaintenance.AfurtherboostinproductionwillrequirerehabilitationofanumberoffieldsintheeasternSirteBasin,replacementofdamagedstoragetanksattheeasternRasLanufandEsSiderterminalsandrepairofmajorpipelines.Oil2023SupplyPAGE63IEA.CCBY4.0.LibyaestimatedcrudeoilproductionandcapacityIEA.CCBY4.0.Note:ProductionassumptionadjustedforcallonOPECcrude.ThereisalsosomehopethatIOCswillseektoinvestinitsrelativelylow-costproduction.TotalEnergieshassaiditispreparedtodeveloptheWahaconcessions–especiallytoboosttheNorthGialofieldto100kb/dandrestore40kb/dofoutputattheMabrukoilfieldafteritwastargetedbyIslamicStatein2016.Tatneft,whichsignedfourproductionserviceagreementswiththeLibyanNationalOilCorpintheGhadamesandSirtebasins,hasrestartedseismicexplorationinBlock4/82inthealHamadaarea.Mexicooutlookdeteriorates;VenezuelastemslossesAfterRussia,MexicopoststhelargestlossamongOPEC+producers,dropping500kb/dto1.5mb/d.Itslong-termoilproductiondeclineshowsabriefrespitein2022-23astheQuesquifieldrampsupinearnest.ThesectorhashaditsupsanddownssincethepandemicwhenPemexseverelycurtailedplannedinvestments.FleetwoodEnergy’sIchalkil-PokochprojecthasbeenoperatingcontinuouslysincestartupandEni’sArea1hasshownsteadyincreasesinvolumessincetheMiamteFPSOwasputintoservicein2022.Additionally,recentlargediscoveriesbyEniandWintershallDeahaveaddedtothosesuccesses.Tostymiedeclinesinlateryears,commissioningtheZamaandTrionfieldswillbecrucial.Equinor’scountryexitandShell’sstringofdryholeshaveraiseddoubtsaboutMexico’slong-termgrowthprospects.0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.420182019202020212022202320242025202620272028mb/dCapacityProductionOil2023SupplyPAGE64IEA.CCBY4.0.MexicototalproductionandcontributionbynewfieldsIEA.CCBY4.0.Venezuelaappearstohavefinallystemmedalong-runningdecline,withcrudeoilproductionrisingforasecondstraightyeartoreach700kb/din2022(+90kb/dy-o-y).Thatisstill70%downon2016,whenitstoodatnearly2.5mb/d.Furthermodestgainscouldbeinstorethisyear.TheUSattheendof2022loosenedsanctionsonCaracasfollowingtheresumptionoftalksbetweenPresidentNicolasMaduroandoppositionparties,allowingChevrontorestartoperationsatfourjointventureswhereitisaminoritypartner:PetroPiar,Petroindependencia,PetroBoscanandPetroIndependiente.Washingtonimposedsanctionsin2019onVenezuelathatbannedmostactivitybyUSfirmsinthecountryandhaltedtheimportofthecountry’soilintotheUnitedStates.UnderthenewUSTreasurylicence,Chevron’sjointventureswithPetroleosdeVenezuela(PDVSA)canproduceoil(includingimportingdiluent)andtheUScompanycanliftthatoilasrepaymentforinvestmentsithasmadeinVenezuelanassets.Butnear-termproductionupsideisexpectedtobelimitedduetolong-overduemaintenanceandmodestoperationalimprovements.Asaresult,wehaveonlyslightlyincreasedourcrudeoilcapacityestimateto840kb/dthroughtheremainderoftheforecast,althoughaturnaroundinthepoliticalsituationwouldprovidetheopportunitytorebuildtheenergysector.Anyrecoveryinproductionwouldrequirereplacinglostprofessionalskillsandinvestmentcapitalnowandforthelongerterm.PDVSAismeanwhileaimingtoboostoutputbyreopeningwellsandcarryingoutmaintenanceinitsvastOrinocoBelt.Upgradersmanagedbyforeignjointventurepartnersintheheavyoilbelthavemalfunctionedduetolackofmaintenanceanddifficultysourcingequipment,poorsecurityandcorruption.TotalEnergiesandEquinorhavedivestedtheirsharesinthePetrocedenojointventureduetoitshigh0.00.51.01.52.02.5201820202022202420262028mb/dKMZCantarellOtherBaselineNewfields0.00.20.40.60.8201820202022202420262028PriorityfieldsMiztonAmocaTecoalliHokchiIchalkilAyatsilOil2023SupplyPAGE65IEA.CCBY4.0.carbonintensity.Thetransferoftheirrespective30%and10%sharesinPetrocedenotoaunitofPDVSAwillgivethestate100%control.TheprojectincludestheJuninoilfieldintheOrinocoBeltanda200kb/dupgraderthatblendstheextra-heavycrudeintolightercrude,whichPDVSAhasrestarted.Non-OPEC+supplyNon-OPEC+supplygrowsintandemwithdemandTheAmericasdrivea5.1mb/dincreaseinnon-OPEC+volumesoverthesix-yearforecastperiod.USgrowthcontinuestobeledbylighttightoildevelopments,specificallyinthePermianBasin.Guyana,poweredbytheExxonMobil-ledLizaproject,isemergingasasubstantialproducer,andexplorerscontinuetofindnewresourcesinitsterritorialwaters.Farthersouth,Brazilrampsupproduction,withIOCsaddingbarrelsandPetrobrascommissioninghalfofthenewFPSOsintheworld.TheVacaMuertashaleplayinArgentinahaslargeupsidepotentialandinfrastructureisbeingputinplacetoeasetakeawaycapacityconstraints.TotalNon-OPEC+supply(mb/d)Otherpartsofthenon-OPEC+worlddonotlookquiteaspromising.TheNorthSeaisonthefrontlineoftheenergytransitionwithsecure,stableandlow-emissionoilproductionandfacessomeofthegreatestoppositiontohydrocarbonextraction.Adecade-longdeclineinAsiaPacificoilproductioncontinuesascompaniespivottowardsgasdevelopments.OthercountriesinSouthAmericaareattemptingtoattractmuchneededcapitaltotheupstream,butitistooearlyto20222023202420252026202720282022-28OECD27.328.529.029.429.629.729.72.4OECDAmericas23.624.825.325.726.126.426.63.0OECDEurope3.23.23.23.33.12.92.7-0.4OECDAsiaOceania0.50.50.50.40.40.40.4-0.1Non-OECD15.315.716.116.416.717.017.11.9FSU0.30.30.30.30.30.30.30.0Europe0.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.0China4.24.34.34.34.24.14.0-0.2OtherAsia2.02.01.91.91.81.71.7-0.4Non-OECDAmericas5.66.06.46.87.07.37.51.9MiddleEast1.91.91.91.92.12.22.20.3Africa1.11.11.11.21.31.31.40.3Non-OPEC+Oil42.544.245.145.946.446.746.84.3ProcessingGains2.32.42.42.52.52.52.50.2GlobalBiofuels2.93.13.33.43.43.53.60.6Total-Non-OPEC+47.849.750.951.752.352.752.95.1AnnualChange1.51.91.20.80.60.40.2Oil2023SupplyPAGE66IEA.CCBY4.0.determineiftheywillbesuccessful.Africaseessomecountriesproducetheirfirstbarrelswhileothersdealwithlegal,security,orCovid-19relateddelaysanddisruptions.USshalematurestoahigherreturn,lowergrowthtrajectoryApostCovid-19recoveryinUSoilproductionwassolidifiedin2022withproductionup1.1mb/dy-o-y.Totaloilsupplyisexpectedtoincreasebyafurther1.1mb/donaveragein2023toreachanall-timehighof19mb/d.However,thepaceofexpansionmarkedlyslowsfrom2024onwardsasproducersnavigatetheenergytransitionandUSLTOcompaniesstrugglewithhighercosts,increasingdeclineratesandloweroutputfromnewwellsdrilled.Despiteclimateaction,concernsofunderinvestmentandasharpslowdowninLTO,theUnitedStatesisstillthelargestcontributortomedium-termsupplygrowthat2.6mb/dby2028,ofwhich1.7mb/discrudeoil.NGLproductionisforecasttoriseby860kb/dto6.7mb/d,ledbyhigherethaneexports,asUSLTOcontinuestogrowandnaturalgasproductionshiftstomoreliquids-richplays.USgrowthexpectationsmoderatedbyshiftinginvestmentstrategiesIEA.CCBY4.0.UScrudeoilproductiongrowsto13.6mb/din2028,settingnewrecordhighsthrough2027.TheincreaseisledbyLTO,primarilyfromthePermianBasin.Theshalepatchhasmaturedfinanciallytoalowergrowthtrajectoryasitfocusesondisciplinedinvesting,de-leveragingandreturningcashtoshareholders.Reinvestmentratesof40-60%areexpectedoverthemediumterm,comparedwithmorethan160%from2015-17.Publiclylistedcompanieswilllikelycontinue0510152025201820202022202420262028mb/dLTOGulfofMexicoAlaskaOtherCrudeNGLsOtherLiquidsUStotaloilsupply-2-10123201820202022202420262028UStotaloilsupplygrowth(y-o-y)Oil2023SupplyPAGE67IEA.CCBY4.0.toprioritiseshareholderreturns,looktoincreaseefficienciesthroughacquisitionsandlimitorganicproductiongrowth.USLTOproductiongrows2.1mb/dfrom2022to2028,to10mb/d,whileconventionalUSonshoreoutputisexpectedtodeclineby550kb/doverthesametimeframe.Overallshaleaveragesjustshyofa4%perannumgrowthrate,withthePermianBasinproviding80%.Gainsarefront-loadedas780kb/dofadditionsthisyearslowtojust170kb/din2028.ProductivityincreaseshaveplateauedorreversedinkeyLTObasinsIEA.CCBY4.0.Notes:Wellcostperbarreldeterminedbydividingthemedianwellcostsbythemedianestimatedultimaterecoveries.NormalisedIP90ratesaremedianflowratestaken90-daysafterawellisputonproductionnormalisedbythemedianlaterallength.Source:IEAanalysisbasedondatafromRystadEnergyShaleWellCube.Investmentrateshavecontinuedtorecoverbutmayneverreturntopre-Covidlevelsasimprovementsinproductivityhad,inaggregate,beenleadingtolowerrecoverycostsfrom2016until2022.Althoughthatmaybelittleconsolationfordrillerstodayastheyfeelthepinchofhighspecrigdayratesthathaveincreasedover50%inthelastyear,continuedtightnessofhydraulicfrackingequipment(frackspreads)andpersistentlabourissues,aswellasreducedwellflowrates.Furthermore,thoseinvestmentdollarswilltargetcost-andcarbon-advantagedbarrelsascompaniesfocusonreducingthecarbonintensitytomeetESGpressures.Foroilandgasexecutives,thequestiontodaymaynotbeclimatechangeperse,butinmaintaininginvestorconfidencethattheycanadapttheirbusinessmodelstotheimpendingchanges.Anaccelerationofdecarbonisationeffortsthroughcapitalredeployment,acquisitionsandstrategicpartnershipsisexpectedovertheforecastperiod.0481216MidlandDelawareEagleFordBakkenDJBasinUSD/bbl20182019202020212022Wellcostperbarrel04080120160MidlandDelawareEagleFordBakkenDJBasinNormalizedIP90ratesb/dper1000feetOil2023SupplyPAGE68IEA.CCBY4.0.Shalegrowthatriskfromlowerprices,highercostsThereactionofshaleproductiontodifferentpricesiscriticaltomarketsasithasbeenaswingproduceralongsideOPEC+inbalancingmarketsoverthelasteightyears.Yet,theresponsivenessoftheUSshaleindustryvis-à-vispricinghaschangedinthewakeoftheCovid-19pandemic(seeNovember2021OilMarketReport).Thiswasespeciallytrueinthesummerof2022whenpricessurgedbutactivitylevelscontinuedalongtheirsametrajectory.Equipmentavailability,lowerreinvestmentrates,productivitychallengesandincreasedcostshavesqueezedtheindustry’sabilitytorespondandskewedriskstothedownside.WhileWestTexasIntermediate(WTI)atUSD75/bblisstillsufficienttocoveroperatingexpensesevenforthelowestquartileofoperatorsinthePermianBasin,formanycompaniesitisveryclosetothresholdpricingfordrillingnewwells.Afteralmostconsistentlyfallingsince2015,wellheadbreakevenpricesroselastyearandare,sofar,ontracktologasecondyearofincreases.Wellheadbreakevenpricesforshaleinkeybasinsare,onaverage,USD14/bbllowerthanhalf-cyclebreakevencosts.BasecaseUSLTOproductionandwellheadbreakevenpricesIEA.CCBY4.0.Source:IEAanalysisbasedondatafromRystadEnergyShaleWellCube.Formodellingpurposes,thisreportassumesthat30%ofproductionismoreresponsivetoforwardstrippricingwiththeother70%lesspriceresponsiveduetohedgingprogrammes,long-termcorporateplanningorotherfactors.That,coupledwithproductionefficiencyandmulti-yearcorrelationsofcompletionactivitytomargins,formsthebasisofourforecast.Inourbasecase,LTOoutputisexpectedtoincreaseby2.1mb/dtoaround10mb/din2028.Shouldpricesapproachtripledigitsonasustainedbasisor,conversely,staybelowthethresholdfordrillingnewwells,producersandoilfield0246810122015201720192021202320252027mb/dUSLTOproductionMidlandDelawareBakkenEagleFordDJ/NiobraraOther01020304050602015201720192021USD/bblWellheadbreakevenpricesOil2023SupplyPAGE69IEA.CCBY4.0.servicecompaniesareexpectedtorespondaccordingly.Ourhigh-pricesensitivitycaseestimatesthatanincremental920kb/dofproductioncouldcomeonlineby2028,whereas,inourlow-pricesensitivity–essentiallyfollowingtheforwardcurve–wewouldexpectroughly1.7mb/dofdownsidepotentialfromourbasecase.USLTOproductionwithhighandlow-pricesensitivitiesIEA.CCBY4.0.Notes:OilpricesusedforthebasecasearebasedonaspotcrudepriceofaboutUSD76/bblforNorthSeaDated,andweassumethislevelremainsconstantinrealtermsovertheforecastingperiod.High-pricescenario:Assumesoilpricesincreaseby2.5%inrealtermsperannum,inlinewiththeirlong-termhistoricalpattern.Low-pricescenario:EstimatesoffuturespotpricesarebasedontheICEBrentforwardcurve(averagingUSD79/bblin2023slowingtoUSD67/bblin2028).Thesearethendiscountedtorealterms.IntheUSGulfofMexico,supplyisexpectedtoriseby140kb/dbetween2022and2028,to1.9mb/d.Productionpeaksin2026at2.1mb/dafterninemajornewprojectscomeonline.Theseinclude360kb/dofcapacityfromfourprojectsthatstartedupin2022and2023,andanother350kb/dofprojectsbeingcommissionedin2024and2025.After2025,productionwillbegintodeclineunlessadditionalprojectsreachafinancialinvestmentdecision(FID)intheverynearterm.TheresultsfromthefederalUSGulfofMexicoLeaseSale259(29March2023)achievedthehighestgrossreceiptssince2019andconfirmthatcompaniesareinterestedinmaintainingafootprintintheGoMafterthiscurrentwaveofprojects.Oftheblocksbidon,closetotwo-thirdsarewithin40kmofanexistinghub–indicatingadesireforafastertimecycleandlowercostsofdevelopmentutilisingexistinginfrastructure.CanadianoilsandsrisedespiteriskofhighercarbontaxCanadianproductioncontinuestorecoverfromits2020slump.Optimisationanddebottleneckingofoperationsatoilsandsprojectswilladdincrementalbarrels,6789101112201820202022202420262028mb/dOil2023SupplyPAGE70IEA.CCBY4.0.butnewcapitalprojectsarelimitedinnumberandscopebythescarsofthepandemic,expectationsofcarbontaxincreasesand,liketheirUScounterparts,callsbyinvestorstoreturncash.By2028,supplywillbejustshyof6.2mb/d,400kb/dmorethanin2022.Canadianoilsupplybyproduct,2018-2028IEA.CCBY4.0.Canadianoffshoreoutputissettogrowbyamarginal30kb/dto260kb/dby2028asthecurrentrenewedinterestintheprovincedoeslittlemorethanoffsetbasedecline.TheSuncor-ledTerraNovaFPSOisexpectedtostartinearly2024,targeting70millionincrementalbarrelsofoil.TheCenovus-ledWestWhiteRoseprojectreceivedFIDlastyearandisslatedtobringupto80kb/dtothemarketstartingin2026–extendingthelifeoftheassetbyoveradecade.Additionally,EquinorandBPcontinuetostudythe700millionbarrelBayduNordproject,havingawardedfront-endengineeringanddesign(FEED)contractsearlierthisyearandworkingtowardsFIDoverthenextfewyears,withapotentialstartdateof2030.TakeawaycapacityisprojectedtoincreasefortheWesternCanadianSedimentaryBasinastheTransMountainExpansion(TMX)pipelineisexpectedtostartupinearly2024,providedfinancingconstraintsareresolved.TheTMXpipeline,already80%contracted,willnearlytriplethecapacityofthe1150kmpipelinetoover890kb/dofPacificCoastexports.ExpectedincreasesinCanada’scarbontaxwillreducegrowthinsupplyasoperatorsassesshigherinvestmentcosts.TheproposedcarbontaxcouldjumpfromaroundUSD30/tonnecurrentlytoapproximatelyUSD135/tonneby2030.TheRoyalBankofCanadaestimatestheindustrywillneedtospendUSD10.5billionannuallyuntil2050toreachnetzeroemissionswhilethe0123456720182019202020212022202320242025202620272028mb/dNGLsOtherconventionalOffshoreSyncrude/upgraderBitumenAlbertaconventionalOil2023SupplyPAGE71IEA.CCBY4.0.CanadianAssociationofPetroleumProducersbelievesitwillneedtospendclosertoUSD75billionintotaltoachievethegoal.Thesizeandrangeofthesenumbershighlightsthechallengeanduncertaintyinvolvedinreachingnetzero.WesternCanadianSedimentaryBasintakeawaycapacityIEA.CCBY4.0.Sources:IEAanalysisbasedondatafromEnverusandcompanystatements,CanadaEnergyRegulator(2023)(accessed2June2023).Brazil,Guyana,ArgentinaunderpinLatinAmericagrowthTotaloilsupplyinnon-OPEC+LatinAmericagrows1.9mb/dto7.5mb/dby2028aslow-costresourcestappedinBrazilianoffshorepre-saltreservoirs,theStabroekblockinoffshoreGuyanaandtheNeuquénBasininArgentina’soffsetdeclinesfromtherestoftheregion.Braziliansupplyrises970kb/dby2028,withPetrobrasexpectedtocontributemorethan70%oftheincrease.OthergainswillcomefromTotalEnergies,Shell,Equinor,ChinaNationalOffshoreOilCorporation(CNOOC)andChinaNationalPetroleumCorporation(CNPC)asIOCsandotherNOCsexpandtheirfootprintinBrazil’sprolificoffshore.TheSantosBasincurrentlyproduces70%ofBrazil’scrudeandiswherethemajorprojectsandexpansionsareslatedtooccurovertheforecastperiod.Withabaseproductiondeclinerateofbetween10-15%peryear,anysignificantprojectdelaysoroperationalissuescouldputBrazil’sprojectedgrowthatrisk.MeroandBúziosaretwolargemulti-phaseprojectsthatwilltotalacombined15FPSOsby2028,includingfivealreadyinservice.IncludingtheseFPSOs,Petrobrasplansonbringingonline15newFPSOsbetween2022and2027,withthreeadditionalpre-FIDFPSOstotalling360kb/dofcapacitypossiblebutnot01234562019202020212022202320242025202620272028mb/dRailcapacityRailTMExpansionEnbridgeLine3KeystoneTransMountainRang/MilkRiver/ExpEnbridgeMainlineWCSBsupplyOil2023SupplyPAGE72IEA.CCBY4.0.includedinthisforecast.Thisrepresentsapproximatelyhalfoftheworld’sFPSOsputinoperationoverthistimeframe.BúziosandMerodriveBraziliangrowththroughthedecadeIEA.CCBY4.0.Argentina’smainshalepatch,VacaMuertaintheNeuquénBasin,roaredbacktolifein2021and2022afteraCovid-19inducedpauseinactivity.Totalfeetdrilledforexploitationwellsrose128%in2021,ledbystate-ownedYacimientosPetrolíferosFiscales(YPF)andBP-backedPanAmerican,andexportswereup45%ontheyear.In2022,totalfeetdrilledincreaseby15%andisontrackforanother20%gainin2023.ExportswillcontinuetogrowthisyearwiththecompletionoftheTrans-Andeanpipelinerevamp,providingaPacificloadingterminalforArgentiniancrude,andacapacityincreaseontheexistinglinetoPuertoRosalesontheAtlanticcoast.LTOproductionmorethandoublesto610kb/doverourforecastperiod,drivingArgentina’stotaloilproductiontorecordhighsofjustover1mb/din2028.Guyanawillpostexplosivegrowthofalmost1mb/dovertheforecastperiod.TheExxonMobil-ledconsortiumcontinuestomakediscoveriesintheStabroekBlockwherecurrentestimatespegrecoverableoilequivalentresourcesatover11billionbarrelsanddiscussionsofaseventhphasehavebegun.Oilstartedflowingin2019fromthe120kb/dLizaPhase1development.Thesecondphase,LizaUnity,startedupinFebruary2022whilethethirdphase,Payara,isplannedfor4Q23.Threemorephasesareplannedforoverthenextsixyears,bringingtotalcapacitytoapproximately1.2mb/d.0.00.51.01.52.02.53.03.54.04.52016201820202022202420262028mb/dBachalaoItapuSepiaMeroIaraBúziosTupiBaseOil2023SupplyPAGE73IEA.CCBY4.0.GuyanagrowthdrivenbyrecentdiscoveriesintheStabroekblockIEA.CCBY4.0.Notes:Phase3,4and5sanctioned.Phase6currentlyinfront-endengineeringanddesign(FEED).Bycontrast,supplyisexpectedtodeclineintherestofLatinAmerica,withinvestmentcutsandalackofnewprojectstakingtheirtollontheregion’sindustry.PeruandEcuadorannouncedplanstoboostinvestmentsinexplorationandproductionoverthenextfiveyearsbuttheroadmaptoincreasedvolumesremainsunclear.ThenewgovernmentinColombiahaschangeddirectionandhaltednewexplorationlicences.Biofuelstoprovide10%ofnewliquidfuelsupplygrowthto2028Biofuelsproductionexpandsnearly600kb/dfrom2022to2028,ledhigherbysignificantgrowthfromemergingeconomies.Brazil,IndonesiaandIndiacombinedaccountfor70%oftheincreaseaseachcountrypursuesdomesticblendingtargets.PoliciesaimedatreducinggreenhousegasemissionsdrivegrowthintheUnitedStates,EuropeandCanada.Ethanolandbiodieselsupplyincreaseby30%inemergingeconomiesfrom2022to2028,primarilytosupportrisingdomesticdemandinresponsetopoliciesdesignedtoreduceoilimportsandGHGemissionswhileusingdomesticfeedstockssuchassugar,cornandpalmoil.Growingdemandforliquidtransportfuelsalsobuoysbiofuelproduction.Indiaisrampingupoutputtomeetits20%ethanolblendingtargetby2025,supportedbyguaranteedpricingandincentivesfornewethanolfacilities.InIndonesia,productionexpandstomeeta35%biodieselblendinggoal,upfrom30%in2022whileBrazilisaimingfor15%for2026.Brazilalsochampionsethanol0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.4202020212022202320242025202620272028mb/dLizaPhase6(Whiptail)LizaPhase5(Uaru)LizaPhase4(Yellowtail)LizaPhase3(Payara/Prosperity)LizaPhase2(Unity)LizaPhase1(Destiny)Oil2023SupplyPAGE74IEA.CCBY4.0.withanexisting27%blendingtarget,taxbreaksandRenovaBio–acarbonintensityreductionscheme.Indonesia,BrazilandIndiaareallconsideringadditionalbiofuelpoliciesthatprovideconsiderableupsidepotentialtogrowth.IEA.CCBY4.0.Notes:BiofuelsforecastfromtheIEA’s2023RenewablesMarketUpdate.Biodieselincludesrenewablediesel,biodieselandbiojetfuel.Liquidfuelsupplyincludescrudeandliquidbiofuels.Greenhousegasreductiontargetsalsofuelbiofueldemandgrowthinadvancedeconomies,evenasslowingtransportfueldemandovertheforecastperiodtempertheoverallincrease.RenewabledieselandbiojetfueldominatenewsupplysinceitcanbeproducedwithlowGHGintensity,oftenfromresidues,andblendedwithfewmodifications.Inethanol’scasemanyjurisdictionsdonothavecompatibleinfrastructure,suchaspumps,tosupporthigherblendinglevels.Staticblendinglevels,combinedwithdeclininggasolinedemandinadvancedeconomies,leadstoaslightdeclineinethanoldemandfrom2022to2028.PoliciesintheUnitedStates,CanadaandtheEuropeanUniondrivenewdemand.IntheUnitedStates,theInflationReductionActaddsanestimatedUSD9.6billionthrough2031intheformoftaxcreditsandloans,inadditiontotheexistingfederalRenewableFuelStandardProgramandstatelevelpoliciesaimedatreducingGHGsandboostinguseofrenewables.Canada’sCleanFuelRegulations,whichsetsannualgreenhousegasintensityreductiontargetsinthetransportsectorfrom2023,inconcertwithprovincialbiofuelpoliciesunderpindemandgrowth.IntheEuropeanUnion,memberstatescontinuetoadvancepoliciestomeettheEU’sRenewableEnergyDirectivetargetof14%renewableenergyintransportby2030.Thistargetwilllikelydouble,pendingtheoutcomeofongoingnegotiations.However,thisdoesnotimplyadoublingofbiofueldemandsincesomebiofuelsaredoublecountedandotherpathwayssuchaselectricvehiclesalsocounttowardsthetotal.7074788286902022liquidfuelsupplyIncreasesDecreases2028liquidfuelsupplymb/dCrudeandbiofuelsupplygrowth,2022-28UnitedStatesOtherOPECSaudiArabiaBrazilBiofuelsRussiaOther-0.100.10.20.30.40.5AdvancedeconomiesEmergingeconomiesmb/dBiofuelgrowthbyeconomies,2022-28EthanolBiodieselOil2023SupplyPAGE75IEA.CCBY4.0.NorthSeaatfrontlineoftheenergytransitionTheNorthSeadisappointedin2022onweakdrillingactivity,projectdelaysandheavymaintenance.Thereislittletosuggestastrongturnaroundinthemediumterm,particularlyintheUnitedKingdomwherevolumesareexpectedtodrop6%peryeartoa45-yearlowof590kb/dby2028.ThesituationisNorwayislessdire;steepdeclinesinbaseproductionmeannewflowsfrommajorprojectssuchasJohanSverdrupPhase2,MartinLingeandJohanCastbergwillleadtoaslightboost,peakingin2025,beforeNorwegianoutputcontinuesitsdownwardmarch.TotalNorthSeaproductionisforecasttodeclineby400kb/dto2.4mb/dfrom2022to2028.InvestmentsinNorwaydelaybutdonotoffsetNorthSeadeclineIEA.CCBY4.0.NetzeroambitionsofgovernmentsandmajorfinancialinstitutionscouldhavestrongimplicationsfortheNorthSea–alreadyhometosomeofthelowestemissionsintensitiesintheworld–whereprivateequity’sfootprinthascontinuedtogrow,reducingthemajor’sdominance.Assuch,NorthSeaproducersaresteppingupeffortstoreducethecarbonintensityoftheiroperationsbyelectrifyingupstreamfacilitiestoimprovetheirlongevityandremainattractiveinvestmentprospects.ThefutureoftheNorthSeaoilindustryhascomeunderincreasedscrutinyinrecentyears.VolatileregionalenergycostsandRussia’sinvasionofUkrainehavehighlightedtheimportanceofsecuringreliableenergysupplies.Conversely,activistshavebeenquicktopointoutthepotentialinconsistenciesofgovernmentsencouraging,andbanksparticipatingin,furtherinvestmentinfossilfuelswhilepursuingclimategoals.0.00.51.01.52.02.53.03.5201820202022202420262028mb/dNorwayUKDenmarkNorthSeaproduction0.00.51.01.52.02.5201820202022202420262028NorwayBaseJohanSverdrupNorwayNewOtherNorwayproductionOil2023SupplyPAGE76IEA.CCBY4.0.Despitemixedmessages,theUKandNorwegiangovernmentsarebroadlysupportiveofanindustrythatdirectlyorindirectlyprovides130000and200000localjobs,respectively,andhealthytaxrevenues.Whilepriceactionandprofitsduring2022stokedconversationsoverwindfalltaxes,thejumpinconsumerpricesalsounderscoredtherisksoflimitingindigenousproductionandbeingdependentonenergyimports.Norway’sproductionisexpectedtogrowthrough2025asmorethaneightnewdevelopmentshaverecentlystartedorwillstartupbeforethen,includingthelargeJohanSverdrupandJohanCastbergprojects.Withbasedeclinesnorthof10%,supplyof1.8mb/din2028is140kb/dlowerthan2022withJohanSverdrupaccountingforalmostone-thirdofNorwegianoutputin2028.SomemodestUKsupplygainswillcomefromShell’sPenguinandNeptune’sSeagullprojects,withbothexpectedonlinein2023andproduceacombined75kb/d.Furthermore,BPistargetingimprovedproductionatthesofardisappointingClairRidgeproject.However,thesearenotsufficienttooffsetyearsofweakinvestment,andwithfewprojectssanctioned(orevenpre-FID),outputlookssettofallby250kb/dby2028.AsiaPacificoilisoutoffavour;non-OPEC+MideastexpandsNon-OPEC+AsiaPacificoilproductioncontinuestofalter,withageingoilfields,Westerncompanyexitsandinvestmentsincreasinglygearedtowardsnaturalgas.Volumes,alreadydownbycloseto900kb/doverthelastdecade,willfallafurther830kb/dby2028.China,Australia,India,IndonesiaandThailandallpostlargelosses,totallingacombined690kb/dbytheendoftheforecastperiod.Chinesecompanieshavesteppeduptheireffortsandincreasedinvestmentstostemproductiondeclines,withsupplyrelativelyflatsince2016.The14thFive-YearPlan(2021-25),initiallyreleasedinMarch2021,laysoutambitiousenergyandclimategoalsforChinathatprioritisesenergysecurity,coalandnaturalgasdevelopments.WhileCNOOCcontinuestodevelopoffshorefieldsandcoal-to-liquidsthroughputisforecasttodoubleoverthemediumterm,theseeffortswillonlypartiallyoffsetnaturaldecline.Asaresult,oilproductioninChinaissettofallby220kb/dto4mb/din2028.Australiansupplyisforecasttofall30%to280kb/dby2028–drivenbydeclinesintheGreaterEnfielddevelopmentandincondensatesfromtheNorthwestShelf.TherecentapprovalsbyAustralianregulatorsofSantos’Doradodevelopmenthavegreatlyincreasedtheprobabilityofafinalinvestmentdecisionontheproject.IfSantosapprovesthe100kb/dDoradodevelopmentin2023,productioncouldpotentiallycomeonlineby2026.Oil2023SupplyPAGE77IEA.CCBY4.0.Theothermedium-sizedproducers–Indonesia,ThailandandIndia–allcontinuealongmanageddeclinetrajectorieswithnomajorprojectsinthequeuetoturnaroundtheirfalteringproduction.OutputinIndonesiaandThailandhasconsistentlyfallensince2016andisforecasttoslipbyafurther120kb/dand80kb/d,respectively,to510kb/dand260kb/dby2028.Indiastymiesitsdeclinein2024astheKG-DWN98/2NorthernAreaprojectrampsup,butvolumesslide140kb/dto560kb/dbytheendoftheforecastperiod.Asianoilsupplybycountry,2018-2028IEA.CCBY4.0.Meanwhile,Qatarioilsupplyissettogrowby360kb/dovertheforecastperiodasitfurtherdevelopsassociatedcondensatesfromthemassiveNorthField.Itstotaloilproductionisduetorisetoarecord2.1mb/din2027andclimbhigherstillin2028.Thecountry’s48milliontonnesperyear(Mt/yr)LNGexpansion,withestimatedinvestmentofuptoUSD50billion,willbecarriedoutintwophases:firstthe32Mt/yrNorthFieldEast(NFE)followedbythe16Mt/yrNorthFieldSouth(NFS).ThetwoschemescombinedareexpectedtoraiseLNGcapacityfrom77Mt/yrto126Mt/yrandincreasethevolumeofNGLsby2027-28.QatarEnergyhassofarawardedacombined26.25%inNFEtoTotalEnergies(6.25%),ExxonMobil(6.25%),Shell(6.25%),Eni(3.125%),ConocoPhillips(3.125%)andSinopec(1.25%).NFSwasawardedtoTotalEnergies(9.375%),Shell(9.375%)andConocoPhillips(6.25%).NFEandNFSareexpectedtostartupin2026and2028,respectively.NFEwillhavefourtrainsthatareduetoproducesome260kb/dofcondensate,130kb/d(11000t/d)ofLPGand70kb/d(4000t/d)ofethane.NFSwillhavetwotrainsthatareslatedtoproduce130kb/dofcondensatealongwithLPG.Qatar’scrudeproductionofaround600kb/disexpectedtoholdbroadlysteadyoverthenextsixyears.01234567820182019202020212022202320242025202620272028mb/dOtherVietNamThailandAustraliaMalaysiaIndiaIndonesiaChinaOil2023SupplyPAGE78IEA.CCBY4.0.Africa:Twostepsforward,onestepbackNon-OPEC+AfricansupplyissettosteadilyincreasethroughtheforecastperiodasprojectsrampupinGhanaandCoted’Ivoire,whileSenegalandUgandaalsojointheproducer’sclub.RecentmegadiscoveriesinNamibiahavebroughtasenseofoptimismtotheregionafteryearsofdelayscatalysedbytheCovid-19pandemic.Senegalremainsontracktobecomeanoilproducerin2023whenWoodside’s100kb/dSangomarFPSOiscommissioned.Additionally,Eni’sBaleineprojectinCoted‘Ivoireistargetingfirstoilin2023withalargeexpansionyettobesanctionedsetforthelateryearsofthisforecast.BaleinewillbeAfrica’sfirstnetzerooilandgasdevelopment(Scope1andScope2).ItisapioneeringstepfortheindustrytoFIDamajorcapitalprojectwithafulllifecyclenetzerointent.InGhana,Mahogany-Teak-Akasa(MTAB)comesonlinein2024andadds30kb/dtoGhana’scurrentoutput,withtotalproductionreaching200kb/dby2028.TotalEnergiesanditspartnerCNOOCapprovedtheUSD7billionUgandanLakeAlbertdevelopmentinlate2021,whichhadbeenrepeatedlydelayedduetofinancingissuesandthelingeringimpactofthepandemic.Firstoilwillcomein2025andflowsfromtheproject’sTilengaandKingfisherfieldsareexpectedtoeventuallyreach230kb/d.TotalEnergies,alongwithShellandQatarEnergy,arealllargestakeholdersintherecentOrangeBasinmegadiscoveriesoffthecoastofNamibia.Whilenodevelopmentplanshavebeensubmittedtoexploittheresourcebase,thesefieldscouldcatapultNamibiaasaproduceralongasimilarpathasGuyanafromtheendofthedecade.However,otherAfricanprojects,suchasTullow’sSouthLokicharinKenyaandAkerEnergy’sPecaninGhana,remainedinpre-FIDstatusafteryearsofdelaysduetolegaldisputes,protestsandCovid-19.Atthetimeofwriting,fielddevelopmentplanshadbeensubmittedforbothprojectstotheirrespectiveregulatoryagencies.SouthLokicharcouldadd120kb/dfrom2026ifsanctionedthisyearasFEEDhasbeencompletedonanew800kmexportpipelineforthefield.YetthatlookslesslikelywiththerecentexitofTullow’snon-operatingpartnersfromtheproject.Ghana’sPecanisestimatedtohave100kb/dofcapacity,representinga50%increaseoverourcurrentforecastshoulddevelopmentproceed.Oil2023SupplyPAGE79IEA.CCBY4.0.Africaoilproductionbycountry,2018-2028IEA.CCBY4.0.Egyptianoutputhascontinuedtoslidebuthigheroilprices,renegotiatedproductionsharingcontracts,andfurtherbidroundshaveledfirmssuchasAPACorporationandEnitoboostinvestment.Asaresult,APACorporationanticipatesthattheirgrossoiloutputwillincreaseatanannualgrowthrateof5-10%through2025,helpingmitigateEgypt’sdeclinebutnotreversingit.Furthermore,CairnandCheironareintheprocessoftakingoverShell’sWesternDesertacreageandstatetheyplanhigherspendingandproduction.0.00.51.01.52.020182019202020212022202320242025202620272028mb/dUgandaSenegalOtherGhanaSudan/SouthSudanEgyptOil2023RefiningPAGE80IEA.CCBY4.0.RefiningGlobalsummaryRefiningsectoroncuspofthirdtransformationalshiftTherefiningindustryfacesitsthirdstepchangeinnearlyasmanyyearswithanimminentpeakindemandforroadtransportationfuelsamidsurgingEVsalescompoundedbyexceptionallystrongjetfuelgrowthoverthe2022-28forecastperiod.Thiswillchallengerefinerstodeliveravitalstructuralshifttowardsmiddledistillateproductyieldsandpetrochemicalfeedstocks.ThisfundamentalchangeinrefiningdynamicsfollowsquicklyontheheelsofthenegativedemandshockcausedbytheCovid-19pandemicfollowedbythesanctions-relatedoilsupplydislocationsfromRussia’swarinUkraine.Globalrefiningcapacityisexpectedtoexpandbyanet4.4mb/dinoursix-yearoutlookto2028.GrowthEastofSuezdominatesthebigpicturewithChinaprovidingthelargestincrease,evenasthenextfewyearsseesabriefrevivalinrefineryexpansionsintheAtlanticBasin.Newrefineryadditionswillfaroutpaceoildemandgrowth,withsparecapacityestimatedat8mb/din2028.SlowingdemandgrowthraisesriskoffurtherrefiningindustryclosuresIEA.CCBY4.0.Whilenameplatecapacityappearsmorethanampleduringouroutlook,China’sinternalpoliciesaimedatreducingemissionsfromitsrefiningsectorcouldleadtocontinuedvolatilityinproductexportvolumesandyetagainupendglobalsupplyflowsandmarginsinthemediumterm.Chinanowhasthegreatestshareof-8-4048122012-162016-202020-242024-28mb/dTotaldemandgrowthChangeincallonrefineries024682012-162016-202020-242024-28AdditionsClosuresOil2023RefiningPAGE81IEA.CCBY4.0.installedcapacityintheworld,afterovertakingtheUnitedStatesin2022,andwillremainthelargestholderofsparerefiningcapacityoverthemediumterm.Crucially,ourforecastforproductbalancesisheavilydependentonhigherChineseproductexports,especiallyfordiesel.China’sdominanceofsparerefiningcapacityandtheloomingpeakintransportationfuelconsumptionwillrequirerefinerstodeftlymanagetheiroperationstosustaintheprofitabilityoftheirassetsandmeetoildemandintheirmarkets.TheywillalsoneedtoadjusttoachangingcrudeoilslateamidslowergrowthinUSlighttightoil(LTO)andthepotentialforOPEC+producerstoreduceexportsofheaviercrudes.Thoserefineriesmostexposedtothesechangesfacetherenewedriskofclosure.RefinedproductdemandgrowthcurtailedbycompetingsourcesofsupplyIEA.CCBY4.0.Notes:Liquidsdemandgrowthisnetofdirectcrudeuse.CTL/GTLarecoal-to-liquidsandgas-to-liquids,respectivelyEfficiencygainsandsurgingEVsaleswillimpactgasolinedemandmorethandiesel.Increasednaphthaconsumptionwillpartlyoffsettheprojecteddeclineingasoline.But,despiteshiftingsuppliestowardsthepetrochemicalsector,theoverhanginlightendssupplywillprovechallengingforrefiners.Whileglobaldieseldemandgrowthslowstowardtheendoftheforecastperiod,persistentgainsinjetfueldemandwilloffsetthistrendandtightenmiddledistillatebalances.Assuch,refinerswillneedtosignificantlyrampuprefineryyieldstowardsmiddledistillateproduction.8081828384858687888990Refinedproductdemand2022TotalliquidsdemandgrowthNon-refinedfuelssupplygrowthRefinedproductdemand2028mb/dFractionationproductsCTL/GTL/additivesBiofuelsTotalliquidsdemandgrowthOil2023RefiningPAGE82IEA.CCBY4.0.RefiningcapacityEastofSuezrefiningcapacitymigrationacceleratesMorethan6mb/dofnewcrudedistillationcapacityisscheduledtobecompletedovertheforecastperiod.Atthesametime,1.6mb/dofcapacityisslatedtoshut,leavinga4.4mb/dnetincrease.EastofSuezdominatestheoutlook,thoughtheAtlanticBasinwillseemodestincreasesearlyinourforecast.Anumberofadditionalprojectsareintheplanningphase,butwehaveexcludedthosethatappeartolackthesufficientfinancial,organisational,orgovernmentalsupportneededtobeoperationalby2028.Approximately3.9mb/dofcrudedistillationcapacitywasclosedin2020-22,morethandoubletheprevailingfive-yearaveragerateandwellaheadofhistoricaltrends.ThelatestroundofshutdownsfollowingtheCoviddemandshockin2020-21arenowlargelycompleteandgrossadditionsoutpaceclosuresbyahealthymarginforthenextthreeyears.Asiadominates2022-2028capacityexpansionsasAtlanticBasinclosuresdiminishIEA.CCBY4.0.Nevertheless,afurtherrationalisationofrefinerycapacitymaybenecessaryinOECDEuropeandOECDAmericas.Bothregionsseeadeclineindemandforgasolineandroaddieselbeforetheendoftheforecast.Furthermore,refinersinEuropearedisadvantagedbyinflatednaturalgasandelectricitypricesandstringentenvironmentalpolicies,inparticulartheEmissionsTradingSystem(ETS).Grossrefinerycapacityexpansionseclipseoveralldemandgrowth,andevenmoresothecallonrefinedproducts,afterallowingforhigherbiofuelsandNGLsupply.Newsitesleadtheincreaseinadditions,withgreenfieldprojectstotalling0123456NewsitesExpansionsShutdownsNetadditionsmb/dNetadditionsAsiaEuropeMiddleEastAfricaNorthAmericaOtherOil2023RefiningPAGE83IEA.CCBY4.0.3.1mb/d,including2mb/dfromfivemegarefineries.Atthesametime,expansionstoexistingrefinerieswilladd2.9mb/dtocapacity.Regionalrefinerycapacityandutilisation2022-2028Netrefinerycapacityadditionswillaverage740kb/dperyearovertheperiod,onparwithhistoricalaverages.Onlyannouncedrefineryclosuresareincludedwithinourestimates.Approximately70%ofthe6mb/dofnewcapacityislocatedEastofSuez.ChinaisexpectedtobethesinglelargestcontributorwithIndiaandtheMiddleEasttiedinsecondplace.Afterthefirstfallin30yearsin2021,refiningcapacitygrowthreboundsIEA.CCBY4.0.-2.0-1.5-1.0-0.50.00.51.01.52.02.53.020082010201220142016201820202022202420262028mb/dClosuresAdditionsNetOil2023RefiningPAGE84IEA.CCBY4.0.TheadditionofseveralworldclassrefineriesunderpinsChina’scapacityincrease,whichhavetheflexibilitytoproducebothoilproductsandpetrochemicalfeedstocks.TheYulongPetrochemical(2025),theSaudiAramco/NorincoPanjin(2026)andSinopecZhangzhou(2027)willeachboostcapacitybymorethan300kb/deach.However,evenChinaisexpectedtoseemountingrefinerycapacityclosuresbytheendoftheforecastperiodasthegovernmentshutsdownsmallerteapotrefineriesandasaconsequenceoffallingdomesticdemandinthelateryearsofourforecast.ElsewhereinAsia,Indianrefineryexpansionsdrivemuchoftheremainingregionalgrowth.Thecommissioningof1.8mb/dofnewrefiningcapacityintheAtlanticBasinstandsinstarkcontrasttothelonger-termtrendforcapacityclosures.However,thisshiftisatemporaryreprieveandreflectsthestart-upoftwoworld-scalerefineriesinNigeria(650kb/d)andMexico(340kb/d),plustheexpansionofExxonMobil’sBeaumontrefinery(+250kb/d)andthecompletionofthesecondtrainoftheRNESTrefineryinBrazil.(+115kb/d).Netproductexportersdominaterefiningcapacitybuilding,2022-2028(mb/d)IEA.CCBY4.0.Note:Circlesizerepresentsthe2022-2028netchangeinrefiningcapacity,placementonaxisrepresentstradeposition.Aftertheonsetofthepandemicandasharpdeclineinglobalproductdemand,therefiningindustrywaspushedintoturmoilresultinginarecordwaveofshutdowns.Refineryrationalisationremoved3.9mb/dofcapacityoverthethree-yearperiodfrom2020to2022.Furthermore,manynew-buildprojectsweredelayedbycontractingproblemsandlogisticalissues.ProjectsdelayedbyCovid-19arenowadvancingandcapacityadditionsremainbroadlysteadyovertheforecastperiod.While2022projectsarenotincludedinourforecastperiod,itwasanimpressiveyearfornewrefiningprojects.Lastyear,netrefiningcapacityadditionsroseby1.6mb/d,withmostprojectsrampingupin1.80.31.20.80.01.20.30.00.2-15-10-50510152025-3.0-2.0-1.00.01.02.03.04.0Netcrudeimporter:NetcrudeexporterNetproductimporterNetproductexporterChinaUSIndiaAfricaEuropeMiddleEastMexicoRussiaOtherAsiaOil2023RefiningPAGE85IEA.CCBY4.0.4Q22.TheMiddleEastincreasedcapacityby640kb/d,withthefirstphaseofKuwait’sAlZourplantadding410kb/dofcrudedistillationwhileIran’sAbadancomplexwasboostedby200kb/d.Atthesametime,Chinabroughtonlinethreenewrefineriestotalling820kb/d.FirmandproposedrefinerycapacityadditionsIEA.CCBY4.0.Theeastwardmigrationofrefineryactivityisaccelerating,drivenbytherecentcapacityclosuresinEuropeandtheUnitedStatesandadditionsintheMiddleEastandAsia.Intermsofnetcapacityadditions,regionsEastofSuezmakeupthebulkoftheincrease,with3.3mb/dofnetcapacitygrowth.Chinaleadsthenewbuilds,contributing1.5mb/dor34%tothenetglobaladditionsthrough2028.TheMiddleEastraisesnetcapacityby900kb/d,whileOtherAsiaadds1.1mb/doverthesameperiod.Indiaalsoaccountsforasignificantshareoftheincrease,withanetaddof1mb/d,ofwhich880kb/dareexpansionprojects.Bycontrast,theAtlanticBasinisexpectedtoonlyadd1.1mb/dofnetcapacity,astheDangotemegarefineryinNigeriaandDosBocasinMexicocomeonlinein2024and2025,respectively.Announcedshutdownsamountto1.6mb/d,ofwhichroughly40%willbeintheUnitedStatesandEurope.EastofSuezhas1mb/dofclosuresscheduled;mainlyasageingcapacityisrejuvenatedandreplacedbynewunits.0.00.51.01.52.02.53.02022202320242025202620272028mb/dProposedFirmOil2023RefiningPAGE86IEA.CCBY4.0.Regionalandcountryrefinerythroughputs,2012-2028IEA.CCBY4.0.RefiningindustryadaptstodemandchangesGlobaloildemandgrowthissettoslowdramaticallyinthecomingyears,drivenbythepeakandsubsequentdeclinefortransportationfuels.Demandwillalsobeconstrainedbytepideconomicactivity,efficiencygainsandbehaviouralchanges.Owingtothepost-pandemicrebound,headlinedemandgrowthissettoaverage3.4mb/dperannumin2021-23butisprojectedtoslowtojust1mb/donaveragefor2022-28.Excludingthelastimpactofthepost-Covid-19recoveryin2023thisrateofgrowthslowsto690kb/donaverageoverthe2023-28period.Ashighlightedinthetablebelow,thedemandforrefinedproductsisfurtherdepressedbyincreasednon-refinerysupply.PrimarilythiscomesfromNGLfractionationplants,whichincreasesby1.2mb/dovertheforecastperiod.Similarly,biofuelssupplygrowthaswellashighercoal-to-liquids(CTL)andgas-to-liquids(GTL)volumesfurtherreducethecallonrefinedproductsasweapproachtheendoftheforecastperiod.Refinedproductmarketsharedeclinesto82.5%in2028from83.3%in2022and86.8%in2012.Consequently,weexpectrefinerswillseedemandfortheirproductslagtheheadlineincrease,averaging690kb/dperannumin2022-28.Thisgrowthslipstojust450kb/donaverageifweconsideronlythe2023-28postCovid-recoveryperiod.ThelossofRussianfeedstocksduetoembargoeshasforcedUSandEuropeanrefineriestoincreasecrudeoilimportsfromalternativesources.AreductioninNigeriancrudeoilexportsfollowingthestart-upoftheDangoterefinerynextyearwillsqueezeAtlanticBasincrudesuppliesandfurtherburdenexport-orientedAtlanticBasinrefineries.20253035404550201220152018202120242027mb/dAtlanticBasinEastofSuezUSIndiaEuropeChina24681012141618201220152018202120242027Oil2023RefiningPAGE87IEA.CCBY4.0.Oildemandandcallonrefinedproducts(mb/d),2022-2028Notes:CTL/GTL:Coal-to-liquidsandgas-to-liquids.Ethane,LPGandpentanesplus,excludingestimateddiluentuseinNorthAmerica.Transportationfuelshavebeenthebedrockofproductdemandgrowthforthepast50years,butaseachangeindemandtrendsamidtheenergytransitiondiminishestheirroleinthefuture.Asaresult,peaktransportationdemandforoilproductspresentsanexistentialchallengeforlesscompetitiverefineries.Demandgrowthfortransportfuelsisforecasttoturnnegativebefore2028,drivenbygasoline.Crucially,keyregionaldemandcentres,suchastheUnitedStatesandEurope,willallseetheirgasolineconsumptioncontract.Inaggregate,between2022and2028gasolinedemandfallsbymorethan1mb/d.Furthermore,keyexportmarketsforgasolineforboththeUSGulfCoastandEuropeanrefinerswillshrinkovertheforecastperiodasnewrefinerycapacitystartsup.Withbothdomesticandexportdemandsettoslump,marginsandrunswilllikelycomeunderpressure.Globally,therefiningindustrywillhavetoadjusttothedeclineingasolineconsumptionpost-2023incontrasttosustaineddiesel/gasoildemandgrowth.Thisaccentuatesthemismatchbetweenthetwoproducts,whichwillincreasethestrainonrefineriestofurtherincreasemiddledistillateyields,givenrobustjet/kerosenedemand.Simultaneously,theresilienceofthepetrochemicalindustryunderpinsgrowthofnaphthaandLPG,butmuchofthiswillbemetbyincreasingUSNGLsupplies,thatbypasstherefiningsector.Thedeclineingasolinedemandwillunderminerefineries’relianceonupgradingunitstomaximisetheproductionoflightdistillatesfromresidualfeedstocks.Atthesametime,incrementalnaphthademand–tomeetrisingpetrochemicaluse–couldpressuregasoline'spremiumtonaphtha.Thegrowthinjet/keroseneconsumptionwilltightenmiddledistillatesmarketsandsustaintheincentivetomaximisemiddledistillateyields.Onbalance,weexpecttoseerefiningyieldsadjusttotheglobaldemanddynamicsbyboostingjet/keroseneproductionbyclosetoafullpercentagepointand,wherepossible,increasingdiesel’sshareofoutputmarginally.20222023202420252026202720282022-28growthTotalliquidsdemand99.8102.3103.1104.1104.8105.3105.75.9Biofuels2.83.03.23.33.43.53.40.6TotalOildemand97.099.2100.0100.8101.4101.9102.35.3CTL/GTL/additives0.70.80.80.80.80.90.90.2Directuseofcrudeoil1.01.01.01.00.90.90.8-0.2Totalcallonrefinedoilproducts95.297.498.299.099.6100.1100.55.3Fractionationproducts12.112.412.612.712.913.113.31.2Refineryproductdemand83.185.085.686.386.887.087.24.1Refinerymarketshare83.3%83.1%83.0%82.9%82.8%82.6%82.5%-0.8%Oil2023RefiningPAGE88IEA.CCBY4.0.Changeinglobalrefiningyields,2022-2028IEA.CCBY4.0.Note:ThecategoryofOtherProductsisexcludedasyieldshavezerochangeovertheperiod.Thedemandshockcreatedbythepandemicpromptedwidespreadruncutsinthefaceofweakand,attimes,negativeproductcracks.Thischallenge,whileglobal,wassimpletosolvegiventhescaleofthedemandcollapse.Rapidlyimplementedruncuts–andcapacityclosures–offeredthesolutiontoaweakmarginenvironment.Conversely,theglobalrealignmentofcrudeandproductflowsduring2022offeredchallengesandopportunitiesinequalmeasure.Some2.5mb/dofRussiancrudehasbeendislodgedfromlong-termbuyersinEuropeandtheUnitedStatesandhasbeenheavilydiscountedtofindnewcustomersinAsia.Thishascreatedatwo-tiermarketforsourcrudegrades,whichhaspressuredAsiancrudedifferentialsforMiddleEasterngradestocompetewithheavilydiscountedRussiansupplies.Bycontrast,EuropeanandUSrefinershavebidupAtlanticbasinsourcrudevaluesinordertoattractincrementalcargoes.Chinawillremainthelargestholderofsparerefiningcapacityoverthemediumterm.TheforecastsforproductbalancesdemonstratetheneedforChinatoremainakeysupplierofproductexports,inparticularfordiesel.Chinesemiddledistillateexportswillbesubjecttogovernmentexportlicencesandtherefiningindustrymustregainitsbiastowardsproducingandexportingdieselifeventightermiddledistillatemarketsinthemediumtermaretobeavoided.Otherpolicyconsiderations,suchassupplyingaburgeoningpetrochemicalindustry,stimulatingthewidereconomy,orpossiblyonceagainlimitingcarbonemissionscouldalsoprovemorecompellingpolicypriorities.-1.0%-0.5%0.0%0.5%1.0%LPGNaphthaGasolineKeroseneDieselFueloilOil2023RefiningPAGE89IEA.CCBY4.0.RecordprofitsunlikelytospurnewwaveofrefineryinvestmentRefinerymarginsandprofitsrosetorecordhighsin2022astheindustrystruggledtokeeppacewiththepost-pandemicdemandreboundamidrestrainedOPEC+crudesupplies.UnprecedenteddislocationsinglobaloiltradeflowsfollowingRussia’sinvasionofUkrainefurthercompoundedthemarkettightness.ProlongedCovid-19lockdownsinChinathatcutitsoildemand,thereleaseofstrategicstocksbyIEAmembercountriesandthewarmNorthernHemispherewintereventuallyfacilitatedthereturntomorenormalisedinventorylevelsandproductcracks.Thefactorsthatcontributedtotheexceptionalprofitsgeneratedlastyearareunlikelytoberepeatedonasustainedbasis.Consequently,theoilindustry’snewlyrediscoveredcapitaldisciplineisnotexpectedtobereversedonthebackof2022’srecordmiddleandlightdistillatecrackstojustifycapacityadditions.Recordrefiningmarginspostedin2022,especiallyforUSGulfCoastIEA.CCBY4.0.Thehurdlesthatneedtobeclearedtobuildnewrefiningcapacityappearprohibitiveformany.Capitalcostsarestillhighwhenmeasuredversusmid-cyclemarginassumptions.Chineserefiningprojectsappeartobenefitfromastreamlinedpermittingprocessandsitatthelowendoftheglobalcostcurve.Furthermore,theheavyintegrationwithnewpetrochemicalcapacityunderpinsthelong-termdemandfortherefinery’soutput.Selectstand-aloneprojects,suchastheBarmerrefineryinIndia,canalsobejustifiedwheretherearecompellingeconomics.However,theleadtimefornew-buildrefiningcapacitycanstretchto5-10yearsgivencomplexenvironmentalpermittingprocesses.Evenunderthemostoptimisticassumptions,anewrefineryprojectunderconsiderationtodaywill04812162024283236402011201320152017201920212023$/bblNorthwestEuropeSingaporeUSGulfCoastNorthSeaDatedBenchmarkrefinerymargins20304050607080901001101202011201320152017201920212023NorthSeaDatedOil2023RefiningPAGE90IEA.CCBY4.0.becomeoperationalinanoilmarketwhereglobaloildemandisdeclining.Withoutthesecurityofprotecteddomesticdemand,internationalcompetitionformarketsharewilllikelyintensify.RegionaldevelopmentsAmericasrefiningcapacitypostsmarginalgainsTheUnitedStateslostitspositionastheworld’slargestrefinerbyinstalledcapacityin2022duetotherapidriseinnewChineserefinerybuilds.However,theUnitedStatesisstillexpectedtoprocessmorecrudethanChinauntil2024,beforebeingovertakeninthesubsequentyears.USthroughputsin2028areseen750kb/dlowerthanin2022,and1.8mb/dbelowthepre-Covid2018peakduetorefineryclosuresinrecentyears.TheUnitedStatesshalerevolution,combinedwiththebanoncrudeexportsinplaceuntiltheendof2015,triggeredamini-boominrefiningcapacity,withnewadditionsbetween2014-2023totalling840kb/d,frombothgreenfieldprojectsandexpansions.However,ExxonMobil’sBeaumontrefinerybuild-out,whichcameonlineearlyin2023,islikelytobethelastmajorprojectintheUnitedStates.ChinarefiningcapacityovertookUnitedStatesin2022,throughputsin2025IEA.CCBY4.0.Nevertheless,challengeslieaheadfortheregion.NorthAmericandemandgrowthisthemostseverelyimpactedbyshifttoEVsandefficiencyimprovements.Regionalgasolinecontractsby1mb/dbetween2022and2028.Ifmeasuredagainstthepre-Coviddemandpeak,thecumulativelossis1.6mb/d.Diesel/gasoiluseisalsoforecasttodeclineby400kb/dovertheforecastperiod.0246810121416182020122016202020242028mb/dUnitedStatesrefinerycapacityChinarefinerycapacity0246810121416182020122016202020242028UnitedStatescruderunsChinacruderunsOil2023RefiningPAGE91IEA.CCBY4.0.TheMexicangovernmentispushingaheadwiththenew340kb/dOlmeca/DosBocasprojectalongwithextensiverepairstoitscurrentfleetofrefineries.Despitethelargecostburden,theplanswillincreasecleanproductoutputandexpandthedomesticprocessingcapacityofheaviercrudegrades.Thecountry’s1.6mb/drefiningcapacityoperatedatjust51%onaveragein2022andonlyslightlyaheadofthisprocessingratein1Q23.WeassumethatDosBocaswillstartin2025,wellbehindscheduleandsignificantlyoverbudget.Withsuccessfulrehabilitation,Mexicocouldeffectivelyincreaseitsoperablerefiningcapacitybyabout1mb/d.However,fornowwetakeamorecautiousapproachandforecastrunsincreasingto1.1mb/din2028,from820kb/din2022.IndustryreportsindicatethatPemexplanstostopsellingitsheavyMayagrade,astapleforseveralUSGulfCoastcokingrefineries,tothirdpartieswhenits340kb/dDosBocasrefinerystartsoperations.Mexicanrefinerycapacity,throughput,crudeproductionandexportsIEA.CCBY4.0.FlowsofCanadiancrudestotheUSGulfCoasthavebeensteadilyincreasingfromtheirCovid-relatedcollapsein2020.DespitethecancellationoftheKeystoneXLproject,pipelinedevelopmentscontinuetoprogress,withthereversedCaplineandEnbridge’sexpandedLine3completed,allowinganimportantlinkbetweenAlbertaandtheUSGulfCoast.Nevertheless,competitionforheavyCanadiangradeswillincreaseoncetheTransMountainExpansionProject(TMX),whichwillmovecrudeoilfromAlbertatotheBritishColumbiaPacificcoastforonwardshippingtoAsia,comesonline.Theproject,whichwillincreasecapacityfrom300kb/dto890kb/d,willopenupnewexportmarketsforCanada’soilsandsproduction,whichcurrentlymovesviapipelinetotheUSMidwest.Thepipelineiscurrently80%completeandisexpectedtostartshippingoilin2024.0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.41.61.82.020122016202020242028mb/dRefinerycapacityCrudethroughput0.00.51.01.52.02.53.020122016202020242028CrudeproductionCrudeexportsOil2023RefiningPAGE92IEA.CCBY4.0.InCanada,nomajordevelopmentsareexpectedintherefiningsectorthroughouttheforecastperiod.Theshuttered115kb/dComebyChancerefineryiscurrentlybeingconvertedintoabiorefinery.Theconversionisscheduledtobecompletedbytheendof2023,withtheplant’sbiodieselavailabletothemarketattheendof1Q24.Therefinerywillproducemorethan18kb/dofrenewabledieselandsustainableaviationfuelmadefromplant-basedwasteoilsandanimalfats.InBrazil,Petrobras’2023-27strategicplanallocatesUSD4.3billionfordownstream“capacityexpansion,qualityandefficiency”.TheTrain1RNESTexpansionprojectisexpectedtocomeonlinein4Q24,andwillraiseprocessingcapacityatTrain1from115kb/dto130kb/d.ThecompanyhascommittedtorestartworkonTrain2,whichiscurrently82%complete,whichwilladdafurther115kb/d,nearlydoublingtheplant’scapacityto245kb/d.WeexpectthatTrain2willbecommissionedin2Q28.Furthermore,Petrobrasplanstoincreaseprocessingofthecountry’scrudefromsubsaltfieldstomaximiseultralowsulfurdiesel(ULSD)output.EuropeEuropeanrefinersshut-in610kb/dofcapacityin2020-22,extendingtheregion’slong-termtrendofclosuresthathasseen2.3mb/dpermanentlyshutduringthe2010-19period.Thereisafurther267kb/dofconfirmedclosuresincludedintheforecastperiod.OECDEuroperefinerycapacity,throughput,crudeimportsandproductexportsIEA.CCBY4.0.2022wasaparticularlychallengingyearforEuropeanrefineries.ThestrongmarginenvironmenthelpedrunsrecovertopostCovid-19highs.However,thelossofRussiancrudesuppliestoUKandEUrefineriesfollowingRussia’sinvasion02468101214161820122016202020242028mb/dRefinerycapacityCrudethroughput02468101220122016202020242028CrudeoilimportsRefinedproductsnetimportsOil2023RefiningPAGE93IEA.CCBY4.0.ofUkraineforcedarapidrealignmentofregionalcrudeandfeedstockflows.Year-to-date,EUrefineriesareimportingmorecrudefromtheNorthSea,theUnitedStatesandNorthAfricatocompensateforthelossofRussiabarrels.Inadditiontolastyear’srapidchangeinthecrudeslate,refinersfacedincreasedcostsfornaturalgas,andalsofromtheirparticipationintheEU’sETS.ThecostofaonecreditEuropeanUnionAllowance(EUA)increasedfrom€40/MtCO2equivalentinJanuary2021tocloseto€100/MtCO2in1Q23.Datafor2022showthatEUrefiningemissionsbouncedbacktotheirhighestlevelsince2017,risingataslightlyfasterpacethantheincreaseincrudethroughputs.Thehigherenergyintensityreflectstheclosureofsimplerrefiningcapacityandproductionofanincreasingshareofcleantransportationfuels.Furthermore,theallocationoffreeallowanceswhichhelprefinerscompetewithinternationalplayerscontinuestofall,coveringjust65%ofthesector’semissionslastyear.Thiscompareswith81%in2020.TheEuropeanUnionhasagreedtointroduceaCarbonBorderAdjustmentMechanismandtorevisetheEUETSschemetoremovethefreeallowances.Theannualrateatwhichthesefreeallowanceswilldeclinewillacceleratefromthecurrent2.2%to4.3%in2024-27andto4.4%for2028-30.Europeanrefinerythroughputsandfreeemissionallocations,2013-2022IEA.CCBY4.0.AtcurrentEUAprices,thisimpliesafinancialcostofUSD1/bbl,considerablyhigherthantheaveragecostsofUSD0.20/bblin2019-2020.OneofthefactorsbehindthesoaringcostsofEUAcreditswerehighernaturalgasprices.Consumerswereencouragedtoburncheaperandmorecarbon-intensivefuelstoreplacelostRussiangassupplies,requiringthemtopurchasemoreallowances.Highernaturalgaspricesalsoincreasedrefinerycosts,asitisusedbothasfuel50%55%60%65%70%75%80%85%90%95%100%8.08.59.09.510.010.511.011.512.012.52013201420152016201720182019202020212022mb/dThroughputs(mb/d)Shareoffreeemissionallocations(righthandside)Oil2023RefiningPAGE94IEA.CCBY4.0.andasinputtohydrogenproduction.Europeanrefiningthroughputsareforecasttocontractby790kb/dinthe2022-28period.Thedropinthroughputmorethanreversesthepost-Covid-19recoveryseenin2020-22thatliftedrunsonthebackofrecord-highmargins.FSURussianrefinershavecompletedmuchofthelarge-scalesecondarycapacitybuild-upthatstartedtwodecadesago,aimedatmodernisingtherefineriesandloweringfueloilyields.WhileG7sanctionswilllikelydepressrunsintheshortterm,weassumethisdragonactivityfadesoverthecourseofthenextfiveyears.Higheryieldsoftransportfuelswillsupportcleanproductsand,basedonourforecasts,Russiawillbeabletomeetitsdomesticgasolinedemand.AfricaAfricanrefinerycapacityissetforitslargestboostsincethe1980s,withNigeriapreparingtolaunchthe650kb/dLekkirefinery,whichweassumewillbefullyoperationalinmid-2024.Nigeria’splanstorehabilitateits440kb/dofshutteredrefineriesremainsmiredinbureaucracyandweseelittleprospectofthesereturningtoservicebefore2028.ElsewhereinAfrica,ahandfulofmini-refineryprojectsalreadymaterialisedorexpectedtostartbefore2028,amounttoafurther130kb/dofcrudeprocessingcapacity.Manymoreprojectslanguishinsearchofsubstantivebacking.North,WestandSouthandEastAfricanrefinerycrudethroughputandnetcrudeexportsIEA.CCBY4.0.0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.41.6201220142016201820202022mb/dNorthAfricaWestAfricaSouthandEastAfricaRefinerycapacitybyregion-1012345201220142016201820202022NorthAfricaWestAfricaSouthandEastAfricaRegionalnetcrudeexportsOil2023RefiningPAGE95IEA.CCBY4.0.SouthAfricahasclosed60%ofitscapacitysince2021.Twoofthecountry’sfourrefineries,withacombinedcapacityofnearly300kb/d,arenowpermanentlyshut.Thegovernmenthasdeferreditscleanfuelslegislationfor2023to2027buttheremainingrefinershaveyettocommittoupgradingtheirfacilitiestomeettighterproductspecifications.The108kb/dNatrefrefineryrestartedlastyearafterbeingshutdownin2020duetooperationalproblemswhiletheremaining110kb/dCapeTownrefinerymayrestartinthecomingmonthsafterbeingshutforrepairsinmid-2020followingafire.MiddleEastTheMiddleEastremainsaregionwithabusydownstreamsector.Kuwaitleadsintermsofcapacityadditions.Thefirstphaseofthe615kb/dAlZourrefinerycameonlineattheendof2022ataninitial410kb/d,whiletheremainingcrudedistillationunitwillstartupbeforetheendof2023.KuwaitwillovertakeIraqandtheUAEandbecomethenumberthreerefinerintheregionafterSaudiArabiaandIranduringourforecastperiod.Iranrecentlydelayedtheshutdownofareplacementcrudedistillationtowerto2028,boostingthecurrentcapacityupto2.5mb/d.Iraqalsohasambitionstoscaleupcapacity,butweforecastmoremodestnetadditionsof310kb/dbetween2023-28.MiddleEastrefinerycapacityexpansions(kb/d),2022-2028BahrainandOmanarefinalisingworkontheirrespectiveexpansionsandnewprojectsthatareslatedtolaunchin2H23or2024,totallinganet370kb/dincreaseincapacity.WithonlyminimalnewprojectsplannedinSaudiArabia,SaudiAramcohasshownrenewedinterestinexpandingtheirdownstreambusinessesoverseasafterapausethatcoincidedwiththepandemic.In2021,itacquired30%ofthe210kb/dGdanskrefineryinPoland,traditionallyanoutletforRussiancrude.Earlierthisyear,itannouncedtwodealsinChinatosecuredemandforitsproductioninthekeyexportmarket.Subjecttoapprovals,SaudiAramcowillpurchasea10%stakeinRongsheng,whichinturnowns51%ofthe800kb/dZPCCountries20222023202420252026202720282022-2028growthBahrain268268380380380380380112Iran2505253125312651271127112476-29Iraq903104310431113111312131213310Jordan909090909090900Kuwait1212141714171417141714171417205Oman298558558558558558558260Qatar4294294294294294294290SaudiArabia326932693289328932893289328920Syria2422422422422422422420UnitedArabEmirates11411141114111411141114111410Yemen1601601601601601601600Total10517111481128011470115301163011395878Oil2023RefiningPAGE96IEA.CCBY4.0.refineryinZhejiangprovince.Theagreementincludesalong-termcrudesupplydealfor480kb/dtotheZPCrefinery.Thecompanyalsoacquireda30%interestinthe300kb/dPanjinrefinerythatweexpecttostartbeforetheendof2026,withaprovisiontosupplyupto210kb/d.ChinaChinawillbuildmorerefineriesthananyothercountryoverthe2022-28period.Afurther1.5mb/dofcrudedistillationcapacityisexpectedtocomeonlinebytheendoftheforecastperiod,takingtotalnameplatecapacityto19.7mb/d.ChinaovertooktheUnitedStateslastyearintermsofinstalledcapacityafterthreelarge-scalefacilitieswerecompleted.Atthesametime,refineryactivityfellforthefirsttimesince1998followingthefalloutfromtheAsianfinancialcrisis.DomesticdemandslumpedduetostringentCovid-19restrictionsandachangeinBeijing’sstanceonproductexports.Theturnaroundingovernmentpolicyregardingrestrictingexports,andtheliftingofpandemic-relatedmeasures,sawChineseoildemandandrefineryrunsreachedrecordhighsatthestartof2023.Chinarefinerycapacity,throughput,netcrudeimports,andnetproductexportsIEA.CCBY4.0.Despitethefastgrowthinrefiningthroughputsinrecentyears,Chinastillaccountsforthesinglelargestamountinglobalsparecapacity,with3mb/dunutilisedatthestartof2023.Ofthis,about500kb/dislocatedintheShandongprovince,hometothelargestnumberofsmaller-scaleindependentrefineries(alsoreferredtoasteapotrefineries).UtilisationratesinShandongarecurrentlyonlyaround70%,suggestingactivityisconstrainedbyalackofimportquotas.Therecenttighteningofthecustomagency’senforcementonbitumenandfueloilimports(ameansforindependentrefineriestoaccessfeedstocksontheinternationalmarket)maystymierunsevenfurther.Evenso,Chineserefinerythroughputsareforecastto0246810121416182020122016202020242028mb/dRefinerycapacityCrudethroughput-20246810121420122016202020242028CrudeimportsNetrefinedproductexportsOil2023RefiningPAGE97IEA.CCBY4.0.riseby2.8mb/dfrom2022-28to16.5mb/d,leaving3.2mb/dofsparecapacity.ChinaovertakestheUnitedStatesintermsofrunsin2025inourprojections,butactuallevelswillbehighlydependentondomesticpolicyconsiderations.ChinesepolicykeytobalancingglobalfuelmarketsChina’sinternalpoliciesaimedatreducingemissionsfromitsrefiningoperationsarepartofitsoverallstrategytodecarbonisetheeconomy.Itsrefiningsectorhaslongbeendesignedtomeetthecountry’sfastpacedomesticdemandgrowth,nottoincreaseitsroleasaproductexporter.Thestate-ownedoilcompanieshave-inlinewithgovernmentpolicy—embarkedonamassiverefiningexpansionofmoretechnologicallyadvancedandintegratedcomplexeswhileitaimstoshutdownsurplus,antiquatedandinefficientprocessingcapacity.Thegovernmentcontrolsthevolumeofproductexportstointernationalmarketsbyenforcingastrictaquotasystem.Thegovernmentdeftlyusesitscrudeimportsandrefinedoilproductexportquotastobalancedomesticdemand,withexcessproductseithergoingintostorageorexported.ChinesecrudeandproducttradedrivenbyimportandexportquotasIEA.CCBY4.0Chinapolicydecisionswillcontinuetoholdswayovermarkets,notleastbecausethecountrywillmaintainthelargestshareofsparerefiningcapacityintheworldoverthe2022-28forecastperiod.Indeed,ourforecastforproductbalancesisheavilydependentonhigherChineseproductexports,especiallyfordiesel,yetthecountry’spolicyprioritiesappeartohaveshiftedtofocusonthesupplyoffeedstockstothepetrochemicalindustries.ThewaveofCovid-19thatsweptthroughChinain2022broughtonextensivepandemic-relatedmobilityrestrictionsandaslumpinindustrialactivity.Demandforoilproductsplummeted,withrefinerythroughputdecliningbyroughly700kb/dy-o-y.Inthefirsteightmonthsof2022,thegovernmentoptedtocutproductexportquotasevenfurtherasitprioritised0123456782016201720182019202020212022mb/dCrudeimportquotasIndependentrefinerycruderuns00.20.40.60.811.21.41.62016201720182019202020212022ProductexportsProductexportquotasOil2023RefiningPAGE98IEA.CCBY4.0.reducingemissionsthroughlowerruns.Thedecisionexacerbatedalreadytightmarketsforgasoil,dieselandjetfuel,furtherdrivingmarginsandconsumerpricestorecordlevels.Inareversalofthepolicyinthethirdquarterof2022,thegovernmentissuedsharplyhighercrudeoilimportquotasinanattempttoboosteconomicactivity.Crucially,productexportquotaswereincreasedbyafurther15MtinSeptember,resultinginasurgeofdieselshipmentstoworldmarkets.Theadditionalsuppliesprovedasignificantcontributortothenormalisationofdieselcracksthathadreachedall-timehighs.China’sdieselproductionandexportpolicywillplayakeyroleinbalancingglobalproductmarketsoverthemediumterm.TheshiftinChineserefineryactivitytowardspetrochemicalintegrationposesadilemmafortheinternationaloilmarket.Itspriorityofpetrochemicalprecursorshasforthemostpartcomeattheexpenseofmiddledistillates.TightnessinglobalmiddledistillatemarketscouldbepartlyoffsetifChinaweretoliftdieselyieldsbacktotheirpre-Covid-19levelsandimportmorenaphthaandotherfeedstocks.However,theriskisthatintegrationwithpetrochemicalcapacitywillmeantheseproductsareprioritisedattheexpenseofmiddledistillates.OtherAsiaRefineryshutdownshavealsoacceleratedelsewhereinAsia,withcapacityreductionsinJapan,Australia,thePhilippinesandSingaporesince2020totallingsome860kb/d.Indiarefinerycapacityandcruderuns,netcrudeimportandproductsexportsIEA.CCBY4.0.0.01.02.03.04.05.06.07.020122016202020242028mb/dRefinerycapacityCrudethroughput0.01.02.03.04.05.06.020122016202020242028CrudeimportsNetrefinedproductexportsOil2023RefiningPAGE99IEA.CCBY4.0.Overthemediumterm,regionalgrowthisunderpinnedbyIndianadditionsthattotal1mb/d.Thenewcapacitycomesmostlyfromexpansionsatexistingsites,withonlythe180kb/dBarmergreenfieldprojectcomingonline.Thefateoftheplanned1.2mb/dRatnagirirefineryremainsunclear.Landacquisitionconstraintsarethelatestroadblocktotheprojectthatwasfirstproposedinthemiddleofthelastdecade.Eveniffinallyapproved,therefineryisnotexpectedtocomeonlineinourforecastperiod.Othercountriesintheregionareexpectedtobringonlinesome155kb/damongthemwhiletworefineriesinJapanwithacombinedcapacityof240kb/darescheduledtoshut.Oil2023GlobaloiltradePAGE100IEA.CCBY4.0.GlobaloiltradeGlobalsummaryRussia’swaronUkraineupendsglobaloiltradeflowsWorldoiltradeflowsareundergoinganunprecedentedseachangeamidinternationalembargoesonRussianenergyexports,withnoreturntothestatusquoanteexpectedintheforeseeablefuture.Around2.5mb/dofRussiancrudehasbeenbackedoutofEuropeandG7countrieswhileafurther2mb/dofproductshavehadtofindnewhomes.Thelonglead-timebeforetheEUembargoesoncrudeandoilproductscameintoeffectandtheG7pricecapthatallowedEUmaritimeservicestobeusedtoshipRussianoiltothirdcountriesfacilitatedthereroutingofoilflowsandminimisedproductionlossesfortheglobalmarket.Europeanrefinerswereabletosourcecrudeoilfromnewsuppliers,mostnotablyfromtheUnitedStatesandtheMiddleEast,whilehigherNorthSeavolumesstayedintheregion.Russianoilexports,January2022-May2023IEA.CCBY4.0.HeavilydiscountedRussiancrudeoilhasfoundnewbuyersprimarilyinAsia.Indiahasincreasedpurchasesfromalmostnothingtocloseto2mb/d,whileChinahasraisedliftingsby500kb/dto2.2mb/d.InMay2023,IndiaandChinaaccountedforalmost80%ofRussiancrudeoilexports.Inturn,Russiamadeup45%and20%ofcrudeimportsinIndiaandChina,respectively.0123456Jan-22May-22Sep-22Jan-23May-23mb/dEUChinaOECDAsiaIndiaTürkiyeUK+USMiddleEastAfricaOtherUnknown01234Jan-22May-22Sep-22Jan-23May-23CrudeProductOil2023GlobaloiltradePAGE101IEA.CCBY4.0.WorldproducttradeflowsalsoshifteddramaticallyinresponsetoG7andEUembargoesonRussianoils,whichcameintoeffectinduring2022andearly2023.Russiapreviouslyaccountedforlargeimportsharesofnaphtha,gasoil,fueloilinEuropeaswellasfeedstocksintheUnitedStates.Importreplacementsinthesemarketscamefromfurtherafield,includingNorthAmerica,theMiddleEastandAsia.RussianvolumesinturnwereroutedtoTürkiye,EastofSuez,LatinAmericaandAfrica.Thecallonavailabletankerstocarryvolumesoverlongerdistancesmassivelytightenedthemarketforavailablecapacityandboostedfreightrates.Overthemediumterm,tradeflowsincrudeandproductswillexpand.TheAtlanticBasin,excludingRussia,willseeitscrudeoilandcondensatesurplusincreaseby4.3mb/dto4.5mb/d,asproductionrisesintheUnitedStates,BrazilandGuyanawhilerefineryactivityfallsinlinewiththecontractionindemandfortransportfuels.ContinueddemandgrowthinAsiawillbyfaroutpaceincreasedcrudesuppliesfromtheMiddleEastovertheforecastperiod.Asia’scrudeandcondensateimportrequirementswillriseby4.8mb/dto28mb/din2028.WithMiddleEasterncrudeandcondensateexportsconstrainedbythestartupofnewrefineryandsplittercapacityandthecallonOPECsupplies,theAtlanticBasincrudesurpluswillplayacriticalroleinmeetingAsiandemandovertheforecastperiod.Worldcrudeandcondensatebalancesbyregion,2019-2028IEA.CCBY4.0.DespitethelossofRussiansupply,therestoftheAtlanticBasinswingsfromroughlybalancedin2022toasurplusofapproximately4.5mb/din2028.Thechangereflectsthecontinuedsurgeincrudeandcondensateoutputaswellasfallingrefineryruns(-900kb/d).ThesetrendslowertheshareofAtlanticBasinbuyersofnetworldcrudeexportstoaround25%overtheforecastperiodandincreasetheconcentrationofthoseEastofSuez.Despitethegrowthinglobalcrudeproductionandexports,by2028Chinawillaccountforone-thirdoftotal0510152025302019202020212022202320242025202620272028mb/dAtlanticBasinexcl.RussiaRussiaMiddleEastAsiancrudedeficitOil2023GlobaloiltradePAGE102IEA.CCBY4.0.tradedcrudevolumeswhileIndiatakesupanother17%.Thisevolution,acceleratedbythepandemic,willrequireabuild-outintheinfrastructureandservicestoaccommodatetheseflows.SharesinuptakeofglobalvolumesfromnetcrudeexportingregionsIEA.CCBY4.0.Amidthesechanges,heavysourcrudeoutputtendstodeclineandgrowthisconcentratedinmediumandlightsweetgrades.Theresultingoverhangwillnarrowlight-heavyandsweet-sourpricespreadstothedetrimentofcomplexrefinerymargins.Theforecastalsohighlightscontinuedproducttradeflowadjustments.TheconcentrationofdemandgrowthEastofSuezanddecliningneedsintheAtlanticBasinwillpropelrisingwest-eastmovementsofcrudeandlightends.ButChina,holdingthebulkoftheworld’srefineryandpetrochemicalcapacitysurplus,willplayakeyroledrivingtheEastofSuezattractionofAtlanticBasincrudebarrelsandpetrochemicalfeedstocks.Moreover,Chineseexportswillsupporteast-westflowsofmiddledistillates,pressuringAsianproductpricestomaintainanopenarbitragewhileunderminingAsianrefinerymargins.CrudeoilbalancesandtradeTheAtlanticBasinwillplayacriticalroleinmeetingAsiancrudeoildeficitTheAtlanticBasin,excludingRussia,hasmovedclosetoanetcrudeoilsurplusthatwillcontinuetogrowoverthe2022-28forecastperiod.SteadydemandgrowthinAsiaandnewrefinerycapacitybooststheAsiancrudedeficit.Atthesametime,MiddleEastproducercountrieswillnotsignificantlyincreasecrudeexports.TheOil2023GlobaloiltradePAGE103IEA.CCBY4.0.steadyincreaseofAtlanticBasincrudeexportvolumestoEastofSuezwillhaveimplicationsasprofoundforcrudeshippingasthoseresultingfromtheswinginRussiancrudeexportsfromwesttoeast.Crudeoilbalancesbyregion,2012-2028IEA.CCBY4.0.Includescondensates.Growthinlightsweetcrudesupplyoutpacesthatofheaviersourgrades,contributingtoanoverhanginlightendsatthegloballevelandchallenginginvestmentsincomplexrefineries.ThepreponderanceoflightsweetcrudestreamsintheAtlanticBasinincreasedwiththelossofheaviersourerRussiancrudethatshiftedtoAsia.ThisraisedthecostofsupplyingsuchbarrelstoAtlanticBasinrefinersthatstillrequiredthem,weakeningregionalrefineryeconomics.Thedynamicshouldpersist.AsignificantincreaseincondensateandNGLoutputaswellasanincipientdeclineingasolineconsumptionwillcontributetoanoverhangoflightendsintheAtlanticBasinasthedemandshareofmiddledistillatesslowlyrises.AtlanticBasincrudeoilbalancesTheAtlanticBasincrudeandcondensatesurplus(excludingRussia)risesby4.3mb/dfrom2022to2028.Theoverallshifthidessubstantialintra-regionaldifferencesincrudeflows.OnthewesternsideoftheAtlanticBasin,theAmericas(NorthandSouthcombined)seeanoverallincreaseintheircrudeandcondensatesurplusof4.6mb/doverthisperiodto7.7mb/d.Buttheeasternflankofthebasin(excludingRussia)seesitsdeficitincreasebyroughly300kb/dto3.2mb/dasthedeclinesinAfricanandNorthSeacrudeproductionoutstriptheimpactoffallingEuropeanrefineryactivityandrisingproductioninCentralAsia.Inaddition,Russia’ssurplusnarrowsslightlyby300kb/dto5mb/d.04812162020122016202020242028mb/dMiddleEastFSUNorthAmericaLatinAmericaAfricaExporters04812162020122016202020242028EuropeChinaIndiaOECDAsiaImportersOil2023GlobaloiltradePAGE104IEA.CCBY4.0.NorthAmericannetcrudeandcondensateexportsincreasefrom700kb/din2022to3.7mb/din2028(+2.9mb/d).ThegrowthinUScrudeoilandcondensateproductioncombinedwiththeimpactofslowingrefineryruns(-750kb/d)helpsreducethedeficitintheUSmarketbyaround3mb/dto1mb/dover2022-28.Mexicancrudeandcondensateproductioncontinuestoslideovertheforecastperiodwhilenewcapacityboostsitsrefineryruns(+300kb/d),reducingtheexportablesurplusofcrudebyapproximately50%to480kb/d,muchofwhichwillbelightsweetcrude.CombinedCanadiancrude,condensateandbitumenproductionriseswhilerunsdropbyanestimated100kb/d,boostingexportsby400kb/dto4.2mb/d.SouthAmerica’scrudeandcondensatesurplusexpands,by1.6mb/d(+68%)from2022through2028.BrazilandGuyanaeachaccountforaroundhalfofthiswithfurtherincrementalvolumesfromArgentina(+250kb/d)andVenezuela(+100kb/d)offsettinglossesinColombiaandEcuador.NewproductionstreamsinGuyanaandBrazilarelargelymediumsweet.TheadditionalheavysourbarrelsfromVenezuelaonlypartlyoffsetthelossofsimilargradesfromMexicoandEcuador.IntheeasternAtlanticBasin,thebalancesofEurope,CentralAsia,aswellasNorthandWestAfrica,seetheircombineddeficitincreasefrom2.9mb/dto3.2mb/dover2022-28.Russia’scrudeandcondensatesurplusof5.3mb/din2022morethanoffsetthiseasternAtlanticBasindeficitinthepast,butnotsincetheinvasionofUkraine.Europenowcoversitsneedswithequivalentvolumesfromotherregions.Europe’sdeficitnarrowsfrom9.3mb/din2022to8.9mb/din2028asthefallinrefineryruns(-800kb/d)outstripsthatforcrudeproduction(-400kb/d).WhilethenetsurplusfromNorthAfricarisesbyaround200kb/d,itdeclinesbyanestimated1mb/dfromWestAfrica.HigherLibyanoutputearlyintheforecastperiodoffsetslossesinAlgeriatoboostregionalsupply,whilelocalrefineryrunsareroughlystable.Onthewestcoast,300kb/dofthisdeclineisaccountedforbyAngolawhilenewrefinerycapacityinNigeriaboostsruns(+600kb/d)startingin2024andoutputremainsflat.ApartfromSenegal(+100kb/d),productionfallsinvirtuallyeveryothercountryinWestAfrica.NotwithstandingthelossofRussiansupply,theAtlanticBasinswingsby+4.3mb/dtoasurplusof4.4mb/din2028.Themassivereversalreflectsthecontinuedsurgeincrudeandcondensateoutputaswellasfallingrunsinrefineriesandcondensatesplitters(-600kb/d).PartofthatsurpluswillbedeliveredviaCanada’sTransMountainCorporation’spipelineexpansionthatreachesmechanicalcompletionin2023.Afterstartingupin2024,itwilltransportalmost590kb/dofheavysourdilutedbitumentotheOil2023GlobaloiltradePAGE105IEA.CCBY4.0.PacificCoastforexportinadditionto300kb/doflightcrudeandsomeproduct.SomeofthiswilllikelymovetoUSWestCoastrefineries,includingdisplacingimportsofheavysourMexicanMaya(30kb/d)andEcuadorianOriente(110kb/d)asexportablesurplusesofbothcrudesdecline.Whiletheremainder(mostly450kb/dofsourcrude)willgotoAsianrefinerswhobroughtonlinesubstantialheavycrudeupgradingcapacityoverthepastdecade,thearbitragewillbechallengedbycheapRussiancrudethathasunderminedMexicanexportstotheregionoverthepastyear.Changeversus2022forcrudesurplusinAtlanticBasinbyregionIEA.CCBY4.0.AstheseheaviersourbarrelsmovetoCanada’swestcoast,USMidcontinentrefinerswillslowthetransferofremainingvolumestothoseontheGulfCoast,creatinganewpullonmediumandheavysourbarrelsintheAtlanticBasin,includingthosefromtheUSGulfCoastandLatinAmerica.However,thelatteraredeclining,particularlyinMexicoatapproximately200kb/d,andareonlypartlyoffsetbyexpectedincreasesfromVenezuelaofaround130kb/d.Thiswillleavetheregionalmarkettighter.WhileWestAfricancrudeexportswilldeclineoverthemediumterm,mostoftheAtlanticBasinsurpluswillbemadeupoflightandmediumsweetcrudethankstorisingexportsfromtheUnitedStates,Brazil,andGuyana.In2022,Asianrefinersabsorbedover45%ofexportsfromthesethreecountriesandEuropearound40%.AsdeclininggasolinedemanddrivesdownAtlanticBasinrefineryactivity,theburdenoflightendswillpressureremainingrefinerstoprivilegeheaviercrudestomaximisemiddledistillateproduction,notablyfromupgradingunits.Hence,onlyincrementalvolumesofmediumsweetgradesfromBrazilandGuyanawilltendtofindbuyersinEuropeandtheUnitedStates.-1.50.01.53.04.56.0202320242025202620272028mb/dEuropeLatinAmericaNorthAmericaOtherFSURussiaAfricaTotalOil2023GlobaloiltradePAGE106IEA.CCBY4.0.Tighteravailabilitiesofheavysourcrudesandanoverhangoflightsweetgradeswillnarrowlight-heavyandsweet-sourpricespreadstothedetrimentofcomplexrefinerymargins.EastofSuezcrudeoilbalancesAsthedriveroffutureoildemandgrowth,EastofSuezwillfundamentallyshapeglobalcrudebalances.BaseloadsupplyhasextendedfromtheexistingMiddleEastflowtoincorporatetheneartotalityofRussiancrudeexportssince2022.Yet,stillmorevolumeswillbeneededbyChina,Indiaandotherregionalrefinersinthecomingyears.TheAtlanticBasinproducerswillprovideincreasingswingsupplyvolumestomeetmonth-to-monthchangesandannualgrowthinAsianrefining.ThiswasalreadythecaseforflowsfromWestAfricaandNorthwestEurope(includingBalticUralscargoes)torefinersinAsia.Itwillbeincreasinglysonow.Changeversus2022forcrudesurplusEastofSuezbyregionIEA.CCBY4.0.MiddleEastcrudeandcondensateexportsroseto18mb/din2022,about1mb/dbelowtheirrecentpeakin2018.Productioncutsandthestartupofnewrefinerycapacityin2023willlimitregionalexportsthrough2028,withanotableimpactonheaviersourgrades.Afterfalling700kb/dy-o-yin2023duetolowertargetsandvoluntaryreductionsbyOPEC+,MiddleEasterncrudeproductionwillincreasethroughtheforecastperiodwhilecrudeusedinpowergenerationfallsby200kb/dto600kb/dintotal.Together,thesecontributionsliftexportstobacktoaround18.5mb/dasin2022.PartofthereboundinflowswillgotofeednewrefinerycapacityownedfullyorpartiallybynationaloilcompaniesintheMiddleEast,furtherconstrainingexportsavailabletorefinersincrudeimportingcountries.Theregion’scondensatesurplusrisesbyanestimated250kb/dto1.2mb/dfrom2022to2028asaboosttoproductionoffsetsanincreaseof190kb/dinsplitteractivity.-4.0-3.0-2.0-1.00.01.0202320242025202620272028mb/dMiddleEastOtherAsiaIndiaChinaOECDAsiaTotalOil2023GlobaloiltradePAGE107IEA.CCBY4.0.AtlanticBasinrefinerstookabout7%ofMiddleEastcrudeexportsin2022and6%inpreviousyears.Themodestvolumes(1-1.3mb/d)willlikelypersistevenasAtlanticBasinrefiningactivityfallsinthecomingyearsastheheaviersourcrudeswillhelpsupportmiddledistillateoutput.Saudicrudeproductionexpansionby2028exceedstheincreaseindomesticrefineryrunswhilecrudeburningdeclines,sothatexportsin2028are340kb/dabove2022levelsat8mb/d.Thisisthehighestlevelinoveradecade.Condensateexportsalsoincreasebyaround50kb/d.TheAsiancrudeandcondensatesupplydeficitwillriseby4.8mb/dto28.1mb/din2028.Refineryandsplitterthroughputsincreaseby3.9mb/dwhileregionalcrudeandcondensateproductionfallsandcrudeburningeasesbyaround50kb/d.Chinaaccountsforalmost75%oftheincreaseinimportrequirements(+3.2mb/d),reflectingaprojected2.9mb/driseincrudeandcondensaterefineryprocessingto16.5mb/dwhiledomesticproductionfalls.Indiaaccountsforanother1.2mb/dofthegainwhilea300kb/dreductioninimportneedsintheOECDAsiaoffsetshalfofthehigherpullfromotherAsiancountrieswhererunsincreaseby300kb/dwhileproductionfalls.WithMiddleEastcrudeandcondensateexportsremainingessentiallyatthesamelevelin2028asin2022,AsiawillneedtocoveralltheincrementalexportsviatheAtlanticBasin’sprojectednetsurplus.Themajorityoftheseflowsareexpectedtobesweetgradesandpredominantlylight,whichwillbeapoormatchforthenewupgrading-orientedrefinerycapacityexpectedtocomeintoservice,predominatelyinIndiaandChina.DominantsourcesofincrementalsupplytoAsiawillbetheUnitedStates,BrazilandGuyanathatdelivermostlylightandsweetbarrels.TheAsiancondensatedeficitincreasesbyabout200kb/d,assplitteractivityrisesby100kb/d(halfinOECDAsia)andregionaloutputdeclines.MostincrementalrequirementswillbemadeupbyhigherMiddleEastexports(+250kb/d).ProductbalancesandtradeAsianrefinerssettobalancemarketseastandwestTheoutlookforproductbalancesdiffersgreatlyfromthatofcrudeandcondensate.EastofSuezrefinedproductsupplygrowsintandemwithnewcapacitystart-upsbutfailstokeeppacewithrapidlyrisingdemandthatsustainstheoverallregionaldeficit.TheAtlanticBasinproductmarketsurplusthatnarrowedwiththepost-pandemicdemandrecoveryandrefineryclosuresincreasesovertheforecastperiodasslowingdemandunderminesnewregionalrefinerycapacity.However,thisoverlookssizeableimbalancesforspecificproductsineachregion.TheMiddleEastsurplusgrowsforallproductsasnewrefinerycapacitycomesonline.Oil2023GlobaloiltradePAGE108IEA.CCBY4.0.Asia’smassivedeficitsinLPGandotherlight-ends(naphthaplusgasoline)growsalongsideabuoyantpetrochemicalbuild-out.TherisingoverallsurplusinmiddledistillatesEastofSuezmatchesanunrelentingdeficitintheAtlanticBasinthatG7andEUsanctionsonRussiahaveaggravated.Ourtradeanalysisonrefinedproductsgroupsjetfuelandkerosenewithgasoil/dieselunder“middledistillates”butseparates“lightends”intonaphthaandgasoline.Thesebroadercategories,middledistillatesandlightends,reflectthemarginalfungibilityoftheunderlyingproductsandthelargermarketimplications.Theforecastapproachendeavourstobalanceworldrefiningactivitywithcrudeavailabilityoverthe2022-28period.Aswell,itaimstomatchrefineryoutputwithoveralldemandformiddledistillates.Astheforecastadvances,anoverhangoflightendsemergesasworldgasolinedemandslowsandflipsintocontraction.TheAtlanticBasindominatesthissurplusastheexpandingAsianpetrochemicalactivitykeepsitsmarketindeficit.Finally,fueloilbalancesremaintight,inpartduetolackofheavysourcrude.TheAtlanticBasinsurplusnarrowsduetofallingrefiningactivityandmoreconversionunitsinnewrefineries,butMiddleEastsuppliesrisewithnewrefinerycapacity.ThesechangesjustkeeppacewithAsia’spersistentandalmostunchangeddeficit.Thesebroadtrendsdon’tignorethevastreshufflingoftradeflowsforeachproductthatarosefromtheG7andEUembargoesonRussia.Russiaisasignificantexporteroffinishedproductsaswellasrefineryandpetrochemicalfeedstocks,shippingprincipallyfromitswesternports.Short-haulbuyersinEuropeandNorthAmericahavetraditionallybeenthepreferreddestinationsaslowershippingcostsbenefittedbothbuyersandsellers.SubsequenttoRussia’sinvasionofUkraine,G7governmentsandEU-basedoilcompaniesandtradersrapidlyhaltedimportsofRussianproducts,withremainingflowsstoppedaftertheEUembargocameintoeffectinFebruary2023.ExportstoG7countries,includingtheUnitedStates,theUnitedKingdomandKorea,rapidlyswungtotheMiddleEastandAsiastartinginmid-2022,notablyforstraight-runfueloilandvacuumgasoiltoUSandUKrefinersaswellasgasolineandgasoiltoEuropeandnaphthatoKorea.TheEUembargohasforcedmoreRussianvolumes,inparticulargasoil,tonewdestinations.ImportersreplacedRussianproductwiththatofqualitiesandoriginspresumablylessoptimalormorecostly.MoregasoilandnaphthamovedfromrefinersintheMiddleEastandAsiatotheAtlanticBasinandmorefueloilmovedfromLatinAmericaandMexicotoNorthAmericaandEurope.RussianproductshavereplacedthesevolumesinLatinAmerica,theMiddleEastandAsia.Importantly,Oil2023GlobaloiltradePAGE109IEA.CCBY4.0.forthestabilityoftheworldoilbalance,theproductmarketslostlittleornooverallsupply,butincreasedoilintransithaslocked-upsubstantialvolumesonthewater.Light-endsbalancesandtrade:AtlanticBasinsurplusseeksbuyersThegasolinepoolbeginstheoutlookperiodrelativelywellbalanced.ThedeficitsinAfricaandOtherAsiaroughlymatchthesurplusesfromRussiaandtheMiddleEast.However,beginningin2025theglobalmarketmovesintoasurplusthatgrowssteadilyovertheforecastperiod.By2028,intheabsenceofanysignificantadjustmentsbyrefiners,theglobalgasolinesurpluscouldreach1.3mb/d.NorthAmerica,ChinaandIndiaeachmovefromroughlybalancedgasolinemarketstonetexportersin2028ofaround600kb/d,900kb/dand130kb/d,respectively.TheonlydeficittoincreasesignificantlyisforAsia,excludingChinaandIndia(+345kb/d).Withaglobalgasolinemarketsurplus,pooreconomicswillforcerefinerstodumpundervaluednaphthaoraromaticsmoleculesintothenaphthapool,pushFCCunitstomaximisepropyleneoutputorreducecrackingactivitytomoveheavygasoilmoleculestothemiddledistillatepool.Worldgasolineandnaphthabalances,2022-2028IEA.CCBY4.0.Theeast-westnaphthamarketsplitreflectsthepreponderanceofAsianimporters,includingChina,drivenbyvastpetrochemicalindustryfeedrequirements.ExportersaremorebroadlybasedandincludetheMiddleEast,Russia,India,EuropeandNorthAmerica.Overtheforecastperiod,acontinuedconcentrationofpetrochemicalactivityinAsiadrivesasignificantwideningofthedeficitsinChina(+700kb/dto1.4mb/d)andotherAsiaexcludingIndia(+200kb/dto1.6mb/d).Ontheotherhand,onlylimitedgainsarisefromkeyexportingregions,includingtheMiddleEast(+270kb/dto940kb/d)andtheUnitedStatesOil2023GlobaloiltradePAGE110IEA.CCBY4.0.(+120kb/dto600kb/d).Thisimpliesamplepotentialtomoveappropriatemoleculesfromthegasolinepooltothenaphthapooliftheeconomicsallowit,particularlygiventhesizeoftheoverhangofgasolinesupplyintheUnitedStatesandEurope.Middledistillatebalancesandtrade–EastmovesWestGlobalmiddledistillatemarkets,includingjetfuel,kerosene,gasoilanddiesel,remainroughlybalancedoverthe2022-28period.Theregionsinoveralldeficit(AtlanticBasinexcludingRussia,EastAfricaandOtherAsiaincludingOECDAsiaOceania)seetheirgapwidenby1.1mb/dovertheforecastperiod,ofwhich800kb/dEastofSuez.ThisisonlymatchedbyincreasesfromnetexportingregionsincludingRussia(+100kb/d),India(+50kb/d),theMiddleEast(+80kb/d)andmostnotablyaverysubstantial1.1mb/drisefromChina.Worldmiddledistillatebalances(diesel,gasoil,jetfuelandkerosene),2022-2028IEA.CCBY4.0.Sinceearly2023,increasingexportsfromIndia,theMiddleEastandChinahavemovedwesttoEuropeanandG7buyersintheAtlanticBasintooffsetRussiancargoesnowmovingtobuyersEastofSuez(300kb/dorroughlyone-thirdofRussianexports).TheAtlanticBasinmiddledistillatedeficitrisesoverthenextfiveyears(+200kb/d)asproductionlostwithfallingrefinerythroughputsandadjustmentsinproductyields(jet/kerosene+260kb/dbutgasoil-670kb/d)exceedsthefallinoveralldemand.ThewideningoftheAtlanticBasinsupplyshortfallwillattractmorebarrelsfromtheMiddleEastwhiledecliningdomesticdemandwillpushmoreRussianvolumestoAfricaandtotheeast.0123456SurplusDeficitSurplusDeficitSurplusDeficitSurplusDeficit2022202420262028mb/dAtlanticBasin(ExRussia)E.AfricaOtherAsiaChinaIndiaMiddleEastRussiaOil2023GlobaloiltradePAGE111IEA.CCBY4.0.Chineseexportsofgasoilplusjetandkerosenewilltriplefrom2022to2028(+1mb/d).Thisamountstoascalechangerequiringahugeinfrastructurebuild-outtoaccommodateterminalingfacilitiesforstorageandloadingofproducttoexport.Failingthisnecessarydevelopment,middledistillatemarketswillremaintight.ThewideningmiddledistillatedeficitinOtherAsia,duetostagnantrefineryoutput(+50kb/d)andstrongdemandgrowth(kerosene+580kb/d,diesel+240kb/d),willabsorbsomeofthissurplus,whileremainingvolumesservetheincrementalrequirementsofAtlanticBasinbuyers.Fueloilbalancesandtrade:EastoffersapermanentsinktoRussiaFueloilbalancesreflectthedriversintwokeyregions.RussiaremainstheprincipalsourceoffueloilexportswhileOtherAsia,notablySingaporeandKorea,dominatesfueloilimportstomeetbunkeringrequirements.ThischangesverylittleoverthecourseoftheoutlookastheshippingindustryhasmadeonlylimitedprogressindevelopingalternativesforbunkeringwhilemajorupgradingprojectstoreducefueloutputatRussianrefinerieshavelargelybeencompletedorputonhold.However,sinceMarch2022,Russianexportsshiftedentirelytotheeast,requiringincreasedflowsfromEastofSueztobalancetheAtlanticBasin.MiddleEastexportsdevelopaslocalrefinerycapacitygrowsfasterthandemand.Worldfueloilbalance,2022-2028IEA.CCBY4.0.-1.5-1.0-0.50.00.51.01.52022202320242025202620272028mb/dAtlanticBasin(ExRussia)E.AfricaOtherAsiaChinaIndiaMiddleEastRussiaOil2023TablesPAGE112IEA.CCBY4.0.TablesTable1WorldOilSupplyandDemand20211Q222Q223Q224Q2220221Q232Q233Q234Q23202320242025202620272028OECDDEMANDAmericas24.324.825.025.325.025.024.625.225.625.225.124.824.724.424.223.9Europe13.113.213.414.013.313.513.113.514.113.513.613.413.313.113.012.8AsiaOceania7.47.97.07.27.77.47.97.07.57.97.67.67.57.57.57.5TotalOECD44.845.845.446.646.045.945.545.747.146.646.245.845.545.044.744.3NON-OECDDEMANDFSU4.94.84.85.15.14.94.94.85.05.04.94.95.05.05.15.1Europe0.80.80.80.80.80.80.80.80.80.80.80.80.80.80.80.8China15.115.114.014.515.014.715.616.316.216.616.116.617.017.317.517.6OtherAsia13.414.214.113.514.214.014.314.314.014.714.314.815.315.816.116.5LatinAmerica6.06.06.26.46.36.26.26.26.46.46.36.46.56.66.76.8MiddleEast8.58.69.19.59.09.08.99.39.79.19.29.39.49.69.79.8Africa4.04.34.24.24.34.24.44.34.24.44.34.44.54.64.74.8TotalNon-OECD52.753.653.154.054.753.955.055.956.256.956.057.358.659.860.661.4TotalDemand197.599.498.5100.6100.699.8100.5101.6103.4103.5102.3103.1104.1104.8105.3105.7OECDSUPPLYAmericas24.324.925.326.126.325.626.626.727.127.226.927.427.727.928.128.1Europe3.43.33.03.13.23.23.33.23.13.33.23.23.33.12.92.7AsiaOceania0.50.50.50.40.50.50.50.40.50.50.50.50.40.40.40.4TotalOECD228.228.728.829.630.029.330.430.330.631.030.631.131.431.531.431.2NON-OECDSUPPLYFSU13.814.413.413.714.113.914.113.613.413.513.713.613.713.713.613.4Europe0.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.1China4.14.24.24.14.14.24.34.34.34.24.34.34.34.24.14.0OtherAsia2.92.82.72.62.72.72.72.72.72.62.72.62.52.42.32.2LatinAmerica5.35.45.55.85.95.66.05.96.16.26.06.46.87.07.37.5MiddleEast3.13.13.23.23.23.23.23.23.13.13.13.13.23.33.43.5Africa1.31.31.31.31.31.31.21.31.31.31.31.31.41.51.51.5TotalNon-OECD230.531.330.430.831.431.031.631.030.931.031.131.531.932.132.232.2Processinggains32.32.32.32.32.32.32.32.32.42.42.42.42.52.52.52.5GlobalBiofuels2.82.53.13.32.92.92.63.23.53.13.13.33.43.43.53.6TotalNon-OPECSupply63.764.864.666.066.665.566.966.967.567.567.268.369.269.569.669.5OPEC4Crude26.428.528.729.629.429.129.3NGLs5.25.35.45.45.35.35.45.45.45.45.45.45.45.55.65.6TotalOPEC31.633.934.135.034.734.434.7TotalSupply95.498.798.7101.0101.399.9101.6Memoitems:CallonOPECcrude+Stockch.528.529.328.629.228.728.928.229.330.530.629.729.429.529.830.130.61Measuredasdeliveriesfromrefineriesandprimarystocks,comprisesinlanddeliveries,internationalmarinebunkers,refineryfuel,crudefordirectburning,oilfromnon-conventionalsourcesandothersourcesofsupply.Includesbiofuels.2Comprisescrudeoil,condensates,NGLs,oilfromnon-conventionalsourcesandothersourcesofsupply.3Netvolumetricgainsandlossesintherefiningprocessandmarinetransportationlosses.4OPECincludescurrentmembersthroughoutthetimeseries.5Totaldemandminustotalnon-OPECsupplyandOPECNGLs.Forthepurposeofthisandthefollowingtables:-OECDcomprisesofAustralia,Austria,Belgium,Canada,Chile,CzechRepublic,Denmark,Estonia,Finland,France,Germany,Greece,Hungry,Iceland,Ireland,Isreal,Italy,Japan,Korea,Latvia,Lithuania,Luxembourg,Mexico,Netherland,Norway,NewZealand,Poland,Portugal,Slovakia,Slovenia,Spain,Sweden,Switzerland,RepublicofTürkyie,UK,US.-OPECcomprisesofAlgeria,Angola,Congo,EquatorialGuinea,Gabon,Iran,Iraq,Kuwait,Libya,Neutralzone,Nigeria,SaudiArabia,UAE,Venezuela.-OPEC+comprisesofOPECmembersthroughtouttimeseriesplusSudan,SouthSudan,Russia,Oman,Mexico,Malaysia,Kazahkstan,Brunei,Bahrain,Azerbaijan.WORLDOILSUPPLYANDDEMAND(millionbarrelsperday)Table1Oil2023TablesPAGE113IEA.CCBY4.0.Table1aWorldOilSupplyandDemand:20211Q212Q213Q214Q2120221Q222Q223Q224Q22202320242025202620272028TotalDemand97.599.498.5100.6100.699.8100.5101.6103.4103.5102.2103.1104.1104.8105.3105.7OECDSUPPLYAmericas222.422.923.324.024.323.624.524.624.925.124.825.325.726.126.426.6Europe3.43.33.03.13.23.23.33.23.13.33.23.23.33.12.92.7AsiaOceania0.50.50.50.40.50.50.50.40.50.50.50.50.40.40.40.4TotalOECD(non-OPEC+)26.326.726.827.627.927.328.328.228.528.928.529.029.429.629.729.7NON-OECDSUPPLYFSU30.40.30.30.30.30.30.30.30.30.30.30.30.30.30.30.3Europe0.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.1China4.14.24.24.14.14.24.34.34.34.24.34.34.34.24.14.0OtherAsia42.22.12.12.02.02.02.02.02.02.02.01.91.91.81.71.7LatinAmerica5.35.45.55.85.95.66.05.96.16.26.06.46.87.07.37.5MiddleEast51.91.91.91.91.91.91.91.91.91.91.91.91.92.12.22.2Africa61.11.11.11.11.11.11.11.11.11.11.11.11.21.31.31.4TotalNon-OECD(non-OPEC+)15.015.215.215.315.515.315.715.615.715.815.716.116.416.717.017.1ProcessingGains2.32.32.32.32.32.32.32.32.42.42.42.42.52.52.52.5GlobalBiofuels2.82.53.13.32.92.92.63.23.53.13.13.33.43.43.53.6TotalNon-OPEC+46.346.747.348.548.647.848.949.450.150.149.750.951.752.352.752.9OPEC+CRUDEAlgeria0.91.01.01.01.01.01.01.01.01.01.01.01.01.00.90.9Angola1.11.21.21.11.11.11.01.11.11.11.11.01.00.90.90.8Azerbaijan0.60.60.60.60.50.60.50.50.50.50.50.60.60.50.50.5Bahrain0.20.20.20.20.20.20.20.20.20.20.20.20.20.20.20.2Brunei0.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.1Congo0.30.30.30.30.30.30.30.30.30.30.30.30.30.20.20.2EquatorialGuinea0.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.0Gabon0.20.20.20.20.20.20.20.20.20.20.20.20.20.10.10.1Iran2.42.52.52.52.62.52.72.82.92.92.82.92.92.92.92.9Iraq4.04.34.44.54.54.44.44.14.24.24.24.24.44.54.64.7Kazakhstan1.51.61.41.41.61.51.61.61.51.51.61.61.81.81.81.8Kuwait2.42.62.72.82.72.72.72.62.52.52.62.52.72.82.82.9Libya1.11.10.81.01.21.01.21.11.21.21.21.21.21.21.21.2Malaysia0.40.40.40.40.40.40.40.40.40.40.40.40.40.30.30.3Mexico1.71.61.61.61.61.61.61.71.71.71.71.71.51.51.31.2Nigeria1.31.31.21.01.11.11.31.21.31.31.21.21.21.11.11.1Oman0.80.80.80.90.90.80.80.80.80.80.80.80.80.80.80.8Russia9.610.09.49.89.89.89.79.59.39.39.59.39.39.39.29.1SaudiArabia9.210.210.410.910.610.510.410.19.610.010.010.010.510.710.911.2SouthSudan0.20.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.1Sudan0.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.00.00.00.0UAE2.83.13.33.43.43.33.43.23.23.23.33.23.43.53.53.6Venezuela0.60.70.70.70.70.70.70.80.80.80.80.80.80.80.80.8OPEC+Crude41.544.143.444.644.644.244.543.543.043.343.643.444.344.444.544.7OPEC+NGLs&Condensate7.57.87.87.77.97.88.17.97.97.98.07.97.98.08.08.0OPEC+Nonconventionals0.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.1TotalOPEC+49.152.051.352.552.652.152.651.651.051.451.651.452.452.552.652.8TotalSupplyOil95.498.798.7101.0101.399.9101.6101.0101.2101.5101.3102.3104.1104.8105.3105.7Memoitems:CallonOPEC+crude+Stockch.43.644.943.344.244.044.143.444.145.245.344.544.244.344.444.544.71FromJunetoDecember2023,OPEC+supplyreflectslatestOPEC+dealandindividualcountries’sustainablecapacity.From2024,supplyisadjustedtoreflectthecallonOPECcrude.Iran,Russiaremainundersanctions.2OECDAmericasexcludesMexico3FSUexcludesRussia,Kazakhstan,Azerbaijan4OtherAsiaexcludesBrunei,Malaysia5MiddleEastexcludesOman,Bahrain6AfricaexcludesSudan,SouthSudanTable1aWORLDOILSUPPLYANDDEMAND(IncludingOPEC+basedoncurrentagreement1)(millionbarrelsperday)Oil2023TablesPAGE114IEA.CCBY4.0.Table1bWorldOilSupplyandDemand:WEO20211Q222Q223Q224Q2220221Q232Q233Q234Q23202320242025202620272028DEMANDNorthAmerica23.924.424.625.024.624.624.224.825.224.824.724.524.324.023.823.5CentralandSouthAmerica6.46.46.56.76.76.66.66.66.86.86.76.86.97.07.17.2Europe14.514.514.815.414.714.914.414.815.515.014.914.814.714.614.514.3Africa4.04.34.24.24.34.24.44.34.24.44.34.44.54.64.74.8MiddleEast8.58.69.19.59.09.08.99.39.79.19.29.39.49.69.79.8Eurasia4.54.44.44.84.74.64.54.44.74.64.64.54.64.74.74.7AsiaPacific35.736.934.935.036.635.837.537.337.339.037.838.739.740.340.941.3TotalDemand197.599.498.5100.6100.699.8100.5101.6103.4103.5102.3103.1104.1104.8105.3105.7NON-OPECSUPPLYNorthAmerica24.324.925.326.026.325.626.626.727.127.226.927.427.727.928.128.1CentralandSouthAmerica5.35.45.55.85.95.76.05.96.16.26.06.46.87.07.37.5Europe3.63.53.23.23.33.33.43.33.23.43.33.33.43.23.02.8Africa1.31.31.31.31.31.31.21.31.31.31.31.31.41.51.51.5MiddleEast3.13.13.23.23.23.23.23.23.13.13.13.13.23.33.43.5Eurasia13.714.313.413.614.113.914.113.613.413.413.613.613.713.613.513.4AsiaPacific7.47.57.57.27.37.47.57.47.47.37.47.47.26.96.76.5TotalNon-OECD258.760.059.260.461.360.262.061.361.662.061.762.663.363.663.663.4Processinggains32.32.32.32.32.32.32.32.32.42.42.42.42.52.52.52.5GlobalBiofuels2.82.53.13.32.92.92.63.23.53.13.13.33.43.43.53.6TotalNon-OPECSupply63.764.864.666.066.665.566.966.967.567.567.268.369.169.569.669.5OPEC4Crude26.428.528.729.629.429.129.3NGLs5.25.35.45.45.35.35.45.45.45.45.45.45.45.55.65.6TotalOPEC31.633.934.135.034.734.434.7TotalSupply95.498.798.6101.0101.399.9101.6Memoitems:CallonOPECcrude+Stockch.528.629.328.629.228.729.028.229.330.530.629.729.429.529.830.230.61Measuredasdeliveriesfromrefineriesandprimarystocks,comprisesinlanddeliveries,internationalmarinebunkers,refineryfuel,crudefordirectburning,oilfromnon-conventionalsourcesandothersourcesofsupply.Includesbiofuels.2Comprisescrudeoil,condensates,NGLs,oilfromnon-conventionalsourcesandothersourcesofsupply.3Netvolumetricgainsandlossesintherefiningprocessandmarinetransportationlosses.4OPECincludescurrentmembersthroughoutthetimeseries.5Totaldemandminustotalnon-OPECsupplyandOPECNGLs.Table1bWORLDOILSUPPLYANDDEMAND-WEORegions(millionbarrelsperday)Oil2023TablesPAGE115IEA.CCBY4.0.Table2SummaryofGlobalOilDemand1Q222Q223Q224Q2220221Q232Q233Q234Q23202320242025202620272028Demand(mb/d)Americas24.825.025.325.025.024.625.225.625.225.124.824.724.424.223.9Europe13.213.414.013.313.513.113.514.113.513.613.413.313.113.012.8AsiaOceania7.97.07.27.77.47.97.07.57.97.67.67.57.57.57.5TotalOECD45.845.446.646.045.945.545.747.146.646.245.845.545.044.744.3Asia29.328.128.029.228.629.930.630.131.330.531.432.433.133.634.1MiddleEast8.69.19.59.09.08.99.39.79.19.29.39.49.69.79.8LatinAmerica6.06.26.46.36.26.26.26.46.46.36.46.56.66.76.8FSU4.84.85.15.14.94.94.85.05.04.94.95.05.05.15.1Africa4.34.24.24.34.24.44.34.24.44.34.44.54.64.74.8Europe0.80.80.80.80.80.80.80.80.80.80.80.80.80.80.8TotalNon-OECD53.653.154.054.753.955.055.956.256.956.057.358.659.860.661.5World99.498.5100.6100.699.8100.5101.6103.4103.5102.3103.1104.1104.8105.3105.7ofwhich:USA20.420.420.620.320.420.120.620.820.520.520.320.119.819.619.4Euro57.47.67.87.47.67.37.57.87.57.57.57.47.37.27.1China15.114.014.515.014.715.616.316.216.616.116.617.017.317.517.6Japan3.73.03.23.63.43.73.13.33.63.43.43.43.43.43.3India5.45.35.05.45.35.65.45.25.75.55.65.86.06.16.3Russia3.73.64.03.93.83.83.63.83.83.73.73.73.73.73.7Brazil3.03.03.23.23.13.13.13.33.23.23.23.33.33.33.3SaudiArabia3.33.84.03.73.73.63.94.13.83.83.83.83.83.83.8Korea2.72.52.52.62.62.62.42.62.72.62.62.62.52.62.6Canada2.22.22.42.32.32.22.22.42.32.32.32.32.32.32.3Mexico1.82.02.02.01.91.91.92.01.91.91.91.91.91.91.9Iran1.91.81.81.81.81.91.91.81.81.91.92.02.02.02.0Total70.669.471.071.270.571.371.973.373.472.572.873.273.373.373.3%ofWorld71.070.470.670.770.770.970.870.970.970.970.670.470.069.669.4AnnualChange(%perannum)Americas8.02.52.2-0.72.9-0.80.80.90.80.4-1.1-0.8-1.1-1.0-0.9Europe10.66.31.2-4.33.0-1.00.30.61.40.4-1.0-1.0-1.0-1.1-1.3AsiaOceania2.3-0.22.1-1.30.70.10.83.23.01.80.2-0.5-0.70.5-0.4TotalOECD7.73.11.9-1.92.6-0.70.71.21.40.6-0.9-0.8-1.0-0.7-1.0Asia3.0-1.30.2-0.10.52.28.77.57.36.43.13.02.31.41.5MiddleEast5.18.26.96.36.64.31.81.71.02.20.61.51.70.90.7LatinAmerica3.55.32.82.23.43.01.01.21.11.51.92.01.51.41.3FSU2.4-0.22.20.41.21.9-0.1-2.1-2.3-0.7-0.11.31.31.60.7Africa4.25.25.54.04.72.51.31.11.01.53.10.92.12.12.2Europe2.71.91.51.21.80.01.30.10.90.61.52.70.90.90.8TotalNon-OECD3.41.62.31.62.22.65.14.24.14.02.22.32.01.41.4World5.42.32.10.02.41.13.12.82.82.50.80.90.70.50.4AnnualChange(mb/d)Americas1.80.60.5-0.20.7-0.20.20.20.20.1-0.3-0.2-0.3-0.2-0.2Europe1.30.80.2-0.60.4-0.10.00.10.20.0-0.1-0.1-0.1-0.1-0.2AsiaOceania0.20.00.1-0.10.10.00.10.20.20.10.00.0-0.10.00.0TotalOECD3.31.40.9-0.91.1-0.30.30.50.60.3-0.4-0.4-0.4-0.3-0.4Asia0.9-0.40.10.00.10.62.42.12.11.80.91.00.70.50.5MiddleEast0.40.70.60.50.60.40.20.20.10.20.10.10.20.10.1LatinAmerica0.20.30.20.10.20.20.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.1FSU0.10.00.10.00.10.10.0-0.1-0.10.00.00.10.10.10.0Africa0.20.20.20.20.20.10.10.00.00.10.10.00.10.10.1Europe0.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.0TotalNon-OECD1.80.81.20.81.21.42.72.32.22.21.31.31.20.80.8World5.12.22.00.02.31.13.02.82.92.40.91.00.70.50.4France,Germany,Italy,SpainandUKTable2SUMMARYOFGLOBALOILDEMANDOil2023TablesPAGE116IEA.CCBY4.0.Table3WorldOilProduction20211Q222Q223Q224Q2220221Q232Q233Q234Q23202320242025202620272028OPECCrudeOilSaudiArabia9.1510.1710.4410.9210.5710.5310.42Iran2.422.552.462.552.632.552.70Iraq4.034.294.454.544.504.454.39UAE2.763.133.333.453.373.323.36Kuwait2.422.612.672.802.712.702.68Angola1.121.161.171.151.081.141.05Nigeria1.311.301.151.001.131.151.27Libya1.151.080.770.961.170.991.15Algeria0.910.991.011.021.021.011.01Congo0.270.270.260.260.260.260.28Gabon0.180.190.180.200.180.190.20EquatorialGuinea0.100.090.090.090.060.080.05Venezuela0.610.720.740.660.680.700.71TotalCrudeOil26.4328.5528.7229.5929.3729.0629.28TotalNGLs15.205.325.365.375.335.345.405.375.395.395.395.425.455.515.575.63TotalOPEC231.6333.8734.0834.9634.7034.4134.68NON-OPEC3OECDAmericas24.3124.8925.2626.0626.2725.6326.6426.7127.0627.2326.9127.4227.6727.9228.0728.11UnitedStates16.7617.1717.7018.2418.3017.8518.6919.0419.0519.0918.9719.4119.7520.1120.3420.44Mexico1.952.001.992.022.022.012.102.132.142.142.132.081.941.821.661.50Canada5.595.715.575.795.955.765.845.535.865.995.815.925.965.986.066.16Chile0.010.010.010.010.010.010.010.010.010.010.010.010.010.010.010.01Europe3.393.333.033.093.213.163.293.163.123.293.213.233.273.132.942.74UK0.880.910.850.750.810.830.850.770.700.830.790.770.720.670.630.59Norway2.051.981.741.911.971.902.001.961.992.032.002.032.142.061.911.76Others0.460.430.440.430.430.430.440.420.430.430.430.420.410.400.400.40AsiaOceania0.510.490.510.430.480.480.460.440.470.500.470.470.440.410.380.35Australia0.440.420.450.370.420.410.390.370.400.420.390.390.360.330.310.28Others0.070.070.070.070.060.070.070.080.070.080.070.080.080.070.070.07TotalOECD28.2228.7128.8129.5829.9629.2730.3930.3130.6531.0230.5931.1131.3831.4731.3931.21NON-OECDFormerUSSR13.7714.4013.4313.6714.0913.9014.0913.6413.4313.4513.6513.6113.7513.6613.5513.42Russia10.8711.3810.7011.0711.2111.0911.1410.7910.6410.6410.8010.6410.6410.5910.5110.38Others2.903.022.732.592.892.812.962.852.792.812.852.973.113.073.043.04Asia6.916.996.956.776.826.887.036.996.936.856.956.906.776.546.376.18China4.064.234.234.124.134.184.344.314.274.204.284.304.294.174.083.96Malaysia0.570.570.560.540.570.560.580.570.560.560.570.560.530.490.470.46India0.730.720.710.700.690.700.680.690.690.700.690.690.660.620.590.56Indonesia0.680.650.630.620.630.630.640.630.630.620.630.600.580.560.530.51Others0.870.830.810.790.800.810.790.790.780.770.780.740.710.700.700.69Europe0.110.110.110.100.100.110.100.100.100.100.100.090.090.080.070.08LatinAmerica5.305.445.465.775.905.645.975.916.086.166.036.446.767.027.307.52Brazil3.003.083.003.163.233.123.303.213.353.413.323.543.773.924.034.09Argentina0.640.690.700.720.740.710.750.770.780.790.780.810.840.880.931.01Colombia0.740.750.760.760.780.760.780.780.770.770.780.750.710.680.650.62Ecuador0.470.470.450.470.460.460.430.460.470.470.460.460.430.410.390.37Others0.440.440.560.670.690.590.700.700.700.720.700.871.001.141.311.43MiddleEast3.063.113.173.213.183.173.163.163.143.143.153.133.203.323.423.49Oman0.981.041.071.101.081.071.071.051.031.031.051.031.081.081.081.08Qatar1.801.781.811.811.811.801.811.811.811.811.811.811.841.972.072.16Syria0.040.040.040.040.040.040.040.040.040.040.040.040.040.040.040.04Yemen0.060.050.050.050.050.050.050.050.050.050.050.050.050.050.050.05Others0.190.190.200.210.200.200.180.200.200.200.200.200.190.180.180.17Africa1.331.291.291.301.291.291.231.261.261.261.251.311.371.501.501.53Egypt0.590.590.610.600.600.600.590.590.590.590.590.590.570.550.530.52Sudan0.060.060.060.060.060.060.060.060.050.050.050.050.050.040.040.04Others0.680.650.620.640.630.640.580.610.610.620.610.660.750.910.920.97TotalNon-OECD30.4831.3430.4130.8231.3830.9931.5831.0430.9330.9631.1331.4731.9232.1332.2232.22ProcessingGains42.252.282.292.322.342.312.312.342.372.382.352.442.462.492.492.49GlobalBiofuels2.792.513.083.302.892.952.633.253.523.143.143.283.393.443.503.55TOTALNON-OPEC63.7464.8564.5866.0266.5865.5266.9166.9467.4767.5067.2168.3069.1669.5469.6069.48TOTALSUPPLY95.3898.7198.66100.98101.2899.92101.591Includescondensatesandoilfromnon-conventionalsources.2TotalOPECcomprisesallcountrieswhicharecurrentlyOPECmembers.TotalNon-OPECexcludesallcountriesthatarecurrentmembersofOPEC.3Comprisescrudeoil,condensates,NGLsandoilfromnon-conventionalsources.4Netvolumetricgainsandlossesinrefiningandmarinetransportationlosses.Table3WORLDOILPRODUCTION(millionbarrelsperday)Oil2023TablesPAGE117IEA.CCBY4.0.Table3aWorldOilProduction(Including20211Q212Q213Q214Q2120221Q222Q223Q224Q22202320242025202620272028OPECCrudeOilAlgeria0.910.991.011.021.021.011.010.980.960.960.980.960.970.960.950.94Angola1.121.161.171.151.081.141.051.101.101.081.081.030.960.910.850.82Azerbaijan0.590.580.560.550.550.560.530.510.520.540.520.560.570.550.530.52Bahrain0.170.180.190.200.190.190.170.190.190.190.190.190.180.180.170.17Brunei0.080.080.070.070.070.070.070.070.070.070.070.080.080.080.070.08Congo0.270.270.260.260.260.260.280.280.270.270.280.270.260.250.230.21EquatorialGuinea0.100.090.090.090.060.080.050.050.070.070.060.060.060.060.050.05Gabon0.180.190.180.200.180.190.200.190.170.170.180.170.160.150.140.14Iran2.422.552.462.552.632.552.702.842.872.872.822.872.872.872.872.87Iraq4.034.294.454.544.504.454.394.094.224.224.234.224.404.494.604.71Kazakhstan1.521.631.431.351.601.501.641.581.501.511.561.641.771.761.761.75Kuwait2.422.612.672.802.712.702.682.602.552.552.592.552.702.752.822.89Libya1.151.080.770.961.170.991.151.141.171.181.161.231.231.231.231.23Malaysia0.420.410.390.380.400.400.390.390.380.370.380.370.350.320.300.29Mexico1.661.641.621.621.621.621.651.681.691.691.681.651.541.461.331.22Nigeria1.311.301.151.001.131.151.271.181.261.251.241.221.181.151.101.07Oman0.750.820.840.880.850.850.840.810.800.800.810.800.840.850.840.84Russia9.6210.049.409.789.789.759.739.479.349.349.479.349.349.299.219.08SaudiArabia9.1510.1710.4410.9210.5710.5310.4210.149.649.9810.049.9810.4610.6610.9311.20SouthSudan0.150.140.140.150.140.140.120.130.130.130.130.120.120.120.110.11Sudan0.060.060.060.060.060.060.060.060.050.050.050.050.050.040.040.04UAE2.763.133.333.453.373.323.363.243.203.203.253.203.383.453.543.62Venezuela0.610.720.740.660.680.700.710.800.830.830.790.840.840.840.840.84TotalCrudeOil41.4744.1243.4344.6344.6244.2044.4843.5142.9843.3243.5743.3944.3244.4144.5244.68ofwhichNeutralZone0.250.270.280.310.270.280.260.270.240.240.250.2413.1613.4213.7514.09TotalNGLs(OPEC+)7.597.917.897.868.027.928.178.058.058.048.088.068.068.088.098.13TotalOPEC+49.0652.0351.3152.4852.6452.1252.6551.5651.0351.3751.6551.4552.3852.4852.6152.81NON-OPEC+OECDAmericas222.3622.8923.2724.0424.2523.6224.5424.5824.9225.0924.7825.3425.7326.1026.4126.61UnitedStates16.7617.1717.7018.2418.3017.8518.6919.0419.0519.0918.9719.4119.7520.1120.3420.44Canada5.595.715.575.795.955.765.845.535.865.995.815.925.965.986.066.16Chile0.010.010.010.010.010.010.010.010.010.010.010.010.010.010.010.01Europe3.393.333.033.093.213.163.293.163.123.293.213.233.273.132.942.74UK0.880.910.850.750.810.830.850.770.700.830.790.770.720.670.630.59Norway2.051.981.741.911.971.902.001.961.992.032.002.032.142.061.911.76Others0.460.430.440.430.430.430.440.420.430.430.430.420.410.400.400.40AsiaOceania0.510.490.510.430.480.480.460.440.470.500.470.470.440.410.380.35Australia0.440.420.450.370.420.410.390.370.400.420.390.390.360.330.310.28Others0.070.070.070.070.060.070.070.080.070.080.070.080.080.070.070.07TotalOECD(non-OPEC+)26.2626.7126.8227.5627.9427.2628.3028.1828.5128.8828.4729.0329.4429.6429.7329.71NON-OECDFormerUSSR0.350.340.300.310.310.320.320.310.310.310.310.310.300.290.290.29Asia6.246.326.296.146.166.236.356.326.276.196.286.246.145.955.815.63China4.064.234.234.124.134.184.344.314.274.204.284.304.294.174.083.96India0.730.720.710.700.690.700.680.690.690.700.690.690.660.620.590.56Indonesia0.680.650.630.620.630.630.640.630.630.620.630.600.580.560.530.51Others0.770.730.710.700.710.710.700.690.680.680.690.640.620.610.610.60Europe0.110.110.110.100.100.110.100.100.100.100.100.090.090.080.070.08LatinAmerica5.305.445.465.775.905.645.975.916.086.166.036.446.767.027.307.52Brazil3.003.083.003.163.233.123.303.213.353.413.323.543.773.924.034.09Argentina0.640.690.700.720.740.710.750.770.780.790.780.810.840.880.931.01Colombia0.740.750.760.760.780.760.780.780.770.770.780.750.710.680.650.62Ecuador0.480.470.450.470.460.470.440.460.470.470.460.470.440.420.400.38Others0.430.440.550.660.680.580.690.690.690.710.700.870.991.131.301.42MiddleEast1.901.871.911.901.901.901.911.911.901.901.911.901.932.062.162.24Qatar1.801.781.811.811.811.801.811.811.811.811.811.811.841.972.072.16Others0.100.100.100.100.100.100.100.090.090.090.090.090.090.090.090.08Africa1.121.101.101.091.091.091.061.071.071.081.071.131.201.341.341.38Egypt0.590.590.610.600.600.600.590.590.590.590.590.590.570.550.530.52Others0.520.510.480.490.490.490.470.480.480.500.480.540.630.790.810.87TotalNon-OECD(non-OPEC+)15.0115.1815.1615.3215.4615.2815.7115.6215.7315.7515.7016.1216.4216.7516.9817.14ProcessingGains2.252.282.292.322.342.312.312.342.372.382.352.442.462.492.492.49GlobalBiofuels2.792.513.083.302.892.952.633.253.523.143.143.283.393.443.503.55TOTALNON-OPEC46.3246.6847.3548.5048.6447.8048.9549.3950.1450.1449.6650.8651.7152.3352.7052.89TOTALSUPPLY95.3898.7198.66100.98101.2899.92101.59100.95101.17101.51101.30102.31104.08104.81105.31105.711FromJunetoDecember2024,OPEC+supplyreflectslatestOPEC+dealandindividualcountries’sustainablecapacity.From2025,supplyisadjustedtoreflectthecallonOPECcrude.Iran,Russiaremainundersanctions.2ExcludesMexicoTable3aWORLDOILPRODUCTION(IncludingOPEC+basedoncurrentagreement1)(millionbarrelsperday)Oil2023TablesPAGE118IEA.CCBY4.0.able3bSelectedUpstreamProjectStart-UpsOECDAmericasLatinAmericaCanadaTerraNova302024BrazilMero1(Guanabara)1802022CanadaWhiteRose802026BrazilBuzios5(AlmiranteBarroso)1502023MexicoAmoca-Mizton-Tecoalli702024BrazilMarlimredev1(Garibaldi)802023USKingsQuay802022BrazilMero2(Sepetiba)1802023USPowerNap352022BrazilMarlimredev2(AnnaNery)702023USMadDogPh2(Argos)1402023BrazilItapu(P-71)1502023USVito1002023BrazilMero3(Mal.DuquedeCaxias)1802024USAnchor752024BrazilAtlantaFDS502024USWhale802024BrazilIPB(MariaQuitéria)1002025USShenandoah602024BrazilBuzios7(Alm.Tamandaré)2202025USBallymore752025BrazilBacalhau2202025USLeon/Castile602025BrazilMero4(AlexandredeGusmão)1802025USPikkaPhase1(Alaska)802026BrazilBuzios6(P-78)1802025OECDEuropeBrazilBuzios8(P-79)1802025DenmarkTyraRedevelopment202024BrazilBuzios9(P-80)2252026NorwayNova302022BrazilBuzios10(P-82)2252027NorwayJohanSverdrupPh22202022BrazilBuzios11(P-83)2252027NorwayNjord/Bauge302023BrazilBM-C-331252028NorwayFenja302023GuyanaStabroekPh2(Unity)2202022NorwayEldfiskNorth302024GuyanaStabroekPh3(Paraya/Prosperity)2202023NorwayBalderX502024GuyanaStabroekPh4(Yellowtail)2502025NorwayBreidablikk502024GuyanaStabroekPh5(Uaru)2502026NorwayJohanCastberg1702024GuyanaStabroekPh6(Whiptail)2502028UKPenguins452023AsiaUKSeagull302023ChinaKenli402022AfricaChinaEnpingJointDevelopmentProject352022GhanaMahogany-Teak-Akasa(MTAB)302024IndiaKG-DWN-98/2502023SenegalSangomarPh1(SNE)1002023VietNamLacDaVang552025UgandaLakeAlbert(KingfisherandTilenga)2302025MiddleEastFSUIsraelKarish/KarishNorth302023AzerbaijanAzeriCentralEast(ACE)1002024QatarNorthFieldExpansionEast2602026KazakhstanTengizchevroilFGP-WPMP2602023QatarNorthFieldExpansionSouth1302028AngolaZinia2,Clov2,Dalia31102021-22SaudiZulufExpansion6002026AngolaCuica,Cabaca,Ndungu452022UAEBelbazem452023SaudiMarjanExpansion3002024-25SaudiBerriExpansion2502024-25Includedintheforecastbutpre-FIDOPECNON-OPECStartYearTable3bSELECTEDUPSTREAMPROJECTSTART-UPSCountryProjectPeakCapacity(kb/d)StartYearCountryProjectPeakCapacity(kb/d)Oil2023TablesPAGE119IEA.CCBY4.0.Table3cNon-OPECsupply–OilMarketCalculation20212022202320242025202620272028NON-OPECSUPPLY63.765.567.268.369.269.569.669.5Processinggains2.32.32.42.42.52.52.52.5Globalbiofuels2.82.93.13.33.43.43.53.6NON-OPECPRODUCTION(excl.processinggainsandbiofuels)158.760.361.762.663.363.663.663.4Crude248.049.150.351.051.651.751.551.1ofwhich:Condensate34.04.24.44.44.44.54.54.5Tightoil47.88.59.49.910.310.610.811.1Un-upgradedbitumen53.84.04.04.14.14.14.24.4NGLs68.79.19.49.59.69.79.910.2Syncrude(Canada)71.41.31.41.41.41.41.41.4CTL,GTL,kerogenoilandadditives180.60.70.70.70.70.80.80.8NON-OPECPRODUCTION(excl.processinggainsandbiofuels)=158.760.361.762.663.363.663.663.4Conventional45.145.746.246.546.846.846.445.7Crudeoil=2-3-4-532.432.432.432.632.832.632.031.1Naturalgasliquids(total)=3+612.713.313.813.914.014.214.414.7Unconventional13.614.615.516.116.516.817.217.7EHOB(incl.syncrude)2=5+75.25.35.45.55.55.55.65.8Tightoil=47.88.59.49.910.310.610.811.1CTL,GTL,kerogenoilandadditives1=80.60.70.70.70.70.80.80.81CTL=coaltoliquids;GTL=gastoliquids.2Extra-heavyoilandbitumenTable3cNON-OPECSUPPLY-OILMARKETREPORTANDWEODEFINITIONS(millionbarrelsperday)WorldEnergyOutlookdefinitionsOil2023ReportdefinitionsOil2023TablesPAGE120IEA.CCBY4.0.Table4WorldRefineryCapacityAdditions2022202320242025202620272028TotalRefiningCapacityAdditionsandExpansions1OECDAmericas-247290-389340241OECDEurope-92-147-239OECDAsiaOceania-249-122-120-242FSU-142268650162Non-OECDEuropeChina58672220680350320-1201,522OtherAsia5513443222872991001,146Non-OECDAmericas334515115175MiddleEast64363113219060100-235878Africa-1601275030792TotalWorld5191,0885911,430747719-1404,435UpgradingCapacityAdditions2OECDAmericas-135-110-110OECDEurope-14223052OECDAsiaOceania-45-65-27-92FSU289148222170181721Non-OECDEurope2020China528130319-58-118273OtherAsia7316121118311019757919Non-OECDAmericas1358585MiddleEast14016617745388Africa-32-372802629298TotalWorld9394351,212379278226242,553DesulphurisationCapacityAdditions3OECDAmericas-255-403-403OECDEurope22385492OECDAsiaOceania-243-109-352FSU52917040201Non-OECDEuropeChina168128408-34-42460OtherAsia1788242481603101621,010Non-OECDAmericas64-378043MiddleEast87747072100111753Africa-74-112504338320TotalWorld8711579872312003482012,1241ComprisesnewrefineryprojectsorexpansionstoexistingCrudedistillationunitsincludingcondensatesplitteradditions.Assumeszerocapacitycreep.2Comprisesgrosscapacityadditionstocoking,hydrocracking,residuehydrocracking,visbreaking,FCCorRFCCcapacity.3Comprisesadditionstohydrotreatingandhydrodesulphurisationcapacity.Table4WORLDREFINERYCAPACITYCHANGES(thousandbarrelsperday)Oil2023TablesPAGE121IEA.CCBY4.0.Table4aSelectedRefineryCrudeDistillationAsiaMexicoPemex-DosBocas3402025ChinaCNPC-Jieyang4002022UnitedStatesPhillips66-BelleChasse-2472022ChinaIndependent-Lianyungang3202022UnitedStatesExxonMobil-Beaumont2502023ChinaSinopec-Yangpu1002022UnitedStatesHoustonRefining-Houston-2642024ChinaIndependent-Cangzhou1722023UnitedStatesPhillips66-Rodeo-1252024ChinaIndependent-Panjin-1002023OECDEuropeChinaCNOOC-Ningbo1202024GermanyShell-Rheinland-1472025ChinaShandongIndependent-Dongying1002024ItalyEni-Livorno-1202024ChinaYulongPetrochemical-Yantai4002025OECDAsiaOceaniaChinaSinopec-Ningbo2202025JapanENEOS-Negishi-1202022ChinaSaudiAramco/Norinco-Panjin3002026JapanENEOS-Wakayama-1222023ChinaCNPC-Karamay1002026JapanSeibuOil-Yamaguchi-1202024ChinaSinopec-Zhangzhou3202027NewZealandNewZealandRefiningCo.Ltd.-MarsdenPoint-1292022IndiaHindustanPetroleumCorp.Ltd.-Visakhapatnam2/Vizag1342023MiddleEastIndiaIndianOil-Barauni1312025BahrainBahrainPetroleum-Sitra2252024IndiaIndianOil-Koyali812025BahrainBahrainPetroleum-Sitra-1132024IndiaIndianOil-Barauni-712025IranNIOC-Abadan2002022IndiaHindustanPetroleumCorp.Ltd.-Barmer,Rajasthan1802026IranNIOC-Abadan-2352028IndiaNumaligarhRefinery-Numaligarh1002026IraqINOCORA-Karbala1402023IndiaChennaiPetroleum-Narimanam1692027IraqSouthRefiningCompany-Basra702025IndiaIndianOil-Panipat1002027IraqSouthRefiningCompany-Nassiriya1002027IndiaIndianOil-Panipat1002028KuwaitKPC-Al-Zour4102022ThailandThaiOil-Sriracha1252025KuwaitKPC-Al-Zour2052023OmanOmanRefineryCo.-Duqm2302023FSUUkraineUkrtatnafta-Kremenchug-2012022Non-OECDAmericasBrazilPetrobras-AbreueLima1152028AfricaNigeriaDangote-Lekki6502024SouthAfricaShell/BP(50%/50%)-Durban-1722022Note:Onlyincludesrefinerycapacitychanges(additionsorclosures)above70kb/d.YearOECDAmericasTable4aSELECTEDREFINERYCRUDEDISTILLATIONCHANGESLISTCountryProjectCapacity(kbd)YearCountryProjectCapacity(kbd)Oil2023TablesPAGE122IEA.CCBY4.0.Table5WorldEthanolProduction201720212022202320242025202620272028OECDNorthAmerica1,0621,0081,0311,0281,0171,0171,0091,001999UnitedStates1,0329791,002994982981971964961Canada302829343536373737OECDEurope88101106107110115120121116Austria544444444Belgium688888888France131820202223232323Germany141213131313131313Italy000124444Netherlands61010101011121313Poland455555555Spain71010101010141510UK1199999999OECDPacific344449111212Australia344444444TotalOECD1,1531,1131,1421,1391,1311,1411,1401,1341,126FSU200000000Non-OECDEurope122222222China565758616161616161MiddleEast200000000Africa523333333OtherAsia44109131149160168177181179India12618095104109113117118Indonesia111333331Malaysia000000000Philippines42323232323232323Singapore101234777Thailand252426262829303030LatinAmerica518553568623646668677687705Argentina191721202020212121Brazil478515528581603625634644662Colombia776999999TotalNon-OECD629723762838872903921934951TotalWorld1,7821,8361,9041,9772,0042,0442,0612,0682,0771Volumetricproduction;toconverttoenergyadjustedproduction,ethanolisassumedtohave2/3energycontentofconventionalgasoline.Table5WORLDETHANOLPRODUCTION1(thousandbarrelsperday)MarketReportOil2022TablesPAGE123IEA.Allrightsreserved.Table5aWorldBiodieselProduction201720212022202320242025202620272028OECDNorthAmerica111167209253308325337350355UnitedStates104160202238291302310317323Canada776151823273333OECDEurope265300307313323330332333322Austria566888888Belgium656666666France474848484852525252Germany626464636261595757Italy132425252525252525Netherlands374443434244474948Poland171818181818181818Spain343131323535353535UK9161616151616169OECDPacific121414131313131313Australia100000000TotalOECD388481530580644668682696690FSU400000000Non-OECDEurope51313121314141411China133945474747474747MiddleEast122222222Africa322333330OtherAsia117252295334359374381386373India334455566Indonesia59158191214231241247251248Malaysia102829384446464646Philippines333333333Singapore192729333233333332Thailand243239424546474837LatinAmerica145165156182207240256258260Argentina563434343434343434Brazil74116108126156183197198199Colombia101110121212131313TotalNon-OECD288471512579630679702709692TotalWorld6769521,0421,1581,2751,3471,3841,4041,382(thousandbarrelsperday)WORLDBIODIESELPRODUCTIONTable5aOil2023AbbreviationsandacronymsPAGE124IEA.CCBY4.0.AbbreviationsandacronymsACGAzeriChirag-Guneshli(Azerbaijan)ADNOCAbuDhabiNationalOilCompanyCAPPCanadianAssociationofPetroleumProducersCTLcoal-to-liquidsCCUScarboncapture,utilisationandstorageCDUcrudedistillationunitCNPCChinaNationalPetroleumCorporationCNOOCChinaNationalOffshoreOilCorporationEEDIEnergyEfficiencyDesignIndexEORenhancedoilrecoveryE&PexplorationandproductionESGenvironmental,socialandgovernanceETSemissionstradingsystemEUEuropeanUnionEUAEuropeanUnionAllowanceEVselectricvehiclesFEEDfront-endengineeringanddesignFCCfluidcatalyticcrackerunitFPSOfloatingproductionstorageandoffloadingFIDfinalinvestmentdecisionG7GroupofSeven(majoreconomies)GTLgas-to-liquidsGDPgrossdomesticproductGHGgreenhousegasGoMGulfofMexicoHDVheavy-dutyvehicleIATAInternationalAirTransportAssociationICEinternalcombustionenginesILOInternationalLabourOrganizationILXinfrastructure-ledexplorationIMOInternationalMaritimeOrganizationIOCinternationaloilcompanyIRAUSInflationReductionActJCPOAJointComprehensivePlanofActionJLLJonesLangLaSalleKRGKurdistanRegionalGovernmentLDARleakdetectionandrepairLNGliquefiednaturalgasLPGliquefiedpetroleumgasLTOlighttightoilOil2023AbbreviationsandacronymsPAGE125IEA.CCBY4.0.MTABMahogany-Teak-Akasa-BandaNGLnaturalgasliquidsNFEQatarNorthFieldEastNFSQatarNorthFieldSouthNIOCNationalIranianOilCoNNPCNigerianNationalPetroleumCorporationLimitedNOCnationaloilcompaniesNREPNationalRenewableEnergyProgram(SaudiArabia)NZEScenarioNetZeroEmissionsby2050ScenarioOPECOrganizationofthePetroleumExportingCountriesPDHpropanedehydrogenationPDVSAPetróleosdeVenezuelaSAPIAPetroleumIndustryAct(Nigeria)RFSUSRenewableFuelStandardRNESTBrazilAbreueLimaRefineryRPKrevenuepassengerkilometresRRRreservereplacementratioSTEPSStatedPoliciesScenarioSUVsportsutilityvehicleTfLTransportforLondonTMXTransMountainExpansionProject(Canada)UAEUnitedArabEmiratesULSDultralowsulfurdieselUNCTADUnitedNationsConferenceonTradeandDevelopmentUSWTIUSWestTexasIntermediateYPFYacimientosPetrolíferosFiscales(Argentina)Unitsofmeasureb/dbarrelsperdayBcf/dbillioncubicfeetperdayCO2carbondioxidegCO2/kmgramsofCO2perkilometreGWgigawattkmkilometreL/100kmlitresper100kilometresmcm/dmillioncubicmetresperdayMtCO2milliontonnesofcarbondioxideMtmilliontonnesMt/yrmilliontonnesperyearMWmegawattTWhterawatthourInternationalEnergyAgency(IEA)ThisworkreflectstheviewsoftheIEASecretariatbutdoesnotnecessarilyreflectthoseoftheIEA’sindividualMembercountriesorofanyparticularfunderorcollaborator.Theworkdoesnotconstituteprofessionaladviceonanyspecificissueorsituation.TheIEAmakesnorepresentationorwarranty,expressorimplied,inrespectofthework’scontents(includingitscompletenessoraccuracy)andshallnotberesponsibleforanyuseof,orrelianceon,thework.SubjecttotheIEA’sNoticeforCC-licencedContent,thisworkislicencedunderaCreativeCommonsAttribution4.0InternationalLicence.Thisdocumentandanymapincludedhereinarewithoutprejudicetothestatusoforsovereigntyoveranyterritory,tothedelimitationofinternationalfrontiersandboundariesandtothenameofanyterritory,cityorarea.Unlessotherwiseindicated,allmaterialpresentedinfiguresandtablesisderivedfromIEAdataandanalysis.IEAPublicationsInternationalEnergyAgencyWebsite:www.iea.orgContactinformation:www.iea.org/about/contactTypesetinFranceby2023-June2023Coverdesign:IEAPhotocredits:©Shutterstock

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